Ruzol v.
Sandiganbayan  While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality charged
April 17, 2013
Velasco, Jr., J.
Ish Guidote
Local Government
FACTS:
 Leovegildo R. Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to
2004.
 Earlier in his term, he organized a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly
composed of civil society groups, public officials and concerned stakeholders
with the end in view of regulating and monitoring the transportation of salvaged
forest products within the vicinity of General Nakar.
 At the organizational meeting for the assembly, the participants agreed that to
regulate the salvaged forests products, the Office of the Mayor, through Ruzol,
shall issue a permit to transport after payment of the corresponding fees to
the municipal treasurer.
 From 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to transport
salvaged forest products were issued to various recipients, of which forty-three
(43) bore the signature of Ruzol while the remaining one hundred seventy-eight
(178) were signed by his co-accused Guillermo T. Sabiduria (Sabiduria), then
municipal administrator of General Nakar.
 221 Informations for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of
Authority or Official Functions were filed against Ruzol and Sabiduria.
o Claimed that the authority to issue such permits belonged to the
DENR and not to the Office of the Mayor.
 Ruzol’s defense:
o As Chief Executive of the municipality of General Nakar, Quezon,
he is authorized to issue permits to transport forest products
pursuant to RA 7160 which give the LGU not only express powers
but also those powers that are necessarily implied from the powers
expressly granted as well as those that are necessary, appropriate
or incidental to the LGU’s efficient and effective governance.
 Invoked the General Welfare Clause (§16, LGC)
o RA 7160 has devolved certain functions and responsibilities of the
DENR to the LGU. And the permits to transport were issued
pursuant to the devolved function to manage and control
communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square
kilometers.
o Under (a) Section 5, Article X of the Constitution, (b) Section 129,
Chapter I, Title One Book II of R.A. 7160, and (c) Section 186,
Article Five, Chapter 5, Tile One, Book II of R.A. 7160, the
municipality is granted the power to create its own sources of
revenue and to levy fees in accordance therewith.
o The only kind of document the DENR issues relating to log, timber
or lumber is denominated “Certificate of Timber Origin” or CTO for
logs and “Certificate of Lumber Origin” or CLO for lumber.
o No proof of conspiracy between the two accused.
o The DENR directly sanctioned and expressly authorized the
issuance of the 221 Transport permits through the Provincial
Environment and natural Resources officer Rogelio Delgado Sr., in
a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly.
 Sandiganbayan: Acquitted Sabiduria but found Ruzol guilty as charged.
o Cited §5, PD 705 (Forestry Code): [The DENR] shall be
responsible for the protection, development, management,
regeneration, and reforestation of forest lands; the regulation and
supervision of the operation of licensees, lessees and permittees
for the taking or use of forest products therefrom or the occupancy
or use thereof…
o Likewise invoked EO 192 (Reorganizing the DENR).
o Finally, citing RA 7160, determined that since the authority relative
to salvaged forest products was not included in the above
enumeration of devolved functions, the correlative authority to
issue transport permits remains with the DENR, and thus cannot
be exercised by the LGUs.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. WoN the authority to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest
product is solely with the DENR, and no one else. (NO)
2. WoN the permits to transport issued by Ruzol are valid. (NO)
3. WoN Ruzol is guilty of usurpation of official functions. (NO)
RATIO:
1. The LGU also has, under the LGC of 1991, ample authority to promulgate
rules, regulations and ordinances to monitor and regulate salvaged forest
products, provided that the parameters set forth by law for their enactment
have been faithfully complied with.
with the mandate of promulgating rules and regulations for the protection of the
environment and conservation of natural resources, it is not the only
government instrumentality clothed with such authority.
 While the law has designated DENR as the primary agency tasked to protect
the environment, it was not the intention of the law to arrogate unto the DENR
the exclusive prerogative of exercising this function. Whether in ordinary or in
legal parlance, the word “primary” can never be taken to be synonymous with
“sole” or “exclusive.”
 The General Welfare Clause of the LGC states:
Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance , and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and
support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture,
promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced
ecology , encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-
reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.
 Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, municipal governments are clothed with
authority to enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon them
by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health,
safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public
morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and its
inhabitants, and ensure the protection of property in the municipality.
 There is a clear merit to the view that the monitoring and regulation of salvaged
forest products through the issuance of appropriate permits is a shared
responsibility which may be done either by DENR or by the LGUs or by both.
o DAO 1992-30: LGUs shall share with the national
government, particularly the DENR, the responsibility in the
sustainable management and development of the
environment and natural resources within their territorial
jurisdiction.
2. The Permits to Transport issued by Ruzol are invalid for his failure to comply
with the procedural requirements set forth by law for its enforcement.
 Ruzol insists that the permits partake of the nature of transport fees levied by
the municipality for the use of public roads.
 Ruzol is correct to a point.
o Nevertheless, We find that an enabling ordinance is necessary to
confer the subject permits with validity.
o As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the power to levy fees or
charges under the LGC is exercised by the Sangguniang Bayan
through the enactment of an appropriate ordinance wherein the
terms, conditions and rates of the fees are prescribed.
 Although We recognize the LGU’s authority in the management and control of
communal forests within its territorial jurisdiction, We reiterate that this authority
should be exercised and enforced in accordance with the procedural
parameters established by law for its effective and efficient execution.
 §17, LGC provides that the LGU’s authority to manage and control communal
forests should be “pursuant to national policies and is subject to supervision,
control and review of DENR.”
 Before an area may be considered a communal forest, the following
requirements must be accomplished: (1) an identification of potential
communal forest areas within the geographic jurisdiction of the concerned
city/municipality; (2) a forest land use plan which shall indicate, among other
things, the site and location of the communal forests; (3) a request to the
DENR Secretary through a resolution passed by the Sangguniang
Bayan concerned; and (4) an administrative order issued by DENR
Secretary declaring the identified area as a communal forest.
 In the present case, the records are bereft of any showing that these
requirements were complied with.
3. Razol’s guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
 Art. 177 of the RPC provides:
Usurpation of authority or official functions. — Any person who shall knowingly
and falsely represent himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any
department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign
government, or who, under pretense of official position, shall perform any act
pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine
Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being
lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
  RTC-Makati City also observed that the facts in Ilusorio [the case
 There are two ways of committing the crime: used by the petitioner] are different from the facts of the present
o First, by knowingly and falsely representing himself to be an case
officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the  MTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion since since the
Philippine Government or of any foreign government. (Usurpation order denying the Motion to Quash was based on jurisprudence
of authority) later than Ilusorio.
o Second, under pretense of official position, shall perform any act Supreme Court: Dismissed the petition.
pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the
Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency
thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so. (Usurpation of
official functions)
 In the present case, Ruzol stands accused of usurpation of official Rationale:
functions for issuing 221 permits to transport salvaged forest products The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is
under the alleged “pretense of official position and without being lawfully consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a
entitled to do so, such authority properly belonging to the Department of duly authorized person.
Environment and Natural Resources.” The following are the elements of Perjury vis-aà -vis the applicability in
 However, contrary to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, We find that a careful the herein case:
scrutiny of the events surrounding this case failed to prove that Ruzol is guilty ELEMENT APPLICABILITY
beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of usurpation of official 1. That the accused made a statement  The petitioner executed
functions of the DENR. under oath or executed an affidavit upon a Certificate Against Forum
o We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally material matter Shopping, duly notarized in
on the prosecution’s theory that the DENR is the only government Makati City
instrumentality that can issue the permits to transport salvaged 
forest products. 2. That the statement or affidavit was  The petitioner executed
o But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole made before a competent officer, Certificate Against Forum
government agency vested with the authority to issue permits authorized to receive and administer oath. Shopping, duly notarized in
relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products, Makati City.
considering that, pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs
may also exercise such authority. 3. That in the statement or affidavit, the  Deliberate falsehood was also
 Moreover, Ruzol acted in good faith. accused made a willful and deliberate sufficiently alleged to have been
o The conduct of a public consultation was a sign supporting Ruzol’s assertion of a falsehood. committed in Makati City, not
good intentions to regulate and monitor the movement of salvaged Pasay City. The Information
forest products to prevent abuse and occurrence of untoward indicates that the Petitioner has
illegal logging. not commenced any other action
or proceeding involving the same
DISPOSITION: Acquitted. issues in another tribunal or
agency, accused knowing well
that said material statement
UNION BANK VS PEOPLE (Perjury) was false
G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012 4. That the sworn statement or affidavit  Certificate Against Forum
En Banc containing the falsity is required by law or Shopping is required by law.
Brion, J made for a legal purpose.
Nature of the Case: Petition for the reversal of RTC Decision & Petition to Quash the
Information for Perjury against Tomas As to the venue (criminal proceedings), when the crime is committed through false
Brief: testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place
This is an appeal of the decision rendered by the Lower Court on the constitutionality of where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual
Ordinance No. 84, series of 1975 of the Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan. testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement
is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or
FACTS: where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material
 Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts of two ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on
complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.
respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong,
NOTE: In my opinion, other topics discussed in the case are more applicable to the proper
 Spouses filed a complaint-affidavit against Tomas for violation of Article 183 of venue of action which is covered in Criminal Proceeding subject. As to the Criminal Law
the RPC, for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. subject, the essence of the case is only to determine whether Perjury is committed.

 OSG shared the petitioner’s view and issued Manifestation and Motion in lieu Article 171 Falsification of public officer
of Comment relying also in Ilusorio case and the crime of perjury is the Article 172 Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents
deliberate or intentional giving of false evidence in the court where the Plea bargaining
evidence is material.
Daan vs. Sandiganbayan
 The case was referred to En Banc because of the conflicting rulings in the case
of Ilusorio (basis of the petition) and the Sy Tiong case that was the basis of Joselito Raniero J. Daan, petitioner
the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling vs.
ISSUE: WON perjury is committed? The Hon. Sandiganbayan
ACTIONS OF THE COURT: (Fourth Division), respondent
MTC of Makati:
 Denied the Petition to Quash on the ff. ground: GR Nos. 163972-77
a) It has jurisdiction since the Certificate against Forum March 28, 2008
Shopping was notarized in Makati City; and Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.
b) Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury
 Dismissed the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Petitioner Nature of the Case:
RTC-Makati- Dismissed the Petition for Certiorari on the ground of abuse of discretion. Certiorari and prohibition
Basis of the ruling is quoted as follows “the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed, or where any of its Brief:
essential ingredients occurred.”
Petitioner, accused with the crime of malversation of public funds by falsification, questions
the denial of the Sandiganbayan of his plea bargaining proposal. The Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the Sandiganbayan.
Facts:
Petitioner, together with Mayor Kuizon were charged for three counts of malversation of
public funds by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period making it appear that
some laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte.
In addition to the charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted for three counts
of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of not guilty and
substitute the same with a plea of guilty, provided, the mitigating circumstances of
confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the
alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute
their plea of not guilty to the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or
employee with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document
by a private individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered to
substitute their plea of not guilty thereto with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of
failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable the
proposal of the accused to plead guilty to the lesser crime of falsification of public document
by a private individual for it will strengthen the cases against the principal accused, Mayor
Kuizon who appears to be the mastermind of these criminal acts. However, the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable
recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was
presented to justify its approval. Likewise, it denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether the lesser offense of falsification of a public document by a private individual is
necessary included in the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer, hence
petitioner may plead guilty to the former
Actions of the Court:
Office of the Special Prosecutor: Granted
Sandiganbayan: Denied
SC: Granted
Court Rationale:
Yes.
The lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to Render Account by
an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of Public
Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, respectively, with which petitioner was
originally charged.
An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or information constitute
the latter. And vice versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the
latter (Art. 171 vis-a-vis Art. 172).
Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for the crime of Falsification of
Public Documents through an untruthful narration of facts to be established, the following
elements must concur:
(a) the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated;
(c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and
(d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of
injuring a third person.
Falsification by Private Individuals penalized under Article 172, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code has the following elements:
(a) the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position;
(b) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated under Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code; and
(c) the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document.
In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient to hold
petitioner liable for the lesser offenses. In the charge for Falsification of Public Documents,
petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals
inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner took advantage of his official
position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte.
In the same vein, he may plead guilty for rendering account by an accountable officer
instead of malversation of public funds.
Therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case likewise
constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses.
Moreover, petitioner is not an accountable officer in that the nature of his duty as
foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require possession or custody of local government
funds, not to mention that petitioner has already restituted the amount ofP18,860.00
involved in this case.
SC Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25, 2004 and May
31, 2004 are SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to grant petitioner's
Motion to Plea Bargain.Let records of this case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for
further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
Additional Info:
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually
involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the
counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver
charge.
30 BORLONGAN, JR VS PENA
GR NO. 143591 (NOV 23, 2007)
NACHURA, J.
Facts:
-Respondent Magdaleno Peña instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation
and expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees, against Urban Bank and the petitioners,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City.
- Respondent anchored his claim for compensation on the contract of agency, allegedly
entered into with the petitioners wherein the former undertook to perform such acts
necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank’s
property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City.
- Petitioners filed a MD arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or
counsel.
-Attached to the MD were the following documents:
1. A letter dated December 19, 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of
Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the subject property;
2. An unsigned letter dated December 7, 1994 addressed to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn
G. Ong;
3. A letter dated December 9, 1994 addressed to Teodoro Borlongan and signed by Marilyn
G. Ong; and
4. A Memorandum dated November 20, 1994 from Enrique Montilla III.
- The above stated documents were presented in an attempt to show that the respondent
was appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners.
- Respondent Peña filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago
City. He claimed that said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not
actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and
employees of ISCI. Worse, petitioners introduced said documents as evidence before the
RTC knowing that they were falsified.
-City Prosecutor’s Report (Sept 23, 1998) : In the report, the Prosecutor concluded that the
petitioners were probably guilty of four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified
Documents penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were falsified because the
alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal of the respondent; that
petitioners knew that the documents were falsified considering that the signatories were
mere dummies; and that the documents formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754
where they were used by petitioners as evidence in support of their motion to dismiss,
adopted in their answer and later, in their Pre-Trial Brief. Subsequently, the corresponding
Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City. The
cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686. Thereafter,
Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants for the arrest of the petitioners.
-Petitioners (Oct `1, 1998) filed an Omnibus MQ : They insist that they were denied due
process because of the non-observance of a proper procedure on preliminary investigation
prescribed in the Rules of Court; since no such counter-affidavit and supporting documents
were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and
attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention of the
Rules. Moreover they claim that the respondent’s affidavit was not based on the latter’s
personal knowledge and therefore should not have been used by the court in determining
probable cause.
-On the same day that the Omnibus MQ was filed, the petitioners posted bail. Their bail
bonds expressly provided that they do not intend to waive their right to question the validity
of their arrest. On the date of arraignment, the petitioners refused to enter their plea, for the
obvious reason that the legality of their information and their arrest was yet to be settled by
the court.
-MTCC’s answer (in response to Omnibus MQ filed by petitioners): They upheld the validity
of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules. Besides,
(according to the MTCC) petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant
since they already posted bail.
Issue:
1) WON petitioners were deprived of their right to due process of law because of the denial
of their right to preliminary investigation and to submit their counter-affidavit;
2) WON the Informations charging the petitioners were validly filed and the warrants for
their arrest were properly issued;
3) WON this Court can, itself, determine probable cause; and
4) WON the petitioners posting a bail constitutes a waiver of their right to question the
validity of their arrest.
Ruling: Petition granted; MTCC is ordered to dismiss criminal cases against petitioners.
RD:
For issues numbered 1 and 3:
-The following sections of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure are relevant to
the aforesaid issues:
“SECTION 1. Definition. – Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the
purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. …
SEC. 3. Procedure. – Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or
information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a
preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied
by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in
such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies of the official file. The
said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official
authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary public, who
must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. …
SEC. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts not
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. –
(a) Where filed with the fiscal. – If the complaint is filed directly with the fiscal or state
prosecutor, the procedure outlined in Section 3 (a) of this Rule shall be observed. The
Fiscal shall take appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting documents
submitted by the complainant.”
-Records show that the prosecutor relied merely on the affidavits submitted by the
complainant and did not require the petitioners to submit their answer. He should not be
faulted for doing such as this is sanctioned by the rules. Moreover, he is not mandated to
require the submission of counter-affidavits. Probable cause may then be determined on
the basis alone of the affidavits and supporting documents of the complainant, without
infringing on the constitutional rights of the petitioners.
-Regarding the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners contend that the warrants were
illegally issued as they were solely based on the affidavits of the complainant. Section 2 of
Article III of the Constitution underscores the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on
the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of
probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard
the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to
aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. There is no
provision or procedural rule which makes the submission of counter-affidavits mandatory
before the judge could determine probable cause.
For issue number 2:
- For the issuance of a warrant of arrest, probable cause has been defined as the existence
of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person
to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. It is one
of the requisites for a warrant of arrest to be valid.
- On the basis of the above-stated documents (in the facts) and on the strength of the
affidavit executed by the respondent, the prosecutor concluded that probable cause exists.
These same affidavit and documents were used by the trial court in issuing the warrant of
arrest.
-The SC finds the complaint-affidavit and attachments insufficient to support the existence
of probable cause. The respondent’s claims of the falsity of the documents were mere
assertions.
- It must be emphasized that the affidavit of the complainant, or any of his witnesses, shall
allege facts within their (affiants) personal knowledge. The allegation of the respondent that
the signatures were falsified does not qualify as personal knowledge. Nowhere in said
affidavit did respondent state that he was present at the time of the execution of the
documents. Neither did he claim that he was familiar with the signatures of the signatories.
He simply made a bare assertion
-A finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence, or on
evidence beyond reasonable doubt. It does not require that the evidence would justify
conviction. Nonetheless, although the determination of probable cause requires less than
evidence which would justify conviction, it should at least be more than mere suspicion.
While probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to
examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accused’s
constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the
State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and
holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation.
CHOA VS PEOPLE
ALFONSO C. CHOA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LENI CHOA, respondents.
G.R. No. 142011
March 14, 2003
Ponente: SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
NATURE OF CASE
Petition for Review on Certiorari
BRIEF
This is a petition for review on certiorari contending that CA decision should be reversed
because (a) not all the elements of the crime of perjury are present; and (b) the withdrawal
of the petition for naturalization which contains the alleged untruthful statements bars the
prosecution for perjury. Alleged false statements were no longer existing or had become
functus officio.
FACTS
Alfonso Choa, a Chinese national, filed a verified petition for naturalization. During the first
hearing, he was not able to finish testifying on the direct examination. Subsequently, he
filed a motion to withdraw his petition for naturalization which the court granted in 1990.
In 1992, upon the complaint of Choa’s wife, an information was filed in MTCC charging
Choa of perjury in his notarized / verified Petition for Naturalization which stated (a) the
address of his wife and children (despite knowing that they left the said residence about 5
years ago) and (b) that he is of good moral character (but in fact he was having an immoral
and illicit affair with another woman begetting 2 children with her)
ISSUE of the CASE
Whether Choa may be convicted of perjury based on the alleged false statements in his
petition for naturalization withdrawn almost two years prior to the filing of the Information for
perjury.
ACTIONS of the COURT
MTCC: Choa is guilty of perjury and sentenced of 6 months and 1 day prision correccional;
motion for reconsideration is denied
RTC: affirmed MTCC judgment
CA: affirmed RTC decision with modification – after applying ISL without any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, to suffer 3 months of arresto mayor to 1 year and 8 moinths of
prision correccional
SC: Petition is denied.
COURT RATIONALE
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. The penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall
be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being
included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an
affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an
oath in cases in which the law so requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any
of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section, shall
suffer the respective penalties provided therein.
The elements of perjury are:
1. The accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material
matter;
2. The statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer authorized to receive
and administer oath;
3. In that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood; and
4. The sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a
legal purpose.
All the elements are present. Petitioner willfully and deliberately alleged false statements
concerning his "residence" and "moral character" in his petition for naturalization. This was
sufficiently proven by the prosecution.

The petition for naturalization was duly subscribed and sworn to by petitioner before Notary
Public Filomino B. Tan, Jr., a person competent and authorized by law to receive and
administer oath. Also, petitioner started testifying under oath on his false allegations before
the trial court.
The allegations in the petition regarding "residence" and "moral character" are material
matters because they are among the very facts in issue or the main facts which are the
subject of inquiry and are the bases for the determination of petitioner's qualifications and
fitness as a naturalized Filipino citizen.
The necessity of declaring a truthful and specific information on the "residence" and "moral
character" in the petition for naturalization has been underscored by this Court in Chua Kian
Lai vs. Republic, thus:
One qualification for Philippine citizenship is that the petitioner must be of good moral
character. That circumstance should be specifically alleged in the petition.
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The law explicitly requires that the applicant should indicate in his petition his present and
former places of residence (Sec. 7, Com. Act No. 473). That requirement is designed to
facilitate the verification of petitioners activities which have a bearing on his petition for
naturalization, especially so as to his qualifications and moral character, either by private
individuals or by investigative agencies of the government, by pointing to them the localities
or places wherein appropriate inquiries may be made (Keng Giok vs. Republic, 112 Phil.
896). Moreover, the suppression of that information might constitute falsehood which
signifies that the applicant lacks good moral character and is not, therefore, qualified to be
admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
At the time Choa filed his petition for naturalization, he had committed perjury. The
withdrawal only terminated the proceedings for naturalization. It did not extinguish his
culpability for perjury he already committed.
Choa cannot seek refuge under the absolutely privileged communication rule since the
false statements he made in his petition for naturalization has instead made a mockery of
the administration of justice. Right to equal protection cannot be invoked to protect his
criminal act.
In People vs. Cainglet, this Court emphatically stressed that "every interest of public policy
demands that perjury be not shielded by artificial refinements and narrow
technicalities. For perjury strikes at the administration of the laws. It is the policy of the law
that judicial proceedings and judgments be fair and free from fraud, and that litigants and
parties be encouraged to tell the truth, and that they be punished if they do not."
SUPREME COURT RULING
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The appealed
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
PEOPLE V. ROBERTO ESTRADA
G.R. NO. 130487
Accused was convicted for murder and sentenced to death. Defense interposed insanity
with proof of his history of mental illness filed for suspension of arraignment and suspension
of proceedings. Both were denied without subjecting accused to mental examination.
HELD:
Case remanded for the conduct of a proper mental examination to determine competency
to stand trial. By depriving appellant of mental examination, the trial court effectively
deprived appellant of a fair trial and the proceedings before the court are therefore nullified.
He who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive
evidence. The absence of direct proof however, does not entirely discount the probability
that accused was not of sound mind at that time. In passing the question of the propriety of
suspending the proceedings, the test is found in the question whether the accused would
have a fair trial with the assistance which the law secures or gives. There are 2 distinct
matters to be determined under this test (1) whether the defendant is sufficiently coherent
to provide his counsel with information necessary or relevant to constructing a defense and
(2) whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it.
The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be ordered rests
generally in the discretion of the trial court. In the case, the trial court took it solely upon
itself to determine the sanity of the accused. The trial judge however is not a psychiatrist or
psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining
the state of a person’s mental health. The court should have at least ordered the
examination of the accused, especially in the light of the latter’s history of mental item.
BATULANON VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Case Digest
LEONILA BATULANON VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 139857 September 15, 2006
FACTS: Polomok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Leonila Batulanon as
its Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of
receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the member of the cooperative.
During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release
of loans were discovered. It was found that Batulanon falsified four commercial documents,
all checks/cash vouchers representing granted loans to different persons namely: Omadlao,
Oracion, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon, making it appear that said names were granted a
loan and received the amount of the checks/cash vouchers when in truth and in fact the
said persons never received a grant, never received the checks, and never signed the
check vouchers issued in their names. In furtherance, Batulanon released to herself the
checks and received the loans and thereafter misappropriated and converted it to her own
use and benefit.
Thereafter, four Informations for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents
were filed against Batulanon. The prosecution presented Medallo, Gopio, Jr. and Jayoma
as witnesses. Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the
preparation of cash vouchers testified that Batulanon forged the signatures of Omadlao,
Oracion and Arroyo. Gopio, Jr. stated that Oracion is Batulanon’ sister-in-law and Dennis
Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that membership in the
cooperative is not open to minors.
On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon of Estafa
through Falsification of Commercial Documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the crime committed by Batulanon was Falsification of Private
Documents.
HELD: Yes. Although the offense charged in the Information is Estafa through Falsification
of Commercial Documents, Batulanon could be convicted of Falsification of Private
Documents under the well-settled rule that it is the allegation in the information that
determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name given in the preamble of
the information.
As there is no complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Private Documents, it is
important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with Falsification of a Private
Document or with Estafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means
to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the Estafa can be
committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime is Estafa. We
find that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Falsification of Private Documents in the cases of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo.
In the case of Dennis Batulanon, records show that Batulanon did not falsify the signature
of Dennis. What she did was to sign: “by: Ibatulanon” to indicate that she received the
proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the modes of
Falsification under Article 171 because there is nothing untruthful about the fact that she
used the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of
the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false
statements, which is not attendant in this case. As to whether, such representation involves
fraud which caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make her liable for
estafa, but not for falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold that
Batulanon is also guilty of Falsification of Private Document with respect to the case
involving the cash voucher of Dennis Batulanon.