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Office of the Court Administration vs.

Judge Floro
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 - March 31, 2006

Facts: Judge Florentino Floro is faced with a multitude of charges, concerning his qualifications
as judge. The charges alleged certain and multiple abuses of his role as a judge and administrator
of justice. The court ruled that some of the charges were substantial enough to be violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, and that his unusual beliefs in psychic powers have affected his
actions and threw shade on the cold impartiality required of him as a member of the judiciary.
The charges are as follows:
(1) circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements, and announcing his
qualifications in open court
(2) allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters
(3) rendering resolutions without written orders
(4) partiality in criminal cases where he declares he is pro-accused
(5) appearing and signing pleadings before a different branch, as a private law
practitioner
(6) appearing in personal cases without prior authority from SC, and without filing leaves
of absences on scheduled hearings
(7) proceeding with the hearing for release of an accused without the trial court
prosecutor: Posing questions in examination of custodian not sworn into oath
(8) taking advantage of moral ascendancy to induce complainant and accused to settle
and dismiss criminal cases for frustrated homicide: Without the presence of the trial
prosecutor
(9) ordering the mental and physical examination of the accused on the ground that
accused is “mahina ang pick-up”: Despite strong objection from the prosecutor
(10) issuing an order which varies from his issuance in open court in a criminal case
for frustrated homicide
(11) criticizing the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system

Issue: Whether Judge Floro may be liable for his violation of the due process (Yes)

Held: Yes. Criminal Cases No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and 20442 entitled, People v. Luisito
Beltran, People v. Emma Alvarez, et al., People v. Rowena Camino, and People v. John Richie
Villaluz. From his explanation that such written orders are not necessary, we can surmise that
Judge Floros failure was not due to inadvertence or negligence on his part but to ignorance
of a procedural rule.

In fine, we perceive three fundamental errors in Judge Floros handling of probation cases. First,
he ordered the release on recognizance of the accused without the presence of the
prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any opportunity to oppose said release. Second,
Judge Floro ordered the release without first requiring the probation officer to render a
case study and investigation report on the accused. Finally, the order granting the release of
the accused on recognizance was not reduced into writing.

We agree in the observation of the audit team that Judge Floro, as a matter of policy, had been
approving applications for release on recognizance hastily and without observing the
requirements of the law for said purpose. Judge Floro did as the unsolicited fervor to release
the accused significantly deprived the prosecution and the private complainants of their right to
due process.

Verily, one of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and uphold it
conscientiously. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and
simply apply it for anything less is constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. True, not every
judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not
warrant administrative sanctions. This rule, however, admits of an exception as good faith in
situations of fallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does
not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and as to be
beyond permissible margins of error. Thus, even if a judge acted in good faith but his
ignorance is so gross, he should be held administratively liable.

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