Minefields and Gap Clearance

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Contents

Alamein Egypt - MINEFIELDS AND GAP CLEARANCE

1. Question 4
2. The Sapper’s Problem 6
3. How was the problem dealt with? 8
4. Mine gap clearance 9
a. Introduction 9
b. Manual detection with metal detectors 9
c. Mechanical clearance 10
d. Mine flails. 10
5. The Southern Sector 13
6. Conclusions 17

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Alamein Egypt - MINEFIELDS AND GAP CLEARANCE

General Feldmarshall Rommel remarked that at El Alamein: -
‘… Rivers of blood were poured out over miserable strips of land which, in normal times,
not even the poorest Arab would have bothered his head about...’'1
1. Question
The ‘Battle of El-Alamein’ was one of the first battles of the Second World War that was
heavily influenced by the use of mines.
How did the Eighth Army cope with this problem?

1
The Rommel Papers, by Erwin Rommel (edited by B. H. Liddell Hart), Harcourt Brace and Company, New York,
1953, page 306.

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The Station at Alamein -- top 2010 -- below 1942

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2. The Sapper’s Problem

Lack of any formal method of lying and gapping of minefields, had led to all Divisional Engi-
neers being asked to perform almost impossible tasks of creating adequate gaps through
their own and the enemies’ minefields.2

2
Phillips, Lucas Alamein, page 95.

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Montgomery delegated to the Chief Engineer (CE) of the 8th Army, Brigadier Frederick Kisch,
who he trusted for the technical expertise to deliver all that was required of his forthcoming
battle plan.

Kisch now had the awesome responsibility of ensuring that his Sappers would provide the
required ‘Gaps’ through the various minefields to the west of Alamein in ONE night.

The 8th Army’s previous experience of such operations, particularly in July was not very en-
couraging.

In each of the Divisions, all Engineers were under the control of a Commander Royal Engi-
neer (CRE)

As an example, the Engineer of 10 Corps were required to provide: -

 2 main corridors through the minefield to their immediate west.
o Each of the Armoured Divisions required 3 ‘Lanes’ with a minimum width of 40
yards.
o Each of the Infantry Divisions required 3 ‘Lanes’ of 16-yard wide
 An estimate of the work involved showed that the Sappers of 30 Corps’ ‘Minefield Task
Force’ (MTF) would be involved in creating at 18 ‘Lanes’ through about 4 minefields
each about 400 yards in depth to a total estimated depth of about 6,000 yards or for
about 3½ miles.
o In addition, and to complicate the operation there were also patches of mines
referred to as ‘mine marshes’ laid on no particular pattern between the regular
minefields.3

The fact that the Kisch and his Sappers overcame the problem at all, was in itself a major
achievement.

3
Charles KCB CMG DSO, Lt General Sir J Robert, Chief Royal Engineer April 1940- June 1946, History of the
Corps of Royal Engineers, volume VII 1939-48, page 385, herein after cited as Charles.

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3. How was the problem dealt with?

In early August 1942, Kisch held a conference of all Corps and Divisional CEs and CREs: -
 Tasked to write reports on the ‘best practice’ for minefield clearance.
 Requirement was to breach the minefields in ONE night for the armour to break
out of the bridgehead by first light

a. Major Peter Moore RE was directed by Kisch to first study all the reports from Di-
visions, and then to set up the ‘School of Mine Clearance’.
i. This was based at Burg el Arab where he was assisted by Major A R Currie RE
as Chief Instructor.
ii. Objective focus: -
 Conduct experiments to determine the best method of mine clearance.
 Incorporate use of metal detectors, including the new Polish Mine De-
tector Mk I.
 Other mechanical methods.
 Consider the Germans adaption of using a small wooden box with min-
imal metal content – the Shu or shoe-box mine, heavy or medium mine
with pressure fuse in wooden box.
 Clearance solution was the Scorpion, a flail that was mounted on the
chassis of a Matilda tank.
 Rank probing as in echelon.

b. The Engineers of the various Divisions provided differing experiences acquired

from actual operations in July4, 5 and again in September.6

c. Lt Colonel F M H Hanson CRE of the 2nd New Zealand Division suggested that a
Gapping Party should be comprised of: -
i. 1 NCO plus 8 men and 1 detector would clear a 4 yards wide through a 400-
yard-deep field in about 30 minutes in daylight.
ii. To clear a 40-yard gap of similar depth at night would require 12 mine par-
ties7.

d. Captured German documents provided evidence that Rommel’s command staff

were issuing instructions for laying better laying minefields in front of the British
positions at Alamein.

4
Operation ‘Bacon’ took place from the 14th at July Tel el Eisa and the Ruweist ridge – a battle of three days’
duration.
5
Operation ‘Manhood’ was a plan to break the Axis line south of the Miteirya Ridge -- then to exploit to the
northwest -- South African Engineers were required to ‘gap’ the minefield to the SE of the ridge by midnight
26th July.
6
On 1st September the 2/15th Australian Infantry Battalion participated in Operation ‘Bulimba’, which as de-
signed to test tactics and strategies for the upcoming battle. The fighting was vicious and the battalion suf-
fered 183 casualties.
7
CRE 2nd NZ Division to CE 13 Corps, 12th August 1942 -- WAII/1DA37/1/36, NANZ

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4. Mine gap clearance

a. Introduction
i. In the field the combat zone of a battle, the military priority is to breach the
minefield quickly in order to create a safe path for troops, armour and other
‘soft skin vehicles.
ii. Speed is vital, both for tactical reasons and because units attempting to
breach the minefield will be under enemy fire.
iii. Both anti-tank [AT] and anti-personnel [AP] mines must be removed in the
lanes through which troops or vehicles are planned to advance.
iv. Sappers could not be expected to carry out the tasks of creating gaps in mine-
fields as well as fighting off enemy interference.
v. It was essential that all such Sapper groups had to be protected by an infantry
screen backed up by armour -- creating a small mobile bridgehead behind
which Sappers could carry out the task of ‘gapping’.
vi. What this did mean, was that the infantry had the frightening experience in
the full knowledge of the consequences of carelessness in crossing AT NIGHT
a totally unknown strip of desert known to be liberally strewn with mines.
vii. The risk to Sappers is far greater because they are called upon to perform
clearance against almost impossible schedules. as tactics dictate, including in
all-weather conditions and invariably

viii. Furthermore, it is accepted that mine clearance will be imperfect and there
will be casualties from undiscovered mines.
ix. Command must accept casualties in the process.
x. Disadvantages for Sappers is that they are dealing with mines that DO NOT
respond predictably to clearance, that have ‘migrated’, have been ‘booby-
trapped’ and may have degraded.

b. Manual detection with metal detectors

i. Metal detectors were first used, after their invention by the Polish officer
Józef Kosacki.
ii. 8th Army Engineers used the Polish mine detector, to clear the German mine
fields.

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iii. The area is swepted with detectors, which are sensitive enough to pick up the
reflected signal of most mines.
iv. Some mines, referred to as minimum metal mines, are constructed with as lit-
tle metal as possible – as little as 1 gram – to make them difficult to detect.
v. Areas where metal is detected are carefully probed to determine if a mine is
present; the probing must continue until the object that set off the metal de-
tector is found.

c. Mechanical clearance
By machines that effectively combine mine detection and removal into one opera-
tion: -
i. That is driven deliberately through a known area containing mines, detonat-
ing the mines it drives over.
ii. These are so designed to withstand the explosions with little damage.
iii. The ‘Scorpion’ was a Matilda tank fitted with a flailing device.
a. It was the original flail-tank and was developed specially for ‘Op Light-
foot’.
b. The flails were driven by an auxiliary Ford V-8 engine housed, in an ar-
moured sponson fitted top the outside the hull of the tank with a Sapper
operator.
c. The speed of the tank when flailing was about one mile per hour through
a scattered mine belt.
iv. As a system it is completely reliable.

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Alamein – October – November 1942 – outline location of ‘Own’ minefields

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The above sketch plan is from one made at the time. It is by no means accurate, but
was roughly what we had to work on, in planning ‘Lightfoot’.

It shows the supposed enemy dispositions in his foremost-defended localities, from

Alam Nayl on the north to Himeimat in the south.

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5. The Southern Sector

In the south lay the 7th Armoured Division.

Briefly the intention was as follows: -

 The enemy's protective minefields were to be breached at or about Point A on plan.
 7th Armoured Division on the left would clear two 12-foot lanes about a hundred
yards apart, (later to be increased to four) using Scorpions.8
 44th Infantry Division on the right would clear one 12-foot lane (later to be increased
to two) by hand.

The real problem was not initially gapping the Allied field but it was more about the un-
known ground beyond that was the nightmare -- across the strip of no-mans-land and then
into the deep ‘mine marches’ of the Axis defence belts of Teller and or the S mine, booby-
trapped with thermite and aerial bombs.

To illustrate something of the courage and morale fortitude that was required of young men
in the face of the enemy, I have taken extracts from a narrative by Corporal Harris RE of 21
Field Squadron Royal Engineers, 7th Armoured Division -- ‘War in the Desert’ James Lucas,
pages 115 - 120: -
'I don't know how well the earlier battles had been organized, but the minefield gap-
ping for Alamein was first class.

One of the most nerve-racking things in mine clearing was finding out where the front
edge of the field was located. It was really a hit or miss affair, and to add confusion
Jerry often mixed in the normal anti-tank (AT) Teller mine with anti-personnel (AP) S
mines.

For Alamein, we had a couple of the new Polish type detectors which we had seen at
the Eighth Army Mine Training School.

But the use of the Polish detector produced a new problem: one of morale, where to
operator was required to stand erect to sweep the arc on his front.

It required more than the usual courage to be upright among the shot and shell that
was flying across the battlefield, all the while listening in the headphones for the
change in the whining signal that would indicate a possible buried mine.

When a ‘S’ mine was activated by a foot treading on the projecting prongs, there were
two distinct explosions – the first flung the mine up into the air, whilst the second at
about waist height spewed out hundreds of ball bearings horizontally. The after effect
of those was devastating.

8 The ‘Scorpion’ was a Matilda tank fitted with a flailing device. It was the original flail-tank and was developed specially for
‘Lightfoot’. The flails were driven by an auxiliary engine (Ford V-8) which was housed, with a Sapper operator, in an ar-
moured box outside the hull of the tank. The speed of the tank when flailing was about one mile per hour scattered mine
belt.

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An explosion caused by a soft-skin vehicle setting it off.

For Alamein, we were rehearsed in mine clearing with and without infantry co-
operation, in addition to the course at the Eighth Army school.

The Sapper Recce Party went in with the infantry, I felt sorry for the infantry boys who
had to walk across the minefield and take up defensive positions to keep the Jerrys off
while our lads got to work.

Behind the recce group were the tape men who ran out the tape for the eight feet wide
gap.

'Then came the detector party of three sweepers who worked in staggered formation.
Each operator had a mate, a marker who fixed a white painted metal cone over any
mine that was detected in the gap.

Behind the sweepers came the three-man lifting team, who knelt down on the desert
and felt around the mine to make sure that it was a 'clean' one -- that is, that it didn't
have trip wires running from it or a booby-trap attached to it.

That really was a dodgy operation -- because Jerry also had an explosive device that
might be fitted under the fuse in the body of the mine.

The rottenest job, I think, was the actual lifting, because of the booby-traps that might
be fitted or other cunning anti-handling devices. In day-light one could often see the

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thin wires that led to another mine nearby, but at night one worked by feel, and a false
move -- one tug without being sure -- and it was all over.

Once the mine had been defused, it was lifted out of the ground and placed outside the
marking tape. The gap markers ran out their tapes to keep pace with the lifters, peg-
ging down the tapes into position.

Working at top speed, a team could work a two-hundred-yard strip in about an hour.
The length of time taken was increased if we were under heavy shell fire; longer still if
we were under Spandau fire; and even longer if we had casualties. Everybody moved
dead slow then.

'There was always a little group of reserves, just in case we lost men on mines or to
shell or machine-gun fire. This group, only a couple of men, stayed at the gap at the
edge of the field and they used to brew up for us. It was really thirsty work in a gap-
ping operation; it was fear I should think that made us so thirsty.

'Because of the strain, we worked in hall-hour shifts. Any longer than that and we lost
our concentration and became cureless. We did the Alamein gapping at night and put
out lights to show the routes forward.’

The existence of the ‘scattered minefield’ in front of ‘January’ complicated matters,

In 7th Armoured Division the advanced guards were led by a pilot vehicle, with a Scorpion
and RE mine-clearing party immediately in rear.

 As soon as the pilot vehicle struck a mine it would be assumed that the edge of the
mined area had been reached and gapping drill would commence.

This would consist of the Scorpion flailing and Sappers with detectors widening and
marking the cleared lane.

 For each of the two lanes there would be a duplicate party and Scorpion in rear, for
leap-frogging, replacements or extra gaps.

 The advance would be led by a party of Sappers on foot that would spot mines by
eye on a 12-foot front, and in avoiding them, find a safe, though probably not
straight, way through the scattered mine belt.

 Immediately behind them the trail was to be blazed by three ‘snail’ lorries9 with in-
fantry protection.
o They had been specially fitted with tanks over the rear wheels and from these
tanks diesel oil flowed through drip-feeds on to the tyre tracks.
o Diesel oil leaves an unmistakable mark on the desert; it can be seen even on a
moonless night by a man driving a truck.

9 These were twin-tyred 30-cwt. trucks of the Divisional Field Park Company.

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o These trucks, besides marking the safe lane would also ‘prove’ it; for when
driven in echelon, their tyres covered the width of the lane.
o These trucks would also carry the gap-marking stores. The drivers' cabs were
well sandbagged.

 Along the oiled path made by the ‘snails’ would come the minefield gapping party
and the carriers of the assaulting battalion.
 As soon as a gap had been made in ‘January’, the infantry, headed by their Bren-gun
Carrier Platoon, would pass through the gap and form a bridgehead.

6. Conclusion

The part of the Engineers of the British and Commonwealth formations may not have been
spectacular, but was an essential element in the victory.

The main task of the Engineers of the 8th Army was to make the necessary gaps to enable
the armour to get to its dominant positions – WHICH IT DID.

The thorough preparation of both the defences, then of the lane gapping through a complex
of differing minefields was an essential element of work for all Sappers.

But the work had been a great strain on the personnel so employed.

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At a conference held on 5th November, the Eighth Army Commander spoke of the ‘magnifi-
cent work’ of the Engineers in clearing gaps through the minefields, permitting the advance
of the armour.

Considering the extent and nature of the operation where some 8,000 Sappers were singu-
larly employed on one task, the casualties in the minefield gapping units were considered to
be not excessive,

This success, with comparatively light casualties, can be attributed to the excellence of the
mine-lifting drill and the accuracy with which it was carried out.

Nevertheless, the fighting at El Alamein was the result of a unique set of circumstances: -
 The mine clearance / gapping evolved by the Sappers before and after the breakout
from the Alamein Line, became the biases of the methodology of Mine Warfare.
 The initial use of Matilda tanks as ‘Scorpions’ with a flail attachment, which was the
commencement of future armoured Engineer vehicles.

Thank you for listening

As a power Point exercise, this is contained on 30 slides

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