Chapter 1

World Energy Demand and Economic Outlook

In the IEO2009 projections, total world consumption of marketed energy is projected
to increase by 44 percent from 2006 to 2030. The largest projected increase
in energy demand is for the non-OECD economies.
In the IEO2009 reference case, world energy consump- energy consumption was in the OECD economies; but in
tion increases from 472 quadrillion Btu in 2006 to 552 2030 their share falls to 41 percent in the reference case.
quadrillion Btu in 2015 and 678 quadrillion Btu in
2030—a total increase of 44 percent over the projection Figure 10. World Marketed Energy Consumption,
period (Figure 10 and Table 1). Total world energy use in 1980-2030
2030 is about 2 percent lower than projected in the Inter- Quadrillion Btu
800
national Energy Outlook 2008 (IEO2008), largely as the History Projections
result of a slower overall rate of economic growth in this 678
637
year’s reference case. 596
600 552
508
The current economic downturn dampens world 472
demand for energy in the near term, as manufacturing 398
and consumer demand for goods and services slow.
400 348 366
308
IEO2009 assumes, however, that most nations will begin 283
to return to trend growth within the next 12 to 24
200
months.

OECD member countries,4 for the most part, have the

0
world’s most established energy infrastructures. In
combination, they account for the largest share of 80 85 90 95 00 06 10 15 20 25 30
19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
current world energy consumption. The situation is
Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),
expected to change over the projection period, however, International Energy Annual 2006 (June-December 2008),
with more rapid growth in energy demand in emerging web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea. Projections: EIA, World
non-OECD economies. In 2006, 51 percent of world Energy Projections Plus (2009).

Table 1. World Marketed Energy Consumption by Country Grouping, 2006-2030

(Quadrillion Btu)
Average Annual
Percent Change,
Region 2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2006-2030
OECD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241.7 242.8 252.4 261.3 269.5 278.2 0.6
North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121.3 121.1 125.9 130.3 135.6 141.7 0.6
Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81.6 82.2 84.8 87.9 90.0 91.8 0.5
Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38.7 39.5 41.8 43.1 43.9 44.6 0.6
Non-OECD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230.8 265.4 299.1 334.4 367.8 400.1 2.3
Europe and Eurasia . . . . . . . . . . 50.7 54.0 57.6 60.3 62.0 63.3 0.9
Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117.6 139.2 163.2 190.3 215.4 239.6 3.0
Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.8 27.7 30.3 32.2 34.6 37.7 1.9
Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5 16.2 17.7 19.1 20.6 21.8 1.7
Central and South America . . . . 24.2 28.3 30.3 32.5 35.2 37.7 1.9
Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 472.4 508.3 551.5 595.7 637.3 678.3 1.5
Note: Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.
Sources: 2006: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2006 (June-December 2008), web site
www.eia.doe.gov/iea. Projections: EIA, World Energy Projections Plus (2009).
4 For consistency, OECD includes all members of the organization as of March 1, 2009, throughout all the time series included in this
report.

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2009 7

OECD energy use grows slowly over the projection countries continues over the projection period, with
period, averaging 0.6 percent per year, as compared their combined energy use increasing nearly twofold
with 2.3 percent per year for the emerging non-OECD and making up 28 percent of world energy consumption
economies (Figure 11). in 2030 in the reference case. In contrast, the U.S. share of
total world energy consumption falls from 21 percent in
China and India are the fastest-growing non-OECD
2006 to about 17 percent in 2030 (Figure 12).
economies, and they will be key world energy consum-
ers in the future. Since 1990, energy consumption as a Non-OECD Asia shows the most robust growth of all the
share of total world energy use has increased signifi- non-OECD regions, with energy use rising by 104 per-
cantly in both countries. China and India together cent from 2006 to 2030 (Figure 13). Energy consumption
accounted for about 10 percent of the world’s total in other non-OECD regions also grows strongly over the
energy consumption in 1990, but in 2006 their combined projection period, with projected increases of around 60
share was 19 percent. Strong economic growth in both percent for the Middle East and for Central and South
America and 50 percent for Africa. A smaller increase,
about 25 percent, is expected for non-OECD Europe and
Figure 11. World Marketed Energy Consumption:
Eurasia (including Russia and the other former Soviet
OECD and Non-OECD, 1980-2030
Republics), as declining population and substantial
Quadrillion Btu
500 gains in energy efficiency result from the replacement of
History Projections inefficient Soviet-era capital equipment.
400 This chapter presents an overview of the IEO2009 out-
look for global marketed energy consumption by energy
source. It includes discussions of the major assumptions
300
that form the basis for the IEO2009 projections, includ-
OECD ing macroeconomic assumptions for the key OECD and
200 non-OECD regions.
As with any set of projections, there is significant uncer-
100 Non-OECD tainty associated with the IEO2009 energy projections.
Two sets of sensitivity cases, which vary some of the
assumptions behind the projections, are also examined
0
1980 1995 2006 2015 2030 in this chapter: the high and low economic growth cases
Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), and the high and low world oil price cases. The sensitiv-
International Energy Annual 2006 (June-December 2008), ity cases are intended to illustrate alternative scenarios
web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea. Projections: EIA, World rather than to identify any bounds on uncertainty,
Energy Projections Plus (2009). which can also be affected by policy and technology
developments as well as by price and growth paths.
Figure 12. Marketed Energy Use by Region, Figure 13. Marketed Energy Use in the Non-OECD
1990-2030 Economies by Region, 1980-2030
Quadrillion Btu Quadrillion Btu
800 500
History Projections History Projections
678
Rest of World Non-OECD Europe and Eurasia 400
596 400
600 United States Central and South America
334
China and India 508 Africa
472
300 Middle East 265
398
400 348 Non-OECD Asia 231
200 167
150
200 106
100

0 0
1990 2000 2006 2010 2020 2030 1980 1990 2000 2006 2010 2020 2030
Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),
International Energy Annual 2006 (June-December 2008), International Energy Annual 2006 (June-December 2008),
web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea. Projections: EIA, World web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea. Projections: EIA, World
Energy Projections Plus (2009). Energy Projections Plus (2009).

8 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2009

Outlook for World Energy
Consumption by Source
The use of all energy sources increases over the time
frame of the IEO2009 reference case (Figure 14). Given
expectations that world oil prices will remain relatively
high through most of the projection period, liquid fuels
and other petroleum5 are the world’s slowest growing
source of energy: liquids consumption increases at an
average annual rate of 0.9 percent from 2006 to 2030.
Renewables are the fastest-growing source of world
energy, with consumption increasing by 3.0 percent per
year. Projected oil prices, as well as rising concern about
the environmental impacts of fossil fuel use and strong
government incentives for increasing renewable pene-
tration in most countries around the world, improve the
prospects for renewable energy sources worldwide.
Although liquid fuels are expected to remain the largest
source of energy, the liquids share of world marketed
energy consumption declines from 36 percent in 2006 to
32 percent in 2030. The reference case assumes that
world oil prices lead many energy users, especially in
the industrial and electric power sectors, to switch from
liquid fuels and other petroleum when feasible. From
2006 to 2030, liquids consumption in the residential,
commercial, and electric power sectors declines on a
worldwide basis. For example, the projections show a
steady decline of 0.3 percent per year in total world use
of liquids for electricity generation. Nonetheless, the
countries of the Middle East continue to rely on liquids
Figure 14. World Marketed Energy Use by Fuel
Type, 1980-2030
Quadrillion Btu
250
History Projections
200
Liquids
(Including Biofuels)
150
Coal Renewables
100
(Excluding Biofuels)
Natural Gas
50
Nuclear
0
1980 1995 2006 2015 2030
Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),
International Energy Annual 2006 (June-December 2008),
web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea. Projections: EIA, World
Energy Projections Plus (2009).
5 In IEO2009, “liquid fuels and other petroleum” includes a full array of liquid product supplies, both conventional and unconventional.
Conventional liquids include crude oil and lease condensate, natural gas plant liquids, and refinery gain; unconventional liquids include
biofuels, gas-to-liquids, coal-to-liquids, and unconventional petroleum products (extra-heavy oils, oil shale, and bitumen) but do not
include compressed natural gas (CNG), liquefied natural gas (LNG), or hydrogen.
Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2009
for a sizable portion of their electricity supply, remain-
ing near 25 percent in 2030.
In the transportation sector, liquids consumption is
relatively unaffected by projected world oil prices in the
reference case. Although world oil prices in the IEO2009
reference case are 80 percent higher in 2030 than the pro-
jected prices in the IEO2008 reference case, the world’s
consumption of liquids for transportation in 2030 is only
9 percent lower in IEO2009. In the absence of significant
technological advances, liquids continue to dominate
the world’s transportation markets.
In the industrial sector, growth in liquids consumption
is slower than projected in last year’s outlook. Efficiency
gains and fuel substitution slow the growth of liquids
consumption in the industrial sector, especially in the
non-OECD regions, where there are more opportunities
for fuel switching. World liquids consumption for
energy in the industrial sector, which was projected to
increase by 1.1 percent per year from 2005 to 2030 in the
IEO2008 reference case, increases by 0.7 per year over
the same period in IEO2009.
Natural gas remains an important fuel for electricity
generation worldwide, because it is more efficient and
less carbon-intensive than other fossil fuels. In the
IEO2009 reference case, total natural gas consumption
increases by 1.6 percent per year on average, from 104
trillion cubic feet in 2006 to 153 trillion cubic feet in 2030,
and its use in the electric power sector increases by 2.1
percent per year. With world oil prices assumed to
rebound following the current economic downturn and
then rise through 2030, consumers are expected to
choose less expensive natural gas to meet their energy
needs whenever possible, particularly in the industrial
sector, where, for example, newly constructed petro-
chemical plants are expected to rely increasingly on nat-
ural gas as a feedstock.
World coal consumption increases by 1.7 percent per
year on average from 2006 to 2030 (growing by 23 qua-
drillion Btu from 2006 to 2015 and another 40 quadrillion
Btu from 2015 to 2030) and accounts for 28 percent of
total world energy consumption in 2030. In the absence
of policies or legislation that would limit the growth of
coal use, the United States, China, and India are
expected to turn to coal in place of more expensive fuels.
Together, the three nations account for 88 percent of the
projected net increase in coal consumption from 2006 to
2030 (Figure 15). The only decreases in coal consump-
tion are projected for OECD Europe and for Japan,
where populations are either growing slowly or declin-
ing, electricity demand growth is slow, and renewable
9
energy sources, natural gas, and nuclear power are
likely to be chosen over coal for electricity generation.
Net electricity generation worldwide totals 31.8 trillion
kilowatthours in 2030 in the reference case, 77 percent
higher than the 2006 total of 18.0 trillion kilowatthours.
The strongest growth in electricity generation is pro-
jected for the non-OECD countries. Non-OECD electric-
ity generation increases by 3.5 percent per year in the
reference case, as rising standards of living increase
demand for home appliances and the expansion of
commercial services, including hospitals, office build-
ings, and shopping malls. In the OECD nations, where
infrastructures are well established and population
growth is relatively slow, much slower growth in gener-
ation is expected, averaging 1.2 percent per year from
2006 to 2030.
Currently, natural gas and coal together account for the
largest share of total world electricity generation, at
more than 60 percent of global electricity supply. They
remain the world’s most important sources of supply in
2030, with a 64-percent share of total generation (Figure
16). In non-OECD Asia, where coal resources are ample,
higher prices for oil and natural gas make coal a more
economical source of energy for electricity generation.

Renewable energy sources are the fastest-growing

Figure 15. Coal Consumption in Selected World energy source for world electricity generation in the
Regions, 1980-2030 IEO2009 reference case, increasing by an average of 2.9
Quadrillion Btu percent per year from 2006 to 2030. Much of the growth
100 is in hydroelectric power and wind power. Of the 3.3 tril-
History Projections
lion kilowatthours of new renewable generation added
80 over the projection period, 1.8 trillion kilowatthours (54
percent) is attributed to hydroelectric power and 1.1 tril-
lion kilowatthours (33 percent) to wind power (Figure
60 17). Other than hydroelectric power, most renewable
China
technologies are not able to compete economically with
40 Rest of World fossil fuels over the projection period, except in a limited
number of niche markets. Government policies and
incentives typically are the primary drivers for the
20 United States construction of renewable generation facilities.
India
As renewable energy use increases worldwide, the
0
1980 1995 2006 2015 2030 mix of fuels in the OECD and non-OECD regions differs
Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), in the reference case. In the OECD nations, the majority
International Energy Annual 2006 (June-December 2008), of economically exploitable hydroelectric resources al-
web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea. Projections: EIA, World ready have been developed. With the exception of Can-
Energy Projections Plus (2009). ada and Turkey, there are few large-scale hydroelectric

Figure 16. World Electricity Generation by Fuel, Figure 17. World Renewable Electricity Generation
2006-2030 by Source, 2006-2030
Trillion Kilowatthours Trillion Kilowatthours
40 8
Renewables Other Renewables
Coal Geothermal
30 Natural Gas 6 Wind
Nuclear Hydroelectricity
Liquids
20 4

10 2

0 0
2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Sources: 2006: Derived from Energy Information Adminis- Sources: 2006: Energy Information Administration (EIA),
tration (EIA), International Energy Annual 2006 (June- International Energy Annual 2006 (June-December 2008),
December 2008), web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea. Projections: web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea. Projections: EIA, World
EIA, World Energy Projections Plus (2009). Energy Projections Plus (2009).

10 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2009

power projects planned for the future. Instead, most
renewable energy growth in the OECD countries is
expected to come from nonhydroelectric sources, espe-
cially wind and biomass. Many OECD countries, partic-
ularly those in Europe, have government policies,
including feed-in tariffs,6 tax incentives, and mar-
ket-share quotas, that encourage the construction of
renewable electricity facilities.
In contrast to the OECD countries, hydroelectric power
is expected to be the predominant source of renewable
energy growth in the non-OECD nations. Strong growth
of hydroelectric generation, primarily from mid- to
large-scale power plants, is expected in China, India,
Brazil, Vietnam, and Laos. Growth rates for wind-
powered electricity generation also are expected to be
high in the non-OECD countries, with the largest incre-
ment in China, which accounts for 88 percent of the total
increase in non-OECD wind generation. From 2 billion
kilowatthours in 2006, generation from wind plants in
China increases to 315 billion kilowatthours in 2030.
Still, the total increase in China’s wind-powered genera-
tion is only about one-half the expected increase in the
country’s hydroelectric generation (Figure 18).
Electricity generation from nuclear power worldwide
increases from 2.7 trillion kilowatthours in 2006 to 3.0
trillion kilowatthours in 2015 and 3.8 trillion kilowatt-
hours in 2030 in the IEO2009 reference case, as concerns
about rising fossil fuel prices, energy security, and
greenhouse gas emissions support the development of
new nuclear generating capacity. Higher capacity utili-
zation rates have been reported for many existing
nuclear facilities, and it is expected that most of the older
plants now operating in OECD countries and in
non-OECD Eurasia will be granted extensions to their
operating lives.
There is still considerable uncertainty about the future of
nuclear power, however, and a number of issues could
slow the development of new nuclear power plants.
Plant safety, radioactive waste disposal, and the prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons, which continue to raise pub-
lic concerns in many countries, may hinder plans for
new installations, and high capital and maintenance
costs may keep some countries from expanding their
nuclear power programs. Nevertheless, the IEO2009
projection for world nuclear electricity generation in
2025 is 25 percent higher than the projection in IEO2004
just 5 years ago.
Most of the expansion of installed nuclear power capac-
ity is expected in non-OECD countries (Figure 19).
China, India, and Russia account for almost two-thirds
of the projected net increment in world nuclear power
capacity between 2006 and 2030. In the reference case,
China adds 47 gigawatts of nuclear capacity between
2006 and 2030, India 17 gigawatts, and Russia 21
gigawatts. Several OECD nations with existing nuclear
programs also add new net capacity in the reference

Figure 18. Renewable Electricity Generation Figure 19. World Nuclear Generating Capacity
in China by Fuel, 2006-2030 by Region, 2006, 2015, and 2030
Billion Kilowatthours Gigawatts
1,200 300
Hydroelectricity OECD Europe OECD North America
Wind OECD Asia Non-OECD Europe/Eurasia
1,000 250
Other Renewables
China India Rest of World
800 200
132

132
127

600 150
121
121
115

88

400 100
74

71
67

54
49
42

200 50
23
22

20
15
10

9
7
3

0 0
2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2006 2015 2030
Sources: 2006: Energy Information Administration (EIA), Sources: 2006: Energy Information Administration (EIA),
International Energy Annual 2006 (June-December 2008), International Energy Annual 2006 (June-December 2008),
web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea. Projections: EIA, World web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea. 2015 and 2030: EIA, World
Energy Projections Plus (2009). Energy Projections Plus (2009).

6 A feed-in tariff is an incentive structure to encourage the adoption of renewable energy through government legislation. Under a
feed-in tariff structure, regional or national electric utilities are obligated to purchase renewable electricity at a higher rate than retail, in
order to allow renewable energy sources to overcome price disadvantages.

Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2009 11

case, including South Korea with 13 gigawatts, Japan
with 8 gigawatts, and the United States with 12
gigawatts.7
In the United States, Title XVII of the Energy Policy Act
of 2005 (EPACT2005, Public Law 109-58) authorizes the
U.S. Department of Energy to issue loan guarantees for
innovative technologies that “avoid, reduce, or seques-
ter greenhouse gases.” In addition, subsequent legisla-
tive provisions in the Consolidated Appropriation Act
of 2008 (Public Law 110-161) allocated $18.5 billion in
guarantees for nuclear power plants [1]. That legislation,
along with high fossil fuel prices, results in expected
increases of 12.7 gigawatts of capacity at newly built
nuclear power plants between 2006 and 2030 and 3.7
gigawatts from uprates at existing plants, offset in part
by the retirement of 4.4 gigawatts of capacity at older
nuclear power plants.
Delivered Energy Consumption by
End-Use Sector
Understanding patterns in the consumption of energy
delivered to end users is important to the development
of projections for global energy use. Outside the trans-
portation sector, which at present is dominated by liquid
fuels, the mix of energy use in the residential, commer-
cial, and industrial sectors varies widely by region,
depending on a combination of regional factors, such as
the availability of energy resources, levels of economic
development, and political, social, and demographic
factors.
Residential Sector
Energy use in the residential sector, which accounted for
about 15 percent of world delivered energy consump-
tion in 2006, is defined as the energy consumed by
households, excluding transportation uses. For residen-
tial buildings, the physical size of the structures is one
key indicator of the amount of energy used by their
occupants. Larger homes require more energy to pro-
vide heating, air conditioning, and lighting, and they
tend to include more energy-using appliances, such as
televisions and laundry equipment. Smaller structures
usually require less energy, because they contain less
space to be heated or cooled, produce less heat transfer
with the outdoor environment, and typically have fewer
occupants. For instance, residential energy consumption
is lower in China, where the average residence currently
has an estimated 300 square feet of living space or less
per person, than in the United States, where the average
residence has an estimated 680 square feet of living
space per person [2].
7 Additional incentives for renewable energy and improved energy efficiency measures included in ARRA2009 lower the prospects for
U.S. nuclear power. In the updated AEO2009 reference case (April 2009), the projection for U.S. nuclear generating capacity in 2030 is 2.5
gigawatts lower than in the published AEO2009 reference case (March 2009), and the net addition to U.S. installed nuclear capacity between
2006 and 2030 is 9.9 gigawatts, bringing the 2030 total to 110.1 gigawatts in the updated AEO2009 reference case, as compared with 112.6
gigawatts in the published reference case.
12 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2009
The type and amount of energy used by households
vary from country to country, depending on income lev-
els, natural resources, climate, and available energy
infrastructure. In general, typical households in OECD
nations use more energy than those in non-OECD
nations, in part because higher income levels allow
OECD households to have larger homes and purchase
more energy-using equipment. In the United States, for
example, GDP per capita in 2006 was about $43,000 (in
real 2005 dollars per person), and residential energy use
per capita was estimated at 36.0 million Btu. In contrast,
China’s per-capita income in 2006, at $4,550, was only
about one-tenth the U.S. level, and residential energy
use per capita was 4.0 million Btu.
Although the IEO2009 projections account for marketed
energy use only, households in many non-OECD coun-
tries still rely heavily on traditional, nonmarketed
energy sources, including wood and waste, for heating
and cooking. Much of Africa remains unconnected to
power grids, and the International Energy Agency esti-
mates that the majority of households in sub-Saharan
Africa still rely on fuelwood and charcoal for cooking.
More than 95 percent of rural households in Angola,
Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Congo (Kinshasa), Ethiopia,
Ghana, Sudan, and Zambia among others still use
fuelwood and charcoal for cooking. [3]. Some areas of
China and India also rely heavily on fuelwood, wood
waste, and charcoal for cooking. In China, about 55 per-
cent of the rural population uses biomass for cooking, as
does 87 percent of the rural population in India.
Regional economic development should displace some
of that use as incomes rise and marketed fuels, such as
propane and electricity, become more widely accessible.
Commercial Sector
The commercial sector—often referred to as the services
sector or the services and institutional sector—consists
of businesses, institutions, and organizations that pro-
vide services. The sector encompasses many different
types of buildings and a wide range of activities and
energy-related services. Examples of commercial sector
facilities include schools, stores, correctional institu-
tions, restaurants, hotels, hospitals, museums, office
buildings, banks, and sports arenas. Most commercial
energy use occurs in buildings or structures, supplying
services such as space heating, water heating, lighting,
cooking, and cooling. Energy consumed for services not
associated with buildings, such as for traffic lights and
city water and sewer services, is also categorized as com-
mercial energy use.
Economic trends and population growth drive commer-
cial sector activity and the resulting energy use. The
need for services (health, education, financial, and gov-
ernment) increases as populations increase. The degree
to which additional needs are met depends in large mea-
sure on economic resources—whether from domestic or
foreign sources—and economic growth.
Economic growth also determines the degree to which
additional activities are offered and utilized in the com-
mercial sector. Higher levels of economic activity and
disposable income lead to increased demand for hotels
and restaurants to meet business and leisure require-
ments; for office and retail space to house and service
new and expanding businesses; and for cultural and lei-
sure space such as theaters, galleries, and arenas. In the
commercial sector, as in the residential sector, energy
use per capita in the non-OECD countries is much lower
than in the OECD countries. Non-OECD commercial
energy consumption per capita averaged only 1.3 mil-
lion Btu in 2006, compared with the OECD average of
16.3 million Btu.
Slow population growth in most of the OECD nations
contributes to slower anticipated rates of increase in
commercial energy demand. In addition, continued effi-
ciency improvements moderate the growth of energy
demand over time, as energy-using equipment is
replaced with newer, more efficient stock. Conversely,
continued economic growth is expected to include
growth in business activity, with its associated energy
use, in areas such as retail and wholesale trade and busi-
ness, financial services, and leisure services. The United
States is the largest consumer of commercial delivered
energy in the OECD and remains in that position
throughout the projection, accounting for about 44 per-
cent of the OECD total in 2030.
In the non-OECD nations, economic activity and com-
merce are expected to increase rapidly, fueling addi-
tional demand for energy in the service sectors.
Population growth also is expected to be more rapid
than in the OECD countries, portending increases in the
need for education, health care, and social services and
the energy required to provide them. The energy needed
to fuel growth in commercial buildings will be substan-
tial, with total delivered commercial energy use among
the non-OECD nations projected to grow by 2.7 percent
per year from 2006 to 2030.
Industrial Sector
Energy is consumed in the industrial sector by a diverse
group of industries—including manufacturing, agricul-
ture, mining, and construction—and for a wide range of
activities, such as processing and assembly, space condi-
tioning, and lighting. Industrial energy demand varies
across regions and countries of the world, based on the
Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2009
level and mix of economic activity and technological
development, among other factors. Industrial energy
use also includes natural gas and petroleum products
used as feedstocks to produce non-energy products,
such as plastics. In aggregate, the industrial sector uses
more energy than any other end-use sector, consuming
about one-half of the world’s total delivered energy.
The OECD economies generally have more energy-
efficient industrial operations and a mix of industrial
output that is more heavily weighted toward
non-energy-intensive sectors than in the non-OECD
countries. As a result, the ratio of industrial sector
energy consumption to total GDP tends to be higher in
the non-OECD economies than in the OECD economies.
On average, industrial sector energy intensity in the
non-OECD countries is double that in the OECD
countries.
Transportation Sector
Energy use in the transportation sector includes the
energy consumed in moving people and goods by road,
rail, air, water, and pipeline. The road transport compo-
nent includes light-duty vehicles, such as automobiles,
sport utility vehicles, minivans, small trucks, and motor-
bikes, as well as heavy-duty vehicles, such as large
trucks used for moving freight and buses for passenger
travel. Growth rates for economic activity and popula-
tion are the key factors for transportation sector energy
demand. Economic growth spurs increases in industrial
output, which requires the movement of raw materials
to manufacturing sites, as well as the movement of man-
ufactured goods to end users.
For both the non-OECD and OECD economies, steadily
increasing demand for personal travel is a primary fac-
tor underlying projected increases in energy demand for
transportation. Increases in urbanization and in per-
sonal incomes have contributed to increases in air travel
and motorization (more vehicles per capita) in the grow-
ing economies. Modal shifts in the transport of goods are
expected to result from continued economic growth in
both OECD and non-OECD economies. For freight
transportation, trucking is expected to lead the growth
in demand for transportation fuels. In addition, as trade
among countries increases, the volume of freight trans-
ported by air and marine vessels is expected to increase
rapidly.
World Economic Outlook
Economic growth is among the most important factors
to be considered in projecting changes in world energy
consumption. In the IEO2009 projections, assumptions
about regional economic growth—measured in terms
of real GDP in 2005 U.S. dollars at purchasing power
parity rates—underlie the projections of regional energy
13
demand. Although it is difficult to assess the full extent
of the current global economic downturn, many analysts
have stated that the world is in the midst of the worst
recession since World War II [4]. Nevertheless, the
IEO2009 projections assume that the global downturn
will not be protracted and that in the mid- to long term
potential trend growth will return.
Over the 2006 to 2030 period, the world’s real GDP
growth on a purchasing power parity basis is projected
to average 3.5 percent annually in the reference case
(Table 2). In the long term, it is the ability to produce
goods and services (the supply side) that determines the
growth potential of any country’s economy. Growth
potential is influenced by population growth, labor force
participation rates, capital accumulation, and produc-
tivity improvements. In addition, for the developing
economies, progress in building human and physical
capital infrastructures, establishing credible regulatory
mechanisms to govern markets, and ensuring political
stability play relatively more important roles in deter-
mining their medium- to long-term growth potential.
Annual growth in world GDP over the 24-year projec-
tion period is about the same as the rate recorded over
the past 25 years. Growth in the more mature industrial-
ized economies of the OECD is expected to be slower in
the future; but growth in the emerging non-OECD econ-
omies is projected to be higher in the future than in the
past. For the OECD, combined GDP increased by an
annual average of 2.9 percent from 1982 to 2006 but is
projected to average 2.2 percent per year from 2006 to
2030. In contrast, non-OECD GDP increased by an
annual average of 4.1 percent over the past 25 years but
is projected to average 4.9 percent per year from 2006 to
2030, based in large on the projected strong growth in
China and India. With the non-OECD economies
accounting for an increasing share of world GDP, their
more rapid economic growth rates offset the slower
growth rates for the OECD economies in the reference
case.
Although many non-OECD economies—particularly
those strongly dependent on exports for revenues—
have been slowed by the economic downturn that began
in the OECD economies, a number of significant reforms
that have been implemented over the past years in key
non-OECD nations have improved and are likely to con-
tinue improving their prospects for recovery and strong
long-term growth. Improved macroeconomic policies,
trade liberalization, more flexible exchange rate
regimes, and lower fiscal deficits have lowered their
national inflation rates, reduced uncertainty, and
improved their overall investment climates. More
microeconomic structural reforms, such as privatization
and regulatory reform, have also played key roles. In
general, such reforms have resulted in growth rates over
much of the past decade that are above historical rates in
many of the developing economies. Those trends are
expected to resume when the OECD countries recover
from the current recession and to continue into the next
decades.
OECD Economies
In the IEO2009 reference case, U.S. economic growth
slows considerably in the near term as a result of the
recent downturn in financial markets, with negative real
GDP growth in 2009 in spite of the expectation that the
economy will begin to recover in the fourth quarter of
2009. The recession is expected to be more severe than
the two most recent U.S. recessions, which began in
1991 and 2001. The rate of growth in real GDP depends

Table 2. World Gross Domestic Product by Country Grouping, 2006-2030

(Billion 2005 Dollars)
Average Annual
Percent Change,
Region 2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2006-2030
OECD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35,221 37,133 42,403 47,466 52,996 59,264 2.2
North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,331 16,073 18,789 21,341 24,283 27,802 2.5
Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14,224 15,015 16,839 18,811 20,894 23,105 2.0
Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,667 6,045 6,775 7,314 7,819 8,357 1.6
Non-OECD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24,717 31,723 41,529 52,907 65,062 78,220 4.9
Europe and Eurasia . . . . . . . . . . 3,159 3,940 4,865 5,725 6,536 7,381 3.6
Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,408 17,934 24,606 32,726 41,428 50,834 5.7
Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,053 2,484 3,030 3,621 4,300 5,102 3.9
Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,341 2,870 3,612 4,384 5,182 5,958 4.0
Central and South America . . . . 3,757 4,495 5,415 6,450 7,615 8,945 3.7
Total World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59,939 68,856 83,932 100,373 118,058 137,484 3.5
Note: All regional real GDP numbers presented in this table are based on purchasing power parity terms.
Sources: IHS Global Insight, Inc., World Overview, Fourth Quarter 2008 (Lexington, MA, January 2009); and Energy Information
Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2009, DOE/EIA-0383(2009) (Washington DC, March 2009).

14 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2009

mainly on assumptions about labor force growth and
productivity. In the reference case, growth in real GDP
averages 2.4 percent per year from 2006 to 2030.8
Like much of the rest of the world, Canada saw its eco-
nomic growth slow precipitously in 2008, to an esti-
mated 0.5 percent for the year, after several years in
which its economy expanded by nearly 3.0 percent per
year. The country’s economy was strongly affected both
by the global economic downturn and by the rapid
retreat of world energy prices, which sharply curtailed
output and revenues from its energy sector [5]. Canada’s
relatively conservative banking system has limited its
exposure to the “toxic assets” revealed by the financial
crisis in 2007-2008, but in the short run it is unlikely to
avoid the negative economic impact of global recession
[6].
The strong economic ties between Canada and the
United States, in addition to depressed world energy
prices starting in the second half of 2008, lead to slower
growth in the near term for Canada’s economy. After
2010, when the world economies are expected to be in
recovery and oil prices are expected to begin rising
(favoring an expansion of production from the country’s
oil sands), Canada’s GDP growth averages about 2.2
percent per year through 2030 in the reference case.
Similarly, Mexico’s close relationship to the U.S. econ-
omy means that it too is likely to see a negative impact
from the current downturn. About 80 percent of Mex-
ico’s exports are sent to the United States, and in combi-
nation with depressed world oil prices and the global
credit crunch, its dependence on the U.S. economy has
slowed the growth of the Mexican economy. A return to
high world oil prices and recovery of the U.S. economy
after 2010 are expected to support a return to Mexico’s
trend growth, with GDP increasing by an average of 3.4
percent per year from 2006 to 2030.
For the economies of OECD Europe, prospects in the
short term are dimmed by the current turbulence in
international financial markets and global economic
recession. Their combined GDP growth is estimated to
have slowed sharply, from 3.4 percent in 2006 and 3.1
percent in 2007 to 1.4 percent in 2008 and an anticipated
contraction of 0.2 percent in 2009. Over the long term,
OECD Europe’s GDP growth is projected to average 2.0
percent per year from 2006 to 2030, in line with what the
OECD considers to be potential output growth [7].
According to the International Monetary Fund, OECD
Europe’s long-term growth prospects depend on its abil-
ity to accelerate improvements in labor productivity
that have been lagging potential (in part because of the
8 GDP growth rates in the short term are substantially lower in the updated AEO2009 reference case (April 2009), but the long-run growth
rate over the 24 year projection period is lower by less than 0.1 percentage point than in the published reference case (March 2009). Investment
and exports show the largest downward revisions, resulting from higher projections for U.S. inflation and interest rates and lower projec-
tions for economic growth in other countries.
Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2009
region’s aging population), as well as improvements in
the structural flexibility of the various national econo-
mies [8].
After maintaining relatively robust economic growth of
about 2.0 percent per year between 2003 and 2007,
Japan’s GDP growth rate slowed to 0.4 percent in 2008.
In the fourth quarter of 2008, exports declined by 14 per-
cent and industrial output fell by an annual rate of 20
percent [9]. Although GDP growth should return as the
rest of the world’s economic situation improves after
2010, the continuing decline in Japan’s aging labor force
is expected to slow its economic growth to average
annual rates of 1.3 percent from 2008 to 2015 and 0.5 per-
cent from 2015 to 2030.
More robust economic growth is projected for the rest of
OECD Asia. In South Korea, GDP growth is projected to
average 3.3 percent per year from 2006 to 2030. The
global downturn has led to sharp declines in exports and
domestic demand [10], and although the Bank of Korea
has tried to ease the pressure on its financial mar-
kets—both by lowering interest rates six times between
October 2008 and February 2009, to 2.0 percent, and by
raising the cap on its low-rate commercial loans to $6.73
billion (10 trillion Korean won) from $6.00 billion (9 tril-
lion won) [11]—the country is widely believed to be in
its first recession since the banking crisis of 1998 [12]. As
world demand begins to improve after 2010, South
Korea’s GDP growth is expected to return to trend. In
the long term, however, its growth is expected to taper
off as the growth of its labor force slows.
GDP growth in Australia/New Zealand averages 3.0
percent per year from 2006 to 2030 in the reference case.
Although economic growth in both Australia and New
Zealand has slowed markedly with the collapse of com-
modity prices, the Reserve Bank of Australia and the
Reserve Bank of New Zealand have eased monetary pol-
icies, helping to cushion the impact of the global down-
turn [13]. Prospects in both countries are relatively
healthy, given their consistent track records of fiscal pru-
dence and structural reforms aimed at maintaining com-
petitive product markets and flexible labor markets.
Non-OECD Economies
From 2006 to 2030, economic growth in non-OECD
Europe and Eurasia as a whole average 3.6 percent per
year. For the past several years, the non-OECD nations
of Europe and Eurasia have largely been sheltered from
global economic uncertainties, recording strong eco-
nomic growth in every year since 2000, primarily as a
result of robust domestic demand, the growth bonus
associated with ascension of some countries (including
15
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia) to the Euro-
pean Union, and the impacts of rising oil prices on
oil-exporting nations (including Russia, Kazakhstan,
Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan).
In the wake of the recent problems in the global financial
system, it became more difficult for banks and other
entities in non-OECD Europe and Eurasia to gain access
to foreign loans, particularly in Russia, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine. The impact was softened somewhat by higher
world market prices for commodity exports [14], but
with the subsequent collapse of commodity prices and
worsening global economic situation, the region’s eco-
nomic growth is projected to decline in the near term. In
the mid- to long term, a return to high world oil prices
stimulates investment outlays, especially in the energy
sector of the Caspian region. Given the volatility of
energy market prices, however, it is unlikely that the
economies of non-OECD Europe and Eurasia will be
able to sustain the growth rates recently achieved until
they achieve more broad-based diversification from
energy production and exports. The long-term growth
prospects for the former Soviet Republic economies of
Eurasia hinge on their success in economic diversifica-
tion, as well as further improvements in domestic finan-
cial and product markets.
Much of the growth in world economic activity between
2006 and 2030 is expected to occur among the nations of
non-OECD Asia, where regional GDP growth is pro-
jected to average 5.7 percent per year. China, non-OECD
Asia’s largest economy, is expected to continue playing
a major role in both the supply and demand sides of the
global economy. IEO2009 projects an average annual
growth rate of approximately 6.4 percent for China’s
economy from 2006 to 2030—the highest among all the
world’s economies.
Although some analysts expected that China’s economy
might be decoupled from those of the United States and
OECD Europe and thus might avoid any significant
impact from the economic downturn in those countries,
it seems clear that this has not been the case [15]. Exports
account for 35 percent of China’s GDP, with the United
States, Europe, and Asia taking 70 percent of its total
exports. As a result, while there is some evidence that
domestic consumer demand has remained relatively
strong even as the world recession continues, manufac-
turing and export growth have declined sharply, lead-
ing to a reduction in near-term economic growth.
Structural issues that have implications for economic
growth in China in the medium- to long term include
the pace of reform affecting inefficient state-owned
companies and a banking system that is carrying a
significant amount of nonperforming loans. In the
IEO2009 reference case, development of domestic
capital markets is expected to continue, providing
16 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2009
macroeconomic stability and ensuring that China’s large
domestic savings are used more efficiently.
Although India’s economy is not as dependent on
export revenues as China’s is, its growth still has slowed
as the result of downturns in output from its industrial
and agricultural sectors. Nearly two-thirds of Indian
households depend on agriculture for their income [16].
India’s GDP growth is expected to slow in the near term,
but prospects for its economy are positive in the
mid-term, as it continues to privatize state enterprises
and increasingly adopts free market policies. In the
IEO2009 reference case, GDP growth in India averages
5.6 percent per year from 2006 to 2030.
Accelerating structural reforms—including ending reg-
ulatory impediments to the consolidation of labor-
intensive industries, labor market and bankruptcy
reforms, and agricultural and trade liberalization—
remain essential for stimulating potential growth and
reducing poverty in India over the medium to long term.
With its vast and relatively inexpensive English-
speaking labor force, India is well positioned to reap the
benefits of globalization.
Outside China and India, the impacts of the global reces-
sion on the countries of non-OECD Asia are likely to
vary. The economies of export-dependent countries
(including Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan) are
expected to weaken in the near term, as demand in the
United States, Europe, and Asia declines [17]. For
nations where domestic demand remains healthy
(including Vietnam and the Philippines), the impact of
the global recession may be less severe [18]. Overall,
long-term economic activity in the nations of non-OECD
Asia is expected to remain robust. From 2006 to 2030,
national economic growth rates for the region—exclud-
ing China and India—average 4.8 percent per year, as
labor force growth rates decline and economies mature.
Rising oil production and prices have helped boost eco-
nomic growth in the oil-exporting countries of the Mid-
dle East, many of which have also benefited from
spillover effects on trade, tourism, and financial flows
from the region’s oil exporters. In recent years, real GDP
growth rates in the Middle East have averaged around 6
percent. Although the sharp decline in world oil prices
will slow economic growth in the near term, as prices
recover in the mid-term, prospects for the region remain
favorable. The region’s reliance on oil revenues is
expected to continue for much of the projection period.
Substantially lower commodity prices and weak import
demand in the United States, OECD Europe, and Asia
are expected to dampen near-term growth potential in
much of Africa. Africa’s national economies were able to
maintain a healthy pace of aggregate economic growth,
in excess of 5 percent per year, from 2000 to 2007 largely
because of increased earnings from fossil fuel exports,
strong global demand and favorable international prices
for some other export commodities, vigorous domestic
demand, and significant foreign direct investment and
foreign aid [19]. If the global recession results in a slow-
down of foreign direct investment in the region,
long-term economic growth may be affected.
In the IEO2009 reference case, Africa’s combined econ-
omy grows at an average annual rate of 4.0 percent from
2006 to 2030—somewhat lower than IEO2008 projection
of 4.5 percent. The IEO2009 projection still is optimistic
by historical standards. It is supported by the region’s
strong economic activity over the past 5 years, resulting
from expansion of primary exports and robust domestic
demand in many of Africa’s national economies. Never-
theless, both economic and political factors—such as
low savings and investment rates, lack of strong eco-
nomic and political institutions, limited quantity and
quality of infrastructure and human capital, negative
perceptions on the part of international investors, pro-
tracted civil unrest and political disturbances, and espe-
cially the impact of disease (notably HIV/AIDS)—
present formidable obstacles to growth in a number of
African countries.
The nations of Central and South America registered a
combined 6-percent increase in GDP in 2004, which was
their best performance in 20 years; however, their
growth prospects have been hampered by a weak inter-
national credit environment and by domestic economic
and/or political problems in a number of countries. The
proximity of the region to the United States and the
trade relationships of its national economies with the
slowing U.S. economy will lead to slower economic
Figure 20. World Marketed Energy Consumption
in Three Economic Growth Cases,
1980-2030
Quadrillion Btu
High
800 Economic
Growth
Reference
600
Low
Economic
400 Growth
200
History Projections
0
1980 1995 2006 2015 2030
Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA),
International Energy Annual 2006 (June-December 2008),
web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea. Projections: EIA, World
Energy Projections Plus (2009).
Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2009
growth in the short term, but the long-term prospects for
Central and South America remain positive. Most coun-
tries in the region have flexible exchange-rates regimes,
positive trade balances, and relatively low fiscal deficits
and public debts. Regional inflation is lower than it was
in the mid-1990s, and its relatively young labor force
supports the region’s economic growth prospects over
the next 30 years. Economic growth in Central and South
American averages 3.7 percent per year from 2006 to
2030 in the reference case, as the region benefits from the
expected recovery in world economic growth after 2010
and foreign capital flows are revived.
Major Sources of Uncertainty
in the Projections
Alternative Economic Growth Cases
Expectations for the future rates of economic growth
are a major source of uncertainty in the IEO2009 projec-
tions. To illustrate the uncertainties associated with eco-
nomic growth trends, IEO2009 includes a high economic
growth case and a low economic growth case in addition
to the reference case. The two alternative growth cases
use different assumptions about future economic
growth paths, while maintaining the same relationships
between changes in GDP and changes in energy con-
sumption that are used in the reference case.
In the high economic growth case, 0.5 percentage point
is added to the growth rate assumed for each country or
country grouping in the reference case. In the low eco-
nomic growth case, 0.5 percentage point is subtracted
from the reference case growth rate. The IEO2009 refer-
ence case shows total world energy consumption reach-
ing 678 quadrillion Btu in 2030—278 quadrillion Btu in
the OECD countries and 400 quadrillion Btu in the
non-OECD countries. In the high growth case, world
energy use in 2030 totals 733 quadrillion Btu—55 qua-
drillion Btu (about 27 million barrels oil equivalent per
day) higher than in the reference case. In the low growth
case, total world energy use in 2030 is 51 quadrillion Btu
(25 million barrels oil equivalent per day) lower than in
the reference case. Thus, the projections for 2030 in the
high and low economic growth cases define a range of
uncertainty equal to 106 quadrillion Btu (Figure 20).
Alternative World Oil Price Cases
Assumptions about world oil prices are another impor-
tant factor that underscores the considerable uncertainty
in long-term energy market projections. The effects of
different assumptions about future oil prices are illus-
trated in IEO2009 by two alternative oil price cases. In
the high price case, world oil prices (in real 2007 dollars)
climb from $68 per barrel in 2006 to $200 per barrel in
2030; in the low price case, they decline to $50 per barrel
in 2015 and remain at about that level through 2030. In
17
comparison, world oil prices rise to $130 per barrel in The potential effects of higher and lower oil prices on
2030 in the reference case (Figure 21). world GDP can also be seen in the low and high price
cases. In the long run, on a worldwide basis, the projec-
Although the difference in world oil prices between the tions for economic growth are not affected substantially
high and low oil price cases is considerable, at $150 per by the price assumptions. There are, however, some rel-
barrel in 2030, the projections for total world energy con- atively large regional impacts. The most significant vari-
sumption in 2030 do not vary substantially among the ations are GDP decreases of around 2.0 percent in the
cases. There is, however, a larger impact on the mix of high price case relative to the reference case in 2015 for
energy fuels consumed. The projections for total world some regions outside the Middle East and, in the
energy use in 2030 in the high and low oil price cases are oil-exporting Middle East region, a 5.5-percent increase
separated by 48 quadrillion Btu (Figure 22), as compared in GDP in 2015. The regional differences persist into the
with the difference of 106 quadrillion Btu between the long term, with GDP in the Middle East about 6.2 per-
low and high economic growth cases. cent higher in 2030 in the high oil price case than in the
reference case and GDP in some oil-importing regions
(such as OECD Europe and Japan) between 2.0 percent
Figure 21. World Oil Prices in Three Price Cases, and 3.0 percent lower in the high price case than in the
1980-2030 reference case.
2007 Dollars per Barrel
250
History Projections The most substantial impacts of the high and low oil
price assumptions are on the mix of energy fuels con-
High World $200
200 sumed in each region—particularly, fossil fuels (Figure
Oil Price
23). In the high price case, total world liquids consump-
tion in 2030 is about 34 quadrillion Btu lower than pro-
150
$130 jected in the reference case, natural gas consumption in
2030 is 9 quadrillion Btu higher, and coal consumption is
100 Reference 2 quadrillion Btu higher than in the reference case. The
differences for nuclear power and renewable energy
consumption between the two cases is very small, espe-
50
Low World $50 cially in the near to mid-term, primarily because both
Oil Price energy sources are strongly influenced by government
0 policies and incentives, and prices do not have a large
1980 1995 2006 2015 2030 impact on their development.
Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA), Annual
Energy Outlook 2009, DOE/EIA-0383(2009) (Washington, DC, In the low oil price case, consumers increase their use of
June 2009), web site www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo. liquids for transportation, and there is less incentive for
movement away from liquids to other energy sources in
sectors where fuel substitution is fairly easy to achieve
Figure 22. World Marketed Energy Consumption
in Three Oil Price Cases, 2006-2030
Quadrillion Btu Figure 23. World Marketed Energy Consumption
800 in Three Oil Price Cases, 2030
High Price Reference Low Price Quadrillion Btu
300
Liquids Coal Natural Gas Renewables
600 Nuclear

200
400

200
100

0
2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Sources: History: Energy Information Administration (EIA), 0
International Energy Annual 2006 (June-December 2008), Reference High Price Low Price
web site www.eia.doe.gov/iea. Projections: EIA, World Source: Energy Information Administration, World Energy
Energy Projections Plus (2009). Projections Plus (2009).

18 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2009

(as opposed to the transportation sector, where there are
few alternatives to liquid fuels). Total liquids consump-
tion in 2030 is 28 quadrillion Btu higher in the low price
case than projected in the reference case, reflecting
increased demand in all the end-use sectors. The trans-
portation sector shows the largest increase in liquids
consumption (12 quadrillion Btu) in 2030 in the low
price case relative to the reference case (Figure 24), fol-
lowed by the industrial sector (8 quadrillion Btu) and the
electric power sector (5 quadrillion Btu).
In the IEO2009 reference case, world oil prices begin to
rise after 2010 and reach $130 per barrel in 2030. As a
result, liquids consumption is curtailed in countries that
have other fuel options available—especially in the elec-
tric power sector, where coal and other fuels can be
substituted. Worldwide use of liquids for electricity gen-
eration falls by 0.8 quadrillion Btu from 2006 to 2030 in
the reference case. In the low price case, consumption of Projections Plus (2009).
liquids for electricity generation increases by 3.9 qua-
drillion Btu, as the non-OECD countries retain their
oil-fired generating capacity in the lower price
environment.
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250 244
216
200 Electric Power
182
Commercial
150 Residential
Industrial
100 Transportation
50
0
0
Reference High Price Low Price
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Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2009 19

 CERAWEEK 2009 (March 2009), web site www.cera.
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20 Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook 2009
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