Zen Buddhism and Western Thought Theory Mirrors Mind

ZEN BUDDHISM AND WESTERNTHOUGHT
Sartreand a ChineseBuddhistTheory
of No-Self:The Mirroringof Mind
Steven W. Laycock
Universityof Toledo
Jean-Paul Sartrewas assuredlynot a Buddhist. Nor do his works exhibit any

influence, immediate or remote, from Buddhist textual sources. Still, it is intri-
guing to find that, laying aside its practical, soteriological aim, much of the
Buddhist phenomenology of the self (2tman) can be reclaimedin terms of the
early Sartreandoctrine articulatedin The Transcendenceof the Ego. And it is
tempting, therefore, simply to assimilate the one to the other. Certain of the
skandhas(the sansk2ras),for example, appearto play the same role in Buddhist
egology as the "psychic" transcendencies(states, actions, and qualities) do in
the Sartrean.The Buddhist conception of 2tman, like the Sartreanego, features
an illusory "construct"of psychicidealities. And both would accept the insight
that at the base of consciousnesslies the anonymousflux of absolutely momen-
taryexperience.It is said thatpratn2 is the realizationof the three marksof exis-
tence: suffering, momentariness, and impersonality.Each of these notions has
its counterpartin the early Sartreanphenomenological ontology. And, indeed,
Sartre's"pure" reflection seems saliently akin to prafih.
It is not my intent, however, to press Sartreinto the Buddhist mold. The
resulting "fit," were it possible at all, would be at once artificial and superfi-
cial. No philosophy enjoys sufficient plasticity to permit such ad hoc adjust-
ments. Serious reservationswould certainlyremain. The apparent congruence
would be met by wisely heeded qualms, the most serious of which would be,
first, that, under the popular (though, I believe, incorrect) reading, Sartre
maintains a Cartesiandualism, a bifurcation of for-itself and in-itself entirely
alien to the spirit of Buddhism; second, that the Sartreanconception of "noth-
ingness," the universalnihilation of the in-itself at the base of the for-itself, is
no more than a "relative"nothingness, the determinatelymodalized privation
of being-in-itself, and not the "absolute" nothingness of sunyat2; and finally,
that Sartre'sattempted resolution of the ego into the manifold of immanent
Erlebnisserepresentsa certain foundationalism in conflict with the profound
doctrineof pratzyasamutp2da.
Certain of these stinging qualms might successfully be resolved. Sartre
claims, in Being and Nothingness, for example, that the two "transpheno-
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26 STEVENW. LAYCOCK
mena," the being of the subject and the being of the object, for-itself and in-
itself, areinternallyrelated, thus disarmingthe chargeof dualism. I wish, how-
ever, to invite attention, not to such glaring failures of divergence, fancied or
real, but to those dimensions of the Sartrean egology most evidently and
unproblematicallyparallel with the Buddhist. I shall then contend that, pre-
cisely at those crucial junctures at which congruence seems most assured, the
Sartreantheory lapses, while the Buddhist theory does not, into infidelity with
its own professedphenomenological commitment to dwell exclusivelyupon the
"things themselves" (die Sache selbst), describingthe "matters"of conscious-
nesspreciselyas and only as they appear.
MIND AS MIRROR
There is, perhaps, no more consistentor fruitful metaphoroperatingwithin the

Chinese Buddhist tradition, particularlythat of Ch'an, than the image of the
gleaming mirror,shining by its own light, reflecting all things standing before
it, yet in itself remainingutterly unaffected. The image, a naturalmetaphorfor
mind, bearsa twofold significance. First,we find in the mirroran absolute and
unqualified permissiveness.All things visible whatsoevermay be reflected. The
mirrormakes but a single demand: visibility. Second, although it may be said,
and truly,that the mirrorreflectsthe manifold forms of visibility,there is a cru-
cial sense in which the mirroritself is utterly free from any such form whatso-
ever. In Shen-hui'sinsightful articulation:
A bright mirroris set up on a high stand; its illumination reachesthe ten-

thousand things, and they are all reflected in it. The mastersare wont to
considerthis phenomenon most wonderful. But as far as my school is con-
cernedit is not to be consideredwonderful. Why? As to this bright mirror,
its illumination reachesthe ten-thousand things, and these ten-thousand
things are not reflected in it. This is what I would declareto be most won-
derful. Why? The Tathagatadiscriminatesall things with non-Tathagata
discriminatingPrajna(chih). If he has any discriminatingmind, do you
think he could discriminateall things?'
Shen-hui does not, of course, deny or disparagethe act of discriminationitself,

the icart whereby a focal object, and thus an object of interest, is set, for con-
sciousness, over against its background, text against context. His claim is,
rather,transcendental:the very condition for discriminationis nondiscriminat-
ing pra/ii, just as the utter indifference to difference of form characteristicof
the mirroris the very condition for its reflection of form. Place an object-a
bright red apple, say-in front of a mirror.Neither the reflection of the apple
nor the mirrorin which it appears is itself red. Mind does not exemplify the
properties of its objects. Property concepts may, indeed, have their being
within a reticular "space" of binary contrasts, but mind remains, in itself,
SARTREAND HUI-NENG 27
indifferent to such discriminations, undivided by conceptual contrasts. The

mirrorneither instantiatesrednessnor non-redness. And this freedom from dis-
criminationis its very nature. When, within the Ch'an tradition, one speaksof
the "Buddha-nature,"surelyit is this "indifference" to difference, this "form-
lessness,"that is meant.
Metaphorsof mirroringinform Sartre'sown understandingof consciousness.
Consciousness, in Satre's more usual trope, is a vacuity, a sheer absence of
being, a "nothingness."But such alternativerepresentationscarryno more log-
ical freight than that of the mirror.The "emptiness" of the for-itself is simply a
variantrepresentationof the "permissiveness"of the mind-mirror.Vacuity,for
our purposes, seems little more than a three-dimensionalizationof mirroring.
And the additional dimension is conceptually otiose.2 The "nothingness" of
consciousnessdoes not, however, entail that subjectivitygazes impassivelyout
upon its world in stolid indifference. But engagement is to be understood in
terms of featuresof the world: "the wood has to be brokeninto small pieces for
the fire to catch. It has to: this is a quality of the wood and an objective relation
of the wood to the fire which has to be lighted."3 The world itself appearsas
possessing such objective practical exigencies. "When I run after a streetcar
. . .there is consciousnessof the streetcar-having-to-be-overtaken"(TE, 49).
And this deliversSartrefrom the necessityof positing "within" consciousnessa
desire or practicalcommitment.
The metaphor of mirroringitself is never far from the surfaceof Sartre'sthe-
ory of consciousreflection. In reflection, "we are in the presence of a synthesis
of two consciousnesses,one of which is consciousnessof the other" (TE, 44).
Before pursuing Sartre'sgeneral descriptionof the ego as, in effect, the reflec-
tion of the reflecting consciousnesswithin the reflected consciousness,it is vital
to see that consciousness, as "mind-mirror,"is ineluctably anonymous and
"formless."
Although Husserl is, in large measure, the mainspringof his phenomenolo-
gical interests, Sartredepartsfrom Husserl'sviews in certainof his most funda-
mental conceptions. Husserl's notion of the phenomenon, inseparable, of
course, from his phenomenology, represents,as Sartrehimself maintains, a sig-
nificant advance beyond the Kantian conception.4 Kant's "phenomenon" is
the deliveranceof a processof synthetic formation initiated by the noumenon,
and it servesto "conceal" its very "source."In starkestterms, Kant is subject to
the objection that that which appears(the noumenon) is not present within the
appearanceof it. For Husserl, however, the phenomenon is not the appearance
of an object, but the object-as-it-appears.For Husserl, an episode of appearing
possessesboth a "genitive" and a "dative" aspect.5Satreconcurswith Husserl's
thesis that, for "natural," prereflective consciousness, neither genitive nor
dative is manifest as such. But he departs from the Husserliandoctrine in his
insistence that reflection reveals only a domain of "genitives." Appearing is
appearing-of not appearing-to. And in this sense, consciousnessis ineluctably
"anonymous."
28 STEVENW. LAYCOCK
Indeed, for the impersonal prereflectiveconsciousness, "There is no longer

an 'inner life' . . . because there is no longer anything which is an object and
which can at the same time partakeof the intimacy of consciousness"(Th, 94).
This representsperhapsan even more dramaticdeparturefrom Husserlianphe-
nomenology. For Husserl, those phenomenal-transcendentalstructuresmade
manifest through reflection (notably, ego, cogito, and cogitatum) are assumed
to function "invisibly"or "transparently,"as it were, in the naturalattitude. It
is this which Sartrewill not allow. Objectivity and subjectivityare incompre-
hensible in isolation from one another. And subjectivitycannot, in principle,
be thematized within prereflectiveconsciousness.Subject is never object. Sub-
jectivity objectified becomes what Sartrecalls "the psychic," a third order of
being "laminated," as it were, immediately against consciousness.If the for-
itself is a "bubble" rising in the medium of worldly being, the psychic is the
enveloping "boundary"that belongs neither to its inner absencenor to the sur-
rounding plenary integrity of the in-itself. We cannot, then, properlyspeak of
an object greeting the mind at all at the prereflectivelevel. Nor, correlatively,
can the ego-act structureinform one's experienceat this level.
This is echoed in its radicalimplications by the familiarcontrastingversesof
Shen-hsiu and Hui-neng. The second line of Shen-hsiu's notable gatha asserts
that "The mind is like a bright mirror."Hui-neng's rejoinder, recognized by
MasterHung-jan as decidedly more profound, appearsto be its negate: "There
never was . . . a stand of mirror bright."6 Subjectivity is never presented to
itself as subjectivity.For mind, there is no mind. Sartre'sclaim that, in reflec-
tion, both reflecting and reflected consciousnessare prereflectivedemonstrates
his accord. "All reflecting consciousnessis, indeed, in itself unreflected" (TE,
45). The necessity to wipe the dust from the mind-mirroris suspended on the
assumptionthat the mind can be presentedto itself through reflectionor repre-
sented to itself in virtue of an image such as that of the mirror.To recognize
dust as dust, we must take up a presumptivevantage point outside the mind.
And this is manifestly impossible. Moreover,the spontaneous reflectivityof a
mirroris in no way impaired by placing an opaque object immediately against
its surface.Dust clinging to the surfaceof a mirrormay partiallyocclude objects
at greaterremove, thus distorting their reflection. But the mirroritself is not
thereby distorted. Occlusionmust not be confused with a diminution of reflec-
tivity.
Suzuki provides an alternative metaphor on Shen-hsiu's behalf, an image
not altogether alien to Sartre'sdescriptionof consciousnessas "all lightness, all
translucence"(Th, 42):
The mind . . . is like a crystalball with no colour of its own. It is pure and
perfect as it is. But as soon as it confrontsthe outside world it takes on all
colours and forms of differentiation. This differentiation is in the outside
world, and the mind, left to itself shows no change of any character.Now
suppose the ball to be placed against something altogether contraryto
itself, and so become a dark-colouredball. Howeverpure it may have been

before, it is now a dark-colouredball, and this colour is seen as belonging
from the first to the nature of the ball. When shown thus to ignorantpeo-
ple they will at once conclude that the ball is foul, and will not be easily
convincedof its essentialpurity.'
Inasmuchas he advisesremovalof the "ball" from its discoloringbackground,

Shen-hsiu has fallen among the ranks of the "ignorant." The motive for the
retraction is teleological: it is in order to realize the essential and inherent
purity of the mind, purity serving thus as telos. Yet this presupposesthat the
dualism of purity and impurity has some purchase on the mind. We must
remind ourselvesthat, in a profound sense, the "ten-thousand things are not
reflected" in the mind-mirror,that "all things are discriminatedwith non-dis-
criminating pra/ii2," as Shen-hui declared. Hui-neng counsels "neither to
cling to the notion of a mind, nor to cling to the notion of purity,nor to cherish
the thought of immovability; for these are not our meditation."8 Indeed,
"When you cherish the notion of purity and cling to it, you turn purity into
falsehood.... Purity has neither form nor shape, and when you claim an
achievement by establishing a form to be known as purity, you obstruct your
own self-nature, you are purity-bound."9Insofar as subjectivity is grasped as
object, it can be no more than an objectified representation,a "reflection,"of
the inner purity of mind. Purity objectified is not purity. Subjectivityobjecti-
fied is not subjectivity. Thus, as Shen-hui insists: "So long as the seeing is
something to see, it is not the real one; only when the seeing is no-seeing-that
is, when the seeing is not a specific act of seeing into a definitely circumscribed
state of consciousness-is it the 'seeing into one's self-nature.' "10 Seeing-seen
must not (pace Husserl)be confused with seeing. Seeing-seen is the thematized
deliveranceof reflection. Seeing is the functioning of prereflectiveconscious-
ness. Reflection "posits" its own objectifications. It does not "discover"them
as already"there" in prereflectiveconsciousness,since, as reflective, it necessar-
ily arisesafter prereflectiveexperience.
THEEGOAS REFLECTION
Sartrepresentshis theory of the ego in two tiers: there is first a general descrip-
tion of its constitution, and then a more refined and nuanced analysis.There is
much in the largeradumbrationthat is reminiscentof the Ch 'an egology. And,
as we shall later see, the finer analysiscomportswell with the early psychologi-
cal insights of the Abhidharmaliterature.
In its general formation, the ego, once again, is represented as the "reflec-
tion" of the reflecting consciousness in the reflected consciousness. This, of
course, is why "the I proffers itself to an intuition of a special kind which
apprehends it, always inadequately, behind the reflected consciousness"(TE,
53). One's face inevitably appears "behind" the mirror. Sartre'smodel bears
30 STEVENW. LAYCOCK
the salient consequence that a "reflection of one's face in a glass exists only so
long as one stands before it."
The ego is not, for Sartre,a sourceor an agency "behind" the activityof con-
sciousnesswhich brings this activity about-a view vividly contrastingwith the
Husserlianthesis that the ego performs every "act" of consciousness,reflective
or prereflective.This is remarkablyin tune with the query of the Tun-huang
manuscript with regard to the productive-agential ego: "Where is this 'I'?
What does it look like?"11 Indeed, if it "looks like" anything at all, it cannot
be what it claims to be: the veryagency "doing" the looking.
The ego, in Sartre'snuanced analysis,is an illusorystructureof abstract,per-
durant "psychic" factors and has no being in isolation from these founding
transcendencies.And these transcendentidealities are, in turn, founded in the
immanent flux of momentaryErlebnisse. Sartredescribesthe ego as the tran-
scendent unity of states, actions, and optionally, of qualities. "The state,"
Sartretells us, "is a noematic unity of spontaneities" (TE, 71). A "state," such
as hatred (to borrowSartre'stypicallymorose example), is a transcendentunity
of transientexperience:
Now my hatred appears to me at the same time as my experience of

repugnance. But it appearsthrough this experience. It is given preciselyas
not being limited to this experience. My hatred was given in and by each
movement of disgust, of repugnance, and of anger, but at the same time it
is not any of them. My hatred escapesfrom each of them by affirming its
permanence. . . . It effects by itself, moreover, a distinction between to
be and to appear, since it gives itself as continuing to be even when I am
absorbedin other occupationsand no consciousnessrevealsit . . . hatred
is not of consciousness. It overflows the instantaneousnessof conscious-
ness, and it does not bow to the absolute law of consciousnessfor which no
distinction is possible between appearanceand being. . . Each Erlebnis
revealsit as a whole, but at the same time the Erlebnisis a profile, a pro-
jection [an Abschattung]. Hatred is credit for an infinity of angry or
repulsedconsciousnesses.[TE, 62-63]
An action "is not only the noematic unity of a stream of consciousnesses:it is

also a concreterealization"(TE, 69). And "the quality is given as a potentiality,
a virtuality,which, under the influence of diversefactors, can pass into actual-
ity. Its actualityis preciselythe state (or the action)" (TE, 70). It is "a unity of
objective passivities" (Th, 71). "The ego," finally, is "nothing outside of the
concrete totality of states and actions it supports" (Th, 74). It is "the infinite
totality of states and actions which is never reducible to an action or to a state"
(TE, 74).
Subjectivityobjectified comprises, as we have noted, the domain of "the
psychic." "The psychic," Sartresays, "is the transcendentobject of reflective
consciousness"(TE, 71). In this, once again, Sartrebetraysa crucialdeparture
from Husserl. For Husserl, the object of reflection is precisely consciousness
(Bewusst-sein)itself. Sartre'scommitment to the utter "nothingness" of con-

sciousnessleads him to reject the Husserlianclaim. Yet the object of reflective
consciousnessis not "transcendent" in the sense typical of tables and chairs.
We are incapable of securing with respect to it a vantage point at sufficient
remove. The psychic is "too close" to consciousnessfor that. What Sartresays
of "the me," that aspect of the psychic comprising the unity of passivity,the
unity, perhaps, of what Husserl would denominate "passive synthesis," is
applicable universallyto the psychic in general: "It is too much present for one
to succeed in taking a truly external viewpoint on it. If we step back for van-
tage, the me accompaniesus in this withdrawal.It is infinitely near, and I can-
not circlearound it" (Th, 86). And the ego, conceived as the overarchingtran-
scendent unity of the psychic, embracing "the me" as passive unity and "the
I" as active, "is an object which appearsonly to reflection, and which is thereby
radicallycut off from the World. The ego does not live on the same level" (TE,
83). The Janus-facedego, with its active and passivefacets, is a curioushybrid.
It is neither in the world nor in consciousness,but in between. In reflection, it
is not subjectivity,but the psychic-the "outside" of consciousness, as Sartre
will say (TE, 84)-that is revealed.
SARTREAN EGOLOGY AND THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF THE SKANDHAS
Unenlightened sentient existence, as the First Noble Truth asserts, is fraught

with "suffering" (duhkha), the unavoidable "pain" which accompaniesphysi-
cal embodiment, and the avoidable mental anguish which results from "crav-
ing" (tazh2): "Now this, monks, is the noble truth of pain: birth is painful,
old age is painful, sickness is painful, death is painful, sorrow, lamentation,
dejection, and despair are painful. Contact with unpleasant things is painful,
not getting what one wishes is painful. In short the five groups of grasping are
painful."12Unmistakably,"the five groups of grasping"refersto the skandhas,
the five sets of "factors" comprising the psychophysicalpersonality (n2ma-
rupa). To say that "the five groups of grasping" are imbued with duhkha
summarizesall varietiesof human suffering. And it is thus impossible to grasp
this fundamental and profound insight of Buddhism in isolation from the Bud-
dhist theory of "no-self' (an#tman). The person, as an integral psychophysical
being, consistsof: (1) the body with its sense-organs;(2) feelings and sensations
(vedan,a);(3) perceptions; (4) the mental "aggregates" (sankara),including
habitual volitions, dispositions, concepts, and so on; and (5) (reflective) con-
sciousness.13
The first skandha, embracing the sense-media and the body as itself the
unifying mode of consciousaccessto the world, comprisesthe physical "form"
(rupa) of the person. In the later description of Being and Nothingness, the
body is said to be one's "contingent point of view on the world."14
It is crucialto see that the skandhasare essentiallyfunctional: "Hands are no
hands, have no existence, until they pick up flowersand offer them to the Bud-
32 STEVENW. LAYCOCK
dha; so with legs, they are no legs, non-entities, unless their Use is set to work,
and they walk over the bridge, ford the stream and climb the mountain." 15 In
the classicalillustration, innocent of their function, the variousparts of a char-
iot would in no wise be parts of a chariot at all. Wheels are not wheels unless
they function as wheels. To borrow the Heideggerian term, the body and its
sense organs are essentially "ready-to-hand" (zu-handen). In their function-
ing, the organsof sense efface themselves. The "content" of the bodily senso-
rium does not include the retina, the tympanium, or the somaestheticnerves.
We do, as Sartrereadily admits, quite often employ the word "I" while
remaining immersed in prereflectiveconsciousness:"But this 'I' which is here
in question . . . is no mere syntacticalform. It has a meaning; it is quite simply
an empty concept which is destined to remain empty" (Th, 89). The "I" of
prereflectivediscoursedoes not, and cannot, enjoy intuitive fulfillment, for the
ego is posited only in reflection.
Now I am breaking the wood, that is to say, the action is realized in the
world, and the objective and empty support of this action is the I-concept.
This is why the body and bodily images can consummate the total degra-
dation of the concreteI of reflectionto the "I-concept" by functioning for
the "I-concept" as its illusoryfulfillment. . . The body there servesas a
visible and tangible symbol for the I. [Th, 90]
The body is presented to us as an "object," and thus, as "present-at-hand"

(vor-handen),no less than as the functioning medium of sensibility, as Korper
as well as Leib, and as such it servesas Ersatzfor objectified subjectivity.
The remainingskandhascomprisethe "formless"(invisible) but nonetheless
"nameable" (n2ma) aspect of the personality.The vedan2s, forming an imme-
diate, momentaryand uninterpretedlevel of experience, play a role quite simi-
lar to that of the prereflective Erlebnisse in Sartre's egology. Perceptions,
involving as they do the synthesis and organization of vedanic sensation, the
"animation" or "ensoulment" (in Husserl'sidiom) of the "body" of hyletic
immediacy, seem the very type of the mental "act," and thus comprise
"noematic unities" of the stream of Erlebnisse. The sankara, those enduring
idealities that are "made-together" or synthesized, constituted by a certain
psychic "momentum," include both dispositions (Sartre's "qualities") and
states. And all the skandhas, including the lived body and functioning sense-
media, as well as consciousnessitself, are psychic objects-transcendent, but
proximalobjectsof reflection.
If these admittedly tentative associationsare correct,we find within the Bud-
dhist tradition a striking analog of the Sartreantheory of egological constitu-
tion: the perceptions and sankaras(acts, states, and qualities) are constituted
out of the vedan2s (hyletic experience). And the overarching Gestalt which
forms the most general context of reflectiveconsciousnessis the "atmanic" self
(the ego).
PURE REFLECTIONAND PRAJNA
States, actions, qualities, and ultimately, the ego itself, are posited by what
Sartrecalls "impure" reflection.
We see here two reflections:the one, impure and conniving, which effects
then and there a passage to the infinite, and which through the Erlebnis
abruptly constitutes hatred as its transcendent object; the other, pure,
merely descriptive, which disarmsthe unreflected consciousnessby grant-
ing its instantaneousness.These two reflections apprehend the same, cer-
tain data, but the one affirmsmore than it knows, directing itself through
the reflected consciousnessupon an object situated outside consciousness.
[Th, 64-65]
Impure reflection is culpable of a collapse of numerical and specific identity

akin to that attributed by David Hume to our confused apprehension of the
rapidly successivechorus line of perceptions. The familiar Buddhist image of
the ego as a ring of fire made visible at night by someone standing a good dis-
tance away swinging a firebrandillustratesthe illusion. The apparent circle is,
of course, merelyphenomenal. Yet this admission by no means mitigates the
strikinglyvisible characterof the "circle."
Consider an alternative metaphor. Imagine ascending directly upward in a
helicopter. While on the ground, the eye is greeted by minutiae of perceptual
detail in their distinctness. As the craft begins to ascend, the blades of grass,
once severallyvisible, now pour together into a common sea of green. And as
we ascend to an even greater altitude, the numerous fields of the area, once
perceptible in their distinctness, blend together to form a unitary terrain. The
"blades of grass" are, for Sartre,the absolutely momentary "spontaneities" of
consciousness, the successive Erlebnisse which comprise the ongoing flux of
experience. The "fields" are the intermediate psychic transcendencies(states,
actions, and perhaps qualities). And, stretching the metaphor somewhat
beyond its naturalserviceability,the general "lay of the land" which lies open
to one's gaze from a supposed maximum altitude is, then, the ego.
The anonymous "merely descriptive" intuition which "disarms the unre-
flected consciousness by granting its instantaneousness" and refrains from
affirming "more than it knows" is, in vital respects, akin to the Chinese Bud-
dhist notion of wu-nien. In Hui-neng's declaration:
Oh good friends, what is there for wu (of wu-nien, unconsciousness)to

negate? And what is there for nien to be consciousof? Wu is to negate the
notion of two forms (dualism), and to get rid of a mind which worriesover
things, while nien means to become conscious of the primary nature of
Suchness (tathata); for Suchness is the Body of Consciousness, and Con-
sciousness is the Use of Suchness. It is the self-nature of Suchness to
become consciousof itself. . . .16
34 STEVENW. LAYCOCK
Pure reflection does, indeed, representa "negation" of the duality of subject

and object. But this "Wu" is not to be conceived as a negation of conceptually
determinate structurespresent as content. It is not that subject and object
appear but are negated. Rather, they do not appear at all. And "Wu," then,
signifies, not a determinatenegation, but an absolutelyindeterminateabsence.
The distinction between subject and object seversour conceptual space. Every
object belongs to a specific kind of object, and everystructureof subjectivityis,
of course, a structureof a subject. Thus, of that which is neither subject nor
object, of the "Wu" of pure reflection, neither type nor propertycan be predi-
cated. This is what prompts Shen-hui to aver: "I would not call it anything."17
Indeed, as he asserts:
No designation whatever is possible. Therefore I say that Wu-nien is

beyond the range of wordy discourse.The reasonwe talk about it at all is
becausequestions are raisedconcerningit. If no questions are raisedabout
it, there would be no discourse. It is like a bright mirror. If no objects
appear before it, nothing is to be seen in it. When you say that you see
something in it, it is becausesomething stands againstit. 18
While the ego arisesonly in the act of impure reflection, within the "synthe-
sis of two consciousnesses,"it is nonetheless a mistake to conceive the duality,
reflected and reflecting, as numerical severance. In reflection, Sartreclaims:
"reflection and reflected are only one . . . and the interiorityof the one fuses
with that of the other. To posit interioritybefore oneself, however,is necessarily
to give it the load of an object. This transpiresas if interiorityclosed upon itself
and proffered us only its outside; as if one had to 'circle about' it in order to
understandit. . . . It is inwardfor itself, notfor consciousness"(Th, 84). This
inner continuity is, perhaps, fruitfullyrepresentedby the image of a single flex-
ible reflecting surface which can be plied to form the shape of the letter U.
While we still have a duality of aspects, we have at the same time a continuity
of surface.To invoke the familiar Ch'an distinction between body (t'i) and use
or function (yung), one might say that in reflection we have a single and con-
tinuous reflecting "body" configuredto performa duality of functions.19
The ego, however, as objectified subjectivity,is manifested to the reflecting
consciousnessas indistinct, preciselybecause: "Indistinctness. . . is interiority
seen from the outside; or, if one prefers, indistinctnessis the degraded projec-
tion of interiority"(Th, 85). And this indistinctness "may be interpreted as a
primitive undifferentiation of all qualities, now as a pure form of being, ante-
riorto all qualification" (Th, 85). Again, "the ego, with respect to the past, is
interpenetrative multiplicity, and with respect to the future, bare power"
(TE, 86).
It is only in (impure) reflection that the distinction between subject and
object arises.In prereflectiveconsciousness,there is no genuine object, because
subjectivityremains unmanifest, and the two are ineluctably correlative.The
objectifying "representation"and "hypostatization"of subjectivityis possible,

however, only in virtue of impure reflection, which "affirms more than it
knows." Forpure reflection, which is "merely descriptive, which disarms the
unreflected consciousness by granting its instantaneousness," which, in our
useful image, never loses sight of the "blades of grass," the "profound irra-
tionality of the notion of an ego" has no purchase.
If, in reflection, we have the confrontationof two sides of a single reflecting
surface,we might, indeed, be tempted to expect the familiarmise-en-abime in
which mirrorappearsreflected within mirrorad infinitum. Suppose, however,
that both mirrorswere unbounded, infinite in extent. There would, of course,
be no discriminationbetween mirrorand non-mirrormanifest in either mirror.
The endless nested series of mirrorswithin mirrorsis possible only on the basis
of an initial discriminationof mirrorand non-mirror,subject and object. And
in pure reflection, no such discriminationis possible. Or suppose, alternatively,
that the reflecting consciousness standing before the reflected is, as Sartre
explicitly claims, perfectly "translucent," completely devoid of even the
slightest hint of opacity, "the mind," in Suzuki's trope, being "like a crystal
ball with no colour of its own." Again, no regressis born. Pure reflection, like
prarjna,involves the capacity to distinguish the perfectly transparent "crystal
ball" from the color visible through it.20 For pure reflection, there is no
"image" of consciousness.It is the psychic "impurities,"the transcendentand
ideal "opacities,"which generate the ego-image.
In significant respects, then, pure reflection coincides with the Buddhist
notion of prajh/ad.As Suzuki observes, "The functioning of Prajnais discrete,
and interruptingto the progressof logical reasoning, but all the time it under-
lies it, and without Prajnawe cannot have any reasoningwhatever.Prajnais at
once above and in the process of reasoning. This is a contradiction, formally
considered, but in truth this contradiction itself is made possible because of
Prajna.''21 If reason is conceived as the capacityto posit and to reify those per-
durant unities which run across an entire domain of immediate, transitory
Erlebnisse, then pure reflection does, indeed, "interrupt" the functioning of
"rational"hypostatization. For all that is given to pure reflection is the imme-
diate, which "moves on for ever, not being cut up into pieces called thoughts
and as such detained and retained as something abiding."22Moreover,as Sartre
himself asserts,we could not be in a position to present a theory of the constitu-
tion of transcendentpsychic idealities (states, actions, qualities, and the ego)
were it not for our capacityto apprehendthe "spontaneities"that found them.
Pure reflection (or better: pure intuition) thus "underlies" rational hypostati-
zation, and is "at once above and in the processof reasoning."Once again, in
Suzuki'selegant trope:
It is like appreciatinga fine piece of brocade. On the surface there is an

almost bewildering confusion of beauty, and the connoisseurfails to trace
the intricaciesof the threads. But as soon as it is turned over all the intri-
36 STEVENW. LAYCOCK
cate beauty and skill is revealed. Prajnaconsists in this turning-over.The

eye has hitherto followed the surfaceof the cloth, which is indeed the only
side ordinarilyallowed us to survey.Now the cloth is abruptlyturned over;
the courseof the eyesight is suddenly interrupted;no continuous gazing is
possible. Yet by this interruption, or ratherdisruption, the whole scheme
of life is suddenly grasped;there is the 'seeing into one's self-nature.'23
That which is manifest to pure reflection is, of course, the dynamic flux of liv-
ing immediate experience prior to "rationalization,"unification, or constitu-
tive synthesis. Since rationalityfeeds upon its own reifications, no proposition
of rational discoursecan descend in referenceor significance to this level. Of
the momentary Erlebnisse, absolutely nothing can be said. They cannot, as
such, be conceptualized, and are thus "empty" of eidetic content. As Suzuki
writes: "Emptinessconstantlyfalls within our reach;it is alwayswith us and in
us, and conditions all our knowledge, all our deeds, and is our life itself. It is
only when we attempt to pick it up and hold it forth as something before our
eyes that it eludes us, frustratesall our efforts, and vanisheslike vapour.We are
ever lured towards it, but it proves a will-o'-the-wisp."24In this respect, the
"emptiness" of pure reflection turns out to be just as fundamentally elusive as
the ego of impure reflection. Writes Sartre:
The ego never appears,in fact, except when one is not looking at it. The
reflective gaze must be fixed on the Erlebnis, insofar as it emanates from
the state. Then, behind the state, at the horizon, the ego appears. It is,
therefore, never seen except "out of the cornerof the eye." As soon as I
turn my gaze toward it and try to reach it without passing through the
Erlebnisand the state, it vanishes. This is because in trying to apprehend
the ego for itself and as a direct object of my consciousness,I fall backonto
the unreflected level, and the ego disappearsalong with the reflectiveact.
[TE, 88-89]
Ego and emptiness differ at least inasmuchas the appearanceof the former,but
not of the latter, is structuredby the distinction between subject and object.
There is, however, a final and ultimate discrimination, a "deviation," which
undergirdseven this basic distinction: "The awakeningof Prajnawas the first
grand deviation, and ever since we live in the midst of deviations. There is no
way to escape them except living them as they follow one another."25The
"deviation" of praji'n-from sinyatd, pure intuitive reflection from the imper-
manent and inconceivable flux of Erlebnisse, is the absolutely primordialact
wherebymind initiates the ever more articulateand ever more demanding task
of manifesting itself to itself.
THE IMPERMANENCEOF THE EGO
The "self' (atman), for the Buddhist tradition, is no more than a certain ges-
talt of sanskaricand perceptualphenomena. It is not the hypostaticfoundation
for mental activity,but a formation of the skandhasrelated to one anotherin an

"organic" way, such that any modification of the elements brings about an
immediate qualitative alteration of the whole. Or, to set aside the misleading
language of merely efficient causality, a strictly external relation between
events, we should rathersay that a modification of the elements simply is the
alteration of the whole. The world-visionof Hua-yen Buddhism is an unmis-
takable extension of the basicgestalt structuringof the skandhas.Everyjewel in
celestialLordIndra'snet is reflectedthroughout the entire reticularstructure26
Psychic states, actions and qualities, and, indeed, the ego itself, are, in
the Husserlian idiom, "transcendent" objects, unitary idealities appearing
throughout potentially endless seriesof appearances.Yet Sartrewould not sim-
ply adopt the Husserlian analysis of transcendencewithout qualification. For
Husserl, the transcendentobject is preciselythat which appears through each
appearanceof the manifold. In Sartre'sreading of Husserl, "What is logically
first are unilateral relations by which each quality belongs (directly or indi-
rectly) to this X like a predicate to a subject" (Th, 73). In the language of the
Ideas, the "nonematic core" is the indeterminate locus for an endless arrayof
"meaning-giving" acts (Sinngebungen). This "X," however,remainssublime-
ly undisturbed throughout. And similarly,the "pure" ego rests serenelyunaf-
fected even by its own position-taking bestowals of "sense." For Sartre,how-
ever, the object is, not the unifying and centralizing "pole" to which each of
the manifold appearancesis tethered, but the infinite manifold itself.27As he
maintains,
An indissoluble synthetic totality which could support itself would have

no need of a supporting X, provided of course that it were really and con-
cretelyunanalyzable. If we take a melody, for example, it is useless to pre-
suppose an X which would serve as a support for the different notes. The
unity here comes from the absolute indissolubility of the elements which
cannot be conceived as separated, save by abstraction.The subject of the
predicate here will be the concrete totality, and the predicate will be a
quality abstractlyseparated from the totality, a quality which has its full
meaning only if one connectsit again to the totality. [Th, 73-74]
And the ego, like the melody, comprises an indissoluble gestalt of psychic
"notes" without a substratum,without, that is, an "X-pole" to which they all
belong. Inasmuchas the ego is to be conceived as an infinite series, an infinite
"melody,"of psychicidealities, "We would have to undertakean infinite plun-
dering in orderto take awayall its powers. And, at the end of this plundering,
nothing would remain; the ego would have vanished" (Th, 78). The ego is
"insubstantial," both in the etymologically ready sense of not being a meta-
physical constituent which "stands-under"its states and experiences, and also
in the sense, more appropriateto a considerationof Buddhist thought, of being
impermanent: "Forthese very reasonswe shall not permit ourselvesto see the
38 STEVENW. LAYCOCK
ego as a sort of X-pole which would be the support of psychic phenomena.

Such an X would, by definition, be indifferent to the psychicqualities it would
support. But the ego . . . is never indifferent to its states; it is 'compromised'
by them" (TE, 74). Imagine a "circle"comprisedof numerouschairs.Now one
by one begin removing the chairs from the circle at equal distances along the
circumference. There will be a point at which the circle-gestalt "shifts,"
replaced, for example, by a rectangle- or triangle-gestalt. The gestalt, as this
simple experimentdemonstrates,is "compromised"by an alterationof its ele-
ments. And the ego, for both Sartreand the Buddhist tradition, is clearlygov-
erned by the logic of the gestalt.
AND DEPENDENTORIGINATION
SPONTANEITY
EGOLOGICAL
Thus far,our "mapping"of Sartreanand Buddhistegology onto one anotherhas

proved, it seems, almost irresistible.Yet the momentum of expectationwill be
disappointedjust at the thresholdof perfectcongruence.It is in tacitlyassuming
a distinctionbetween "real"and merely "apparent"constitutionthat Sartreini-
tiatesa fateful departurefromhis own methodologicalcommitments.
The ego, in Sartre'sview, has no originaryor causativepower of its own, no
spontaneity or agency. Yet it undeniably appears to possess this virtue. Sartre
describesthis apparentagencyas "magical."Likethe moon, its seeming illumi-
nation is merely borrowedfrom the "solar" effulgence of immediately lived
and instantaneousErlebnisse.In Sartre'swords:
The ego is an object apprehended, but also an object constituted, by

reflectiveconsciousness.The ego is a virtual locus of unity, and conscious-
ness constitutes it in a direction contraryto that actuallytaken by the pro-
duction: really, consciousnessesare first; through these are constituted
states; and then, through the latter, the ego is constituted. But, as the
order is reversedby a consciousnesswhich imprisons itself in the world in
order to flee from itself, consciousnessesare given as emanating from
states, and states as produced by the ego. It follows that consciousnesspro-
jects its own spontaneity into the ego-object in order to confer on the ego
the creativepower which is absolutelynecessaryto it. But this spontaneity,
representedand hypostatized in an object, becomes a degraded and bas-
tard spontaneity, which magically preservesits creativepower even while
becoming Passive. Whence the profound irrationalityof the notion of an
ego. [TE, 80-81]
The ego is really passive, but apparently active. While the Buddhist tradition
will have its own way of understanding the "profound irrationality of the
notion of the ego," the gestalt of factorswhich make up the psychophysicalper-
sonality does not necessarily involve a delusory confusion of passivity and
activity.
A serious flaw in Sartre'spurported "phenomenology" of the ego can be
glimpsed by returning to our imagery of sun and moon. How is one to distin-
guish the genuine "creative power" of immediate experience from the
"degraded and bastardspontaneity" of the ego? Phenomenologically, there is
only one course available: "solar" and "lunar" illumination must possess dif-
ferent modes of appearing. Sartre,in fact, must decide whether the sun/moon
or the object/reflected metaphor is the more adequate. Moonlight, of course, is
reflected sunlight, and its total effulgence is a "sun-image." The difference of
appearance, however, is inescapable. Moonlight, as so many would-be poets
have intoned, possesses a pale, ghostly luminescence qualitatively different
from the bedazzling intensity of the sun. But the reflectionof an object formed
in a mirrorideally free from distortion is phenomenally indistinguishablefrom
the object. If the ego is, as Sartrehas maintained from the beginning, and as
Ch'an itself suggests, the "reflection" of reflecting consciousness, and if con-
sciousness, reflective and prereflective alike, is, as Sartre vigorously insists,
utterly vacuousand "luminescent," if the "mind-mirror"is perfectlyfree from
distortion, then it becomes impossible to see how any descriptive discrimina-
tion between "image" and "original," formulated on purely phenomenologi-
cal grounds, could be made. The undistorted image is preciselya "reflection"
of whatever agential, originarypower the "original" enjoys. To be sure, ego
and reflective experience appear differently (to "pure" reflection). The ego
appears as transcendent;and experience as immanent. But the spontaneity of
the ego cannot appeardifferently from the spontaneity of experience. As Sartre
maintains, "spontaneityrendersimpossible any distinction between action and
passion" (Th, 101). And since consciousnesssimply is its own spontaneity, the
very identity of action and passion must likewise be represented within the
"reflection."
We seem to find, in Suzuki'sremarks,a salient parallelwith Sartre'svision of
the ego which "magicallypreservesits creativepower even while becoming pas-
sive":
When 'I' is an illusion, all that goes on in the name of this agent must
be an illusion too, including moral sins, various kinds of feelings and
desires, and hell and the land of bliss. With the removal of this illusion,
the world with all its multiplicities will disappear,and if there is anything
left which can act, this one will act with utmost freedom, with fearlessness,
like the Dharma-kinghimself, indeed as the One.28
The "illusory" characterof the "I" is a consequence, however, not of a bor-

rowed spontaneity, but of the attribution of Platonicpermanence to the ego.
Sartrehimself rejectsboth the immutability and the eternityof the ego, charac-
terizing as "profoundly irrational"that "impure" reflective posturing of con-
sciousnesswherebythe spontaneity of consciousnessis "representedand hypos-
tatized in an object." From the Buddhist point of view, Sartre's only
phenomenological "sin"-but one of no little significance-is that of positing
40 STEVENW. LAYCOCK
the ego as a "nomological dangler," an object "constituted by reflective con-

sciousness,"but an object that in no genuine sense constitutes experience. This
view of experienceas uncaused "cause,"and of the ego as ineffectual "effect,"
flies directlyin the face of the doctrineofprat#tyasamutpada. Whateverinstan-
tiates either term of a conceptual polarityis "empty,"has within it nothing of
its-"self." The constituting Erlebnisseof Sartre'segology are inescapablyto be
accounted svabhsrvata inasmuch as they are "uncaused," and thereby pur-
portedly fall through the universalnet of dependent origination. By contrast,
as Zen MasterTai-yung asserts, "The five Skandhas are not realities; the six
objects of sense are by nature empty."29Of the Tathagata'sdhyana, Tai-yung
says: "It is neither quiet nor illuminating; it is neither real nor empty; it does
not abide in the middle way; it is not-doing, it is no-effect-producing, and yet
it functions with the utmost freedom: the Buddha-nature is all-inclusive."30
Suinyats, the inconceivable matrix of all possible discrimination, produces no
effects. It is "something conditioning all things and itself not being condi-
tioned by anything."31 Like space, it is indifferent to the "differents" that are
differentiated from it. The differents are "empty." Only emptiness itself is
"full."
NOTES
1. Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind: The Significance of the
Sutraof Hui-Neng (Wlei-Lang),ChristmasHumphreys, ed. (New Beach: Samuel Wiser,
1981), p. 51.
2. It is interesting to find that Plato representsthe receptacle indifferently as the
'mirror" of the Formsand as the "space" wherein their sensible illustrationsare mani-
fested.
3. Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendenceof the Ego: An ExistentialistTheoryof Con-
sciousness (hereafter Th; subsequent citations appear in text), ForrestWilliams and
RobertKirkpatrik,trans. (New York:Farrar,Straus& Giroux, 1972), p. 90.
4. "Modern thought," as Sartre characterizesthe Husserlian analysis of transcen-
dence, "has realized considerable progress by reducing the existent to the series of
appearanceswhich manifest it." Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: A Pheno-
menologicalEssayon Ontology, Hazel E. Barnes,trans. (New York:Washington Square
Press, 1966), p. 3. This progressconsists in the resolution of a number of "dualisms"
such as the bifurcations of "interior" and "exterior," "being" and "appearance,"
"potency" and "act," and "appearance"and "essence."Cf. pp. 3-5.
5. Cf. Thomas Prufer, "An Outline of Some HusserlianDistinctions and Strategies,
Especiallyin 'The Crisis,' " PhaenomenologischeForschung1 (1975), 102-103.
6. It may be helpful to have the gathas in their entirety before us. Shen-hsiu'sverse
goes as follows:
Body is the bodhi tree,
The mind a bright mirror-stand.
Takecareto wipe it continually,
And never allow the dust to cling.
Hui-neng counters:
There neverwas a bodhi tree,
Nor bright mirror-stand.
Originally,not one thingexists.

Sowhereis the dustto cling?
The conflictbetweenthe two may be merelyapparent,or may be significantlymore
thana merecontradiction. On readingShen-hsiu'spoem, the agingmaster,as tradition
records,calledhis disciplesto him and announcedthat whoeverwould practicethe
gatha would assuredlyattainenlightenment.The transmission receivedby Hui-neng
would suggestthat, while Shen-hsiu'sverseis venerablefor its efficaciousness, Hui-
neng's"rejoinder" is issuedfromthe verystandpointof enlightenment.Fora sustained
treatmentof the two verses,see my paper,"Hui-nengand the Transcendental Stand-
point,"Journalof ChinesePhilosophy12(1985),179-196.
7. Suzuki,p. 17.
8. Ibid., p. 27.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., pp. 28-29.
11. Ibid.,p. 115.
12. E. A. Burtt,ed., TheTeachings of the Compassionate Buddha(NewYork:Men-
tor,1955),p. 30.
13. As the Buddhataught: "All materialphenomena,whetherpast, presentor
future,one'sownor external,grossor subtle,loftyor low, faror near,all belongto the
aggregateof materialform.All sensations. . . belongto the aggregateof sensation.All
perceptions. . . belong to the aggregateof perception.All mental formations...
belong to the aggregateof mentalformations.All consciousness . . . belongsto the
aggregateof consciousness." See MajjhimaNikaya, 109, as quoted in AmadeoSole-
Leris,Tranquility andInsight:An Introduction to the OldestFormof BuddhistMedita-
tion(Boston:Shambhala,1986),p. 99.
14. Sartre,BeingandNothingness,p. 433.
15. Suzuki,p. 42.
16. Ibid., p. 59.
17. Ibid., p. 29.
18. Ibid., p. 30.
19. Considerthe declaration of Ta-chuHui-hai:
It is likea brightly-shining mirrorreflectingimageson it. Whenthe mirrordoes
this, doesthe brightnesssufferin anyway?No, it doesnot. Why?Becausethe Use
of the brightmirroris free from affections,and thereforeits reflectionis never
obscured.Whetherimagesarereflectedor not, thereareno changesin its bright-
ness.Why?Becausethatwhichis freefromaffectionsknowsno changein all con-
ditions.
Againit is likethe sunilluminatingtheworld.Doesthe lightsufferanychange?
No, it doesnot. How,whenit doesnot illuminatethe world?Thereareno changes
in it, either.Why?Becausethe lightis freefromaffections,andthereforewhether
it illuminesobjectsornot, the unaffectedsunlightis everabovechange.
Ibid., p. 50.
20. MasterHsi-yunconcurs:"ThisMindhasno beginning,wasneverborn,andwill
neverpassaway. . . it hasno shape,no form;it doesnot belong . . . it transcends all
measurements, nameability,marksof identification,and formsof antithesis.... It is
likevacuityof space,it hasno boundaries." Ibid.,p. 129.
21. Ibid., p. 55.
22. Ibid.,p. 56.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.,p. 60.
25. Ibid., p. 150.
26. InTu-shun'swell-articulated vision:
42 STEVENW. LAYCOCK
First,one in one.
Second,allin one.
Third,one in all.
Fourth,allin all.
Tu-shun,"On the Meditationof Dharmadhatu," GarmaC. C. Chang,trans.,in The
BuddhistTeachingof Totality(UniversityPark:PennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress,
1977),p. 219. In Suzuki'slovelycommentary on the Gandhavyuha:
Whatwe havehereis an infinitemutualfusionorpenetrationof all things,each
with its individualityyet with somethinguniversalin it.... The Gandavyuha
makeseverythingit depictstransparent and luminous,for luminosityis the only
possibleearthlyrepresentation thatconveysthe ideaof universalinterpenetration.
... No shadowsarevisiblehereanywhere.The cloudsthem-selvesareluminous
bodiesinconceivable andinexpressible in number,hangingall overtheJetavana of
the Gandavyuha.... Thisuniverseof luminosity,thissceneof interpenetration,
is knownasthe Dharmadhatu....
DaisetzTeitaroSuzuki,Essaysin Zen Buddhism,3d series,Christmas Humphreys,ed.
(NewYork:SamuelWeiser,1976),pp. 77-78.
27. As Sartremaintains:
Althoughan objectmaydiscloseitselfonlythrougha singleAbschattung,the sole
fact of therebeing a subjectimpliesthe possibilityof multiplyingthe pointsof
viewon thatAbschattung.Thissufficesto multiplyto infinitythe Abschattung
underconsideration.Furthermore if the seriesof appearances werefinite, that
wouldmeanthat the possibilityof reappearing, whichis absurd,or that theycan
be all givenat once, whichis still moreabsurd.... The appearance, reducedto
itselfandwithoutreferenceto the seriesof whichit is a part,couldbe onlyan intu-
itiveandsubjectiveplenitude,the mannerin whichthe subjectis affected.If the
phenomenonis to revealitselfas transcendent, it is necessarythatthe subjecthim-
self transcendthe appearance towardthe totalseriesof whichit is a member....
Thusthe appearance, whichisfinite, indicatesitselfin itsfinitude,but at the same
time in orderto be graspedas an appearance-of-that-which-appears, it requires
thatit be surpassedtowardinfinity.
Sartre,BeingandNothingness,pp. 5-6.
28. Suzuki,TheZenDoctrineof No-Mind,pp. 115-116.
29. Ibid.,p. 35.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.,p. 56.

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ZEN BUDDHISM AND WESTERNTHOUGHT

Jean-Paul Sartrewas assuredlynot a Buddhist. Nor do his works exhibit any

There is, perhaps, no more consistentor fruitful metaphoroperatingwithin the

A bright mirroris set up on a high stand; its illumination reachesthe ten-

Shen-hui does not, of course, deny or disparagethe act of discriminationitself,

indifferent to such discriminations, undivided by conceptual contrasts. The

Indeed, for the impersonal prereflectiveconsciousness, "There is no longer

itself, and so become a dark-colouredball. Howeverpure it may have been

Inasmuchas he advisesremovalof the "ball" from its discoloringbackground,

Now my hatred appears to me at the same time as my experience of

An action "is not only the noematic unity of a stream of consciousnesses:it is

(Bewusst-sein)itself. Sartre'scommitment to the utter "nothingness" of con-

SARTREAN EGOLOGY AND THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF THE SKANDHAS

Unenlightened sentient existence, as the First Noble Truth asserts, is fraught

The body is presented to us as an "object," and thus, as "present-at-hand"

PURE REFLECTIONAND PRAJNA

Impure reflection is culpable of a collapse of numerical and specific identity

Oh good friends, what is there for wu (of wu-nien, unconsciousness)to

Pure reflection does, indeed, representa "negation" of the duality of subject

No designation whatever is possible. Therefore I say that Wu-nien is

objectifying "representation"and "hypostatization"of subjectivityis possible,

It is like appreciatinga fine piece of brocade. On the surface there is an

cate beauty and skill is revealed. Prajnaconsists in this turning-over.The

THE IMPERMANENCEOF THE EGO

for mental activity,but a formation of the skandhasrelated to one anotherin an

An indissoluble synthetic totality which could support itself would have

ego as a sort of X-pole which would be the support of psychic phenomena.

Thus far,our "mapping"of Sartreanand Buddhistegology onto one anotherhas

The ego is an object apprehended, but also an object constituted, by

The "illusory" characterof the "I" is a consequence, however, not of a bor-

the ego as a "nomological dangler," an object "constituted by reflective con-

Originally,not one thingexists.

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