Central Asian Survey

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The role of the ortoq in the Mongol Empire in

forming business partnerships

Enerelt Enkhbold

To cite this article: Enerelt Enkhbold (2019) The role of the ortoq in the Mongol
Empire in forming business partnerships, Central Asian Survey, 38:4, 531-547, DOI:
10.1080/02634937.2019.1652799

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2019.1652799

Published online: 06 Sep 2019.

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CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY
2019, VOL. 38, NO. 4, 531–547
https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2019.1652799

This article is the winner of the 2018 Central Eurasian Studies Society Award for Best Graduate Paper. This prize is
awarded yearly by the society to promote new scholarship focusing on the history, politics, culture and societies of
Central Eurasia.

The role of the ortoq in the Mongol Empire in forming

business partnerships
Enerelt Enkhbold
History Department, National University of Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
This study investigates the emergence and development of Mongol Empire; ortoq;
business partnerships established by the Mongols and their medieval trade; business
merchant partners, ortoqs, in the Middle Ages. Ortoqs are known partnership; trade contract;
to have conducted trade and money-lending with the capital commenda
invested by their partners. This study shows that the contractual
arrangements of Mongol–ortoq partnerships closely resembled
medieval partnership contracts, such as mudharaba, inan, societas
and commenda. Sophisticated concepts of liability in relation to
investments and loans were developed in Mongol–ortoq
partnerships, promoting trade and investment to facilitate the
commercial integration of the Mongol Empire.

Introduction
The Eurasian long-distance land trade has played an essential role in the livelihood of Inner
Asian pastoral nomads from the earliest times. The nomads specialized in animal husban-
dry, but lacked the ability to domestically produce abundant resources of manufactured
wares, metals, and crops. They also had various other requirements, ranging from basic
needs to luxury consumption, which led them to establish contact with settled societies.
Economic interactions between the nomads and settled societies were not always peace-
ful and were shaped by the political dynamics of the time. Consequently, to acquire com-
modities that were rare or not available in the steppe, over time the nomads developed
specific approaches, which took four major forms: trade, warfare, tribute and gift. This
study focuses on trade.
Compared to war booty or tribute, trade was undoubtedly a less life-threatening endea-
vour for pastoral nomads. When merchants were interested in livestock products and war
booty possessed by nomads, trade could be easily conducted between the two groups.
Merchants were also eager to sell their wares to nomadic rulers to earn handsome
profits and enter their service in exchange for various privileges (Ciocîltan 2012). Most pas-
toral nomads were not long-distance traders themselves and did not generally possess an

CONTACT Enerelt Enkhbold eenee74@gmail.com

© 2019 Global South Ltd
532 E. ENKHBOLD

equivalent indigenous merchant class within their society. Realizing the vital importance
of trade to their economy, pastoral nomads quickly learned to furnish protection for mer-
chants and exploit the commercial traffic that passed along the trade routes of Inner Asia.
The Mongols were no exceptions in this regard and played a crucial role in advancing
international trade (Allsen 1989; Chaffee 2018; Ciocîltan 2012). Chinggis Khan and his suc-
cessors implemented several important measures to promote interregional and local trade
during the heyday of the Mongol Empire. Mongol leaders protected foreign travellers and
merchants; established a wide network of relay stations, known as jam, across their great
contiguous land empire; and granted other specific privileges to merchants as well as to
religious men, who were often entrepreneurs. Certain medieval writers living during this
time reported that these measures were effective in facilitating trade and commerce
(Ibn Battuta 1988, 80, 128; Juvaynī 1958, 33).
The pastoral nomads of Inner Asia had to collaborate with foreign merchants to bring in
much-needed resources to the steppe, and links between nomadic leaders and merchants
were forged from early times. Merchants not only assisted the nomads in acquiring all
sorts of wares from distant lands but also enabled powerful nomads to increase their
wealth. Nomadic rulers of steppe empires relied on merchants long before the rise of
Chinggisid elites in the region of Mongolia. It is probable that Türk qaghans [rulers]
profited from their collaboration with Sogdian merchants in exporting Chinese silk to
the West (de la Vaissière 2005, 209, 228; 2014, 108–109). However, the extent to which
this type of partnership had been institutionalized before the advent of the Mongols
remains open for discussion.
The Mongols brought previously unknown commercial techniques to the eastern
steppe of Inner Asia and further adjusted them to their needs. Their merchant partners,
known as ortoq (Turkic: ortaq), conducted trade and money-lending businesses using
the capital invested by Mongol elites.1 The term ortoq was primarily used in primary
sources to designate merchants who had a personal gift exchange relationship with a
high-status Mongol or received funding and commodities from Mongol government, aris-
tocrats and commanders. The relationship between the Mongols and the ortoq went
beyond a simple exchange of goods. Considering the extensive attention they received
from medieval writers, it would appear that the ortoq formed an important institution
within the Mongol Empire. Some historians argue that the ortoq merchants played a
pivotal role in the circulation of silver across the Eurasian continent (Otagi 1973; Yokkaichi
2009). This article emphasizes that this partnership was based on an arrangement whereby
an investor entrusted capital to an agent who was expected to trade and lend the capital
and then repay the principal amount and a share of the profits to the investor. This descrip-
tion closely resembles that of popular commercial partnerships within the Islamic world
and Europe during the Middle Ages. In the world of business partnerships, nothing is
more important than trust. It is quite likely that the Mongols initially did not require any
hostage, collateral or guarantor for partnership investment, but used disciplinary pro-
cedures such as boycotting to avoid destroying trust. However, debt financing or loan sup-
plied by the Mongol government or investing partners to the ortoq was scheduled on a
predetermined payment plan monitored by state officials (Juvaynī 1958, 224; Otagi
1973, 8). Guarantors and hostages could be required to secure a loan agreement. As
was common in the Middle Ages, close friends and family members of a borrower were
demanded for a guarantor or hostage. At least in the Yuan and the Il-khanate the
 CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY 533

Mongols used similar practices, wherein a defaulted ortoq’s family was to be enslaved and
the ortoq and his guarantor were required to pay back commercial losses (Otagi 1973, 8–9;
Rashid al-Din 1998, 426).
In a groundbreaking paper, Allsen (1989) noticed similarities between the Mongol–
ortoq partnership and the commenda or qirad partnerships (also known as mudharaba).
Following his lead, historians have tended to regard the activities of the ortoq as identical
to medieval business partnerships (Endicott-West 1989; Qiu 2016). On the other hand, and
largely due to limited available information (see e.g. Lin 2013, 228), some specialist scho-
lars have cast doubt on whether the relationship between the Mongols and the ortoq was
based on an actual business partnership. In the history of ortoq scholarship, the focus has
usually been on trade, commodities, and the social interaction between the Mongols and
merchants. This article attempts to explore the contractual features of the Mongol–ortoq
partnership through examining primary sources from the Mongol period. While the ortoq
have previously been studied from the social history perspective, this study contributes to
research with a novel analysis of the Mongol–ortoq partnership from the perspective of
liability and risk-sharing. This study aims to demonstrate that partnerships operated by
the ortoq were one of the earliest forms of business partnerships. Although the
Mongols employed merchants for other important services, such as tax farming, diplo-
macy and espionage, this article will discuss trade and money-lending partnerships.

Investment forms
As is well documented, Chinggisid conquests increased the material wealth of Mongol
aristocrats and dignitaries. Both the Song ambassador Zhao Gong and the Papal ambas-
sador Giovanni da Pian del Carpine describe how Mongol aristocrats and commanders
lived in luxury, with an abundance of silver, gold, silk and gems (Carpine 1955, 8; Zhao
2015, 57). Having learned from Uighur and Central Asian merchants, Mongol leaders
paid special attention to the business activities of long-distance traders. Much of their
wealth was passed into the hands of ortoq merchants to fund commercial ventures.
Their business relationships are described in a passage from the Song ambassador Peng
Daya’s account:
From the Tatar (Mongol) Emperor to the false princes of the blood, to the false heir apparent,
to the false princesses, all entrust their silver to the Hui-hui. As for [the latter] some lend it out
to the populace and earn high interest … and they buy [with the silver] sundry goods, and
then sell them in other places. (Peng and Xu 2016, 35)

Another Song official, Xu Ting, reports the deeds of foreign merchants as follows:
From the Tatar (Mongol) ruler to everyone, silver is simply entrusted to the Hui-hui, so that they
trade with satisfaction and then pay interest [to the Mongols]. The Hui-hui either lend [the silver]
to others or conduct trade themselves in many locales. (Peng and Xu 2016, 35)

It appears from these passages that Uighur and Muslim merchants, identified as Hui-hui
or Hui-hu in Chinese records, conducted trade and money-lending businesses with capital
advanced by the Mongols. Neither Peng Daya nor Xu Ting seem familiar with the term
ortoq, but their description of commercial transactions closely resembles the activities
of the ortoq. They also emphasized that silver was used for investments in business part-
nerships. While the Mongols issued their first silver coins in Central Asia as early as
534 E. ENKHBOLD

Chinggis Khan’s time, the qubchur tax paid in silver was adopted only in 1236 as part of
fiscal reforms during the reign of the Qaghan Ögedei, the third son and successor of
Chinggis Khan. From that time on, the süke silver ingot (ding in Chinese, yastuq in
Turkic, balish in Persian) became the standard monetary unit of account of the Mongol
Empire (von Glahn 2010, 478). It should be noted that the two Song officials travelled
to the Mongols when the relevant fiscal reforms were taking place under the leadership
of Ögedei’s administrators.
The Mongols used gold and silver ingots, and later metal coins, as partnership invest-
ments. Despite taxes being paid in kind in some parts of the Mongol Empire, both ingots
and coins were universally recognizable as legal tender in all Mongol realms. Islamic jurists
were in unanimous agreement concerning the acceptability of dinars and dirhams (gold
and silver coins) for partnership investments (Udovitch 1970, 55, 177). In other words, a
partnership involving currencies of the same qualification was considered valid in the
Islamic world. Islamic legal considerations that accepted coins with a single standard
weight, fineness and unified standard stemmed from uncertainties regarding each part-
ner’s proportional share of the capital. In a situation of a partnership investment involving
commodities, any price dispersion and fluctuation handicap the accurate determination of
the exact investment amount in monetary terms and, as a result, mixed investments can
lead to disputes during profit-sharing. It is highly likely that, to judge from medieval
writers’ remarks, the Islamic commercial principles were impracticable for the Mongols
as they were primarily shamanists in the early thirteenth century and not restrained by
Abrahamic religious doctrines. For example, we know that, shortly before 1219, Mongol
elites advanced capital consisting of gold and silver ingots and various wares to a
caravan dispatched to Khwārazm (Ibn Battuta 1988, 94; Juvaynī 1958, 78–79; Juzjānī
1881, 967; Rashid al-Din 1998, 228). Contemporary historians are silent on how the
Mongol elites agreed with their merchant partners on sharing profits. The ingots involved
were probably cast in the Song-Jin style, with slight variation in weights. In Song-Jin times,
standard silver ingots were minted in three forms with weights ranging from 500 grams to
2 kilograms (von Glahn 2010, 476). By the early fourteenth century, the monetary unit for
accounts and weight measures had been generally standardized and reformed in the
Mongol Empire (Kolbas 2006, 123; von Glahn 2010, 492–93). The süke (ding or yastuq)
silver ingot weighted approximately 2 kg during the Mongol era. Despite variations in
weight systems over time and in some localities, it is likely that it was easier to determine
each partner’s share of liability and profit for mixed investments on the basis of silver
ingots. Islamic legal restrictions allowed uncoined gold and silver for the purposes of part-
nership investment in places where they served as a medium of exchange (Udovitch 1970,
62). Gold and silver ingots circulated widely in the Mongol Empire and were extensively
used in long-distance trade in the thirteenth century, because they possessed intrinsic
value, as did gold and silver coins. Most interregional trade in the Mongol Empire was con-
ducted on the basis of imaginary units of silver despite regional variations in currency
forms (Kuroda 2009, 261). Therefore, an ingot could be appropriate for investment in a
Mongol–ortoq partnership. Furthermore, influential and high-status Muslims could
openly establish partnerships with the Mongols without difficulties. Indeed, a certain
sayyid [a respected person claiming descent from the prophet Muhammad] of Central
Asia entered the service of Ögedei, who hired Muslim merchants in sizeable numbers
as ortoqs and administrators (Juvaynī 1958, 224).
 CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY 535

Another currency circulating in the eastern part of the empire from an early period was
a form of paper money that later became legal tender, commonly known as chao, in the
Yuan Empire in the second half of the thirteenth century. This paper currency was initially
issued on a very limited scale and circulated only within the domains of Mongol elites and
local rulers of Northern China. Under Qubilai’s reign, a unified monetary system was
created based on a new paper currency, Zhongtong chao (von Glahn 2010, 482; Vogel
2013, 96). By the second half of the thirteenth century, the Yuan government’s invest-
ments in business partnerships in China used paper currency (Song 1976, 17, 365). The
chao paper currency was freely exchangeable with silver, which meant that long-distance
traders were not constrained to using the chao. Furthermore, the Song and Jin dynasties
had already introduced paper currency in China prior to the Mongols, so the local popu-
lace was already accustomed to paper currency as legal tender. In contrast, a partnership
investment using paper currency seems not to have been possible in the Islamic world.
The Mongols’ abortive attempt in 1294 to introduce paper currency into Mongol Iran
clearly demonstrated a lack of trust in the chao in that part of the world, whereas faith
in gold and silver ingots as a medium of exchange was maintained. Paper currency was
used in partnership investments only in the territories of the Yuan Empire.
There seem to have been no special rules regarding the kinds of capital used for com-
mercial ventures in the early Mongol Empire. The capital that financed business partner-
ships comprised not only money or liquid funds but also various sorts of goods. This
was a major deviation from the Islamic financial principles of the mudharaba, in which
only cash was accepted for a partnership investment, in accordance with the requirements
of Islamic legal authorities. Only the Mālikī school of Sunni Islam recognized the validity of
partnership investments in the form of goods (Udovitch 1970, 151–52). Mālikī legal auth-
orities accepted partnership investments in the form of goods, excepting certain commod-
ities, such as wine and pork, to solve the problems caused by the Islamic doctrine
(Udovitch 1970, 155). In the Islamic lands, probably due to various legally grounded excep-
tions, Muslims entered into contracts in which goods were invested as capital. Meanwhile,
medieval European merchants, who recognized the practical needs and who were less
constrained, freely accepted partnership investments in the form of goods (Pryor 1977,
31). The Mongol economy was largely based on animal husbandry and hunting from an
early period and, even at its peak, the rural economy of Mongolia proper remained
focused on the nomadic pastoralism and barter that prevailed among the steppe
nomads (Dalai 1992, 84–105; Natsagdorj and Dalai 2003, 252). In this situation, the for-
mation of partnerships involving goods tended to occur between a merchant whose prop-
erty was tied up in goods, which could not be easily sold in the steppe, and a powerful
nomad who lacked adequate liquid funds.
In the thirteenth to the early fourteenth century, a partnership investment that com-
prised a mix of different varieties of goods and money was often initiated, for which
the caravan of Chinggis Khan and his family forms a well-known example. Chinggis
Khan, his family and his Mongol commanders supplied their ortoqs with gold, silver, silk,
various kinds of textiles and fabrics, pelts, and silver and gold ingots to trade with the
Muslim traders of Khwārazm (Ibn Battuta 1988, 94; Juvaynī 1958, 78–79; Juzjānī 1881,
967; Rashid al-Din 1998, 228). Unfortunately, this first-recorded business partnership of
the Mongols ended in failure when a Khwārazmian governor of the frontier town of
Utrar murdered the ortoqs in 1218. In Vas s āf’s account, there are several examples of
536 E. ENKHBOLD

Mongol–ortoq partnerships in which the investment was in goods. An act of aggression

committed during the war between Chinggis Khan’s grandsons Berke and Hülegü is nar-
rated by Vas s āf as follows:
After the sovereign [Hülegü], who is a lightning bolt to his enemies, safely retired to his camp,
he ordered the execution of all ortoqs of Berke oghul, who were engaged in trade and com-
merce in Tabriz and owned numerous properties and wealth, and to seize any property
[of the ortoqs] to be found for the treasury. Among them there were many who entrusted
capital and goods to the influential people of Tabriz. After they [the ortoqs] were killed,
their property remained in the hands of those people to whom it was entrusted. In retaliation,
Berke oghul also killed merchants [who came to his realm] from the lands that belonged to
the khan’s [Hülegü’s] possessions, and began to treat them in the same manner.
(Vas s āf al-H.az̤rat 1853, 50)

Vas s āf, a native of Shiraz, was a fiscal administrator in Fars during the Il-khanid period,
and therefore very well acquainted with ortoqs and tax farmers. Vas s āf’s history of the
Mongols can be considered reliable because major sections of his work were submitted
to two successive Muslim Il-khans, Ghazan and Öljeitü. It seems that, according to the evi-
dence provided by Vas s āf, the merchant partners of two Mongol rulers travelled long dis-
tances between Persian Azerbaijan and the Volga region, indicating that ortoqs were
caravan traders in the thirteenth century and that the capital contributed by the two
Chinggisid leaders to business ventures was a combination of goods and cash. Vas s āf
also gives another clear example of a mixed investment, which can be found in the
section concerning the Il-khan’s embassy to the Qaghan Temür in approximately 1297:
The exalted governor Fakhr al-Dīn Ah mad was appointed as ambassador to Temür Qaghan in
the year A.H. 697, by the order of Ghazan Khan, the just king, and was accompanied by Noqai
elchi, who carried Ghazan’s oral instruction, jewels, expensive garments with the royal pat-
terns, deer-hunting leopards, and many other valuables and wares as the tribute which
were worthy of his royal acceptance, and fitted for his glorious palace. Then, ten tūmān of
gold were given to him [Fakhr al-Dīn] from the chief treasury, which were combined with
the tribute mentioned above, to be employed as the capital in trade. Malik Fakhr al-Dīn sup-
plied the ships [jahāzat] and jūnk for this voyage, and other commodities suited to [the
qaghan], which belonged to Shaykh-i Islam Jamāl al-Dīn, and to his friends and relatives.
(Vas s āf al-H.az̤rat 1853, 505; Qiu 2016, 384)

Just as the ortoqs of the Golden Horde were engaged in commerce with the capital
advanced by Berke, Ghazan’s ortoq received capital in the form of money and goods,
but with one marked difference. Hülegü and Berke’s merchant partners took overland
routes in the 1260s, whereas the Il-khan’s ortoq travelled by sea in the late thirteenth
century. In the second half of the thirteenth century, part of the ortoq trade shifted to mar-
itime channels of the Indian Ocean (Yokkaichi 2019, 432). During this period, the govern-
ment of the Yuan Empire was making special efforts to develop maritime commercial
ventures. Several reasons can be suggested for this change, including the Mongol con-
quest of Song China, the Yuan-Il-khanid alliance, threats to overland routes from
Mongol Central Asia, and cheaper water transportation. Nevertheless, many travellers
and merchants still preferred to take overland trade routes during the Mongol era.
The evidence presented enables some important observations. First, Mongol leaders
regularly contracted mixed investment partnerships involving a combination of goods
and money, and continued to do so even after the monetization of major taxes, such as
 CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY 537

qubchur and tamgha. Second, the kinds of goods that were invested in a Mongol–ortoq
partnership consisted primarily of valuable textiles and jewels which could be advanta-
geously sold in the markets. In principle, most valuable commodities could help constitute
a partnership investment. Later in the thirteenth century, the Yuan government occasion-
ally banned the export of base and precious metals, silk, bamboo and weapons (Endicott-
West 1989, 139; Tai 2016, 34), which prevented their use as tradable commodities. In con-
trast, the situation seems to have been much more flexible concerning items for business
partnerships in the Il-khanate. Third, the evidence cited from the war between Berke and
Hülegü demonstrates that an ortoq was permitted to enter into several partnerships sim-
ultaneously. It also suggests that there were no barriers for them to establish a partnership
with a third party with the capital of the already contracted partnership. Likewise, the evi-
dence cited concerning the wealthy merchant Fakhr al-Dīn clearly implies that he might
have entered separately into several partnerships with his father, relatives and friends. It
is also possible that this partnership was contracted involving one travelling partner
and several investors. Furthermore, there is additional evidence in this second case that
an ortoq could invest additional capital of his own to that of his investor. Broadly speaking,
this kind of partnership is in the category of the inan partnership for Muslims.2 Each
partner was authorized to invest different amounts in an inan partnership and was respon-
sible for any obligation jointly undertaken with the other partner for the business purpose.
An inan partner needed the permission of his colleague to invest their joint property in
another partnership (Udovitch 1970, 120–121, 140). It is not clear whether the Mongols
ever legally implemented a similar practice. Rashid al-Din (1998, 337) tells how Ögedei
declined the request of his deceased brother Tolui’s widow, Sorghaqtani, when the
latter wanted to employ one of his ortoqs. After hearing complaints from Sorghaqtani,
Ögedei finally agreed to transfer the ortoq to her service. This suggests that the consent
of an investor was required for ortoqs who worked for the qaghan prior to forming a
new partnership with a third party.
Italian merchants also had their own commercial techniques of maritime and land
trade. Many of them served as courtiers, diplomats, ortoqs, shipwrights or auxiliary
troops for Mongol khans (Petech 1962). Although we know too little about their commer-
cial activities in Mongol-held territories, it is possible that they used various commercial
practices in Asia during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. A partnership in which
both parties supplied capital was known as either collegantia or societas in the Italian
city-states. These partnerships are usually referred to as bilateral commenda in modern his-
toriography. In the bilateral commenda, an agent becomes a partner by investing capital
plus labour (Cosman and Jones 2008, 206). The arrangements of a bilateral commenda per-
mitted a travelling partner to add additional capital while travelling. In the same way, rein-
vestment of revenues from the sale of goods was allowed in Islamic partnerships (Udovitch
1970, 132–133), which appears similar to what was possible for ortoqs, as evidenced by the
arrangements of the Il-khan Ghazan’s ortoq Fakhr al-Dīn.
Many medieval trade contracts, such as mudharaba and commenda, were contracted
for the duration of an expedition. The maximum time of validity of a Mongol–ortoq part-
nership is not entirely clear. There is some evidence that the partnership contract expired
when ortoqs paid back the principal amount of an investment and a share of profits. Marco
Polo’s father Niccolò and uncle Maffeo were free to leave the Golden Horde after they suc-
cessfully sold wares entrusted to them by the Mongol leader Berke (Marco Polo 1938, 75).
538 E. ENKHBOLD

Maritime merchants of the Yuan Empire were apparently contracted for the duration of a
single voyage. The merchants were presumably exempted from financial obligations at
the expiration of a voyage as long as they paid out a share of the profits to the government
(Song 1976, 43, 2402). On the other hand, some trusted and experienced ortoqs might
have been continuously employed by their Mongol investors, since the duration of
these partnerships was at the will of the partners.
An ortoq carrying a paiza (badge) or jarliq (edict) was entitled to exact provisions and
mounts from postal relay stations, especially if travelling as an envoy of Mongol rulers.
The empire’s settled subjects paid silver ingots and cash to finance these stations, while
attached households and Mongol troops maintained the operation of the whole relay
system. Another advantage of being an official ambassador of Mongol leaders was
access to regular food and a daily allowance. Some Mongol leaders, such as Möngke,
Qubilai, Ghazan and Ayurbarwada, tried to restrict the special privileges enjoyed by the
ortoq, including the use of relay mounts and provisions, and made them subject to
taxes (Atwood 2004, 429). But their edicts were frequently ignored, and many merchants
wilfully evaded taxation and freely used relay stations in Mongol realms.
Apart from postal relays, the Mongols provided other means of transportation support
to ortoqs. Juzjānī alludes to a case wherein Chinggis Khan and his associates gave 500
camels to their merchant-envoys for a mission dispatched to Central Asia (Juzjānī 1881,
966). It is not clear how an ortoq acting on behalf of a non-sovereign investor financed
travel expenses. An agent while travelling was permitted to deduct all legitimate expenses,
including taxes and food, from the capital in a mudharaba or commenda. It is probable that
the same principles were applied to ortoqs.
Although a Mongol–ortoq partnership was initially used for long-distance land-based
commerce, all the Mongol khanates that bordered seas began to use partnerships for mar-
itime trade starting from the second half of the thirteenth century. The Yuan government
established a joint venture practice whereby it provided capital and ships to merchants to
undertake maritime trade. Chinggis Khan’s grandson Qubilai spent 100,000 silver ingots to
build government ships for merchant partners in 1285 (Deng 1999, 122), and his allies fol-
lowed his lead in Mongol Iran. For example, as mentioned before, Ghazan’s ortoq Fakhr al-
Dīn supplied ships for his voyage (Vas s āf al-H.az̤rat 1853, 505). An investor could claim
shares in ships in a commenda which was used for seaborne trade. A trading vessel was
collectively shared by investors in the form of the carati partnerships in Genoa and
Venice in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (Çizakça 1996, 27). The terms of more soph-
isticated forms of contracts, such as colonna and rhederij, stipulated that several partners
shared the ownership of a ship, and that profits from the enterprise were to be divided
among the partners accordingly at the end of the voyage. A very similar commercial prac-
tice already existed in Eastern Asia. In Song China, wealthy merchants and investors
employed their private vessels for maritime partnerships (Lin 2013, 229).

Partnership activities
Money-lending
The ortoq’s deep involvement in money-lending can be ascertained from Chinese and
Persian historical records. Contemporary authors make it clear that merchants were
 CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY 539

held in ill repute for their money-lending contracts in Mongol times (Allsen 1989, 99;
Rashid al-Din 1998, 724–26). Various loan forms had long been available in Asia and
Europe, but Christian and Muslim religious doctrine banned the charging of interest on
loans, which was considered usury. Business partnerships like mudharaba or commenda
can be seen as means to avoid such usury restrictions, although it appears that a few
Muslims and Christians were prepared to risk practices involving usury. Vas s āf al-H.az̤rat
(1853, 225) briefly tells about a Muslim merchant from Persia who amassed a huge
fortune, much of it by means of transactions involving usury. Similarly, a Syriac Christian,
Simeon Rabban Ata, was once described as a money-lender by a contemporary (de Saint
Quentin 1965, 30). Simeon was a physician who won the respect of the Mongols in Trans-
caucasia, and even his commercial interests were protected by the qaghan. Thus, the ortoq
community was composed of many ethnic groups with different religious beliefs, with
most coming from Central and Western Asia. Lending money at interest was an insepar-
able part of their business. In contrast, in the Islamic world and in Europe, medieval part-
nerships were chiefly concerned with trade and entrepreneurship. Mongol leaders closely
cooperated with merchants to profit from investments. The Muslim khan of the Golden
Horde, Özbeg, whose reign was marked by the Islamic high culture of the Qipchaq
steppe, commanded merchants at Sarai to lend 20,000 gold dinars to a Mamluk ambassa-
dor when the latter lacked the funds to pay for a bride intended for his sultan (Tizengau-
zen 1884, 169). The ambassador borrowed another 7,000 dinars to organize a feast.
However, it is not entirely clear whether the loan was expected to be paid by the
Mamluks with interest. The Mongols encouraged their ortoqs to lend money at interest
from early on at the other end of the empire in Eastern Asia. For instance, Otagi (1973,
16–18) and Allsen (1989, 99–101) ascribed the rapid growth in debts in Northern China
to Mongol tax policies. It appears that ortoqs saw opportunities to enrich themselves
through money-lending at interest. When in the 1230s the Mongol government
imposed various categories of taxes and levies on Northern China, to be paid in silver,
silk and grain, and in the early 1250s a new silver tax, baoyin, which was assessed on
the basis of households, the Chinese urban dwellers and peasants who did not have
silver had to heavily borrow from ortoqs, which led to further impoverishment in the
former Jin territories already affected by war (Peng and Xu 2016, 34–36; Song 1976,
155, 3659).
Usury involving money-lending at interest (Mongolian: asiq) seems to have been a stan-
dard practice. Ortoqs lent gold and silver ingots and cash invested by their Mongol patrons
at unreasonably high rates of interest to whoever needed money, from ordinary individ-
uals to local government officials and other merchants. The biographer of the Sino-
Khitan administrator Yelü Chucai set out the interest rates involved: ‘Their debt doubled
in a year, and again doubled in the following year together with the [loan] interest’; and
Peng Daya detailed that: ‘one ding [a silver ingot] of capital will be 1,024 ding [silver
ingots] in ten years’ (Peng and Xu 2016, 85; Su 1962, 57). Moreover, in the Official
History of the Yuan Dynasty (Yuan Shi), it is briefly stated: ‘Officials and the people borrowed
the hui-hui gold to pay official [taxes], and annually [the debt] doubled. This is called lamb
interest’ (Song 1976, 2, 37). Based on this evidence, it appears that loan interest was com-
pounded annually and that interest rates stood at 100%. In 1240, the interest accruing
yearly was limited to the loan principal amount (Song 1976, 2, 37). The government of
the Yuan Empire attempted to mandate a 3% interest rate for both government and
540 E. ENKHBOLD

private loans (Song 1976, 2, 37). Loan contracts discovered at Dunhuang suggest that the
enforcement of this mandatory interest rate was unsuccessful, with annual interest rates of
200–300% found for some private loans (Yang 1990, 80).
The time frame of an ortoq loan is not clear at all. Although Peng Daya speaks of ‘ten
years’ in the passage about trade in his account, this is possibly no more than a metaphor
to indicate the heavy burden on the conquered Chinese under Mongol rule (Peng and Xu
2016, 35). Private loan contracts often lasted for few months. It is also probable, however,
that merchants wanted to exploit borrowers by taking large amounts of money for interest
payments over a long period of time, as Allsen suggested earlier (1989, 99). Perhaps for the
same reason, Chinese sources tend to allude to a period of more than one year for loans
received from ortoqs. Consumption loan terms were generally similar across contracts, as
seen in private loan documents from Dunhuang and Qara-Qota. When a borrower died,
the responsibility for paying back any loan was transferred to the family, and repayment
was often guaranteed by a third party such as the borrower’s family or close friends. As
stipulated in some of these contracts, a borrower could pledge some real estate as collat-
eral for the loan (Yang 1990, 78–81; Cleaves 1955, 1–49), and land could be taken if a bor-
rower defaulted. Concerning standard loan practices of the same period, we can surmise
that ortoq loan contracts operated in a similar fashion. As Rashid al-Din (1998, 724–26)
notes, loans could lead to abuse and corruption, and loan defaulters could lose their
homes, with families becoming tied to debt bondage. It is highly likely that money-
lenders would not readily accept that debts had been repaid through the labour service
of the loan defaulter and the family involved but would demand ongoing labour
service, because the protection of borrowers’ rights was extremely weak, as described
in Chinese and Persian sources (Song 1976, 155, 3659; Rashid al-Din 1998, 725).

Trade
An ortoq (active partner) conducted trade using either capital advanced by an investor (or
investing partner) or his own wealth. Ortoqs who traded on their own initiative were not
distinctively different from regular medieval merchants selling wares (Jackson 2017, 220).
Merchants who received capital from the Mongols, therefore, are important for my study
purpose as they formed trade partnerships with their investors. The commercial character-
istics of a trade partnership can be seen through an examination of the ortoqs’ trade pro-
cedures. As indicated, the ortoqs not only traded in various goods but also received them
as a partnership investment. Merchant partners, trading on the behalf of their investors,
converted received capital in three ways: through exchanging one good for another
good, through converting goods into cash and other liquid assets, and through purchasing
goods using money.
Ortoqs exchanged goods for other goods mostly at the orders of their investors. In
approximately 1218, Chinggis Khan commanded his ortoqs to engage in commerce and
buy precious wares for him, his family, and his Mongol commanders. Although Juvaynī
says the Mongols’ investment comprised gold and silver ingots, Juzjānī and Ibn Battuta
add that Chinggis Khan gave commodities brought from the Jin Empire to his merchants
(Ibn Battuta 1988, 94; Juzjānī’ 1881, 966). In the absence of money, trade through barter is
more common and played a principal role in the Mongol economy in the early days of the
empire, when coins and ingots were rare. It is highly likely that the exchange of goods, in
 CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY 541

many instances, involved cash and liquid assets as a medium. When a trader possessing a
good that an ortoq desired was not interested in his wares, an effective strategy for the
ortoq was to sell his wares for money and spend the sales revenue to buy that particular
good. This exchange method could be helpful because the cash realized from the sale
could be invested in a business partnership.
The Mongols employed merchant partners to sell commodities to earn income. For
example, Mongol noble ladies in Iran, known as khatuns, invested a share of the war
booty given to them in capital used by their ortoqs (Rashid al-Din 1998, 701, 732). The
ortoqs became key economic agents of aristocratic Mongol women, and Persian locals
gave their sons as ortoqs in the service of the Mongol ladies and dignitaries in return
for small earnings. Ortoqs helped the Mongol ladies convert war booty, including
objects and goods, into money, through which they could engage in luxury consumption
and earn income. In the Yuan Empire, a similar pattern prevailed under state patronage on
a much larger scale. The Yuan government provided ships and capital to selected mer-
chants to trade in all kinds of goods overseas and share the profits (Song 1976, 94,
2402). Capital provided by the Yuan government consisted of money as well as various
wares.
Ortoqs purchased goods with money from the Mongols for two major purposes: con-
sumption and trade. In this regard, ortoqs served as both middlemen and business part-
ners for the Chinggisids. Mongol elites were eager to possess and consume rare and
marvellous objects and luxuries, collectively known as tanqsuq. For instance, Chinggis
Khan and his family invested silver and gold ingots in the caravan to buy the marvellous
wares of Khwārazm. Another motivation was to earn income from the resale of goods. In
the Yuan Empire, the government supplied merchants with cash to engage in trade and
commerce (Song 1976, 17, 365), and merchant partners spent the money to purchase
various sorts of goods with the intention of reselling them to generate more profits.
Those merchants were not identified as ortoq in the primary source but their activities
closely correspond to those of the ortoq. It is likely that the merchants did not belong
to the ortoq community but to another category of ordinary merchants trading with gov-
ernment funds. This example illustrates, in any case, that the Mongol government was
active in organizing and financing overseas trading ventures. In the Il-khanate, merchants
and speculators borrowed money to invest in goods for resale. Rashid al-Din (1998, 724)
testifies that some ortoqs invested their capital in weaponry and horses and earned hand-
some profits from trade with the Il-khan Abagha’s court.
Buying and selling on credit was a widespread commercial practice in Mongol domains.
In the Islamic World, in many business partnerships, neither partner was required to ask
permission of the other for a credit sale of their joint capital. It seems likely ortoqs also
needed no authorization from an investor because they were autonomous in conducting
trade. The difference between the price at which a good was sold on credit and the price at
which the same good was sold for cash was intended to serve as a premium to compen-
sate merchants for the commercial risks involved in trade (Udovitch 1967, 262). However,
this practice was prone to abuse and fraud rather than acting as a real reflection of the
risk–return trade-off.
The commercial knowledge of Central and Western Asian administrators and mer-
chants played an important part in the development of payment methods and commer-
cial practices in the Mongol Empire. One commercial technique was a written order of
542 E. ENKHBOLD

trade or a bill of exchange. While there were some cases where a credit sale was con-
ducted without using a bill of exchange, the widespread use of this payment method gen-
erally boosted buying and selling on credit among the Mongols. Mongol rulers, aristocrats
and courtiers made use of these bills of exchange for various purposes, such as purchasing
merchandise and weapons and bestowing gifts on their acquaintances (Juvaynī 1958, 259,
267, 508, 512, 603). Revenues from conquered territories backed these orders through the
confirmation order known as barat. The Chinese had long used bills of exchange (‘flying
money’) to transfer large sums of tax money from one place to another (Lieber 1968,
234). In the Yuan Empire, buying on credit was likewise very common at the Mongol
court, and Mongol aristocrats possibly used the same payment method to buy goods
from merchants and ortoqs. Due to limited provincial revenues, these orders were not
always honoured, and it seems that Mongol elites wrote numerous bills of exchange in
excess of the actual revenue capacity of the subject peoples (Juvaynī 1958, 603; Rashid
al-Din 1998, 603).

Profit-sharing and liability

In the development of commerce, the creation of limited liability ensured the separation of
private property from assets utilized for a commercial venture. Some types of ancient com-
mercial contracts are believed to be predecessors of modern companies (Çizakça 1996, 23;
Sándor 2009, 85). Thus, it may be revealing to look more deeply into the risk-sharing struc-
tures of Mongol–ortoq partnerships. This approach enables a comparison of ortoq oper-
ations with other forms of medieval partnerships, and highlights specific commercial
enterprise characteristics.
After deducting travel expenses, the Mongols and their merchant partners divided the
profits using a predetermined ratio. In the early years of Qubilai’s reign, a principal received
a mere one-tenth of the profits earned; the ortoq received the rest (Otagi 1973, 15). In
1284, the Yuan government provided capital and ships to merchants, receiving 70% of
the profits while merchants received the other 30% (Allsen 1989, 118). The status of the
merchants is not specified clearly in the relevant passage of the Official History of the
Yuan Dynasty, but historians consider them to be ortoq merchants (Chaffee 2018, 128;
Qiu 2016, 386). In both mudharaba and commenda agreements, profit and loss were simi-
larly divided. The terms of mudharaba and commenda contracts authorized deducting
travel and operating expenses from revenues earned, so that any remaining amount or
profit was split between the parties. There were many variations in profit sharing. In a uni-
lateral commenda in which only a home-staying partner (commendator) provided capital
to a travelling partner (tractator) a ratio of one-fourth to three-fourths had prevailed
(Çizakça 1996, 13). On the other hand, different variations of profit- and loss-sharing
ratio were used in a mudharaba, from 1:3 to 19:20 (Pryor 1977, 30).
Evidence of the liability borne by the Mongols or their partners is extremely fragmen-
tary. Lin (2013, 229) claimed that it is unclear whether the ortoq were granted any form of
entity or owner-shielding due to a lack of historical sources. I contend that there is primary
source evidence that the concept of liability existed among the Mongols. Identical to the
modern concept of equity financing, partnership investment represented an ownership
interest and liability in a Mongol–ortoq partnership. Juvaynī’s work alludes to some
examples of Ögedei’s investment activities associated with the ortoq. A clear example of
 CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY 543

partnership capital can be seen in Ögedei’s treatment of an ortoq whose identity was not
provided. The qaghan continued to invest in enterprises conducted by the ortoq despite
the latter’s repeated failures (Juvaynī 1958, 209). That ortoq’s irregular appearances at the
ordo [mobile encampment or headquarters of a Mongol ruler] are in sharp contrast with a
conventional loan payment schedule, in which payments were usually made at regular
intervals. According to Juvaynī (1958, 210), that ortoq spent the capital supplied by the
qaghan on worthless persons (most likely defaulting borrowers and fraudsters), and on
basic survival. In this example, Ögedei bore all liability for any losses, while his ortoq
bore no liability for the loss of capital. Rashīd al-Dīn (1998, 725) reports that investors
could do nothing when merchant partners lost capital, and tried hard to compensate
their ortoqs. When Fakhr al-Dīn T ībī received capital from the Il-khan Ghazan, who was
against money-lending at interest, it seems unlikely that the capital was extended in
the form of a loan. Moreover, soon after Ghazan’s death, Fakhr al-Dīn also died while on
a return voyage from China to Iran (Qiu 2016, 396). Vas s āf’s silence on the T ībī family’s obli-
gations pertaining to the lost capital of the Il-khan suggests that Fakhr al-Dīn’s partnership
investment was made using equity arrangements. Thus, it can be hypothesized that, in a
Mongol–ortoq partnership, the principal bore losses up to the limit of the original invest-
ment amount. The principal’s liability could not, however, be extended to private property
other than a partnership investment. At the failure of a venture, the ortoq lost labour and
time but was not liable for any loss of capital. He could bear the loss of his investment only
when both partners contributed capital. These contractual features closely resemble other
medieval partnerships.
Allsen (1989, 118) has noted, however, that not all the features of a Mongol–ortoq part-
nership could be equated with a commenda (or qirad), but may have confused two kinds of
partnership capital: investment and loan. Liability restrictions for each partner of a com-
menda or mudharaba involved equity-like arrangements (Van Doosselaere 2012, 64). A
loan, by contrast, makes a borrower’s liability unlimited. Loan financing was adopted to
finance business partnerships when Ögedei and Möngke ruled the Mongol Empire.
Loan capital eventually became prevalent in Mongol–ortoq partnerships of the Yuan
Empire by the end of the thirteenth century. In the early years of Qubilai’s reign, the
Yuan government extended loans at 0.8% interest per month to the ortoq (Allsen 1989,
119). Rashid al-Din’s (1989, 725–27) account also suggests a similar pattern that prevailed
in the Il-khanate. It appears that the huge losses suffered by Mongol elites motivated
Mongol authorities to shift towards a risk-transfer model. For example, in 1240 the
Mongol government spent 76,000 ding of silver to bail out ortoqs who would otherwise
have suffered a huge loss (Allsen 1989, 102). Consequently, ortoqs were completely
liable for the loans they took, which extended beyond partnership capital to their
private properties, meaning that ortoq borrowers had to pay back the principal and inter-
est as required. There was a long-established tradition among the Uighurs and Chinese
that either a close friend or a relative of a debtor usually became a guarantor or
hostage. In such cases, the guarantor unconditionally guaranteed the full payment of
the debt. When an ortoq had a guarantor, he was required to pay off the debt in the
event of default (Otagi 1973, 8) or face severe consequences. Properties could be
seized, and if they were insufficient to clear the debt, defaulters and their families were
taken into slavery (Rashid al-Din 1998, 726).
544 E. ENKHBOLD

Disciplinary actions were conducted in many ways. In one instance, Ögedei boycotted
the purchase of an ortoq’s goods sold in the market in retaliation for his failure to honour
contractual obligations (Juvaynī 1958, 224). The government’s tolerant approach to
dealing with a defaulting contractor gradually changed over time, with punishment for
defaulters confirmed in writing in 1295 (Endicott-West 1989, 149). Although not
specified, the punishment appears to have been severe. As a result, some ortoqs fled to
other regions, including to the Yuan dynasty’s vassal state, Goryeo, where imperial trade
regulations were relatively relaxed (Lee 2016, 60). However, the Mongols offered more
flexibility to ortoqs in practice, including debt-restructuring options, such as extending
the loan closing date and the postponement of interest payments (Otagi 1973, 8). More-
over, the Mongol court forgave interest when distressed borrowers failed to honour their
obligations to ortoqs (Otagi 1973, 8; Endicott-West 1989, 149). In addition to debt restruc-
turing, Mongolian authorities forced local officials to compensate ortoqs for all losses
resulting from borrowers’ default and flight (Otagi 1973, 16). In such situations, ordinary
civilians ultimately had to shoulder the losses, since local officials levied additional taxes
on them.

Conclusions
From the early years of Chinggis Khan’s reign over what became a vast empire, the Mongol
ruling class facilitated a massively subsidized trade policy within their domains, which
revived international trade along the ancient Silk Road. Prior to their conquest, the
Mongols had been largely isolated from major commercial centres. Subsequently, securing
a reliable supply of goods and valuables otherwise unavailable in the steppe became
essential. After establishing control over new trade routes, the Mongols formed business
partnerships with merchant partners. The Mongols offered them armed protection, secur-
ity and transport through postal relay stations, and furthermore guaranteed their goods if
they were lost.
The enforced purchase of goods at an elevated price by the Mongolian court quickly
attracted the interest of merchants in joining the ortoq system. Moreover, the silver,
gold and other wealth accumulated in the hands of the Mongol elites motivated ortoqs
to expand their business activities into the purchase of predominantly luxury goods, the
resale of items in high demand, and money-lending at exorbitant rates. Ortoqs and
their investors were prone to abuse the privileges afforded them. Enforced purchasing
placed a heavy fiscal burden on the empire while the subject populations were
weighed down with high taxes and excessively high interest rates charged on loans
extended by the ortoqs.
Some Mongol leaders made administrative and economic reforms, starting in the
second half of the thirteenth century, to curb the dangers arising from unfair business
practices. These reforms made ortoqs subject to official oversight and liable to taxation,
but the ortoq tax responsibility was often ignored in reality. Consequently, some commer-
cial activities carried out by the ortoqs were suspended, with credit sales and lending
money at interest prohibited in the Il-khanate. However, these reforms did not target
the whole ortoq system. After the 1270s, in the Yuan Empire and the Il-khanate, ortoq oper-
ations quickly expanded beyond long-distance land trade to maritime trade connecting
the Middle East and Eastern Asia.
 CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY 545

In a Mongol–ortoq partnership, a principal advanced capital to an ortoq with instruc-

tions to purchase or sell pre-identified goods at a selected destination. The ortoq, as an
agent, was supposed to carry out commercial activities with the capital provided and
share profits with the principal at a predetermined ratio. However, there are few examples
of variations in profit-sharing ratios. Perhaps only two variations of the ratios applied to
merchants working with the government are known. The contract for a Mongol–ortoq
partnership included the conception of liability. Analogous to the modern concept of
limited liability, the principal was liable for all losses up to the limit of the original invest-
ment, whereas an ortoq was not liable for the lost capital.
As the Mongols incurred greater financial losses, loan capital became dominant in
Mongol–ortoq partnerships. With loan capital, risks were shifted from the principal to
the ortoq. Thus, ortoqs who borrowed from the Mongols became completely liable for
loan capital used in a commercial venture. Although increasingly subject to stricter con-
trols and greater risks in relation to loan defaults, ortoqs remained a critical component
of the financial structure of the Mongol Empire, facilitating trade and investment, and
helping integrate Mongol elites into more sophisticated commercial practices.

Note
1. Ortaq in Turkic literally means ‘partner’ or ‘companion’ and has a wide semantic field. Its
Mongolian form ortoq is used in this article to designate merchants who received capital
from the Mongols and established business partnerships with them. Interestingly, contempor-
ary writers did not explicitly designate all merchants who either had a personal gift exchange
relationship with a high-status person or received funds from the state and wealthy individ-
uals as an ortoq. For example, Rashid al-Din did not apply the term to his merchant partners
in one of his personal letters (Rashid al-Din 1947, 182, 237). And besides the Mongol–ortoq
partnership, there were certainly other types of partnerships that existed in Mongol Eurasia
in the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries.
2. Inan is a type of Islamic business partnership. In H anafī law, this can be a partial investment
partnership involving mutual agency while, in Mālikī law, it is a partnership limited either to
a single commodity or a single transaction (Udovitch 1970, 274).

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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