#29 RIVERA, HONEYLET MICHELLE G.

RIVERA
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

1. G.R. No. 209031, April 16, 2018

ABIGAEL AN ESPINA-DAN, Petitioner v. MARCO DAN, Respondent

2. G.R. No. 229272; November 19, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner v. GINA TECAG, Respondent

3. G.R. No. 218630, January 11, 2018REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs. KATRINA S. TOBORA-TIONGLICO, Respondent;

4. G.R. No. 210518; April 18, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner v. MARTIN NIKOLAI Z. JAVIER and
MICHELLE K. MERCADO- JAVIER, Respondent

PRESUMPTIVE DECLARATION

5. G.R. No. 210580 APRIL 18, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner v.
LUDYSON C. CATUBAG, Respondent

6. G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018

ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent

CAPACITY TO CONTRACT MARRIAGE/ REMARRIAGE

7. G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner VS. MARELYN MANALO, Respondent

8. G.R. No. 212860, March 14, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner v. FLORIE GRACE M. COTE, Respondent

DAMAGES

9. G.R. No. 207004, June 06, 2018

Astrid A. Van De Brug, Martin G. Aguilar and Glenn G. Aguilar, Petitioner vs. Philippine
National Bank, Respondent
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

10. G.R. No. 212683; November 12, 2018

JERSON E. TORTAL, Petitioner v. CHIZURU TANIGUCHI, Respondent

WILLS AND SUCCESSION

WITNESSES TO A WILLS

11. G.R. No. 213994, April 18, 2018

MARGIE SANTOS MITRA, Petitioner, v. PERPETUA L. SABLAN-GUEVARRA, REMEGIO
L. SABLAN, ET AL., Respondents.

INTESTATE SUCCESSION

12. G.R. No. 196499, November 28, 2018

INGRID V. HILARIO, Petitioner v. THELMA V. MIRANDA AND IRENEA BELLOC,
Respondent

PROPERTY

IN GENERAL

13. G.R. No. 217051, August 22, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner v. SPOUSES CORNELIO ALFORTE AND
SUSANA ALFORTE, Respondent

14. G.R. No. 190817, January 10, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs. ROVENCY REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent

15. G.R. No. 231116, February 07, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. CLARO YAP, Respondent.

OWNERSHIP

16. G.R. No. 213972, February 05, 2018

FELICITAS L. SALAZAR, Petitioner, v. REMEDIOS FELIAS, ON HER OWN BEHALF AND
REPRESENTATION OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF CATALINO NIVERA, Respondents
 17. G.R. No. 200223, June 06, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LAKAMBINI C. JABSON, PARALUMAN
C. JABSON, MAGPURI C. JABSON, MANUEL C. JABSON III, EDGARDO C. JABSON,
RENATO C. JABSON, NOEL C. JABSON, AND NESTOR C. JABSON, REPRESENTED BY
LAKAMBINI C. JABSON, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, Respondents.

18. G.R. No. 196733, November 21, 2018

HEIRS OF ROGER JARQUE, Petitioner, v. MARCIAL JARQUE, LELIA JARQUE-LAGSIT,
AND TERESITA JARQUE-BAILON, Respondent

19. G.R. No. 225176 January 19, 2018

ESMERALDO GATCHALIAN, duly represented by SAMUEL GATCHALIAN, Petitioner v.
CESAR FLORES, JOSE LUIS ARANETA, CORAZON QUING, and CYNTHIA FLORES,
Respondents

INNOCENT PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH

20. G.R. No. 225929, January 24, 2018

JOSE V. GAMBITO, Petitioner, v. ADRIAN OSCAR Z. BACENA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 209031, April 16, 2018

ABIGAEL AN ESPINA-DAN, Petitioner v. MARCO DAN, Respondent
Del Castillo, J.

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petition for Review on Certiorari

FACTS:

Petitioner and Respondent met in the chatroom sometime in May 2005. In November,
2005, respondent proposed marriage. The following year, he flew in from Italy and tied the knot
with petitioner on January 23, 2006. Soon after the wedding, respondent returned to Italy.
Petitioner followed thereafter, or on February 23, 2006. The couple lived together in Italy.

While they were in Italy, Petitioner observed that Respondent is addicted to video games and that
Respondent was extremely lazy that he never helped her in doing all the household chores. He
also has extremely poor hygiene. He seldom takes a bath and brushes his teeth. For him to be able
to take, a bath, petitioner would literally push him to the bathroom or hand him his toothbrush
with toothpaste to brush his teeth. She had to put deodorant on his underarms for he would not
do it himself. He refused circumcision.

That is why, on April 2007, Petitioner went back to the Philippines and filed a case for declaration
of nullity of her marriage on the ground of Psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:

Whether there is sufficient evidence to prove Psychological Incapacity on the part of the
Respondent

RULING:

None. While petitioner alleged such condition, she was unable to establish its existence, gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability based solely on her testimony, which is insufficient, self-
serving, unreliable, and uncorroborated, as she did not know respondent very well enough -
having been with, him only for a short period of time; Dr. Tayag's psychological report - which is
practically one-sided for the latter's failure to include respondent in the study; and the account of
petitioner's mother, which is deemed biased and thus of doubtful credibility.

Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of her judicial affidavit and testimony; the judicial affidavits
and testimonies of her mother and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological, evaluation report on
the psychological condition of both petitioner and respondent. The determination of respondent's
alleged psychological incapacity was based solely on petitioner's account and that of her mother,
since respondent was presumably in Italy and did not participate in the proceedings.

At some point in her accounts, petitioner admitted that before and during their marriage,
respondent was working and giving money to her; that respondent was romantic, sweet,
thoughtful, responsible, and caring; and that she and respondent enjoyed a harmonious
relationship. This belies her claim that petitioner was psychologically unfit for marriage. As
correctly observed by the trial and appellate courts, the couple simply drifted apart as a result of
irreconcilable differences and basic incompatibility owing to differences in culture and
upbringing, and the very short period that they spent together prior to their tying the knot. As for
respondent's claimed addiction to video games and cannabis, the trial and appellate courts are
correct in their ruling that these are not an incurable condition, and petitioner has not shown that
she helped her husband overcome them - as part of her marital obligation to render support and
aid to respondent.

Hence, the Petition is denied.

G.R. No. 229272; November 19, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner v. GINA TECAG, Respondent
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision rendered by the CA granting the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Article 36 of the Family Code.

FACTS:

After living together as husband and wife for two years, Gina and Marjune formalized their marital
union through civil rites on August 2, 2006. As a means of livelihood, they engaged in vegetable
farming until Gina found employment in Macau, where she likewise searched for job
opportunities for Marjune. When she found one suited for him, she sent money for his travel
abroad, but Marjune refused to go, telling her that he would rather use the money for their farming
venture.

As months passed, the communication between Gina and Marjune became less frequent until it
ceased altogether. During the rare times when Gina would call, they would only end up arguing,
as Marjune would be too drunk to talk. Eventually, news reached Gina that Marjune was having
an affair. To confirm the news, Gina returned to the Philippines in 2009. However, Marjune told
her that it was better for her to stay abroad. Brokenhearted, Gina returned to Macau. It was only
later when she was able to confirm through relatives and friends that, indeed, Marjune was having
an affair. In 2010, while she was abroad, a woman called and informed her that she was presently
living with Marjune and that they already have a child. Gina also alleged that Marjune hit her
because she was unable to conceive.

Thus, Gina filed a petition to declare her marriage with Marjune null and void on the basis of the
latter's psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:

Whether an avoidant personality disorder and sexual infidelity are sufficient to declare the person
psychologically incapacitated.

RULING:

No. Settled is the rule that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that one is suffering
from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations
of a disordered personality which makes him/her completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of marriage.

Based on jurisprudence, psychological incapacity has a specific and peculiar denotation. It ought
to pertain to only the most serious cases of personality disorders that clearly demonstrate the
party's/parties' utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It
should refer to no less than a mental - not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.

Psychological incapacity is more than just a "difficulty," "refusal," or "neglect" in the performance
of marital obligations. Instead, it is a serious, deep-rooted, and incurable psychological condition
that renders the party incapable of complying with - as they are basically incognitive of - these
marital obligations.

G.R. No. 218630, January 11, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs. KATRINA S. TOBORA-TIONGLICO,
Respondent;

TIJAM, J.:

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated May 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985, which affirmed the May 8, 2012 Decision rendered by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Imus Cavite, Branch 20, granting the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of Article 36 of the Family Code and declaring the marriage of Katrina S.
Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio.

FACTS:
Katrina and Lawrence met sometime in 1997 through a group of mutual friends. After a brief
courtship, they entered into a relationship. When she got pregnant, the two panicked as both
their parents were very strict and conservative. Lawrence did not receive the news well as he was
worried how it would affect his image and how his parents would take the situation.
Nevertheless, they got married on July 22, 2000.

Upon their return, they moved into the home of Lawrence's parents until the birth of their child,
Lanz Rafael Tabora Tionglico (Lanz), on December 30, 2000. Lawrence was distant and did not
help in rearing their child, saying he knew nothing about children and how to run a family.
Lawrence spent almost every night out for late dinners, parties and drinking sprees. Katrina
noticed that Lawrence was alarmingly dependent on his mother and suffered from a very high
degree of immaturity. Lawrence would repeatedly taunt Katrina to fight with him and they lost
all intimacy between them as he insisted to have a maid sleep in their bedroom every night to
see to the needs of Lanz.
In 2003, due to their incessant fighting, Lawrence asked Katrina to leave his parents' home and
never to come back. They have been separated in fact since then

Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano (Dr. Arellano), who confirmed her
beliefs on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Dr. Arellano determined that this personality
disorder is permanent, incurable, and deeply integrated within his psyche; and that it was
present but repressed at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the onset was in early
adulthood.

RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage of Katrina and Lawrence as void ab initio.

ISSUE:

Whether the totality of evidence presented by Katrina supports the findings of both the RTC and
the CA that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital
obligations, meriting the dissolution of his marriage with Katrina.

RULING:

The court ruled in the negative. It has been held that "psychological incapacity" has been
intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.

We find that Katrina failed to sufficiently prove that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to
discharge the duties expected of a husband.

Indeed, and We have oft-repeated that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must
always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on
the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.
Here, we reiterate that apart from the psychiatrist, Katrina did not present other witnesses to
substantiate her allegations on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Her testimony, therefore, is
considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value

G.R. No. 210518; April 18, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner v. MARTIN NIKOLAI Z. JAVIER and
MICHELLE K. MERCADO- JAVIER, Respondent
REYES, JR., J.

NATURE OF THE ACTION:

Petition for review on certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

FACTS:

Martin and Michelle were married on February 8, 2002. On 2008, Martin filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Joint Custody of Common Minor Child under Article 36 of
the Family Code. Martin alleged that both he and Michelle were psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He thus prayed for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage, and for the joint custody of their minor child, Amanda M. Javier.

In order to support the allegations in his petition, Martin testified on his own behalf, and
presented the psychological findings of Dr. Elias D. Adamos and diagnosed her with Narcissistic
Personality Disorder. Their disorder was considered grave and incurable, and rendered Martin
and Michelle incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Dr. Adamos further
testified before the RTC to provide his expert opinion, and stated that with respect to the
Psychological Impression Report on Michelle, the informants were Martin and the respondents'
common friend, Jose Vicente Luis Serra.

ISSUE:

Whether or not both of the spouses are Psychologically capacitated.

RULING:

No. Only the psychological ioncapacity of Martin was proved. Martin was diagnosed with
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, with tendencies toward sadism. Dr. Adamos concluded from
the tests administered on Martin that this disorder was rooted in the traumatic experiences he
experienced during his childhood, having grown up around a violent father who was abusive of
his mother. This adversely affected Martin in such a manner that he formed unrealistic values and
standards on his own marriage, and proposed unconventional sexual practices. When Michelle
would disagree with his ideals, Martin would not only quarrel with Michelle, but would also inflict
harm on her. Other manifestations include excessive love for himself, self-entitlement,
immaturity, and self-centeredness.

the Court emphasizes that the factual circumstances obtaining in this specific case warrant the
declaration that Martin is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations at the time of his marriage to Michelle. This is neither a relaxation nor abandonment
of previous doctrines relating to Article 36 of the Family Code. The guidelines in Molina still apply
to all petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage inasmuch as this Court does not lose sight of
the constitutional protection to the institution of marriage.

G.R. No. 210580 APRIL 18, 2018

 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner v.
LUDYSON C. CATUBAG, Respondent

REYES, JR., J.:

NATURE OF THE ACTION:

Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 131269 dated September 3, 2013 and December 6,
2013. The assailed Resolutions denied the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner for failure to
file a motion for reconsideration. Likewise challenged is the Decision dated May 23, 2013 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11, declaring Ludyson C. Catubag's
(private respondent) spouse, Shanaviv G. Alvarez-Catubag (Shanaviv), as presumptively dead.

FACTS:

Private respondent and Shanaviv had been cohabiting with each other as husband and wife.
Their union begot two (2) children named Mark Bryan A. Catubag and Rose Mae A. Catubag,
both of whom were born on May 18, 2000 and May 21, 2001, respectively. On June 26, 2003,
private respondent and Shanaviv tied the knot in Rizal, Cagayan. The marriage was solemnized
by Honorable Judge Tomas D. Lasam at the Office of the Municipal Judge, Rizal, Cagayan.

Sometime in April 2006, private respondent and his family were able to acquire a housing unit
located at Rio del Grande Subdivision, Enrile Cagayan. Thereafter, private respondent returned
overseas to continue his work. On July 12, 2006, while working abroad, private respondent was
informed by his relatives that Shanaviv left their house and never returned.

He then proceeded to inquire about Shanaviv's whereabouts from their close friends and
relatives, but they too could offer no help. On May 4, 2012, after almost seven (7) years of
waiting, private respondent filed with the RTC a petition to have his wife declared presumptively
dead.

On May 23, 2013, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent complied with the requisites of a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Art. 41 of the Family Code

RULING:

The petition is impressed with merit. Prevailing jurisprudence has time and again pointed out
four (4) requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code that must be complied with for the
declaration of presumptive death to prosper: first, the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger
of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code. Second, the present
spouse wishes to remarry. Third, the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee
is dead. Fourth, the present spouse files for a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
In the instant case, since it is private respondent who asserts the affirmative of the issue, then it
is his duty to substantiate the same. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegations will not suffice. The Court finds that private respondent's efforts falls short of the
degree of diligence required by jurisprudence for the following reasons:

First, private respondent claims to have inquired about his missing wife's whereabouts from
both friends and relatives. Further, he claims to have carried out such inquiries in the place
where they lived and, in the place, where his wife was born and raised. However, private
respondent failed to present any of these alleged friends or relatives to corroborate these
"inquiries." Moreover, no explanation for such omission was given. As held in the previous
cases, failure to present any of the persons from whom inquiries were allegedly made tends to
belie a claim of a diligent search.

Second, private respondent did not seek the help of other concerned government agencies,
namely, the local police authorities and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
In Cantor, the Court reasoned that while a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature
of the situation, it would still be prudent for the present spouse to seek the aid of the authorities
in searching for the missing spouse. Absent such efforts to employ the help of local authorities,
the present spouse cannot be said to have actively and diligently searched for the absentee
spouse. 52

Finally, aside from the certification of Bombo Radyo's manager, private respondent bases his
"well-founded belief' on bare assertions that he exercised earnest efforts in looking for his wife.
Again, the present spouse's bare assertions, uncorroborated by any kind of evidence, falls short
of the diligence required to engender a well-founded belief that the absentee spouse is dead.

Taken together, the Court is of the view that private respondent's efforts in searching for his
missing wife, Shanaviv, are merely passive. Private respondent could have easily convinced the
Court otherwise by providing evidence which corroborated his "earnest-efforts." Yet, no
explanation or justification was given for these glaring omissions. Again, he who alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it by some other means than mere allegations.

G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018

 ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent

Velasco, Jr. J.

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Appeal assailing the decision of the CA.

FACTS:

Petitoner is married to Wilfredo who is a member of the Philippine Constabulary and was
assigned in Arayat, Pampanga since August 24, 1967, but he never came back from his tour of
duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he never made contact or communicated with the
petitioner nor to his relatives. With this, Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine
Constabulary for any news regarding her beloved husband, but the Philippine Constabulary had
no answer to his whereabouts, neither did they have any news of him going AWOL, all they know
was he was assigned to a place frequented by the New People's Army.

Weeks became years and years became decades, but the petitioner never gave up hope, and after
more than three (3) decades of waiting, the [petitioner is still hopeful, but the times had been
tough on her, specially with a meager source of income coupled with her age, it is now necessary
for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to survive. Hence, petitioner
filed a Petition for presumptive death of her husband to get the benefits as required by law.

The RTC granted the petition under Rule 41 of the Family Code. The CA however, granted a
decision setting aside the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether the decision of RTC to declare Wilfredo presumptively dead under Article 41 of the
Family Code is correct.

RULING:

No. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that
would have warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC because petitioner was not seeking
to remarry. A reading of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of death established
therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the
said law.

RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive death of Wilfredo was
misleading and grossly improper. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by
petitioner was based on the Civil Code, and not on Article 41 of the FC.

Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death of
Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the RTC should have dismissed such petition outright. This is
because, in our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a person declared
presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any
authority to take cognizance of the same.

G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner VS. MARELYN MANALO, Respondent

Peralta, J.

NATURE OF THE ACTION:

Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and
set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076.

FACTS:

A divorce decree that was secured by a Filipino spouse (Marelyn Taneo Manalo) through a
petition for divorce that she initiated in Japan, in accordance with the national law of her
foreign spouse (Japanese national Yoshino Minoro).

The trial court (RTC) denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by
Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil
Code, the Philippine law “does not afford Filipinos the right to file a divorce, whether they are in
the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated
their marriage in the Philippines or in another country” and that unless Filipinos “are naturalized
as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipino
family rights and duties, together with determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter
into contracts and civil relations, including marriages”.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for
divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer
married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec.
Secretary, et al. [663 Phil. 546 (2011)] ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the
intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the
height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is
no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce
case is inconsequential.

ISSUE:
Whether a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a favorable
judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has the capacity to
remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.

RULING:
Yes. Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can we put words in the mouth of lawmakers. The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words to have used words advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of
such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a
statute there should be departure."

G.R. No. 212860, March 14, 2018

 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner v. FLORIE GRACE M. COTE,
Respondent

Reyes, Jr., J.

NATURE OF THE ACTION:

Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS:

Rhomel Gagarin Cote (Rhomel) and respondent Florie Grace Manongdo-Cote (Florie) were
married in Quezon City. At the time of their marriage, the spouses were both Filipinos and were
already blessed with a son. On 2002, Rhomel filed a Petition for Divorce before the Family Court
of the First Circuit of Hawaii on the ground that their marriage was irretrievably broken. This was
granted on August 23, 2002.

Seven years later, Florie commenced a petition for recognition of foreign judgment granting the
divorce before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Florie also prayed for the cancellation of her
marriage contract, hence, she also impleaded the Civil Registry of Quezon City and the National
Statistics Office (NSO). The Office of the Solicitor General, representing Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner), deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor to appear on behalf of the
State during the trial. On April 2011, RTC granted the petition and declared Florie to be
capacitated to remarry after the RTC's decision attained finality and a decree of absolute nullity
has been issued.

ISSUE:

Whether Florie is capacitated to remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

RULING:

Yes. Although the Court has already laid down the rule regarding foreign divorce involving
Filipino citizens, the Filipino spouse who likewise benefits from the effects of the divorce cannot
automatically remarry. Before the divorced Filipino spouse can remarry, he or she must file a
petition for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce.

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered
by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must
be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made
in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

After a careful consideration of the evidence presented and Florie having sufficiently complied
with the jurisdictional requirements, judgment was rendered by the lower court recognizing the
decree of foreign divorce. It likewise declared Florie legally capacitated to remarry citing the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

G.R. No. 207004, June 06, 2018

 Astrid A. Van De Brug, Martin G. Aguilar and Glenn G. Aguilar, Petitioner vs.
Philippine National Bank, Respondent
Caguioa, J.
NATURE OF THE ACTION:
Petition or review (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) dated March 23, 2012 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00708, which granted the appeal of the
respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB) and reversed the Decision dated December 10, 2004
of the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental
(RTC) in Civil Case No. RTC-725 in favor of the petitioners. Likewise, the Resolution of the CA
dated April 1, 2013, denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, is being assailed.
FACTS:
Spouses Romulus and Evelyn are borrowing clients of PNB. It was secured by real
estate mortgage over four parcels of land. However, for their failure to pay
obligations, mortgage was foreclosed and ownership was consolidated under PNB.
With the enactment of RA 7202 on February 29, 1992, the late Romulus Aguilar wrote [PNB] on
July 5, 1995, and he stated: "Since our indebtedness with the PNB had been foreclosed, we are
asking your good Office for a reconsideration of our account based on the Sugar Restitution
Law."
Now, the children of the late spouses Aguilar is asking the PNB to help them the accorded benefit
of RA 7202, but to no avail, the PNB did not help them. PNB, claimed that Petitioners failed to
comply the requirements given under the law.
ISSUE:
Whether the Petitioner may claim for damages under Art. 19 of the NCC?
RULING:
No. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right; that is,
when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised only for the purpose of prejudicing or injuring
another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure
another
In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
In this case, the Aguilars failed to substantiate the above requisites to justify the award of damages
in their favor against PNB, who merely exercised its legal right as a creditor pursuant to RA 7202.

G.R. No. 212683; November 12, 2018

 JERSON E. TORTAL, Petitioner v. CHIZURU TANIGUCHI, Respondent

Leonen, J.

NATURE OF THE ACTION:

Petition for Review on Certiorari which grants the CA ruling which upheld the annulment of the
levy and sale of a house and lot covered by a compromise agreement between Tortal and
Sevillana P. Sales

FACTS: Tortal and Taniguchi were married in 1999 and sometime in 2000, Taniguchi filed a
petition for the nullity of her marriage with Tortal which was granted by the RTC of Paranaque.
In the same decision annulling their marriage, the Regional Trial Court declared the house and
lot to be Taniguchi's exclusive property. Tortal did not move for the reconsideration of this
decision. Hence, it became final and executory on October 14, 2005.

While the petition for nullity of marriage was pending, Sales filed a complaint for collection of
sum of money against Tortal. Sales and Tortal eventually entered into a compromise agreement,
and Tortal and Taniguchi's house and lot was levied. Tanuguchi upon learning the levying of his
house, moved to declare the levy null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether Tortal may file an annulment of judgement to the RTC’s decision to grant Taniguichi’s
petition for nullity of marriage and therefore still had the right over the property levied.

RULING:

No. Without a ruling from the Court of Appeals nullifying the Regional Trial Court August 25,
2003 Decision, which granted the nullity of petitioner and respondent's marriage and declared
respondent as the exclusive owner of the house and lot, this Decision remains valid and subsisting.
Moreover, it became final and executory as early as October 14, 2005; hence, the lower courts did
not err in granting the petition for nullity of levy and sale at auction since respondent was the
established exclusive owner of the house and lot. Thus, petitioner had no authority to use the real
property as security for his indebtedness with Sales.
 G.R. No. 213994, April 18, 2018
MARGIE SANTOS MITRA, Petitioner, v. PERPETUA L. SABLAN-GUEVARRA,
REMEGIO L. SABLAN, ET AL., Respondents.

REYES, JR., J.:

Nature of the action:

Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision dated May 22, 2013 and Resolution dated
August 15, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93671, which reversed the
Decision dated February 23, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 128 of Caloocan
City in SP. Proc. Case No. C-3450.

Facts:

On June 26, 2006, Margie Santos Mitra (petitioner) filed a petition for the probate of the
notarial will of Remedios Legaspi y Reyes (Legaspi) with prayer for issuance of letters
testamentary before the RTC. It was alleged that the petitioner is the de facto adopted daughter
of Legaspi; that Legaspi, single, died on December 22, 2004 in Caloocan City; that Legaspi left a
notarial will, instituting the petitioner, Orlando Castro, Perpetua Sablan Guevarra, and Remigio
Legaspi Sablan, as her heirs, legatees and devisees; that Legaspi left real and personal properties
with the approximate total value of One Million Thirty-Two Thousand and Two Hundred Thirty
Seven Pesos (P1,032,237.00); and that Legaspi named Mary Ann Castro as the executor of the
will.

Perpetua L. Sablan-Guevarra and Remegio L. Sablan (respondents), who claim to be Legaspi's

legal heirs, opposed the petition. They aver that the will was not executed in accordance with the
formalities required by law; that since the last page of the will, which contained the
Acknowledgement, was not signed by Legaspi and her instrumental witnesses, the will should be
declared invalid; that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages upon which the
will was written; and that the will was executed under undue and improper pressure, thus,
Legaspi could not have intended the document to be her last will and testament.

Issue:

Whether the CA erred in finding that the instrumental witnesses to the will failed to sign on each
and every page thereof on the left margin, except the last, as required under Article 805 of the
Civil Code

Whether the CA erred in ruling that the failure to state the number of pages comprising the will
on the attestation clause renders such will defective

Ruling:

According to the CA, while Legaspi signed on the left margin of each and every page of her will,
the instrumental witnesses failed to do the same, in blatant violation of Article 805 of the Civil
Code which states:

Article 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by
the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and
by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of
the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left
margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact
that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the
latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and
of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to
them. In any event, it is uncontested and can be readily gleaned that the instrumental witnesses
signed on each and every page of the will, except the last page. Such being the case, the CA erred
in concluding otherwise. There is no doubt that the requirement under the Article 805 of the
Civil Code, which calls for the signature of the testator and of the instrumental witnesses on
each and every page of the will on the left margin, except the last, was complied with.
As to whether the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause renders
such will defective, the CA, citing Uy Coque vs. Naves Sioca and In re: Will of Andrada,
perceived such omission as a fatal flaw.
 G.R. No. 196499, November 28, 2018

INGRID V. HILARIO, Petitioner v. THELMA V. MIRANDA AND IRENEA BELLOC,

Respondent

Jardaleza, J.

NATURE OF THE ACTION:

Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS: Antonio Belloc during his lifetime was never married and died single, but he was
survived by his two illegitimate children, plaintiff Magdalena Varian, Dolores Retiza and his
grandson Teresito Flamor. Accordingly, he died intestate and his intestate estate will pass on and
will be inherited by his intestate heirs upon his death.
Thelma alleged that Magdalena is not the sole heir of Antonio and that she could not be an heir of
Dolores. Purportedly, Antonio begot three children in his lifetime, namely, Magdalena, Dolores,
and Alberto Flamor. Magdalena and Alberto were illegitimate children of Antonio. Alberto and
Dolores are already deceased. Dolores died without issue, but Alberto is survived by his son,
Teresito Flamor, who, in turn, is entitled to inherit from the estate of Antonio in representation
of his father. Moreover, Thelma asserted that since the status of Dolores was elevated from
illegitimate to legitimate child by the subsequent marriage of her mother, Silveria Retiza, with
Antonio, Magdalena, an illegitimate child, cannot inherit from Dolores under Article 992.
ISSUE:
Whether Magdalena is an intestate heir of both Antonio and Dolores and therefore can inherit?
RULING:
Yes. Under the Civil Code, there are three kinds of illegitimate children, namely, natural children,
natural children by legal fiction, and illegitimate children who belong to neither of the first two
classifications and are also known as spurious. The Civil Code provides that natural children are
those born of parents who had legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of conception, while
natural children by legal fiction are those conceived or born of marriages which are void from the
beginning, In De Santos v. Angeles, we described spurious children as those with doubtful origins.
There is no marriage, valid or otherwise, that would give any semblance of legality to the child's
existence. Paternity presupposes adultery, concubinage, incest, or murder, among others. These
classifications are significant as the Civil Code provides for varying degrees of rights for the use of
surname, succession, and support depending on the child's filiation.
In this case, there is no evidence that Magdalena was a spurious child.
It is settled that Magdalena was an illegitimate child of Antonio. Since the law gave her that status
from birth, she had no need to file an action to establish her filiation. Looking at the circumstances
of the case, she was only compelled by the CA to present a "higher standard of proof" to establish
her filiation as a result of an unsubstantiated claim of a better status raised by Irene.
 G.R. No. 217051, August 22, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner v. SPOUSES CORNELIO ALFORTE
AND SUSANA ALFORTE, Respondent

Del Castillo, J.

NATURE OF THE ACTION:

Petition for Review on Certiorari

FACTS:

Respondents Cornelio and Susana Alforte were the registered owners of a 300-square meter
parcel of land which appears to be a vacant lot, was originally covered by a March 21, 1956 Free
Patent.

A total of 127 square meters of the subject property will be traversed by the Naga City-Milaor
Bypass Road construction project of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). For
this reason, respondents filed a Complaint6 - docketed as Civil Case No. RTC 2012-0013 - before
the Naga RTC to compel petitioners to pay them just compensation for the 127-square meter area
that would have been lost to the road project.

Spouses Alforte now claims for just compensation however, defendants raised the issue that
Section 112, CA No. 141 otherwise known as 'The Public Land Act' which imposes a 60-meter wide
legal encumbrance on the property and thus, precludes the Spouses Alforte from claiming just
compensation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Spouses Alforte may claim just compensation

RULING:

Yes but only to damages with the improvements only. The law provides that, Section 112 of C.A
No. 141, said land shall further be subject to a right-of-way not exceeding sixty (60) meters on
width for public highways, railroads, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, telegraph and telephone lines,
airport runways, including sites necessary for terminal buildings and other government structures
needed for full operation of the airport, as well as areas and sites for government buildings for
Resident and/or Project Engineers needed in the prosecution of government-infrastructure
projects, and similar works as the Government or any public or quasi-public service or enterprise,
including mining or forest concessionaires, may reasonably require tor carrying on their
business, with damages for the improvements only.

In other words, lands granted by patent shall be subject to a right-of-way not exceeding 60 meters
in width for public highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and other similar works of the
government or any public enterprise, free of charge, except only for the value of the improvements
existing thereon that may be affected.
 G.R. No. 190817, January 10, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs. ROVENCY REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent

MARTIRES, J.:

NATURE OF THE ACTION:

A petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the 10 March 2009 Decision
and the 3 December 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00651,
which affirmed the 7 November 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41,
Cagayan de Oro City, in LRA Case No. N-2000-084, which granted the application for original
registration of title to land by respondent Rovency Realty and Development
Corporation (RRDC).

FACTS:

On 22 March 2001, RRDC filed before the RTC an Amended Application for Registration
covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 3009 (subject land) situated in Barangay
Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City, described as follows:

A parcel of land (Lot No. 3009, Cad-237, Cagayan Cadastre) situated in the Barrio of Carmen,
City of Cagayan de Oro, Island of Mindanao. Bounded on the S., along line 1-2 by Lot 6648; on
the NW along line 2-3 by Lot 30011; along line 3-4 by Lot 301 O; along line 4-5 by Lot 3047;
along line 5-6 by Lot 3020; on the N., along line 6-7 by Lot 3007; on the SE., along line 8-9 by
Lot 6645; along line 9-1 by Lot 3008; all of Cad-237, Cagayan Cadastre.

RRDC alleged, among others, that it is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines; that it is the absolute owner in fee
simple of the subject land having acquired the same from its previous owner, P.N. Roa
Enterprises, Inc., by virtue of a notarized deed of absolute sale executed on 05 March 1997; that
the subject land was assessed at ₱2,228,000.00 as shown in the Tax Declaration (TD) No.
141011; that it has registered the subject land for taxation purposes and paid the realty taxes due
therein from its acquisition, to the filing of the application; that immediately after acquiring the
subject land, it took actual physical possession of the same and has been continuously occupying
the subject land; and that it and its predecessors-in- interest have been in open, continuous,
adverse, and peaceful possession in concept of owner of the subject land since time immemorial,
or for more than thirty (30) years.

On 16 July 2001, an opposition to the application was filed by the Heirs of Paulino Avancena.
They alleged, that the subject land was already claimed and owned by the late Atty. Paulino
Avancena (Paulino), their father and predecessor-in-interest, as early as 1926; that Paulino had
been in open, continuous, notorious, adverse, and exclusive possession and occupation of the
subject land; that Paulino registered the subject land for taxation purposes and has paid the
taxes due thereon in 1948; that their parents, Paulino and Rizalina Neri (Rizalina) merely
allowed and tolerated Pedro N. Roa's (Pedro) possession of the subject land after the latter
approached them and requested that he be allowed to use the subject land for his businesses;
that Pedro is one of RRDC's predecessors-in-interest; that sometime in 1994, Rizalina
demanded the return of the subject land from the heirs of Pedro, but to no avail; that in 1996,
Rizalina died leaving the private oppositors as the rightful heirs of the subject land; that their
parents never sold the subject land to Pedro nor to RRDC, and as such, no right or title over the
subject land was passed on to RRDC. Thus, they prayed that RRDC's application be dismissed,
and that their opposition be treated as their own application for registration.
On 3 August 2001, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its opposition to the application on the following grounds: that
neither RRDC nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto;
that the subject land exceeds the twelve (12)-hectare limit for confirmation of imperfect title set
by Section 47 of Commonwealth Act (CA.) No. 141, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6940;
and that the subject land forms part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and, thus,
not subject to private appropriation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private corporations may apply for registration of title to lands.
RULING:
Sec. 3, article XII of the constitution provides:
SECTION 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by
law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall
be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not
more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant. However, this only applies
to lands of public domain. The constitutional provisions do not necessarily apply to private
lands and that the corporation may not apply for original registration of title to lands. The rule is
that as long as the lands were already considered private lands or ownership by operation of law
such land may be apply for registration by a private corporation.
 G.R. No. 231116, February 07, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. CLARO YAP, Respondent.

VELASCO JR., J.:

NATURE OF THE ACTION:

A Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the March 16,
2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 05491. The CA affirmed the
October 20, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 6, granting
respondent's petition for registration of a parcel of land located in Carcar, Cebu.
FACTS:
On July 28, 2010, respondent Claro Yap (Yap) filed a petition for cancellation and re-issuance of
Decree No. 99500 covering Lot No. 922 of the Carcar Cadastre, and for the issuance of the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) pursuant to the re-issued decree.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued an Order5 dated August 3,
2010 setting the case for hearing on August 3, 2011 and ordering the requisite publication
thereof. Since no oppositors appeared before the court during the said scheduled hearing, the
RTC issued another Order setting the case for hearing on petitioner's presentation of evidence.
During the ex parte hearing held on August 8, 2011, Yap presented the following documents,
among others, as proof of his claim:

1. Certified true copy of Decree No. 99500 issued by the authorized officer of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA);

2. Index of decree showing that Decree No. 99500 was issued for Lot No. 922;

3. Certification from the Register of Deeds of Cebu that no certificate of title covering Lot No.
922, Cad. 30 has been issued;

4. Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Late Porfirio C. Yap with Deed of Donation;

5. Certification from the Office of the City Assessor of Carcar indicating that the heirs of
Porfirio Yap had been issued Tax Declarations for Lot No. 922 since 1948;

6. Tax Declarations covering Lot No. 922 from 1948 up to 2002;

7. Blueprint of the approved consolidation and subdivision plan; and

8. Certification from Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO),

Cebu City stating that there is no existing public land application for Lot No. 922.

In its September 20, 2011 Order, the RTC admitted petitioner's evidence and deemed the case
submitted for decision. On the other hand, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed its Comment mainly arguing that Yap's petition and motion should be denied since
the Republic was not furnished with copies thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC correctly ordered the cancellation of Decree No. 99500, the re-issuance
thereof, and the issuance of the corresponding Original Certificate of Title covering Lot No. 922.
RULING:
Petition is denied. The propriety of cancellation and reissuance of Decree No. 99500, to serve as
basis for the issuance of an OCT covering Lot No. 922, had been sufficiently proven in the
instant case. Records show that Yap sufficiently established that Decree No. 99500 was issued
on November 29, 1920 in the name of Andres Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan
Rodriguez. Further, it was also proven during the proceedings before the court that no OCT was
ever issued covering the said lot. In this regard, Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 152935 or
the "Property Registration Decree" provides that the original certificate of title shall be a true
copy of the decree of registration. There is, therefore, a need to cancel the old decree and a new
one issued in order for the decree and the OCT to be exact replicas of each other.
 G.R. No. 200223, June 06, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LAKAMBINI C. JABSON,
PARALUMAN C. JABSON, MAGPURI C. JABSON, MANUEL C. JABSON III,
EDGARDO C. JABSON, RENATO C. JABSON, NOEL C. JABSON, AND NESTOR C.
JABSON, REPRESENTED BY LAKAMBINI C. JABSON, ATTORNEY-IN-
FACT, Respondents.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* J.:

NATURE OF THE ACTION:

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to
reverse and set aside the Amended Decision dated November 4, 2010 and Resolution dated
December 26, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82986 entitled, "Lakambini C.
Jabson, Paraluman C. Jabson, Marpuri C. Jabson, Manuel C. Jabson III, Edgardo C. Jabson,
Renata Jabson, Noel C. Jabson, and Nestor C. Jabson, represented by Lakambini C. Jabson,
Attorney-in Fact." The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision dated October 28, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 161, Pasig City in LRC Case No. N-11402 entitled, "Re:
Application for Registration of Title Lakambini C. Jabson, et al., Applicants, Represented by:
Lakambini C. Jabson, Attorney-in-Fact.

FACTS:
On February 17, 1999, siblings Lakambini, Paraluman, Tala, and Magpuri together with Manuel
III, Edgardo, Renato, Noel, and Nestor representing their father, Manuel, Jr., all surnamed
Jabson (respondents Jabson), filed for the second time an Application for Registration of Title.
Their first attempt to have the subject properties registered in their names was denied by then
Court of First Instance in 1978 "for failure of the applicants to comply with the recommendation
of the then Land Registration Commission to include in their application the complete names
and postal addresses of all the lessees occupying the lands sought to be registered.
RTC narrated the facts leading to the application's filing, viz,:

There are two parcels of land being applied for registration—one is located at Barrio San Jose,
Pasig City, and the other is situated in Barangay Bagong Katipunan, Pasig City. Both used to form
part of seven parcels of land owned and possessed by the Jabson family as early as 1909. Each and
every applicant herein claims undivided share and participation as follows: Lakambini C.
Jabson—1/5; Paraluman Jabson—1/5; Magpuri Jabson—1/5 & Tala J. Olega—1/5; Manuel III,
Edgardo, Renata, Noel & Nestor Jabson as legal heirs of their father Manuel Jabson, Jr. —1/5.

Sometime in 1978, applicants had already applied for registration of the same parcels of land.
However, said previous application docketed as LRC No. 9572 was dismissed by the CFI of Rizal,
Branch 11, as per Order dated 29 December 1978 for failure of the applicants to comply with the
recommendation of the then Land Registration Commission to include in their application the
complete names and postal addresses of all the lessees occupying the lands sought to be
registered. The first parcel of land (or the San Jose property) consists of Lots 1, 2 and 3 with a
total area of 1,344 square meters and is covered by verified survey plan PSU-233559.

The second parcel of land (or the Bagong Katipunan property) sought to be registered consists of
Lots 26346 and 26347, with a total area of 3,024 square meters and is covered by verified survey
plan AP-00- 000399. Respondents Jabson acquired the San Jose and Bagong Katipunan
properties via inheritance and purchase from their predecessors-in-interest. At the time of filing,
it is not disputed that Lakambini, Paraluman, and Magpuri have already built their residences on
the San Jose property, with remaining portions of the land occupied by third parties either thru
lease or applicants' mere acquiescence. As to the Bagong Katipunan property, respondents Jabson
alleged that they have leased portions of it to various third parties who have been paying rentals
thereon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Jabson establish with clear and convincing evidence that they have complied
with all the requirements under the law to register their title over the subject properties.
RULING:
Petition is meritorious. Respondents Jabson failed to present during trial any evidence
establishing the subject properties' alienable and disposable nature. Admittedly, found in the
trial court's records was Oppositor Leonida Jabson's Oposisyon sa Pagpapatitulo ng Lupa dated
July 2, 1998, and attached thereto was an alleged CENRO Certification dated May 14,
1998 issued by Atty. Juanito A. Viernes, a CENR Officer, stating that the subject Bagong
Katipunan property is, "[w]ithin the Alienable and Disposable Zone per Project No. 21 and Land
Classification Map No. 639."But such document is of no consequence as it was: (a) merely a
plain photocopy; (b) not formally offered during trial; and (c) only formed part of the trial
court's record not at the instance of respondents Jabson, but due to Oppositor Leonida's
submission. Second, as correctly pointed out by petitioner Republic, Carlito P. Castañeda,
a DENR Sr. Forest Management Specialist, was not authorized to issue certifications as to land
classification, much less order for the release of lands of the public domain as alienable and
disposable.
 G.R. No. 196733, November 21, 2018
HEIRS OF ROGER JARQUE, Petitioner, v. MARCIAL JARQUE, LELIA JARQUE-
LAGSIT, AND TERESITA JARQUE-BAILON, Respondent

Jardaleza, J.

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

FACTS:

This case pertains to the ownership of an unregistered parcel of land situated at Sorsogon and
declared under the name of Laureano. Laureano was married to Servanda Hagos (Servanda) with
whom he had four children, namely: Roger, Lupo, Sergio, and Natalia.Petitioners are the heirs of
Roger, the original plaintiff in this case. On the other hand, respondents are the living children of
Lupo.

Upon the death of Laureano, his children orally portioned the lot and the lot that is the subject
matter of this case was given to Roger. His brother, Lupo pleaded with Roger to let the property
remain with him as he needed a source of income to support his children's education. Roger
acceded to Lupo's request. When Lupo died in 1980, Roger informed Lupo's wife, Asuncion, of
his desire to take back the property. Asuncion however, requested that she be allowed to continue
possessing the property since she needed a source of livelihood for her family's survival. Once
again, Roger acquiesced.

However, on 2004, when Roger’s sons was claiming the lot they were surprised to discover that
respondents were already claiming ownership over lot. This prompted Roger to file a complaint
for annulment of deeds and other documents, recovery of ownership and possession, accounting,
and damages against respondents with the MCTC of Casiguran, Sorsogon.

MCTC declared petitioners as the rightful owners and possessors of the property to which RTC
affirms however, the CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether the possession of the Respondents to the land give rise to their ownership thereof

RULING:

No. Respondents' possession of the property did not give rise to their ownership over it. There is
no dispute that respondents are in possession of Lot No. 2560 since its repurchase from Benito in
1974 until the filing of the complaint. However, whether their possession was adverse and in the
concept of owner, with just title and in good faith, is another matter.

Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor through the requisite

lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner,
public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Thus, mere possession with a juridical title, such as, to
exemplify, by a usufructuary, a trustee, a lessee, an agent or a pledgee, not being in the concept of
an owner, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription, unless the juridical relation is
first expressly repudiated and such repudiation has been communicated to the other party. Acts
of possessory character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner would likewise
be inadequate. Possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be en
concepto de dueno, or, to use the common law equivalent of the term, that possession should be
adverse, if not, such possessory acts, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of
prescription
 G.R. No. 213972, February 05, 2018
FELICITAS L. SALAZAR, Petitioner, v. REMEDIOS FELIAS, ON HER OWN BEHALF
AND REPRESENTATION OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF CATALINO
NIVERA, Respondents.

REYES, JR., J.:

NATURE OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION:
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal
of the Decision dated December 62013, and Resolution dated August 7, 2014, rendered by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 97309, which affirmed the execution of the final and
executory judgment issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Alaminos, Pangasinan (RTC
Branch 55).
FACTS:
On February 28, 1990, private respondent Remedios Felias, representing the heirs of Catalino
Nivera (Heirs of Nivera) filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages
against the Spouses Romualdo Lastimosa (Romualdo) and Felisa Lastimosa (Fe1isa). The
former sought to recover from the latter four parcels of land located in Baruan, Agno,
Pangasinan (subject property).
During the trial of the case, Romualdo died. a Motion for Substitution was filed by the
decedent's wife, Felisa, and their children Flordeliza Sagun, Reynaldo Lastimosa, Recto
Lastimosa (Recto), Rizalina Ramirez (Rizalina), Lily Lastimosa, and Avelino Lastimosa (Heirs
ofLastimosa).
Felicitas Salazar (Felicitas), daughter of Romualdo, along with Recto and Rizalina filed a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated June 22, 2006 with the CA. Felicitas sought the
nullification of the RTC Branch 55's Decision dated March 16, 2004, and the corresponding
Writs of Execution and Demolition issued pursuant thereto. In her Petition for Annulment of
Judgment, Felicitas claimed that she was deprived of due process when she was not impleaded
in the case for Recovery of Ownership, before the RTC Branch 55.

ISSUE:
Whether or not failure to implead a party excludes such party from execution of judgment
RULING:
The court is not persuaded. The intimation of the petitioners that private respondent is at fault
for failing to implead [Felicitas] as party defendant in this case is patently without basis. It must
be recalled that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the original defendants
Romualdo and Feliza Lastimosa. Hence, the outcome of this case is binding on all the heirs or
persons claiming rights under the said defendants. When [Romualdo] died on March 3, 1997,
the defendants filed an Urgent Motion to Substitute Other Heirs of the said defendant listing the
names of the heirs to be substituted. It is therefore crystal clear that if [Felicitas] was not
impleaded in this case as party defendant being the daughter of [Romualdo], that omission
could not be attributed to the private respondent but the defendants themselves.
 G.R. No. 200223, June 06, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LAKAMBINI C. JABSON,
PARALUMAN C. JABSON, MAGPURI C. JABSON, MANUEL C. JABSON III,
EDGARDO C. JABSON, RENATO C. JABSON, NOEL C. JABSON, AND NESTOR C.
JABSON, REPRESENTED BY LAKAMBINI C. JABSON, ATTORNEY-IN-
FACT, Respondents.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* J.:

NATURE OF THE ACTION:

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to
reverse and set aside the Amended Decision dated November 4, 2010 and Resolution dated
December 26, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82986 entitled, "Lakambini C.
Jabson, Paraluman C. Jabson, Marpuri C. Jabson, Manuel C. Jabson III, Edgardo C. Jabson,
Renata Jabson, Noel C. Jabson, and Nestor C. Jabson, represented by Lakambini C. Jabson,
Attorney-in Fact." The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision dated October 28, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 161, Pasig City in LRC Case No. N-11402 entitled, "Re:
Application for Registration of Title Lakambini C. Jabson, et al., Applicants, Represented by:
Lakambini C. Jabson, Attorney-in-Fact.

FACTS:
On February 17, 1999, siblings Lakambini, Paraluman, Tala, and Magpuri together with Manuel
III, Edgardo, Renato, Noel, and Nestor representing their father, Manuel, Jr., all surnamed
Jabson (respondents Jabson), filed for the second time an Application for Registration of Title.
Their first attempt to have the subject properties registered in their names was denied by then
Court of First Instance in 1978 "for failure of the applicants to comply with the recommendation
of the then Land Registration Commission to include in their application the complete names
and postal addresses of all the lessees occupying the lands sought to be registered.
RTC narrated the facts leading to the application's filing, viz,:

There are two parcels of land being applied for registration—one is located at Barrio San Jose,
Pasig City, and the other is situated in Barangay Bagong Katipunan, Pasig City. Both used to form
part of seven parcels of land owned and possessed by the Jabson family as early as 1909. Each and
every applicant herein claims undivided share and participation as follows: Lakambini C.
Jabson—1/5; Paraluman Jabson—1/5; Magpuri Jabson—1/5 & Tala J. Olega—1/5; Manuel III,
Edgardo, Renata, Noel & Nestor Jabson as legal heirs of their father Manuel Jabson, Jr. —1/5.

Sometime in 1978, applicants had already applied for registration of the same parcels of land.
However, said previous application docketed as LRC No. 9572 was dismissed by the CFI of Rizal,
Branch 11, as per Order dated 29 December 1978 for failure of the applicants to comply with the
recommendation of the then Land Registration Commission to include in their application the
complete names and postal addresses of all the lessees occupying the lands sought to be
registered.

The first parcel of land (or the San Jose property) consists of Lots 1, 2 and 3 with a total area of
1,344 square meters and is covered by verified survey plan PSU-233559. x x x

The second parcel of land (or the Bagong Katipunan property) sought to be registered consists of
Lots 26346 and 26347, with a total area of 3,024 square meters and is covered by verified survey
plan AP-00- 000399.7 x x x (Citations omitted.)

Respondents Jabson acquired the San Jose and Bagong Katipunan properties via inheritance and
purchase from their predecessors-in-interest. At the time of filing, it is not disputed that
Lakambini, Paraluman, and Magpuri have already built their residences on the San Jose property,
with remaining portions of the land occupied by third parties either thru lease or applicants' mere
acquiescence. As to the Bagong Katipunan property, respondents Jabson alleged that they have
leased portions of it to various third parties who have been paying rentals thereon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Jabson establish with clear and convincing evidence that they have complied
with all the requirements under the law to register their title over the subject properties.
RULING:
Petition is meritorious. Respondents Jabson failed to present during trial any evidence
establishing the subject properties' alienable and disposable nature. Admittedly, found in the
trial court's records was Oppositor Leonida Jabson's Oposisyon sa Pagpapatitulo ng Lupa dated
July 2, 1998, and attached thereto was an alleged CENRO Certification dated May 14,
1998 issued by Atty. Juanito A. Viernes, a CENR Officer, stating that the subject Bagong
Katipunan property is, "[w]ithin the Alienable and Disposable Zone per Project No. 21 and Land
Classification Map No. 639."39 But such document is of no consequence as it was: (a) merely a
plain photocopy; (b) not formally offered during trial; and (c) only formed part of the trial
court's record not at the instance of respondents Jabson, but due to Oppositor Leonida's
submission.
Second, as correctly pointed out by petitioner Republic, Carlito P. Castañeda, a DENR Sr. Forest
Management Specialist, was not authorized to issue certifications as to land classification, much
less order for the release of lands of the public domain as alienable and disposable.
 G.R. No. 234533, June 27, 2018
SPOUSES JULIETA B. CARLOS AND FERNANDO P. CARLOS, Petitioners, v. JUAN
CRUZ TOLENTINO, Respondent.

VELASCO JR., J.:

NATURE OF THE ACTION:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the April 5, 2017 Decision and the September 27, 2017 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 106430. The challenged rulings reversed and set aside the
October 16, 2015 Decision and the December 9, 2015 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 87 which dismissed respondent's complaint for annulment of title against
the petitioners.
FACTS:
A complaint for annulment of title with damages filed by respondent Juan Cruz Tolentino (Juan)
against his wife, Mercedes Tolentino (Mercedes), his grandson, Kristoff M. Tolentino (Kristoff),
herein petitioners Spouses Julieta B. Carlos (Julieta) and Fernando P. Carlos (Spouses Carlos),
and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Without Juan's knowledge and consent, Mercedes and
Kristoff, who were then residing in the subject property, allegedly forged a Deed of Donation,
hereby making it appear that Juan and Mercedes donated the subject property to Kristoff. Thus,
by virtue of the alleged forged Deed of Donation, Kristoff caused the cancellation of TCT No. RT-
90764 (116229), and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 004-2011003320 was issued in his name on March
9, 2011.
Kristoff offered the sale of the subject property to Julieta's brother, Felix Bacal (Felix), who is also
the administrator of the lot owned by Julieta which is adjacent to the subject property.Thereafter,
Kristoff surrendered to Felix copies of the title and tax declaration covering the said property.
Kristoff and Julieta executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated April 12, 2011 stating
that Kristoff is selling the subject property to Julieta in the amount of Two Million Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P2,300,000.00), payable in two (2) installments. On the same day, a Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed between Kristoff and Julieta.
Upon learning of the foregoing events, Juan executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim and filed a
criminal complaint for Falsification of Public Document before the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City against Kristoff.

Meanwhile, Kristoff and Julieta executed another Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 12, 2011
over the subject property and, by virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City cancelled
TCT No. 004- 2011003320 and issued TCT No. 004-2011013502 on December 5, 2011 in favor of
Spouses Carlos. The affidavit of adverse claim executed by Juan was duly carried over to the title
of Spouses Carlos.

On February 23, 2012, Juan filed a complaint for annulment of title with damages against
Mercedes, Kristoff, Spouses Carlos, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City before the RTC of
Quezon City. The case was raffled to Branch 87 and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12-70832.

ISSUE:
Who between the spouses Carlos and Juan has the better right to claim ownership over the subject
property?
RULING:
The ruling of the court emphasizes that the property forms part of the conjugal partnership of
Juan and Mercerdes. However the said deed of donation in favor of Kristoff is valid but to half of
the part of Mercedes since Juan signature was forged. Therefore the court ruled that the spouses
Carlos are entitled only the half part portion which is the subject of the deed of donation to
Kristoff. As owners pro indiviso of a portion of the lot in question, either Spouses Carlos or Juan
may ask for the partition of the lot and their property rights shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to them in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
 G.R. No. 204131, June 04, 2018
SPOUSES JAIME AND CATHERINE BASA, SPOUSES JUAN AND ERLINDA OGALE
REPRESENTED BY WINSTON OGALE, SPOUSES ROGELIO AND LUCENA
LAGASCA REPRESENTED BY LUCENA LAGASCA, AND SPOUSES CRESENCIO
AND ELEADORA APOSTOL, Petitioners, v. ANGELINE LOY VDA. DE SENLY LOY,
HEIRS OF ROBERT CARANTES, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR BAGUIO CITY,
AND THE CITY ASSESSOR'S OFFICE OF BAGUIO CITY, Respondents.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

NATURE OF THE ACTION:

Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the May 31, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 95490 affirming the January 22, 2010 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Baguio City, Branch 7 in Civil Case No. 6280-R, and the CA's subsequent October 11, 2012
Resolution denying herein petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
FACTS:
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-30086 (subject property) in the name of the late Busa Carantes,
who is the predecessor-in-interest of Manuel Carantes and herein respondent Robert Carantes.
The subject property was mortgaged to respondent Angeline Loy and her husband in 1994.
Thereafter, they foreclosed on the mortgage, and at the auction sale, they emerged the highest
bidder. On March 31, 2006, after consolidating ownership over the subject property, Branch 6 of
the Baguio RTC - in LRC ADM Case No. 1546-R - issued in their favor a writ of possession.
On May 30, 2006, herein petitioners filed before Branch 7 of the Baguio RTC a petition for
quieting of title with prayer for injunctive relief and damages. They essentially claimed that in
1992 and 1993, portions of the subject property - totaling 351 square meters - have already been
sold to them by respondent Robert Carantes, by virtue of deeds of sale executed in their favor,
respectively. In her answer with counterclaim, Angeline Loy alleged that she was entitled to the
subject property as a result of the foreclosure and consequent award to her as the highest bidder
during the foreclosure sale and that she had no knowledge of the supposed sales to petitioners by
Robert Carantes as these transactions were not annotated on the title of Busa Carantes; and that
the sales to the petitioners were either unnotarized or unconsummated for failure to pay the price
in full. In his answer, Robert Carantes alleged that the sales to petitioners did not materialize; that
petitioners failed to fully pay the purchase price; that his transactions with Angeline Loy and her
husband were null and void; and that he was the real owner of the subject property in issue.
ISSUE:
Whether or not quieting of title the proper remedy;
RULING:
Petition lacks merit. The trial court defines an action for quieting of title to prosper, it is essential
that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the property which is the
subject-matter of the action. Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means
beneficial ownership. In the absence of such legal or equitable title, or interest, there is no cloud
to be prevented or removed. The two indispensable requisites for quieting of to title to prosper,
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting
cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
Petitioner failed to present the original of the said deed of sale executed in their favor. In other
words petitioner failed to discharge the required burden of proof to satisfy the claim of existence
of legal or equitable of title.