PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

CHARLIE VILLORENTE & TERESITA VILLORENTE

G.R. No. 100198; July 1, 1992

FACTS:
Jona Neron was only fifteen years old when Teresita, with deceit and abuse of confidence, willfully and
unlawfully abducted her. Jona agreed to leave her employer's house to go with Charlie and his mother Teresita,
wherein after which, she was raped by Charlie.
The crime committed was forcible abduction under Art. 342 of the RPC, and since the abduction was proven to
have been committed as a necessary means for the commission of the rape, under Art. 48 of the RPC, appellants
committed the complex crime of abduction with rape for which the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly
imposed by the lower court on both appellants.
Charlie and his mother are equally liable for the crime in view of the conspiracy between them which was alleged
in the information and duly proven at the trial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty imposed for Teresita Villorente is too excessive.

RULING:
Yes. Executive clemency was recommended with respect to appellant Teresita Villorente.

(The penalty is too excessive for Teresita Villorente. Unschooled like her son who also affixed his thumbmark
in the documents pertinent to this case, she appears to have acquiesced to cooperate with Charlie on account of
maternal concern. She must have agonized with Charlie who did not know how to court the girl of his dreams.
As the lower court aptly observes, "not knowing how to court (Jona), (Charlie) just looked at her from a
distance until he could no longer hold his desire for Jona Neron and, with the complicity of his mother,
abducted and raped her." It was therefore, necessary that, under the provision of Art. 5 of the Revised Penal
Code, the attention of the President be called on the matter.)

Note: Executive clemency is the power of the President in criminal cases and in state convictions to pardon a
person convicted of a crime, commute the sentence (shorten it, often to time already served), or reduce it from
death to another lesser sentence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CONRADO M. GLINO

G.R. No. 173793; December 4, 2007

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Conrado Glino is convicted of murder and attempted murder for the senseless killing of
Domingo Boji and the stabbing of his wife, Virginia Boji.
RTC found Glino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and indemnify the heirs of Domingo for the first criminal case (against
Domingo), and another penalty of indeterminate prison term of prision correccional to prision mayor and to
suffer the accessory penalty and pay Virginia damages for the second criminal case (against Virginia).

Both the trial court and the appellate court found Glino liable for attempted murder. The RTC and the CA are in
agreement that there was intent to kill Virginia as well.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty sentenced to Glino, for the attempted murder of Virginia, was excessive.
RULING:

Yes. The penalty was excessive.

An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated or attempted stage, is
intent of the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. If
the assailants also intended to kill her, they could have easily stabbed her in any vital part of her body. They did
not.

It is crystal-clear that the wound on Virginia was inflicted during her attempt to shield Domingo from accused-
appellant's and Baloes' knife thrusts. It bears stressing that Virginia embraced Domingo while the assault upon
him was at its peak. Evidently, the wound was inflicted while she was in that position.

Although the indictment was for attempted murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of less serious
physical injuries is tenable. Clearly, accused-appellant Glino should be held liable for less serious physical
injuries only, and not attempted murder.

Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes less serious physical injuries in the following
manner:

Article 265. Less serious physical injuries. – Any person who shall inflict upon another physical injuries
not described in the preceding articles but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten
days or more, or shall require medical attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious
physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.

Again, absent any appreciable mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty of arresto mayor (1 month
and 1 day to 6 months) should be imposed in its medium period (between 2 months and 1 day to 4 months).

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH ORILLA

G.R. Nos. 148939-40; February 13, 2004

FACTS:

Joseph Orilla was accused of raping his 15-year-old sister Remilyn twice. (Joseph raped his sister once, but he
ejaculated twice, that’s why they counted it as 2 counts of rape.) The trial court found him guilty of only one
crime of qualified rape and imposed on him the supreme penalty of death in the first case. Instead of dismissing
the second case of rape against him however, the trial court considered it as a qualifying circumstance for the
purpose of imposing death penalty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in considering the second criminal case as a qualifying circumstance
in the imposition of death penalty against the appellant in the first case.

RULING:

Yes. Remilyn’s straightforward narration on how appellant forcibly ravished her proves beyond reasonable
doubt that the appellant is guilty of rape as charged in the first case, but the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua,
not death. The gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman against her will. It is not the
number of times that appellant ejaculated but the penetration or "touching" that determines the consummation of
the sexual act. Thus, appellant committed only one count of rape, and because of that, the second case must be
dismissed, and not used as a qualifying circumstance.

Additional info: The prosecution’s failure to allege other valid circumstances such as the relationship of the
appellant to accused, the use of knife, and specifically Remilyn’s minor age, prevents the transformation of the
crime to its qualified form.