Republic of the Philippines parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan

SUPREME COURT Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption
Manila (CIBAC), Gabriela’s Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine
Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party
(AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco
EN BANC
Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns
(ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety
G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009 below:

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND
TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS),Intervenor.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179295 April 21, 2009
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board
of Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had
officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of fifteen
million two hundred eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine
(15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of Representation, in
connection with the National and Local Elections conducted last 14 May
2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the
National Board of Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum total
party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven hundred
twenty three thousand one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes
given the following statistical data:

Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections

BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH
ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL
REFORMS, INC., and ABONO, Petitioners,
vs. i. Total party-list votes already 15,283,659
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. canvassed/tabulated

ii. Total party-list votes 1,337,032

DECISION
remaining uncanvassed/
untabulated (i.e. canvass
CARPIO, J.: deferred)

The Case iii. Maximum party-list votes 102,430

Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 — Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) — in a petition for certiorari
and mandamus,1 assails the Resolution2 promulgated on 3 August 2007 by
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The
COMELEC’s resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the
recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of
Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being
moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition
to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution.
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and
Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 — Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for
Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony
Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) — in a petition for certiorari
with mandamus and prohibition,3 assails NBC Resolution No. 07-
604 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial
proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at least
two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The
COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list
results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party,
organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v.
COMELEC5 (Veterans).
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the
Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos.
179271 and 179295.
(based on 100% outcome)
from areas not yet submitted
for canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais
City; Pantar, Lanao del Norte;
and Pagalungan,
Maguindanao)
Maximum Total Party-List 16,723,121
Votes
WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act)
provides in part:
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes: provided, finally, that each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of
party-list votes, the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold can be
pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two
(334,462)votes;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation Party
versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional seats of each party,
organization or coalition receving more than the required two percent
(2%) votes, stating that the same shall be determined only after all party-
list ballots have been completely canvassed;

The Facts
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far
garnered at least three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:
representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93
parties under the Party-List System.6
RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of COALITION RECEIVED
Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC
No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he 1 BUHAY 1,163,218
Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted
in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall 2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730
implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban
formula in allocating party-list seats."7 There were no intervenors in
3 CIBAC 760,260
BANAT’s petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July
2007.
4 GABRIELA 610,451

On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC

5 APEC 538,971
Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13)
 The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition
6 A TEACHER 476,036 shall be determined pursuant to Veterans Federation Party versus
COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.
7 AKBAYAN 470,872
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing
8 ALAGAD 423,076 Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred until final resolution of SPC No.
07-250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and academic.
9 BUTIL 405,052
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties,
10 COOP-NATCO 390,029 organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held
in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
11 BATAS 386,361
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a
12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036
copy thereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines.
13 ARC 338,194
SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis in the original)
14 ABONO 337,046

Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC,

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing
Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an URGENT PETITION FOR
CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF
PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining
Order) has been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250,
all the parties, organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned
list are therefore entitled to at least one seat under the party-list system of
representation in the meantime.
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution,
the Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos.
6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission on Elections,
sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to
PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below, the
following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the
Party-List System:
1 Buhay Hayaan BUHAY
Yumabong
promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional
seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELEC’s
interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-
72:
WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as
the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified
parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the presumptive two
percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected maximum
total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1)
guaranteed party-list seat each;
WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory
Committee of the National Board of Canvassers, the projected maximum
total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually
canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in Report No. 29, votes
received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao
del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the projected maximum total votes for
the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalition[s] are as
follows:

2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA

Party-List Projected total
number of votes
3 Citizens Battle Against CIBAC
Corruption
1 BUHAY 1,178,747
4 Gabriela Women’s GABRIELA
Party 2 BAYAN 977,476
MUNA
5 Association of APEC
Philippine Electric 3 CIBAC 755,964
Cooperatives
4 GABRIELA 621,718
6 Advocacy for Teacher A TEACHER
Empowerment
Through Action, 5 APEC 622,489
Cooperation and
Harmony Towards 6 A TEACHER 492,369
Educational Reforms,
Inc.
7 AKBAYAN 462,674

7 Akbayan! Citizen’s AKBAYAN

Action Party 8 ALAGAD 423,190

8 Alagad ALAGAD 9 BUTIL 409,298

9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL 10 COOP- 412,920

NATCO

10 Cooperative-Natco COOP-NATCCO
11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165
Network Party

11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS 12 ARC 375,846

13 ABONO 340,151
12 Alliance of Rural ARC
Concerns

13 Abono ABONO WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay)
obtained the highest number of votes among the thirteen (13) qualified
parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the "first party" in
accordance with Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC, reiterated
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;
organizations, or coalitions which may later on be established to have
obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating
Party-List System. under the party-list system of representation that have obtained one
guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats based on
the formula prescribed by the Supreme Court in Veterans;
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the
correct formula as expressed in Veterans, is:
NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution,
Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646,
7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en
bancsitting as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties, organizations or
coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to wit:

Number of votes of first Proportion of votes of

Party List Additional Seats
party first
= party relative to total
Total votes for party-list votes for BUHAY 2
system party-list system
BAYAN MUNA 1

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without CIBAC 1
rounding off) shall entitle it to additional seats:
GABRIELA 1

Proportion of votes received Additional seats APEC 1

by the first party

Equal to or at least 6%
Equal to or greater than 4% but
less than 6%
Two (2) additional This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties,
seats organizations or coalitions which may later on be established to have
obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the party-
One (1) additional list system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate
seat percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1) additional seat.

Less than 4% No additional seat Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties,
organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held
in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following
percentage:
Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this
Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines.
1,178,747
0.07248
=
or 7.2% SO ORDERED.9
16,261,369

Acting on BANAT’s petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-
which entitles it to two (2) additional seats. 88 on 3 August 2007, which reads as follows:

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
parties, organizations and coalitions, the correct formula as expressed Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed by the Barangay
in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows: Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).

Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National

No. of
Additional No. of votes of Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D.
additional
seats for concerned party Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his
seats
a = x comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)],
allocated
concerned No. of votes of which reads:
to first
party first party
party
COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows: Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of
Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the
Party List Percentage Additional Seat following reliefs, to wit:

BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1 1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List
representatives as mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the
CIBAC 1.28 1 Constitution shall be proclaimed.

GABRIELA 1.05 1 2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2%

threshold votes, should be harmonized with Section 5, Article VI
APEC 1.05 1 of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in
that it should be applicable only to the first party-list
A TEACHER 0.83 0 representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their
initial/first ranking.
AKBAYAN 0.78 0
3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and
ALAGAD 0.71 0
4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of
BUTIL 0.69 0 seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes they received and
the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with
COOP-NATCO 0.69 0 Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of
votes obtained by each party-list group in relation to the total
ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0 nationwide votes cast in the party-list election, after deducting
the corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats
ARC 0.63 0 under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure
prescribed in the "ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX
"A" of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall
ABONO 0.57 0 be used for [the] purpose of determining how many seats shall
be proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to
representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat
[sic].
 5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Issues
Republic Act No. 7941 and that the procedure in allocating seats
for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
7941 shall be followed.

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N:
provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, constitutional?
2007 re "In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of
the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List
3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed
System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections" resolved
by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
among others that the total number of seats of each winning party,
organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans
Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass 4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?16
of the party-list results."1awphi1
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers issues in their petition:
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the
recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to
I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National
DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and academic.
Board of Canvassers, committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in
the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as
said rule:
SO ORDERED.10

A. Violates the constitutional principle of

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in
proportional representation.
NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration
of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC,
acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as 1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First
stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is Party Rule in allocating additional seats for
violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). the "First Party" violates the principle of
On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proportional representation under RA
proceedings of the NBC.11 7941.

Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, 2. The use of two formulas in the allocation
the COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified of additional seats, one for the "First Party"
parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: and another for the qualifying parties,
Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP), 12 Anak violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.
Mindanao (AMIN),13 and An Waray.14 Per the certification15by COMELEC,
the following party-list organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May
3. The proportional relationships under
2008:
the First Party Rule are different from
those required under RA 7941;
Party-List No. of Seat(s)
C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the
1.1 Buhay 3 Philippine party-list system as provided for under the
same case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v.
1.2 Bayan Muna 2 COMELEC.

1.3 CIBAC 2 II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
1.4 Gabriela 2 jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the
allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations, the same
1.5 APEC 2 being merely in consonance with the ruling in Veterans
Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is a
1.6 A Teacher 1 justiciable case as the issues involved herein are constitutional
in nature, involving the correct interpretation and
1.7 Akbayan 1 implementation of RA 7941, and are of transcendental
importance to our nation.17
1.8 Alagad 1
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of
1.9 Butil 1 the parties in these cases, we defined the following issues in our
advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1

1.11 Anak Pawis 1 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list

representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
1.12 ARC 1 Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?

1.13 Abono 1 2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941

constitutional?
1.14 AGAP 1
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section
1.15 AMIN 1 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing
Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an Urgent Petition for 4. How shall the party-list representative seats be
Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list allocated?
Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed
before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07- 5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political
250. parties from participating in the party-list elections?
 If not, can the major political parties be barred from
participating in the party-list elections?18
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-
list election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated
in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number
of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of
the total membership of the House of Representatives, including
those elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast
for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the
House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of
the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two
additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats
which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in
proportion to their total number of votes."19
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical
interpretation of the term "proportional representation," this Court is
compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to
party-list organizations.
Number of Party-List Representatives:
The Formula Mandated by the Constitution
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half
of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total
number of the members of the House of Representatives including those
under the party-list.
xxx
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The House of Representatives
shall be composed of district representatives and party-list
representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the
number of the members of the House of Representatives.1avvphi1.zw+
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the
ratio of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives.
We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives
from the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate
from the first formula in Veterans, thus:
Number of seats
Number of seats
available to legislative
available to
districts x .20
party-list
=
representatives
.80
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats
available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is
created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district
representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.
220
x .20 = 55
.80
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to
the total number of representatives, the Constitution left the manner of
allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the
wisdom of the legislature.
Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:
The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of
seats reserved under the Party-List System, as well as on the formula to
determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least
two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are numerous
interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation
of "additional seats" under the Party-List System. Veterans produced the
First Party Rule,20 and Justice Vicente V. Mendoza’s dissent
in Veterans presented Germany’s Niemeyer formula21 as an alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of
allocating the seats for party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A.
No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which
provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — x x x
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,22 the following
procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least
two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes:Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. —
The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or
coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of
votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately
according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization,
or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list
system. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three
formulas to allocate party-list representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section
11(b) on the 2% requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT
described this procedure as follows:
(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty
percent (20%) of the total Members of the House of
Representatives including those from the party-list groups as
prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11
(1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25
June 1996. Since there are 220 District Representatives in the
14th Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All
seats shall have to be proclaimed.
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for
every two per centum (2%) of the total party-list votes they
obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more
than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained
by the party-list groups under the immediately preceding
paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes
corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be
 allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups which have
not secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2% 12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872
threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941.23
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s first
interpretation. 14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846

15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751

The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote
requirement is declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for
party-list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT 16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522
states that the COMELEC:
17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or
coalitions on a nationwide basis; 18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837

19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478

(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according
to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization 21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624
or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the
party-list system.24
22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062

BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the 23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282
proportional percentage of the votes received by each party as against the
total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is "by making the votes of a
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512
party-list with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing
the allocation of seats."25 Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded
under BANAT’s second interpretation. 25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835

26 SENIOR 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098

In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the CITIZENS
COMELEC’s original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for
systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They
claim that both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted 27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938
for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject
the three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the 28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA 33,903
qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing the votes of ILONGGO
a qualified party by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The number
of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total 29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691
party-list seats available with the second percentage. There will be a first
round of seat allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the 30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896
equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned party-list.
After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat
31 ANG 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255
allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole
KASANGGA
integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the
basis of this ranking are allocated until all the seats are filled up. 26
32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA 29,130
PILIPINO
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list
representatives.
33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271

Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating 34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781
parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946

Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest 36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744
based on the number of votes garnered during the elections. 27
37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916

Votes Votes
Rank Party Rank Party 38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING 16,729
Garnered Garnered
PINOY

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868

39 ABANSE! 130,356 86 APO 16,421
PINAY
2 BAYAN 979,039 49 APOI 79,386
MUNA
40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG 16,241
BUKID
3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541
41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161
4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424
42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445
5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327
43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD 8,915
6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200 FILIPINA

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686 44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471

8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544 45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406

9 COOP- 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220 46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221

NATCCO
47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900
10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993

11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717 The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties,
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each." distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the
number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50
of votes cast for all party-list candidates.
million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party
that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a
Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one
of votes garnered over the total votes for the party-list.28 million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats.
Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will
repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats
Votes and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the
Garnered maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party,
over it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed
Votes Guaranteed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
Rank Party Total
Garnered Seat
Votes for
Party- We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the
List, in % distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI
of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible
2 BAYAN 979,039 6.14% 1 representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
MUNA Representatives."30

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the
9 COOP- 409,883 2.57% 1 ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
NATCCO proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated.
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
11 BATAS29 385,810 2.42% 1 more than three (3) seats.

12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be
included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
"additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the
absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 fractional seats.

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit
our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters.
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at
by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the
Total 17 total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in
the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by
the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0
maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17
guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a
party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are
completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the
second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to
From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is
least 2% from the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The entitled. Thus:
17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list
candidates that are "entitled to one seat each," or the guaranteed seat. In Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats
this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.

The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those Votes
Garnered
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to over
Guaranteed Additional (B) plus Applying
Seat Seats (C), in the
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." This is Rank Party
Votes Total
(First (Second whole three
Garnered Votes for
where petitioners’ and intervenors’ problem with the formula Party
Round) Round) integers seat cap
(B) (C) (D) (E)
in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion to their total List, in %
(A)
number of votes" to be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This
interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the 2

BAYAN
979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
MUNA
continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No.
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.
7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold
makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of 4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
available party list seats when the number of available party list seats
exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
 xxx
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not
limited to political parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for
example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties?
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A. Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under the district
legislation side of it only?
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.

COOP- MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the
931 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
NATCCO Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for
the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of
the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.

12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A. MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district
candidates and can also participate in the party list system?
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system,
they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.
party list system?
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A. who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution.
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group
and says that he represents the farmers, would he qualify?
21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.

22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.

23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A. MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system
and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A. farmer or not?

25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin
SENIOR
ito. Political parties, particularly minority political parties, are not
26 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.
CITIZENS prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove
that they are also organized along sectoral lines.
27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.

28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties
can participate because it is precisely the contention of political parties
29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.
that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are
represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na
ANG
31
KASANGGA
170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A. isang political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay
din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system.
32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa
marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito
33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A. sa political parties.

34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my
question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner
35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.
Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running
36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.
under the party list system?

Total 17 55 MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On
that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party
list system.
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above,
there are 55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that
organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional
answer?
seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole
seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in
column (D). MR. TADEO. The same.

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system xxxx

that allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list
elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear
this out, thus:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or
proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the political
system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are
for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the
sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a
ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that
can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.
MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political
parties and mass organizations to seek common ground. For example, we
have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not
be able to make common goals with mass organizations so that the very
leadership of these parties can be transformed through the participation of
mass organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this
will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed.
There is no question that they will be attractive to many mass
organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a
stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with their
participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed
because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the
mass organizations and the political parties to come together. And the
party list system is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties.
It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the
names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated with them. So
that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have in
Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example,
distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the
Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has
a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those
parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO
always vote with the Democratic Party. But the businessmen, most of them,
always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at
all why political parties and mass organizations should not combine,
reenforce, influence and interact with each other so that the very objectives
that we set in this Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in
a wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized way. Therefore, I support
this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral representation as
a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it challenges the sector to rise to
the majesty of being elected representatives later on through a party list
system; and even beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of
contesting political power in the wider constitutional arena for major
political parties.
xxx 32 (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the
Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House
of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition
may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form
part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for
the general conduct of government and which, as the most
immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a
regional party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof
whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and
concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a
coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical
attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered
national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political
and/or election purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any
party from dominating the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties
from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of
the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate
in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of
the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral
seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the
sectoral groups.33In defining a "party" that participates in party-list
elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also
clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-
list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties
from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the
law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or
form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political
purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party
participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng
Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties
can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To
further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to
participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its
fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the
same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A.
No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be nominated as
party-list representative unless he is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of
not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections,
able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day
of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of
the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five
(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during
his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list
organization’s nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity" 34 as
there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the
nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,35 that is, if the nominee
represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee
represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the
entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the
Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left
the determination of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress: "The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be
more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However,
we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which
will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the
number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy,
remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating
the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be
allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling
in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue
disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate
party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the
Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL)
as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare
unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional
party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List
System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this
Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in party-
list elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
PUNO, C.J.:
History has borne witness to the struggle of the faceless masses to find
their voice, even as they are relegated to the sidelines as genuine functional
representation systemically evades them. It is by reason of this underlying
premise that the party-list system was espoused and embedded in the
Constitution, and it is within this context that I register my dissent to the
entry of major political parties to the party-list system.
The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v.
Comelec1 with regard to the computation of seat allotments and the
participation of major political parties in the party-list system. I vote for
the formula propounded by the majority as it benefits the party-list system
but I regret that my interpretation of Article VI, Section 5 of the
Constitution with respect to the participation of the major political parties
in the election of party-list representatives is not in direct congruence with
theirs, hence this dissent.
To revisit the crux of the controversy, the pertinent portion of Article VI,
Section 5 of the Constitution reads:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half
of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. 2
It will be remembered that the petitioners in Ang Bagong Bayani sought
the disqualification of the major political parties on the ground that the
party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented, and not the mainstream political parties, the non-
marginalized or overrepresented. Rising to the occasion, the Court ruled
through then Associate, later Chief Justice Panganiban, that while any duly
registered political party, organization or group may participate, the role
of the Comelec is to ensure that only those who are marginalized and
underrepresented become members of Congress through the "Filipino-
style" party-list elections. Characterizing the party-list system as a social
justice vehicle, the Court batted for the empowerment of the masses,
thus—
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our
midst are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It
was for them that the party-list system was enacted — to give them not
only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be
elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and
simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of
the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the
masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those
marginalized and underrepresented in the past — the farm hands, the
fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement — to
come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and
participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and
frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face.6
Everybody agrees that the best way to interpret the Constitution is to
harmonize the whole instrument, its every section and clause. 7 We should
strive to make every word of the fundamental law operative and avoid
rendering some words idle and nugatory.8 The harmonization of Article VI,
Section 5 with related constitutional provisions will better reveal the
intent of the people as regards the party-list system. Thus, under Section 7
of the Transitory Provisions,9 the President was permitted to fill by
appointment the seats reserved for sectoral representation under the
party-list system from a list of nominees submitted by the respective
sectors. This was the result of historical precedents that saw how the
elected Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa and the regular
Batasang Pambansa tried to torpedo sectoral representation and delay the
seating of sectoral representatives on the ground that they could not rise
to the same levelled status of dignity as those elected by the
people.101avvphi1 To avoid this bias against sectoral representatives, the
President was given all the leeway to "break new ground and precisely
plant the seeds for sectoral representation so that the sectoral
representatives will take roots and be part and parcel exactly of the
process of drafting the law which will stipulate and provide for the concept
of sectoral representation."11 Similarly, limiting the party-list system to the
marginalized and excluding the major political parties from participating
in the election of their representatives is aligned with the constitutional
mandate to "reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove
cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for
the common good";12 the right of the people and their organizations to
effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and
economic decision-making;13 the right of women to opportunities that will
enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the
service of the nation;14 the right of labor to participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits in keeping
with its role as a primary social economic force; 15 the right of teachers to
professional advancement;16 the rights of indigenous cultural communities
to the consideration of their cultures, traditions and institutions in the
formulation of national plans and policies,17 and the indispensable role of
the private sector in the national economy.18
There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to
our traditional political parties in the political arena. This is borne out in
the party-list elections held in 2001 where major political parties were
initially allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the
fear expressed by some commissioners in the Constitutional
Commission19 that major political parties would figure in the
disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties which
participated, the seven major political parties20 made it to the top 50. These
seven parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total number of votes
counted, yielding an average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155
parties (including those whose qualifications were contested) only
obtained 90.45% or an average of 0.58% each. Of these seven, three
parties21 or 42.8% of the total number of the major parties garnered more
than 2% of the total number of votes each, a feat that would have entitled
them to seat their members as party-list representatives. In contrast, only
about 4% of the total number of the remaining parties, or only 8 out of the
155 parties garnered more than 2%.22

Today, less than a decade after, there is an attempt to undo the democratic
In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people
victory achieved by the marginalized in the political arena in Ang Bagong
at the time of the framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today.
Bayani. In permitting the major political parties to participate in the party-
It is through the party-list system that the Constitution sought to address
list system, Mr. Justice Carpio relies on the deliberations of the
this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized
Constitutional Commission. Allegedly, the said deliberations indicate that
how the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be
the party-list system is open to all political parties, as long as they field
frustrated by the traditional political parties who have the machinery and
candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors.3 Buttressing
chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow major political
his view, Mr. Justice Carpio notes that the major political parties also fall
parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will
within the term "political parties" in the Definition of Terms in Republic
surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty
Act 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.4 Likewise, he
and betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will
holds that the qualifications of a party-list nominee as prescribed in Section
serve as the graveyard of the party-list system.
9 of the said law do not specify any financial status or educational
requirement, hence, it is not necessary for the party-list nominee to
"wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity."5 It is then concluded that IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the entry of major
major political parties may now participate in the party-list system. political parties into the party-list system.

With all due respect, I cannot join this submission. We stand on solid REYNATO S. PUNO
grounds when we interpret the Constitution to give utmost deference to Chief Justice
the democratic sympathies, ideals and aspirations of the people. More than
the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, these are expressed in
the text of the Constitution which the people ratified. Indeed, it is the intent
of the sovereign people that matters in interpreting the Constitution. In
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, we held:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and

proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be
had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary Republic of the Philippines
the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the SUPREME COURT
constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the Manila
individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179271 July 8, 2009
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND
TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS),Intervenor.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179295
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH
ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL
REFORMS, INC., and ABONO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
The House of Representatives, represented by Speaker Prospero C.
Nograles, filed a motion for leave to intervene in G.R. Nos. 179271 and
179295. The House of Representatives filed a motion for clarification in
intervention and enumerated the issues for clarification as follows:
A. There are only 219 legislative districts and not 220.
Accordingly, the alloted seats for party-list representation
should only be 54 and not 55. The House of Representatives
seeks clarification on which of the party-list representatives
shall be admitted to the Roll of Members considering that the
Court declared as winners 55 party-list representatives.
B. The House of Representatives wishes to be guided on whether
it should enroll in its Roll of Members the 32 named party-list
representatives enumerated in Table 3 or only such number of
representatives that would complete the 250 member
maximum prescribed by Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution.
In the event that it is ordered to admit all 32, will this act not
violate the above-cited Constitutional provision considering
that the total members would now rise to 270.
C. The Court declared as unconstitutional the 2% threshold only
in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found in the
second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. Yet, it
distributed first seats to party-list groups which did not attain
the minimum number of votes that will entitle them to one seat.
Clarification is, therefore, sought whether the term "additional
seats" refer to 2nd and 3rd seats only or all remaining available
seats. Corollary thereto, the House of Representatives wishes to
be clarified whether there is no more minimum vote
requirement to qualify as a party-list representative.
D. For the guidance of the House of Representatives, clarification
is sought as to whether the principle laid down in Veterans that
"the filling up of the allowable seats for party-list
representatives is not mandatory," has been abandoned.1
On the other hand, Armi Jane Roa-Borje (Roa-Borje), third nominee of
Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), filed a motion for leave for
partial reconsideration-in-intervention, alleging that:
The Supreme Court, in ruling on the procedure for distribution of seats, has
deprived without due process and in violation of the equal protection
clause, parties with more significant constituencies, such as CIBAC,
Gabriela and APEC, in favor of parties who did not even meet the 2%
threshold.2
Following the Court’s Decision of 21 April 2009, the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) submitted to this Court on 27 April 2009 National
Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 09-001. NBC Resolution No. 09-
001 updated the data used by this Court in its Decision of 21 April 2009.
The total votes for party-list is now 15,723,764 following the cancellation
of the registration of party-list group Filipinos for Peace, Justice and
Progress Movement (FPJPM). Moreover, the total number of legislative
districts is now 219 following the annulment of Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Thus,
the percentage and ranking of the actual winning party-list groups are
different from Table 3 of the Decision in G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The Number of Members of the House of Representatives
in the 2007 Elections
Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
The 1987 Constitution fixes the maximum number of members of the
House of Representatives at 250. However, the 1987 Constitution
expressly allows for an increase in the number of members of the House of
Representatives provided a law is enacted for the purpose. This is clear
from the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law" in Section 5(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The Legislature has the option to
choose whether the increase in the number of members of the House of
Representatives is done by piecemeal legislation or by enactment of a law
authorizing a general increase. Legislation that makes piecemeal increases
of the number of district representatives is no less valid than legislation
that makes a general increase.
In 1987, there were only 200 legislative districts. Twenty legislative
districts were added by piecemeal legislation after the ratification of the
1987 Constitution:
Thus, for purposes of the 2007 elections, there were only 219 district
representatives. Navotas City became a separate district on 24 June 2007,
more than a month after the 14 May 2007 elections.
The Number of Party-List Seats
in the 2007 Elections
Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads in part:
The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party-list. x x x
The 1987 Constitution fixes the ratio of party-list representatives to
district representatives. This ratio automatically applies whenever the
number of district representatives is increased by law. The mathematical
formula for determining the number of seats available to party-list
representatives is
Number of seats
available Number of seats
to legislative available to
x .20 =
districts party-list
representatives
.80
As we stated in our Decision of 21 April 2009, "[t]his formula allows for
the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-
list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law."
Thus, for every four district representatives, the 1987 Constitution
mandates that there shall be one party-list representative. There is no need
for legislation to create an additional party-list seat whenever four
additional legislative districts are created by law. Section 5(2), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution automatically creates such additional party-list
seat.
We use the table below to illustrate the relationship between the number
of legislative districts and the number of party-list seats for every election
year after 1987.
We see that, as early as the election year of 1995, the total number of
members of the House of Representatives is already beyond the initial
maximum of 250 members as fixed in the 1987 Constitution.
Any change in the number of legislative districts brings a corresponding
change in the number of party-list seats. However, the increase in the
number of members of the House of Representatives went unnoticed as the
available seats for party-list representatives have never been filled up
before. As of the oral arguments in G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, there
were 220 legislative districts. Fifty-five party-list seats were thus allocated.
However, the number of legislative districts was subsequently reduced to
219 with our ruling on 16 July 2008 declaring void the creation of the
Province of Sharif Kabunsuan.3 Thus, in the 2007 elections, the number of
party-list seats available for distribution should be correspondingly
reduced from 55 to 54.
The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Actual
occupancy of the party-list seats depends on the number of participants in
the party-list election. If only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list
election, then, despite the availability of 54 seats, the maximum possible
number of occupied party-list seats would only be 30 because of the three-
seat cap. In such a case, the three-seat cap prevents the mandatory
allocation of all the 54 available seats.
Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total votes cast
guarantees a party one seat. This 2% threshold for the first round of seat
allocation does not violate any provision of the 1987 Constitution. Thus,
the Court upholds this 2% threshold for the guaranteed seats as a valid
exercise of legislative power.1avvphi1
In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum
vote requirement to obtain a party-list seat because the Court has struck
down the application of the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional
seats. Specifically, the provision in Section 11(b) of the Party-List Act
stating that "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall
be entitled to additional seats in the proportion to their total number of
votes" can no longer be given any effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent party-
list seats in the total membership of the House of Representatives as
provided in the 1987 Constitution will mathematically be impossible to fill
up.
However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient number of
votes to gain a seat in the second round of seat allocation. What is deemed
a sufficient number of votes is dependent upon the circumstances of each
election, such as the number of participating parties, the number of
available party-list seats, and the number of parties with guaranteed seats
received in the first round of seat allocation. To continue the example
above, if only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list election and
each party received only one thousand votes, then each of the ten parties
would receive 10% of the votes cast. All are guaranteed one seat, and are
further entitled to receive two more seats in the second round of seat
allocation.
Similarly, a presidential candidate may win the elections even if he receives
only one thousand votes as long as all his opponents receive less than one
thousand votes. A winning presidential candidate only needs to receive
more votes than his opponents. The same policy applies in every election
to public office, from the presidential to the barangay level. Except for the
guaranteed party-list seat, there is no minimum vote requirement before a
candidate in any election, for any elective office, can be proclaimed the
winner. Of course, the winning candidate must receive at least one vote,
assuming he has no opponents or all his opponents do not receive a single
vote.
In the absence of a minimum vote requirement in the second round of
party-list seat allocation, there is no need to belabor the disparity between
the votes obtained by the first and last ranked winning parties in the 2007
party-list elections. In the same manner, no one belabors the disparity
between the votes obtained by the highest and lowest ranked winners in
the senatorial elections. However, for those interested in comparing the
votes received by party-list representatives vis-a-vis the votes received by
district representatives, the 162,678 votes cast in favor of TUCP, the last
party to obtain a party-list seat, is significantly higher than the votes
received by 214 of the 218 elected district representatives. 4
The Actual Number of Party-List Representatives
in the 2007 Elections
The data used in Table 3 of our Decision promulgated on 21 April 2009 was
based on the submissions of the parties. We used the figures from Party-
List Canvass Report No. 32, as of 6:00 p.m. of 31 August 2007. The NBC
issued NBC Report No. 33 on 11 June 2008, updating the 31 August 2007
report. The parties did not furnish this Court with a copy of NBC
Report No. 33. In any case, we stated in the dispositive portion of our
Decision that "[t]he allocation of additional seats under the Party-List
System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this
decision." Party-List Canvass Report No. 32 is not part of the
procedure.1avvphi1
The computation of the COMELEC in NBC No. 09-001 applying the
procedure laid down in our Decision requires correction for purposes of
accuracy. Instead of multiplying the percentage of votes garnered over the
total votes for party-list by 36, the COMELEC multiplied the percentage by
37. Thirty-six is the proper multiplier as it is the difference between 54, the
number of available party-list seats, and 18, the number of guaranteed
seats. Only the figures in column (C) are affected. The allocation of seats
to the winning party-list organizations, however, remains the same as
in NBC No. 09-001. Our modification of the COMELEC’s computation in
NBC No. 09-001 is shown below:
Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS)
and Ang Laban ng Indiginong Filipino (ALIF) both have pending cases
before the COMELEC. The COMELEC correctly deferred the proclamation
of both BATAS and ALIF as the outcome of their cases may affect the final
composition of party-list representatives. The computation and allocation
of seats may still be modified in the event that the COMELEC decides
against BATAS and/or ALIF.
To address Roa-Borje’s motion for partial reconsideration-in-intervention
and for purposes of computing the results in future party-list elections, we
reiterate that in the second step of the second round of seat allocation, the
preference in the distribution of seats should be in accordance with the
higher percentage and higher rank, without limiting the distribution
to parties receiving two-percent of the votes.6 To limit the distribution of
seats to the two-percenters would mathematically prevent the filling up of
all the available party-list seats.
In the table above, CIBAC cannot claim a third seat from the seat allocated
to TUCP, the last ranked party allocated with a seat. CIBAC's 2.81% (from
the percentage of 4.81% less the 2% for its guaranteed seat) has a lower
fractional seat value after the allocation of its second seat compared to
TUCP's 1.03%. CIBAC's fractional seat after receiving two seats is only 0.03
compared to TUCP's 0.38 fractional seat. Multiplying CIBAC's 2.81% by 37,
the additional seats for distribution in the second round, gives 1.03 seat,
leaving 0.03 fractional seat. Multiplying TUCP's 1.03% by 37 gives a
fractional seat of 0.38, higher than CIBAC's fractional seat of 0.03. The
fractional seats become material only in the second step of the second
round of seat allocation to determine the ranking of parties. Thus, for
purposes of the second step in the second round of seat allocation,7 TUCP
has a higher rank than CIBAC.
Roa-Borje’s position stems from the perceived need for absolute
proportionality in the allocation of party-list seats. However, the 1987
Constitution does not require absolute proportionality in the allocation of
party-list seats. Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties and organizations. (Boldfacing and italicization supplied)
The phrase "legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"
in Section 5(1) of Article VI requires that legislative districts shall be
apportioned according to proportional representation. However, this
principle of proportional representation applies only to legislative
districts, not to the party-list system. The allocation of seats under the
party-list system is governed by the last phrase of Section 5(1), which
states that the party-list representatives shall be "those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party-list system," giving the
Legislature wide discretion in formulating the allocation of party-list seats.
Clearly, there is no constitutional requirement for absolute proportional
representation in the allocation of party-list seats in the House of
Representatives.
Section 2, on Declaration of Policy, of R.A. No. 7941 provides that the "State
shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof x x x." However, this proportional
representation in Section 2 is qualified by Section 11(b) 8 of the same
law which mandates a three-seat cap, which is intended to bar any single
party-list organization from dominating the party-list system. Section
11(b) also qualifies this proportional representation by imposing a two
percent cut-off for those entitled to the guaranteed seats. These statutory
qualifications are valid because they do not violate the Constitution, which
does not require absolute proportional representation for the party-list
system.
To summarize, there are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list
election system:
1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the
House of Representatives is the maximum number of seats
available to party-list organizations, such that there is
automatically one party-list seat for every four existing
legislative districts.
 2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list
elections guarantees a party-list organization one seat. The
guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of seat
allocation to parties receiving at least two percent of the total
party-list votes.
3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after
allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the
party-list organizations including those that received less than
two percent of the total votes. The continued operation of the
two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the
additional seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold
mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the
available party-list seats. The additional seats shall be
distributed to the parties in a second round of seat allocation
according to the two-step procedure laid down in the Decision
of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this Resolution.
4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is
intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from
dominating the party-list system. There is no violation of the
Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not require
absolute proportionality for the party-list system. The well-
settled rule is that courts will not question the wisdom of the
Legislature as long as it is not violative of the Constitution.
These four parameters allow the mathematical and practical fulfillment of
the Constitutional provision that party-list representatives shall comprise
twenty percent of the members of the House of Representatives. At the
same time, these four parameters uphold as much as possible the Party-
List Act, striking down only that provision of the Party-List Act that could
not be reconciled anymore with the 1987 Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the Court’s Decision of 21 April 2009 in the present case is
clarified accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
SEPARATE OPINION
NACHURA, J.:
This will clarify my position in these consolidated cases.
I concurred in the April 24, 2009 ponencia of the Honorable Justice Antonio
T. Carpio subject to my submission that Section 11, 1 Republic Act No.
79412 or the Party-List System Act, insofar as it requires a two percent
(2%) threshold vote to entitle a party, sectoral organization or coalition to
a seat in the House of Representatives under the party-list system, is
unconstitutional. As explained in my Separate Opinion, the 2% minimum
vote requirement poses an insurmountable barrier to the full
implementation of Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution.
My advocacy, however, does not extend to the complete disregard of a
threshold vote. I expressed full agreement with [now Chief] Justice
Reynato S. Puno who, in his Separate Concurring Opinion in Veterans
Federation Party v. Commission on Elections,3 validated the need for a
minimum vote requirement, in order—
1. to avaoid a situation where the candidate will just use the
party-list system as a fallback position;
2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not
ready and whose chances are very low, from participating in the
elections;
3. to avoid the reserve seat system from opening up the system;
4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard
and earn their seats within the system;
5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty
as that of the elective representatives in the legislative body,
rather than owing to some degree their seats in the legislative
body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an
appointment by the President of the Philippines;
6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate
political party groups and those who have not really been given
by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their
constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the
Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-
list system; and
7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial
following can be represented.4
Thus, we proposed that, until Congress shall have effected an acceptable
amendment to Section 11, R.A. 7941, we should abide by the sensible
standard of "proportional representation" and adopt a gradually
regressive threshold vote requirement, inversely proportional to the
increase in the number of party-list seats. Expressed differently, we do not
propose that Section 11 or a paragraph thereof be scrapped for being
unconstitutional. It is only the ratio of 2% that we find as
unconstitutional—the steady increase in the party-list seat allotment as it
keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative districts, and the
foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the fixed 2% vote
requirement/ratio is no longer viable. It does not adequately respond to
the inevitable changes that come with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent
with the Constitution, because it prevents the fundamental law from ever
being fully operative.
Obviously, the ponencia did not fully accept our submission. It declared as
unconstitutional the 2% threshold vote only with respect to the second
round of allocating party-list seats (on the additional seats); it continued
to apply the 2% minimum vote requirement for entitlement to a seat under
the first round of allocation (on the guaranteed seats). This, clearly, was
not the intent of our modified concurrence to the ponencia, as expressed
in our Separate Opinion.
As expressed in that opinion, the formula which must be adopted—
scrapping only the 2% ratio but still adopting a threshold vote
requirement, is as follows:
100%
(Total number of votes cast
for party-list)
= 1.8518%
54 party-list seats (as
clarified)
Clearly, the minimum vote requirement will gradually lessen as the
number of party-list seats increases. Thus, in a scenario in which there are
100 party-list seats, the threshold vote is computed as follows:
100%
(Total number of votes cast
for party-list) = 1%
100 party-list seats
This is the more logical and equitable formula. It would judiciously respond
to the inevitable changes in the composition of the House of
Representatives; it would open opportunities for the broadest people’s
representation in the House of Representatives; and more importantly, it
would not violate the Constitution. Moreover, the threshold vote
requirement, as enacted by Congress and as validated by this Court in
Veterans, is maintained.
Additionally, the formula will not be discriminatory as it will not only apply
in the first round of allocation of seats, but will also be applicable in the
second round. While I do not wish to belabor the point, the erroneous
application by the ponencia of a threshold vote (2%) in the first round of
allocation of seats, and its disregard in the second round, might cause an
unintended transgression of the equal protection clause, which requires
that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to the rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.5
Thus, as I have expressed before, with respect to the fixed threshold vote
of 2% (only the ratio) in Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, I join the Court in
declaring it unconstitutional, since all enactments inconsistent with the
Constitution should be invalidated.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice