Najaf Haidar Monetary PDF

Precious Metal Flows and Currency Circulation in the Mughal Empire
Author(s): Najaf Haider

Source: Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 39, No. 3, Money in the
Orient (1996), pp. 298-364
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3632649
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PRECIOUS METAL FLOWS AND CURRENCY CIRCULATION
IN THE MUGHAL EMPIRE*
BY
NAJAF HAIDER
(University of Oxford)
Abstract
From the late sixteenth century, the Mughal empire became, with the sole exception of
Ming China, the biggest importer of foreign bullion outside Europe. In many modern pub-
lications, references to this phenomenonare confined to the context of studying the East-West
trade in general, while there is some discussion of its relevance as a factor of change in the
Mughal economy. An attempt has been made here to quantify precious metal flows to the
Mughal empire and to put them in the perspective of its mint productionand silver currency
circulation. The significance of India's trade network with Iran and the Ottoman empire is
highlighted together with the suggestion that the economic organisation of these regions had
a greater influence on the transmission of precious metals to the former than is usually
acknowledged. Also, as the level of money supply in medieval monetary economies was
inextricably linked with the structure of the bullion market, mint organisation and fiscal
measures of the state, the objective here is to point out the importance of this interface in
any assessment of a precise relationshipbetween trade and real economic changes.
The Mughalempire(est. 1526A.D.) experiencedthe co-existenceof two domains

of economic activities: one of subsistenceand inflexibility, where the village
communitylived by itself, peasantsgrew and consumed,artisansproducedand
bartered.The other, in which economic life was buoyantand movementswere
visible, was indicatedby the prevalenceof marketrelationsof exchangeand the
use and flow of money. Money penetratedthe agrariansector of the Mughal
empirethroughthe twin process of state drivencommerceand directproduction
for the market. The outstanding state policy to realize the land revenue in
money under the zabt system or to commute the collections into cash when the
paymentwas made in kind establisheda direct line of commercebetween the
countrysideand the local markets.')At the same time peasantsgrew cash crops
and supplied raw materials to the nearby towns fostering another stream of
*) I am grateful for the comments made by Dr. Sumit Guha, Professor Irfan Habib and
Dr. David Washbrook on an early draft of this paper. All mistakes are, of course, mine and
not theirs.
1) Habib 1963: 236-40; 1982: 239. A recent study of western Rajasthanclearly brings out
the role of revenue demand in monetizing and commercializing the village economy of the
region. See Bhadani 1992: 215-25.
? E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1996 JESHO39,3
THE MUGHALEMPIRE 299
commercial exchange which had greater implicationsfor the Mughal foreign

trade, this being the most importantsource of precious metals. The two major
export items of the Mughalempire in the sixteenthand seventeenthcenturies-
cotton textiles and indigo--originally came from the countryside and were
securedby the merchant-contractors for manufacturingcentresthrougha system
of money-loans (dadani) advanced to the primary producers.2)The flow of
goods and capitalbetween these centresand the entrepotswas furtherfacilitated
by the artifices of bills of exchange (hundi) and respondentia (risk-sharing
loans), in which the Mughal money-changers(sarrafs) specialized. Merchants
also availed themselvesthe services of a class of people, called adaviyas, who
organisedcaravantrafficand paymentof transitdues.3)
The urban centres and entrepotsof the Mughal empire were immersedfar
more deeply into commodityproductionand monetaryexchange.Here, the con-
centrationof the bureaucracy,mercantileclasses and artisanscreateda perma-
nent demandfor food suppliesorganisedby the itineranttraders(banjaras)who
brought the cash back to the countryside.Urban taxes, such as customs and
transit dues and mint seigniorage were always paid in cash and were spent
towards meeting the administrativecosts and consumptionsof the residentrul-
ing elites.
The Mughalforeign tradewas the productof a largereconomic environment
and its fortuneswere tied to the system of productionand exchangein the rural
hinterlands,local marketsand urbanentrepots.At the same time, endowedwith
limited natural resources to sustain an exchange network based on metallic
currencies,the system itself was greatlydependenton the lands beyondits fron-
tiers to acquiremonetarymetals.4)Political conquestsof the state, followed by
plunderand tribute,only partially succeeded in meeting this demand, and the
development of the Mughal economy demonstrated to a very large extent
the complex correlationbetween long-distancetrade,bullion flows and its mon-
etary sector.
The purpose of this study is to offer a description and, where possible, a
quantitativeevaluation of the flow of precious metals to the Mughal empire
along the major trade routes. Given the imprecise natureof our data, some of
the estimates offeredhere are at best approximations.However, since there has
2) Haider 1988.
3) Haider 1995.
4) There was no domestic extraction of gold and silver in the Mughal empire, and even
though copper, the third monetary metal, was extracted from the mines of Central India, its
demand required that huge quantities had to be imported. The two non-metallic currencies,
bitter almond (badam) and cowrie shells (kauri) used respectively in Gujarat and Bengal,
were also imported from Iran and the Maldives.
300 NAJAFHAIDER
been no work done at all on bullion imports in the Mughal empire and the
present state of our knowledge only derives from general features of Indian
overseas trade, the estimates do give an idea of specifically Portuguese and
Levantineexports of bullion, as well as those of the EuropeanCompanies,and
contribute towards appraising the overall flow of precious metals into the
Mughalempirefrom c. 1550 to c. 1700. For the sake of comparison,and given
the overwhelmingcomponentof silver in the imports,all estimatesof imported
bullion are presentedhere in their silver equivalentthough gold imports have
also been taken into account. In the subsequentsections, the impact of these
flows on the monetaryeconomy is examinedwith referenceto the changes in
the volume and patternof currencycirculationand the ways in which these
were mediatedthroughthe market,mint and fiscal apparatusof the state.
I
InternationalTrade and Bullion Flows: the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea
It is generally accepted that among the factors responsiblefor a revival of
the Levanttradeby the middle of the sixteenthcentury,perhapsthe most impor-
tant was the political unificationof the trade routes which linked the Levant
with the Indian Ocean.s)The Ottomanincorporationof Syria was an underly-
ing factor behind the commercialexpansionof Aleppo and an increase in the
biannual caravan traffic to Hurmuzand Basra.6)A settlementof Indian mer-
chants was establishedat Aleppo, and when the Venetians shifted their facto-
ries from Damascusto Aleppo in the mid-sixteenthcentury,the idea was to get
closer to the Basra-Alepporoute in orderto obtain Indianmerchandiseas well
as Iraniansilk.') A strongOttomanpresencein the Red Sea, the practicallimita-
tions of the priorityset by Lisbon, and the interestsof the Luso-Indianofficials
5) In the opening decades of the sixteenth century the volume of commerce passing
through the Levant registered a decline following Portuguese attempts to divert the Indian
Ocean trade through the Cape route. The decline was reflected in the shortage of spices
reaching the Levant and a fall in the trade revenues of the Mamluk Sultan. Consequently,
the Venetian supply of precious metals to the Levant fell from 340,000 ducats (equivalent of
13 metric tons of silver) in 1496 to 170,000 ducats in 1503 (equivalent of 5 metric tons of
silver). Ashtor 1971: 66; 1983: 477; Magalhaes-Godinho 1969: 306. The gold-silver ratio in
the Levant adopted for conversion of ducats into silver weight is given in Ashtor 1971: 49.
For an early Venetian response to the Cape voyages see Priuli 1938: 132-4. For the decline
and revival of the Levant trade see Lybyer 1915: 584-5; Lane 1968: 33-5; 1968a: 47-54;
Magalhaes-Godinho1969: 736, 751, 756-8, 773; Boxer 1969: 415-28.
6) See Linschoten 1885: I, 47-50 for a detailed description of this route; Masters 1988:
12-14 and Steensgaard 1972: 62 for the rise of Aleppo.
7) Lane 1968a: 50. Ottoman archival documents (c. 1610) testify to the busy caravan
traffic on this route in the early seventeenth century as well. At least ten Indian merchants,
in sharingthe benefits of an open trade,8)dictatedthe thrustof the Portuguese

policy, which eventually centred round the developmentof Hurmuzas a com-
peting entrepotto OttomanAden and Jadda.This was reflectedin their control
of the Hurmuzcustoms as well as the impositionof an additionaltax (curujo;
Ar. kharaj) on Turkishmerchantstradingat Hurmuzand on all merchandise
leaving for OttomanBasra.9)With the advantageof the customs figures pub-
lished by Magalhaes-Godinho,it is possible to arriveat a rough estimate of the
total value of trade passing throughHurmuzin this period.
The estimatedvalue of tradepresentedin Table 1 suggests thatthe Portuguese
policy was bearingfruit and that there was a real increase in the IndianOcean
trade passing through this point in the second half of the sixteenth century.
These estimates, however, exclude the amount of bullion broughtto Hurmuz
since it was exempt from customs duties.10) According to contemporaryesti-
mates, silver exported from Hurmuzin c. 1590 and 1602 amountedto 2 mil-
lion [crusados].")This gives us a figure of 41.74 metric tons of silver for each
of the two years which exceeds the total estimatedvalue of tradein this period
by more than 20 percent.12)It was not unnaturalfor the real export of bullion
to exceed customs recordedimports, though the status of Hurmuzas a major
exporterof horses, the value of which increasedthe revenue figures used for
our calculations,must have correspondinglyreducedits trade deficit. The only
out of the 120 in one such caravan, were carrying textiles and indigo. Inalcik and Quartaert
1994: 339.
8) The policy advocated by Lisbon was to blockade and intercept the spice trade pass-
ing by the Red Sea. The implementation of this policy required intervention in the complex
commercial circuits of the Indian Ocean at the expense mainly of the traders and rulers of
Arabia, Gujarat, Malabar and Achin. The military operations imposed serious constraints
on the Luso-Indian economy which derived sustenance partly from the trade of the region.
Magalhaes-Godinho 1969: 757-8; Braudel 1975: I, 545-6.
"The balance was not always easy... between the necessities of the metropolitan econ-
omy and Portuguese interests in the Indies. The first imposed..., the priorityof loading ships
destined for Lisbon and rationing of exports to the commercial ports of the Levant. But the
Luso-Indian economy, the finances of the Portuguese State of India and the careers of the
officials could only profit by overstepping the limits and by eschewing all priority,except that
which concerned the biggest benefit." Magalhaes-Godinho 1969: 773-4. It was this precari-
ous balance which characterisedthe variations in the policies of commisioning hostile cruises
and issuing concessions and cartazes.
9) Magalhaes-Godinho 1982: 46.
10) Steensgaard 1972: 198.
11) For c. 1590 see ibid. The figures for 1602 are for the bullion exported by the Ottoman
merchants.Magalhaes-Godinho 1969: 772. The document cited by Godinho is dated 1602 on
p. 66.
12) Each crusado was valued at 400 reis, and one mark of silver of 229.5 grams was fixed
at 4398 reis after the debasement of the Luso-Indian scherafin in 1581. Magalhaes-Godinho
1969: 504.
302 NAJAF
HAIDER
explanationwhich can be offeredfor an overplusof bullion is that there was a

sizeable tradein-silver specie as a commodityin which the role of Hurmuzwas
just as centralas in the sale of non-bullionmerchandise.
Table 1. EstimatedValue of HurmuzTrade:c. 1515-c. 1618

(silver equivalentin metric tons)
Year QuinquennialAverage Year Annual Total
c. 1515 25.7 c. 1574 31.93

1524-1528 22.8 c. 1588 33.81
1529-1533 22.5 c. 1605 34.99
1534-1538 22.5 c. 1610 35.93
1539-1543 24.1 c. 1618 16.43b)
1544-1548 18.9
1549-1551a) 27.4
a) 3 years b)
FromJanuaryto July
Note: The customs duty on the bulk of merchandise(cotton textiles, silk, indigo, sugar
and horses) arrivingat Hurmuzwas 10 percentad valorem.For rice, butter,silk goods
and cotton, it was 5 percent.The heaviestduty--16.6 percentad valorem-was imposed
on spices and drugs.Besides, merchantswere also expectedto pay 2 percentfor the per-
sonal expenses of the Shah, the governorof the town and customs officials.In addition
to that, a tax of 1 percentwas realisedtowardsthe maintenanceof the Portuguesefleet
for protectionagainst piracy in the PersianGulf. Since no details are available for the
amountof taxes received for each item, an averagefigureof 10 percentis taken to rep-
resent the total rate levied on all the merchandise.The choice of this figurewould mean
that in the two categoriesrelevantfor exports to India, the proportionof goods in the
one category would be underestimated.However, at the same time, it would partly
accountfor the value which evaded customsreceiptsbecauseof undervaluations, exemp-
tions, smugglingand official corruption.
The figures for the customs revenue are available for 1515 to 1588 in the ashrafi of
Hurmuzwhich was equal to 21.5 sadi, while one misqal of gold was valued at 30 to
32 sadi. One Portuguesemark of gold of 229.5 grams (23.125 carat)was equal to 60
misqal. The weight of the ashrafiin fine gold was thus 2.57 grams.Magalhaes-Godinho
1969: 296-7. The gold-silver ratio in Iran at about this time was 1:10. Fragner1986:
565. The figurefor the year 1605 is convertedfrom pardaosof reis into pardaosof lari,
in which denominationfigures for the years 1610 and 1618 are given, each valuing
5 silver lari of Hurmuzof 74 grains (98 percentfineness).Rabino 1945: 16.
Source: Magalhaes-Godinho1982: 45-9.
For this to be explained we have to look at the ways in which bullion was
exported to India by the Levantine routes. One type of movement was of a
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 303
purely transitorynaturewhere the Europeancoins, on their outwardjourney to

India, simply passed through the Arab and Iranian territoriesand evaded the
watchful eyes of the monetaryauthorities.The other and more circuitousway
was linked to the internationaltrade and regional economy. In this, European
bullion was first restruck into the coins of the respective realms, either to
finance the export trade or as a result of bullionist measures,") broughtinto
circulation and then exported to India in the form of lari, abbasi and shahi
against the merchandisewhich was largely consumed within these regions.14)
Speaking of the Armenianmerchants,who were the most active in the bullion
trade,Taverniermade the following observation:
Fromthe reign of Shah AbbasI to thatof ShahAbbasII therehas been plentyof sil-
ver in Persiathanis to be seen now; and the Armenianmerchantsused to transportit
fromEuropeinto Persiaand thengot themconvertedinto local money(le reduisoiten
monnoyedu pays). But in these past years they bringnothingbut ducatsand sequins
since these are more portable. They have also invented new ways of hiding the money
in their vests and shirts to safeguard against robberies which take place on caravans
travellingfromTurkey,and also to avoidpaymentsof customsand otherduesat places
which are not rigorousin searchingfor what the merchantsare carrying.5")
Later, discussing the merchants in general, Tavernier observed that those

travelling in caravans between Aleppo and Basra could be allowed at some
places to pass with their piastre and to pay toll in the same specie. At other
points, however, they were forced to convert these into local currenciesat an
official rate of exchange.'6)Also, the silk exports from Gilan and Georgiawere
financed by prototypal Iranian coins struck entirely out of European silver
which the Armenian merchants brought to the frontier regions of northern
Iran.") Through a system of deposit banking and money-lending, which was
quite widespread in Iran and controlled largely by the Indian baniyas,j8) com-
13) Among the measures taken by the Iraniankings to contain the flow of gold and silver
out of the country, only one, perhaps not the most significant but nonetheless colourful, has
come to our attention.This was the greatexpeditiontakenby Shah Abbasto the tombof
Imam Reza where he had a vision of the spiritual founder of Iranian Shiism. On his return
journey from Mashhad, he narrated the vision to his subjects and enticed the devotees to
undertakeregularpilgrimageto the rauza.Foreignobservers,almostall of whomknew the
story,agreedthat the real motivewas to drivethe pilgrimsaway fromMecca,Karbalaand
Najafsince they carriedwith them"abundance of his gold ducats"in offeringsandexpenses
to the Ottoman territories.Tavernier 1679: I, 588-9; Sanson 1695: 171-2.
14) Ibid.: 589-90. Also see Sahillioglu 1983: 286; Mackenzie 1988: 181-186; Khoury
1991: 65-6.
15) Tavernier 1679: I, 418.
16) Ibid.: 153-4, 169. This was at least one importantreasonfor the merchantson these
routes to avail themselves the services of a class of people who specialised in transporting
the goods and money of the merchants on a small payment. Ibid.: 230.
17) Ibid.: 134, 361, 363-4.
18) Tavernier makes it quite clear that the baniyas were mainly bankers (banquiers) who
304 NAJAFHAIDER
mercial capital was made available to finance commoditytrade and to facili-

tate the transmissionof preciousmetals by bills of exchange.It often happened
that when the Indian ships called, there was more merchandisethan money at
Bandar Abbas and word was quickly sent to those who held cash reserves
(l'argentcontant) at Lar, Shiraz and Isfahanto finance the imports.Creditwas
then advancedto the merchantsbuying goods for inland towns and the loans
were repaidafter the goods reachedtheirdestinations.19)Similarly,money taken
up by the merchantsat Baghdadcould be paid at Aleppo or the debts owed at
Erzerumcould be settled at Bursa, Smyrnaand Leghorn.In this process which,
accordingto Tavernier,linked Surat and Golconda to the Mediterraneanentre-
pots, the remittanceof commercialpaperswas matchedby a reverseremittance
of cash which was eventually transferredphysically from Bandar Abbas to
India.20)
At Hurmuzand Basra, the two movements of precious metals were repre-
sented by the reale of eight and the lari. There is indeed some evidence to sug-
gest that the export of the lari, a unique silver coin of high fineness minted at
Lar (the capital of Laristanin SouthernIran, which did not yet belong to the
Safavid empire) assumed a very high proportionin the second half of the six-
teenthcentury.21) The reasonfor this increasewas two-fold:the monetarypolicy
of the authoritiesat Lar, and the status which lari had acquiredas the com-
mercialcurrencyof the IndianOcean. While the Ottomanand the Iranianmints
coerced the merchantsinto changingtheirreale, Laristanofferedan incentiveto
them by overvaluingthe reale againstits own lari which suggeststhat the profit
earnedhere was not so much from silver arbitragebut from seigniorage.22) The
marketfor the lari in the IndianOcean trade, limited by the predominanceof
Hurmuziashrafiin the firsthalf of the century,expandedenormouslyas a result
of the influx of Europeansilver. The mechanismof this tradewas demonstrated
by van Linschotenin some detail, and interestingaspects of the patternof cur-
rency circulation,mono-metallicarbitrageand supply of silver can be gleaned
from his description.23)
As a result of regulartrade with Hurmuz,the lari had alreadybecome an
accepted deposits from the wealthy men of Isfahan on interest. These deposits were then lent
out at a higher rate of interest. Ibid. 471, 586-8.
19) Ibid.: 767-8.
20) Ibid.
21) The lari was a double twist of silver purl weighing over 74 troy grains in which 98
percent was pure silver. Rabino 1945: 16. On numerous occasions laris were described by
foreign travellers and observers, who took care to note their size and shape and testified to
their high degree of fineness. See Barret 1904: 12; Linschoten 1885: I, 18; Pyrard 1888: II,
ii, 239.
22) Barret 1904: 10, 11, 15; Tavernier 1679: II, 589-90.
23) Linschoten 1885: I, 186-7.
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 305
establishedmediumof paymenton the coasts of Gujaratand westernDeccan.24)

But it seems that in the second half of the sixteenthcentury,it also gained cur-
rency in the spice exportingareas of the south-westerncoast as well, which was
predominantlygold based. Wheneverspices were paid for in silver at Malabar,
it was the lari, and not reale, which was accepted.25)The Portuguesemerchants
bringing reale from Lisbon in Septemberhad to exchange them for the lari in
order to obtain spices, and such was the demandfor this specie that a profitof
12 percent could be earned on this exchange.26)It is worth rememberingthat
gold coins were very much in use to settle the purchase of spices, and the
demandfor laris here had grown out of the rising silver influx and the currency
they had acquiredon the western coast to settle regional tradebalances.27)The
reales obtained by the money changers were sold to the China trading mer-
chants, against laris, on the eve of the ships' departurein April, and a profit
was again earned on this transaction.The circuit which Linschotendescribes
was completed when the money-changersexchanged the lari once again for
reale towardsthe end of the year.
In another testimony, Gomes Solis, who was a big merchantin Indo-Por-
tuguese trade at the turn of the seventeenthcentury,describedhow the reales
were convertedinto Turkishand Iraniancoins and then taken to India in ever
larger quantities.28)By 1602, the annual export of bullion to Hurmuzby the
Ottomanmerchantswas as high as 2 million crusados(41.74 metrictons of sil-
ver).29) Much of this silver (in the form of shahi, lari and reale) was brought
not only to the western coasts of India but into the heartlandof the Mughal
empire as well.30)
The signs of a decline in the Hurmuztradewere visible from 1610 onwards
with the estimatedvalue of its trade falling from 35.93 metrictons of silver in
that year to 16.45 in 1618.31)In this period,the annualloss of revenuesuffered
24) Fredericke 1904: 374; Barrett 1904: 17. In the seasons for making purchases in the
markets of Cambay, Diu, western Deccan and Bengal, the lari enjoyed a premium of above
20 percent. Magalhaes-Godinho 1969: 513.
25) In 1582, an Italian merchant reportedly invested 20,000 ducats (here money of ac-
count) in laris at Cannanoreto buy pepper. Magalhaes-Godinho 1969: 332.
26) See editor's note in Linschoten 1885: I, 186fn.
27) The exchange rate for the Venetian sequin at Goa was "9 tangaes and halfe good
money." But when the ships were to sail for Cochin its value rose to 10 tangas. Barret 1904:
19.
29) Ibid.: 772.
30) Abul Fazl 1872: I, 19.
31) The figures for 1618 are available only for seven months, but it should be remem-
bered that this period was the time of the year when much of the trading took place at
Hurmuz. Tavernier 1925: I, 4-5; English Factories 1642-45: 87.
306 NAJAFHAIDER
by the Portuguesefrom this source was estimated at 60,000 pardaos.32)The

Safavid offensives to regain Hurmuzand the mounting pressure of a hostile
Anglo-Dutchpresence on Portugueseshippingmay partly account for the loss
of trade on this route.33) As a result, the currentsof trade turnedaway from
Hurmuzto the caravan route linking Agra and Lahore with Isfahan through
Qandhar.The annual trafficon this route, eclipsed earlierby the less cumber-
some passage to Hurmuz from Sind and Gujarat,had reportedlygrown four
times in 1615 from the previous level.34)The link between the decline in Per-
sian Gulf tradeand a rise in the caravantrafficwas noticed by Portugueseob-
servers as well, who suggestedmeasuresto rectify the perceivedimbalanceby
bringingthe merchantsback to the sea.35)The annualvalue of the revived car-
avan trade has been estimated at 1.4-1.8 million rupees (16-20 metric tons of
silver).36)
A recovery in the silver importsby sea seems to have begun around1630s,
following the resumptionof regulartradewith the PersianGulf. The settlement
of the conflict over Hurmuzand the subsequentrise of Bandar Abbas as an
entrepotdue to its convenientconnectionswith the Iranianhinterland,may have
contributedto its successful renewal.37)Accordingto a detailed reportprepared
by a Dutch factor in 1634, the total value of textile, indigo, sugar and gumlac
exportedannuallyfrom Agra, Lahore,Sind, Gujaratand Daulatabadsold in the
marketsof Iran was 2,130,350 muhammadisor 24.20 metric tons of silver.3")

33) Pelsaert 1925: 39-40 contains a vivid description of the decline in the western Indian
Ocean trade and says that the "Portuguese,Moslems and Hindus all concur in putting the
blame for this state of things entirely on us and the English.. ." Also see Boxer 1935: 46-
87; Steensgaard 1972: 206.
34) Purchas 1905: IV, 268-9. In his letter from Isfahan, Richard Steele (1615) mentioned
the passing of 12,000 to 14,000 camel loads of merchandise from Lahore to Isfahan every
year while, according to him, not more than 3,000 camels travelled on this route in times of
peace. Robert Coverte (1609), who travelled with a caravan from Agra to Isfahan, reported
that "7 or 8 thousand camels" carried merchandisefrom Qandharalone. Coverte 1971: 74.
35) Steensgaard 1972: 207.
36) Moosvi 1987a: 382.
37) English Factories 1618-21: 46; Steensgaard 1972: 398-462. It seems that the decision
to fortify the customs house of Bandar Abbas was part of a comprehensive plan by the
Safavids to harness its potentials in developing their overseas trade. See Tavernier 1679:
I, 755-62.
38) Bronnen: 482-94. The exchange rates used here are those given in the source.
According to this inventory, the volume of Bayana indigo destined for Iran by sea was 4000
man i Akbari or 25 percent of the total yield of this region estimated by Pelsaert in c. 1626.
Pelsaert 1925: 13-4. It seems that this figure represents the total volume of indigo exported
to Iran (this variety being exported to the Red Sea and Europe in larger quantities), and
its absence from the list of commodities transportedby the land route might have something
to do with its prohibitive price. The high component of textiles from the inland regions of
Agra, Awadh and Lahore in the overland trade and their absence from the goods exported
THE MUGHAL EMPIRE 307
A decade later, it was observed by anotherDutch factor, that the amount of

bullion annually importedby the merchantsof Surat was 22.7 metric tons of
silver.39)These figurescould provide a basis for the suggestionthat, on an aver-
age, about 25 metrictons of silver was exportedto the Mughalempirefrom the
Iranianports in the second quarterof the seventeenthcentury.
In the second half of the seventeenthcentury,the general patternof Iranian
tradewith the Levant and India remainedmuch the same. Ralph du Mans, writ-
ing in 1660, summedup the position of Iran as a conduit of Europeansilver:
Persia is like a big caravanseraiwhich has only two doors, one towardsthe side of
Turkeyby whichsilverfromthe Westenters;[in the formof] piastreswhichcome from
the New World to Spain, from there to France... [and] leaving France through Mar-
seilles, they enter into Turkey, from where they arrive here [Iran], where one recasts
them into abbasis... Some carrytheirpiastresuntilthe Indies...
The otherdoor of exit is BandarAbbas... for going to the Indies,to Surat,where
all silver of the world unloads, and from there as fallen in an abyss, it does not re-
emerge.. .40)
Even though the export of bullion out of Iran was never popular with the
authorities, the merchantscould always find ways and means to circumvent
official prohibitions.But during periods of monetarycrisis, itself attributedto
bullion exports, these came under the strictestscrutiny.It was reportedto Shah
Sulayman, while he took measures to regulate the supplies of silver to the
mints, that the Armenianswere now bringingno more foreign bullion into the
countrythan they were exportingto India. This, in the opinion of the officials,
was causing a crisis of silver in the empire.41)Similarly,the popularprejudice
against the baniyas (there were 10 to 12 thousandin Isfahan alone) for being
usurersand bullion exporterswas often reflectedin the remarksof the foreign
observerswhen they spoke of the bullion crisis:
These Indians,like trueleeches extractall the gold and silverof the countryand send
them to theirown countryso that in the year 1677 when I departedfromPersia,one
could not see there any more gold or silver. These usurershad made it disappear
entirely.42)
Ironically, the Iranian monetary policy to overcome the contraction of the cir-
culating medium served to worsen the situation and further contributed to the
drainage of the specie from the country. After the debasement of silver currency
in 1684, foreign coins were greatly undervaluedat the official rate of exchange
by sea suggests a shift in the commodity composition of the export trade over the two routes
in this period.
39) Van Santen 1982: 75.
40) Du Mans 1890: 192.
41) Sanson 1695: 12-3.
42) Chardin 1811: VI, 164. Also see Tavernier 1679: I, 586-8.
308 NAJAFHAIDER
and it became practicallyimpossiblefor the merchantsto obtainthe true value

of theirbullion in Iran,compellingthem to exportit directlyto India.43)In this,
the tightly controlled Bandar Abbas was altogether avoided and Basra was
selected for theirbullionexportsin the last decadeof the seventeenthcentury.44)
The cargoes of a Dutch ship which sailed from Basra at about this time, and
was interceptedby the Iranianauthoritieswhen it driftedtowardsBandarAbbas,
carriedover 24 metrictons of silver in Spanishreales owned by the Armenian
merchantsof Iran.45)
The evidence for Gujaratishippingin the westernIndianOcean suggests that
tradewith Iranwas on an increasein this period.The English reportedin 1660
that the number of non-Europeanships at Surat had gone up "so fast that,
wheras in Surattten yeares past there were but 15 or 20, there is now 80, and
the most parte of greateburthen."46) Some of this shippingseems to have been
directedtowardstradewith the Red Sea and Iran as suggestedby the alarmed
responseof the Dutchfactorsto the possibilityof a loss of freighttradeto these
destinations.47)The figures for the customsrevenuederivedfrom BandarAbbas
also suggest an upwardtrendin the Iraniantradecomparedto the earlierperiod.
The customs revenueof Hurmuzin 1610 was 3.6 metric tons of silver, but the
correspondingfigurefor BandarAbbas in 1643 was 5.5 metrictons, which rose
to 6 metric tons in 1654 and 7 metric tons in 1657.48)In 1656-57, the average
value of goods exportedfrom Surat to BandarAbbas stood at around22 met-
ric tons of their silver value.49)
An equally importantsupplier of bullion to western India by the maritime
route was the Red Sea region which, owing to the distributionof bullion and
43) Sanson 1695: 159-61.

44) Ibid.: 14. Also Fryer 1909: I, 282-3.
45) Sanson 1695: 14.
46) English Factories 1655-60: 301. Among these ships one may count six large vessels
(groote backen) owned once by Shahjahan, and an equal number of freight ships built
for the Surat administrator,Mir Arab, and commissioned by him for coastal trade. Generale
Missiven: II, 624-5. The wealthy merchants of Surat were described in 1663 as "worth over
five to six millions and own up to fifty ships which sail every where." Godinho 1990: 49.
47) Generale Missiven: III, 36. Reporting on the great volume of the trade conducted by
the Muslim and baniya merchants of Gujarat, they noted that between May 1654 and April
1655, "40 heavy ships [cloucke schepen] sailed [from Gujarat],mostly to trade with Persia,
Basra and Mokha."
48) For Hurmuz see the source cited for Table 1. For Bandar Abbas see Generale
Missiven: II, 207; III, 107; English Factories 1655-60: 28. All figures are given in toman
(= 50 abbasis of 107 grains of fine silver).
49) English Factories 1655-60: 171-2. Since these values are derived from the records of
the Surat custom house, the value of bullion in the returncargo would be higher by at least
50 percent to account for, besides the usual undervaluation,the difference in the cost price
and sales price of the goods exported by the Gujarati merchants. The Iranian merchants
would, however, bring an amount of bullion equal to the value of exported goods.
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 309
merchandiseacross the traditionalroutes linking the Levant with the Arab and
Iranian ports, handled a volume of merchandisehigher than was brought to
Basra and BandarAbbas by the Aleppo-Baghdadroute.50)Merchantstravelled
from Cairo both by land and sea and reachedMokha either directlyby Tor (on
the southerntip of the Sinai peninsula)or via Jadda.An Ottomanimperialship
sailed every year to Mokha laden with Europeanmerchandiseand, above all,
huge quantitiesof gold and silver coins. In 1616, exportsto Mokhaby one such
ship reportedlyconsisted of 350,000 reales of eight and 50,000 Venetian and
"MoorscheDucaten"(sultani).51)The land trafficwas describedby an English
factor as he saw it in 1629:
There cometh also yearly from Grand Cairo to Mocho a land caphilo of some 800 or
1,000 cammells, who bring but little ladinge save marchants and their estates; which
marchants bring greate quantities of monies, as rialls of eight and chekeens of gold to
buy commodities; ... This caphilo aryveth in Mocho every yeare about the latter end
of Aprill or the beginning of May, and in July following departethagaine for Judda and
Grand Cairo, being laden with Indian commodities [a list of textiles and spices].52)
Merchantstradingbetween Aleppo and Mokha took the annual pilgrimage

route to Hedjaz. Pedro Texeira mentionsthat every year after Ramadhan,a big
caravanleft Aleppo for Mecca which was joined by anotherat Damascuswith
more pilgrims and merchants.He himself watched with some amusementthe
departureof one such caravan,amidst great fanfare and playing of music, of
800 personstravellingwith 3,000 camels, manyhorses and packedanimals,mer-
chandise and "a great deal of money which passes on to India that way."") A
smallercaravanof about 600 camels which came from Aleppo in 1616 with the
intention of buying Indian commoditiesat Mokha, reportedlybrought200,000
reales of eight and 100,000 Venetian and Hungarian ducats and Ottoman
50) The Red Sea ports of Jadda, Mokha and Aden were visited by the merchants from
Cairo and Aleppo, where European bullion came through the ports of Alexandria, Smyrna
and Iskenderun.Texeira 1902: 115, 118-21, 130; Tavernier 1679: I, 88; Bernier 1989: 202-3;
SupplementaryCalendar 1600-40: 69.
51) Broecke 1962: I, 107fn. See English Factories 1624-29: 349-50 for the annual visits
of a "great Junck" to Mokha from Cairo. Also see 1637-41: 103 where the cheapness of
Indian goods at Mokha was ascribed to the lack of buyers following "a great vessel from
Suez having been wrecked on her way thither."
52) English Factories 1624-29: 350. The arrival of the caravan at Mokha was timed to
match the calling of the Gujarat ships at the port in spring. Terry 1921: 301-2; Brouwer
1992: 19-20.
53) Texeira 1902: 122. The size of the Aleppo caravan would largely depend on the coin-
cidence of the Islamic calendar with the sailing seasons, and it is likely that smaller cara-
vans set on their course strictly with a mercantile objective independent of the hadj traffic.
The outward Meccan caravan itself split into two before reaching its destinations, one ter-
minating at Jadda and the other travelling all the way to the shores of southernArabia. Lane
1968: 53-4; Inalcik 1994: 345-6; Meilink-Roelofsz 1962: 223, 388.
310 NAJAF
HAIDER
sultani. It was believed that the amountactually broughtwas higher than was
declared at the Mokha custom house.54) Judged from the figures of this year
alone, the bullion exportsto Mokhafrom the Levantby land and sea came were
well above 20 metric tons of silver.
Table 2. Bullion Exportsfrom Europe to the Levant: VariousEstimates
Year From To AnnualTotal/Average References

(metrictons of silver)
1581-90 Europe Easta) 54.30 Morineau1985: 581
1590s Europe Easta) 80.00 Parker1974: 529
1590s Europe Levant 39.70 Ibid.
1591-1600 Europe Easta) 54.30 Morineau1985: 581
1593-96 Venice Aleppo 6.96 Braudeland Spooner
1977: 448 and n.
1595 Venice Aleppo 14.69 Ibid.
c. 1600 Holland Levant 15.58 Attman 1986: 76
c. 1600 Europe Levant 25.98 Ibid.: 33, 77
1601-25 Europe Levant 50.00 Barrett1990: 251-2
1604 Marseilles Aleppo 21.30 Texeira 1902: 120
1604 Europe Aleppo 66.00b) Ibid.
1610-14 Venice Levant 9.96 Spooner 1962: 645-55
a) Includes exports to the Levant
b) Cash and goods
Indian ships called at all the three ports of the Red Sea although, in the
course of the seventeenthcentury,Mokha overshadowedthe rest by becoming
the busiest marketfor the exchangeof Europeanbullion againstthe spices from
Malabarand Achin, textile and indigo from Gujaratand coffee from Yemen.55)
Textiles and indigo broughtto Mokhawere sold to the Arab and Turkishmer-
chants mainly for silver and gold.56)
Any direct informationon bullion importedby the Red Sea is lacking for the
second half of the sixteenthcenturyand its magnitudehas been inferredfrom
its overall tradewith India. Portuguesesources speak of twelve to fifteen ships
going to the Red Sea from Gujarateach year, and a modem estimatehas put
54) Broecke1962:I, 85.

55) English Factories 1637-41: 103; 1661-64: 78; Inalcik 1994: 336; Meilink-Roelofsz
1962: 222-3, 386-7. In the fiscal year 1599-1600, the revenue from the ports of Yemen was
118,851 gold pieces (probablyYemenidinar)of which the contribution
of Mokhawas 73
percent.Inalcik1994: 335-6.
56) Coen 1919:I, 238; Ovington1929:269-70;Fryer1909:I, 282-3.
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 311
the total value of this trade at 20 million rupees (app. 226.6 metric tons of
silver) on the basis of duties paid to the Portuguese by these ships.57)This
estimate would put the supply of bullion by this route in the proximity of
100 metrictons of silver consideringthat a little less than half of the total value
of trade, allowing for the share of merchandise,was broughtback in bullion.
This seems to me to be a high figure for two reasons. If we anticipateour
later estimates for bullion imports from the Red Sea, the gap would be sig-
nificantly large unless it could be explained that there was a big decline in
this trade in the interveningperiod. The evidence, as it exists, however, is to
the contrary.Second, the figures (Table 2) we have for the Europeanexportsto
the Levant are much too low to allow for such a massive amountof silver pass-
ing by the Red Sea alone, even though one could argue that the intermediary
regions of Ottomanand Safavid empirewere in a position to sustain a net loss
of their silver stock to India. For these reasons it is perhaps appropriateto
reduce this figure, ratherarbitrarily,to 75 metric tons of silver. Even then, this
figure would serve as the upper limit for the volume of bullion exports in this
period.
In 1622, two ships, the Salamati and Tawakkuli Ali ("Tocolij")brought
between them from Mokha an equivalentof 32 metric tons of silver belonging
to the merchantsof Gujarat.58) Two otherships arrivedfrom Jaddaand Hodeida
in the same year, and one of them was describedas returning"richly laden"
(coostelijck gelaaden).59) Certainly,the total amount of bullion importedfrom
the Red Sea in that year was higher than the cargoes of the two ships which
the Dutch factor came to know about and which he cared to enter in his jour-
nal. In 1624, the news of the safe arrivalof a Diu ship was receivedwith great
joy by the merchantsof Ahmadabad,Cambay and Surat since it brought an
equivalentof 28 metrictons of silver in bullion and merchandise.6?) Besides the
regularvoyages of the merchant an
ships, important featureof the Gujarattrade
was the annual sailing of the imperialships to the Red Sea with pilgrimsand
merchandise.They broughtback huge quantitiesof bullion after distributinga
part of it in charityat the holy places on behalf of the emperor.61) Such bullion
consignments as were recorded for the year 1628 reached the figure of 11 met-
ric tons of silver (see Table 3).62) While the annual importsmust have varied
57) Pearson 1976: 100-1 and fn.

58) Broecke 1963: II, 273, 275.
59) Ibid.:275, 278.
60) Ibid.:296-7.
61) Moosvi 1990:308-20.
62) In 1637, Shahjahan's ship, Shahi, which was wrecked on its way to Mokha, had
reportedly lost a cargo worth 7 to 10 lakhs of rupees. Generale Missiven: I, 622.
312 HAIDER
NAJAF
with the availability of the Red Sea going ships, the supplies which came to
Mokhafrom the Levant and the politicalclimate of southernArabia,63)one can
say that on an average they stayed between 35 to 40 metric tons of silver in
the first half of the seventeenthcentury.
Table 3. Bullion exported to Gujarat by the Red Sea

(silver equivalent)
Year Amount FineSilver Remarks

(metrictons)
1582 1,200,000 rupees 13.63 On one imperialship
1622 2,500,000 rupees 32.10 On two Gujarat ships
200,000 ducats
1624 - 24.00 Bullion and goods on a
Diu ship
1628 1,200,000fl. 11.30 On one imperialship
1641 1,700,000 reales [of eight] 43.50 On Gujarat ships
1642 1,000,000 reales 25.59 On one English ship
1643 600 to 700,000 rupees 6.8 to 7.9 On Gujarat ships
1645 485,000 reales 12.85 On Gujarat ships and
10,000 ducats one Dutch ship
1648 1,167,853 reales 29.88 On Gujarat ships
1653 961,000 reales 24.59 On eight Gujarat ships
1654 1,000,000 reales 25.76 On five Gujarat ships
4,000 ducats
1679 5,000,000 rupees 56.67 On Gujarat ships
1685 5,000,000 rupees 56.67
c. 1700 6,000,000 rupees 68.00 Total exports to Gujarat
Source: Pearson 1976: 101; Broecke 1963: II, 273, 275, 341; English Factories 1642-45:
17-8, 61-2, 92; 1646-50: 249; Generale Missiven: II, 729, 800-1; Fryer 1915: III, 163;
Brouwer 1988: 73, 85; Van Santen 1982: 76, 248fn; Das Gupta 1976: 147fn, 151-2fn.
It is evident from the figureswe have for the last quarterof the seventeenth
centurythat therewas an increasein the importsof Red Sea bullion to Gujarat.
At the turn of the eighteenth century the figure stood at 68 metric tons of
63) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 84, pt. I11, 430. The Red Sea ports had suffered inter-
mittently as a result of recurringrevolts against the Ottoman occupation of Yemen, and when
the province finally gained independencein 1635, the Arab authoritiesat Mokha acted swiftly
in reducing customs rates and giving assurancesof more liberty in trading affairs to the mer-
chants than was granted earlier by the Turks. English Factories 1634-36: 300, 307; Dagh-
Register1637: 266-7.
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 313
silver.64)There is some evidence of an expansion in this period in the number

and tonnage of Gujaratishippingto the Red Sea and the PersianGulf. In 1682,
an English factor at Surat sent a reportto his superiorsthat "aboutsixty Junks
doe yearly loade from Surat for Mocha, Cudda [Jadda],Persia and Bassora,
most of whose loading consists of Callicoes, drugsand Ahmudabadsilk bought
in the Bazar at Surat."65) This was certainlya remarkableincrease in the num-
ber of ships active on this route comparedto the first half of the century.66)It
is likely that this increasehad somethingto do with the shift in the commodity
compositionof the Red Sea trade from spices to textiles, and the ability of the
region in handling more productsfrom Gujaratafter becoming a net importer
of Europeanbullion when coffee began to be exportedfrom Bait al Faqih and
Luhayya in great quantities.67)However, these figures should be treated with
care for measuringthe supply of bullion silver in individualyears. There are
indications that in certainyears, the componentof gold was very high in the
total.
Cape route and the Carreira voyages: Portuguese exports of silver

It was the enormousincrease in the supply of bullion by the Carreiravoy-
ages from Lisbon which remainedperhapsthe most distinguishingfeatureof the
Indian Ocean trade in the second half of the sixteenthcentury.From an aver-
age of 2 to 3 metrictons of silver in the firsthalf of the century,bullionexports
reached a staggering44 metric tons in 1580.68) The predominanceof silver in
these exportsis testifiedto by the sourceswhich explicitly point to the presence
of reales of eight and four and no other specie.69)Not all silver in the cargo of
the Carreirada India was spent in India, and at least a quarterof the total
64) Das Gupta 1976: 147n.

65) Letter Book: vol. 7, la. Of the eight big ships owned by the merchantstradingat Surat
and employed on the Red Sea run in 1694, five belonged to Abdul Ghafur (Faizbakhsh of
500 tons, Faiz rasan and Khuda bakhsh of 300 tons each, Fath i Muhammadiof 234 tons
and Fazl i Ali of 167 tons). The others were owned by Sulaiman ji (Welcome of 267 tons),
Shaikh Ahmad (Ahmadi of 667 tons) and Yusuf Sakhi (Hurmuz Merchant of 500 tons).
Factory Records, Surat: vol. 94, 56b; vol. 5, 163b.
66) The number of ships calling at the Red Sea ports are estimated as follows: 22 to 24
in 1616; 7 in 1621; 4 in 1622; 24 in 1623; and 6 in 1628. Brouwer 1991: 128-67; 1992:
29-30.
67) Ovington 1929: 271. At the principal markets of Yemen, coffee could be bought only
with cash, preferably reales of eight. Das Gupta 1976: 132-33, 136-7. Also see Tuchscherer
1993: 168, 172-3.
68) Magalhaes-Godinho 1969: 329-32, 491. The figures are given in crusados of 400 reis.
One mark of silver (229.5 grams) was rated in Portugal at 2700 reis from 1578 to 1588.
After 1588, each crusado was rated at 2800 reis.
69) Linschoten clearly states that "the most and greatest ware that is commonly sent into
314 NAJAFHAIDER
exportswas takento China.We have alreadyreferredto the mode of this redis-

tribution,and Fitch estimatedit, in the last quarterof the century,at 250,000
crusadosper annum.70)Silver retainedin India was employed, along with the
capital raised from trade and customs, to finance both the coastal and interna-
tional trade.
A sizeable portion of the total capital investmentby the Portuguese-over
one third-was directedtowardstradewith the individualregionsof the Mughal
empire.71)It was organised on the basis of a close coordinationbetween the
Carreiraand Casado (regional trade of the resident Portuguese)voyages. At
varyingintervals,a fleet of Portuguesemerchantboats ("cafila"),escortedby a
galley or two, sailed from Goa to Cambayand Laharibandar to buy textiles and
It
indigo.72) was this cavalcade which was observed with awe and alarm by
English and Dutch merchantsfrom their ships lying off the Suratcoast.73)While
a part of the cargo broughtto Goa, mainly textiles, was meant for the markets
of Malacca, a substantialportionof it was reservedfor the annualvoyages to
Lisbon.
It is possible to estimatethe size of this tradefrom the figuresof Portuguese
importsgiven by James Boyajian,derivedfrom the descriptionsof the Carreira
cargo as declaredat the Casa da India (Lisbon)or as recordedby independent
observers on the arrival of ships from India. Among the two regular items,
which covered almost the entire value exportedby the Mughal empire, indigo
stood out as a high value productin termsof its weight and thus fetched a price
higher than pepperin the marketsof Lisbon.74)But in terms of the total value
exported,textiles from Sind and Gujarat,and to a lesser extent Bengal,"7)had
India, are rials of eight.. ." Linschoten 1885: I, 11, 186-7. Also see Pyrard 1888: II, ii, 193,
211; Magalhaes-Godinho 1969: 328-30.
70) Fitch 1921: 41; For the Potuguese exports of silver to China from Goa see Boxer
1959: 7; Atwell 1982: 75.
71) Boyajian 1993: 55, 67, 69.
72) Downton 1939: 113; Moreland 1962: 224-5.
73) Best 1934: 34; Dutch Factories 1617-23: 151.
74) Boyajian 1993: 45-6. The average price of indigo, 45 crusados per quintal given in
the documents and adopted by Boyajian for his calculations, is used here too. The danger of
working with a single price quotation is manifest and the only argument one can suggest in
favour of this figure is that it does not refer to the prime cost of any particularvariety of
indigo. Rather, it represents the average cost of transportingindigo from Gujarat, including
apparently,the customs paid on both exported commodity and imported bullion as well as
other costs of transaction. Hence, despite its apparent shortcomings, it is incidentally more
convenient for our purpose in estimating the value of the total outlay. That merchants cal-
culated the total cost of indigo shipped from India by including customs payments, interests
on loans, costs of remitting cash to the market and transportcharges can be seen from the
accounts sent by a Dutch factor from Agra. Bronnen 1611-38: 513-4.
75) The English reported from Patna in 1620, that the Portuguese imports to Bihar and
Bengal comprised mainly spices and Chinese silk, while from these regions they exported
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 315
the highest share.76) There will be little doubt that, from the patternwe have
observed of India's foreign trade, almost the entire export to Lisbon was paid
for in preciousmetals, mainly silver, and whatevermerchandisethe Portuguese
broughtto supplementtheirbullion capitalwas likely to have been less than the
value of indigo and textiles meant for the regional and South-EastAsian mar-
kets. Thus, the assumptionhere is that the estimatedvalue of these importsin
silver effectively representsthe volume of Portugueseexportsof bullion into the
Mughal empire.
Table 4. Estimates of Portuguese Exports of Precious Metals

to the MughalEmpire:1586-1631
(silver equivalent in metric tons)
Year Gujaratand Sind Bengal AnnualTotal
1586-1590 50.45 5.65 11.22a)

1591-1595 22.54 2.74 5.04a)
1596-1600 42.81 3.93 9.34a)
1602 3.38 0.43 3.81
1605 0.00 0.00 0.00
1608 1.02 0.13 1.15
1610 2.28 0.19 2.47
1615 2.14 0.27 2.41
1616 4.98 0.61 5.59
1618 4.12 0.47 4.59
1630 5.76 0.54 6.30
1631 1.99 0.34 2.33
a) Annual Average
Source: Boyajian 1993: AppendixA, 247-53
FactoryRecords,Patna:
coyyon textiles, silk fabrics and "coarsecarpetsof Junapoore".
vol. 1, 3. Also see EnglishFactories1618-21:213-4.
76) Boyajian1993:44 (Table3). It is harderto analysethe figuresavailablefor textiles
exported by the Portuguese. The figures refer to total exports to Lisbon in bales of mixed
contents, the true value of which can be ascertained only by knowing the exact nature of
assortments. The distribution by merchants of high value products such as silk with cotton
fabrics in the bales was done not only to minimise risks of loss but also to manipulate cus-
toms payments at both ends. Ibid.: 46-7. The documents designated the textiles as "roupase
sedas" (cloth and silk), and at least one source put an average value of 150 crusados on each
such bale. Ibid.: 46. In considering this figure as representativeof the average value of a bale
of textile we are indeed assuming a certain standardin its preparation.About 90 percent of
the textiles exported to Lisbon were known to be either Indian cotton or cotton and silk mix-
tures. Ibid.: 44, 47, 66, 67 (Table 6). The shares of Gujarat,Sind, Coromandel,Bengal and
Orissa in the volume exported from India have been worked out from the figures available
316 NAJAF
HAIDER
For corroboration;the estimatesbasedon Portugueseimportsfromthe Mughal

empire are compared with the figures of revenue derived by the Habsburg
crown from the Cape trade.The resultsof this comparison,plottedon the graph
below, suggest a close correlationbetween the two sets of figures.
Graph 1. Crown revenueand Portuguesetrade

700000 A A 20
A- 18
2 600000
•-16 B
m 500000 B 14
400000 12
>- 300000-
-10
10 W=
8
& 200000- -6
SU 100000 - 2
0 0 ;4
1587 1588 1589 15901591 1592 1593 15941595 1596 1597 1598
Years
Source:(A) Rooney1994:548 (Table3).
(B) Derivedfromfiguresusedin Table4 above.
During the quinquennium1586-90, the high point of Portuguesetrade with

the Mughal empire,the average annualexport of silver was 11.22 metric tons.
The amountwas considerableenoughto upset the gold-silver ratioon the west-
ern coast as well as the monetarypolicies of the Estado da India.The demand
for reales was so high from Sind and Gujaraton the one hand and Bengal,
Malacca and China on the other, that Goa had to regulatethe profiton money-
changing with a view to favouring the expansion of Luso-Indiancoinage.77)
However, whenever such restrictionswere put up, they had to be withdrawn
soon in the face of a huge demand for silver. In 1583, when the outflow of
reales to western India was prohibited,local merchantsrushedto Goa with an
enormousquantityof gold to obtain the specie.78)A decade later, a law estab-
lished the compulsoryregistrationof reales which were exportedto Gujaratand
a list of personspermittedto participatein this tradewas drawnup. Exportsto
China and Malacca, however, remained entirely free from restrictionsduring
for their respective contributions to the total value delivered in Lisbon. These calculations
provide us with an estimate of 78 percent as the share of Gujarat and Sind, and 10 percent
as the share of Bengal and Orissa.
77) Magalhaes-Godinho1969: 514-5.
78) Ibid.: 515.
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 317
the monsoons, and a clash of interestsbecame apparentbetween those export-

ing textiles from Gujaratand Sind to Malacca,who wanted a free flow of reales
to western India, and those who were accustomedto carryingthe specie directly
to Bengal, Malacca and China.79)The impact of the continuedinflux of reales
due to these demandswas soon reflectedin the gold-silver ratio of the region.
Between 1582 and 1624, the price of the reale fell in terms of the saotome and
the pagoda by about 30 percent. Even against the lari, which itself came in
large quantities,the exchangerate of the reale fell by about 16 percentbetween
the two dates.80)
Following a generaldecline in the Portugueseexports of silver to India from
about 26.71 metric tons in 1585 to 6.55 metric tons in 1615 and 1618,81)there
was a fall in the exports to the Mughal empire as well. Comparedto the last
quarterof the sixteenthcentury,exportswere reducedto almost one thirdin the
first quarterof the seventeenthcentury(Table 4). A sharpdownwardtrendhad
set in after 1600, when the exports fell to the lowest level in 1608. Although
there were signs of revival in 1616 and 1630, for which figures are available,
the annual average now remainedwell below 3 metric tons.82)
Bullion exported by the English East India Company

The early voyages of the English merchantsin the seventeenthcenturywere
directedtowardsthe spice marketsof South-eastAsia. Even thoughthey learnt
about the great demand for Indian textiles in these markets,when Lancaster
(1602) successfullybarteredthemforSumatranpepperafterplunderinga Portuguese
carrackin the Straitsof Malacca, the tradewith India took at least a decade to
develop. In all the twelve early voyages to this region (1602-1613) the total sil-
ver exportedwas about 30.7 metric tons.83)Of this only a very small portion
was broughtto the Mughalempireby way of trade.84)It was with the firstjoint
79) Ibid.
80) Ibid.: 522-3.
81) Magalhaes-Godinho 1969: 329-32, 491.
82) General statements by contemporaries also support the quantitative estimates of the
decline in the Portuguese trade with the Mughal empire. It was reported in 1621, that the
number of Portuguese vessels on the Cambay run was reduced from approximately200 in
previous years to 50 or 60, and the observer considered it a veritable sign of their declining
trade. Dutch Factories 1617-23: 151; Broecke 1963: II, 302-3. Also see Pelasert 1925: 19-20;
Van Dam: II, iii, 8; Winius 1981: 120-1; Ahmad 1991: 90. A decline in the Portuguse trade
of Sind is alluded to in English Factories 1637-41: 137.
83) Home Misc: vol. 39, 124; SupplementaryCalendar: 4, 6; Marine Records Misc: vol.
4, 13.
84) English merchant ships called at the port of Surat respectively in 1607, 1609 and
1612, in an attempt to seek favourable terms and commence regular trade with the Mughal
empire. These were Hector, which brought William Hawkins to the court of Jahangir,Ascen-
318 NAJAFHAIDER
Table 5. English Exports of Precious Metals to Gujarat

(silver equivalent)
Year QuinquennialTotal QuinquennialTotal AnnualAverage

(?) (metrictons) (metrictons)
1614-1618 69,722 7.91 1.58
1619-1623 174,337 19.37 3.87
1628-1632 292,610 32.42 6.48
1638-1642a) 2.94
1643-1647 25.18 5.03
1650-1654b) 2.26
1658-1662 168,805 17.54 3.50
1663-1667 82,326 7.51 1.50
1668-1672 136,890 14.60 2.92
1675-1679 356,084 37.72 7.54
1680-1684 565,442 59.74 11.94
1685-1689c) 11.64
1692-1696 288,168 29.08 5.81
a) 4 years b) 3 years c) 4
years
Source: HomeMiscellaneous:vol. 15, 15-30,39-61,70-6, 107-33,135-48,167-208;General
Ledgers: vol. 9, 121-6; vol. 10, 137, 139; CourtBook: vol. 4, 96-7; vol. 16, 149; vol.
17, 41, 46, 65; vol. 18, 78; vol. 19, 246, 438, 443-4; vol. 20, 151b, 250a, 253a; Letter
Book: vol. 1, 78, 170, 231, 339; vol. 2, 55, 90, 174, 183, 216-7, 295; vol. 3, 6b, 57a-b,
127a, 195a, 206b, 238b; vol. 4, 5,101, 147-8, 221, 231-2, 320-1, 431-2, 530-1; vol. 5,
15b-16a, 52b, 53b, 58a, 64b, 88a-b, 134a-135b,208a, 209a, 271b-272a, 280a; vol. 6,
12b-13a, 50a, 51b, 53a-b, 70b, 178b, 179a, 208a, 256a-b, 282b, 291a; vol. 7, 24a, 69b,
71a-b, 75b, 183b, 198a; vol. 8, 67b; FactoryRecords,Surat:vol. 1, 18, 114; vol. 5, 68a;
vol. 92, 2; ibid., Rajapur:vol. 1, 31b, 37a-b, 47a; ibid., Miscellaneous:vol. 25, 34-9;
Downton: 170, 200; Supplementary Calendar: 69, 70, 83, 86, 88-9, 90, 92, 136, 138,
139, 151, 152; English Factories, 1618-21: 29, 53-4, 64-5, 130, 185, 190, 202-3, 206-7,
218, 282, 310-11; 1622-3: 166, 167, 182; 1624-9: 55, 103, 111, 213, 235, 295; 1630-3:
5-6, 32-3, 123, 205, 246, 262-3, 286, 291, 323; 1634-6: 68-9, 318; 1637-41: 62, 103,
204; 1642-5: 28, 61, 175, 209-11; 1646-50: 327-8; 1651-4: 28-29, 31; 1655-60: 59, 152,
207-8, 320; 1661-4: 22, 23n., 95-6, 99, 171, 198-9, 326; 1665-7: 169, 280; 1668-9: 13;
English Factories (NS): I, 230 and n.; III, 239-40, 280-81; Letters Received: VI, 164;
Dutch Factories: 123; Moreau 1825: 5; Bruce 1810: I, 213, 234; Wylde: 3-8; Calendar
of StatePapers:373-4; 0. C. 1543 A: 16; CourtMinutes:304; GeneraleMissiven:II, 628.
sion, whichwas wreckedoff the Gujaratcoast,andthe fleetcaptainedby ThomasBest which

successfullyrepelleda Portugueseonslaught.
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 319
stock voyage of 1614 that regular shipmentof bullion from Englandbegan to

arrive in Gujaratwhich continuedalmost without interruptiontill the middle of
the eighteenthcentury.Tables 5 and 6 are based on the figures collected from
invoices of the bullion ships and the correspondenceof the recipientfactories.
English exports of bullion to Gujaratfluctuatedbetween 1.5 and 6.4 metric
tons from 1614 to 1672 with an average of 3.3 metric tons per year.85)The
exports were virtually suspended during the second Anglo-Dutch war, and a
total of less than half a metricton of silver was sent during1665-67. Therewas
a significantrise in the exports from 1675 and the annualaverage touched the
maximum mark of 11.8 metric tons during 1680-89, an importantreason for
which was to drive the "interlopers"out of the market.86)
Table 6. English Exports of Precious Metals to Bengal

Year Quinquennial Total Annual Average
1657-1661 7.56 1.51

1662-1666a) 4.19 1.39
1667-1671a) 7.45 2.48
1673-1677a) 13.15 4.38
1678-1682a) 41.87 13.95
1683-1687b) 40.66 10.16
a) 3 years b) 4 years
Source:Ibid.
Precious Metals Exported by the Dutch East India Company

The Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) entered Asian waters with
the objective of tradingin the Indonesianarchipelagoand the spice islands, and
in the first two decades of the seventeenthcentury never consideredit oppor-
tune to divert its investmentsto the Gujarat-Malaccatextile trade on any sig-
nificant scale.87)It was only in the thirddecade, following a sharpreductionin
85) The figures are inclusive of the supplies received from Iran, Mokha and Bantam by
the English.
86) English Factories (NS), 1678-84: III, 292.
87) Dutch Factories 1617-23: 111-2, 114-5. The problem of obtaining suitable trading
privileges, including the establishment of a factory at Surat, may have deterredthe Company
in the beginning from commiting itself fully to this branch of trade. The Portuguesewere still
dominant on the western coast, and the Mughal officials were not forthcomingin grantingthe
Dutch a carte blanche for fear of upsetting the existing arrangements.But once certain rights
were granted by an official decree, the problem of availability of adequate capital soon
320 NAJAFHAIDER
the bullion supply from Amsterdam due to renewed conflicts with Spain, that
the Company's search for an alternative source of capital began in great earnest
The expansion in the Dutch trade with the Mughal
to finance its spice trade."88)
empire from 1622 came at a time when the Company had discovered a new
source of silver in Japan, obtained in exchange for Chinese raw silk and gold,
which supplemented to a very large extent the bullion sent from Batavia to
finance its investments in the textiles and indigo of Agra and Gujarat.89)
Table 7. Dutch Exports of Precious Metals to Gujarat

(silver equivalent)
Year Annual Total Metric tons Year AnnualTotal Metrictons

fl. fl.
1620 23,207 0.23 1640 10.53

1621 120,000 1.23 1641 6.28
1624 110,000 1.13 1642 1,205,074 11.14
1625 200,000 2.05 1643 5.43
1628 579,172 5.95 1644 5.44
1629 712,560 7.32 1645 11.73
1631 - - 1646 5.40
1635 250,000 2.57 1647 4.90
1636 566,469 5.82 1648 5.47
1639 7.57 1651 300,000 3.08
Note: The conversion into fine silver is based on the following values: 1 tael = 30
grams fine silver = 3.125 fl. before 1636 and 2.85 fl. thereafter.1 reale of eight = 2.5
fl. (till 1656). 1 abbasi = 0.8 fl. Dagh Register 1641: 376; Generale Missiven: II, 207,
215; Uytrekening 1691: 28; Boxer 1959: Appendix, 338.
Source: Coen: III, 96; V, 588; Broecke 1963: II, 312-3, 347; Bronnen: 122, 124, 126, 130,
133-4, 143-4, 264-5, 269, 548-51; Generale Missiven: I, 280, 509; II, 94, 202, 215, 224,
264, 273, 292, 316, 336, 364, 567; Dagh Register 1624-29: 64; 1636: 205; 1637: 264-5;
1640-41: 175, 376; 1641-42: 74, 184, 192; 1643-44: 163, 178, 188, 191, 193; 1644-45:
229, 239, 241-2; English Factories 1618-21: 325; 1637-41, 215; 1642-45: 22, 167; Sup-
plementary Calendar 1928: 143; Radwan 1978: 68; Van Santen 1982: 37; Alam 1993.
became apparent.Ibid.: 59-61, 73, 79, 81-3, 90, 95. For a lucid descriptionof the Company's
early years in Gujaratsee Radwan 1978: 21-51. Also see Winius and Vink 1994: 23-4.
88) Dutch exports of precious metals from the Netherlands declined from an average of
1.48 million guilders between 1621 and 1623 to 0.47 million guilders between 1624 and
1626. Bruijn, Gaastra, and Schoffer 1979: 228 (Appendix IV, Table 46).
89) Israel 1989: 124, 130, 177-9. Israel also attributesa rise in the Dutch exports of indigo
from western India to the Spanish embargo which caused a soaring in the price of Gua-
temalan indigo at Amsterdam.The export of Japanese silver to Gujaratwas first reported in
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 321
During 1621-1626, the average annual export of precious metals to Gujarat

by the Dutch was under 2 metric tons of silver. The exports rose dramatically
in 162790) and thereafter remained, on an average, at around 6 metric tons till
about 1651. The pattern of Dutch trade with Gujarat changed significantly
from the late 1650s. Now, the Company was largely financing its exports with
spices, Japanese copper (occasionally gold), tin and gold imported from Iran.91)
Not only was the supply of bullion discontinued, coined silver from Surat
was exported in large quantities to the Dutch factories of Ceylon, Bengal and
Batavia.92)
Table 8. Dutch Exports of Precious Metals to Bengal

(silver equivalent)
Year Total Total Annual Average

fl. metrictons metric tons
1663-1667a) 5,397,206 46.27 11.56
1668-1672a) 4,995,386 42.82 10.72
1678-1682 5,654,159 48.47 9.69
1683-1687 4,528,493 38.82 7.76
1688-1692 8,633,384 74.01 14.80
1693-1697 8,565,522 73.43 14.68
a) 4 years
Note: The conversioninto fine silver is done at the rate of 1 reale of eight = 25.7 grams
fine silver = 3 fl. Bruijn,Gaastraand Schoffer1979: 225. Since coins were reckonedat
a premiumin the money of accounts, this conversionwould slightly underestimatethe
bullion componentof the exports as opposedto specie.
Source: Prakash1988: 66 (Table 3.2).
1624. Dagh Register1624-29:64. Followingthe Bakufu'sban on Japaneseparticipation

in
overseas trade in 1635, the VOC succeeded in obtaining the lion's share of the Sino-Japanese
trade. Its annual exports of Japanese silver surged from 2.37 metric tons in 1622-26 to 11.71
metric tons in 1632-36 and 14.93 metric tons in 1642-46, which was maintainedtill at least
1661. Figures calculated from Kato 1981: 224 (Table 2); Nachod 1897: CCVIII (Table E.
Silber-Ausfuhr).
90) The value of total cargo, including bullion, sent in 1626 to Gujarat and Iran was
fl. 177, 347. In 1627, the value was fl. 930, 115. Dagh Register 1624-29: 276, 326.
91) Generale Missiven: H, 707; III, 39, 173; IV, 548; English Factories 1655-60: 56. In
1674, for instance,the Dutch at Suratsold spices and othercommoditiesfor more than 9
lakhs of rupees. Generale Missiven: IV, 15.
92) Generale Missiven: III, 744, 764, 775; IV, 75-6, 593, 739. In 1666, the Dutch carried
Surat rupees to the value of ?60,000 to Ceylon. Historical Manuscripts 1913: 306-7.
322 NAJAF
HAIDER
Conclusion
After having surveyed,admittedlywith discontinuousdata, one and half cen-
turies of bullion exports to the Mughal empire,we can now bring all our esti-
mates togetherto suggest a range of figures for the total supplies at intervals
for which we are better served by information:1588-1602, 1630-45 and 1679-
85. During the first interval,the export of bullion from Hurmuzwas 41.7 met-
ric tons, and if we assume that two thirdsof this amountwas broughtto the
Mughalempire (not an implausibleassumptionin view of the enormousimpor-
tance of Gujaratand Sind in this network),we get a figure of 27.8 metric tons
of silver. To this can be added a figure of 10 metric tons of silver annually
exportedfrom Iran by the land route at the turn of the century.93) For the Red
Sea, we have accepted a figure of 75 metric tons of silver based on a down-
ward revision of Pearson'sestimates of its total value of tradewith Gujaratin
the second half of the sixteenthcentury.The average amountof bullion annu-
ally exported by the Portugueseto the Mughal empire from 1586 to 1590 is
estimated at 11.2 metric tons. Together, these estimates yield a cumulative
figure of 124 metric tons of silver annuallyexportedto the Mughalempiredur-
ing the last quarterof the sixteenthcentury.
For the second interval,we have the figuresof 40 and 30 metrictons of sil-
ver importedrespectivelyby the Red Sea and from Iran (land and sea route).94)
The annualaverageof the English and Dutch exportsin this periodwas 5.2 and
6.6 metric tons respectively. The Portuguese trade with Gujarat, and with
Bengal, till the destructionof their factory at Hugli in 1632,95)was still opera-
tive and though it is not possible to quantifyit for the entire phase we are dis-
cussing, from the last two figures in Table 4 we can put their bullion supply at
around3 metrictons of silver per year. The total supplyof bullionin this period
would thus be around84.8 tons of silver per annum.
The choice of the last intervalfor our calculationsis dictatedby the figures
availablefor the Red Sea. The figurefor both 1679 and 1685, being 56 metrictons
of silver, lower than the last quarterof the sixteenth century,was still higher
than the first half of the seventeenthcentury.This, as we saw, was primarily
93) This is derived by reducing the value of land trade to Iran (16 to 20 metric tons of
silver) estimated for the years when it registered a four-fold increase following a decline in
the sea trade. The volume of this trade seems to have been naturally affected by the renewal
of the Hurmuz trade judging from the figures we have for c. 1634 (11.6 metric tons of sil-
ver). The latter figure has been rounded off to 10 metric tons.
94) There is abundant evidence that trade on the land route had declined due to the
Mughal-Safavid conflicts over Qandhar.See Moosvi 1987: 66.
95) Lahori 1867-8: I, 433-9 has a detailed description of the Mughal expedition against
the Portuguese.
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 323
due to an increase in the Indian Ocean trade of the Mughal empire. No figures
are available for Iran and we have to adopt the earlier estimates with an upward
revision (to take into account the rise) to 40 metric tons. For the same period,
the calculated annual average of English and Dutch exports to the Mughal
empire is 25.1 and 9.7 metric tons of silver respectively. The cumulative esti-
mate for this phase can be set at 130.8 metric tons of silver.
Table 9. Bullion Imports of the Mughal Empire

Source 1588-1602 % of the 1630-45 % of the 1679-85 % of the

total total total
Persian Gulf 27.8 22.4 25.0 29.5 30.0 22.9
Isfahan-Agra 10.0 8.1 5.0 5.9 10.0 7.6
Red Sea 75.0 60.5 40.0 47.2 56.0 42.8
Portuguese 11.2 9.0 3.0 3.5 - -
English - - 5.2 6.1 25.1 19.2
Dutch - - 6.6 7.8 9.7 7.4
Total 124.0 100.0 84.8 100.0 130.8 100.0
The Gold Imports

Our evidence for gold imports is too scanty to offer even the type of quan-
titative estimates we have been able to make for silver, and there can only be
a general idea regarding the periods in which these imports were more signifi-
cant. The first half of the sixteenth century was a period of the dominance of
gold in the Indian Ocean trade, and the "river of gold" which flowed through
the Red Sea brought to the Indian Ocean markets a multitude of gold coins
(Egyptian ashrafi, Ottoman sultani and Yemeni dinar), all modelled originally
on the Venetian zechhino (sequin; ducat) which itself came in large quanti-
ties.96) Unlike the inland regions of northern India, foreign gold coins circulated
with greater freedom on the coasts of the western Deccan and Malabar, made
possible by the organisation of the regional currency systems in order to accom-
modate not only imported gold coins but also to facilitate trade and exchange
within the region.") The gold of Africa was exported to Gujarat either from
96) Barbosa 1989: I, 100-1; Pires 1967: I, 13, 17, 21, 43-4; Bacharach 1973: 77-96; 1987:
171; Pamuk 1994: 954. For the Red Sea gold plundered by the Portuguese on its way to
India,see Magalhaes-Godinho 1969:293-4.
97) BothContiandDe Gamafoundin the fifteenthcenturyVenetiansequinsandgold ash-
rafis amongthe coins circulatingin Malabar.Conti 1857:30; Cabral1938: 194; Magalhaes-
Godinho1969:294.
324 NAJAFHAIDER
Cairo or the Indian Ocean ports of Malindi and Sofala.98)It was out of this
gold, acquiredfrom both trade and tributefrom the Deccan, that Sultan Mu-
zaffarShah of Gujaratand his successorswere able to strike the muzaffarshahi
(185 grains),which was the heaviest gold coin ever issued by a medievalIndian
rulerwith the sole exception of Jahangir.99)
In contrast,as we saw, the importsin the second half of the sixteenthcen-
tury were dominatedby silver, and gold seems to have been brought,at least
in the Mughal empire, in very small quantities.Abul Fazl's descriptionof the
foreign coins deliveredto the Mughalmints does not list any gold coins, while
his account of gold minting gives an impressionthat gold had to be drawnby
the sarrafs from privatehoards.'")
In the seventeenthcentury,gold was broughtboth by the Europeansand the
Asian merchants.The exports from Iran until 1660 were mainly in silver, but
after 1666 gold began to replace silver in greaterquantities.'01) However,from
1684 onwards,silver exportsto the Mughalempirewere revived once again.102)
As for the Red Sea shipmentsof gold, evidence for this is desultory.From our
discussion of this trade, it can be seen that in the first half of the seventeenth
century, gold ducats were carriedon the ships and by the merchantcaravans
between the Levant and Gujaratin varying proportions(4 to 27 percent).For
the second half, the evidence suggests that gold came to Gujaratin increasing
quantitiesfrom this region between 1665 and 1682.103)
Silver was the principalitem in the shipmentsof the English Company to
Gujaratand Bengal and gold made its appearancefor two short durations.In
the first phase (1627-1637), the shareof gold was around50 percentof the total
value of bullion, while in the second (1674-85) it was about 20 percent.Inci-
dentally, both these phases coincided with a fall in the silver price of gold in
the Mughalempire,and the losses sufferedby the Companyin exchanginggold
for rupees forced it to returnto silver on both occasions.4")
Dutch exportsof gold to Gujaratdependedvery largely on the availabilityof
Chinesegold as well as suppliesfrom the Netherlands,a majorportionof which
98) Ethiopian Itineraries 1958: 173; Cabral 1938: 65.

99) For tribute from the Deccan in a gold coin called "Ibrahimidu baiti" (do buti!) see
Khan 1927: I, 24, 76.
100) Abul Fazl 1872: I, 31-2. In 1604, Europeanexports to the Levant were mainly in sil-
ver (Texeira 1902: 120), and in the Venetian exports for 1610-14, gold was only 0.29 per-
cent of the total bullion (Spooner 1962: 645-55).
101) Du Mans 1890: 192; Tavernier 1679: I, 418; English Factories 1665-67: 95.
102) Sanson 1695: 12-4, 159-61.
103) English Factories 1665-67: 95; Factory Records, Surat: vol. 3, 83-4; vol. 90, 93b-94a.
104) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 4, 116a; vol. 102, 525; English Factories, 1624-29: 221,
230, 235, 270, 295; 1630-33: 262-3; English Factories (NS), 1678-84: III, 240, 270;
Lawrence 1677-9: 54a, 63b; Generale Missiven: IV, 8.
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 325
was howevermeantto be exportednot to Suratbut to the regions,such as

Theperiodsof highpricesof gold
wheregoldwas in currency.105)
Coromandel,
in the Mughalempiremight have providedan inducementto increasethe share
of gold exportedthere but its availabilityat the point of shipmentwas still the
all important of the bullionconsignments.'
factorin deciding.the composition 6)
Until 1668,the VOCexportsof bullionto Bengalmainlyconsistedof silver.107)
Followinga banon the exportof Japanesesilverin thatyear,gold,in the form
of Japanesekobans,was substituted.108)Between1670 and 1673, the VOC's
average annualexport of kobans from Japanwas 948 kgs of fine gold,'") and
it was in these years that the share of gold in the exports to Bengal reached
very high proportions(75 to 80 percent).10)However,the decision taken by the
Japanese authoritiesto contain the outflow of koban by overvaluingit by 21
percent in 1670-721") soon resultedin a decline in its export to an average of
353 kgs of gold per annumbetween 1675 and 1679.112)
It seemsthat,whileon an averagegoldimportsmayhavefluctuated between
15
an estimated10 to percenteveryyear, therearetwo phaseswhich standout
as yearsof highimports:1627-37and 1670-82.Recently,Spanishrecordshave
revealed that there was indeed a drop in the Americansilver arrivingin Spain
in the 1670s, and that the "annualplata fleet was importinggold in surprisingly
large scale...""13)
105) Generale Missiven: I, 709; II, 323, 394; III, 30.

106) In 1625, when gold appreciated greatly in Gujarat and North India, Dutch exports
consisted exclusively of gold ducats. Broecke 1963: II, 312-3. In 1638, when gold price was
low, the Dutch exported 300,000 fl. worth of Chinese gold which was an impressive figure
by their standard.Generale Missiven: I, 709; SupplementaryCalendar: 139. Gold began to
rise again in value after 1640, having fallen in the intervening period. Habib 1987: 148,
(Table 3). Between 1641 and 1647, Dutch exports from Batavia and Japan were entirely in
silver. The reference to gold in Generale Missiven: II, 202 is clearly a mistake as other
sources only mention silver in the cargo of the ship Pauw. See the sources cited for
Table 7. Also see English Factories 1642-45: 100, 145.
107) Generale Missiven: II, 394, 707; III, 1, 30, 61, 101; Prakash 1988: 65, 67 and n.
108) Glamann 1981: 58, 63; Gaastra 1986: 103. For the exports of koban to Bengal see
Generale Missiven: III, 714; IV, 91, 144, 197.
109) Nachod1897:CCVII(TableD). The originalfiguresaregiven in numberof kobans,
each of which contained 15.64 grams of pure gold. Van Dam 1929: I, ii, 92.
110) Prakash 1988: 67n.
111) Glamann 1981: 63.
112) Nachod 1897: CCVII (Table D).
113) Chaudhuri1986: 70-1.
326 NAJAFHAIDER
II
Bullion Marketand Mint Production

There is enough contemporaryevidence to suggest that much of the bullion
and foreign specie obtained through trade was brought to the mints of the
empire to be struckinto rupees (Mughal silver coins of 179 grains) and muhrs
(gold coins of 169 grains).114)Cognisantof the growing importanceof precious
metals for sustaining currencycirculation,commodity trade and taxation, the
Mughal state policy towardsbullion importsand minting was shaped by both
fiscal and mercantileconsiderations."'5)The customs duties on silver and gold
(1 to 2.5 percent) were always kept lower than those on merchandise(2 to 5
percent)and were increasedto 3.5 percent,probablyunderfiscal pressure,only
towards the end of the seventeenthcentury."6)The mints had an open coinage
system in which freedom to obtain Mughal coins was grantedto bullion sup-
pliers on paymentof mintingcost (brassage)and seigniorage.The Mughalcur-
rency itself was usually of a very high degree of fineness and was acceptedat
a premiumover and above its weight in fine metal. The thrustof the policy was
thus to allow the merchantsaccess to a marketfree from currencymanipula-
tions and administrativeinterventions.
In actual practice,however, merchantshad to face one importantproblem.
The coining in the mint was done by officials assigning fixed days to the mer-
chant suppliers,which often clashed with the timetable set by them to make
investmentsin the hinterlandmarketsand to keep commoditiesready for ship-
ment in the right seasons."'17)While some merchantsworking with adequate
capital could organise the supply of commodities through their factors and
correspondentswell in time, and a privilegedfew would be grantedaccess to
the mint out of their turnas a favour,"8)the majoritywould have to cope with
114) Terry 1921: 302; Bernier 1989: 202-3; Ovington 1929: 132; Khan 1928: I, 304, 408;
Tavernier 1925: I, 8-9; Van Twist 1937: 72-3; Thevenot 1949: 25-6; Roques 1678: 246.
There were however, certain notable exceptions to the rule. In Gujarat, foreign bullion was
also coined into mahmudis, a regional coin, which circulatedin certain parts of the province.
In the north western part of the empire, a part of the bullion coming from Iran and Central
Asia was minted into khanis of Balkh and Badakhshan.Lahori 1867-8: II, 562-3. In addi-
tion, foreign coins did circulate quietly in the coastal areas to settle immediate transactions.
Careri 1949: 253; Ovington 1929: 132.
115) Abul Fazl 1872: I, 12-3; Khan 1928: I, 340.
116) Finch 1921: 134; Oxenden Papers 40702: 22b; English Factories 1655-60: 243-5;
Tavernier 1925: I, 7; II, 21; Ovington 1929: 132; Factory Records, Surat, vol. 96: 20b; Letter
Book, vol. 8: 24b. Comparethis with the levy of 5 percent on importedsilver in Safavid Iran.
Chardin 1811: V, 356.
117) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 4, 101b-102a; vol. 5, 145a; ibid., Miscellaneous: vol.
24: 22, 24, 31; Bodleian Rawlinson MS. A 302: 250b-251a; English Factories (NS): II, 390.
118) Letters Received: V, 86-7. See Surat Documents: 3 and 4 for permission granted to
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 327
delays in the availabilityof cash to serve their investmentplans.19) It was this

particularproblemwhich made the presenceof the money-changers(sarrafs) in
the bullion marketextremely importantas buyers of importedbullion. In their
capacityas bullion buyers they were in a uniquepositionto assay preciousmet-
als and coins (hence the name sarraf from Arabic sayrafi, money-testing)as
well to fix their value in the market.'20)
The sarrafs' professionbroughtthem close not only to the merchantsbut also
to the mint. They were often appointedin the latter as assayers,121)and as a
professionalgroup outside the mint helped the administrationin recoinage.'22)
All this grantedthem ready access to the mint, and several sarrafs had their
places reserved for them in the mint from where they supervised their busi-
ness. 23) Apart from dealing in currency,the sarrafs also organisedcommercial
credit,and theirposition as deposit bankersand discountersof bills of exchange
(hundi) enabled them not only to supply the bullion seller with the cash he
immediatelyrequiredbut also to providethe facility to transferfunds from one
place to another.124)It thus became quite naturalfor a merchantwho had just
cleared his bullion out of the custom house to look for a sarraf who could be
approachedeither directly or througha broker.The sarrafs made their profits
out of the wholesale buying of all kinds of bullion, foreign and regional coins
which they took to the mint as and when they found it suitable.Their ability to
strike a good bargaindependedon the timings at which the sale of the bullion
took place as well as the competitiveprice they offeredto the sellers.'25)
two reputable merchants (umdat ut tujjar) of Surat to coin money. The English too were
exempted from taking turns in the mint towards the end of the seventeenth century. Factory
Records, Surat: vol. 5, 188a-b.
119) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 4, 102a; Letter Book: vol. 8, 24b; English Factories,
1661-64: 22; Das Gupta 1979: 46.
120) Van Twist 1931: 73; Roques 1678: 245, 248.
121) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 5, 179a.
122) Abul Fazl, Akbarnama,OIOC MS. Add. 27247: 332b. In the reign of Aurangzeb, the
sarrafs of Ahmadabadwere ordered to bring to the mint all the silver coins which had lost
in weight up to 3 surkha (a little over 3 percent) for reminting. Khan 1928: I, 327-8.
123) This was a privilege rarely extended to the merchants,and the success of the English
in securing one such place for themselves in 1694, amidst strong opposition from the sar-
rafs, was worth all the efforts they had put up working for it in previous decades. For the
Surat mint see Factory Records, Surat: vol. 94, 50a, 52b, 68b, 71a. For Rajmahal see ibid.,
Hugli: vol. 10, 185. The factor appointed here to look after the Company's bullion however
pleaded to be transferredaway from "the unwholesome fumes & the unreasonableheat."
124) "The merchantsthat buy gold and plate [silver] pay allwayes ready mony when it is
weighed to them, then they presently sent it up to Rajmaul (where the mint is) to be coined".
B. L. Add. MS. 34123: 42a-b. Also see Factory Records, Surat: vol. 6, 112-3. For the use
of bills of exchange in bullion transactions see SupplementaryCalendar: 89; English Fac-
tories, 1655-60: 120. For an appreciationof the various branches of the sarrafs' business see
Habib 1990: 391-6.
125) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 3, 108; Tavernier 1925: I, 12-3. Occasionally big mer-
328 NAJAFHAIDER
Bullion sales usually took place when the returningfleet of Indian ships
broughthuge quantitiesof silver and gold from the Red Sea and the Persian
Gulf. The abundanceof preciousmetals lowered the price of bullion relative to
specie as a result of the demandfor Mughal coins for up-countryinvestments
or the settlementof debts.126)The sarrafs fixed the bullion price and exchange
rates of the foreign coins by skilfully evaluatingthe extent of precious metal
content and adding the cost of mintingand seigniorage.127) They chargedinter-
est on all cash paymentsmade to the bullion sellers, the durationof which was
determinedby an assessmentof the time taken by the mint to coin a particular
consignment.'28) The deals were never concludedwithouttough bargaining,and
the major points of contentionwere the marketprice of bullion and the dura-
tion of payment.129) The latter, agreed upon after careful calculations, was
indeed central to notions of the liquidity of capital among mercantilegroups.
For the sarrafs, an early payment made to the bullion seller meant a loss of
intereston the capital locked up in the mint. The merchanton his part counted
the extra days for which interestwould be due to the sarrafs, in case the mint-
ing time exceeded his own calculations.'30)Sales synchronisingwith the sea-
sonal flow of bullion from the Red Sea and the PersianGulf normallyneeded
a longer durationof paymentfor the reason that the pressureon the mint dur-
ing this time was greater and the output slower for each individual money
changeror merchant."')Referringto the sale of silver dollarsto the sarrafs, the
English once observed:
chants, like Virji Vora, driven apparentlyby the need to invest surplus cash, would compete
with the sarrafs by offering a higher price for the bullion. English Factories, 1630-33: 262-3;
1646-50: 281.
126) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 4, 180b-181a; vol. 90, 93b-94a; Terpstra 1918: 210;
Van Twist 1931: 73; SupplementaryCalendar: 88-9; English Factories, 1618-21: 7-8; 1646-
50: 240; 1655-60: 211n.; Tavernier 1925: I, 21-2; Roques 1678: 246.
127) English Factories, 1646-50: 185, 316; Factory Records, Surat: vol. 5, 157a; Master
1911: II, 303-5. A qualitative method of assaying by touch-needles was used for silver and
gold in the mint and the bullion market. Quantitativetesting was done mainly for uncoined
bullion by melting and refining it to the standard of the Mughal coins. Abul Fazl 1872: I,
14-5, 16-9; Roques 1678: 247; Tavernier 1925: I, 28-9; Factory Records, Dacca: vol. 1, 80b;
ibid., Surat: vol. 5, 170a-b.
128) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 105, 133a. "They [the sarrafs] take 15 to 20 days to
pay you in rupees and discount on the same day in order to make good the interest at 3/4
and 1/2 percent. It is a custom that one can not shake them from... I have seen up to 90
days of term when the mint is well supplied and the less it works the more shorterthe dura-
tion of payment."Roques 1678: 246-7.
129) Original Correspondence2062: 190a; 2216: 1-2; Factory Records, Surat: vol. 4, 51a;
English Factories, 1678-84 (NS): III, 270.
130) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 3, 108; vol. 4, 51a; vol. 5, 129b-130a, 196a-b; vol. 84,
pt. II, 153.
131) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 4, 180b-181a; vol. 90, 183a.
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 329
sheroffes here are certainly the greatest masters of their art, of any people in these parts
of the world..., where dollers are sold according to their kinds. The only trouble and
difficulty in their disposing is in agreeing for the time; and in weighing and looking
ones; which they doe with great exactness and deliberation, the better to discover what
is false and counterfeit...132)
The Mughal mint was an integral part of the bullion marketand merchant
supplierswere drawn to it for comparableadvantages.The mint price of bul-
lion was higherthan the marketprice, and for this reason alone it receivedhuge
quantitiesof bullion directlybroughtby the merchants.133)Though it functioned
essentially as a craft centre, where labourersand skilled artisanswere engaged
in mass productionunder the close supervisionof a set of officials, the eco-
nomic significance of the mint was undeniably greater than the rest of the
Mughal artisanalworkshopswhich producedmainly for imperialand elite con-
sumption.'34)The techniquesemployed for making coins were simple and per-
formed by manuallabour,as was the case in contemporaryIranand Turkey.35)
Tavernier,the peripateticFrenchjeweller, testified to the fact that all gold and
silver broughtto the Mughal Empirewas refinedto the highest standardbefore
it was coined into money.136) This was a common belief of almost all the
132) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 90, 93b-94a. The English usually sold their bullion to
the sarrafs for the reason, among others stated above, that the entire transactionwas done at
their factories where the buyers were called in to assess the bullion and make payments either
in cash or bills of exchange. They also exercised their option, though not so frequently, to
use the services of the mint. English Factories, 1634-36: 55, 68-9, 225-6; 1642-45: 91;
Original Correspondence 5461: 12; Factory Records, Surat: vol. 3, 38; vol. 4, 115b; vol. 5,
63b, 70a; ibid., Dacca: vol. 1, 68b, 80b-81a; ibid., Qasimbazar: vol. 1, 4; ibid., Balasore:
vol. 134a; Master 1911: I, 382; II, 303-4. The Dutch merchants too alternatedbetween the
mint and the bullion market, but it seems that in Bengal, where they brought considerable
amounts of treasure, the preference for using the mint directly was based on the detailed
calculations they made about the cost effectiveness of the two methods. For their annual
accounts of the Rajmahal mint see Van Dam 1929: I, ii, 79-86 (1687), and Appendix VI
(1689-90) for a comparative assessment. For the bullion sold to Qasimbazarsarrafs see ibid.:
69, and Dagh-Register, 1637: 264-5 for Surat. For the Dutch coining their bullion at the Surat
mint see English Factories, 1634-36: 68-9; Perlin 1987: 351 (Table 4.1.1). Also see Prakash
1987: 173-4, 189 for a discussion of the Dutch policy towards the disposal of their bullion
in Bengal.
133) Van Dam 1929: I, ii, Appendix VI (1689-90). Also see English Factories, 1646-50:
185; Factory Records, Dacca: vol. 1, 23a-b, 39b; Khan 1928: I, 408.
134) The mint was frequently recorded as a manufactory (karkhana) in Mughal docu-
ments. Kaghzat i Mutafarriqa: 57a-58b. For a recent treatment of the mint as a medieval
workshop see Perlin 1993: 91-130.
135) For Safavid Iran see Samia 1943: 36a-39b. A mechanical process of productionwas
introduced in the Ottoman Empire towards the end of the seventeenth century as a result of
which the daily production of copper coins in the Istanbul mint rose to 600,000. By 1695,
the mints of Edirne and Izmir too had begun production with the help of new machinery.
Sahillioglu 1992: 262-6.
136) Tavernier 1925: I, 8-9.
330 NAJAFHAIDER
commentatorson Mughal coinage in the seventeenthcentury,borne out by the

high fineness of the coins themselves (98 percent and above according to a
recent test going to be published soon), and we get detailed informationin
recordsrelating to coin productionon the methodsof refininggold and silver.
A properorganisationof the mints was viewed by the state as a matterof
bothcommercialandfiscalimportance.'37) ForAbulFazl,a thoughtfulcommentator
on Akbar's administrativemeasures, the successful working of the mint was
linked to the prosperityof the empire.He thus devoted a detailedsection of his
work to the organisationof the mint, precededby a prologueon the significance
of money as a means of exchange,and the propertiesof preciousmetalswhich
could be bettertested and analysedin the mints of the empire.'38)In a separate
section entitled"the profitof bullion merchants"he offereda statisticalaccount
of the costs of manufacturingdifferentcoins with a completebreakdownof the
costs of labourand raw materials,seigniorageand the profitof the bullion mer-
chants.'39)
From Abul Fazl and later sourceswe get the impressionthat the mint was a
fairly centralisedinstitution,which was run in accordancewith the imperialreg-
ulations communicatedto the officials either directly or throughthe provincial
administration.140)The latterheld an indirectcontrol over the mint for its rev-
enue and for the policies relating to the supply of money in the province.'41)
The higherbureaucracyof the mint was a mere extensionof the generaladmin-
istrativestructureof the Mughalempire in which the superintendent(darogha)
and an imperial official of the same rank (amin) implemented the imperial
137) Mint organisation figured prominently in the administrative and financial literature
of the medieval Indo-Islamic world, and the attention of rulers and administratorswas drawn
to achieving the good-will of the people through a better organised currency system. Ibn
Khaldun 1958: II, 3, 7, 54-60; Owen 1955: 75-76; Samia 1943: text 34a-40b.
138) Abul Fazl 1872: I, 12-23. The section dealing with the mint is contained in the Ain
i Daruzzarb. The Mughal chancery used the term dar uz zarb for the mint while it was com-
monly called taksal in the Indian languages. Abul Fazl sometimes calls the mint a sik-
kakhana, probably to avoid using Arabic terms. Ibid. 12.
139) Ibid. 31-3 (Ain i sud i bazargan i tala wa nuqra). In what is perhaps the only sur-
viving mint record of the Mughal empire, preserved in an administrative manual, we get
another statistical account of an eastern mint towards the end of Shahajahan'sreign (1657).
Dastur ul Amal i Alamgiri: 53b-58a. The manual itself was written in 1659, but the record
belongs to the year 1657.
140) Document Forms: 223a-b; Bihari 1714: 37a-39a. For instructions which the mint
officials received from the emperor see Factory Records, Surat: vol. 5, 151a-b; ibid., vol. 1,
182-3; Lawrence 1677-9: 556.
141) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 5, 145a, 151b, 173a-b, 185a. A report sent to the
emperor Aurangzeb from Ahmadabadoffers an insight into the working of these officials in
matters relating to the mint. Khan 1928: I, 265. It shows that lines were firmly drawn
between local autonomy and central control in fixing or relaxing rules for the administration
of the mint.
THEMUGHAL
EMPIRE 331
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instructionsrelating to the shape, weight and fineness of coins, and the mint
revenue.142) Supervision was immediately followed by accounting where the
professionalaccountantof the mint (mushrif)maintaineda systematicdaybook
(roznamcha)of its income and expenditure.'43) The records of the Patna mint,
which have survivedonly in fragments(see p. 34a for a reproduction),bear elo-
quent testimonyto the highly organisedand detailedmethod of accountingob-
served by the mint officials.44)
At the mint, the value of the incoming bullion was calculated from its
weight and fineness.'45)An estimate of its value determinedthe mint charges
and the amountdeliveredto the suppliersand also helped the mint officials to
maintain uniformityin weight and fineness while striking a fixed numberof
coins from a given weight of fine metal. In the case of silver, the mint evalua-
tion firstrequireda specimento be cut from the bullion and refinedto the stan-
dard of the rupee. The net weight of the refined silver (chandi) decided the
proportionof standardsilver in the consignmentand, accountingfor the irre-
trievableloss in casting (haq un nar; lit. fire's share),the total numberof rupees
to be struckout of the gross weight. Mintingcharges and seigniorage(wajib i
sarkar) were then deducted and the supplierwas handed over a schedule of
paymentreckonedin a unit called mal, each representing1000 rupees.'46)
The mint charges and seignioragedeterminedthe mint price of fine bullion
in terms of specie in the open coinage system. The state was capable of regu-
lating the level and compositionof money supply by modifying the mint price
142) Abul Fazl 1872: I, 15. The dyarchical office of the amin was instituted to strike a
balance between local and imperial interests. He also assisted the darogha and other officials
of the mint in exigent matters. Abul Fazl describes him literally when he says that he was
expected to be impartial. The English describe him as "the Chief officer in the mint on the
Emperor's behalf." Factory Records, Surat: vol. 5, 180a. Also Original Correspondence
6436: 135b, where the amin is described as the "chiefe of the Tanksal."
143) Abul Fazl 1872: I, 15; Khan, Supplement:183.
144) Dastur ul Amal i Alamgiri: 53b-56a.
145) For coins of known metallic composition no quantitative assaying was needed, and
these were taken simply by weight in the mint as well as in the bullion market. Tavernier
1925: I, 12-3. At Ahmadabad, Spanish reales were exchanged for mahmudis by weight: "the
want of weight being always to be made good". Factory Records, Miscellaneous: vol. 25, 97.
In 1621, the English were supplying old and new reales at pre-fixed prices offered by the
mint. English Factories 1618-21: 314.
146) The description is based on the information contained in Abul Fazl 1872: I, 31-2;
Dastur ul Amal i Alamgiri: 54a-57b; "Mukhlis":173a; Surat Documents: nos. 3 and 4; Van
Dam 1929: I, ii, 80; 0. C. 6436:, 135a-b; 6490, vol. 53, 295b-296a; Factory Records, Surat:
vol. 5, 170a-b. The mint employed a set of weighers (wazn-kash) and assayers (Pers. muiy-
yar; Hindi chauksi). The weigher was responsible for taking the gross weight of the coins
and bullion, which served as a reference point to verify subsequent calculations when an
assessment of the fine metal was made. Bihari 1714: 37b; Kaghzat i Mutafarriqa: 57a-b,
58a-b; Document Forms: 234a; Master 1911: I, 403.
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 333
of each metal. Besides, the tax levied by the state on minting (seiniorage) was
not only a source of revenue but also contributed towards the premium enjoyed
by the specie over its bullion content necessary to safeguard its monetary usage.
It is possible to calculate the brassage (cost of raw materials and wages of the
workmen) and the rate of seigniorage under the Mughals as the state did not
realise profit from the mint by adding alloy to the coins, apart from what was
needed for metallurgical reasons, but rather by levying a separate charge. The
figures available for the late sixteenth century are presented separately in Table
10 and expressed in money as well as percentage of the net output (sarraf's net
capital).
Table 10. The Costs of Coining Silver: c. 1595
Rupees Percentageof Rupees Percentageof

(bullion silver) Net Output (coined silver) Net Output
Total Output 1006.67 - 1015.50
Net Output 950.00 100.00 950.00 100.00
Wages 2.56 0.27 4.69 0.49
Raw Material 0.26 0.02 5.61 0.59
Seigniorage 50.32 5.29 50.60 5.32
Total Mint Charges 53.14 5.58 60.90 6.41
Loss in Casting 5.26 0.55 5.15 0.54
Sarraf's Profit 3.53 0.37 4.72 0.49
Total Costs 61.93 6.51 70.77 7.44
Source: Abul Fazl 1872: I, 32-3.
The value of the silver rupee was determined by the costs of minting and
thus corresponded to the premium at which it circulated in the market over and
above its weight in bullion. The above figures suggest that the market costs of
coining silver from two different sources were 6.5 percent and 7.4 percent
respectively of the sarraf's capital, the latter being higher because of the addi-
tional cost of refining the alloyed silver and the higher gross profit realised by
the sarraf on account of the elaborate assaying of the various types of coins.147)
From the Ain i Akbari we learn that each silver coin of 11.5 masha weight pur-
chased 12.25 masha of fine silver in bullion, and 12.35 masha of fine silver in
coined form.148) The premium in both the cases coincide with the value added
to the rupee arrived at in Table 10.
147) The profit of the supplier for converting the bullion into specie was a factor recog-
nised by the mint and entered into its schedule of payment as such.
148) Abul Fazl 1872: I, 32.
334 HAIDER
NAJAF
It is importantto rememberthat all the factors which determinedthe market

value of the coins were subjectto change.A shorttermchange was effectedby
a sudden rise or fall in the volume of bullion supply as well as the supply of
currencyin the market.A bullion merchantwas, for instance,able to obtain sil-
ver cheaperwhen therewas a glut in the marketor if the demandfor the cur-
rency rose without a correspondingchange in the mint outputresultingin a rise
in the marketvalue of rupeerelative to silver.'49)The inter-regionalvariationin
the marketprice of specie similarlydependedon the mint price and the sarrafs'
profit on the one hand and the demandfor that specie on the other.The rupee
carrieda higher premiumin the marketswhich were placed at a distancefrom
the mint, and a lower value in the regions, such as the Deccan, which were pri-
marily gold based.150)
The long termchange in the value of specie relativeto bullion (with its boni-
tas intrinsecaremainingconstant)came aboutas a resultof a change in the mint
price. From the comparisonof two sets of wages paid to workmen,it appears
that the operatingcosts were higher for coining silver in the seventeenthcen-
tury. The wages of the mint workmenwere usually stated in proportionto the
amount minted since they were not employed roundthe year and were called
upon to work only when the mint functionedregularly.While at work, it was
customaryfor them to receive a monthlysalaryand a subsistenceallowance.'5t)
The wages of the zarrab(blankcutter)availableto us for the late sixteenthcen-
tury seem to have been paid for the periodwhen they were at work. These were
given as 1.325 rupees (53 dams 8.75 jitals) per thousandand 2.025 rupees (81
dams) for minting a little over a thousandsilver coins.152) In 1694, the English
needed workmen for the Bombay mint who could, only be recruited from
Gujarat.The zarrab at Cambay demandedfrom them 6 rupees per month as
"diet"money duringthe entire period of employmentand 4.5 rupees per thou-
sand on the total silver coins they crafted.153)The zarrab at Suratdemandeda
149) For the evidence of such a rise occurring at Balasore in 1675 see English Factories
(NS): II, 391. Also see Factory Records, Dacca: vol. 1, 16b, for a fall in the exchange rates
of the new rupee because of an extraordinaryrise in the mint output. The sarrafs of Hugli
once attemptedto delay deliveries of newly minted coins to the Dutch merchantsin an expec-
tation to raise the value of rupees they were themselves holding. Prakash 1987: 174.
150) Abul Fazl alludes to the fact that the merchants' profit from coining would increase
(farawan sud) if he obtained the silver cheaper (arzan) in the market. Abul Fazl 1872: I, 33.
151) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 94, 39a, 58a.
152) Abul Fazl 1872: I, 17.
153) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 94, 58a. In an inventory of the costs incurred by the
Dutch merchantson coining silver probably at Surat (c. 1676), the wages paid to the zarrab
("seraeb, die de ropyen haar teecken en ronte geeft") were listed as 4 rupees per thousand
coins. Van Dam: III, ii, 109 (Appendix VIIIc). The date is inferred from the absence of
seigniorage, abolished in 1676, from the total costs.
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 335
higher rate of 8 rupees for subsistenceand 6 rupees per thousandfor coining

thoughthey were reportedto have been paid 5 rupees for the latterat the Surat
mint.154) These figures suggest that even if we accept the higher figure for the
late sixteenthcentury,the wages seem to have more than doubledin the inter-
vening century. Similarly, the wages of the weigher had gone up from 0.169
rupees per thousandin the late sixteenthcenturyto 0.25 rupeesper thousandat
the turn of the eighteenthcentury.'"')Therehad been a simultaneousrise in the
price of the raw materialsas well. Here we have at least one set of figures to
compare.In the late sixteenthcentury,the charcoal(ingisht)needed for refining
and casting silver for 1000 coins cost 0.25 rupees,156)while the cost of charcoal
needed for the same numberof coins in a mint of Orissain the early eighteenth
centurywas 0.5 rupees (eight ana).157)
For the bullion merchant,an increase in the cost of mintingwas more than
offset by a significantreductionin the seigniorage.The seignioragechargedby
Akbar's administrationwas 5 percenton total silver output.It was recorded2.5
percent (1 percentin the case of recoinage)for the Patna mint in 1657 and 2
percentfor Suratbefore it was abolishedin 1676.s58)The abolitionremainedin
force for only five years and the tax was reintroducedthroughoutthe empirein
1681, now set at three differentrates viz. 5 percent chargedfrom Hindu mer-
chants, 3.5 from Europeans and 2.5 percent from Muslims.'59)Reductions in
seigniorage inevitably caused a fall in the mint price of silver throughoutthe
empire and boosted the mint output.160)
154) "The jurobs demands 8 Rs. each the moneth when there is no business and 6 p. mille
on al they coin: in the tanksal they have 5 p. mille." Factory Records, Surat: vol. 94, 39a.
155) The weigher received 6 dams and 19 jitals (0.169 rupees) for 1000 rupees in c. 1595.
Abul Fazl 1872: I, 16. At another place (I, 32-3), Abul Fazl gives his wage as 5 dams and
7.75 jitals (0.133 rupees) for coining a little over 1000 coins. In c. 1702, eight ana per thou-
sand rupees were fixed for the wages of the weigher and the assayer. Document Forms: 234a.
In c. 1701, the weighers of the Rajmahal mint were paid 0.37 rupees per thousand rupees.
Prakash 1987: 177.
156)AbulFazl1872:I, 32-3.
157) Bihari 1714: 39a.
158) Dastur ul Amal i Alamgiri: 54a-b; Factory Records, Surat: vol. 4, 42b-43a, where
what is described as "duty on mintage" in 1677 was reported to have been abolished in the
"previous year." Also see English Factories (NS): I, 282-3.
159) For seigniorage (3.5 percent) charged from the Dutch merchants at the Rajmahal
mint in 1681 see Prakash 1987: 174. An order of the subadar of Gujarat,dated 1682, stated
that the tax realised on all the gold and silver bullion (hasil i tala wa nuqra ghair maskuk)
sold by the merchants to the mints of the province should be at the rate of "two [in] forty"
(chahal do) for the Hindus and "one [in] forty" (chahal yak) for the Muslims. Khan 1928:
I, 304. In the same year, the English were already expected to pay "wasby or mintage" on
their bullion delivered to the mint by the sarrafs. Factory Records, Surat: vol. 4, 181a-b.
160) This can be seen from a comparison of the mint price given in Dastur ul Amal i
Alamgiri: 54a-57a; B. L. MS. Add. 34123: 42a-b; Roques 1678: 247; Van Dam: I, ii, 79-86,
336 NAJAFHAIDER
The Silver Mint Output

To a very large extent, the changes in a monetaryeconomy are measuredby
the level of its money supply.Since there is no directmethodof evaluatingthe
volume of the circulatingmedium for medieval economies, estimates of mint
outputhave often served as the closest guide.'61)The absence of any statistical
series on the outputof the Mughalmints has made the use of numismaticevi-
dence necessary for evaluatingthe size of currencyoutput, and two attempts
have so far been made to estimatethe relative and absolute size of silver out-
put for NorthernIndia by serialisingthe rupee specimensheld in museumcol-
lections and hoardreports.'62)With a view to estimatingthe mint outputand the
absolute size of coined silver stock, ShireenMoosvi analysedthe reportsof the
coin hoards (treasure trove reports), containing silver coins of the Mughal
emperors,discovered in the region of erstwhile United Province (roughly the
modern state of Uttar Pradesh)between 1886 and 1979.163)Moosvi arrivedat
an absolute figure for the annual silver coin output of the Mughal empire by
suggesting a ratio between the rupee specimens of Surat in the U.P. treasure
troves and its daily output derived from documentaryevidence.64) The close
correspondencebetween the trendsdepicted by the two time series histograms
of museum and hoard specimens validated the internal consistency of the
museumholdings much against the argumentsof selectivity affectingthe qual-
ity of the evidence.'65)In the presentdiscussion,the methodadoptedto estimate
the silver mint output is essentially the same as that used by Moosvi, though
91; Factory Records, Surat: vol. 94, 3b, 8b. For the relationshipbetween mint price and out-
put see ibid., vol. 4, 43b.
161) In major works on the monetary systems of pre-modernEurope, mint output figures
have served to estimate the level of money supply with broad adjustmentsmade to account
for the use of commercial papers. The celebrated treatmentby Hamilton of the Spanish cur-
rency and price structurewas, however, based essentially on the level of bullion imports.
Hamilton 1934.
162) Hasan 1969: 85-93, esp. figure 1. Evaluating Hasan's numismatic evidence John
Deyell argued that museums have a tendency to dispense with duplicates and, for this rea-
son, only the variations in cointypes in museum holdings can dictate the movements of her
currency curve and not the actual output. Deyell 1976: 393-401. This apparent bias in
Hasan's methodology prompted a new attempt by Shireen Moosvi to examine another type
of numismatic evidence, the coin hoards, where the possibilities of conscious selection are
considered minimal.
163) Moosvi 1987: 47-81.
164) Ibid.: 56-7. The positive relationship between the hoard specimens and textual evi-
dence of mint output has been critically explored in Thordeman 1948: 188-204.
165) See Perlin 1987: 344-5. Perlin has consistently argued against the use of numismatic
methods to support inferences on monetary changes. Deyell reiterated his objections to the
use of museum collections (Deyell 1991: 3) though elsewhere he used them as source mate-
rial to study the trend in copper coinage.
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 337
certain modificationshave been made in the light of additionalevidence we

now have on the working of the mints as well as on the currencymeasures
taken by Akbar.
The workingof a mint was linked to a variety of factors, the principalbeing
the supply of bullion and the level of economic activity in the region. Factors
such as political uncertaintyand administrativeinterventionin the affairsof the
mint were in large measuresporadic,even though they were capable of affect-
ing the performanceof a mint for any shortduration.The geographicallocation
of the mint and the commercialstatus of its hinterlandwere majordeterminants
of its long term output. The mints situatedat the trade routes remainedmore
active than the rest because of the continuoussupply of precious metals they
received as well as the immediateneed which was felt for coined money to pur-
chase goods sold in these markets.The facilities available aroundthese entry
points to convertspecie into bill money also workedtowardseasing pressureon
the inland mints closer to the primarymarkets.Merchantsfree to carry their
bullion to the inland mints were likely to do so only after paying transportand
insurance charges. The supplies to the inland mints were linked in varying
degrees to revenue paymentand recoinage,on the one hand, and to the inland
commerce,on the other.
Within a year, the total mint productionwas not only limited by the tech-
nology employed in coining, but also by administrativeand culturalfactors.166)
A closer look at the Surat mint, the biggest recipientof importedbullion, sug-
gests that in the time of the year when merchantships returnedfrom the Red
Sea and the Persian Gulf, there was a tremendousrush to coin money which,
even at full employment,often outweighed the capacity and efficiency of the
mint.167)There were social factors as well which affected the working of the
mint. The workmen stopped work during the major festivals (Ekadashi and
Amavas were particularlycited as examples) and took leave to attend funeral
and other rites of the membersof their caste. It was estimatedin the late sev-
enteenth century, that the Surat mint worked an average of 20 days a month
due to the social customs and other pre-occupationsof the mint workers,and it
seems that this was the case with the other mints as well.168)The mint auto-
matically stopped functioningduringtimes of externaldanger as in the 1670s,
166) It was reported in 1647 that, even in the face of a standing demand, the Thatta mint
spent more time coining for the provincial officials than for the merchants.English Factories
1646-50: 101. The Surat mint once closed down and the workmen "absconded"when the
governor persisted in intervening in its affairs at the expense of the bullion suppliers.Factory
Records, Surat: vol. 5, 145a, 149b.
167) English Factories 1642-45: 17-8. For the complaints regarding the "slow" working
of the mint see Factory Records, Surat: vol. 94, 69a; vol. 92, 1.
168) Ibid.: vol. 94, 7a, 154b. The festivals of Ekadashi and Amavas were universally
338 NAJAFHAIDER
when intermittentrumoursof a Marathaattackon Suratput the mint to a halt

and forced most contractsfor bullion sales to be reverted.169)
While the mints of the empireworked an average of 240 days a year, their
individualproductionwas not uniformthroughoutthe year. For the mints which
received their supplies exclusively from overseas trade,one can discernat least
two stages in the outputdependingon the season of the year. On the western
coast, the first stage coincided with the landing of the importedbullion from
west Asia and Europewhich began in Septemberand continuedup to March.
In this season, the mints workedwith theirfull workforce.170)The second phase
commencedfrom aroundApril and continuedtill August. With the south-west
monsoon virtually closing all the harboursof the Indian Ocean from May on-
wards, no fresh supplies of bullion were to be expected and the mint produc-
tion was levelled down to clear the remainderof the precedingseason.
In the busy season itself, the variationin the mint outputwas reflectedonly
in termsof the length of the productiontime. In otherwords, with the daily out-
put and the size of the workforceremainingconstantin that season, the season
could either be shorter or longer in response to the level of supplies. The
English merchantsat Suratreferredto this phenomenonon more than one occa-
sion while commentingupon the length of the waiting time in getting the sup-
ply of coins back from the mint.
The time agreed for (payment) is 93 daies which we were necessitated submit to at this
juncture of tyme, though it exceeds what accustomaryin regard there is by computation
800000 Rupees now in Towne to come lately importedfrom Judda and Mocho, together
with our owne.'7')
This would mean that the time taken by the mint to deliver the coins to the
merchants,reckonedfrom the date of delivery,was fixed undernormalcircum-
stances and was to be increasedor reducedwith the pressureon the mint.172) It
could be inferredthat the mint did not make short term changes in the volume
of its daily outputto cope with the additionalsupplies and minimise the delay.
observed by merchants and craftsmen in the Mughal empire, and one among several meas-
ures taken by Aurangzeb's administrationwas to prohibit the closing of the shops on these
two occasions. Dastur ul Amal, MS. Fraser 86: 38a; Zawabit i Alamgiri: 137a.
169) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 3, 117, 119; vol. 105, 132a.
170) "On the Judda and Moch Fleet arrivals, the Tanksal officers would all be employed
and the shroffs might require 120 days (as usual at such times to coin the bullion)." Factory
Records, Surat: vol. 94, 69a. Also see ibid.: vol. 4, 180b-181a; vol. 90, 183a; Original
Correspondence2115: 109a. For the evidence that the workmen were relieved when the mint
was not functioning see Factory Records, Surat: vol. 5, 149b.
171) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 4, 180b-181a.
172) See ibid.: 188b for evidence of the lower pressure on the mint reducing the waiting
period for the merchants. Also see ibid.: vol. 6, 112-3; vol. 90, 183a.
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 339
However, mints were also capable of expandingor contractingthe absoluteout-

put, relative to previous years, if the volume of supplies registereda change
over a period of time sufficientlylong to recruit additionalworkmen.173) It is
here that the significanceof our fragmentaryevidence on mint productionlies,
and if examinedcarefully by keeping in view not only the patternof mint pro-
duction but also the trend in the level of bullion supply over the years, it can
be helpful in providingsome insight into the overtimemovementin the level of
money supply.
Most of our quotationsfor the mint's daily outputcome from the recordsof
the Europeanmerchantswho were mainly concernedwith theirpartof the busi-
ness with the mint. In their letter to London(December1634), the English mer-
chants at Suratmade the following remarks:
Our greatest trouble, and noe small losse (yet unavoidable) is the slowness of the mint,
from whence wee doe not receive one day with another, since our silver was carryed
in, above 6000 rupees. It was once brought to 9000; but since the Dutch became com-
petitors, they have 3000 daily and our number is discended to 5000; . . .174)
Writing in April 1636, the English once again reflectedupon their share of
the mint productionat Surat:
[H]ere we must attend diverese monthes if wee have any competitors, or, if wee have
the mint alone, wee do not receive above 6000 rupees daily... 175)
It appearsfrom these descriptionsthat in the peak seasons, the mint had a

policy of fixing the shares of the merchantgroups in the daily output, and it
was possible for an indivdualmerchantor a groupto avail the total outputonce
the pressureon the mint had eased out. With the outputfiguresremainingcon-
stant for a particularseason in a given year, as arguedearlier,the figurescited
above could thus be representativeof the daily output of the Surat mint for
1634-36 at different times of the year. The average of these figures (7666.6
rupees) would give us a broadestimate of the daily outputfor the whole year.
Allowing for the fact that the Surat mint worked for 240 days, its annualout-
put in these years would work out to be 20.9 metrictons of silver which is less
than the figure suggested by Moosvi (33 metric tons).
While relating this figure to the numberof hoard specimensof Surat during
173) See Moreland 1972: 177 for an expansion in the mint output at Surat in response
to the merchants' demands. In April 1684, the Surat mint had to send additional workmen
to Delhi to cope with the increased scale of production there. Akhbarat, R.A.S. Library,
no. 2361, 24 shaban, 37th regnal year of Aurangzeb. The English merchants found it very
hard to recruit workmen for their Bombay mint since there was a strict administrativecon-
trol on the mobility of the skilled mint workers. See Factory Records, Surat: vol. 94, 30b.
174) English Factories, 1634-36: 68-9.
175) Ibid.: 217-8.
340 HAIDER
NAJAF
the years 1634-37 (40 rupees),we have divided the samplesinto two parts:one
comprisingthose coins which are fully dated and have mint names on them (A);
and the otherconsistingof all coins includingthose only partiallydatedanddate-
less and mintless coins (B). The trend in both the cases would largely remain
the same, thoughthe absolutelevel of outputin A would be lower than B. The
numberof Suratcoins for 1634-37 was raised by Moosvi to 46 to accountfor
the dateless coins, but the figuresfor the actual outputare so few that the pos-
sibilities of a close correspondencebetween this addition(10 percent)and the
volume of unspecifiedcoins in the hoard (25 percent)seem ratherlimited.
Table 11. EstimatedOutputof the MughalSilver Mints
Years A AnnualOutput B AnnualOutput

Numberof Coins (metrictons Numberof Coins (metrictons
of silver) of silver)
1556-1565 20.5 4.28 32.0 5.79

1566-1575 122.0 25.49 226.5 40.99
1576-1585 231.0 48.28 424.5 76.83
1586-1595 440.0 91.96 854.5 154.66
1596-1605 584.0 122.05 1147.0 207.60
1606-1615 368.0 76.91 516.5 93.48
1616-1625 308.0 64.37 432.5 78.28
1626-1635 574.0 119.96 758.0 137.19
1636-1645 384.0 80.25 499.5 90.41
1646-1655 306.5 64.05 398.0 72.03
1656-1665 299.8 62.65 365.0 66.06
1666-1675 223.5 46.71 256.0 46.33
1676-1685 258.3 53.98 294.5 53.21
1686-1695 395.6 82.68 453.0 81.99
1696-1705 585.1 122.28 670.0 121.27
Note: The conversion of coins bearing the Hijra and the Ilahi years into their corre-
spondingChristianyears is based on the methodof assigning them in proportionto the
part(s)of the Christianyear which fell within each Hijraor Ilahi year.
Source: Treasure Trove Reports, MS., Lucknow Museum.
There is yet anotherimportantnumismatic imbalance which needs to be redressed.

The shape of the specimen curves of both Hasan and Moosvi shows a sharp rise
between 1580 and 1590, giving the impression of an increase in the output.716)
176) Moosvi 1987: 52-4 (figs. 1 and 2).
THE MUGHAL EMPIRE 341
However, this had more to do with the decision taken by Akbarto strike coins
bearing the date 1000 Hijra (alf) from 990 onwards, so that all silver coins
mintedduringthe decade carry a single year of issue.177)In our calculations,all
alf coins are distributedacross the decade in proportionto the dated coins.
Graph II. Estimated Output of the Mughal Silver Mints
250-
200 -
00-
1556- 1566- 1576- 1586- 1596- 1606- 1616- 1626- 1636- 1646- 1656- 1666- 1676- 1686- 1696-
1565 1575 1585 1595 1605 1615 1625 1635 1645 1655 1665 1675 1685 1695 1705
Years
These estimatesof the silver mint ouput suggest that in the last two decades
of the sixteenthcentury,the annualaveragewas 107 metrictons for A and 181
metric tons for B. Our figure for the bullion imports(124 metric tons) is closer
to the lower range of the output,more so if we consider the fact that it con-
tains some amount of gold in it. However, there were other factors which
influenced the direct relationship between bullion supplies and mint output.
These were the non-monetaryusage and outflow of bullion on the one hand,
and the minting of previouslyaccumulatedstock on the other. From our treat-
ment of the bullion market,the possibilitiesof the outflow and hoardingof bul-
lion appearsminimal, though it was possible for the merchantsand sarrafs to
sell some bullion to the goldsmithsand silversmithsand membersof the ruling
class (includingthe imperialestablishment)for employmentin makingjewellery
and craft goods and a small but unknownquantity of importedbullion must
have been divertedaway from the mint."8)On the side of recoinage,as we shall
later observe, this was a period of great effortstaken by the state to remintall
177) Haider 1996.

178) Khan 1928: 1, 304, 340. The mint, being itself a manufactory, also received a
342 NAJAFHAIDER
previousissues which may have contributedto a rise in the outputindependent

of the level of bullion supplies.
The fall in the outputof the first quarterof the seventeenthcenturyis con-
sistent with our descriptionof an overall decline in trade and bullion supplies
in this period, and the figurewe have for the importsalso standsvery close to
the level of output.The subsequentspurtin the outputand a quick fall can be
ascribednot so much to the foreign supplies as to anotherprocess of recoinage
undertakenthis time by Jahangir(see infra). The period thereafter(1636-85)
was of a seculardecline from which the outputrecoveredonly towardsthe end
of the seventeenthcentury.This happeneddespite a general increase in both
Gujarat'strade and its bullion importsin this periodas well as total importsto
the Mughal empire. Our figure for the latterin 1679-85 are in fact the highest
for the entire period.
The regionaldistributionof the hoardspecimens,on which the outputfigures
are based, show that the decline took place in all the regions of the empire
except for Gujarat.'79) The explanationfor this phenomenonrequiresmore in-
formationof the economic performanceof the respectiveregions and the pat-
tern of distributionof precious metals. With regard to the latter part of this
phase, one can say that the rise in gold importsmay have had partlyto do with
the contractionof silver. We shall have occasion to return to this point, but
suffice it to say here that even Gujarathad to sufferin this periodinsofar as its
own need of silver was concerned.
III
The Contractionof CopperCurrencyand the Rise of Silver: c. 1556-c. 1605
On the eve of the Mughal conquest, the monetaryscene of northernIndia
was dominatedby the billon and copperissues of the late Delhi Sultans.In the
tribute collected by Babar from the ruler of Tirhut,billon (tanka i siyah) and
silver coins (tanka i nuqra) are clearly stipulated and the relative quantities
mentionedin the revenuerecordpoint to the largercirculationof the former.'80)
Also, the silver tankamentionedin Babar'sbalance sheet was no longer a pure
silver coin but only had a higher silver content than the more debased billon
issues of the period. The pure silver tanka was an innovation of the early
Sultansof Delhi in the thirteenthcentury.A prolongedcrisis of preciousmetals
portion of the bullion going into craft-production.For the wire-drawers of the Srimal caste
employed by the Ahmadabadmint for such purposes see Ibid.: 292-3.
179) Moosvi 1987: 56, 58.
180) Babar 1905: 293a.
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 343
from about the middle of the fourteenthcentury,influencedthe monetarypoli-

cies of the Sultans and successive attemptswere made to reduce the weight of
the silver tankaas well as to replaceit with a billon coin of the same name.181)
This marked the beginning of a progressive debasement of the silver tanka
till it reached a point when, under the Lodis, it became a money of account
linked to copper, the only stable medium of circulation in that period.182) In
Akbar's reign, the status of the tanka as a money of account was formally
expressed in the designationtanka i muradi (lit. tanka of reference)and used
for assessing revenue and expressingprices and salaries before it was replaced
by the dam, itself a copper coin in the beginningbut later a money of account
as well.
The revival of silver, and to a limited extent gold, minting began with the
establishmentof Mughal rule in northernIndia. There are 74 silver coins pre-
served in various museum collections, of the CentralAsian standard(shahrukhi
of 73.5 grains), struckby Babarfrom the mints at Patna in the east to Badakh-
shan in the north-west.Part of this silver came from the tributesextractedfrom
the subjugatedpotentatesin billon, and part of it may well have been brought
from CentralAsia. Humayuncontinuedto strike silver shahrukhistill 1540, and
gold coins also startedappearingin relativelylarge quantities.By the time Sher
Shah interruptedMughal rule in 1540, the monetary economy of India was
beginning to feel the impact of Americansilver coming from Europe.'83)The
decision to produce a heavier silver coin (rupee of 179 grains) by Sher Shah
and his successorsfrom at least eleven active silver mints could be truly attrib-
uted to the growing volume of silver importsfrom the middle of the sixteenth
century.184)
In the early years of Akbar's reign (c. 1556-74), the rupee was regularly
struck from five silver mints of the empire, all situatedin urbancentres lying
181) This first happened in the reign of Muhammad Tughlaq (1324-51), whose much
derided policy of introducing a fiduciary currency (a copper coin with the legal value of a
tanka) also seems to be the product of the same crisis. For the currency measures of this
Sultan see Barani 1860-2: 474-75; Sihrindi 1931: 102-3; Ahmad 1927: I, 199-203. The
paucity of gold and silver in the market and the low prices of food grains under Ibrahim
Lodi (1517-1526) are noticed in Abdullah 1954: 104-5. The numismaticevidence is discussed
in Wright 1936: 156-71; Haider 1989: 229-35.
182) While the payments made to the soldiers of SikandarLodi were in copper coins (pul
i siyah), the records were kept in tanka. Abdullah 1954: 83. It seems that the billon issues
of the various Sultans, named after them (tanka i Bahluli, tanka i Sikandarietc.), had sepa-
rate standards but all were linked to the tanka of account through the copper coin. For the
tanka as the principal coin of monetary transactionsunder the Lodis see Niamatullah 1969:
88, 164, 168.
183) American silver started arriving in Spain in significant quantities only after 1531.
Hamilton 1934: 40 (Table 2).
184) For the silver outputunderthe Sur regime see Deyelle 1987: 46 (Appendix 1, Table 14).
344 NAJAFHAIDER
at the major trade routes and also the seats of imperialor provincialadminis-
Tradewas a majorsourceof supplyfor these mints and we have evi-
tration.185)
dence of foreign silver being carriedto the inland regions of the empire and
coined into rupees. While describing the managementof the Mughal mints,
Abul Fazl mentions the foreign coins which were refinedto the imperialstan-
dardbefore being restruck,the most notablebeing the shahi, lari, Spanishreales
and Turkishpiastre (narjilfirangi wa rumi).'86)As we have alreadyobserved,
these were all principalcoins within the streamof silver flowing into Indiafrom
the maritimeand the caravanroutes.In the last quarterof the sixteenthcentury
two majordevelopmentstook place which had importantmonetaryimplications:
the conquest of Gujaratin 1572, and the reorganisationof the administrative
and fiscal apparatusfrom 1575 onwards.
The trend depicted in GraphIII demonstratesthat in the first fifteen years
of Akbar's administration(1556-1570), silver circulationhad alreadybegun in
the core areas of the empire, though it was still quite modest relative to the
later part of his reign.187)
The progressiveincreasein the silver outputbecame
sharper from the fourth quinquennium,a period in which, following Akbar's
annexationof Gujarat,silver minting at Ahmadabadre-started.GraphIII also
charts the share of the Ahmadabadmint in the total output of Akbar's silver
mints based on the computationB (due to a very large presenceof Ahmadabad
coins in the hoard which are datableonly by decades). Since the total output
includes mintless coins as well, this will slighly underestimateAhmadabad's
contribution.
The graph clearly suggests that the major supply route of silver into the
Mughalempireran throughAhmadabad,and from 1582 onwards,the contribu-
tion of this mint alone accountsfor half the total output.Abul Fazl has indeed
mentioned,as one of the tradefeaturesof Gujarat,the importof silver from the
territoriesof Turkey and Iraq (wilayat i Rum wa Iraq).'88)Silver reachingthe
185) These were the mints of Agra, Delhi, Lahore, Jaunpurand Narnol. I have excluded
from this list all those mints which were active for only a very short period of time and
where minting was done either for political reasons, such as annexations, or for the presence
of the royal entourage.
186) Abul Fazl 1872: I, 19. The Spanish reale or piastre was obviously taken by Abul
Fazl to be a Portuguese (firangi) coin, and the Turkish piastre (ghurush) was essentially a
reale of eight with an Ottoman stamp. Gerber 1982: 311.
187) The first reference to the use of rupee in commercial transactionsin the vicinity of
Agra comes from a farman of Akbar (1569), addressed to the shiqdar of pargana Chanwar,
ordering the recovery of a debt of 13 rupees owed to Ramdas, once the chief dyer in the
service of Akbar. The original document is in the possession of Mr. BarkatullahKhan of
Firuzabad with a photocopy in the Library of the Centre of Advanced Study in History,
Aligarh Muslim University.
188) Abul Fazl 1872: I, 486.
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 345
Graph III. Estimated Output of Akbar's Silver Mints
25-
200
Ahmadabad'sshare in the total output

S150
0 100-
50-
1556- 1561- 1566- 1571- 1576- 1581- 1586- 1591- 1596- 1601-
1560 1565 1570 1575 1580 1585 1590 1595 1600 1605
Years
marketsof Cambayfrom the ports of Diu and Ghoghawas eventuallybrought

for coining to Ahmadabad,the hinterlandmarket for these port cities. After
Gujaratbecame a partof the Mughalempire,the link of Ahmadabad,now cap-
ital of the province,with the core areas of the empirebecame even stronger."89)
The remittanceof imperialrevenue from the province,effected throughAhma-
dabad, complementedthe alreadyestablishedchannel of preciousmetal flow to
the inland towns throughtrade. As a result of the massive outputof rupees in
the Ahmadabadmint, the imperial issue began to substitutethe local Gujarat
coinage, mainly mahmudis(a coin weighing 88 grainsin which 93 percentwas
pure silver), in settling Gujarat'strade balances with the northIndian markets.
It gave the merchantsan opportunityto avoid the inconvenienceof a double
exchange, i.e. the exchange of importedcoins first into mahmudisand then into
rupees, when they had to transportthe specie from the western coast to the
inlandregions. At the turnof the seventeenthcentury,in the administrativedivi-
sion (sarkar)of Ahmadabadwhich housed both the capital city of the province
and the mint, rupees had become the sole medium of exchange to the total
exclusion of mahmudis. In European accounts of the trade of Cambay, the
newly minted sikka rupee ("ropiasackey")is explicitly stated as the only coin
189) Moosvi 1992: 123, 125.
346 NAJAFHAIDER
acceptablein payment.'")Subsequently,we find that all the bills of exchange

drawn upon Cambay and Ahmadabadwere written in rupees, and the bills
drawn at Ahmadabadon any other city were paid for in the same specie as
well."'9)It seems that the use of the rupee had become so widespreadby 1583
that, after recapturingAhmadabad,the GujaratSultan needed to strike silver
coins of the exact shape and weight as the rupee of Akbar rather than the
reputedmahmudiof his ancestors.'92) In 1601, a sum of one lakh of rupeeswas
annually fixed for the consumption Prince Salim out of the port revenuesof
of
Cambay.193) This suggests that a significant portion of urban revenue in the
sarkar of Ahmadabad,of which Cambaywas a part, was collected in rupees.
With the use of the same specie in paymentsmade to the provincialofficials
and troopersas well as the amount spent on the personal expenditureof the
high officials,'94) the rupee would have been gradually introduced into the
marketsof Ahmadabadand Cambay.The penetrationof rupees in the regional
exchange networkwould have come to a full circle when the merchantsand
manufacturers paid their dues either by obtainingrupees directly from the mar-
ket or by changing mahmudis,laris and other foreign coins at the mint and
money-changers'shops.
There will be little doubt about the fact that a real expansion in silver cur-
rency took place in the urban sector. However, it is much more importantto
know the position silver occupied in the overall monetary structureof the
Mughalempirealong with copper.The answerto this questionlies in an under-
standingof the monetarydemandof the agrarianeconomy, the working of the
Mughalfiscal system and the performanceof the copper currencysector. In an
insightful treatmentof such evidence as exists on these aspects, Irfan Habib
arguedthat the impactof silver on the sixteenthcenturymonetaryeconomywas
limited to the extent of commencingonly a phase of transition,which culmi-
natedin its dominancein the sevententhcentury.In his opinion,the stable mon-
etary usage of copper and a rise in its silver value revealed the limitations
of absorptionsof silver in the economy at the same rate as its supplies.'95)
Our own reconstructionof the monetarymovementsof the sixteenth century,
though differentin terms of the performanceof silver in the economy and the
190) Broecke 1963: II, 382; Terpstra 1918: 206; Letters Received: III, 11; Supplementary
Calendar: 46. Also see English Factories, 1618-21: 178, 309.
191) SupplementaryCalendar: 64, 90, 112; English Factories, 1618-21: 113, 181-2; 1622-
23: 19, 147, 149.
192) Taylor 1902: 413; Brennig 1983: 482.
193) Khan 1927: I, 184.
194) In the early years the suba of Gujaratwas held in jagir by the subadar himself and
his family.
195) Habib 1987: 137-70, esp. 142-7.
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 347
chronology of events associated with that, is in agreement with the general

thrustof his argumentthat silver was succesful in replacingcopper as the prin-
cipal medium of exchange.
We have shown earlierthat beforethe adventof silver, copperand billon cur-
rency was used in all transactionsincludingrevenue payments.In the revenue
recommendationsof the Mughal finance minister,Todarmal,the collection of
land revenue is shown in the bahluli tanka as late as 1582, from which pay-
ments to the revenue officials (statedin tanka i muradi)were made.196) Akbar's
administrationhad retainedthe heavy copperpiece of Sher Shah and circulated
it, with a new weight (323 grains) from eight cities of the empire in the first
fifteen years of his reign.'97)The internalsupply of copper from the mines of
centralIndia and its regularimportsfrom Europeby the Red Sea had sustained
the copper currencysector in the first half of the sixteenthcentury.A clause of
the agreementnegotiated by Malik Gopi, the merchant-administrator of Cam-
bay, provided for the Portuguese to supply each year over 2,000 metric tons of
for
copper, Gujarat as well as the inlandregions, since the Portuguese blockade
of the Red Sea (c. 1515) had cut the major supply route of the Levant.'98)In
the second half of the sixteenth century, silver seems to have substitutedthe
copperimportsby both the Red Sea and the Cape route.The contractionin cop-
per supplies must have allowed silver to replace it in sectors such as the urban
and intermediarymarketswhich were tied to commodityproductionand foreign
trade.However, silver still not invadingthe ruraleconomy, and not being a per-
fect substitutefor copper in areas involving petty transactions,the demandfor
copper must have increasedrelative to its supplies. This could perhapsexplain
why as the silver influx continuedits value fell in terms of copper from 1:48
during 1556-75 to 1:40 between 1575-83 (see infra).
It might seem paradoxicalthat the fall in silver value came about at a time
when the state made its first majorattemptto incorporateit in its fiscal system.
Like many other state apparatuses,the Mughalmonetarypolicy duringthe early
years of Akbar's reign was also in a formativestage. In 1575, administrative
measureswere taken to reorganisethe fiscal structureof the empirewith impor-
tant monetaryconsequences.Up till now, the pay claims of the Mughal mili-
tary-bureaucracy,representedby the rank holding officials (mansabdar)and
their subordiantesoldiers (tabinan),were met by a system of revenue assign-
ment (jagir). In this system, territoriesyielding a fixed revenue in tanka were
196) Abul Fazl, Akbarnama, OIOC, MS. Add. 27247, f. 332b.

197) The cities in which copper was actively minted between 1556 and 1570 were Agra,
Delhi, Lakhnau, Awadh, Bahraich, Narnol, Kalpi and Alwar.
198) Aubin 1971: 44, 60; Magalhaes-Godinho 1969: 403-4. For the exports of European
copper to India from Mamluk Egypt in the fifteenth century see Bacharach 1976: 42-3.
348 NAJAFHAIDER
assigned to each mansabdarclaiming a matchingsalary calculatedin the same

money of account. In 1575, with a view apparentlyto expand cultivation,all
jagirs were resumedand convertedinto khalisa or taxable territoriessubjectto
centralfinancialcontrol.'")This requiredhuge amountsof cash paymentmade
out to the mansabdarsand their soldiers.It seems that it was at this stage that
the state decided to take the first majorstep towardsaccommodatingthe inflow
of importedsilver into its fiscal apparatus.The fixing of mansdabdar'ssalaries
and the method of paymentis describedby Abul Fazl as follows:
When someoneby good fortuneentersthe fold of the army(jirga i sipah) and the
brandingis conducted,the [pay]ordersare issuedwithoutdelay or costs. The salaries
(wajhi talab)are fixed (lit. written)in damwhile at the time of paymenthalf is made
out in rupeesat the rate of 48 dam.The rest is paid in two equalhalves:one in muhr
at the value of 9 rupees,and the otherin the form(bajins) of dam.Whenthe priceof
the rupee reached(afzud!)40 dam, by the emperor'sbenevolencesuch dam were
obtained[i.e. paymentmadeat the new rate].200)
There are three important points which emerge from this description: first,
that the salaries were fixed in the copper money of account (the dam, as in
other cases, was here extrapolated by Abul Fazl); second, that half of the
salaries were paid in silver and the rest in gold and copper money; and the
third, that at some point after the year in which cash payments began, the mar-
ket value of silver fell against copper calling for a revision of the official rate
of exchange.
It is obvious that in order to effect such huge payments in rupees, the state
required sufficient stock of silver at its disposal, and it is also fair to assume
that much of this stock was acquired through taxes, both urban and rural. The
collection of urban taxes, such as the customs duties on imported silver, mint
revenues and levies on manufactured goods (the revenue rates for indigo are
stated in rupees in the Ain), though an important source of silver for the state,
would have hardly sufficedto meet the pay claims realised in rupeeswhich, by
a rough estimate, would have exceeded 350 metric tons of silver at the official
rate of exchange in c. 1595.201) It is therefore quite likely that the state began
to encourage the collection of land revenue (stated in tanka i muradi)202)in
199) Ahmad 1931: II, 300-1; Abul Fazl 1887: III, 117. A set of officials(karoris)was
appointedto assess and collect revenuefrom the provinceswith the exceptionof Gujarat,
Biharand Bengal.
200) Abul Fazl 1872:1, 196.
201) For the estimatedsalarybills of the mansabdarssee Moosvi 1987a:206-20.
202) In anotherfarmanof Akbargrantedin favourof the above mentionedRamdas,the
assessed revenue(jama i raqami)of the village Hamirpur,pargnanaChanwar(Agra),is
stated as 5000 tanka i muradi.
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 349
silver either before or at about 1575, at the official rate of exchange (1:48).203)
As long as the official rate remainedabove the currentmarketrate (progres-
sively declining to 1:40), the policy must have continuedto providean incen-
tive to the revenue payers to offer the overvalued silver coin ratherthan the
undervalueddam. The insistence of the revenue officials in demandinga par-
ticular currencyin payment(so that they could benefit from arbitrage),and the
attemptsby the state to declare this unlawful,suggests that the discrepancybe-
tween the two rates was wilfully acknowledgedby the state for fiscal and mon-
etary considerations.204)It also seems that a majorreorganisationof the Mughal
silver mints, which took place in 1577-78, and passed their managementfrom
the chaudhuristo the officials directlyappointedby the emperor,was designed
to improve the mint productionand meet the fiscal demandsof the state.205)
That despite these measuressilver should continueto fall in its value against
copper and the ratio should once reach an all time low of 1:38 is most sur-
prising. A tentativeexplanationcould be that the internalsupply of silver out-
strippedits seasonal demandwhen the expendituresof the mansabdarsand their
trooperswere carriedout in rupees. In 1582 the previous system of assigning
jagirs in lieu of cash salarieswas reinstated,and in the same year the official
rate of exchange between copper and silver was fixed at 1:40. These measures
would have simultaneouslyaffectedthe fiscal and agrariandemandfor silver as
well as its internalsupply to the market.
After 1591, an exceptionalrise in the silver outputtook place apparentlyas
a result of a massive recoinageof the circulatingstock. We have the evidence
of an imperialorderof 1592 to demonetiseall the issues of the previousemper-
ors (padshahani sabiq), and comprehensivemeasureswere takenby the admin-
istration to melt all such coins and sell them as bullion (ba baha i tala wa
nuqra) in the market.206)As always, the officialsfound themselvesdependanton
203) The collection of revenue in silver at the market rate would have gone against the
entire idea of fixing the revenue in the money of account which is done to preparea balance
sheet based on fixed income and fixed expenditure.
204) In 1583, the official value of the rupee was fixed at 40 dams ad infinitium.Abul Fazl
1872: I, 26-8, 176, 196; Abul Fazl, Akbarnama,MS. Add. 27247: 332b. But the marketvalue
of silver may still have been lower, and the state made additional payments to the officials
to make up for the difference rather than furtherchanging the fixed rate. Ibid.: 176, 178.
205) Abul Fazl, Akbarnama, MS. Add. 27247, f. 249b. The printed text of Bib. Indica:
III, 227, omits from its inventory the mint situated at Malwa.
206) Badauni 1869: III, 380. The intensity of the decree was revealed by the authorwhen
he suggested that the objective of this measure was to drive "these [coins] out without leav-
ing a trace in the world." Among the guidelines issued to the treasurerand the police chief
(kotwal) at about the same time, there was a clause which referred exclusively to the treat-
ment of the coins of the previous rulers (bastani maskuk).It was ordered that they should be
declared uncurrent(na maskuk) and should either be melted down (ba gudazgah dahad) or
350 NAJAFHAIDER
the sarrafs for a successful completionof their task and were temptedto use
all possible means, includingcoercion,to seek compliancefrom them.207) When
the policy was eventuallyimplemented,undera new set of officials and with a
great deal of hard labour,in all the regions of the empire(aqsa i mamalik),it
must have resultedin a substantialrecoinageof gold and silver issues. In these
years, several measureswere takenby the state to regulatethe exchangeof pre-
cious metal coinage including a control over the business of the sarrafs.208)
Complaints were also looked into that the officials of the imperial revenue
(amalguzar khalisa), assignees (tuyuldar) and money-changers (sairafi) were
demandingpayment in a specific coin (sikka i khas) or, alternatively,levying
discounteven on the coins of full weight and fineness(naqddurustaiyar tamam
wazn).209)
It can be seen that that the thrustof these measureswas directedtowards
the precious metal coinage, especially silver, which was now being used in-
creasingly in the agrariansector. One can perhapspredatethe process of dis-
placementof copper by at least two decades from what was being arguedtill
now.210) Since the value of copperlargely dependedon its utility as a monetary
metal, with its displacementin the monetarysector came about a fall in its
value from 26.1 rupee per man i Akbariin c. 1595 to 19.8 rupees in 1614 and
16.3 rupees in 1615.211)A similar trendwas visible in the ratio of copperand
silver currencies. The market ratio seems to have risen after 1595 until it
reached 1:50 in 1614.212)Some of this rise could be attributedto a decline in
silver importsin this period but the general trend pointedto a downwarddrift
of coppertill at least 1619, when the policy of mintingcopperon an apparently
largerscale in the second decade of the seventeenthcenturyrenewedits demand
as a currencymetal.213)
sent to the treasury at the value of uncoined bullion (ba irj i na maskuk). Abul Fazl 1872:
I, 284, 289.
207) Badauni 1869: III, 380.
208) Ibid.; Abul Fazl 1872: I, 288; Monserate 1922: 207.
209) Abul Fazl, Akbarnama,
MS. Add. 26207, 275b.
210) It has been argued till now that the silver price of copper remained unchangedtill at
least 1614. The value of silver remained stable because of its absorptionin the monetarysec-
tor for the period it was replacing copper, while the value of the latter remained unchanged
because of its growing demand in the non-monetary sector as an industrial metal. Habib
1987: 157-8; Moosvi 1987: 368-9.
211) Abul Fazl 1872: I, 32; Downton 1939: 172; Letters Received: II, 152; Terpstra1918:
216. One man i Akbari = 55.32 lb. avdp. or 60 lb. Holland, and one man of Gujarat= 33.19
lb avdp. or 30 lb. Holland. One rupee = 2s. 4d., and 1 mahmudi = 2.25 rupee in 1614-15.
212) The rupee at Agra in 1614 is reckoned at "96 to 102 pices." Supplementary
Calendar: 48. The conventional explanation that a paisa is a half dam is accepted here.
213) Terry 1921: 302; English Factories 1618-21: 142, 144; Jourdain 1905: 150.
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 351
The Contractionin Silver Supplies and MonetaryMeasures:1605-1630

In the first quarterof the seventeenthcentury,when the precipitaterush of
silver to the Mughal empire seemed to have faded, its impact was felt on the
currencyoutputof all thoseregionswhichreceivedoverseassilver.The Ahmadabad
mint, which was the most prolific in coining money till the previous decade,
was broughtto a halt due to lack of supplies.214) There was also a substantial
fall in its outputbetween 1605 and 1625.215)The decline in the North-Western
mints was less dramatic,and there was even a relative increase in the decade
1616-1625.216) This was obviously due to the increasein the caravantradepass-
ing through this region, which sustained the mints of Lahore, Multan and
Qandhar. But the biggest beneficiariesof this diversionwere the centralIndian
mints, mainly those of Agra and Delhi, where the caravantrafficterminated.
Notwithstandingthe regional redistributionof silver supplies,an absolutefall in
the total silver outputof the empire (GraphII) forcefully indicatedthe impor-
tance of foreign trade in sustainingthe working of the silver mints.
The two monetarymeasurestaken by the MughalemperorJahangir(r. 1605-
28) should be seen against this background.Upon his accession, the emperor
had made changes in the weight and standardof the existing silver coins for
what seems to have been purely a matterof personalpredilection.In the first
instance,he increasedthe weight of the rupeeby 20 percent(dah dwazdah)and
instituteda new silver weight so that the Jahangirirupee now weighed one tola
(213.5 grains), instead of 1.15 tola on the weight standardof his predeces-
sor.217)A few years later (c. 1609), he furtherraised the weight of his rupee to
make it a quarterheavier (222.4 grains) than the standardrupee of Akbar.218)
By 1611, the pressureof the fall in silver supplies on the existing monetary
stock seems to have forced the emperor to abandon the heavier rupees and
restore the silver coin to the previous standardof 177.9 grains.219)
The later part of Jahangir'sreign was characterisedby a mountingdeficit in
the imperialincome which could be attributed,at least partly,to the decline in
trade and bullion imports. According to the court historianof Shahjahan,the
imperial income lagged behind expenditureat the rate of 8 million rupees per
214) English Factories 1618-21: 7-8.

215) Moosvi 1992: 126 (Table 1).
216) Moosvi 1987: 62-3.
217) Jahangir 1864: 5; Hodivala 1923: 133-4.
218) Hodivala 1923: 135-6. The new coin was now equal in value to one and a quarter
(sawa) of the ordinary rupee of Akbar. The popular designation, sawai, which the heaviest
coin acquired in the empire may have been in direct reference to its added weight and value.
219) Jahangir 1864: 96. For the rest of Jahangir's and the best part of Shahjahan's reign
the weight of the rupee remained stable and it continued to be reckonedon the jahangiri scale
at only 10 masha. Sometime towards the end of Shahjahan's reign, the weight standardof
352 NAJAFHAIDER
year.220)Since the imperial income was largely derived from taxation (which
was falling), the only way left to service the deficit was to draw upon imperial
reserveswhich contained,interalia, the silver hoardleft by Akbarrangingfrom
100 to 130 million rupees (1136 to 1477 metrictons of silver).221) It seems that
so much silver was spent from this source that Shahjahan(r. 1628-59) inherited
only 10 million rupees from his father'streasuryand had to pursuea policy of
amassing silver.222)If JahangirrestruckAkbar'scoins into his own, in orderto
avoid the market discount fixed on old coins regardless of weight loss, this
would have meant a significantincreasein the silver output.The lattercan help
us explain the sharp and short term rise in silver output (Graph II) for the
decade 1625-35.
The Crash of Gold: 1674-85

Even though gold importsinto the Mughal empire seems to have risen from
1665 onwards,it was only towardsthe end of 1674 that gold startedits down-
ward course, which was to continue for almost a decade in all parts of the
Mughalempireresultingin what may be called the GreatCrashof gold. As we
shall see, this coincided with importantchanges in the working of the Mughal
economy.
It is quite clear from the evidence we have that both the muhrand uncoined
gold had begun to fall in value in Gujaratand Bengal from 1674,223)and the
quantitiesimportedfrom the Red Sea and PersianGulf only addedto its ongo-
ing misery.224)The English merchants,anxious to sell the stock they were al-
ready holding, feared that the falling rate of the gold price would accelerate
with the marketsensing the arrivalof the Red Sea fleet.225)
That the "crashof gold" was not only limited to the coastal areas but was
Akbar came into force once again. In the mint record of Patna, all the ordinaryrupees were
reckoned at 11.5 masha. Dastur ul amal i Alamgiri: 54a-55b, 57a.
220) Qazwini: B. M. MS. Add. 20734, 444-5; MS. Or. 173, 221b. The expendituremainly
included the costs of maintaining the empire, especially those of military campaigns, and the
imperial establishment. See English Factories 1622-23: 94, for the allocation of 1 million
rupees for the campaign to reoccupy Qandharfrom the Safavids.
221) Hawkins: 101-2 (13 crores); Contemporary Dutch Chronicle: 33 (10 crores); De
Laet: 107 (10 crores); Farishta 1905: I. 272 (10 crores). Also see Moosvi 1987a: 198, 259-
60. Qazwini's estimate of 7 crores seems rather conservative.
222) Qazwini: op. cit.; Generale Missiven: I, 341.
223) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 4, 35b; vol. 107, 41, 90; Factory Records, Miscella-
neous: vol. 2, 162; Factory Records, Qasimbazar:vol. 1, 9; Factory Records, Dacca: vol. 1,
50b, 51a, 52b; English Factories, (NS): I, 267-8; IV, 243; Generale Missiven: IV, 8, 69; Mas-
ter 1911: II, 304-5.
224) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 90, ff. 94a-b; 4, f. 161b; English Factories (NS): III,
270.
225) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 4, 161b.
THEMUGHALEMPIRE 353
more widespreadis shown by a reportsent from Ajmerto the imperialcourtin

1680. Here the marketrate of the muhrwas cited as 13 rupees by a group of
musketeers (banduqchian)who were forced to accept a part of their salary,
fixed in silver, at an overvaluedrate of 15 rupees to the muhr.226)When the
musketeerspetitionedthe Mughaladministratorof Ajmerto seek revision of the
paymentprocedurethey in fact hinted that the interestof the diwan lay in tak-
ing advantageof the falling price of gold.227)
The prolongedfall in the value of gold, spanningmore than a decade, was
widely perceived and commented upon by the European merchants. In his
annual letter of January 1677, the Surat President of the English Company,
Gerald Aungier, anxiously ponderedupon the phenomenonwhich in his view
had caused "a decay of commerce in the country."228) In a lengthy explana-
tion, he drew attention to a financial necessity which compelled the emperor
Aurangzeb(r. 1659-1707) to draw upon the gold reserves. It was also believed
that the gold coins drawn out of the treasurywere spent on state expenditure,
which first precipitateda fall in the value of those coins and, ipso-facto, in the
value of gold in general.
However, the real reason for the decline in its value was not the abundance
of gold but the scarcity of silver. When the fall in gold was first noticed to-
wards the end of 1674, it was explicitly ascribedto the great scarcity of silver
rupees in both Gujaratand Bengal.229) It appearsfrom these reports that the
paucity of silver itself was the result of a decline in its importin these years.
The supply of silver to Gujaratfrom the Red Sea and Persian Gulf had dried
up in that monsoon and whatever the Dutch had broughtfor investing in the
markets of western and central India was largely diverted to Bengal. The
Bengal factors themselves lamentedthe fact that the region had received very
little silver from the English in the past years and none at all from the Dutch.230)
The crisis of silver continued well beyond 1675 and was reportedfrequently
from both ends of the coast at least till about 1678.231)Isaac Lawrence, an
English factor stationedat Suratin 1678, mentioneda "greatscarcityof money
here, I meane rupees, which the like hath not beene known."232)
There is thus considerableevidence to suggest that the steep fall in the gold
226) Waqai sarkar Ranthambhorwa Ajmer: no. 79, 678-9.

227) Ibid.
228) Original Correspondence 4258. See Foster 1925: 314-5. for the relevant portions of
the letter, and English Factories, (NS): I, 267-8 for a summary.
229) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 107, 41. Original Correspondence4062 cited in Chaud-
hurl 1978: 179. Generale Missiven: IV, 8.
230) Generale Missiven: IV, 8.
231) Ibid.: 69 (1675), 91 (1676); English Factories (NS): I, 121 (1675); III, 228 (1678).
232) Lawrence 1677-9: 54a, 55b, 63b.
354 HAIDER
NAJAF
price was actuallythe resultof an acute shortageof silver in probablythe whole

of the Mughalempire.Gold sufferedespecially in this periodbecause of its con-
tinuous importsfrom both Europeand Asia.233)At the same time, the lack of
silver money may have inducedgold to be broughtout of reserves and hoards
from within the empire to make up for the shortfallin the monetarystock. It is
also conceivable that with the appreciationin its value, some quantitiesof sil-
ver may have disappearedinto hoarding. The account of the dishoardingof
imperialgold, if at all true, could be just a symptomof this crisis ratherthan
its cause. With more and more gold enteringinto circulationit is not surprising
that its downhill slide continuedwell afterthe crisis of silver was over. It could
not recover much of its lost esteem in the subsequentdecade and continuedto
fetch a low price at Surattill 1697.234)
The crisis obviously had its impact on the workingof the Mughal monetary
and fiscal apparatus.The two major administrativedecisions taken in these
years were to increase the mint price of silver by abolishing silver seignior-
age,235)and, at the same time, to debase the rupee itself, perhapsfor the first
time in the entire history of the Mughalempire.236) These measureswere obvi-
ously intendedto attractsilver to the mint by offeringmore coins to the bullion
holder out of the same amountof silver previouslyminted in order to expand
the circulationof silver money from the existing stock. It seems that by 1678,
with a partial improvementin the situation, the state decided to increase the
fineness of the rupee. It was then reportedthat while the silver was availableto
the sarrafs, it was the slow working of the mints, due to the new regulations,
which was preventingrupeesfrom coming into the market.237) The reimposition
of silver seignioragein 1682 suggests that the state at least was quite positive
about the situation.238)The restorationof the pre-existingmint regulationswere,
however, accompaniedby a concertedattemptto monopolisethe sale of bullion
in orderto maintaina regularsupply to the mint.239)
Anotherimportantoutcome of the contractionin silver money was a shift in
the mode of payment from silver to gold for which our evidence points only
to the military sector of the Mughal bureaucracy.The salaries of the soldiers
233) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 4, 116a, 161b; vol. 90, 94a-b; English Factories (NS):
III, 240.
234) Careri 1949: 253; English Factory at Surat, Persian Correspondence, OIOC, MS.
Ethe 370: 63b.
235) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 4, 43b; English Factories (NS): I, 282-3.
236) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 4, 43a-b; vol. 90, 183a; Lawrence 1677-9: 55b;
Algemeen Rijksarchief, VOC 1371: 428b; Generale Missiven: V, 563.
237) Factory Records, Surat: vol. 90, 183a; Lawrence 1677-9: 55b.
238) Khan 1927: I, 304; Factory Records, Dacca: vol. 1, 23a-b.
239) Khan 1927: I, 304.
THEMUGHAL
EMPIRE 355
serving under the subadar of Bengal were being paid in gold in 1676,240)and
we have alreadyseen that a similardecision was taken at Ajmerin 1680.241)In
both the cases, the Mughal officialstried to turnthe adversityinto an advantage
by overvaluingthe muhr at the expense of the soldiers.
The impact of the dearthof silver on the prices of general commoditiesis
less certain. That there was a widespreaddeflationaryeffect on the prices of
Europeangoods is clearly evident from the reportsof the factors.242) They also
complained about the difficulties in obtaining Indian goods which suggests
either a fall in production or a breakdownof commercial networks.243)The
latter, however, seems more pronouncedin these statements, and may have
resulted from falling sales and profits. In the letter of the Surat factor cited
above the following remarkwas made:
These circumstancesdoe naturallyproduce a decay of commerce in the country;the rich
moneyed men, who are the only support therof, chooseing rather to secure their estates
then expose them in trade.244)
A little later, the evidence furnished by another factor suggested that the
tightness of money was further deepened by a contraction of credit and the cap-
ital available to finance commerce.
[The value of imported goods was lower than had ever been known], which has lately
ruined many considerable persons in these parts, every few acquainting us with fail-
ing of one eminent shroff or another, which has made money so extremely scarce
in Surat as has infinitely obstructed its usual course of trade and put us to no small
difficulties.245)
The crisis clearly shows the extent to which the money supply in the Mughal
marketeconomy came to be identifiedwith silver and the inability of gold to
substitutefor silver and credit to offer an alternativefor money as well.
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Precious Metal Flows and Currency Circulation in the Mughal Empire

Author(s): Najaf Haider

The Mughalempire(est. 1526A.D.) experiencedthe co-existenceof two domains

? E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1996 JESHO39,3

commercial exchange which had greater implicationsfor the Mughal foreign

in sharingthe benefits of an open trade,8)dictatedthe thrustof the Portuguese

explanationwhich can be offeredfor an overplusof bullion is that there was a

Table 1. EstimatedValue of HurmuzTrade:c. 1515-c. 1618

c. 1515 25.7 c. 1574 31.93

purely transitorynaturewhere the Europeancoins, on their outwardjourney to

Later, discussing the merchants in general, Tavernier observed that those

mercial capital was made available to finance commoditytrade and to facili-

establishedmediumof paymenton the coasts of Gujaratand westernDeccan.24)

by the Portuguesefrom this source was estimated at 60,000 pardaos.32)The

32) Magalhaes-Godinho 1982: 50.

A decade later, it was observed by anotherDutch factor, that the amount of

and it became practicallyimpossiblefor the merchantsto obtainthe true value

43) Sanson 1695: 159-61.

Merchantstradingbetween Aleppo and Mokha took the annual pilgrimage

Table 2. Bullion Exportsfrom Europe to the Levant: VariousEstimates

Year From To AnnualTotal/Average References

54) Broecke1962:I, 85.

57) Pearson 1976: 100-1 and fn.

Table 3. Bullion exported to Gujarat by the Red Sea

Year Amount FineSilver Remarks

silver.64)There is some evidence of an expansion in this period in the number

Cape route and the Carreira voyages: Portuguese exports of silver

64) Das Gupta 1976: 147n.

exportswas takento China.We have alreadyreferredto the mode of this redis-

Table 4. Estimates of Portuguese Exports of Precious Metals

Year Gujaratand Sind Bengal AnnualTotal

1586-1590 50.45 5.65 11.22a)

For corroboration;the estimatesbasedon Portugueseimportsfromthe Mughal

Graph 1. Crown revenueand Portuguesetrade

During the quinquennium1586-90, the high point of Portuguesetrade with

the monsoons, and a clash of interestsbecame apparentbetween those export-

Bullion exported by the English East India Company

Table 5. English Exports of Precious Metals to Gujarat

Year QuinquennialTotal QuinquennialTotal AnnualAverage

sion, whichwas wreckedoff the Gujaratcoast,andthe fleetcaptainedby ThomasBest which

stock voyage of 1614 that regular shipmentof bullion from Englandbegan to

Table 6. English Exports of Precious Metals to Bengal

Year Quinquennial Total Annual Average

1657-1661 7.56 1.51

Precious Metals Exported by the Dutch East India Company

Table 7. Dutch Exports of Precious Metals to Gujarat

Year Annual Total Metric tons Year AnnualTotal Metrictons

1620 23,207 0.23 1640 10.53

During 1621-1626, the average annual export of precious metals to Gujarat

Table 8. Dutch Exports of Precious Metals to Bengal

Year Total Total Annual Average

1624. Dagh Register1624-29:64. Followingthe Bakufu'sban on Japaneseparticipation

Table 9. Bullion Imports of the Mughal Empire

Source 1588-1602 % of the 1630-45 % of the 1679-85 % of the

The Gold Imports

98) Ethiopian Itineraries 1958: 173; Cabral 1938: 65.

was howevermeantto be exportednot to Suratbut to the regions,such as

105) Generale Missiven: I, 709; II, 323, 394; III, 30.

Bullion Marketand Mint Production

delays in the availabilityof cash to serve their investmentplans.19) It was this

commentatorson Mughal coinage in the seventeenthcentury,borne out by the

Table 10. The Costs of Coining Silver: c. 1595