In the matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee, Haron S.
Meiling in the 2002 bar behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was possessed of good
examinations - JEN
FACTS: Melendrez filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant a Petition to disqualify
Haron Meling from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the
appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. He alleges
that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has
3 pending criminal cases both for Grave Oral Defamation and for Less Serious Physical
Injuries. Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is
not a member of the Bar. Meling then explains that he did not disclose the criminal
cases because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to
settle misunderstanding. Meling, believing in good faith that the case would be settled
because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, considered the three cases
that arose from a single incident as “closed and terminated.” He denies the charges and
added that the acts do not involve moral turpitude. Use of the title “Attorney,” Meling
admits that some of his communications really contained the word “Attorney” as they
were typed by the office clerk. Office of Bar Confidant disposed of the charge of non-
disclosure against Meling. Meling should have known that only the court of competent
jurisdiction can dismiss cases, neither a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the
cases filed against Meling are still pending. Even if these cases were already dismissed,
he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral
character.
RULING: By concealing the existence of such pending cases, the applicant then flunks
the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or
insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.
Rule 7.01: “A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or
suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.”
He is aware that he is not a member of the Bar, that there was no valid reason why he
signed as “attorney” whoever may have typed the letters. Unauthorized use of the
appellation “attorney” may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.
Requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the
general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the
possession of legal learning. It has been held that good moral character is what a person
really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he
is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to
objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by
such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good
moral character includes at least common honesty.
In re: Al Argosino (246 SCRA 14, 1995) - JEN
DOCTRINES: (Galing to sa syllabus)
1. The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral
character, with special education qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
2. Requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so far as the general
public and proper administration of justice is concerned.
4. Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek
admission to the bar must be a necessity more stringent than the norm of conduct
expected from members of the general public.
5. Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible
RULING: Respondent is guilty of professional misconduct. Despite the simplicity of the
moral character.
6. Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated at
the time of the application for permission to take the bar examinations and more
importantly at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the
attorney's oath of office.
FACTS: Al Caparros Argosino had passed the bar examinations but was denied of taking
the Lawyer’s Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys due to his conviction of “reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide” from a hazing incident. Later in his sentence, he was
granted probation by the court. He filed a petition to the Supreme Court praying that he
be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Rolls of Attorneys. As a proof of the
required good moral character he now possesses, he presented no less than fifteen
certifications among others from: two senators, five trial court judges, and six members
of religious order. In addition, he, together with the others who were convicted,
organized a scholarship foundation in honor of their hazing victim.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath, sign
the Rolls of Attorneys, and practice law.
RULING: Yes. Given the fact that Mr. Argosino had exhibited competent proof that he
possessed the required good moral character as required before taking the Lawyer’s
Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys, the Supreme Court considered the premises
that he is not inherently in bad moral fiber. In giving the benefit of the doubt, Mr.
Argosino was finally reminded that the Lawyer’s Oath is not merely a ceremony or
formality before the practice of law, and that the community assistance he had started
is expected to continue in serving the more unfortunate members of the society.
Avida Land v. Atty Al Argosino (A.C. 7437) - JEN
FACTS: Complainant is a Philippine corporation engaged in the development and sale of
subdivision houses and lots. Respondent was counsel for Rodman Construction &
Development Corporation (Rodman). Complainant entered into a Contract to Sell with
Rodman, under which the latter was to acquire from the former a subdivision house and
lot in Santa Rosa, Laguna through bank financing. In three separate letters, complainant
demanded that Rodman pay the outstanding balance of P3,088,577.80. Both parties
agreed that the amount would be paid on a deferred basis within 18 months.
Respondent thereafter moved for the inhibition of Atty. Aquino as arbiter of the case
and for the setting of a hearing on the Petition to Cite Complainant in Contempt. The
motion alleged that Arbiter Aquino had shown bias in favor of complainant, and that she
had failed to set the Petition for hearing. In an Order dated 23 April 2008, the HLURB
Regional Office (1) denied the motion for inhibition; (2) granted complainant's Motion
for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution and Writ of Possession; and (3) directed
complainant to comment on the Petition citing the latter for contempt.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment
or misuse court processes.
It took complainant's counsel a period of six months to file a Motion for Writ of
Execution of the HLURB Board's Decision dated 22 June 2005. Further, respondent
argued that he could not have possibly caused delays in the execution of the Decision
dated 22 June 2005 at the time the instant Complaint was filed on 21 February 2007, as
complainant filed its Motion for Writ of Execution before the HLURB Regional Office
only in April 2007. Lastly, respondent asserted that he merely followed his legal oath by
defending the cause of his client with utmost dedication, diligence, and good faith.
issue involved in the HLURB case, the path towards its resolution became long, tedious,
and frustrating because of the deliberate attempts of respondent to delay the actual
execution of the judgment therein. He continued to file pleadings over issues already
passed upon even after being enjoined not to do so, and made unfounded accusations
of bias or procedural defects. These acts manifest his prop ensity to disregard the
authority of a tribunal and abuse court processes, to the detriment of the
administration of justice. As a lawyer, respondent indeed owes fidelity to the cause of
his client and is expected to serve the latter with competence and diligence. As such,
respondent is entitled to employ every honorable means to defend the cause of his
client and secure what is due the latter. Professional rules, however, impose limits on a
lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and qualifications.63 Under the
Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers are required to exert every effort and
consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.64 The
Code also obliges lawyers to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of their client.
Villareal v. People (G.R. No. 151258; February 1, 2012)
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; CONSOLIDATED WITH: G.R. No.
154954; G.R. No. 155101; G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
FACTS: In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila
University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity
(AquilaFraternity).
The neophytes, including victim, Lenny Villa, were subjected to initiation rites. After the
second day of initiation rites has ended, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity
members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites
be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused.
Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites.
The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to
"paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle
blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes
heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session
of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries
to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes
started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and
incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they
thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really
feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and
helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened,
the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against 35 Aquilans.
G.R. No. 151258; Villareal v. People: The instant case refers to accused Villareals
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition raises two reversible errors
allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No.
15520 first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond
reasonable doubt. While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for
petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the
Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject
matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the death of the
accused.
ISSUE: Whether the death of Villareal extinguish his criminal liability.
RULING: Yes. In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending
resolution, this Court took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal
penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability
for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The
term "personal penalties" refers to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties,
while the term "pecuniarypenalties" (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs, including
civil liability predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex
delicto). However, civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict
survives the death of the accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action.
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for
both personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from
the delict complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the
criminal case against him deemed closed and terminated.
G.R. No. 154954; People v. Court of Appeals: This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
seeks the reversal of the CAs Decision, insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and
convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical
injuries. According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there could have
been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been
criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been
upheld, inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on
Lenny. Since the injuries led to the victims death, petitioner posits that the accused
Aquilans are criminally liable for the resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of
the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Whether CA err in convicting accused of the lesser offense of slight physical
injuries instead of homicide.
RULING:
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in
order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a
regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on
pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, a verdict of acquittal is
immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the
appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense.
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower courts
acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the
following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due
process; (2) where there is a finding of mistrial; or (3) where there has been a grave
abuse of discretion.
The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly
applies when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused. We
have also recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive
judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower court blatantly abused its authority
to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. The present
case is one of those instances of grave abuse of discretion.
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa in finding that the four
accused should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA,
because of "the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the
duration of the incapacity or medical attendance required. The reliance on Penesa was
utterly misplaced.
On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug
were liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact.
According to the court, the four accused "were found to have inflicted more than the
usual punishment undertaken during such initiation rites on the person of Villa. It then
adopted the NBI medico-legal officers findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas
death was the "multiple traumatic injuries" he suffered from the initiation rites.
Considering that the CA found that the "physical punishment heaped on Lenny Villa was
serious in nature, it was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to
slight physical injuries, which is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the
consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a
person is found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction
of physical injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to
automatically apply the legal framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is
mandatory, and not subject to discretion.
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts, in and of
themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own findings. From
proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he
suffered, the only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all
those who have been proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical
injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac
arrest. Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally
liable for slight physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double
jeopardy, we therefore give due course to the Petition.
G.R. No. 155101; Dizon v. People: Petitioner Dizon sets forth two main issues first, that
he was denied due process when the CA sustained the trial courts forfeiture of his right
to present evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due process when the CA did
not apply to him the same "ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the other
accused.
ISSUE: Whether Dizon deprived of due process.
RULING: Yes. The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than
the Constitution itself. Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that "in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel" This
constitutional right includes the right to present evidence in ones defense, as well as the
right to be present and defend oneself in person at every stage of the proceedings.
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on
August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have
considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially since counsel for another accused
General had made a last-minute adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the
succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks
later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates for the reception of
evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done was
to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizons testimonial evidence. Stripping the
accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the
court is called upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the
consequences of a waiver of the right to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that
the accused is simply warned of the consequences of another failure to attend the
succeeding hearings. The court must first explain to the accused personally in clear
terms the exact nature and consequences of a waiver.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080; Villa v. Escalona: Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal
of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a
reasonable period of time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted
for the delay, as the original records and the required evidence were not at its disposal,
but were still in the appellate court.
ISSUE: Whether CA erred in dismissing the case for violation of the accused's right to
speedy trial.
RULING: We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case against
accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right
to speedy trial. While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors
that contributed to the delay of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, we
nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial has been utterly violated in this case.
The absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the
case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to comply with
the order of the court a quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same.
What is glaring from the records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the
court a quo already issued an Order requiring the prosecution, through the Department
of Justice, to secure the complete records of the case from the Court of Appeals. The
prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in fact, the same directive was
repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no
compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such order was
complied with. It appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the said records
were still not at the disposal of the trial court because the lack of it was made the basis
of the said court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion. It is
likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period
of almost seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except
for the pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which
was on January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to set case for trial on
August 17, 1998 which the court did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a
considerable length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of
delay that the constitution frowns upon.
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060
that accused Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in
the records that would show that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S.
Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
PIATT v. ABORDO
FACTS:
On February 19, 1932, Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar entered into
transaction between two individuals to purchase a quantity of opium for P 600. He
found out that the opium was fake and he filed charges witth two individual with the
crime of estafa
Abordo admits that he entered into the transaction detailed above, adding that "he is
sincerely sorry for it and vows not to repeat". His defense is that "there being no
evidence in the record establishing the relationship of attorney and client between the
respondent and the malefactors", and "the act complained of not having been
committed in the exercise of his profession of attorney-at-law", the acts he committed
could not affect his status as attorney-at-law and could not, therefore, constitute a
ground for disciplinary action.
ISSUE: Whether the acts committed by atty. Abordo constitute ground for disciplinary
actions
RULING:
Yes. The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the
profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are
fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good character is an essential qualification
for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such
respect as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an
attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him.
It will be recalled that Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar, attempted to
engage in an opium deal in direct contravention of the criminal law of the Philippine
Islands. All that kept the nefarious plan from succeeding was the treacherous conduct of
his co-conspirators. The intention to flaunt the law was present even if consummation
of the overt act was not accomplished. In the eyes of the canons of professional ethics
which govern the conduct of attorneys, the act was as reprehensible as if it had been
brought to a successful culmination. "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws" said the United States Supreme Court in the well
known case of Ex Parte Wall ( [1882], 107 U.S., 265), and to that doctrine we give our
unqualified support.
STEMMERIK v. MAS
FACTS: Stemmerik is a citizen and residence of Denmark in one of his trips in the
philipines he met Atty. Mas. Complainant marveled at the beauty of the country and
expressed his interest in acquiring real property in the Philippines. He consulted
respondent who advised him that he could legally acquire and own real property in the
Philippines. Respondent even suggested an 86,998 sq.m. property in Quarry, Agusuin,
Cawag, Subic, Zambales with the assurance that the property was alienable.Atty, bought
the property to de mesa the contract to sell provided that demesa sold the property
Gonzales for 3.8m then in another authorize deal stated that Gonzales receive funds
from Stemmerik. In preparing funds atty mas also received 400k
After the various contracts and agreements were executed, complainant tried to get in
touch with respondent to inquire about when the property could be registered in his
name. However, respondent suddenly became scarce and refused to answer
complainant's calls and e-mail messages.
It was revealed that the property was inalienable as it was situated within the former US
Military Reservation.Thereafter, complainant, through his attorneys-in-factexerted
diligent efforts to locate respondent for purposes of holding him accountable for his
fraudulent acts. Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent in the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBPHe deplored respondent's acts of serious
misconduct. In particular, he sought the expulsion of respondent from the legal
profession for gravely misrepresenting that a foreigner could legally acquire land in the
Philippines and for maliciously absconding with complainant's P3.8 million.
ISSUE: Whether Atty Mas shold be disbarred
RULING: YES. Lawyers, as members of a noble profession, have the duty to promote
respect for the law and uphold the integrity of the bar. As men and women entrusted
with the law, they must ensure that the law functions to protect liberty and not as an
instrument of oppression or deception. Respondent has been weighed by the exacting
standards of the legal profession and has been found wanting. Respondent committed a
serious breach of his oath as a lawyer. He is also guilty of culpable violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, the code of ethics of the legal profession. All lawyers take
an oath to support the Constitution, to obey the laws and to do no falsehoodThat oath
is neither mere formal ceremony nor hollow words. It is a sacred trust that should be
upheld and kept inviolable at all times Lawyers are servants of the law and the law is
their master. They should not simply obey the laws, they should also inspire respect for
and obedience thereto by serving as exemplars worthy of emulation. Indeed, that is the
first precept of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
EMBIDO vs. PE
FACTS: Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya received two written communications from Mr. Ballam
Delaney Hunt. The letter requested a copy of the decision dated February 12, 1997
rendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the
Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was
one Shirley Quioyo. Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the
records of Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It was then discovered that the RTC had no record of
Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead, the
court files revealed that Judge Penuela had decided Special Proceedings No. 084
entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria,
whose petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria.
Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist, Mr. Hunt sent a
letter attaching a machine copy of the purported decision in Special Proceedings No.
084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna that
had been presented by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK. After comparing
the two documents and ascertaining that the document attached to the October 12,
2004 letter was a falsified court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise
him of the situation.
The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to communicate on
the situation in writing to the NBI, triggering the investigation of the falsification. Dy
Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit wherein
he stated that it was the respondent who had facilitated the issuance of the falsified
decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna for a fee of P60,000.00. The allegations against the
respondent were substantially corroborated by Mary Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley
Quioyo. The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side but he invoked his
constitutional right to remain silent
.
ISSUE: Whether Pe should be disbarred.
RULING: YES. Inlight of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of
grave misconduct for having authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent
court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the
dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.” Lawyers are further
required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any
unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Gross immorality, conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyer’s
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate
falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high
degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the
administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was
to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became
unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar. It then becomes timely to remind all
members of the Philippine Bar that they should do nothing that may in any way or
degree lessen the confidence of the public in their professional fidelity and integrity. The
Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on those among them who
wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring demands of their Attorney’s Oath for
them to:
x x x support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; x x x not wittingly or willingly promote or sue on groundless, false or unlawful
suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; x x x delay no man for money or malice, and x
x x conduct themselves as lawyers according to the best of their knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients x x x.
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is
always a privilege that the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may
withdraw or deny the privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyer’s
Oath and the canons of ethical conduct in his professional and private capacities.
GARCIA vs. SESBREÑO
FACTS: Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the Office of the
Bar Confidant.Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing
Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth, filed an action for support against him and his sister
Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was
already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In 2007,
Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreño and Garcia’s children learned about his
return, Sesbreño filed a Second Amended Complaint against him.
Garcia alleged that he learned that Sesbreño was convicted by the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 18, for Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia alleged
that Sesbreño is only on parole. Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime against moral
turpitude; and thus, Sesbreño should not be allowed to continue his practice of law.
In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted and
the phrase “with the inherent accessory penalties provided by law” was deleted.
Sesbreño argued that even if the accessory penalty was not deleted, the disqualification
applies only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreño further alleged that homicide
does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that Garcia’s complaint was
motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate against him for
representing Garcia’s daughters in court.
ISSUES: Whether Sesbreño should be disbarred
RULING: YES. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, states that a member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate
penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral
turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contraryto justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals.
DISPOSITION: Respondent Raul H. Sesbreno is DISBARRED.
 People v. Tuanda (181 SCRA 692) - JEN
FACTS: Instead of returning jewelry from the complainant for sale on commission basis,
Fe Tuanda issued 3 weeks which were later dishonoured. The RTC acquitted respondent
of the charge of estafa and convicted him of violation of BP 22 in all 3 cases. On appeal,
the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC but in addition, suspended respondent
Tuanda from the practice of law because according to the CA, the offense for which she
was found guilty involved moral turpitude, dishonest and deceitful conduct.
ISSUE: Whether conviction of the crime of estafa is a ground for suspension or
disbarment
RULING: Yes. The SC affirmed the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the
CA upon Tuanda. SC said that violation of BP 22 is a serious criminal offense which
affects public interest and public order. And that the offense involved moral turpitude,
dishonest and deceitful conduct. According to secion 27 of Rule 138, ROC, conviction of
crimes involving moral turpitude warrants suspension of removal of a lawyer.
Tan v. Sabandal (206 SCRA 473, 1992) - JEN
FACTS: Respondent Sabandal passed the 1975 Bar Examinations but was denied to take
his oath in view of the finding of the Court that he was guilty of unauthorized practice of
law. Since then, he has filed numerous petitions for him to be allowed to take his
lawyer’s oath.
Acting to his 1989 petition, the Court directed the executive judge of the province
where Sabandal is domiciled to submit a comment on respondent’s moral fitness to be a
member of the Bar. In compliance therewith, the executive judge stated therewith in
his comment that he is not aware of any acts committed by the respondent as would
disqualify him from admission to the Bar. However, he added that respondent has a
pending civil case before his Court for cancellation/reversion proceedings, in which
respondent, then working as Land Investigator in the Bureau of Lands is alleged to have
secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land which upon
investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a
free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the bank. The mortgage was later
foreclosed and the land subsequently sold at public auction and respondent has not
redeemed the land since then.
The case was however settled through amicable settlement. The said amicable
settlement cancelled the OCT under Free Patent in the name of Sabandal and his
mortgage in the bank; provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the RD for
proper annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered by the
aforesaid certificate of title with respondent refraining from exercising acts of
possession or ownership over the said land. Respondent also paid the bank a certain
sum for the loan and interest.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent may be admitted to the practice of law considering the
he already submitted three testimonials regarding his good moral character, and his
pending civil case has been terminated.
RULING: His petition must be denied. Time and again, it has been held that practice of
law is a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only
learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character. It should be
recalled that respondent worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said
employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over the property which
he could not but have known was a public land. This was manipulative on his part and
does not speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty
while in public service, which cannot be erased by the termination of the case and
where no determination of guilt or innocence was made because his suit has been
compromised. This is a sad reflection of his sense of honor and fair dealings.
Although the term “good moral character” admits of broad dimensions, it has been
defined as “including at least common dishonesty.” It has also been held that no moral
qualification for membership is more important than truthfulness or candor.
Fernandez v. Grecia (223 SCRA 425, 1993) - JEN
FACTS: In 1990, Linda Aves was admitted to St. Lukes Hospital. Among the doctors who
treated her, was Dr. Fernandez. She was treated well hence she was sent home but then
the next day, she died with her unborn child. Damaso Aves, husband, then filed a
damage suit against the hospital and he impleaded the attending doctors which
included Fernandez. Aves hired Atty. Benjamin Grecia to represent him. Grecia
requested St. Lukes to surrender before the court medical records of Linda. St. Lukes
complied and records were delivered to clerk of court. In the morning of July 16, 1991,
Grecia went to the office of the clerk of court to borrow the said medical records. While
Grecia was examining the records, he tore in front of the clerk and one office staff 2
pages from medical records and then handed it back to the clerk. The clerk was stunned
as she watched Grecia walkaway. She then reported the incident to the judge. The judge
immediately took action and the torn pages were eventually recovered as it turned out
that Grecia handed the torn pages to someone else. Grecia was then administratively
charged by Dr. Fernandez. Apparently, Grecia has been disbarred before. However, he
was able to get to the good side of the SC hence he was reinstated to the profession.
ISSUE: Whether Grecia should be disbarred again.
RULING: Yes. Grecia violated the CPR. As a lawyer, he should not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar.
Considering that it is his second offense, an incredible practitioner of dirty tricks, would
be to discharge from the role of an “instrument to advance the ends of justice.”
Pimentel v. Llorente (339 SCRA 154) - JEN
FACTS: Complainant was then a candidate during the May 8, 1995 elections. He filed this
complaint against respondent Attys. Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon, in their
capacity as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers, for gross misconduct,
serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyer’s oath. Complainant alleges that
respondents tampered with the votes received by him, with the result that, as shown in
the Statements of Votes (SoVs) and Certificate of Canvass (CoC), other senatorial
candidates were credited with votes which were above the number of votes they
actually received while, on the other hand, petitioner’s votes were reduced.
Respondents denied the allegations, claiming that the errors pointed out by
complainant could be attributed to honest mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue.
ISSUE: Whether respondents are guilty of misconduct.
RULING: Yes. Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, despite the
fact that the discrepancies, especially the double recording of the returns from 22
precincts and the variation in the tabulation of votes as reflected in the SoVs and CoC
were apparent on the face of the documents and that the variation involves substantial
number of votes, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which
stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.” By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the
government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to
“do no falsehood.”
Dishonest, deceitful conduct
Freeman v. Reyes, A.C. 6246, 15 Nov 2011
FACTS:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint, filed by complainant Marites E.
Freeman, seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes, for gross
dishonesty in obtaining money from her, without rendering proper legal services, and
appropriating the proceeds of the insurance policies of her deceased husband.
Complainant also seeks recovery of all the amounts she had given to respondent and
the insurance proceeds, which was remitted to the latter, with prayer for payment of
moral and exemplary damages . She and her son, Frank Lawrence applied for visas, to
enable them to attend the wake and funeral, but their visa applications were denied.
Complainant engaged the services of respondent who, in turn, assured her that she
would help her secure the visas and obtain the death benefits and other insurance
claims due her. Complainant said that despite repeated follow-ups with respondent,
nothing came out.
ISSUE: Whether the lawyer is liable.
RULING: Yes. Worse, respondent even inculcated in the mind of the complainant that
she had to adhere to the nefarious culture of giving “grease money” or lagay, in the
total amount of P43,000.00,43 to the British Embassy personnel, as if it was an ordinary
occurrence in the normal course of conducting official business transactions, as a means
to expedite the visa applications. This runs afoul the dictum in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Dizon vs. De Taza
FACTS:
Amado Dizon (complainant) alleged he, along with his siblings engaged the services of
Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates to represent them in the case of Eliza T. Castaneda,
et al. v. Heirs of Spouses Martin and Lucia Dizon. The complainant claimed that
sometime Atty. De Taza demanded the sum of (P75,000.00) from him to expedite the
proceedings before the Court. This amount was over and above the parties’ stipulated
retainer fee as evidenced by a contract. According to the complainant, unknown to him
at that time was that, a month earlier Atty. De Taza had already demanded and received
a total of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) from his sibling Aurora Dizon,
for the same reason that Atty. De Taza proffered to him, which was to expedite the
proceedings of their case before the Court. Handwritten receipts signed by one Atty.
Atty. Norlita De Taza were submitted by the complainant. Moreover, A certain Ana
Lynda Pineda executed an affidavit which was attached to the complaint, alleging that
Atty. De Taza issued 11 checks in her favor amounting to P481,400.00, which were all
dishonored by the bank. Demand letters sent to her went unheeded.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. De taza should be held administratively liable for issuing bouncing
checks, demanding and/or receiving money from her clients under the guise of having
the proceedings before the court expedited.
RULING: Yes. We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for
having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust
and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. The issuance of a series of
worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the
deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order.
Atty. De Taza’s actuations towards the complainant and his siblings were even worse as
she had the gall to make it appear to the complainant that the proceedings before the
Court can be expedited and ruled in their favor in exchange for an exorbitant amount of
money. Said scheme was employed by Atty. De Taza just to milk more money from her
clients. Without a doubt, Atty. De Taza’s actions are reprehensible and her greed more
than apparent when she even used the name of the Court to defraud her client. When a
lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to
render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that particular
purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must
immediately return the money to his client. In this case, the purpose for which Atty. De
Taza demanded money is baseless and nonexistent. Thus, her demand should not have
even been made in the first place.
Immoral Conduct
Ui v. Bonifacio
FACTS:Complainant Leslie Ui filed an administraive complaint for disbarment against
Aty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carryin on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui,
complainant’s husband. It is respondent’s contention, however, that when she
discovered Carlos Ui’ true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him.
ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of immoral conduct.
RULING: No. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral
norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.
Respondent’s act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his
true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no
intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession/
Complainant’s bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit.
Immoral Conduct
Figueroa v. Barranco, 276 SCRA 445 (1997)
FACTS: Patricia Figueroa and Simeon Barranco were town-mates and teen sweethearts.
Their intimacy yielded to a child Simeon. Subsequently, Simeon first promised he would
marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and
Simeon allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. Patricia
learned that Simeon married another woman. Meanwhile, Simeon successfully passed
the 1970 bar examinations. But before he could take his oath, Patricia filed a petition to
disqualify Simeon to take the Lawyer’s Oath on the ground of gross immoral conduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Simeon in engaging in premarital relations with Patricia
and making promises to marry her constitute gross immoral conduct.
RULING: No. The SC ruled that the facts do not constitute gross immoral
conductwarranting a permanent exclusion of Simeon from the legal profession. His
engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry
suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly
immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is
one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. It is wilful, flagrant, or shameless
act, which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the
community.
CORDOVA v. CORDOVA
FACTS:
In 1985, Atty. Laurence Cordova, while being married to Salvacion Delizo and with two
children, left his wife and children to cohabit with another married woman. In 1986,
Salvacion and Cordova had a reconciliation where Cordova promised to leave his
mistress. But apparently, Cordova still continued to cheat on her wife as apparently,
Cordova again lived with another woman and worse, he took one of his children with
him and hid the child away from Salvacion.
In 1988, Salvacion filed a letter-complaint for disbarment against Cordova. Eventually,
multiple hearing dates were sent but no hearing took place because neither party
appeared. In 1989, Salvacion sent a telegraphic message to the Commission on Bar
Discipline intimating that she and her husband has reconciled. The Commission, since
Salvacion failed to submit her evidence ex parte, merely recommended the reprimand
and admonishment of Cordova.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cordova should be merely reprimanded.
HELD: No. He should be suspended indefinitely until he presents evidence that he has
been morally reformed and that there was true reconciliation between him and his wife.
Before a person can be admitted to the bar, one requirement is that he possesses good
moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission
to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing
condition for membership in the Bar in good standing. The moral delinquency that
affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for
instance, which makes “a mockery of the inviolable social institution or marriage” such
was the case in the case at bar.
MIJARES v. VILLALUZ
FACTS: Complainant Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. De Mijares is the presiding judge in
Pasay City while respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Court of Appeals,
is a consult at the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission.
Judge Mijares is actually widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares.
She obtained a decree declaring her husband presumptively dead, after an absence
of 16 years. Thus, she got married to respondent in a civil wedding on January 7, 1994
before Judge Myrna Lim Verano.
They (complainant and respondent) knew each other when the latter, who was at that
time the Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, was trying a murder case
involving the death of the son of Mijares.
During their marriage, complainant judge discovered that respondent was having an
illicit affair with another woman. Respondent denied such rather he uttered harsh
words to the complainant judge. As a result, they lived separately and did not get in
touch with one another and the respondent did not bother to apologize for what
happened.
Through Judge Ramon Makasiar, complainant knew that respondent married Lydia
Geraldez. Complainant then filed a complaint against respondent for disbarment for the
latter immorally and bigamously entered into a second marriage while having a
subsisting marriage and distorted the truth by stating his civil status as single.
In his defense, he contended that his marriage to the complainant judge was a “sham
marriage”; that he voluntarily signed the marriage contract to help her in the
administrative case for immorality filed against her by her legal researcher. Likewise, he
maintained that when he contracted his marriage with complainant, he had a subsisting
marriage with his first wife because the decision declaring the annulment of such
marriage had not yet become final and executory or published.
Judge Purisima the found respondent guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct and
later on affirmed by the Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of complainant and respondent was a sham
marriage
RULING: As to the issue that it was a “sham” marriage is too incredible to deserve
serious consideration. Thus, former Justice Onofre Villaluz is found guilty of immoral
conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; he is hereby suspended
from practice of law for two years with the specific warning.
CALUB v SULLER
FACTS: Atty Suller raped the wife of his neighbor Cristino Calub.A criminal complaint for
rape was filed against Suller. A complaint for disbarment was also filed by Calub before
the SC. The CFI acquitted Suller for failure of the prosecution to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: Whether Atty Suller be disbarred
RULING: Yes. Acquittal in a criminal case is not determinative of an administrative case
for disbarment. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows that he lacks moral character to continue
as officer of the court. The rape by a lawyer of his neighbor’s wife constitutes such
serious moral depravity.
GARRIDO v. GARRIDO
FACTS: Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Angel E.
Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them with gross
immorality.
Maelotisea alleged that she is the legal wife of Atty. Garrido. They have 6 children.
Sometime in 1987, one of their children confided that an unknown caller talked with her
claiming that the former is a child of Atty Garrido. Also, one of her daughter, May
Elizabeth, told her that she saw Atty. Garrido strolling at a mall together with a woman
and a child who was later identified as Atty. Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia
Garrido, respectively.
Maelotisea was able to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating among
others that the said child is the daughter of Atty. Garrido and Atty. Valencia.In 1993,
Atty. Garrido left the conjugal home and joined Atty. Valencia at their residence. Since
he left the conjugal home Atty. Garrido failed and still failing to give Maelotisea the
needed financial support to the prejudice of their children who stopped schooling
because of financial constraints.
By way of defense, Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, aas he
was already married to Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He
claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. As he and
Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty.
Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties.
Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial difficulties with his
second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his
children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in
private schools; all graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a
special secondary course.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a
member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death
of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born
before he became a lawyer.
On her part, Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She
explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage
between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty.
Garrido with Constancia.In the course of the hearings before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of her complaint, arguing that she
wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6)
children.
ISSUE: Should the disbarment case against Atty. Garrido be dismissed because the
alleged immoral acts were committed before he was admitted to the Philippine Bar?
RULING:
A. Prescription of offenses by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a
lawyer’s qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. Admission to the practice
of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest
because it involves service to the public.
The time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint
is not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for
admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a member of the
legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of
were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. The
possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon
proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the
respondent before he became a lawyer (Zaguirre v. Castillo). Admission to the practice
only creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to
become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary
even after admission to the Bar.
Ventura v. Samson (686 SCRA 430, 2012) - JEN
FACTS: Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against the respondent for grossly
immoral conduct. She alleged that respondent had carnal knowledge of her twice
when she was still a minor, the first being committed in the maid’s room and the other
committed in the respondent’s poultry farm. Respondent did not deny the deed, but
alleged that the sexual act was done with mutual consent, the complainant even
accepting the fees he had given after the intercourse. Respondent also alleged that the
complainant was of loose morals and that complaint was only concocted so that the
complainant can extort money from him.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent’s act warrant disbarment.
RULING: Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that
show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community. Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by
complainant, then a 13-year-old minor who for a time was under respondent’s care.
Whether the sexual encounter between the respondent and complainant was or was
not with the latter’s consent is of no moment. Respondent clearly committed a
disgraceful, grossly immoral and highly reprehensible act. Such conduct is a
transgression of the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be
disciplined accordingly.
Adjudication: Respondent Atty. Danilo Samson is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Immoral
Conduct, Violation of his oath of office, and Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7,
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ong v. de los Santos, A.C. 10179, 4 March 2014
FACTS:
Complainant Benjamin Ong was introduced to respondent Atty. William F. Delos Santos
by Sheriff Fernando Mercado of MTC of Manila. After several calls and personal
interactions between them, Ong and Atty. Delos Santos became friends. In time,
according to Ong, Atty. Delos Santos asked him to encash his postdated check inasmuch
as he was in dire need of cash. To reassure Ong that the check would be funded upon
maturity, Atty. Delos Santos bragged about his lucrative practice and his good paying
clients. Convinced of Atty. Delos Santos’ financial stability, Ong handed to Atty. Delos
Santos on January 29, 2008 the amount of P100,000.00 in exchange for the latter’s
Metrobank Check. However, the check was dishonored upon presentment for the
reason that the account was closed. Ong relayed the matter of the dishonor to Atty.
Delos Santos, and demanded immediate payment, but the latter just ignored him. When
efforts to collect remained futile, Ong brought a criminal complaint for estafa and for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against Atty. Delos Santos. Ong also brought this
disbarment complaint against Atty. Delos Santos in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).
ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyer is guilty of immoral conduct even the conduct was
done in private dealing.
RULING:
Yes. That his act involved a private dealing with Ong did not matter. His being a lawyer
invested him — whether he was acting as such or in a non-professional capacity — with
the obligation to exhibit good faith, fairness and candor in his relationship with others.
There is no question that a lawyer could be disciplined not only for a malpractice in his
profession, but also for any misconduct committed outside of his professional capacity.
His being a lawyer demanded that he conduct himself as a person of the highest moral
and professional integrity and probity in his dealings with others. Moreover, in issuing
the dishonored check, Atty. Delos Santos put into serious question not only his personal
integrity but also the integrity of the entire Integrated Bar.
Unauthorized Practice of Law
CRUZ v. MINA
FACTS: Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner), a third-year law student, filed before the MeTC a
formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case for Grave Threats,
where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. The petitioner furthermore
avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a
written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of
the said criminal case. However, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as
private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student
practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule)
should take precedence over the ruling of the Court and set the case for continuation of
trial. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MeTC and RTC) seeking to reverse
the Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the
effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the
source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.
The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave
Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10,
1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior
courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a
member of the bar. The petitioner directly filed to the Supreme Court the petition and
contended that the court[s] are clearly ignoring the law when they patently refused to
heed to the clear mandate of the Laput, Cantimbuhan and Bulacan cases, as well as bar
matter no. 730, providing for the appearance of non-lawyers before the lower courts
(MTC’s).
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an
agent or friend of a party litigant
RULING: The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in
Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from
entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal
case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
However, in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified: The rule, however, is
different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer: Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted.—In the court of a justice of the peace, a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
without the supervision of a member of the bar.There is really no problem as to the
application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of a
non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter
rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party
litigant, may appear before the courts.
Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act
as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the
basis for the petitioner’s appearance. Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance
before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he
is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34,
Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without
the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
Spouses Suarez vs. Salazar
Considering respondents’ “Motion to Expunge All Pleadings Filed by Atty. Filemon A.
Manangan with Motion to Hold Him in Contempt of Court and to Dismiss the Petition”
and said Atty. Manangan’s admission at the hearing this morning, September 29, 1999,
that he is not a lawyer entitled to practice law in the Philippines, and that he is the same
“Filemon A. Manangan” who was found by this Court in G.R. No. 82760) decided on
August 30, 1990, to be in reality Andres Culanag who is not a member of the Philippine
Bar, but despite these facts he has continued to misrepresent himself to be an attorney-
at-law and has appeared as counsel for petitioners in this case, Atty. Filemon A.
Manangan, who is in reality Andres Culanag, is hereby declared guilty of indirect
contempt of this Court. Wherefore, he is hereby sentenced to three (3) months
imprisonment to be served at the Headquarters of the National Bureau of Investigation,
Taft Avenue, Manila, until further orders from this Court.
(Eto lang nakalagay sa original case. )
AGUIRRE v. RANA
FACTS: Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the
scheduled mass oath-taking, complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. The Court allowed respondent to take his oath.
Respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of
Attorneys up to now. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer,
appeared as counsel for a candidate in an election. On the charge of violation of law,
complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not
allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses
respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the
latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the
pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
Issue: Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus
does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar

Ruling: The Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually
performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render
any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained
and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal
knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of
the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing
the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from
one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had
practiced law without a license.
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath.
However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged
lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the
bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know
that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely:
his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.
OCA v. LADAGA
FACTS: Atty. Ladaga, an RTC Branch Clerk of Court, acted as pro bonocounsel for a
relative in a criminal case, without the previous authorityfrom the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court as required by the Administrative Code. An administrative complaint
was filed against Atty. Ladaga for practicing law without permission from the
Department Head (CJ) as required by law. Atty. Ladaga justified his appearance as he
merely gave a free legal assistance to a relative and that he was on an approved leave of
absence during his appearances as such counsel. Moreover, the presiding judge of the
court to which he is assigned knew his appearancesas such counsel.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Ladaga’s appearances as a pro bono counsel for a relative
constitutes practice of law as prohibited by the Administrative Code.
HELD: No. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of the statute should be
customarily or habitually holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services. It does not pertain to isolated court appearances as in this
case. Nevertheless, for his failure to obtain a prior permission from the head of the
Department (CJ) as required by law, respondent was reprimanded.
Alawi v. Alauya (1997) - JEN
FACTS: Ashary Alauya transacted with Sophia Alawi to avail of a contract for the
purchase of one housing unit from EB Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd., a real estate and
housing company. Shortly thereafter Alauya wrote to the company expressing his intent
to render the contract void ab initio. Several correspondences ensued, all of which were
signed by Alauya as ATTY. ASHARY M. ALAUYA. Alauya is a member of the Sharia Bar and
for that matter he is a counselor-at-law. Alauya claims that he does not use the title of
counselor-at-law for fear of being mistaken as a local legislator, i.e. councilor. Hence, he
affixed the title of attorney before his name. Alawi filed a verified complaint against
Alauya, alleging, among others, that Alawi usurped the title of an attorney which is
reserved only for the members of the Philippine Bar.
ISSUE: Whether Alauya's membership in the Sharia Bar endows him the title of an
attorney.
RULING: No. Alauya is hereby reprimanded for usurping the title of an attorney reserved
for those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and had
successfully passed the bar examinations, have been admitted ti the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing.
Persons who passed the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Bar and may
only practice law before a Sharia Court, Alauya's disinclination to use the title of
counselor-at-law does not warrant his use of the title of an attorney.
Halili v. CIR (GR. L-24864, 1985)
FACTS: The cases involve disputes regarding claims for overtime of more than five
hundred bus drivers and conductors of Halili Transit. Litigation initially commenced with
the filing of a complaint for overtime with the CIR. The disputes were eventually settled
when the contending parties reached an Agreement where the Administratrix would
transfer to the employees the title to a tract of land in Caloocan, Rizal. The parcel of
land was eventually registered in the name of the Union.
The Union, through Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda, filed an urgent motion with the Ministry
of Labor and Employment (MOLE) requesting for authority to sell and dispose of the
property. Union President Amado Lopez, in a letter, informed J.C. Espinas and
Associates that the general membership of the said Union had authorized a 20%
contingent fee for the law firm based on whatever amount would be awarded the
Union.
Atty. Jose C. Espinas, (the original counsel) established the award of 897 workers' claim.
When Atty. Pineda appeared for the Union in these cases, still an associate of the law
firm, his appearance carried the firm name B.C. Pineda and Associates," giving the
impression that he was the principal lawyer in these cases.
Atty. Pineda joined the law firm of Atty. Espinas in 1965 when these cases were pending
resolution. He always held office in the firm's place at Puyat Building, except in 1966 to
1967 when he transferred to the Lakas ng Manggagawa Offices. During this one-year
stint at the latter office, Atty. Pineda continued handling the case with the arrangement
that he would report the developments to the Espinas firm. When he rejoined the law
firm in 1968, he continued working on these cases and using the Puyat Building office as
his address in the pleadings.
When Atty. Pineda rejoined the Espinas firm in 1968, he did not reveal to his partners
(he was made the most senior partner) that he had a retainer's contract. He stayed with
the law firm until 1974 and still did not divulge the 1967 retainer's contract. Only the
officers of the Union knew of the contract.
The alleged retainer's contract between Atty. Pineda and the Union appears anomalous
and even illegal as well as unethical considering that-
1. The contract was executed only between Atty. Pineda and the officers of the Union
chosen by about 125 members only. It was not a contract with the general membership.
2. The contingent fee of 30% for those who were still working with Halili Transit and the
45% fee for those who were no longer working worked to the prejudice of the latter
group who should and were entitled to more benefits. Thus, too, when the alleged
retainer's contract was executed in 1967, the Halili Transit had already stopped
operations in Metro Manila. By then, Atty. Pineda knew that all the workers would be
out of work which would mean that the 45% contingent fee would apply to all.
3. The contract which retroactively took effect on January 1, 1966, was executed when
Atty. Espinas was still handling the appeal of Halili Transit in the main case before the
Supreme Court.
4. When Atty. Pineda filed his motion for approval of his attorney's lien with Arbiter
Valenzuela on February 8, 1983, he did not attach the retainer's contract.
5. The retainer's contract was not even notarized.
A prospective buyer, the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. objected in view of PD
1529 which requires no less than an order from a court of competent jurisdiction as
authority to sell property in trust.
Atty. Pineda, without authority from the Supreme Court but relying on the earlier
authority given him by the Ministry of Labor, filed another urgent motion, praying that
the Union be authorized to sell the lot. The sale was finally consummated, resulting in
the execution of an escrow agreement.
When Atty. Jose C. Espinas (herein movant and alleged original counsel for the Union)
learned of the sale and apportionment of the proceeds from past Union president
Amado Lopez, he requested Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela to allow him to look
into the records of the case. The latter, however, told him that the records of the case
were missing. Thereupon, Atty. Espinas requested Director Pascual Reyes of the NLRC to
locate the records.
ISSUES:
a.Whether or not Atty. Pineda and Arbiter Valenzuela should be held in contempt.
b. Whether or not Atty. Pineda should be disbarred.
RULING:
a. Yes. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court;
such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into
disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during
litigation.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments,
orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of
justice.
In the Slade Perkins case, "the exercise of the power to punish contempt has a twofold
aspect, namely (1) the proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the
court or its order; and (2) to compel his performance of some act or duty required of
him by the court which he refuses to perform. Due to this twofold aspect of the exercise
of the power to punish them, contempts are classified as civil or criminal.
A civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge
for the benefit of the opposing party therein.
A criminal contempt, is conduct directed against the authority and dignity of a court or
of a judge, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority or dignity of the court
or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act.
b. Yes. Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds.—A
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corrupt or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his
unfitness for the confidence and trust which characterize the attorney and client
relations, and the practice of law before the courts, or showing such a lack of personal
honesty or of good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence.
In the case, the expeditious manner by which Arbiter Valenzuela granted Atty. Pineda's
motion for such authority to sell the property make the entire transaction dubious and
irregular.
Significantly Atty. Pineda's act of filing a motion praying for authority to sell was by itself
an admission on his part that he did not possess the authority to sell the property. He
could not and did not even wait for valid authority but instead previously obtained the
same from the labor arbiter whom he knew was not empowered to so authorize.
The 45% attorney's lien on the award of those union members who were no longer
working and the 30% lien on the benefits of those who were still working as provided
for in the alleged retainer's contract are also very exorbitant and unconscionable.
*Atty. Pineda is found guilty of indirect contempt of court for which he is sentenced to
imprisonment and directed to show cause why he should not be disbarred.
(Mahaba. Hahahahaha)
Duty not to divide legal fees
Lijiaco v. Terrado (AC 6317, 2006)
FACTS:
Sometime in January 2001, Luzviminda C. Lijauco engaged the services of Atty. Rogelio
P. Terrado for P 70,000 to assist in recovering her deposit with Planters Development
Bank in the amount of P180,000 and the release of her foreclosed house and lot located
in Calamba, Laguna. The said foreclosed house and lot is the subject of a petition for the
issuance of writ of possession then pending before the RTC of Binan Laguna docketed as
LRC Case No. B-2610.
Ms. Lijauco alleged that Atty. Terrado failed to appear in the hearing for the issuance of
Writ of Possession and did not protect her interest in allowing her to participate in a
Compromise Agreement in order to end the LRC Case No. B-2610. She filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and
conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court. In his defense, Atty. Terrado claims that
the P 70,000 legal fees he received is purely and solely for the recovery of the P 180,000
savings account. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The Investigating
Commissioner submitted his report finding Atty. Terrado guilty of violating Rule 1.01
and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. The IBP Board of Governors
adopted the recommendation of the investigating commissioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors is proper?
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the IBP. The records show that Atty.
Terrado acted as complainant’s counsel in the drafting of the compromise agreement
between Ms. Lijauco and the bank regarding LRC Case No. B-2610. He lured Ms. Lijauco
to participate in a compromise agreement with a false and misleading assurance that
the latter can still recover her foreclosed property even after three years from
foreclosure. Atty. Terrado violated Rule 1.01 Canon 1 of the CPR which says that a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Furthermore, the Investigating Commissioner observed that the fee of P 70,000 for legal
assistance in the recovery of the deposit amounting to P 180,000 is unreasonable and is
violative of Canon 20 of the CPR. Atty. Terrada was also found guilty of violating Rule
9.02 of the CPR by openly admitting that he divided the legal fees with two other people
as a referral fee.
ROC, RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for student practice. — A law student who has successfully
completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is
enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the
Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent
indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Section 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule,
shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs,
memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for
and in behalf of the legal clinic.
Section 3. Privileged communications. — The Rules safeguarding privileged
communications between attorney and client shall apply to similar communications
made to or received by the law student, acting for the legal clinic.
Section 4. Standards of conduct and supervision. — The law student shall comply with
the standards of professional conduct governing members of the Bar. Failure of an
attorney to provide adequate supervision of student practice may be a ground for
disciplinary action. (Circular No. 19, dated December 19, 1986).
ROC, RULE 138
Section 33. Standing in court of person authorized to appear for Government. — Any
official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for
the Government of the Philippines shall have all the rights of a duly authorized member
of the bar to appear in any case in which said government has an interest direct or
indirect.
Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed
by him for the purpose, or with the aid an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be
either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
ACT NO. 2259
Section 1. When, in the opinion of the Governor-General (now the President), the public
interests require that the title to any lands be titled and adjudicated, he may to this end
order the Director of Lands to make a survey and plan thereof. (As amended by Sec.
1850, Act No. 2711.)
The Director of Lands shall, thereupon, give notice to persons claiming an interest in the
lands, and to the general public, of the day on which such survey will begin, giving as full
and accurate a description as possible of the lands to be surveyed. Such notice shall be
published in two successive issues of the Official Gazette, and a copy of the notice in the
English and Spanish languages shall be posted in a conspicuous place on the chief
municipal building of the municipality, township or settlement in which the lands, or any
portion thereof, are situated. A copy of the notice shall also be sent to the president of
such municipality, township, or settlement, and to the provincial board. (As amended by
Sec. 1851, Act No. 2711.)
LABOR CODE
Article 222. Appearances and Fees. — (a) Non-lawyers may appear before the
Commission or any Labor Arbiter only:
1. If they represent themselves; or
2. If they represent their organization or members thereof.
(b) No attorneys fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from any
collective bargaining negotiations or conclusion of the collective agreement shall be
imposed on any individual member of the contracting union: Provided, however, that
attorney's fees may be charged against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by
the parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be
null and void.
LGC (RA 7160, SECTION 415)
Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang pambarangay
proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of counsel or
representative, except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next-
of-kin who are not lawyers.
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES AM 08-8-7-SC
Section 1. Title. - These Rules shall be known as "The Revised Rules of Procedure for
Small Claims Cases."
Section 2. Scope. - These Rules shall govern the procedure in actions before the
Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCCs), Municipal
Trial Courts (MTCs) and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) for payment of money
where the value of the claim does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00) exclusive of interest and costs.
Section 3. Objectives. -
(a) To protect and advance the constitutional right of persons to a speedy disposition of
their cases;
(b) To provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the disposition of small claims
cases; and,
(c) To introduce innovations and best practices for the benefit of the underprivileged.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Rule:
(a) Plaintiff refers to the party who initiated a small claims action. The term includes a
defendant who has filed a counterclaim against plaintiff;
(b) Defendant is the party against whom the plaintiff has filed a small claims action. The
term includes a plaintiff against whom a defendant has filed a claim, or a person who
replies to the claim;
(c) Person is an individual, corporation, partnership, limited liability partnership,
association, or other juridical entity endowed with personality by law;
(d) Individual is a natural person;
(e) Motion means a party's request, written or oral, to the court for an order or other
action. It shall include an informal written request to the court, such as a letter;
(f) Good cause means circumstances sufficient to justify the requested order or other
action, as determined by the judge; and,
(g) Affidavit means a written statement or declaration of facts that are sworn or
affirmed to be true.
Section 5. Applicability. - The Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall apply this Rule in all
actions that are purely civil in nature where the claim or relief prayed for by the plaintiff
is solely for payment or reimbursement of sum of money.
The claim or demand may be:
(a) For money owed under any of the following:
1. Contract of Lease;
2. Contract of Loan;
3. Contract of Services;
4. Contract of Sale; or
5. Contract of Mortgage;
(b) For liquidated damages arising from contracts;
(c) The enforcement of a barangay amicable settlement or an arbitration award
involving a money claim covered by this Rule pursuant to Sec. 417 of Republic Act 7160,
otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991.
Section 6. Commencement of Small Claims Action. - A small claims action is commenced
by filing with the court an accomplished and verified Statement of Claim (Form 1-SCC) in
duplicate, accompanied by a Certification Against Forum Shopping, Splitting a Single
Cause of Action, and Multiplicity of Suits (Form 1-A SCC), and two (2) duly certified
photocopies of the actionable document/s subject of the claim, as well as the affidavits
of witnesses and other evidence to support the claim. No evidence shall be allowed
during the hearing which was not attached to or submitted together with the Statement
of Claim, unless good cause is shown for the admission of additional evidence.
The plaintiff must state in the Statement of Claims if he/she/it is engaged in the
business of lending, banking and similar activities, and the number of small claims cases
filed within the calendar year regardless of judicial station.
No formal pleading, other than the Statement of Claim/s described in this Rule, is
necessary to initiate a small claims action.
Section 7. Venue. - The regular rules on venue shall apply.
However, if the plaintiff is engaged in the business of lending, banking and similar
activities, and has a branch within the municipality or city where the defendant resides,
the Statement of Claim/s shall be filed where that branch is located.
Section 8. Joinder of Claims. - Plaintiff may join in a single statement of claim one or
more separate small claims against a defendant provided that the total amount claimed,
exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00).
Section 9. Affidavits. - The affidavits submitted under this Rule shall state only facts of
direct personal knowledge of the affiants or based on authentic records, which are
admissible in evidence.
A violation of this requirement shall subject the party, and the counsel who assisted the
party in the preparation of the affidavits, if any, to appropriate disciplinary action. The
inadmissible affidavit(s) or portion(s) thereof shall be expunged from the record.
The non-submission of the required affidavits will cause the immediate dismissal of the
claim or counterclaim.
Section 10. Payment of Filing Fees. - The plaintiff shall pay the docket and other legal
fees prescribed under Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court, unless allowed to litigate
as an indigent. Exemption from the payment of filing fees shall be granted only by the
Supreme Court.
However, if more than five (5) small claims are filed by one party within the calendar
year, regardless of the judicial station, an additional filing fee of P500.00 shall be paid
for every claim filed after the fifth (5th) claim, and an additional P100.00 or a total of
P600.00 for every claim filed after the tenth (10th) claim, and another P100.00 or a total
of P700 for every claim filed after the fifteenth (15th) claim, progressively and
cumulatively.
If the plaintiff is engaged in the business of banking, lending and similar activities, the
amount of filing and other legal fees shall be the same as those applicable to cases filed
under the regular rules.
A claim filed with a motion to sue as indigent (Form 6-SCC) shall be referred to the
Executive Judge for immediate action in case of multi-sala courts. If the motion is
granted by the Executive Judge, the case shall be raffled off or assigned to the court
designated to hear small claims cases. If the motion is denied, the plaintiff shall be given
five (5) days within which to pay the docket fees, otherwise, the case shall be dismissed
without prejudice. In no case shall a party, even if declared an indigent, be exempt from
the payment of the P1,000.00 fee for service of summons and processes.
Section 11. Dismissal of the Claim. - After the court determines that the case falls under
these Rules, it may, from an examination of the allegations of the Statement of Claim/s
and such evidence attached thereto, by itself, dismiss the case outright on any of the
grounds for the dismissal of the case. The order of dismissal shall state if it is with or
without prejudice.
If, during the hearing, the court is able to determine that there exists a ground for
dismissal of the Statement of Claim/s, the court may, by itself, dismiss the case even if
such ground is not pleaded in the defendant's Response.
If plaintiff misrepresents that he/she/it is not engaged in the business of banking,
lending or similar activities when in fact he/she/it is so engaged, the Statement of
Claim/s shall be dismissed with prejudice and plaintiff shall be meted the appropriate
sanctions, such as direct contempt.
However, if the case does not fall under this Rule, but falls under summary or regular
procedure, the case shall not be dismissed. Instead, the case shall be re-docketed under
the appropriate procedure, and returned to the court where it was assigned, subject to
payment of any deficiency in the applicable regular rate of filing fees. If a case is filed
under the regular or summary procedure, but actually falls under this Rule, the case
shall be referred to the Executive Judge for appropriate assignment.
Section 12. Summons and Notice of Hearing. - If no ground for dismissal is found, the
court shall forthwith issue Summons (Form 2-SCC) on the day of receipt of the
Statement of Claim/s, directing the defendant to submit a verified Response.
The court shall also issue a Notice of Hearing (Form 4-SCC) to both parties, directing
them to appear before it on a specific date and time for hearing, with a warning that no
unjustified postponement shall be allowed, as provided in Section 21 of this Rule.
The Summons to be served on the defendant shall be accompanied by a copy of the
Statement of Claim/s and documents submitted by plaintiff, and a blank Response Form
(Form 3-SCC) to be accomplished by the defendant.
A Notice of Hearing shall accompany the Summons and shall contain: (a) the date of the
hearing, which shall not be more than thirty (30) days from the filing of the Statement of
Claim/s; and (b) the express prohibition against the filing of a motion to dismiss or any
other motion under Section 16 of this Rule.
If Summons is returned without being served on any or all of the defendants, the court
shall order the plaintiff to cause the service of summons and shall inform the court
within thirty (30) days from notice if said summons was served or not; otherwise, the
Statement of Claim/s shall be dismissed without prejudice as to those who were not
served with summons.
Section 13. Response. - The defendant shall file with the court and serve on the plaintiff
a duly accomplished and verified Response within a non-extendible period of ten (10)
days from receipt of summons. The Response shall be accompanied by certified
photocopies of documents, as well as affidavits of witnesses and other evidence in
support thereof. No evidence shall be allowed during the hearing which was not
attached to or submitted together with the Response, unless good cause is shown for
the admission of additional evidence.
Section 14. Effect of Failure to File Response. - Should the defendant fail to file
his/her/its Response within the required period, and likewise fail to appear on the date
set for hearing, the court shall render judgment on the same day, as may be warranted
by the facts alleged in the Statement of Claim/s.
Should the defendant fail to file his/her/its Response within the required period but
appears on the date set for hearing, the court shall ascertain what defense he/she/it has
to offer which shall constitute his/her/its Response, and proceed to hear or adjudicate
the case on the same day as if a Response has been filed.
Section 15. Counterclaims Within the Coverage of this Rule. - If at the time the action is
commenced, the defendant possesses a claim against the plaintiff that (a) is within the
coverage of this Rule, exclusive of interest and costs; (b) arises out of the same
transaction or event that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim; (c) does not
require for its adjudication the joinder of third parties; and (d) is not the subject of
another pending action, the claim shall be filed as a counterclaim in the Response;
otherwise, the defendant shall be barred from suing on the counterclaim.
The defendant may also elect to file a counterclaim against the plaintiff that does not
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, provided that the amount and nature
thereof are within the coverage of this Rule and the prescribed docket and other legal
fees are paid.
Section 16. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings, motions, or
petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the Statement of Claim/s;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
(d) Petition for relief from judgment;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits, or any other paper;
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order
issued by the court;
(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default;
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(j) Reply and rejoinder;
(k) Third-party complaints; and
(l) Interventions.
Section 17. Availability of Forms; Assistance by Court Personnel. - The Clerk of Court or
other court personnel shall provide such assistance as may be requested by a plaintiff or
a defendant regarding the availability of forms and other information about the
coverage, requirements as well as procedure for small claims cases.
Section 18. Appearance. - The parties shall personally appear on the designated date of
hearing.
Appearance through a representative must be for a valid cause. The representative of
an individual-party must not be a lawyer and must be related to or next-of-kin of the
individual-party. Juridical entities shall not be represented by a lawyer in any capacity.
The representative must be authorized under a Special Power of Attorney (Form 7-SCC)
to enter into an amicable settlement of the dispute and to enter into stipulations or
admissions of facts and of documentary exhibits.
Section 19. Appearance of Attorneys Not Allowed. - No attorney shall appear in behalf
of or represent a party at the hearing, unless the attorney is the plaintiff or defendant.
If the court determines that a party cannot properly present his/her claim or defense
and needs assistance, the court may, in its discretion, allow another individual who is
not an attorney to assist that party upon the latter's consent.
Section 20. Non-appearance of Parties. - Failure of the plaintiff to appear shall be cause
for the dismissal of the Statement of Claim/s without prejudice. The defendant who
appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on a permissive
counterclaim.
Failure of the defendant to appear shall have the same effect as failure to file a
Response under Section 14 of this Rule.1âwphi1 This shall not apply where one of two
or more defendants who are sued under a common cause of action and have pleaded a
common defense appears at the hearing.
Failure of both parties to appear shall cause the dismissal with prejudice of both the
Statement of Claim/s and the counterclaim.
Section 21. Postponement When Allowed. - A request for postponement of a hearing
may be granted only upon proof of the physical inability of the party to appear before
the court on the scheduled date and time. A party may avail of only one (1)
postponement.
Section 22. Duty of the Court. - At the beginning of the court session, the judge shall
read aloud a short statement explaining the nature, purpose and the rule of procedure
of small claims cases.
Section 23. Hearing. - At the hearing, the judge shall first exert efforts to bring the
parties to an amicable settlement of their dispute. If efforts at settlement fail, the
hearing shall immediately proceed in an informal and expeditious manner and be
terminated within the same day.
Any settlement (Form 8-SCC) or resolution of the dispute shall be reduced into writing,
signed by the parties and submitted to the court for approval (Form 9-SCC and Form 10-
SCC).
Section 24. Decision. - After the hearing, the court shall render its decision based on the
facts established by the evidence (Form 11-SCC), within twenty-four (24) hours from
termination of the hearing. The decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of
Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the
parties.
The decision shall be final, executory and unappealable.
Section 25. Execution. - When the decision is rendered, execution shall issue upon
motion (Form 12-SCC) of the winning party.
Section 26. Certification of Documents. - All documents attached to the Statement of
Claim/s or Response that are required to be certified, except public or official
documents, shall be certified by the signature of the plaintiff or defendant concerned.
Section 27. Applicability of the Rules of Civil Procedure. - The Rules of Civil Procedure
shall apply suppletorily insofar as they are not inconsistent with this Rule.
Section 28. Non-applicability. - The rules on mediation/judicial dispute resolution shall
not apply, inasmuch as the parties may enter into compromise at any stage of the
proceedings.
Section 29. Effectivity. - These Revised Rules shall take effect on February 1, 2016
following their publication in two newspapers of general circulation. They shall govern
all cases filed after their effectivity, and also all pending proceedings, except to the
extent that in the opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible or would
work injustice, in which case the procedure under which the cases were filed shall
govern.
ROC, RULE 71
Contempt
Section 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. — A person guilty of misbehavior in the
presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the
same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or
refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition
when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court
and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or
higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a lower court. (1a)
Section 2. Remedy therefrom. — The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court
may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or
prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of
such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the
judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the
petition be decided against him. (2a)
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a charge
in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or
counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt;
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his
official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court,
including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real
property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or
attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession
given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a
court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without
authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer
by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing
process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such
proceedings. (3a)
Section 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu propio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an
order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified
petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers
involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of
or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall
allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless
the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the
principal action for joint hearing and decision. (n)
Section 5. Where charge to be filed. — Where the charge for indirect contempt has been
committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or
against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such court. Where such
contempt has been committed against a lower court, the charge may be filed with the
Regional Trial Court of the place in which the lower court is sitting; but the proceedings
may also be instituted in such lower court subject to appeal to the Regional Trial Court
of such place in the same manner as provided in section 11 of this Rule. (4a; Bar Matter
No. 803, 21 July 1998)
Section 6. Hearing; release on bail. — If the hearing is not ordered to be had forthwith,
the respondent may be released from custody upon filing a bond, in an amount fixed by
the court, for his appearance at the hearing of the charge. On the day set therefor, the
court shall proceed to investigate the charge and consider such comment, testimony or
defense as the respondent may make or offer. (5a)
Section 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. — If the respondent is adjudged guilty of
indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or
higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. If he is adjudged guilty of contempt
committed against a lower court, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding five
thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or both. If the contempt
consists in the violation of a writ of injunction, temporary restraining order or status
quo order, he may also be ordered to make complete restitution to the party injured by
such violation of the property involved or such amount as may be alleged and proved.
The writ of execution, as in ordinary civil actions, shall issue for the enforcement of a
judgment imposing a fine unless the court otherwise provides. (6a)
Section 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed. — When the contempt consists in the
refusal or omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the respondent to perform,
he may be imprisoned by order of the court concerned until he performs it. (7a)
Section 9. Proceeding when party released on bail fails to answer. — When a respondent
released on bail fails to appear on the day fixed for the hearing, the court may issue
another order of arrest or may order the bond for his appearance to be forfeited and
confiscated, or both; and, if the bond be proceeded against, the measure of damages
shall be the extent of the loss or injury sustained by the aggrieved party by reason of the
misconduct for which the contempt charge was prosecuted, with the costs of the
proceedings, and such recovery shall be for the benefit of the party injured. If there is
no aggrieved party, the bond shall be liable and disposed of as in criminal cases. (8a)
Section 10. Court may release respondent. — The court which issued the order
imprisoning a person for contempt may discharge him from imprisonment when it
appears that public interest will not be prejudiced by his release. (9a)
Section 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay. — The judgment or final
order of a court in a case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper court as
in criminal cases. But execution of the judgment or final order shall not be suspended
until a bond is filed by the person adjudged in contempt, in an amount fixed by the
court from which the appeal is taken, conditioned that if the appeal be decided against
him he will abide by and perform the judgment or final order. (10a)
Section 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities. — Unless otherwise provided by
law, this Rule shall apply to contempt committed against persons, entities, bodies or
agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall have suppletory effect to such rules
as they may have adopted pursuant to authority granted to them by law to punish for
contempt. The Regional Trial Court of the place wherein the contempt has been
committed shall have jurisdiction over such charges as may be filed therefor.
RA 6713
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a) Financial and material interest. - Public officials and employees shall not, directly or
indirectly, have any financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the
approval of their office.
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
(1) Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer, employee, consultant,
counsel, broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated,
supervised or licensed by their office unless expressly allowed by law;
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with
their official functions; or
(3) Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or
pending official transaction with their office.
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation,
retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2)
above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with
any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition
shall likewise apply.
(c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information. - Public officials and employees
shall not use or divulge, confidential or classified information officially known to them
by reason of their office and not made available to the public, either:
(1) To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to anyone; or
(2) To prejudice the public interest.
(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. - Public officials and employees shall not solicit or
accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of
monetary value from any person in the course of their official duties or in connection
with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the
functions of their office.
As to gifts or grants from foreign governments, the Congress consents to:
(i) The acceptance and retention by a public official or employee of a gift of nominal
value tendered and received as a souvenir or mark of courtesy;
(ii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of a gift in the nature of a scholarship
or fellowship grant or medical treatment; or
(iii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of travel grants or expenses for
travel taking place entirely outside the Philippine (such as allowances, transportation,
food, and lodging) of more than nominal value if such acceptance is appropriate or
consistent with the interests of the Philippines, and permitted by the head of office,
branch or agency to which he belongs.
The Ombudsman shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purpose of this subsection, including pertinent reporting and disclosure requirements.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to restrict or prohibit any educational, scientific or
cultural exchange programs subject to national security requirements.
Section 11. Penalties. - (a) Any public official or employee, regardless of whether or not
he holds office or employment in a casual, temporary, holdover, permanent or regular
capacity, committing any violation of this Act shall be punished with a fine not
exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months' salary or suspension not exceeding one (1)
year, or removal depending on the gravity of the offense after due notice and hearing
by the appropriate body or agency. If the violation is punishable by a heavier penalty
under another law, he shall be prosecuted under the latter statute. Violations of
Sections 7, 8 or 9 of this Act shall be punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five
(5) years, or a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000), or both, and, in the
discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public office.
(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient
cause for removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal
prosecution is instituted against him.
(c) Private individuals who participate in conspiracy as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories, with public officials or employees, in violation of this Act, shall be subject to
the same penal liabilities as the public officials or employees and shall be tried jointly
with them.
(d) The official or employee concerned may bring an action against any person who
obtains or uses a report for any purpose prohibited by Section 8 (D) of this Act. The
Court in which such action is brought may assess against such person a penalty in any
amount not to exceed twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000). If another sanction
hereunder or under any other law is heavier, the latter shall apply.
Feliciano v. Lozada (2015) - JEN seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if she can represent her husband.
While we understand her devotion and desire to defend her husband whom she
FACTS: In an action for injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining believed has suffered grave injustice, Atty. Lozada should not forget that she is first and
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case no. 101-V-07 entitled foremost, an officer of the court who is bound to obey the lawful order of the Court.
“Edilberto Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin S. Feliciano, et al.,” where complainant was one of the Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, willful
respondents, complainant lamented that Atty. Lozada appeared as counsel for the disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or
plaintiff and her husband, Edilberto Lozada, and actively participated in the proceedings suspension from the practice of law:
of the case before Branch 75 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City. To prove his
allegation, complainant submitted certified true copies of the minutes of the hearings, SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A
dated June 12, 2007, July 3, 2007 and July 6, 2007, wherein Atty. Lozada signed her member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
name as one of the counsels, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes showing Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
that Atty. Lozada conducted direct examination and cross-examination of the witnesses grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
during the trial proceedings. Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
appearing as counsel while still suspended from the practice of law constitutes willfull to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
disobedience to the resolutions of the Court which suspended her from the practice of corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to
law for two (2) years. On September 12, 2007, the Court resolved to require Atty. do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
Lozada to comment on the complaint against him. In her Comment dated November 19, through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. Atty. Lozada would have
2007, Atty. Lozada explained that she was forced by circumstances and her desire to deserved a harsher penalty, but this Court recognizes the fact that it is part of the
defend the rights of her husband who is embroiled in a legal dispute. She claimed that Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families will always look out and extend a helping
she believed in good faith that her appearance as wife of Edilberto Lozada is not within hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to a spouse. Thus, considering that Atty.
the prohibition to practice law, considering that she is defending her husband and not a Lozada's actuation was prompted by her affection to her husband and that in essence,
client. She insisted that her husband is a victim of grave injustice, and his reputation and she was not representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate the
honor are at stake; thus, she has no choice but to give him legal assistance. On January severeness of her penalty.
30, 2008, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of
investigation, report and recommendation. In its Report and Recommendation dated unworthy members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the
March 9, 2009, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP- legal profession. While the Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline erring
CBD) found Atty. Lozada guilty of violating Rule 1.01 & 1.02, Rule 18.01 of the Code of lawyers through this kind of proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as
Professional Responsibility and the terms of her suspension from the practice of law as not to frustrate its preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial
imposed by the Court. Thus, the IBP-CBD recommended the disbarment of Atty. Lozada. discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe punishment if, through it, the end desire of
On May 14, 2011, however, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve reforming the errant lawyer is possible.
with modification the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD such that it
recommended instead that Atty. Lozada be suspended from the practice of law for Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of
three (3) months. the Rules of Court.
RULING: We adopt the ruling of the IBP-Board of Governors with modification.
Indeed, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When
this Court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, as in the instant case, the
lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal
knowledge within the period of suspension. Suffice it to say that practice of law
embraces "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It includes "[performing] acts which
are characteristics of the [legal] profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which]
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.” In the instant case, Atty.
Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on the records, there is no doubt that Atty. Lozada's
actuations, that is, in appearing and signing as counsel for and in behalf of her husband,
conducting or offering stipulation/admission of facts, conducting direct and cross-
examination, all constitute practice of law. Furthermore, the findings of the IBP would
disclose that such actuations of Atty. Lozada of actively engaging in the practice of law in
June-July 2007 were done within the period of her two (2)-year suspension considering
that she was suspended from the practice of law by this Court in May 4, 2006. It would
then appear that, at the very least, Atty. Lozada cannot practice law from 2006 to 2008.
Thus, it is clear that when Atty. Lozada appeared for and in behalf of her husband in Civil
Case No. 101-V-07 and actively participated in the proceedings therein in June-July
2007, or within the two (2)-year suspension, she, therefore, engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law. Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to convince. She
knew very well that at the time she represented her husband, she is still serving her two
(2)-year suspension order. Yet, she failed to inform the court about it. Neither did she