A. WHEN DOES LAW TAKES EFFECT?
NCC 2 Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the
1. PESIGAN VS. ANGELES
FACTS: Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported in the evening of
April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Camarines Sur with
Batangas as their destination. They were provided with three certificates:
1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian, 2) permit to
transfer or transport from the provincial commander; and 3) three
certificates of inspections. In spite of the papers, the carabaos were
confiscated by the provincial veterinarian and the towns police station
commander while passing through Camarines Norte. Confiscation was
based on Executive Order No. 626-A which prohibits transportation of
carabaos and carabeef from one province to another.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A, providing for the
confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported
from one province to another, dated October 25, 1980 is enforceable
before publication in the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982.
RULING: No. The said order isn‗t enforceable against the Pesigans on
April 2, 1982 because it‗s a penal regulation published more than 2
months later in the Official Gazette. It became effective only fifteen days
thereafter as provided in A2 of the Civil Code and §11 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The word ―laws‖ in article 2 includes circulars &
regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise
the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties
binding on the persons affected thereby. Commonwealth Act No. 638
requires that all Presidential Executive Orders having general
applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that,
every order or document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be
deemed to have general applicability and legal effect. This applies to a
violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation &
forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. It results that
they have cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The
summary confiscation wasnt in order. The recipients of the carabaos
should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the
carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said
executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and
Zenerosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of
the carabaos.
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected
hereby. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of
that provision by means of the publication on the Gazette.
2. PEOPLE VS. VERIDIANO
FACTS: Private respondent Benito Go Bio, Jr. was charged w/ violation
of BP 22. Before he could be arraigned, Go Bio, Jr. filed a Motion to
Quash the information on the ground that the info, did not charge an
offense, pointing out that at the time of the alleged commission of the
offense, w/c was about the second week of May 1979 (date of issue of
the check), BP 22 has not yet taken effect. The prosecution opposed the
motion contending, among others, that the date of the dishonor of the
check, September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the offense.
Resolving the motion, the court granted the same and held that BP 22
cannot be given a retroactive effect to apply to the case. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner submitting for review the
respondent Judge's dismissal of the criminal case.
HELD: When private resp. Go Bio, Jr. committed the act complained of in
May 1979 (at the time he issued the check-- the law penalizes the act of
making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check and not only the
fact of its dishonor), there was no law penalizing such act. Following the
special provision of BP 22, it became effective only on June 29, 1979.
The copy editor of the OG made a certification that the penal statute in
question was made public only on 6/14/79 and not on the printed date
4/9/79. Differently stated, 6/14/79 was the date of publication of BP 22.
Before the public may be bound by its contents especially its penal
provisions, the law must be published and the people officially informed
of its contents. For, it a statute had not been published before its viod,
then, in the eyes of the law, there was no such law to be violated and,
consequently the accused could not have committed the alleged crime.
The effectivity clause of BP 22 states that "This Act shall take effect 15
days after publication in the Official Gazette." The term "publication" in
such clause should be given the ordinary accepted meaning, i.e., to
make known to the people in general. If the legislature had intended to
make the printed date of issue of the OG as the point of reference, then it
could have so stated in the special effectivity provision of BP 22.
3. TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
FACTS: Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for
writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or
cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the
dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal
personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required
before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.
RULING: Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the
date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which
he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be
published in the Official Gazette. The word ―shall‖ therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public
concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general
applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before
a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances
of general application which have not been published have no force and
effect.
4. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs. HYPERMIX
FACTS:
November 7 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO
27-2003 (Customs Memorandum Order). Under the memorandum, for tariff
purposes, wheat is classified according to: 1. Importer or consignee, 2. Country
of origin, and 3. Port of discharge. Depending on these factors wheat would
be classified as either as food grade or food feed. The corresponding tariff for
food grade wheat was 3%, for food feed grade 7%. A month after the issuance
of CMO 27-200 respondent filed a petition for declaratory for Relief with the
Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City.
Respondent contented that CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the
mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior
notice, and publication or registration with University of the Philippines Law
Canter. Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to
be a feed grade supplier without the benefit of prior assessment and
examination, despite having imported food grade wheat, it would be
subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing to pay 133%.
Respondent also claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution
was violated and asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation
was confiscatory in nature.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss. They alleged that: 1. The RTC did not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, 2. an action for declaratory
relief (Rule 63, Sec.1 “who may file petition”) was improper, 3. CMO 27-2003
was internal administrative rule not legislative in nature, and 4. The claims of
respondent were speculative and premature, because the Bureau of Customs
had yet to examine respondent’s products.
RTC held that a petition for declaratory relief was proper remedy,
and that respondent was the proper party to file it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CMO 27-2003 of the petitioner met the requirements for the
Revised Administrative Code? Whether or not the content of the CMO 27-2003
met the requirement of the equal protection clause of the Constitution?
RULLING:
No, they did not. The petitioners violated respondents’ right to due
process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they failed to observe the
requirements under the Administrative Code which are:
Sec 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law
Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on
the date of effectively of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months
from that date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any
party of persons.
Sec 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency
shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and
afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the
adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid
unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of
general circulation at least 2 weeks before the first hearing thereon.(3) In case
of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.
No. CMO 27-2003 did not meet these requirements. For a classification to be
reasonable, it must be shown that 1. it rests on substantial distinctions; 2. it is
germane to the purpose of the law; 3. it is not limited to existing conditions
only; and 4. it applies equally to all members of the same class. Petitioners
violated respondents right to equal protection of laws when they provided for
unreasonable classification in the application of the regulation. Petitioner
Commissioner of Customs went beyond his powers of delegated authority
when the regulation limited the powers of the customs officer to examine and
assess imported articles.
5. MARALITA
DOCTRINE:
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since
its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
FACTS:
By virtue of Proclamation 423, Former President Carlos P. Garcia reserved
parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Paranaque, Province of
Rizal and Pasay City for military reservation. Later on, Former President Marcos
issued a proclamation amending such publication, which excludes certain
area of the reserved land. Again, President Marcos issued Proclamation No.
2476 that further amended the proclamation that excluded the barangays of
Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village and a handwritten
addendum which includes Western Bicutan for the disposition of the area. The
proclamation was published in the Official Gazette without the handwritten
addendum. Demolition of illegal structures existed to prevent the area from
the increasing number of informal settlers. Members of petitioner
Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) and Western Bicutan
Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed for a Petition with Commission on
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) praying for the reclassification of the
areas they are occupying as is already alienable and disposable. COSLAP
ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not published
thus the areas occupied by the petitioners are in question alienable and
disposable.
NMSMI and WBLOAI filed Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE: Did the handwritten addendum of President Marcos have the force and
effect of law though it was not included in the publication?
RULING:
NO, the handwritten addendum of President Marcos did not have the force
and effect law since it was not included in the publication. We agree that the
publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the
Civil Code expressly provides: ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication. Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is
indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise
provided.
In the case at bar, though Proclamation No. 2476 was published in an Official
Gazette, the handwritten addendum of President Marcos declaring the
Western Bicutan as alienable and disposable was not included.
Therefore, without publication, the handwritten addendum of President
Marcos never had any legal force and effect.
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, NCC 3
6. KASILAG VS. RODRIGUEZ
FACTS: Responds, Rafaela Rodriguez, et al., children and heirs of the
deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced a civil case to recover from
the petitioner the possession of the land and its improvements granted
by way of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio.
The parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on
the land acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the
indebtedness for P1,000 plus interest. In Clause V, the parties stipulated
that Emiliana Ambrosio was to pay, w/in 4 1/2 years, the debt w/ interest
thereon, in which event the mortgage would not have any effect; in
Clause VI, the parties agreed that the tax on the land and its
improvements, during the existence of the mortgage, should be paid by
the owner of the land; in Clause VII, it was covenanted that w/in 30 days
from the date of the contract, the owner of the land would file a motion in
the CFI of Bataan asking that cert. of title no. 325 be cancelled and that
in lieu thereof another be issued under the provisions of RA 496; in
clause VIII the parties agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to
redeem the mortgage w/in the stipulated period of 4 1/2 years, she would
execute an absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the mortgagee,
the petitioner, for the same amount of the loan including unpaid interest;
and in Clause IX it was stipulated that in case the motion to be presented
under Clause VII should be disapproved by the CFI-Bataan, the contract
of sale of sale would automatically become void and the mortgage would
subsist in all its force.
One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, it came to pass that
Emiliana Ambrosio was unable to pay the stipulated interest as well as
the tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she and the
petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to
the latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would not
collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land
tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce
improvements thereon.
HELD: The possession by the petitioner and his receipts of the fruits of
the land, considered as integral elements of the contract of antichresis,
are illegal and void agreements, because such contract is a lien and as
such is expressly prohibited by Sec 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended.
The CA held that petitioner acted In BF in taking possession of the land
because he knew that the contract he made w/ EA was an absolute sale,
and further, that the latter could not sell the land because it is prohibited
by Sec. 116 of Act 2874.
xxx [A] person is deemed a possessor in bad faith when he knows that
there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is
invalidated.
The question to be answered is w/n the petitioner should be deemed a
possessor in GF because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the
manner of its acquisition by w/c it is invalidated. Ignorance of the flaw is
the keynote of the rule. From the facts as found by the CA, we can
neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his
title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition
contained in Sec. 116. This being the case, the question is within good
faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws.
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of
good faith but excusable ignorance may be such basis (if it is based
upon ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant
with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of
the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was
not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking
possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not
know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of
the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter,
as a lien, was prohibited by Sec. 116. Thus, as to the petitioner, his
ignorance of the provisions of sec. 116 is excusable and may be the
basis of good faith.
The petitioners being in good faith, the respondents may elect to have
the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter the
value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the
land where the improvements or plants are found, by paying them its
market value to be fixed by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties.
RETROACTIVITY, NCC 4
7. USON VS DEL ROSARIO
FACTS
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in
1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir
except his widow Maria Uson. Maria Uson sought to recover lands held by
Maria del Rosario who had four illegitimate children with Nebreda, which the
latter contends that her children are given the status and rights of natural
children and are entitled to the successional rights, and because these
successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall
be given retroactive effect.
ISSUE

Whether or not the illegitimate children may have successional rights under the
new Civil Code by way of its retroactive effect.
RULING
NO. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are
declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event
which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but
this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired
right of the same origin. The law commands that the rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new
right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of
the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested
right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
8. ACOSTA VS PLAN
Facts:
Petitioners filed an accion publiciana against private respondent Magday at
the CFI of Isabela. Believing that as pauper litigants they did not have to
submit a record on appeal, they waited for the trial court to elevate the entire
records of the case to CA (as provided in Section 16, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court).
On June 16, 1976, respondent Judge dismissed the appeal for failure to file a
record on appeal, hence this petition. Under the Rules of Court then in force, a
record on appeal was indeed required to be filed by a pauper appellant
although it did not have to be printed.
Issue: Whether or not a timely submission of a record on appeal is required for
the perfection of an appeal by a pauper litigant
NO.
Under B.P. Blg. 129, which has overtaken this case before it could be decided,
a record on appeal is no longer required for the perfection of an appeal. This
law was given retroactive effect.
As held in People v Sumilang, being procedural in nature, those provisions may
be applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners, as appellants. 'Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to
actions pending undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws
are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.'
9. DACUDAO VS GONZALES
Facts: The petitioners filed a case of syndicated estafa against Celso Delos
Angeles and his associates after the petitioners were defrauded in a business
venture. Thereafter, the DOJ Secretary issued Department Order 182 which
directs all prosecutors in the country to forward all cases already filed against
Celso Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates to the secretariat of DOJ in Manila
for appropriate action. However, in a separate order which is Memorandum
dated March 2009, it was said that cases already filed against Celso Delos
Angeles et. al of the Legacy Group of Companies in Cagayan De Oro City
need not be sent anymore to the Secretariat of DOJ in Manila. Because of
such DOJ orders, the complaint of petitioners was forwarded to the secretariat
of the Special Panel of the DOJ in Manila. Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed
this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing to the
respondent Secretary of justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
department Order and the Memorandum, which according to the violated
their right to due process, right to equal protection of the law and right to
speedy disposition of the cases. The petitioners opined that orders were
unconstitutional or exempting from coverage cases already filed and pending
at the Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan De Oro City. They contended that the
assailed issuances should cover only future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et
al, not those already being investigated. They maintained that DO 182 was
issued in violation of the prohibition against passing laws with retroactive
effect.
Issue: Whether or not the assailed issuances can be given retroactive effect.
Ruling: Yes. As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However,
exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in
nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies
or modes of procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights
but operates only in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation already
existing rights. The retroactive application is not violative of any right of a
person who may feel adversely affected, for, no vested right generally
attaches to or arises from procedural law.