CIVPRO II Katarungang Pambarangay Page |1
No. L-62339. October 27, 1983.* municipal courts, but also to all the judges of the courts of first instance, circuit criminal courts, juvenile
SPOUSES MARIA LUISA P. MORATA AND JULIUS MORATA, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES VICTOR
GO and FLORA C. GO and HON. VALERIANO P. TOMOL, JR., Judge, Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch XI, respondents.
Courts; Barangay Courts; Extent of authority of the Lupon Tagapamayapa in the settlement of cases.—
Thus, except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of the law, the Lupon has the authority
to settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same city or
municipality. The law, as written, makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil
disputes that should be compromised at the barangay level, in contradistinction to the limitation
imposed upon the Lupon by paragraph (3), section 2 thereof as regards its authority over criminal
cases. In fact, in defining the Lupon’s authority, Section 2 of said law employed the universal and
comprehensive term “all”, to which usage We should neither add nor subtract in consonance with the
rudimentary precept in statutory construction that “where the law does not distinguish, We should not
distinguish.”
Same; Same; Purpose of Pres. Decree 1508 in the settlement of disputes at barangay level.—By
compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the intervention of the barangay leader and
other respected members of the barangay, the animosity generated by protracted court litigations
between members of the same political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and cooperation, is
avoided. It must be borne in mind that the conciliation process at the barangay level is likewise designed
to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in court in order to decongest its clogged dockets and, in
the process, enhance the quality of justice dispensed by it. Thus, to say that the authority of the Lupon
is limited to cases exclusively cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of this objective. Worse,
it would make the law a self-defeating one. For what would stop a party, say in an action for a sum of
money or damages, as in the instant case, from bloating up his claim in order to place his case beyond
the jurisdiction of the inferior court and thereby avoid the mandatory requirement of P.D. 1508? And
why, indeed, should the law seek to ease the congestion of dockets only in inferior courts and not in
the regional trial courts where the log-jam of cases is much more serious? Indeed, the lawmakers could
not have intended such half-measure and self-defeating legislation.
Same; Same; Cases falling within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance must also be coursed first
to the barangay court in the cases mentioned by law cognizable by the Lupon.—There can be no
question that when the law conferred upon the Lupon “the authority to bring together the parties actually
residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes, x x x,” its obvious
intendment was to grant to the Lupon as broad and comprehensive an authority as possible as would
bring about the optimum realization of the aforesaid objectives. These objectives would only be half-
met and easily thwarted if the Lupon’s authority is exercised only in cases falling within the exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts.
Same; Same; The Chief Justice has directed all courts, including CFIs, not to receive complaints in
cases falling under the authority of the Lupon.—It is significant that the above-quoted circular
embodying the directive “to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions and proceedings in
cases falling within the authority of said Lupons,” has been addressed not only to judges of city and
and domestic courts and courts of agrarian relations, now known as regional trial courts under B.P. No.
129. The said circular was noted by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in a Letter of Implementation, dated
November 12, 1979, the first paragraph of which reads as follows: “with the view to easing up the log-
jam of cases and solving the backlogs in the case of dockets of all government offices involved in the
investigation, trial and adjudication of cases, it is hereby ordered that immediate implementation be
made by all government officials and offices concerned of the system of amicably settling disputes at
the barangay level as provided for in the Katarungang Pambarangay Law [Presidential Decree No.
1508].”
PETITION for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review the order of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Br. XI Tomol, Jr., J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Amado G. Olis for petitioners.
Paul G. Gorres for private respondents.
ESCOLIN., J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the Court is
called upon to determine the classes of actions which fall within the coverage of Presidential Decree
No. 1508,1 otherwise known as Katarungang Pambarangay Law. This law requires the compulsory
process of arbitration at the Barangay level as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court. Petitioners
contend that said legislation is so broad and all-embracing as to apply to actions cognizable not only
by the city and municipal courts, now known as the metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial courts,
but also by the courts of first instance, now the regional trial courts. Upon the other hand, respondents
would limit its coverage only to those cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the metropolitan
trial courts and municipal trial courts.
The antecedent facts are not disputed. On August 5, 1982, respondents Victor Go and Flora D. Go filed
in the defunct Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided by respondent Judge Valeriano P. Tomol, Jr.,
a complaint against petitioners Julius Morata and Ma. Luisa Morata for recovery of a sum of money
plus damages amounting to P49,400.00. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-22154.
On the basis of the allegation in the complaint that the parties-litigants are all residents of Cebu City,
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, citing as grounds therefor, the failure of the complaint to allege
prior availment by the plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process required by P.D. 1508, as well as
the absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had
been reached by the parties. The motion was opposed by private respondents.
On September 2, 1982, respondent judge issued an order denying the motion to dismiss.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in an order dated October 3,
1982, as follows:

“Considering the specific reference to City or Municipal Courts in the provisions of Sections 11
and 12 of P.D. No. 1508, as the Courts to which the dispute settled or arbitrated by the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat, shall be elevated for nullification of the award or for execution of the
same, and considering that from the provision of Section 14 of the same law, the pre-condition
to the filing of a complaint as provided for in Section 6 thereof, is specifically referred to, it is
the considered opinion of this Court that the provision of Section 6 of the law applies only to
cases cognizable by the inferior courts mentioned in Sections 11 and 12 of the law.
“In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants, of the order of
September 2, 1982, denying their motion to dismiss, is hereby denied.” [Annex ‘G’, p. 36, Rollo].
From this order, petitioners came to Us thru this petition. In a resolution dated December 2, 1982, We
required respondents to file an answer, and likewise granted a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondent judge from requiring petitioners to file their answer and enter into trial in Civil Case No. R-
22154.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
Section 6 of P.D. 1508 reads as follows:
“SECTION 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint.—No complaint, petition, action
for proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2
hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless
there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and
no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the
Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has
been repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to court in the following cases:
[1]
 Where the accused is under detention;
[2]
 Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas
corpus proceedings;
[3]
 Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction,
attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and
[4]
 Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations.”
Section 2 of the law defines the scope of authority of the Lupon thus:
“SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement.—The Lupon of each barangay shall
have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for
amicable settlement of all disputes except:
“[1]
 Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
“[2]
 Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;
“[3] Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;
CIVPRO II Katarungang Pambarangay Page |2
“[4]
 Offenses where there is no private offended party;
“[5]
 Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice
determine upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local
Government.”
Thus, except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of the law, the Lupon has the authority
to settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same city or
municipality. The law, as written, makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil
disputes that should be compromised at the barangay level, in contradistinction to the limitation
imposed upon the Lupon by paragraph (3), section 2 thereof as regards its authority over criminal
cases. In fact, in defining the Lupon’s authority, Section 2 of said law employed the universal and
comprehensive term “all”, to which usage We should neither add nor subtract in consonance with the
rudimentary precept in statutory construction that “where the law does not distinguish, We should not
distinguish.”2
By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the intervention of the barangay leader
and other respected members of the barangay, the animosity generated by protracted court litigations
between members of the same political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and cooperation, is
avoided. It must be borne in mind that the conciliation process at the barangay level is likewise designed
to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in court in order to decongest its clogged dockets and, in
the process, enhance the quality of justice dispensed by it. Thus, to say that the authority of the Lupon
is limited to cases exclusively cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of this objective. Worse,
it would make the law a self-defeating one. For what would stop a party, say in an action for a sum of
money or damages, as in the instant case, from bloating up his claim in order to place his case beyond
the jurisdiction of the inferior court and thereby avoid the mandatory requirement of P.D. 1508? And
why, indeed, should the law seek to ease the congestion of dockets only in inferior courts and not in
the regional trial courts where the log-jam of cases is much more serious? Indeed, the lawmakers could
not have intended such half-measure and self-defeating legislation.
The objectives of the law are set forth in its preamble thus:
“WHEREAS, the perpetuation and official recognition of the time-honored tradition of amicably
settling disputes among family and barangay level without judicial resources would promote
the speedy administration of justice and implement the constitutional mandate to preserve and
develop Filipino culture and to strengthen the family as a basic social institution;
“WHEREAS, the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts of justice contributes heavily and
unjustifiably to the congestion of court dockets, thus causing a deterioration in the quality of
justice;
“WHEREAS, in order to help relieve the courts of such docket congestion and thereby enhance
the quality of justice dispensed by the courts, it is deemed desirable to formally organize and
institutionalize a system of amicably settling disputes at the barangay level.”

There can be no question that when the law conferred upon the Lupon “the authority to bring together
the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes, x x
x,” its obvious intendment was to grant to the Lupon as broad and comprehensive an authority as
possible as would bring about the optimum realization of the aforesaid objectives. These objectives
would only be half-met and easily thwarted if the Lupon’s authority is exercised only in cases falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts.
Moreover, if it is the intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to cases cognizable by the inferior
courts, then it would not have provided in Section 3 thereof the following rule on venue, to wit:
“Section 3. Venue. x x x However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest
therein shall be brought in the Barangay where the real property or any part thereof is
situated.”
for it should be noted that, traditionally and historically,jurisdiction over cases involving real property or
any interesttherein, except forcible entry and detainer cases, has alwaysbeen vested in the courts of
first instance [now regional trialcourt].
But it is pointed out by the respondent judge that Sections 11,3 12,4 and 145 of the law speak of the city
and/or municipal courts as the forum for the nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration
award issued by the Lupon. We hold that this circumstance cannot be construed as a limitation of the
scope of authority of the Lupon. As heretofore stated, the authority of the Lupon is clearly established
in Section 2 of the law; whereas Sections 11, 12 and 14, relied upon by respondent judge, deal with
the nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration awards obtained at the barangay level.
These sections conferred upon the city and municipal courts the jurisdiction to pass upon and resolve
petitions or actions for nullification or enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards issued by the Lupon,
regardless of the amount involved or the nature of the original dispute. But there is nothing in the context
of said sections to justify the thesis that the mandated conciliation process in other types of cases
applies exclusively to said inferior courts.
Any doubt on the issue before Us should be dispelled by Circular No. 22 issued by Chief Justice Enrique
M. Fernando,6 the full text of which is quoted as follows:
“TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURTS,
JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURTS, COURTS OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS,
CITY COURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS AND THEIR CLERKS OF COURT
“SUBJECT: Implementation of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
“Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of Local Government and
Community Development that all the barangays within your respective jurisdictions have
organized their Lupons provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in implementation of the barangay system of settlement of
CIVPRO II Katarungang Pambarangay Page |3
disputes, you are hereby directed to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or
proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons.
“Circular No. 12 dated October 20, 1978, issued by the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro is
to that extent modified.
“This Circular takes effect immediately.”
It is significant that the above-quoted circular embodying the directive “to desist from receiving
complaints, petitions, actions and proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons,” has
been addressed not only to judges of city and municipal courts, but also to all the judges of the courts
of first instance, circuit criminal courts, juvenile and domestic courts and courts of agrarian relations,
now known as regional trial courts under B.P. No. 129. The said circular was noted by president
Ferdinand E. Marcos in a Letter of Implementation, dated November 12, 1979, the first paragraph of
which reads as follows: “with the view to easing up the log-jam of cases and solving the backlogs in the
case of dockets of all government offices involved in the investigation, trial and adjudication of cases,
it is hereby ordered that immediate implementation be made by all government officials and offices
concerned of the system of amicably settling disputes at the barangay level as provided for in the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law [Presidential Decree No. 1508].”
Therefore, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, We now declare that the conciliation process at
the barangay level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, is
compulsory not only for cases falling under the exclusive competent of the metropolitan and municipal
trial courts, but for actions cognizable by the regional trial courts as well.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, and the order of respondent judge denying petitioners’
motion to dismiss is hereby set aside. Respondent judge is restrained from conducting further
proceedings in Civil Case No. R-22154, except to dismiss the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., reserves his vote.
Makasiar, J., reserves his vote.
De Castro, J., on sick leave.

G.R. No. 167261. March 2, 2007.*
ROSARIA LUPITAN PANG-ET, petitioner, vs. CATHERINE MANACNES-DAO-AS, Heir of LEONCIO
MANACNES and FLORENTINA MANACNES, respondent.
Katarungang Pambarangay Law; The object of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is the amicable
settlement of disputes through conciliation proceedings voluntarily and freely entered into by the parties;
The disputing parties are not compelled to settle their controversy during the barangay proceedings
before the Lupon or the Pangkat, as they are free to instead find recourse in the courts.—At this
juncture, it must be stressed that the object of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is the amicable
settlement of disputes through conciliation proceedings voluntarily and freely entered into by the parties.
Through this mechanism, the parties are encouraged to settle their disputes without enduring the rigors
of court litigation. Nonetheless, the disputing parties are not compelled to settle their controversy during
the barangay proceedings before the Lupon or the Pangkat, as they are free to instead find recourse
in the courts in the event that no true compromise is reached.
Same; The key in achieving the objectives of an effective amicable settlement under the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law is the free and voluntary agreement of the parties to submit the dispute for
adjudication either by the Lupon or the Pangkat, whose award or decision shall be binding upon them
with the force and effect of a final judgment of a court.—The key in achieving the objectives of an
effective amicable settlement under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is the free and voluntary
agreement of the parties to submit the dispute for adjudication either by the Lupon or the Pangkat,
whose award or decision shall be binding upon them with the force and effect of a final judgment of a
court. Absent this voluntary submission by the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration under the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law, there cannot be a binding settlement arrived at effectively resolving
the case. Hence, we fail to see why the MCTC further remanded the case to the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa and insisted that the arbitration proceedings continue, despite the clear showing that
the spouses Manacnes refused to submit the controversy for arbitration. It would seem from the Order
of the MCTC, which again remanded the case for arbitration to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, that it is
compulsory on the part of the parties to submit the case for arbitration until an arbitration award is
rendered by the Lupon. This, to our minds, is contrary to the very nature of the proceedings under the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law which espouses the principle of voluntary acquiescence of the
disputing parties to amicable settlement.
Same; What is compulsory under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is that there be a confrontation
between the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and that a certification be issued that
no conciliation or settlement has been reached, as attested to by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman,
before a case falling within the authority of the Lupon may be instituted in court or any other government
office for adjudication.—What is compulsory under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is that there be
a confrontation between the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and that a certification
be issued that no conciliation or settlement has been reached, as attested to by the Lupon or Pangkat
Chairman, before a case falling within the authority of the Lupon may be instituted in court or any other
government office for adjudication. In other words, the only necessary pre-condition before any case
falling within the authority of the Lupon or the Pangkat may be filed before a court is that there has been
personal confrontation between the parties but despite earnest efforts to conciliate, there was a failure
CIVPRO II Katarungang Pambarangay Page |4
to amicably settle the dispute. It should be emphasized that while the spouses Manacnes appeared
before the Lupon during the initial hearing for the conciliation proceedings, they refused to sign the
Agreement for Arbitration form, which would have signified their consent to submit the case for
arbitration. Therefore, upon certification by the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa that the confrontation before
the Pangkat failed because the spouses Manacnes refused to submit the case for arbitration and
insisted that the case should go to court, the MCTC should have continued with the proceedings in the
case for recovery of possession which it suspended in order to give way for the possible amicable
resolution of the case through arbitration before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa.
Same; As reflected in Section 413 of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in order that a party
may be bound by an arbitration award, said party must have agreed in writing that they shall abide by
the arbitration award of the Lupon or the Pangkat.—The MCTC should not have persisted in ordering
the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa to render an arbitration award upon the refusal of the spouses Manacnes
to submit the case for arbitration since such arbitration award will not bind the spouses. As reflected in
Section 413 of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in order that a party may be bound by an
arbitration award, said party must have agreed in writing that they shall abide by the arbitration award
of the Lupon or the Pangkat. Like in any other contract, parties who have not signed an agreement to
arbitrate will not be bound by said agreement since it is axiomatic that a contract cannot be binding
upon and cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to it. In view of the fact that upon verification
by the Pangkat Chairman, in order to settle the issue of whether or not they intend to submit the matter
for arbitration, the spouses Manacnes refused to affix their signature or thumb mark on the Agreement
for Arbitration Form, the Manacnes spouses cannot be bound by the Agreement for Arbitration and the
ensuing arbitration award since they never became privy to any agreement submitting the case for
arbitration by the Pangkat.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ma. Inglay Capuyan-Fokno for petitioner.
Johnny Ekid for respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78019, dated 9 February 2005, which reversed
and set aside the Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36, Bontoc, Mountain Province,
and reinstated the Resolution3 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Besao-Sagada, Mountain
Province dismissing herein petitioner’s action for Enforcement of Arbitration Award and Damages.
The instant petition draws its origin from an Action4 for recovery of possession of real property situated
in Sitio Abatan, Barrio Dagdag, Sagada filed by herein petitioner before the MCTC of Besao-Sagada,
Mountain Province on 9 November 1994, against the spouses Leoncio and Florentina Manacnes, the
predecessors-in-interest of herein respondent.

On 23 February 1995, during the course of the pre-trial, the parties, through their respective counsels,
agreed to refer the matter to the Barangay Lupon (Lupon) of Dagdag, Sagada for arbitration in
accordance with the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.5 Consequently, the proceedings
before the MCTC were suspended, and the case was remanded to the Lupon for resolution.6
Thereafter, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action on 26 February 1995 due to the refusal of the
Manacnes spouses to enter into an Agreement for Arbitration and their insistence that the case should
go to court. On 8 March 1995, the Certification, as well as the records of the case, were forwarded to
the MCTC.
An Order was issued by the MCTC on 7 April 1995, once more remanding the matter for conciliation
by the Lupon and ordering the Lupon to render an Arbitration Award thereon. According to the MCTC,
based on the records of the case, an Agreement for Arbitration was executed by the parties concerned;
however, the Lupon failed to issue an Arbitration Award as provided under the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, so that, the case must be returned to the Lupon until an Arbitration Award is
rendered.
In compliance with the MCTC Order, the Lupon rendered an Arbitration Award on 10 May 1995 ordering
herein petitioner to retrieve the land upon payment to the spouses Manacnes of the amount of
P8,000.00 for the improvements on the land. Aggrieved, Leoncio’s widow,7 Florentina Manacnes,
repudiated the Arbitration Award but her repudiation was rejected by the Lupon. Thereafter, the MCTC
was furnished with copies of the Arbitration Award.
On 1 June 1995, herein petitioner filed with the Lupon a Motion for Execution of the Arbitration Award.
On the other hand, Florentina Manacnes filed a Motion with the MCTC for the resumption of the
proceedings in the original case for recovery of possession and praying that the MCTC consider her
repudiation of the Arbitration Award issued by the Lupon.
Subsequently, the MCTC heard the Motion of Florentina Manacnes notwithstanding the latter’s failure
to appear before the court despite notice. The MCTC denied Florentina Manacnes’ Motion to repudiate
the Arbitration Award elucidating that since the movant failed to take any action within the 10-day
reglementary period provided for under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, the arbitration award has
become final and executory. Furthermore, upon motion of herein petitioner Pang-et, the MCTC issued
an Order remanding the records of the case to the Lupon for the execution of the Arbitration Award. On
31 August 1995, the then incumbent Punong Barangay of Dagdag issued a Notice of Execution of the
Award.
Said Notice of Execution was never implemented. Thus, on 16 October 2001, herein petitioner Pang-
et filed with the MCTC an action for enforcement of the Arbitration Award which was sought to be
dismissed by the heir of the Manacnes spouses. 8 The heir of the Manacnes spouses argues that the
Agreement for Arbitration and the Arbitration Award are void, the Agreement for Arbitration not having
been personally signed by the spouses Manacnes, and the Arbitration Award having been written in
English—a language not understood by the parties.
CIVPRO II Katarungang Pambarangay Page |5
In its Resolution dated 20 August 2002, the MCTC dismissed the Petition for Enforcement of Arbitration
Award in this wise:
“x x x Are defendants estopped from questioning the proceedings before the Lupon Tagapamayapa
concerned?
The defendants having put in issue the validity of the proceedings before the lupon concerned and the
products thereof, they are not estopped. It is a hornbook rule that a null and void act could always be
questioned at any time as the action or defense based upon it is imprescriptible.
The second issue: Is the agreement to Arbitrate null and void? Let us peruse the pertinent law dealing
on this matter which is Section 413 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160), to wit:
“Section 413—(a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings, agree in writing that they
shall abide by the arbitration award of the lupon chairman or the pangkat. x x x” The foregoing
should be taken together with Section 415 of the same code which provides:
“Section 415. Appearance of parties in person.—In all katarungang pambarangay
proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of counsel or
representative, except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next-
of-kin who are not lawyers.”
It is very clear from the foregoing that personal appearance of the parties in conciliation proceedings
before a Lupon Tagapamayapa is mandatory. Likewise, the execution of the agreement to arbitrate
must be done personally by the parties themselves so that they themselves are mandated to sign the
agreement.
Unfortunately, in this case, it was not respondents-spouses [Manacnis] who signed the agreement to
arbitrate as plaintiff herself admitted but another person. Thus, it is very clear that the mandatory
provisos of Section 413 and 415 of RA 7160 are violated. Granting arguendo that it was Catherine who
signed the agreement per instruction of her parents, will it cure the violation? The answer must still be
in the negative. As provided for by the cited provisos of RA 7160, if ever a party is entitled to an
assistance, it shall be done only when the party concerned is a minor or incompetent. Here, there is no
showing that the spouses [Manacnis] were incompetent. Perhaps very old but not incompetent.
Likewise, what the law provides is assistance, not signing of agreements or settlements.
Just suppose the spouses [Manacnis] executed a special power of attorney in favor of their daughter
Catherine to attend the proceedings and to sign the agreement to arbitrate? The more that it is
proscribed by the Katarungang Pambarangay Law specifically Section 415 of RA 7160 which mandates
the personal appearance of the parties before the lupon and likewise prohibits the appearance of
representatives.

In view of the foregoing, it could now be safely concluded that the questioned agreement to arbitrate is
inefficacious for being violative of the mandatory provisions of RA 7160 particularly sections 413 and
415 thereof as it was not the respondents-spouses [Manacnis] who signed it.
The third issue: Is the Arbitration Award now sought to be enforced effective? Much to be desired, the
natural flow of events must follow as a consequence. Considering that the agreement to arbitrate is
inefficacious as earlier declared, it follows that the arbitration award which emanated from it is also
inefficacious. Further, the Arbitration Award by itself, granting arguendo that the agreement to arbitrate
is valid, will readily show that it does not also conform with the mandate of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law particularly Section 411 thereto which provides:
“Sec. 411. Form of Settlement.—All amicable settlements shall be in writing in a language or
dialect known to the parties x x x. When the parties to the dispute do not use the same language
or dialect, the settlement shall be written in the language known to them.”
Likewise, the implementing rules thereof, particularly Section 13 provides:
“Sec. 13. Form of Settlement and Award.—All settlements, whether by mediation, conciliation
or arbitration, shall be in writing, in a language or dialect known to the parties. x x x”
It is of no dispute that the parties concerned belong to and are natives of the scenic and serene
community of Sagada, Mt. Province who speak the Kankanaey language. Thus, the Arbitration Award
should have been written in the Kankanaey language. However, as shown by the Arbitration Award, it
is written in English language which the parties do not speak and therefore a further violation of the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
IN THE LIGHT of all the foregoing considerations, the aboveentitled case is hereby dismissed.” 9
Petitioner Pang-et’s Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, she filed an Appeal before the
RTC which reversed and set aside the Resolution of the MCTC and remanded the case to the MCTC
for further proceedings. According to the RTC:
“As it appears on its face, the Agreement for Arbitration in point found on page 51 of the
expediente, dated Feb. 6, 1995, and attested by the Pangkat Chairman of the Office of the
Barangay Lupon of Dagdag, Sagada was signed by the respondents/defendants spouses
Manacnis. The representative of the Appellee in the instant case assails such Agreement
claiming that the signatures of her aforesaid predecessors-in-interest therein were not
personally affixed by the latter or are falsified-which in effect is an attack on the validity of the
document on the ground that the consent of the defendants spouses Manacnis is vitiated by
fraud. Indulging the Appellee Heirs of Manacnis its contention that such indeed is the truth of
the matter, the fact still remains as borne out by the circumstances, that neither did said original
defendants nor did any of such heirs effectively repudiate the Agreement in question in
accordance with the procedure outlined by the law, within five (5) days from Feb. 6, 1995, on
the ground as above-stated (Secs. 413 (a), 418, RA 7160; Secs. 7, 13, KP Law; Sec. 12, Rule
CIVPRO II Katarungang Pambarangay Page |6
IV, KP Rules). As mandated, such failure is deemed a waiver on the part of the defendants
spouses Manacnis to challenge the Agreement for Arbitration on the ground that their consent
thereto is obtained and vitiated by fraud (Sec. 12, Par. 3, KP Rules). Corollarily, the Appellee
Heirs being privy to the now deceased original defendants should have not been permitted by
the court a quo under the equitable principle of estoppel, to raise the matter in issue for the first
time in the present case (Lopez vs. Ochoa, 103 Phil. 94).
The Arbitration Award relative to Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) dated May 10, 1995, written in English,
attested by the Punong Barangay of Dagdag and found on page 4 of the record is likewise assailed by
the Appellee as void on the ground that the English language is not known by the defendants spouses
Manacnis who are Igorots. Said Appellee contends that the document should have been written in
Kankana-ey, the dialect known to the party (Sec. 413 (b), RA 7160; Sec. 7, Par. 2, KP law, Sec. 11, KP
Rules). On this score, the court a quo presumptuously concluded on the basis of the selfserving mere
say-so of the representative of the Appellee that her predecessors did not speak or understand English.
As a matter of judicial notice, American Episcopalian Missionaries had been in Sagada, Mountain
Province as early as 1902 and continuously stayed in the place by turns, co-mingling with the
indigenous people thereat, instructing and educating them, and converting most to the Christian faith,
among other things, until the former left about twenty years ago. By constant association with the white
folks, the natives too old to go to school somehow learned the King’s English by ear and can effectively
speak and communicate in that language. Any which way, even granting arguendo that the defendants
spouses Manacnis were the exceptions and indeed totally ignorant of English, no petition to nullify the
Arbitration award in issue on such ground as advanced was filed by the party or any of the Appellee
Heirs with the MCTC of Besao-Sagada, within ten (10) days from May 10, 1995, the date of the
document. Thus, upon the expiration thereof, the Arbitration Award acquired the force and effect of a
final judgment of a court (Sec. 416, RA 7160; Sec. 11, KP Law; Sec. 13, KP Rules); conclusive upon
the original defendants in Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) and the Appellee Heirs herein privy to said
defendants.
In the light thereof, the collateral attack of the Appellee on the Agreement for Arbitration and Arbitration
Award re Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) should not have in the first place been given due course by the
court a quo. In which case, it would not have in the logical flow of things declared both documents
“inefficacious;” without which pronouncements, said court would not have dismissed the case at bar.
Wherefore, Judgment is hereby rendered Reversing and Setting Aside the Resolution appealed from,
and ordering the record of the case subject thereof remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings.”10
Aggrieved by the reversal of the RTC, herein respondent filed a petition before the Court of Appeals
seeking to set aside the RTC Judgment. On 9 February 2005, the appellate court rendered the herein
assailed Decision, to wit:
“After thoroughly reviewing through the record, We find nothing that would show that the
spouses Manacnes were ever amenable to any compromise with respondent Pang-et. Thus,

We are at a loss as to the basis of the Arbitration Award sought to be enforced by respondent
Pang-et’s subsequent action before the MCTC.
There is no dispute that the proceeding in Civil Case No. 83 was suspended and the same
remanded to the Lupon on account of the Agreement to Arbitrate which was allegedly not
signed by the parties but agreed upon by their respective counsels during the pretrial
conference. In the meeting before the Lupon, it would seem that the agreement to arbitrate was
not signed by the spouses Manacnes. More importantly, when the pangkat chairman asked the
spouses Manacnes to sign or affix their thumbmarks in the agreement, they refused and
insisted that the case should instead go to court. Thus, the Lupon had no other recourse but to
issue a certificate to file action. Unfortunately, the case was again remanded to the Lupon to
“render an arbitration award.” This time, the Lupon heard the voice tape of the late Beket
Padonay affirming respondent Pang-et’s right to the disputed property. While Pang-et offered
to pay P8,000.00 for the improvements made by the spouses Manacnes, the latter refused to
accept the same and insisted on their right to the subject property. Despite this, the Lupon on
May 10, 1995 issued an Arbitration award which favored respondent Pang-et.
From the time the case was first referred to the Lupon to the time the same was again
remanded to it, the Spouses Manacnes remained firm in not entering into any compromise with
respondent Pang-et. This was made clear in both the minutes of the Arbitration Hearing on 26
February 1995 and on 9 April 1995. With the foregoing, We find it evident that the spouses
Manacnes never intended to submit the case for arbitration.
Moreover, the award itself is riddled with flaws. First of all there is no showing that the Pangkat
ng Tagapagkasundo was duly constituted in accordance with Rule V of the Katarungan
Pambarangay Rules. And after constituting of the Pangkat, Rule VI, thereof the Punong
Barangay and the Pangkat must proceed to hear the case. However, according to the minutes
of the hearing before the lupon on 9 April 1995, the pangkat Chairman and another pangkat
member were absent for the hearing.
Finally, Section 13 of the same Rule requires that the Punong Barangay or the Pangkat
Chairman should attest that parties freely and voluntarily agreed to the settlement arrived at.
But how can this be possible when the minutes of the two hearings show that the spouses
Manacnes neither freely nor voluntarily agreed to anything.
While RA 7160 and the Katarungan Pambarangay rules provide for a period to repudiate the
Arbitration Award, the same is neither applicable nor necessary since the Agreement to
Arbitrate or the Arbitration Award were never freely nor voluntarily entered into by one of the
parties to the dispute. In short, there is no agreement validly concluded that needs to be
repudiated.
With all the foregoing, estoppel may not be applied against petitioners for an action or defense
against a null and void act does not prescribe. With this, We cannot but agree with the MCTC
that the very agreement to arbitrate is null and void. Similarly, the arbitration award which was
but the off shoot of the agreement is also void.
CIVPRO II Katarungang Pambarangay Page |7
WHEREFORE, the RTC judgment of 2 June 2003 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the MCTC
Resolution DISMISSING the Civil Case No. 118 for enforcement of Arbitration Award is
REINSTATED.”11
Vehemently disagreeing with the Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner Pang-et filed the instant
petition. Petitioner maintains that the appellate court overlooked material facts that resulted in reversible
errors in the assailed Decision. According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that
the original parties, as represented by their respective counsels in Civil Case No. 83, mutually agreed
to submit the case for arbitration by the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dagdag. Petitioner
insists that the parties must be bound by the initial agreement by their counsels during pre-trial to an
amicable settlement as any representation made by the lawyers are deemed made with the conformity
of their clients. Furthermore, petitioner maintains that if indeed the spouses Manacnes did not want to
enter into an amicable settlement, then they should have raised their opposition at the first instance,
which was at the pre-trial on Civil Case No. 83 when the MCTC ordered that the case be remanded to
the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for arbitration.
We do not agree with the petitioner.
First and foremost, in order to resolve the case before us, it is pivotal to stress that, during the initial
hearing before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, the spouses Manacnes declined to sign the Agreement
for Arbitration and were adamant that the proceedings before the MCTC in Civil Case No. 83 must
continue. As reflected in the Minutes12 of the Arbitration Hearing held on 26 February 1995, the legality
of the signature of Catherine Manacnes, daughter of the Manacnes spouses, who signed the
Agreement for Arbitration on behalf of her parents, was assailed on the ground that it should be the
spouses Manacnes themselves who should have signed such agreement. To resolve the issue, the
Pangkat Chairman then asked the spouses Manacnes that if they wanted the arbitration proceedings
to continue, they must signify their intention in the Agreement for Arbitration form. However, as stated
earlier, the Manacnes spouses did not want to sign such agreement and instead insisted that the case
go to court.
Consequently, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action on 26 February 1995 due to the refusal
of the Manacnes spouses. Indicated in said Certification are the following: 1) that there was personal
confrontation between the parties before the Punong Barangay but conciliation failed and 2) that the
Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo was constituted but the personal confrontation before the Pangkat
failed likewise because respondents do not want to submit this case for arbitration and insist
that said case will go to court.13 Nevertheless, upon receipt of said certification and the records of
the case, the MCTC ordered that the case be remanded to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa and for the
latter to render an arbitration award, explaining that:
“Going over the documents submitted to the court by the office of the Lupon Tagapamayapa of
Dagdag, Sagada, Mountain Province, the court observed that an “Agreement for Arbitration”
was executed by the parties anent the above-entitled case. However, said Lupon did not make
any arbitration award as mandated by the Katarungang Pambarangay Law but instead made

a finding that the case may now be brought to the court. This is violative of the KP Law, which
cannot be sanctioned by the court.”14
At this juncture, it must be stressed that the object of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is the
amicable settlement of disputes through conciliation proceedings voluntarily and freely entered into by
the parties.15 Through this mechanism, the parties are encouraged to settle their disputes without
enduring the rigors of court litigation. Nonetheless, the disputing parties are not compelled to settle their
controversy during the barangay proceedings before the Lupon or the Pangkat, as they are free to
instead find recourse in the courts16 in the event that no true compromise is reached.
The key in achieving the objectives of an effective amicable settlement under the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law is the free and voluntary agreement of the parties to submit the dispute for
adjudication either by the Lupon or the Pangkat, whose award or decision shall be binding upon them
with the force and effect of a final judgment of a court.17 Absent this voluntary submission by the parties
to submit their dispute to arbitration under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, there cannot be a
binding settlement arrived at effectively resolving the case. Hence, we fail to see why the MCTC further
remanded the case to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa and insisted that the arbitration proceedings
continue, despite the clear showing that the spouses Manacnes refused to submit the controversy for
arbitration.
It would seem from the Order of the MCTC, which again remanded the case for arbitration to the Lupon
ng Tagapamayapa, that it is compulsory on the part of the parties to submit the case for arbitration until
an arbitration award is rendered by the Lupon. This, to our minds, is contrary to the very nature of the
proceedings under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law which espouses the principle of voluntary
acquiescence of the disputing parties to amicable settlement.
What is compulsory under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is that there be a confrontation between
the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and that a certification be issued that no
conciliation or settlement has been reached, as attested to by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, before
a case falling within the authority of the Lupon may be instituted in court or any other government office
for adjudication.18 In other words, the only necessary pre-condition before any case falling within the
authority of the Lupon or the Pangkat may be filed before a court is that there has been personal
confrontation between the parties but despite earnest efforts to conciliate, there was a failure to
amicably settle the dispute. It should be emphasized that while the spouses Manacnes appeared before
the Lupon during the initial hearing for the conciliation proceedings, they refused to sign the Agreement
for Arbitration form, which would have signified their consent to submit the case for arbitration.
Therefore, upon certification by the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa that the confrontation before the Pangkat
failed because the spouses Manacnes refused to submit the case for arbitration and insisted that the
case should go to court, the MCTC should have continued with the proceedings in the case for recovery
of possession which it suspended in order to give way for the possible amicable resolution of the case
through arbitration before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa.
Petitioner’s assertion that the parties must be bound by their respective counsels’ agreement to submit
the case for arbitration and thereafter enter into an amicable settlement is imprecise. What was agreed
to by the parties’ respective counsels was the remand of the case to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for
CIVPRO II Katarungang Pambarangay Page |8
conciliation proceedings and not the actual amicable settlement of the case. As stated earlier, the
parties may only be compelled to appear before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for the necessary
confrontation, but not to enter into any amicable settlement, or in the case at bar, to sign the Agreement
for Arbitration. Thus, when the Manacnes spouses personally appeared during the initial hearing before
the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, they had already complied with the agreement during the pre-trial to
submit the case for conciliation proceedings. Their presence during said hearing is already their
acquiescence to the order of the MCTC remanding the case to the Lupon for conciliation proceedings,
as there has been an actual confrontation between the parties despite the fact that no amicable
settlement was reached due to the spouses Manacnes’ refusal to sign the Agreement for Arbitration.
Furthermore, the MCTC should not have persisted in ordering the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa to render
an arbitration award upon the refusal of the spouses Manacnes to submit the case for arbitration since
such arbitration award will not bind the spouses. As reflected in Section 413 of the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, in order that a party may be bound by an arbitration award, said party must have
agreed in writing that they shall abide by the arbitration award of the Lupon or the Pangkat. Like in any
other contract, parties who have not signed an agreement to arbitrate will not be bound by said
agreement since it is axiomatic that a contract cannot be binding upon and cannot be enforced against
one who is not a party to it.19 In view of the fact that upon verification by the Pangkat Chairman, in
order to settle the issue of whether or not they intend to submit the matter for arbitration, the spouses
Manacnes refused to affix their signature or thumb mark on the Agreement for Arbitration Form, the
Manacnes spouses cannot be bound by the Agreement for Arbitration and the ensuing arbitration award
since they never became privy to any agreement submitting the case for arbitration by the Pangkat.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 78019 is hereby AFFIRMED. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Besao-Sagada, Mountain Province, is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 83
for Recovery of Possession of Real Property, and the immediate resolution of the same with deliberate
dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez and Nachura, JJ., concur.
Callejo, Sr., J., On Leave.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

G.R. No. 157830. November 17, 2005.*
DANTE M. PASCUAL, represented by REYMEL R. SAGARIO, petitioner, vs. MARILOU M.
PASCUAL, respondent.
Actions; Katarungang Pambarangay; Where the parties are not actual residents in the same city or
municipality or adjoining barangays, there is no requirement for them to submit their dispute to the
lupon.—In the 1982 case of Tavora v. Veloso, this Court held that where the parties are not actual
residents in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays, there is no requirement for them to
submit their dispute to the lupon as provided for in Section 6 vis-à-vis Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. 1508
(Katarungang Pambarangay Law). [B]y express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have
no jurisdiction over disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality,
except where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other.
Same; Same; Parties; To construe the express statutory requirement of “actual residency” as applicable
to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff would abrogate the meaning of “real party in interest”; Where
the plaintiff is not an actual resident of the barangay where the defendant resides, the local lupon has
no jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior referral to it for conciliation is not a precondition to its
filing in court.—To construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as applicable to the
attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as contended by respondent, would abrogate the meaning of a
“real party in interest” as defined in Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court vis-à-vis Section 3
of the same Rule which was earlier quoted but misread and misunderstood by respondent. In fine, since
the plaintiff-herein petitioner, the real party in interest, is not an actual resident of the barangay where
the defendant-herein respondent resides, the local lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, hence,
prior referral to it for conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the order and resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela, Br.
23.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Pedro C. Antonio for petitioner.
Bob Armand L. Lecitona for respondent.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
On challenge via Petition for Review on Certiorari is the February 10, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Isabela, Branch 23 at Roxas dismissing, on motion of herein respondent Marilou M.
Pascual, the complaint filed against her by her brother herein petitioner Dante M. Pascual, represented
by his attorney-in-fact Reymel R. Sagario (Sagario), for non-compliance with the conciliation provision-
pre condition to filing of complaint in court under R.A. 7160 (the Local Government Code).
Petitioner, a permanent resident of the United States of America, appointed Sagario as his attorney-
in-fact by a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated April 10, 2002:
CIVPRO II Katarungang Pambarangay Page |9
1.
 To file a case for the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-271656 issued in the
name of Marilou M. Pascual as well as the Deed of Sale of Registered Land (Dec. No. 639;
Page No. 52; Book No. XXI; Series of 1994) and/or Reconveyance at the appropriate court;
2.
 To collect the monthly rentals from the tenant;
3.
 To enter into amicable settlement with Marilou M. Pascual or any other mode of
payment/and/or dispute resolution;
4. To execute and sign any and all papers, contracts/documents which may be necessary
relative to the above acts.
x x x1
Pursuant to the SPA, Sagario filed on October 14, 2002 before the Isabela RTC at Roxas a complaint
entitled “Dante M. Pascual, plaintiff v. Marilou M. Pascual and Register of Deeds, Defendants,”
docketed as Civil Case No. Br. 23-713-02, for Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-271657
of Isabela and Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land and/or Reconveyance with Damages. 2
To the Complaint the defendant-herein respondent Marilou M. Pascual filed a Motion to Dismiss 3 on
two grounds one of which was non-compliance with the requirement under Section 412 of the Local
Government Code,4 she contending that there is no showing that the dispute was referred to the
barangay court before the case was filed in court.
By the assailed Order of February 10, 2003, 5 Branch 23 of the Isabela RTC at Roxas granted
respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in this wise:
. . . RA 7160 repealing P.D. 1508 otherwise known as the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay
provides under Section 409 “All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be
brought in the barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.” Hence,
the reliance of the plaintiff on Section 408 of R.A. 7160 is incorrect. When real property or any
interest therein is involved, the dispute shall be filed before the barangay where the property is
located, regardless of the residence of the parties. Besides, it is incorrect to say that the parties
are not residents of the same place, Vira, Roxas, Isabela. The Attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff in
the person of Reymel R. Sagario is a resident of Vira, Roxas, Isabela, and he substitute (sic)
Dante Pascual by virtue of said Special Power of Attorney. Hence, said Attorney-in-fact should
have brought the dispute before barangay Vira, Roxas, Isabela, where the property is located.
In the case of Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470, “Ordinarily,
noncompliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on
ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity.”6 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration7 of the above-said order was denied by Order of March 24,
2003:8
xxx

Consequently, the Court is [of] the opinion that the said Attorney-in-fact shall be deemed to be
the real party in interest, reading from the tenor of the provisions of the Special Power of
Attorney. Being a real party in interest, the Attorney-in-fact is therefore obliged to bring this
case first before the Barangay Court. Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that “Where
the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a
fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed
to be the real party in interest.
xxx
Being the real party in interest, the Attorney-in-fact may therefore bring the necessary
complaint before the Lupon Tagapayapa and appear in person as if he is the owner of the land.9
(Emphasis and italics supplied)
Hence, the present petition questioning “the palpable legal errors” of the RTC.
Petitioner argues that since he, not his attorney-in-fact Sagario, is the real party in interest, and since
he actually resides abroad, the lupon would have no jurisdiction to pass upon the dispute involving real
property, he citing Agbayani v. Belen.10
Respondent submits, on the other hand, that Section 408, paragraph (f), of the Local Government
Code, is qualified by paragraph (c) of Section 409 of the same Code the latter of which provides that
“[a]ll disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the
real property is located,” hence, the use of the word “shall” makes it mandatory for the bringing of the
dispute before the lupon.
That attorney-in-fact Sagario is a resident of the same barangay as that of hers, respondent argues in
any event, brings the matter under the jurisdiction of the lupon, for Sagario, following Section 3 of Rule
3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
Sec. 3. Representative as parties.—Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a
representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of
the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest.
A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a
party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name for the benefit of an
undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves
things belonging to the principal, being a substitute, becomes the real party-in-interest.
Respondent’s submissions do not lie. The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code read:
In the 1982 case of Tavora v. Veloso,11 this Court held that where the parties are not actual residents
in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays, there is no requirement for them to submit their
SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto.—The lupon of each
dispute to the lupon as provided for in Section 6 vis-à-vis Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. 1508 (Katarungang
barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or
Pambarangay Law).
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
C I V P R O I I K a t a r u n g a n g P a m b a r a n g a y P a g e | 10
(a)
 Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
(b)
 Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;
(c)
 Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding
Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d)
 Offenses where there is no private offended party;
(e)
 Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities
unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by
an appropriate lupon;
(f)
 Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties
thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate
lupon; and
(g)
 Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of
justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this
Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the lupon concerned
for amicable settlement. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 409. Venue.—(a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall
be brought for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay.
(b)
 Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or
municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the
respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant.
(c)
 All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.
(d)
 Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the
institution where such parties are enrolled for study shall be brought in the barangay
where such workplace or institution is located.
Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong barangay;
otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may confront the
punong barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to may be submitted to the
Secretary of Justice or his duly designated representative whose ruling thereon shall be
binding. (Emphasis supplied)
 C I V P R O I I K a t a r u n g a n g P a m b a r a n g a y P a g e | 11

[B]y express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over disputes where
the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality, except where the barangays in
which they actually reside adjoin each other. (Italics supplied)

In the 2000 case of Vercide v. Hernandez,12 this Court, noting that the Tavora ruling, reiterated in other
cases including the 1996 case of Agbayani13 cited by petitioner, was decided under the provisions of
P.D. No. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay) Law which were, except for some modifications, echoed
in Sections 408-409 of the Local Government Code which took effect on January 1, 1992, held that the
Tavora ruling remained.

To construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as applicable to the attorney-in-fact
of the party-plaintiff, as contended by respondent, would abrogate the meaning of a “real party in
interest” as defined in Section 2 of Rule 314 of the 1997 Rules of Court vis-à-vis Section 3 of the same
Rule which was earlier quoted but misread and misunderstood by respondent.

In fine, since the plaintiff-herein petitioner, the real party in interest, is not an actual resident of the
barangay where the defendant-herein respondent resides, the local lupon has no jurisdiction over their
dispute, hence, prior referral to it for conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court.

The RTC thus erred in dismissing petitioner’s complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed February 10, 2003 Order, as well as the March 24,
2003 Order denying reconsideration of the first, of Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela at
Roxas is SET ASIDE. Said court is accordingly directed to reinstate Civil Case No. 23-713-02 to its
docket and take appropriate action thereon with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (Chairman), Corona and Garcia, JJ.,concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.,On Leave.
Petition granted, assailed order and resolution set aside.

Notes.—Judges should take judicial notice of the Local Government Code of 1991, specifically on
the provisions on the katarungang pambarangay, and a judge’s total unawareness thereof is
distressing. (Uy vs. Contreras, 237 SCRA 167 [1994])

The primordial objective of P.D. No. 1508 (The Katarungang Pambarangay Law), now included
under R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991), is to reduce the number of court litigations
and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought about by the indiscriminate
filing of cases in the courts. (Zamora vs. Heirs of Carmen-Izquierdo, 443 SCRA 24 [2004])

A.C. No. 6296. November 22, 2005.*
ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO, complainant, vs. ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Code of Professional Responsibility; Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991
[R.A. No. 7160]; Katarungang Pambarangay; Section 415 of the Local Government Code (LGC) clearly
requires the personal appearance of the parties in katarungang pambarangay conciliation proceedings,
unassisted by counsel or representative; There can be no quibbling that laymen of good will can easily
agree to conciliate and settle their disputes between themselves without what sometimes is the
unsettling assistance of lawyers whose presence could sometimes obfuscate and confuse issues.—
Section 415 of the LGC of 1991, on the subject Katarungang Pambarangay, provides: Section 415.
Appearance of Parties in Person.—In all katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties must
appear in person without the assistance of the counsel or representative, except for minors and
incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers. The above-quoted provision
clearly requires the personal appearance of the parties in katarungan pambarangay conciliation
proceedings, unassisted by counsel or representative. The rationale behind the personal appearance
requirement is to enable the lupon to secure first hand and direct information about the facts and issues,
the exception being in cases where minors or incompetents are parties. There can be no quibbling that
laymen of goodwill can easily agree to conciliate and settle their disputes between themselves without
what sometimes is the unsettling assistance of lawyers whose presence could sometimes obfuscate
and confuse issues. Worse still, the participation of lawyers with their penchant to use their analytical
skills and legal knowledge tend to prolong instead of expedite settlement of the case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; That the Sumbong was addressed to the barangay captain instead
of the lupong tagapamayapa is of no moment since the barangay captain chairs the Lupong
Tagapamayapa.—The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation
proceedings was not, to be sure, lost on respondent. Her defense that the aforequoted Section 415 of
the LGC does not apply since complainant addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain of Brgy.
San Pascual who thereafter proceeded to hear the same is specious at best. In this regard, suffice it to
state that complainant wrote her Sumbong with the end in view of availing herself of the benefits of
barangay justice. That she addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain is really of little moment
since the latter chairs the Lupong Tagapamayapa.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The prohibition in Section 415 of the Local Government Code (LGC)
applies to all the katarungang barangay proceedings.—Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question
applies to all katarungan barangay proceedings. Section 412(a) the LGC of 1991 clearly provides that,
as a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process
either before the lupon chairman or the lupon or pangkat. As what happened in this case, the punong
barangay, as chairman of the Lupon Tagapamayapa, conducted the conciliation proceedings to resolve
the disputes between the two parties.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Willful Violation of Section 415 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 and Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
C I V P R O I I K a t a r u n g a n g P a m b a r a n g a y P a g e | 12
GARCIA, J.:
In her sworn complaint, as endorsed by the President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Nueva Ecija Chapter, Atty. Evelyn J. Magno charged Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba, a member of the
same IBP provincial chapter, with willful violation of (a) Section 415 of the Local Government Code
(LGC) of 1991 and (b) Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
This disciplinary case arose out of a disagreement that complainant had with her uncle, Lorenzo Inos,
over a landscaping contract they had entered into. In a bid to have the stand-off between them settled,
complainant addressed a letter, styled “Sumbong,”1 to Bonifacio Alcantara, barangay captain of Brgy.
San Pascual, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. At the barangay conciliation/confrontation proceedings conducted
on January 5, 2003, respondent, on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney signed by Lorenzo
Inos, appeared for the latter, accompanied by his son, Lorenzito. Complainant’s objection to
respondent’s appearance elicited the response that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to be represented by a
lawyer inasmuch as complainant is herself a lawyer. And as to complainant’s retort that her being a
lawyer is merely coincidental, respondent countered that she is appearing as an attorney-in-fact, not
as counsel, of Lorenzo Inos.
Complainant enumerated specific instances, with supporting documentation, tending to prove that
respondent had, in the course of the conciliation proceedings before the Punong Barangay, acted as
Inos Lorenzo’s counsel instead of as his attorney-in-fact. This is what complainant said in her
complaint:2
“5.
 xx x Atty. Olivia Jacoba asked for an ocular inspection of the subject matter of the complaint.
A heated argument took place because Lorencito Inos said that [complainant’s brother]
Melencio Magno, Jr. made alterations in the lagoon …. Afterwards Atty. Olivia Jacoba . . .
returned to the barangay hall to have the incident recorded in the barangay blotter.... attached
as Annex “A”
6. That on January 12, 2003, … Lorenzo Inos appeared before the hearing also with
the assistance of [respondent]. When the minutes of the proceeding (sic) was read,
[respondent] averred that the minutes is partial in favor of the complainant because
only her statements were recorded for which reason, marginal insertions were made
to include what [respondent] wanted to be put on record. She also signed as “saksi” in
the minutes ….
7.
 x x x In a letter (answer to the “sumbong”) sent to the Punong Barangay dated
December 22, 2002, she signed representing herself as “Family Legal Counsel of Inos
Family,” a copy of the letter is attached as Annex “C” . . . . (Words in bracket added.)
In an Order dated February 17, 2003, Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, IBP Director for Bar Discipline, directed
the respondent to submit, within fifteen (15) days from notice, her answer to the complaint, otherwise
she will be considered as in default.3

The case, docketed as CBD No. 03-1061, was assigned to Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala,
who admitted respondent’s answer notwithstanding her earlier order of July 15, 2003, declaring
respondent in default for failure to file an answer in due time.4
In her Answer, respondent alleged that the administrative complaint was filed with the Office of the
Punong Barangay, instead of before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, and heard by Punong Barangay
Bonifacio Alcantara alone, instead of the collegial Lupon or a conciliation panel known as pangkat.
Prescinding from this premise, respondent submits that the prohibition against a lawyer appearing to
assist a client in katarungan pambarangay proceedings does not apply. Further, she argued that her
appearance was not as a lawyer, but only as an attorney-in-fact.
In her report dated October 6, 2003,5 Commissioner Maala stated that the “charge of complainant has
been established by clear preponderance of evidence” and, on that basis, recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of her profession for a period of six (6) months. On the
other hand, the Board of Governors, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, while agreeing with the
inculpatory finding of the investigating commissioner, recommended in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-
235,6 a lighter penalty, to wit:
“RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution/Decision as Annex “A”; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering respondent's actuations
was in violation of Section 415 which expressly prohibits the presence and representation by lawyers
in the Katarungan Pambarangay, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is hereby ADMONISHED.
This resolution is now before us for confirmation.
Section 415 of the LGC of 1991,7 on the subject Katarungang Pambarangay, provides:
“Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person.—In all katarungang pambarangay
proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of the counsel or
representative, except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin
who are not lawyers.”
The above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal appearance of the parties in katarungan
pambarangay conciliation proceedings, unassisted by counsel or representative. The rationale behind
the personal appearance requirement is to enable the lupon to secure first hand and direct information
about the facts and issues,8 the exception being in cases where minors or incompetents are parties.
There can be no quibbling that laymen of goodwill can easily agree to conciliate and settle their disputes
between themselves without what sometimes is the unsettling assistance of lawyers whose presence
could sometimes obfuscate and confuse issues.9 Worse still, the participation of lawyers with their
penchant to use their analytical skills and legal knowledge tend to prolong instead of expedite
settlement of the case.
The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation proceedings was not, to be
sure, lost on respondent. Her defense that the aforequoted Section 415 of the LGC does not apply
C I V P R O I I K a t a r u n g a n g P a m b a r a n g a y P a g e | 13
since complainant addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual who
thereafter proceeded to hear the same is specious at best. In this regard, suffice it to state that
complainant wrote her Sumbong with the end in view of availing herself of the benefits of barangay
justice. That she addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain is really of little moment since the
latter chairs the Lupong Tagapamayapa.10
Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question applies to all katarungan barangay proceedings.
Section 412(a)11 the LGC of 1991 clearly provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in court,
the parties shall go through the conciliation process either before the lupon chairman or the lupon or
pangkat. As what happened in this case, the punong barangay, as chairman of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa, conducted the conciliation proceedings to resolve the disputes between the two
parties.
Given the above perspective, we join the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline in its determination that
respondent transgressed the prohibition prescribed in Section 415 of the LGC. However, its
recommended penalty of mere admonition must have to be modified. Doubtless, respondent’s conduct
tended to undermine the laudable purpose of the katarungan pambarangay system. What compounded
matters was when respondent repeatedly ignored complainant’s protestation against her continued
appearance in the barangay conciliation proceedings.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is hereby FINED in the amount of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) for willful violation of Section 415 of the Local Government Code of 1991 with
WARNING that commission of similar acts of impropriety on her part in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (Chairman), Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., On Official Leave.
Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba meted with P5,000.00 fine for willful violation of Section 415 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, with warning against repetition of similar acts.
Notes.—A party’s act of trifling with the authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the
scheduled mediation hearings and instead filing the complaint right away with the trial court cannot be
countenanced. (Uy vs. Contreras, 237 SCRA 167 [1994])
There is substantial compliance with the law even though no pangkat was constituted if the parties
met at the office of the barangay chairman for possible settlement yet the efforts of the barangay
chairman proved futile. (Diu vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 472 [1995])
It is clear from the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules that recourse to barangay conciliation proceedings
is not necessary where the parties do not reside in the same municipality or city or in adjoining
barangays. (Vercide vs. Hernandez,330 SCRA 49 [2000])

G.R. No. 146195. November 18, 2004*
AVELINA ZAMORA, EMERITA ZAMORA-NICOL, SONNY NICOL, TERESA ZAMORA-UMALI,
CLARENCE UMALI, ROBERTO ZAMORA, ROLANDO ZAMORA, MARY ANN ZAMORA,
MICHELLE ZAMORA and RODRIGO ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF CARMEN IZQUIERDO,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ANITA F. PUNZALAN, respondents.
Actions; Katarungang Pambarangay Law; The primordial objective of P.D. No. 1508 (The Katarungang
Pambarangay Law), now included under R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991), is to
reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has
been brought about by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts.—The primordial objective of
Presidential Decree No. 1508 (the Katarungang Pambarangay Law), now included under R.A. No. 7160
(the Local Government Code of 1991), is to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the
deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought about by the indiscriminate filing of cases
in the courts. To attain this objective, Section 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160 requires the parties to undergo
a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a precondition to filing a complaint
in court, thus: “SECTION 412. Conciliation.—(a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court.—No
complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon shall be
filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been
a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation
or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon or pangkat secretary and attested to by the
lupon or pangkat chairman x x x.”
Same; Same; Section 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160 clearly provides that, as a precondition to filing a
complaint in court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process either before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat.—We cannot sustain petitioners’ contention that the Lupon conciliation alone,
without the proceeding before the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo, contravenes the law on Katarungang
Pambarangay. Section 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160, quoted earlier, clearly provides that, as a precondition
to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process either before the Lupon
Chairman (as what happened in the present case), or the Pangkat. Moreover, in Diu vs. Court of
Appeals, we held that “notwithstanding the mandate in Section 410(b) of R.A. No. 7160 that the
Barangay Chairman shall constitute a Pangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts,” the same “Section
410(b) should be construed together with Section 412(a) of the same law (quoted earlier), as well as
the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case.” Here, while the Pangkat was not constituted,
however, the parties met nine (9) times at the Office of the Barangay Chairman for conciliation wherein
not only the issue of water installation was discussed but also petitioners’ violation of the lease contract.
It is thus manifest that there was substantial compliance with the law which does not require strict
adherence thereto.
Same; Same; Ejectment; Unlawful Detainer; Motions to Dismiss; Revised Rule on Summary Procedure;
A motion to dismiss may only be filed in an action for unlawful detainer if anchored on lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, or failure by the complainant to refer the subject matter of his/her complaint to
the Lupon for conciliation prior to its filing with the court.—We hold that petitioners’ motion to dismiss
the complaint for unlawful detainer is proscribed by Section 19(a) of the 1991 Revised Rule on
C I V P R O I I K a t a r u n g a n g P a m b a r a n g a y P a g e | 14
Summary Procedure, quoted earlier. Section 19(a) permits the filing of such pleading only when the
ground for dismissal of the complaint is anchored on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or
failure by the complainant to refer the subject matter of his/her complaint “to the Lupon for conciliation”
prior to its filing with the court. This is clear from the provisions of Section 18 of the same Rule, which
reads: “SEC. 18. Referral to Lupon.—Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such
requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such requirement
shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was
arrested without a warrant.”
PETITION for review on certiorari and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Emmanuel M. Basa for petitioners.
Salonga, Hernandez & Mendoza for respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated
September 12, 2000 and its Resolution dated December 1, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54541, entitled
“Avelina Zamora, et al., petitioners, versus Heirs of Carmen Izquierdo, represented by the executrix,
Anita F. Punzalan, respondents.”
The records show that sometime in 1973, Carmen Izquierdo and Pablo Zamora entered into a verbal
stipulation whereby the former leased to the latter one of her apartment units located at 117-B General
Luna Street, Caloocan City. They agreed on the following: the rental is P3,000.00 per month; the leased
premises is only for residence; and only a single family is allowed to occupy it.
After the death of Carmen (lessor) in 1996 her attorney-in-fact, Anita Punzalan, representing the heirs,
herein respondents, prepared a new contract of lease wherein the rental was increased from P3,000.00
to P3,600.00 per month.3 However, petitioners refused to sign it.
In January 1997, Pablo (lessee) died. His wife, Avelina Zamora, and their children (two of whom have
their own families), herein petitioners, continued to reside in the apartment unit. However, they refused
to pay the increased rental and persisted in operating a photocopying business in the same apartment.
Meanwhile, petitioner Avelina Zamora applied with the Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System
(MWSS) for a water line installation in the premises. Since a written consent from the owner is required
for such installation, she requested respondents’ attorney-in-fact to issue it. However, the latter declined
because petitioners refused to pay the new rental rate and violated the restrictions on the use of the
premises by using a portion thereof for photocopying business and allowing three families to reside
therein.
This prompted petitioner Avelina Zamora to file with the Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay
16, Sona 2, District I, Lungsod ng Caloocan, a complaint against Anita Punzalan (respondents’

attorney-in-fact), docketed as “Usaping Bgy. Blg. 1-27-97, Ukol sa: Hindi Pagbibigay ng Pahintulot sa
Pagpapakabit ng Tubig.”
On August 24, 1997, during the barangay conciliation proceedings, petitioner Avelina Zamora declared
that she refused to sign the new lease contract because she is not agreeable with the conditions
specified therein.
The following day, Anita Punzalan sent Avelina a letter4 informing her that the lease is being terminated
and demanding that petitioners vacate the premises within 30 days from notice.
Despite several barangay conciliation sessions, the parties failed to settle their dispute amicably.
Hence, the Barangay Chairman issued a Certification to File Action dated September 14, 1997.5
Consequently, on October 2, 1997, respondents, represented by Anita Punzalan, filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 49, Caloocan City, a complaint for unlawful detainer and
damages against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 23702. 6 Forthwith, petitioners filed a motion
to dismiss7 the complaint on the ground that the controversy was not referred to the barangay for
conciliation. First, they alleged that the barangay Certification to File Action “is fatally defective” because
it pertains to another dispute, i.e., the refusal by respondents’ attorney-in-fact to give her written consent
to petitioners’ request for installation of water facilities in the premises. And, second, when the parties
failed to reach an amicable settlement before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, the Punong Barangay (as
Lupon Chairman), did not constitute the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo before whom mediation or
arbitration proceedings should have been conducted, in violation of Section 410(b), Chapter 7
(Katarungang Pambarangay), Title One, Book III of Republic Act No. 71608 (otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991), which reads:
“SECTION 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement.—
(a)
 x x x
(b)
 Mediation by lupon chairman—Upon receipt of the complaint, the lupon chairman9
shall, within the next working day, summon the respondent(s), with notice to the
complainant(s) for them and their witnesses to appear before him for a mediation of
their conflicting interests. If he fails in his mediation effort within fifteen (15) days from
the first meeting of the parties before him, he shall forthwith set a date for the
constitution of the pangkat in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.” (Italics
supplied)
Respondents opposed the motion to dismiss,10 the same being prohibited under Section 19 of the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. They prayed that judgment be rendered as may be warranted
by the facts alleged in the complaint, pursuant to Section 611 of the same Rule.
On July 9, 1998, the MTC issued an Order12 denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss and considering the
case submitted for decision in view of their failure to file their answer to the complaint.
C I V P R O I I K a t a r u n g a n g P a m b a r a n g a y P a g e | 15
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,13 contending that a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of failure to refer the complaint to the Lupon for conciliation is allowed under Section 19 of
the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, which partly provides:
“SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions.—The following pleadings, motions, or petitions
shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the
preceding section [referring to Section 18 on referral of the complaint to the Lupon for
conciliation];
x x x.”
On August 26, 1998, the MTC rendered a Judgment 14 in favor of respondents and against petitioners,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, ordering defendants and all persons claiming right under them:
1)
 To vacate the leased premises located at No. 117-B General Luna Street, Caloocan
City and to surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff;
2)
 To pay the amount of three thousand six hundred (P3,600.00) pesos per month
starting January, 1997 until the premises being occupied by them is finally vacated and
possession thereof is restored to the plaintiff;
3)
 To pay plaintiff the sum of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos as and for attorney’s
fees; and
4)
 To pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.”
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 125, Caloocan City, rendered its Decision 15 dated
February 15, 1999 affirming the MTC Judgment. Subsequently, it denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.16
Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
54541. On September 12, 2000, it rendered a Decision17 affirming the RTC Decision. Thereafter,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court in its Resolution
dated December 1, 2000.18
Hence, the instant petition.
I
The primordial objective of Presidential Decree No. 1508 (the Katarungang Pambarangay Law), now
included under R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991), is to reduce the number of court
litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought about by the

indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts.19 To attain this objective, Section 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160
requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a
precondition to filing a complaint in court, thus:
“SECTION 412. Conciliation.—(a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court.—No complaint,
petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be
filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there
has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and
that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon or pangkat
secretary and attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman x x x.” (Italics supplied)
In the case at bar, the Punong Barangay, as Chairman of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, conducted
conciliation proceedings to resolve the dispute between the parties herein. Contrary to petitioners’
contention, the complaint does not only allege, as a cause of action, the refusal of respondents’
attorney-in-fact to give her consent to the installation of water facilities in the premises, but also
petitioners’ violation of the terms of the lease, specifically their use of a portion therein for their
photocopying business and their failure to pay the increased rental. As correctly found by the RTC:
“The records show that confrontations before the barangay chairman were held on January 26,
1997, February 9, 1997, February 23, 1997, February 28, 1997, July 27, 1997, August 3, 1997,
August 10, 1997, August 17, 1997 and August 24, 1997 wherein not only the issue of water
installation was discussed but also the terms of the lease and the proposed execution of a
written contract relative thereto. It appears, however, that no settlement was reached despite
a total of nine meetings at the barangay level.
It is of no moment that the complaint was initially made by defendant-appellant Avelina Zamora
because herein plaintiff-appellee was given by the Sangguniang Barangay the authority to bring
her grievance to the Court for resolution. While it is true that the Sertifikasyon dated September
14, 1997 is entitled ‘Ukol Sa Hindi Pagbibigay Ng Pahintulot Sa Pagpapakabit Ng Tubig’, this
title must not prevail over the actual issues discussed in the proceedings.
Hence, to require another confrontation at the barangay level as a sine qua non for the filing of
the instant case would not serve any useful purpose anymore since no new issues would be
raised therein and the parties have proven so many times in the past that they cannot get to
settle their differences amicably.”20
We cannot sustain petitioners’ contention that the Lupon conciliation alone, without the proceeding
before the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo, contravenes the law on Katarungang Pambarangay. Section
412(a) of R.A. No. 7160, quoted earlier, clearly provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in
court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process either before the Lupon Chairman (as what
happened in the present case), or the Pangkat.
Moreover, in Diu vs. Court of Appeals,21 we held that “notwithstanding the mandate in Section 410(b)
of R.A. No. 7160 that the Barangay Chairman shall constitute a Pangkat if he fails in his mediation
efforts,” the same “Section 410(b) should be construed together with Section 412(a) of the same law
C I V P R O I I K a t a r u n g a n g P a m b a r a n g a y P a g e | 16
(quoted earlier), as well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case.” Here, while the
Pangkat was not constituted, however, the parties met nine (9) times at the Office of the Barangay
Chairman for conciliation wherein not only the issue of water installation was discussed but also
petitioners’ violation of the lease contract. It is thus manifest that there was substantial compliance with
the law which does not require strict adherence thereto.22
II
We hold that petitioners’ motion to dismiss the complaint for unlawful detainer is proscribed by Section
19(a) of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, quoted earlier. Section 19(a) permits the filing
of such pleading only when the ground for dismissal of the complaint is anchored on lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, or failure by the complainant to refer the subject matter of his/her complaint “to
the Lupon for conciliation” prior to its filing with the court. This is clear from the provisions of Section 18
of the same Rule, which reads:
“SEC. 18. Referral to Lupon.—Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such
requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such
requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases
where the accused was arrested without a warrant.” (Italics supplied)
As discussed earlier, the case was referred to the Lupon Chairman for conciliation. Obviously,
petitioners’ motion to dismiss, even if allowed, is bereft of merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54541 sustaining the Decision of the RTC which upheld the MTC Judgment
is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (Chairman), Carpio-Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., On Leave.
Petition denied, assailed decision and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—Judges should take judicial notice of the Local Government Code of 1991, specifically on
the provisions on the katarungang pambarangay, and a judge’s total unawareness thereof is
distressing. (Uy vs. Contreras, 237 SCRA 167 [1994])
There is substantial compliance with the law even though no pangkat was constituted if the parties
met at the office of the barangay chairman for possible settlement yet the efforts of the barangay
chairman proved futile. (Diu vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 472 [1995])
It is clear from the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules that recourse to barangay conciliation proceedings
is not necessary where the parties do not reside in the same municipality or city or in adjoining
barangays. (Vercide vs. Hernandez, 330 SCRA 49 [2000])

No. L-63277. November 29, 1983.*
PETRA VDA. DE BORROMEO, petitioner, vs. HON. JULIAN B. POGOY, Municipal/City Trial Court
of Cebu City, and ATTY. RICARDO REYES, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Forcible entry and detainer; Prescription; Prescriptive period for
filing actions for forcible entry and detainer.—Under Article 1147 of the Civil Code, the period for filing
actions for forcible entry and detainer is one year, and this period is counted from demand to vacate
the premises.
Same; Same; Same; PD 1508 or Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Conciliation process at the barangay
level condition precedent for filing actions in applicable cases under PD 1508; Failure of complaint to
allege compliance with the requirement of referral of case first to the barangay courts under PD 1508,
fatal.—While respondent acknowledged said Circular in his order of December 14, 1982, he
nevertheless chose to overlook the failure of the complaint in Civil Case No. R-23915 to allege
compliance with the requirement of PD 1508. Neither did he cite any circumstance as would place the
suit outside the operation of said law. Instead, he insisted on relying upon the pro tanto presumption of
regularity in the performance by the clerk of court of his official duty, which to Our mind has been
sufficiently overcome by the disclosure by the Clerk of Court that there was no certification to file action
from the Lupon or Pangkat secretary attached to the complaint.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and phrases; Word "individual" in Section 4a of PD 1508 applies
only to cases involving natural persons.—Be that as it may, the instant petition should be dismissed.
Under Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where
the parties thereto are "individuals". An "individual" means "a single human being as contrasted with a
social group or institution." Obviously, the law applies only to cases involving natural persons, and not
where any of the parties is a juridical person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate
or intestate, estate, etc.
PETITION for certiorari to review the order of the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Antonio T. Uy for petitioner.
Numeriano G. Estenzo for respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Petitioner herein seeks to stop respondent Judge Julian B. Pogoy of the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu
City from taking cognizance of an ejectment suit for failure of the plaintiff to refer the dispute to the
Barangay Lupon for conciliation.
The intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo is the owner of a building bearing the deceased's name,
located at F. Ramos St., Cebu City. Said building has been leased and occupied by petitioner Petra
Vda. de Borromeo at a monthly rental of P500.00 payable in advance within the first five days of the
month.
C I V P R O I I K a t a r u n g a n g P a m b a r a n g a y P a g e | 17
On August 28, 1982, private respondent Atty. Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the estate and a resident
of Cebu City, served upon petitioner a letter demanding that she pay the overdue rentals corresponding
to the period from March to September 1982, and thereafter to vacate the premises. As petitioner failed
to do so, Atty. Reyes instituted on September 16, 1982 an ejectment case against the former in the
Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R-23915 and
assigned to the sala of respondent judge.
On November 12, 1982, petitioner moved to dismiss the case, advancing, among others, the want of
jurisdiction of the trial court. Pointing out that the parties are residents of the same city, as alleged in
the complaint, petitioner contended that the court could not exercise jurisdiction over the case for failure
of respondent Atty. Reyes to refer the dispute to the Barangay Court, as required by PD No. 1508,
otherwise known as Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
Respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss. He justified the order in this wise:
"The Clerk of Court when this case was filed accepted for filing same. That from the acceptance
from (sic) filing, with the plaintiff having paid the docket fee to show that the case was docketed
in the civil division of this court could be considered as meeting the requirement or precondition
for were it not so, the Clerk of Court would not have accepted the filing of the case especially
that there is a standing circular from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court without even
mentioning the Letter of Instruction of the President of the Philippines that civil cases and
criminal cases with certain exceptions must not be filed without passing the barangay court."
(Order dated December 14,1982, Annex "c", P. 13, Rollo).
Unable to secure a reconsideration of said order, petitioner came to this Court through this petition for
certiorari. In both his comment and memorandum, private respondent admitted not having availed
himself of the barangay conciliation process, but justified such omission by citing paragraph 4, section
6 of PD 1508 which allows the direct filing of an action in court where the same may otherwise be
barred by the Statute of Limitations, as applying to the case at bar.
The excuse advanced by private respondent is unsatisfactory, Under Article 1147 of the Civil Code, the
period for filing actions for forcible entry and detainer is one year, 1 and this period is counted from
demand to vacate the premises.2
In the case at bar, the letter-demand mand was dated August 28, 1982, while the complaint for
ejectment was filed in court on September 16, 1982. Between these two dates, less than a month had
elapsed, thereby leaving at least eleven (11) full months of the prescriptive period provided for in Article
1147 of the Civil Code. Under the procedure outlined in Section 4 of PD 1508,3 the time needed for the
conciliation proceeding before the Barangay Chairman and the Pangkat should take no more than 60
days. Giving private respondent nine (9) months—ample time indeed—within which to bring his case
before the proper court should conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it cannot be truthfully asserted, as private
respondent would want Us to believe, that his case would be barred by the Statute of Limitations if he
had to course his action to the Barangay Lupon.
 C I V P R O I I K a t a r u n g a n g P a m b a r a n g a y P a g e | 18

With certain exceptions, PD 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition
precedent for filing of actions in those instances where said law applies. For this reason, Circular No.
22 addressed to " ALL JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL
COURTS, JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURT, COURTS OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS,
CITY COURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS AND THEIR CLERKS OF COURT" was issued by Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando on November 9, 1979. Said Circular reads:
Notes.—Fact that the owner made the tenant understand that he may need the premises in the
future is not sufficient basis to terminate a leasehold relationship. (F.S. Divinagracia Agro-Commercial
vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 180.)
In case the defendant fails to make the monthly deposit of current rentals, it is generally mandatory
for the court to order execution of the appealed judgment. (Dehesa vs. Macalalag, 81 SCRA 543.)

"Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of Local Government and
Community Development that all the barangays within your respective jurisdictions have
organized their Lupons provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in implementation of the barangay system of settlement of
disputes, you are hereby directed to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or
proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons. "
The remedy of the tenant where the lessor refuses to make urgent repair of the leased premises
is not to suspend rental payments, but to make urgent repair himself and charge the cost thereof to the
lessor under Art. 1663 of the Civil Code. (Banson vs. Ubay, 94 SCRA 454.)
A mere caretaker of land is without right to possession of the disputed land. (Dalida vs. Court of
Appeals, 117 SCRA 480.)

While respondent acknowledged said Circular in his order of December 14, 1982, he nevertheless
chose to overlook the failure of the complaint in Civil Case No. R-23915 to allege compliance with the
requirement of PD 1508. Neither did he cite any circumstance as would place the suit outside the
operation of said law. Instead, he insisted on relying upon the pro tanto presumption of regularity in the
performance by the clerk of court of his official duty, which to Our mind has been sufficiently overcome
by the disclosure by the Clerk of Court that there was no certification to file action from the Lupon or
Pangkat secretary attached to the complaint.4

Be that as it may, the instant petition should be dismissed. Under Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508, referral
of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties thereto are "individuals", An
"individual" means "a single human being as contrasted with a social group or institution." 5 Obviously,
the law applies only to cases involving natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical
person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc,

In Civil Case No. R-23915, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in behalf of the
Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. While it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the
administrator of an estate to sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is
presented or defended, it is indisputable that the real party in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915 is the
intestate estate under administration. Since the said estate is a juridical person6 plaintiff administrator
may file the complaint directly in court, without the same being coursed to the Barangay Lupon for
arbitration.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed. Respondent judge is ordered to try and decide
Civil Case No. R-23915 without unnecessary delay. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr, Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Aquino; J., in the result.
Petition dismissed

G.R. No. 83907.September 13, 1989.*
NAPOLEON GEGARE, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (ELEVENTH DIVISION) AND
ARMIE ELMA, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Certiorari; Writ of certiorari or prohibition, available even in respect to interlocutory
orders.—It is precisely to correct the lower court when in the course of proceedings it acts without
jurisdiction or in excess thereof or if the trial court judge otherwise acted with grave abuse of discretion
that the extraordinary writ of certiorari or prohibition is afforded to parties as a relief. Such writ is
available even in respect to interlocutory orders.
Same; Courts; Administrative Law; Courts of justice will not interfere with pure administrative matters
rendered by administrative bodies within the scope of their power and authority.—The appellate court
correctly ruled that courts of justice will not interfere with purely administrative matters rendered by
administrative bodies or officials acting within the scope of their power and authority. The discretionary
power vested in the proper executive official, in the absence of arbitrariness or grave abuse so as to
go beyond the statutory authority, is not subject to the contrary judgment or control of the courts and is
treated with finality.
Same; Parties; Petitioner is not a party-in-interest who can seek the nullification of the land grant.—
Moreover, petitioner had no capacity to file the questioned suit in the lower court. The real party-in-
interest who can seek the nullification of the land grant is the government or the state.
Same; Katarungang Pambarangay (PD 1508); When the government or its instrumentality is only one
of the contending parties, a confrontation should still be undertaken among the other parties.—The
purpose of this confrontation is to enable the parties to settle their differences amicably. If the other
only contending party is the government or its instrumentality or subdivision the case falls within the
exception but when it is only one of the contending parties, a confrontation should still be undertaken
among the other parties.
PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Camilo Cariño Dionio, Jr. for petitioner.
Cedo, Ferrer & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The familiar story in the Old Testament is of how King Solomon settled the dispute between two women
over a child by deciding that the child be cut into two for them to share. The real mother full of love
implored that the King not kill the child and give the child to the other woman. The latter asked the King
not to give it to either of them and to go on, cut the child into two.
C I V P R O I I K a t a r u n g a n g P a m b a r a n g a y P a g e | 19
This case involves a small piece of land. The decision was to cut it into two between the parties. But
the parallel ends there. The petitioner wants the whole lot. Private respondent is happy with his half.
This is the impasse’ that must be resolved.
The center of controversy is Lot 5989, Ts-217 with an area of about 270 square meters situated at
Dadiangas, General Santos City. This lot was titled in the name of Paulino Elma under Original
Certificate of Title No. (P-29947) (P-11503) P-1987 issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds of
General Santos City and Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-635. A reversion case was filed by the
Republic of the Philippines against Paulino Elma in the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato
docketed as Civil Case No. 950, wherein in due course a decision was rendered on January 29, 1973
declaring the title of Paulino Elma null and void and the same was ordered cancelled. The lot was
reverted to the mass of public domain subject to disposition and giving preferential right to its actual
occupant, Napoleon Gegare.
This decision was affirmed by this Court when We dismissed the petition for review on certiorari filed
by the heirs of Elma on March 13, 1974 in G.R. No. L-38069. Thereafter, the writ of execution was
issued and the title of Elma to the property was cancelled.
Both petitioner and private respondent filed an application for this lot in the Board of Liquidators (Board
for short) in 1975. On June 15, 1976, Resolution No. 606, Series of 1976 was passed by the Board
disposing of the lot in favor of petitioner by way of a negotiated sale in conformity with the decision in
Civil Case No. 950. Private respondent protested against the application of petitioner and on August 8,
1978, the Board adopted Resolution No. 611, Series of 1978 denying private respondent’s protest for
the same reason. A request for reconsideration of private respondent was referred by the Board to Mr.
Artemio Garlit, liquidator-designee, General Santos Branch, for verification and investigation. After
hearings, Mr. Garlit submitted a report to the Manila office recommending division of the lot to the
parties. Nevertheless, on March 13, 1981, the Board denied the protest because the case had already
been decided by the court.
However, a motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent was favorably considered by the
Board in Resolution No. 233, Series of 1981 dated July 8, 1981. Thus, the Board directed the chief of
LASEDECO to investigate the occupancy and area of the lot. In this investigation, it was found that only
private respondent was the actual occupant so the LASEDECO chief recommended the division of the
property between petitioner and private respondent.
On August 14, 1981, the Board passed Resolution No. 272, Series of 1981 approving said
recommendation by dividing the lot equally between the parties at 135.5 square meters each to be
disposed to them by negotiated sale.
Both parties appealed to the Office of the President but in a decision dated March 25, 1984, both
appeals were dismissed. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied on May 29, 1984.
Private respondent paid for the value of 1/2 of the lot and applied for the issuance of a patent. In
Resolution No. 185, Series of 1985 adopted on October 7, 1985, the Board gave due course to the

application of private respondent and for the issuance of a patent to 1/2 portion of the lot. Petitioner
was also advised to file his application and pay for his portion. Thus, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No.
4261 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-5139 were issued to private respondent.
On November 27, 1985, petitioner filed an action for “Annulment and Cancellation of Partition of Lot
5989, Ts-217, situated at Dadiangas, General Santos City and Annulment of Resolutions No. 272 and
185 and/or to Declare them Null and Void” against private respondent and the Board. The suit was
docketed as Civil Case No. 3270 in the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City.
On February 11, 1985, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following
grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) petitioner has no capacity to sue; (3)
petitioner is not a real party-in-interest; and (4) the action is barred by prior judgment. Private
respondent added another ground (5) lack of conciliation efforts pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential
Decree No. 1508. The motion was granted in an order dated March 18, 1986.
On April 3, 1986, petitioner moved for a reconsideration thereof to which an opposition was filed by
private respondent. The motion for reconsideration was granted in an order of April 21, 1986 and private
respondent was required to file his responsive pleading. Private respondent filed his answer. On July
10, 1986, private respondent asked for a preliminary hearing of the grounds for the motion to dismiss
in his affirmative defenses. This was denied on July 24, 1986.
Hence, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals
questioning the said orders of the trial court dated April 21, 1986 and July 24, 1986. In due course, a
decision was rendered by the appellate court on March 16, 1988 granting the petition, declaring the
questioned orders null and void, and directing the trial court to dismiss the civil case for lack of
jurisdiction, without pronouncement as to costs.
An urgent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in a resolution dated May 31, 1988. 1
Thus, the herein petition wherein petitioner raises the following issues—
“FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DECIDING CA-G.R. SP NO. 12183 WITHOUT FIRST
SERVING SUMMONS AND A COPY OF THE PETITION TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT
IN THE SAID CASE (NOW PETITIONER IN THE INSTANT CASE), THUS, DEPRIVING HIM
OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION OF
ARMIE ELMA IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 12183 IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2)
ORDERS SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PETITION ARE INTERLOCUTORY IN NATURE.
C I V P R O I I K a t a r u n g a n g P a m b a r a n g a y P a g e | 20
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL CASE NO. 3270.
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD
HAVE DISMISSED CIVIL CASE NO. 3270 FOR FAILURE OF THE PLAINTIFF TO COMPLY
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P.D. NO. 1508 BEFORE FILING HIS COMPLAINT IN COURT.”2
The petition is devoid of any merit.
Under the first assigned error, petitioner alleges that he was not served summons and a copy of the
petition so that he was deprived of due process and the respondent court did not acquire jurisdiction
over his person.
Private respondent disputes this claim by showing that it was at the address of petitioner appearing in
the petition at Liwayway Disco Restaurant and Disco Pub, Ilang-Ilang Street, General Santos City,
where petitioner was served a copy of private respondent’s “Manifestation and Motion for Early
Resolution.”3 Petitioner’s counsel was also served a copy of the resolution dated June 28, 1987, 4
“Motion for Restraining Order” dated July 28, 1987 and Manifestation dated December 1, 1987.5 Indeed,
petitioner’s counsel filed a motion dated April 4, 1988 seeking a reconsideration of the decision of
respondent court6 which was denied on May 31, 1988. Obviously, petitioner voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the respondent court and was never deprived of due process.7
Under the second and third assigned errors, petitioner contends that the appellate court erred in giving
due course to the petition that assailed the two orders of the court a quo which are interlocutory in
character and in holding that the trial court has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 3270.
It is precisely to correct the lower court when in the course of proceedings it acts without jurisdiction or
in excess thereof or if the trial court judge otherwise acted with grave abuse of discretion that the
extraordinary writ of certiorari or prohibition is afforded to parties as a relief. Such writ is available even
in respect to interlocutory orders.8
The appellate court correctly ruled that courts of justice will not interfere with purely administrative
matters rendered by administrative bodies or officials acting within the scope of their power and
authority. The discretionary power vested in the proper executive official, in the absence of arbitrariness
or grave abuse so as to go beyond the statutory authority, is not subject to the contrary judgment or
control of the courts and is treated with finality.9
When Board Resolution No. 272 was passed in 1981, petitioner appealed to the Office of the President.
After his appeal was denied on March 26, 1984, he did not file a petition for review in this court. Thus,
the said decision became final and it was duly implemented. We agree that when petitioner filed Civil
 C I V P R O I I K a t a r u n g a n g P a m b a r a n g a y P a g e | 21

Case No. 3270, the trial court should have refrained from interfering with said administrative disposition
of the chief executive absent any showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
Moreover, petitioner had no capacity to file the questioned suit in the lower court. The real party-in-
interest who can seek the nullification of the land grant is the government or the state. 10

Under the fourth and last assigned error, petitioner argues that it was erroneous for the appellate court
to hold that the case should be dismissed by the lower court for failure to comply with a provision of
Presidential Decree No. 1508 before filing the complaint. He alleges that this rule is not applicable in
said case for one of the parties therein is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof
which is excepted from this requirement under Section 2 of said law.

True it is that the Board is a government instrumentality but the petitioner and private respondent who
are also contending parties in the case are residents of the same barangay so Section 6 of Presidential
Decree No. 1508 should apply to them as it provides—

“Section 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint.No complaint, petition, action or

proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Luponas provided in Section 2 hereof
shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there
has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat
Secretary attested by the LuponorPangkatChairman, or unless the settlement has been
repudiated.”

The purpose of this confrontation is to enable the parties to settle their differences amicably. If the other
only contending party is the government or its instrumentality or subdivision the case falls within the
exception but when it is only one of the contending parties, a confrontation should still be undertaken
among the other parties.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—Grave abuse of discretion as basis for the issuance of the writ of certiorari is a well-
defined concept. (Imutan vs. CA, 102 SCRA 286.)

Certiorari, even in instances of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, cannot as a rule be a
substitute for appeal. (People vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465.)

G.R. No. 137359. September 13, 2004.*
EDWIN N. TRIBIANA, petitioner, vs. LOURDES M. TRIBIANA, respondent.
Remedial Law; Dismissal of Actions; A dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted only if there
is a failure to comply with a condition precedent. Given that the alleged defect is a mere failure to allege
compliance with a condition precedent, the proper solution is not an outright dismissal of the action, but
an amendment under Section 1 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.—A dismissal under
Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted only if there is a failure to comply with a condition precedent. Given
that the alleged defect is a mere failure to allege compliance with a condition precedent, the proper
solution is not an outright dismissal of the action, but an amendment under Section 1 of Rule 10 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It would have been a different matter if Edwin had asserted that no
efforts to arrive at a compromise have been made at all.
Same; Habeas Corpus; In a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare and custody of a child of
tender age, the paramount concern is to resolve immediately the issue of who has the legal custody of
the child. Technicalities should not stand in the way of giving such child of tender age full protection.—
In a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare and custody of a child of tender age, the paramount
concern is to resolve immediately the issue of who has legal custody of the child. Technicalities should
not stand in the way of giving such child of tender age full protection. This rule has sound statutory
basis in Article 213 of the Family Code, which states, “No child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Agripino C. Baybay III for petitioner.
Bridie O. Castronuevo for respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals’ Resolutions 2 dated 2 July
1998 and 18 January 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48049. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order 3 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite (“RTC”), denying petitioner Edwin N. Tribiana’s
(“Edwin”) motion to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus filed against him by respondent Lourdes
Tribiana (“Lourdes”).
Antecedent Facts
Edwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who have lived together since 1996 but formalized their union
only on 28 October 1997. On 30 April 1998, Lourdes filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC
claiming that Edwin left their conjugal home with their daughter, Khriza Mae Tribiana (“Khriza”). Edwin
has since deprived Lourdes of lawful custody of Khriza who was then only one (1) year and four (4)
C I V P R O I I K a t a r u n g a n g P a m b a r a n g a y P a g e | 22
months of age. Later, it turned out that Khriza was being held by Edwin’s mother, Rosalina Tribiana
(“Rosalina”). Edwin moved to dismiss Lourdes’ petition on the ground that the petition failed to allege
that earnest efforts at a compromise were made before its filing as required by Article 151 of the Family
Code.
On 20 May 1998, Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwin’s motion to dismiss claiming that there were
prior efforts at a compromise, which failed. Lourdes attached to her opposition a copy of the Certification
to File Action from their Barangay dated 1 May 1998.
On 18 May 1998, the RTC denied Edwin’s motion to dismiss and reiterated a previous order requiring
Edwin and his mother, Rosalina to bring Khriza before the RTC. Upon denial of his motion for
reconsideration, Edwin filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellate court denied Edwin’s petition on 2 July 1998. The
appellate court also denied Edwin’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The Rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
The RTC denied Edwin’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the Certification to File Action attached
by Lourdes to her opposition clearly indicates that the parties attempted to reach a compromise but
failed.
The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the RTC and added that under Section 412 (b) (2) of the
Local Government Code, conciliation proceedings before the barangay are not required in petitions for
habeas corpus.
The Issue
Edwin seeks a reversal and raises the following issue for resolution:
WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE PETITION
FOR HABEAS CORPUS ON THE GROUND OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITION
PRECEDENT UNDER ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Edwin argues that Lourdes’ failure to indicate in her petition for habeas corpus that the parties exerted
prior efforts to reach a compromise and that such efforts failed is a ground for the petition’s dismissal
under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.4 Edwin maintains that under Article
151 of the Family Code, an earnest effort to reach a compromise is an indispensable condition
precedent. Article 151 provides:

No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but
that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must
be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil
Code.
Edwin’s arguments do not persuade us.
It is true that the petition for habeas corpus filed by Lourdes failed to allege that she resorted to
compromise proceedings before filing the petition. However, in her opposition to Edwin’s motion to
dismiss, Lourdes attached a Barangay Certification to File Action dated 1 May 1998. Edwin does not
dispute the authenticity of the Barangay Certification and its contents. This effectively established that
the parties tried to compromise but were unsuccessful in their efforts. However, Edwin would have the
petition dismissed despite the existence of the Barangay Certification, which he does not even dispute.
Evidently, Lourdes has complied with the condition precedent under Article 151 of the Family Code. A
dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted only if there is a failure to comply with a condition
precedent. Given that the alleged defect is a mere failure to allege compliance with a condition
precedent, the proper solution is not an outright dismissal of the action, but an amendment under
Section 1 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 It would have been a different matter if
Edwin had asserted that no efforts to arrive at a compromise have been made at all.
In addition, the failure of a party to comply with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional defect. 6
Such defect does not place the controversy beyond the court’s power to resolve. If a party fails to raise
such defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed waived.7 Such defect is curable by
amendment as a matter of right without leave of court, if made before the filing of a responsive
pleading.8 A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading.9 More importantly, an amendment alleging
compliance with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional matter. Neither does it alter the cause of
action of a petition for habeas corpus. We have held that in cases where the defect consists of the
failure to state compliance with a condition precedent, the trial court should order the amendment of
the complaint.10 Courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of
suits and to present the real controversies between the parties. 11
Moreover, in a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare and custody of a child of tender age,
the paramount concern is to resolve immediately the issue of who has legal custody of the child.
Technicalities should not stand in the way of giving such child of tender age full protection.12 This rule
has sound statutory basis in Article 213 of the Family Code, which states, “No child under seven years
of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.”
In this case, the child (Khriza) was only one year and four months when taken away from the mother.
The Court of Appeals dismissed Edwin’s contentions by citing as an additional ground the exception in
Section 412 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (“LGC”) on barangay conciliation, which states:
C I V P R O I I K a t a r u n g a n g P a m b a r a n g a y P a g e | 23
(b) Where the parties may go directly to court.—the parties may go directly to court in the
following instances:
xxx
2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas
corpus proceedings;
x x x.
Under Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may resort to a habeas corpus proceeding
in two instances. The first is when any person is deprived of liberty either through illegal confinement
or through detention. The second instance is when custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled to such custody. The most common case falling under the second instance involves children
who are taken away from a parent by another parent or by a relative. The case filed by Lourdes falls
under this category.
The barangay conciliation requirement in Section 412 of the LGC does not apply to habeas corpus
proceedings where a person is “deprived of personal liberty.” In such a case, Section 412 expressly
authorizes the parties “to go directly to court” without need of any conciliation proceedings. There is
deprivation of personal liberty warranting a petition for habeas corpus where the “rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.” 13 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err when it
dismissed Edwin’s contentions on the additional ground that Section 412 exempts petitions for habeas
corpus from the barangay conciliation requirement.
The petition for certiorari filed by Edwin questioning the RTC’s denial of his motion to dismiss merely
states a blanket allegation of “grave abuse of discretion.” An order denying a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory and is not a proper subject of a petition for certiorari. 14 Even in the face of an error of
judgment on the part of a judge denying the motion to dismiss, certiorari will not lie. Certiorari is not a
remedy to correct errors of procedure.15 The proper remedy against an order denying a motion to
dismiss is to file an answer and interpose as affirmative defenses the objections raised in the motion to
dismiss. It is only in the presence of extraordinary circumstances evincing a patent disregard of justice
and fair play where resort to a petition for certiorari is proper.16
The litigation of substantive issues must not rest on a prolonged contest on technicalities. This is
precisely what has happened in this case. The circumstances are devoid of any hint of the slightest
abuse of discretion by the RTC or the Court of Appeals. A party must not be allowed to delay litigation
by the sheer expediency of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on scant allegations of
grave abuse. More importantly, any matter involving the custody of a child of tender age deserves
immediate resolution to protect the child’s welfare.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals dated 2 July 1998 and 18 January 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48049. The Regional
 C I V P R O I I K a t a r u n g a n g P a m b a r a n g a y P a g e | 24

Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite is ordered to act with dispatch in resolving the petition for habeas
corpus pending before it. This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed, assailed resolutions affirmed.

G.R. No. 160032. November 11, 2005.*
ESTELA L. BERBA, petitioner, vs. JOSEPHINE PABLO and THE HEIRS OF CARLOS PALANCA,
respondents.
Actions; Katarungang Pambarangay; Settlement Agreements; The Settlement Agreement of parties
approved by the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa may be enforced by the Lupon, through the punong
barangay within six months, and if the settlement is not enforced after the lapse of said period, it may
be enforced by an action in the proper city or municipal court.—The records show that petitioner and
respondent Josephine Pablo executed an Agreement on June 5, 1999, which was approved by the
Lupon. Respondent Josephine Pablo did not repudiate the agreement; hence, such agreement of the
parties settling the case had the force and effect of a final judgment. As the Court declared in Vidal v.
Escueta, the settlement of the parties may be enforced by the Lupon, through the punong barangay,
within six months; and if the settlement is not enforced after the lapse of said period, it may be enforced
by an action in the proper city or municipal court, as provided in Section 417 of the Local Government
Code.
Same; Same; Administrative Law; Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Under Section
408 of the Local Government Code, parties actually residing in the same city or municipality are bound
to submit their disputes to the Lupon for conciliation/amicable settlement, unless otherwise provided
therein; If the complainant/plaintiff fails to comply with the requirements of the Code, such complaint
filed with the court may be dismissed for failure to exhaust all administrative remedies.—Under Sec.
408 of the same Code, parties actually residing in the same city or municipality are bound to submit
their disputes to the Lupon for conciliation/amicable settlement, unless otherwise provided therein:
SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto.—The lupon of each barangay
shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for
amicable settlement of all disputes except: (a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision
or instrumentality thereof; (b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates
to the performance of his official functions; (c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1)
year or a fine exceeding Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00); (d) Offenses where there is no private
offended party; (e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities
unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate
lupon; (f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities,
except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their
differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon; (g) Such other classes of disputes which
the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice. The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this
Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the lupon concerned for
amicable settlement. If the complainant/plaintiff fails to comply with the requirements of the Local
Government Code, such complaint filed with the court may be dismissed for failure to exhaust all
administrative remedies.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
C I V P R O I I K a t a r u n g a n g P a m b a r a n g a y P a g e | 25
Garcia, Ines, Villacarlos and Garcia Law Offices for petitioner.
Patricio Balao for respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed before the Court on a petition for review on certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 73531, affirming the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in
Civil Case No. 170639.
Estela L. Berba, a resident of 978 Maligaya Street, Malate, Manila, was the owner of a parcel of land
located at No. 2338 M. Roxas Street, Sta. Ana, Manila covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 63726. A house was constructed on the lot, which she leased to Josephine Pablo ** and the Heirs
of Carlos Palanca sometime in 1976. The lease was covered by a lease contract. Upon its expiration,
the lessees continued leasing the house on a month-to-month basis.
By 1999, the monthly rental on the property was P3,450.00. The lessees failed to pay the rentals due,
and by May 1999, their arrears amounted to P81,818.00. Berba then filed a complaint for eviction and
collection of unpaid rentals only against Pablo in the Office of the Punong Barangay. On June 5, 1999,
Berba and Pablo executed an Agreement approved by the pangkat, as follows:
Ako si Josephine Pablo, naninirahan sa 2338 M. Roxas St., Sta. Ana, Manila, na nasasakop
ng Barangay 873, Zone 96, ay nangangako kay GG Robert Berba na nagmamay-ari ng aking
tinitirahan ay maghuhulog ng halagang Tatlong Libong Piso P3,000.00 kada ika-sampu ng
buwan bilang hulog sa aking pagkakautang kay GG Berba na umaabot sa halagang
P81,818.00 na ang nasabing halagang ito ay aking huhulugan hanggang aking mabayaran ng
buo ang aking pagkakautang. Ako rin, si Josephine Pablo, ay nangangako na ang hindi ko
pagsunod o pagbayad ng buwanang hulog, ako ay kusang aalis sa aking tinitirahan. Bukod pa
sa hulog sa aking pagkakautang, ako rin ay magbabayad ng halagang P3,450.00 bilang aking
upa sa aking tinitirahan.3
By May 2000, Pablo and the lessees still had a balance of P71,716.00. As of May 1, 2001, the total
arrearages of the lessees amounted to P135,115.63.4 On May 2, 2001, Berba, through counsel, wrote
the lessees, demanding payment of the said amount and to vacate the house within 30 days from
notice, otherwise she will sue them.5 The lessees ignored the demand. On June 21, 2001, Berba filed
a complaint6 against Josephine Pablo and the Heirs of Carlos Palanca in the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC) of Manila for unlawful detainer. She prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered
in her favor:
“WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed for that judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiff
ordering defendant (sic)—
a)
 to vacate the premises situated at 2338 M. Roxas Street, Sta. Ana, City of Manila;

b)
 to pay plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand One Hundred Fifteen
and 63/100 Pesos (P135,115.63) representing monthly rentals in arrears to the
present;
c)
 to pay plaintiff the amount of Four Thousand Five Hundred Sixty-Two and 63/100
Pesos (P4,562.63) per month representing monthly rent on the premises for the year
2001 until finality of the judgment;
d)
 to pay plaintiff the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) by way of attorney’s
fees;
e)
 to reimburse plaintiff all expenses for litigation estimated in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos;
f)
 to pay costs of suit.
Other reliefs just and equitable are, likewise, prayed for under the premises.” 7
Berba, however, failed to append to her complaint a certification from the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa
that no conciliation or settlement had been reached.
In their answer to the complaint, the defendants admitted to have stopped paying rentals because of
financial distress. They also alleged that they were not certain if the plaintiff was the owner of the
property. By way of special and affirmative defenses, they averred that the plaintiff had no cause of
action against them as she failed to secure a Certificate to File Action from the Lupon.8
During the pre-trial conference, the parties manifested to the court that, despite earnest efforts, no
amicable settlement was reached. They defined the main issue as whether or not the plaintiff had a
valid cause of action for unlawful detainer against the defendants. 9
In her position paper, Berba appended an Agreement dated June 5, 1999 between her and Pablo,
which appeared to have been approved by Punong Barangay Cayetano L. Gonzales of Barangay 873,
as well as other members of the Lupon,10 duly approved by the Pangkat. She also appended a
Statement of Account indicating that the defendants’ back rentals amounted to P135,115.63. 11
In their position paper, the defendants insisted that the dispute did not go through the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa prior to the filing of the complaint; hence, Berba’s complaint was premature. They also
averred that the increase in the rental rates imposed by the plaintiff was unjustified and illegal.
In her reply, the plaintiff alleged that there was no more need for her to secure a Certificate to File
Action because she was a resident of No. 978 Maligaya Street, Malate, Manila, while the defendants
were residing in Barangay 873, Zone 6 in Sta. Ana, Manila.
On March 14, 2002, the MTC rendered judgment in favor of Berba. The fallo of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and ordering the defendants and
all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the premises at 2338 M. Roxas St., Sta. Ana,
Manila and restore possession thereof to the plaintiff. Ordering the defendant to pay the amount
of P135,115.63 representing monthly rentals since 1999 until December 2000. Ordering the
C I V P R O I I K a t a r u n g a n g P a m b a r a n g a y P a g e | 26
defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P4,562.63 per month beginning January 2001 and for
the succeeding months until finally vacated. Ordering the defendant to pay the reduced amount
of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.”12
The defendants appealed the decision to the RTC. On motion of the plaintiff, the RTC issued an order
for the execution of the decision pending appeal.13 The defendants filed a motion for the recall of the
Order,14 but before the court could resolve the motion, the Sheriff turned over the physical possession
of the property to Berba on May 20, 2002.15
In their Appeal Memorandum, Pablo and the heirs of Palanca insisted that Berba’s action in the MTC
was premature because of the absence of Certificate to File Action issued by the Lupon. They also
claimed that Berba unlawfully increased the rentals for the house. 16 Berba, on the other hand, averred
that there was no need of a prior referral to the Lupon before filing her complaint. The petitioner cited
Section 408(f) of the Local Government Code, pointing out that she resided in a Barangay in Malate, 8
kilometers away from Barangay 873 in Sta. Ana, where Pablo and the Palanca heirs resided.17
On August 20, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting the appeal and setting aside the appealed
decision. The fallo of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court a quo is ordered set aside. The complaint is also
ordered DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Writ of Execution issued by the Court a quo
pending appeal is also set aside.
SO ORDERED.”18
The RTC ruled that under Section 408 of the Local Government Code, parties who reside in the same
city or municipality although in different barangays are mandated to go through conciliation proceedings
in the Lupon.19 The court cited the rulings of this Court in Morata v. Go,20 and Vda. de Borromeo v.
Pogoy.21
Berba filed a motion for the reconsideration22 of the decision, which the RTC denied in its Order23 dated
October 2, 2002. She then elevated the case to the CA via petition for review, where she averred:
a)
 The raising of other affirmative defenses apart from the non-referral to the Barangay Court
by the respondents constitute a waiver of such requirement; and
b)
 There was substantial compliance on the part of the petitioner with respect to referring her
complaint before the Barangay Court.24
Citing the ruling of this Court in Diu v. Court of Appeals,25 Berba claimed that Section 408 of the Local
Government Code should be construed liberally together with Section 412. She further averred that
she had complied substantially with the requisites of the law, and recalls that conciliation proceedings
before the Lupon resulted in the execution of an Agreement on June 5, 1999. Upon failure to comply
with the agreement, all chances of amicable settlement were effectively foreclosed. Hence, Pablo and

the Heirs of Palanca were estopped from claiming that she failed to comply with the Local Government
Code’s requirement of prior referral of their dispute to the Lupon.
After due proceedings, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and affirming the RTC
decision. Berba moved for a reconsideration of the decision, which proved futile.
In the instant petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner alleges that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
CONSIDER THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF DIU VS.
COURT OF APPEALS (251 SCRA 478) AND IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS NO
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE MANDATE OF PD 1508 (NOW R.A. 7160)
WITH RESPECT TO PRIOR REFERRAL TO THE BARANGAY COURT, THEREBY
DECIDING THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
COURT.26
The petitioner avers that she is a sickly widow, in the twilight of her years, and whose only source of
income are the rentals generated from the property, which she also uses to pay her medical expenses.
She avers that the continued denial of her right to the fruits of the subject property is highly unjust and
contrary to the spirit behind the enactment of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1508. 27
The petitioner also points out that, for her to pay obeisance to the decision of the CA, she would have
to go through the tedious, not to mention horrendous, process of going back to square one; that is,
referring the dispute to the barangay which, in all likelihood, would be rendered useless considering
that respondents had already been validly and effectively ejected from the leased premises. She would
then have to go through the rungs of the judicial ladder a second time to vindicate her trampled rights.
She further claims that the CA’s affirmation of the RTC decision is equivalent to sanctioning a “legal
anomaly.” She points out that the very purpose of barangay conciliation is to abbreviate disputes
between members of the same or adjacent barangays to the end that their disputes will not reach the
doors of the courts. Clearly, it does not contemplate a protracted process as suggested by the RTC
ruling and affirmed by the CA.28
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petitioner was estopped from relying on
the June 5, 1999 Agreement between her and respondent Josephine Pablo before the Lupon because
the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca were not parties thereto. The respondents maintained that the
petitioner must bear the blame for her failure to comply with the Local Government Code. At first, she
insisted that there was no need for prior referral of the dispute to the Lupon, claiming that she resided
in a barangay other than where the respondents resided. Thereafter, she made a volte face and invoked
the June 5, 1999 Agreement between her and respondent Josephine Pablo. Moreover, the respondents
aver, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the petitioner’s action for unlawful detainer because it was filed
only on June 21, 2001, or more than one year from June 5, 1999 when the petitioner and respondent
Josephine Pablo executed the agreement. As such, the action should be one for recovery of possession
of property (accion publiciana).
C I V P R O I I K a t a r u n g a n g P a m b a r a n g a y P a g e | 27
On June 2, 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to file
their respective memoranda.29 The parties complied.
The Court rules that the CA cannot be faulted for affirming the decision of the RTC reversing the
decision of the MTC and ordering the dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer without prejudice.
The records show that petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo executed an Agreement on June 5,
1999, which was approved by the Lupon. Respondent Josephine Pablo did not repudiate the
agreement; hence, such agreement of the parties settling the case had the force and effect of a final
judgment. As the Court declared in Vidal v. Escueta,30 the settlement of the parties may be enforced
by the Lupon, through the punong barangay, within six months; and if the settlement is not enforced
after the lapse of said period, it may be enforced by an action in the proper city or municipal court, as
provided in Section 417 of the Local Government Code:
“We also agree that the Secretary of the Lupon is mandated to transmit the settlement to the
appropriate city or municipal court within the time frame under Section 418 of the LGC and to
furnish the parties and the Lupon Chairman with copies thereof. The amicable settlement which
is not repudiated within the period therefor may be enforced by execution by the Lupon through
the Punong Barangay within a time line of six months, and if the settlement is not so enforced
by the Lupon after the lapse of said period, it may be enforced only by an action in the proper
city or municipal court as provided for in Section 417 of the LGC of 1991, as amended, which
reads:
SEC. 417. Execution.—The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced
by execution by the Lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement. After
the lapse of such time, the settlement may be enforced by action in the proper city or
municipal court. (Italics supplied).
Section 417 of the Local Government Code provides a mechanism for the enforcement of a
settlement of the parties before the Lupon. It provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of
an amicable settlement executed by the parties before the Lupon, namely, (a) by execution of
the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the
party/parties entitled thereto; and (b) by an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial.
Under the first remedy, the proceedings are covered by the LGC and the Katarungang
Pambarangay Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Punong Barangay is called upon
during the hearing to determine solely the fact of non-compliance of the terms of the settlement
and to give the defaulting party another chance at voluntarily complying with his obligation
under the settlement. Under the second remedy, the proceedings are governed by the Rules
of Court, as amended. The cause of action is the amicable settlement itself, which, by operation
of law, has the force and effect of a final judgment.
Section 417 of the LGC grants a period of six months to enforce the amicable settlement by
the Lupon through the Punong Barangay before such party may resort to filing an action with
the MTC to enforce the settlement. The raison d’etre of the law is to afford the parties during

the six-month time line, a simple, speedy and less expensive enforcement of their settlement
before the Lupon.”31
In the present case, respondent Josephine Pablo failed to comply with her obligation of repaying the
back rentals of P81,818.00 and the current rentals for the house. Hence, the petitioner had the right to
enforce the Agreement against her and move for her eviction from the premises. However, instead of
filing a motion before the Lupon for the enforcement of the agreement, or (after six months), an action
in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) for the enforcement of the settlement, the petitioner filed an action
against respondent Josephine Pablo for unlawful detainer and the collection of unpaid rentals, inclusive
of those already due before the June 5, 1999 Agreement was executed. The action of the petitioner
against respondent Pablo was barred by the Agreement of June 5, 1999.
The Court notes that the petitioner even submitted with the MTC a copy of her June 5, 1999 Agreement
with respondent Josephine Pablo. Instead of dismissing the complaint as against such respondent, the
MTC rendered judgment against her and ordered her eviction from the leased premises.
The Court thus rules that the petitioner’s complaint against respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca was
premature. It bears stressing that they were not impleaded by the petitioner as parties-respondents
before the Lupon. The petitioner filed her complaint solely against respondent Josephine Pablo.
Moreover, the said respondent heirs were not privy to the said agreement, and, as such, were not
bound by it. Section 412 of the Local Government Code, sets forth the precondition to filing of
complaints in court, to wit:
SEC. 412. Conciliation.—(a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court.—No complaint,
petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be
filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there
has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and
that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or
pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon chairman or pangkat chairman or unless the
settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.
(b)
 Where parties may go directly to court.—The parties may go directly to court in the
following instances:
(1)
 Where the accused is under detention;
(2)
 Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for
habeas corpus proceedings;
(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary
injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property, and support pendente
lite; and
(4)
 Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.
(c)
 Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities.—The customs and
traditions of indigenous cultural communities shall be applied in settling disputes between
members of the cultural communities.
C I V P R O I I K a t a r u n g a n g P a m b a r a n g a y P a g e | 28
Under Sec. 408 of the same Code, parties actually residing in the same city or municipality are bound
to submit their disputes to the Lupon for conciliation/amicable settlement, unless otherwise provided
therein:
SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto.—The lupon of each
barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
(a)
 Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
(b)
 Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;
(c)
 Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding
Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d)
 Offenses where there is no private offended party;
(e)
 Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities
unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by
an appropriate lupon;
(f)
 Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties
thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate
lupon;
(g)
 Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of
justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this Code are
filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable
settlement.
If the complainant/plaintiff fails to comply with the requirements of the Local Government Code, such
complaint filed with the court may be dismissed for failure to exhaust all administrative remedies. 32
The petitioner’s reliance on the ruling of this Court in Diu v. Court of Appeals33 is misplaced. In that
case, there was a confrontation by the parties before the Barangay Chairman and no agreement was
reached. Although no pangkat was formed, the Court held in that instance that there was substantial
compliance with the law. In any event, the issue in that case was whether the failure to specifically
allege that there was no compliance with the barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of
that defense. Moreover, no such confrontation before the Lupon occurred with respect to the unlawful
detainer suit against Josephine Pablo before the MTC.34
In this case, the petitioner and the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca resided in the City of Manila,
albeit in different barangays. The dispute between the petitioner and the respondent heirs was thus a
matter within the authority of the Lupon. Hence, the petitioner’s complaint for unlawful detainer and the
collection of back rentals should have been first filed before the Lupon for mandatory conciliation, to
afford the parties an opportunity to settle the case amicably. However, the petitioner filed her complaint
 C I V P R O I I K a t a r u n g a n g P a m b a r a n g a y P a g e | 29

against the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca directly with the MTC. Clearly then, her complaint was
premature. The execution of the June 5, 1999 Agreement between petitioner and respondent Josephine
Pablo does not amount to substantial compliance to the requirements of the Local Government Code
on mandatory barangay conciliation proceedings.

Indeed, considering that the MTC had already rendered a decision on the merits of the case, it is not
without reluctance that the Court reaches this conclusion which would require the petitioner to start
again from the beginning. The facts of the present case, however, do not leave us any choice. To grant
the petition under these circumstances would amount to refusal to give effect to the Local Government
Code and to wiping it off the statute books insofar as ejectment and other cases governed by the Rule
on Summary Procedure are concerned. This Court has no authority to do that.35

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
Puno (Actg. C.J., Chairman), Austria-Martinez and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J.,On Leave.
Petition denied.

Notes.—While the Local Government Code of 1991 revised the law on katarungang
pambarangay, and expressly repealed P.D. No. 1508, the jurisprudence built on P.D. 1508 regarding
prior referral to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of an action in court remains applicable. (Uy
vs. Contreras, 237 SCRA 167 [1994])

Where only a postal office address is indicated in the complaint, it cannot be said that the parties reside
in the same city or municipality, and the dispute is excepted from the requirement of referral to the
barangay lupon or pangkat for conciliation or settlement prior to filing with the court. (Boleyley vs.
Villanueva, 314 SCRA 364 [1999])

G.R. No. 191336. January 25, 2012.*
CRISANTA ALCARAZ MIGUEL, petitioner, vs. JERRY D. MONTANEZ, respondent.
Civil Law; Compromise Agreements; Amicable Settlements; Barangay Conciliation; An amicable
settlement reached at the barangay conciliation proceedings, is binding between the contracting parties
and, upon its perfection, is immediately executory insofar as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public order and public policy.—It is true that an amicable settlement reached at the barangay
conciliation proceedings, like the Kasunduang Pag-aayos in this case, is binding between the
contracting parties and, upon its perfection, is immediately executory insofar as it is not contrary to law,
good morals, good customs, public order and public policy. This is in accord with the broad precept of
Article 2037 of the Civil Code, viz.: A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res
judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise. Being a by-
product of mutual concessions and good faith of the parties, an amicable settlement has the force and
effect of res judicata even if not judicially approved. It transcends being a mere contract binding only
upon the parties thereto, and is akin to a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with the
Rules. Thus, under Section 417 of the Local Government Code, such amicable settlement or arbitration
award may be enforced by execution by the Barangay Lupon within six (6) months from the date of
settlement, or by filing an action to enforce such settlement in the appropriate city or municipal court, if
beyond the six-month period.
Same; Same; Same; Same; If the amicable settlement is repudiated by one party, either expressly or
impliedly, the other party has two options, namely, to enforce the compromise in accordance with the
Local Government Code or Rules of Court as the case may be, or to consider it rescinded and insist
upon his original demand.—It must be emphasized, however, that enforcement by execution of the
amicable settlement, either under the first or the second remedy, is only applicable if the contracting
parties have not repudiated such settlement within ten (10) days from the date thereof in accordance
with Section 416 of the Local Government Code. If the amicable settlement is repudiated by one party,
either expressly or impliedly, the other party has two options, namely, to enforce the compromise in
accordance with the Local Government Code or Rules of Court as the case may be, or to consider it
rescinded and insist upon his original demand. This is in accord with Article 2041 of the Civil Code,
which qualifies the broad application of Article 2037, viz.: If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide
by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and
insist upon his original demand.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Arellano Law Firm for petitioner.
Calberto M. Caballero for respondent.
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner
Crisanta Alcaraz Miguel (Miguel) seeks the reversal and setting aside of the September 17, 2009
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Decision1 and February 11, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100544,
entitled “Jerry D. Montanez v. Crisanta Alcaraz Miguel.”
Antecedent Facts
On February 1, 2001, respondent Jerry Montanez (Montanez) secured a loan of One Hundred Forty-
Three Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-Four Pesos (P143,864.00), payable in one (1) year, or until
February 1, 2002, from the petitioner. The respondent gave as collateral therefor his house and lot
located at Block 39 Lot 39 Phase 3, Palmera Spring, Bagumbong, Caloocan City.
Due to the respondent’s failure to pay the loan, the petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent
before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay San Jose, Rodriguez, Rizal. The parties entered into a
Kasunduang Pag-aayos wherein the respondent agreed to pay his loan in installments in the amount
of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) per month, and in the event the house and lot given as collateral
is sold, the respondent would settle the balance of the loan in full. However, the respondent still failed
to pay, and on December 13, 2004, the Lupong Tagapamayapa issued a certification to file action in
court in favor of the petitioner.
On April 7, 2005, the petitioner filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch
66, a complaint for Collection of Sum of Money. In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 the respondent
raised the defense of improper venue considering that the petitioner was a resident of Bagumbong,
Caloocan City while he lived in San Mateo, Rizal.After trial, on August 16, 2006, the MeTC rendered a
Decision,4 which disposes as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant Jerry
D. Montanez to pay plaintiff the following:
1. The amount of [Php147,893.00] representing the obligation with legal rate of
interest from February 1, 2002 which was the date of the loan maturity until the account
is fully paid;
2. The amount of Php10,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees; and the costs.
SO ORDERED.” 5
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 146, the respondent raised the
same issues cited in his Answer. In its March 14, 2007 Decision, 6 the RTC affirmed the MeTC Decision,
disposing as follows:
“WHEREFORE, finding no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the court a quo, the appeal
is hereby DISMISSED, and the DECISION appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in its entirety
for being in accordance with law and evidence.
SO ORDERED.”7

Dissatisfied, the respondent appealed to the CA raising two issues, namely, (1) whether or not venue
was improperly laid, and (2) whether or not the Kasunduang Pag-aayos effectively novated the loan
agreement. On September 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, disposing as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision
dated March 14, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 146, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered dismissing respondent’s complaint for collection of
sum of money, without prejudice to her right to file the necessary action to enforce the Kasunduang
Pag-aayos.
SO ORDERED.”8
Anent the issue of whether or not there is novation of the loan contract, the CA ruled in the negative. It
ratiocinated as follows:
“Judging from the terms of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, it is clear that no novation of the old
obligation has taken place. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, there was no reduction of the
term or period originally stipulated. The original period in the first agreement is one (1) year to
be counted from February 1, 2001, or until January 31, 2002. When the complaint was filed
before the barangay on February 2003, the period of the original agreement had long expired
without compliance on the part of petitioner. Hence, there was nothing to reduce or extend.
There was only a change in the terms of payment which is not incompatible with the old
agreement. In other words, the Kasunduang Pag-aayos merely supplemented the old
agreement.”9
The CA went on saying that since the parties entered into a Kasunduang Pag-aayos before the Lupon
ng Barangay, such settlement has the force and effect of a court judgment, which may be enforced by
execution within six (6) months from the date of settlement by the Lupon ng Barangay, or by court
action after the lapse of such time.10 Considering that more than six (6) months had elapsed from the
date of settlement, the CA ruled that the remedy of the petitioner was to file an action for the execution
of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos in court and not for collection of sum of money.11 Consequently, the CA
deemed it unnecessary to resolve the issue on venue.12
The petitioner now comes to this Court.
Issues
(1) Whether or not a complaint for sum of money is the proper remedy for the petitioner,
notwithstanding the Kasunduang Pag-aayos;13 and
(2) Whether or not the CA should have decided the case on the merits rather than remand
the case for the enforcement of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos.14
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Our Ruling
Because the respondent failed to comply with
the terms of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, said
 agreement is deemed rescinded pursuant to
Article 2041 of the New Civil Code and the
petitioner can insist on his original demand. Perforce, the complaint for collection of sum
of money is the proper remedy.
The petitioner contends that the CA erred in ruling that she should have followed the procedure for
enforcement of the amicable settlement as provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law,
instead of filing a collection case. The petitioner points out that the cause of action did not arise from
the Kasunduang Pag-aayos but on the respondent’s breach of the original loan agreement.15
This Court agrees with the petitioner.
It is true that an amicable settlement reached at the barangay conciliation proceedings, like the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos in this case, is binding between the contracting parties and, upon its perfection,
is immediately executory insofar as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public order
and public policy.16 This is in accord with the broad precept of Article 2037 of the Civil Code, viz.:
“A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be
no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.”
Being a by-product of mutual concessions and good faith of the parties, an amicable settlement has
the force and effect of res judicata even if not judicially approved.17 It transcends being a mere contract
binding only upon the parties thereto, and is akin to a judgment that is subject to execution in
accordance with the Rules.18 Thus, under Section 417 of the Local Government Code,19 such amicable
settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the Barangay Lupon within six (6)
months from the date of settlement, or by filing an action to enforce such settlement in the appropriate
city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month period.
Under the first remedy, the proceedings are covered by the Local Government Code and the
Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Punong Barangay is called
upon during the hearing to determine solely the fact of non-compliance of the terms of the settlement
and to give the defaulting party another chance at voluntarily complying with his obligation under the
settlement. Under the second remedy, the proceedings are governed by the Rules of Court, as
amended. The cause of action is the amicable settlement itself, which, by operation of law, has the
force and effect of a final judgment.20
It must be emphasized, however, that enforcement by execution of the amicable settlement, either
under the first or the second remedy, is only applicable if the contracting parties have not repudiated
such settlement within ten (10) days from the date thereof in accordance with Section 416 of the Local

Government Code. If the amicable settlement is repudiated by one party, either expressly or impliedly,
the other party has two options, namely, to enforce the compromise in accordance with the Local
Government Code or Rules of Court as the case may be, or to consider it rescinded and insist upon his
original demand. This is in accord with Article 2041 of the Civil Code, which qualifies the broad
application of Article 2037, viz.:
“If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either
enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.”
In the case of Leonor v. Sycip,21 the Supreme Court (SC) had the occasion to explain this provision of
law. It ruled that Article 2041 does not require an action for rescission, and the aggrieved party, by the
breach of compromise agreement, may just consider it already rescinded, to wit:
It is worthy of notice, in this connection, that, unlike Article 2039 of the same Code, which
speaks of “a cause of annulment or rescission of the compromise” and provides that “the
compromise may be annulled or rescinded” for the cause therein specified, thus suggesting an
action for annulment or rescission, said Article 2041 confers upon the party concerned, not a
“cause” for rescission, or the right to “demand” the rescission of a compromise, but the
authority, not only to “regard it as rescinded”, but, also, to “insist upon his original demand”.
The language of this Article 2041, particularly when contrasted with that of Article 2039,
denotes that no action for rescission is required in said Article 2041, and that the party
aggrieved by the breach of a compromise agreement may, if he chooses, bring the suit
contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any compromise
agreement, without bringing an action for rescission thereof. He need not seek a judicial
declaration of rescission, for he may “regard” the compromise agreement already “rescinded”.22
(emphasis supplied)
As so well stated in the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals,23 a party’s non-compliance with the
amicable settlement paved the way for the application of Article 2041 under which the other party may
either enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, or consider it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. To quote:
“In the case at bar, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode
of enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong Barangay
which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and
(b) an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial. However, the mode of enforcement does
not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041 of the Civil Code. The availability of the right
of rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417 itself which provides that the amicable
settlement “may” be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from its date or
by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond that period. The use of the word
“may” clearly makes the procedure provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law
directory or merely optional in nature.
Thus, although the “Kasunduan” executed by petitioner and respondent before the Office of the
Barangay Captain had the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, petitioner’s non-
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compliance paved the way for the application of Art. 2041 under which respondent may either
enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. Respondent
chose the latter option when he instituted Civil Case No. 5139-V-97 for recovery of unrealized
profits and reimbursement of advance rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s
fees. Respondent was not limited to claiming P150,000.00 because although he agreed to the amount
in the “Kasunduan,” it is axiomatic that a compromise settlement is not an admission of liability but
merely a recognition that there is a dispute and an impending litigation which the parties hope to prevent
by making reciprocal concessions, adjusting their respective positions in the hope of gaining balanced
by the danger of losing. Under the “Kasunduan,” respondent was only required to execute a waiver of
all possible claims arising from the lease contract if petitioner fully complies with his obligations
thereunder. It is undisputed that herein petitioner did not.” 24 (emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
In the instant case, the respondent did not comply with the terms and conditions of the Kasunduang
Pag-aayos. Such non-compliance may be construed as repudiation because it denotes that the
respondent did not intend to be bound by the terms thereof, thereby negating the very purpose for
which it was executed. Perforce, the petitioner has the option either to enforce the Kasunduang Pag-
aayos, or to regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand, in accordance with the provision
of Article 2041 of the Civil Code. Having instituted an action for collection of sum of money, the petitioner
obviously chose to rescind the Kasunduang Pag-aayos. As such, it is error on the part of the CA to rule
that enforcement by execution of said agreement is the appropriate remedy under the circumstances.
Considering that the Kasunduang Pag-
aayos is deemed rescinded by the non-
compliance of the respondent of the terms
thereof, remanding the case to the trial
court for the enforcement of said agree-
ment is clearly unwarranted.
The petitioner avers that the CA erred in remanding the case to the trial court for the enforcement of
the Kasunduang Pag-aayos as it prolonged the process, “thereby putting off the case in an indefinite
pendency.”25 Thus, the petitioner insists that she should be allowed to ventilate her rights before this
Court and not to repeat the same proceedings just to comply with the enforcement of the Kasunduang
Pag-aayos, in order to finally enforce her right to payment.26
The CA took off on the wrong premise that enforcement of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos is the proper
remedy, and therefore erred in its conclusion that the case should be remanded to the trial court. The
fact that the petitioner opted to rescind the Kasunduang Pag-aayos means that she is insisting upon
the undertaking of the respondent under the original loan contract. Thus, the CA should have decided
the case on the merits, as an appeal before it, and not prolong the determination of the issues by
remanding it to the trial court. Pertinently, evidence abounds that the respondent has failed to comply
with his loan obligation. In fact, the Kasunduang Pag-aayos is the well nigh incontrovertible proof of the
respondent’s indebtedness with the petitioner as it was executed precisely to give the respondent a
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second chance to make good on his undertaking. And since the respondent still reneged in paying his
indebtedness, justice demands that he must be held answerable therefor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE
and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 146, Makati City, dated March 14, 2007 is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Perez, Sereno and Perlas-Bernabe,** JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution set aside.

Note.—A detainer suit is premature if it fails to exhaust all administrative remedies, such as compliance
with Section 412 of the Local Government Code on the need for prior barangay conciliation
proceedings. (Villadar, Jr. vs. Zabala, 545 SCRA 325 [2008])