Satori: Toward a Conceptual Analysis

Author(s): Avery M. Fouts

Source: Buddhist-Christian Studies , 2004, Vol. 24 (2004), pp. 101-116
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press on behalf of Society for Buddhist-Christian
Studies

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 ESSAYS

Satori: Toward a Conceptual Analysis

Avery M. Fouts
California Baptist University

One of the significant points of division between Zen Buddhism and Western
thought is the status of the law of noncontradiction.1 In the West, no matter wha
our ontology, we have overwhelmingly regarded this law as indubitable. For example
Aristotle insists in his Metaphysics that the law of noncontradiction is the most cer
tain of all first principles, the fabric of any significant assertion since any significa
assertion can be distinguished from its contradictory.2 In the East, however, Ze
Buddhists tend to view this law as provisional, and this presents formidable barrie
to communication with the West. At particular issue is the interpretation of satori
the abrupt and momentary Enlightenment experience within the Rinzai school o
Zen.

The West can learn much from Zen about the subtleties of unhealthy contradic-
tions in consciousness. To this end, satori and the liberation found therein are phe-
nomenological facts worthy of the deepest respect by the West. The problem, how
ever, is that satori seems to demand an interpretation that is irrational according t
Western canons of rationality. In light of this, the purpose of this paper is to inte
pret satori in a way that eases this purported irrationality. A first step is taken toward
reconciling Zen and the West by accepting the challenge posed by D. T. Suzuki:

The position assumed by the Zen masters is this. They leave the logical side
of the business to the philosopher, and are content with conclusions drawn
from their own inner experiences. They will protest, if the logician attempts
to deny the validity of their experience, on the ground that it is up to the logi-
cian to prove the fact by the instruments which he is allowed to use. If he fails
to perform the work satisfactorily--that is, logically to confirm the experi-
ence-the failure is on the side of the logician, who has now to devise a more
effective use of his tools.3

In the first section, the logic of the Zen experience is examined through the wri
ings of Suzuki, traditionally regarded as the best expositor of Zen to the West an
one who specifically deals with the present theme. While Suzuki does not represent
the whole of Zen, he nonetheless "stands in the first rank of the cultural brid
builders between Asia and the West during the twentieth century."4 In the secon
section, the notion of"intentional identity," the nondualism inherent in cognitio

Buddhist-Christian Studies 24 (2004). ? by University of Hawai'i Press. All rights reserved.

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102 AVERY M. FOUTS

is elucidated with the help of certa

sic to intentional identity that is j
tend that it is this paradox that lies
recognized in the West provides th
section, it is shown that the first-
sciousness in first-order experienc
subject-object dualism into satori, a
experience transcends reflection. In
brought together to provide a con
maintained, on the one hand, and t
the other.

ILLOGICAL ZEN

In the Zen tradition, the Absolute, if the term may be used, is non
affirmation of the Absolute in the form of A as opposed to not
sacred unity because in the Absolute there are no distinctions w
reason, even though the experience of the Absolute is positive in n
to express the truth that lies therein must in the final analysis be
this," a "not that." The problem is that the Absolute of which Z
encompasses things finite such that the distinctions made in every
thing less than the way things really are. This is particularly tr
comes to things considered numerically distinct-for example, t
book. This table and that book are each what it is and is not what it is not. If this
is the way things really are, to assert otherwise is to affirm a contradiction.
According to Suzuki, however, Zen is "illogical."5 The distinction between A and
not-A only pertains to "words" rather than to the "facts."

We generally think that "A is A" is absolute, and that the proposition "A is
not-A" or "A is B" is unthinkable. We have never been able to break through
these conditions of the understanding; they have been too imposing. But now
Zen declares that words are words and no more. When words cease to corre-
spond with facts it is time for us to part with words and return to facts. ...
The meaning of the proposition "A is A" is realized only when "A is not-A."
To be itself is not to be itself-this is the logic of Zen, and satisfies all our
aspirations.6

The "return to facts" occurs in satori, an experience of Reality in its Suchness

(tathata), and the latter is that which precedes all conceptualization.7 In this expe-
rience, the Emptiness (sunyata) of all things is revealed, and intrinsic to Emptiness
is a nondualism in which all distinctions are seen for what they are, mere "words" as
opposed to the "facts." Such an experience liberates a consciousness beset with
unhealthy cravings by relativizing our life lived in terms of A and not-A, and this
relativization "satisfies all our aspirations." It is worth hearing Suzuki again:

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 SATORI: TOWARD A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 103

According to the philosophy of Zen, we are too much of a

ventional way of thinking, which is dualistic through and th
penetration" is allowed, there takes place no fusing of opposi
day logic. . . . Black is not white, and white is not black. Tiger
is cat, and they will never be one. Water flows, a mountain t
way things or ideas go in this universe of the senses and syllo
ever, upsets this scheme of thought and substitutes a new on
exists no logic, no dualistic arrangements of ideas. . . . In t
ness of things Zen establishes the foundations of its philosop

Included in the Absolute is the "absolute oneness" of the su

Suzuki never tires of claiming that there is ultimately "no sepa
object" in Zen experience.9 He remarks that "in the satori seeing
ject nor object, it is a nothing seeing itself as such."'01 In anothe
satori is "an experience experiencing itself."'' We should also c

A monk asked a Zen.Master: "What would you say when bo

its objects are forgotten?" "The mind and its objects" means t
ativity, where the subject stands against the object, the kn
known, the one against the many, the soul against God, I aga
on. To forget this means to transcend a world of dualities,
into the Absolute.12

Moreover, he implies that any interpretation of satori in terms

the product of the intellect: "This self-consciousness on the par
tually interpreted, is precisely where subject and object begin t
... Understanding 'pure experience' in this fashion, as a comb
of 'union' between subject and object, is the result of intellectu
Suzuki is aware that if there is not ultimately a numerical distin
ties in our ordinary experience, including ourselves, the asserti
nondual is not logically problematic. "A contradiction implies
set against each other. Sunyata is absolutely one; hence, there is
it."14 A logical problem only arises when Western philosopher
distinction in ordinary experience as the way things really are
the claim that reality in its Suchness is nondual. "The philoso
first from the experience and logic of a reconstructed world, an
this fact, he proceeds to apply his 'logic' to the experience of s
tates that sunyata step out into this world, which means destro
Suzuki is also aware that to speak of the "absolute oneness" of
to the absolute duality of things, is itself to assert an A as oppo
admits this, maintaining that he cannot "avoid resorting to wo
are not at all adequate." As a matter of "skillful means" (upayaka
be used to help the disciple see the "facts" that lie beyond "wor
truth attained lies beyond "words," Suzuki says that he "must tr
that most closely approximates the facts." 16'

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104 AVERY M. FOUTS

Given this brief survey, there a

Western logic have a right yet to b
that skillful means is a legitimat
appeal to skillful means, it is diff
closely approximates the facts" wh
so inadequate that no positive affir
If Suzuki at some point were not a
"words" and the "facts," it would s
ing. This is not meant disparagingl
about this difficulty enough. Hick
this very matter. He contends that
refer to something as opposed to s
this includes all of Suzuki's books
skillful means becomes self-referen
Second, by contrasting "words" t
that carves out reality in terms of
experience is an "intellectual or con
tree until it is subsumed under the
be a tree until it is conceptualized,
how creates a tree, thereby opposin
rect, it is hard to accept (or at leas
distinction between this tree and th
that independent of my intellectu
things. What is even more difficul
intellectualization, I myself am not
tiger. Admittedly, Suzuki remarks
yet in dualities" is experienced.19 H
nary experience is transcended in s
ing the problem, this qualification
what it is in satori that warrants S
Third, the notion of "absolute o
option insofar as life is lived in du
we can never live otherwise, if we
there might be another way to inte
live it.

Fourth, Suzuki implies that holding to a correspondence between thought and

reality, and thus regarding the numerical distinction between finite entities as the way
things really are, is a sufficient condition for an unhealthy consciousness. He con-
tends that if the intellect "persuades itself into thinking" that there is an I that has
somehow become one with a not-I, "the whole thing turns topsy-turvey and an 'I'
with all its egocentric impulses comes to assert itself."20 This is an important psy-
chological observation, providing us with the reason Suzuki admirably holds to the
authority of satori in the face of logical challenges. We will see that in a certain sense

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 SATORI: TOWARD A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 105

Suzuki is correct about this, but there is nonetheless no reason

correspondence between thought and reality.

INTENTIONAL IDENTITY

That the external world is immediately given to consciousness is

starting point for existential Thomists. In articulating a theory of
tent with this starting point, they notice that direct realism man
tionship between the subject and the object. This nondualism c
for in terms of numerical distinction, for this is to say no more
two objects; but neither can it be accounted for in terms of num
this destroys the law of identity (and/or the law of noncontradic
relationship must therefore be accounted for in terms of the p
intentional identity that leaves the laws of logic intact.
Let us begin by accepting two things as phenomenological given
an external world. For instance, as I sit here writing, there is an a
desk. The apple is not dependent upon a relation to me, as would b
imagining or hallucinating the apple. Rather, the apple is externa
we are taking as coterminous in meaning, the apple and I are n
The second given we need to accept is that the apple itself is th
of my experience. Admittedly, there are arguments to the contrary
ception of objects numerically distinct from us is a commonsense
life, and for some, it is self-evidently true.21 The adoption of th
will help us elucidate some of the perplexities of Zen. Moreover,
not necessarily antithetical to Suzuki's claims. Given the commo
of direct realism, it is reasonable to assume that Suzuki regards h
contact with the external world inasmuch as he lives "in dualities."
saying, he is not simply reiterating the distinction between app
characteristic of much of modern and contemporary Western ph
With these things in mind, given the numerical distinction betw
me, there is an ontological gap that must be mediated in order
knowledge of the apple. If this gap is not mediated in some way
completely immanent to my own being. For instance, after epi
dering the subject and the object, Descartes uses God as a guaran
of causal action on the part of corporeal objects, resulting in sens
this very gap. However, instead of ideas, if I directly experience t
if the apple is that which is directly determining my consciousne
nition no mediation between us. The ontological gap has someh
ately overcome. This implies, oddly enough, that the numerical d
the apple and me has also somehow been overcome.
Let us be clear about this. If there is a numerical distinction bet
me, there is the respective ontological gap. If there is the ontolog
be cognitive mediation between the apple and me. It follows th

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106 AVERY M. FOUTS

immediately, experience the apple it

there is no mediation, there is no ont
is no numerical distinction.

In less contentious terms, while t

throughout my experience, we enter
tively speaking. Concerning the cog
apparent scandal to the principle of id
thing other than what one is: it is to
ing of the same relationship, Simon
midable challenge hurled at the princ
of advancing in our understanding of
our awareness of the strength of this
out the Aristotelian dictum, endorse
'in a way' all things."24
That the subject is (or becomes) the
relationship between the two is ofte
Simon puts it succinctly: "What I k
dence that amounts to an identity."2
knowledge as a copy or transfer is utt
thing known and the mind "are not o
it this way: "Since, in fact, to know a
at the moment when the act of know
synthesis involves, consequently, th
moment of their union." 28

Admittedly, speaking of cognition in

tity is a symmetrical notion, and no
Nevertheless, these thinkers find this
dualism.
In order to ease the apparent cont
posited. Maritain speaks for this tradi
principle of identity can only be appar
knower to be another thing than wha
tinguish two ways of having existenc
The two kinds of existence posited ar
existence pertains to the object inasm
ject, and intentional existence pertain
izes the cognitive faculties of the sub
erty of thought, a prerogative of its
'outside it,' i.e. being which is fully
thing existing within it."'31 The natur
in the subject, as it were, such that t
to an identity." Maritain recognizes
'beginning with' its otherness and ma
Maritain realizes that the "notion of

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 SATORI: TOWARD A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 107

tor already known and already clarified by some other means."

is initially and necessarily posited in order to account for our c
We must admit, however, that what is necessarily posited is a f
Gilson is adamant that attempting to imagine how the subje
coincide but each remain what it is provides a "fatal obstacle
ing."34 But this nondualism does more than elude a clear and
ing of the intentional identity of two numerically distinct thing
intentional identity of the subject with the object) is no easier
numerical identity of two numerically distinct things. Simon e
paradox:

And here is the great paradox. The identity of being with itself will have each
thing be what it is and nothing else. Despite the way we sometimes speak,
bread can never be a rock (and remain bread), or an eel a serpent (and remain
a fish). But we all know a lot of real rocks without ceasing to be human beings.
... The knower knows only by acknowledging the otherness of the object and
preserving at the same time his own identity. He becomes the other without
becoming other. .. .35

We are nonetheless obliged to accept the notion of intentional identity in spite of

its paradoxical character on pain of denying the laws of logic, on the one hand, or
denying our experience, on the other. We will see that Suzuki is caught between the
horns of this same dilemma.

PREREFLECTIVE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS36

In the last section, we accepted that the apple is numerically distinct from me and
that I am directly experiencing it. In addition, we now need to accept that I can cor-
rectly discern that the apple is numerically distinct from me. With this addition, a
prereflective consciousness not only of myself but also of my relationship to the
apple is entailed in my first-order experience.
As Hume notices, discerning that an object is external demands some sort of self-
consciousness for "external" means "external to me."37 Since we are treating "exter-
nal" and "numerically distinct" as coterminous, this same self-consciousness is
demanded in order to discern that an object is numerically distinct from me. Given
that I do correctly discern that the apple is so related to me, it follows that I must
possess this self-consciousness. The question arises as to the nature of this self-
consciousness.

The self-consciousness in question pertains to myself as fir

referent of "I" in what Wittgenstein calls its "use as subjec
"this body here," or the referent of "I" in what Wittgenstein
For one thing, I may not perceive "this body here" when
more importantly, even though the apple is numerically
here," if I do not know that the apple is numerically distinc
subject, I do not know (as we will see) that I perceive it.

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108 AVERY M. FOUTS

In my first-order experience, my
toward myself. I am therefore no
would take a second-order reflecti
as I am reflecting within my first
exclusively, maybe considering wh
sciousness goes out to the apple, as
from it, the apple distinguishes it
ontological integrity, ontologically
me to perceive the apple directly w
logical integrity. This means being
tinct from objects adjacent to it (t
but also that it is numerically distin
order experience of the apple, an o
tence as numerically distinct fro
would take a second-order reflectio
panying consciousness of my relati
consciousness because second-orde
are generated by reflection upon t
By its very nature, this prereflecti
nonetheless, it can be indirectly v
my relationship to the apple in my
whatsoever for discerning that th
this premise can be shown to be t
numerically distinct from me (acc
reflective self-consciousness.

Let us assume then that in my fir

prereflective consciousness of my
with no reciprocal consciousness of
is numerically distinct from me.
rance. The problem, however, is that
my ignorance, for I am caught in
knowing whether the contents of
external to me or not. It is not cle
to say that one could get closer to
I get so close that I am looking rig
yet only immediately experiencing
it in and of itself is not a sufficien
I have done nothing to relieve my
The only recourse is to reflect up
than the apple itself) in the hope o
judge "I am experiencing an apple
apple that it is external to me si
perceiving an apple," since I canno
ically distinct from us define perc

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 SATORI: TOWARD A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 109

All in all, if I do not have a prereflective consciousness of my

apple in my first-order experience of it, I have no grounds for
numerically distinct from me; the necessary self-consciousn
merely in a reflective act generating the concept "I." Since, h
that the apple is numerically distinct from me, it follows that in
rience of it, I possess this prereflective self-consciousness.
The conclusion here is that when I correctly discern that the
distinct from me, I am not creating a numerical distinction b
me by way of reflection. My judgment rather affirms, and is g
reflective self-consciousness. I am prereflectively aware that I am
from the apple all along.

ZEN AND WESTERN METAPHYSICS: A RAPPROCHEMENT

Suzuki asserts that Zen boldly declares, "I hold a spade, yet I
uses this paradoxical declaration as evidence of the illogicality of
is what Suzuki calls "double-roofing," described in this passage: "
conscious strivings to accomplish a task the very consciousness w
no task is accomplished. It is only when all the traces of this con
out that Buddhahood is attained."41 What Suzuki means by a co
striving "to be conscious of consciousness," that is, a striving to p
consciousness of first-order consciousness simultaneously with
notion of double-roofing.42 On the contrary, one attains Budd
in a state of "no-mind," or a "state of mind in which there is no
ness of its own workings, reminding one of what the philosophe
tal apperception.'"43 This does not mean a state of unconscious
case if one were temporarily knocked out; rather, this means
yet to be unconscious of self-nature," that is, conscious and ye
mind's own workings.44 So the person holding a spade is indeed
conscious of it, but since the person is not engaged in double-ro
the person is not holding it. This is why those liberated thro
"When I feel sleepy, I sleep; when I want to sit, I sit."45
In the West, the phenomenon of double-roofing is manifested
doxical old adage "the hurrier I go, the behinder I get." Suppose
fronted with an important, timed examination, and in order t
answer the questions quickly. In her insecurity, she attempts to a
quickly and simultaneously to be conscious of her own consci
ensure that she is answering the questions in a hurried manner.
that her reflective consciousness now has a dual role to play; it m
quickly and simultaneously watch itself doing so. This produces
ings that stifle her spontaneity. As a result, she actually slows down
to ensure a hurried action, the more she gets behind. Were such
up double-roofing, she would return to spontaneous action and
quickly. Suzuki puts it this way:

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110 AVERY M. FOUTS

The idea is that when every effor

are finally exhausted and have co
self up so far as your consciousnes
scious mind is still intensely bent
find the work accomplished. "Ma
really what is meant by "to accom

Upon a return to spontaneous actio

right alongside the Zen Buddhist,
We have already seen that Suzuki
as "facts" rather than mere "word
sciousness. To quote Suzuki again, h
immediately and inevitably establ
into the errors of intellectualizatio
"facts" can only be some sort of m
the insecure individual thinks that
she has engaged in the creation of
a false self since otherwise there
for a finite consciousness directly to
self can only be a mis-taking. The
doing the watching. For instance,
and asks me what I am doing, I m
But in this case the "I" refers to m
thinking about X but I am makin
X. Any time I think that I have c
directly refers to me in the prese
cept (or the idea of myself) for m
place mistake:

This is just what happens to the human being, to the mind, when the desire
for certainty and security prompts identification between the mind and its
own image of itself.... The identification of the mind with its own image is,
therefore, paralyzing because the image is fixed-it is past and finished. ...
To cling to it is thus to be in constant contradiction and conflict.... Wu-shin
is action on any level whatsoever, physical or psychic, without trying at the
same moment to observe and check the action from outside. This attempt to
act and think about the action simultaneously is precisely the identification of
the mind with its idea of itself.48

As Suzuki puts it, the cessation of the identification of the mind with its idea of
itself occurs when "the mind is altogether detached from form, which also means
detachment from the mind itself ...."49 I take Suzuki to mean here that any sort of
formal structure between self and not-self is ultimately false, and detachment from
this structure entails giving up the notion altogether of a subject set over against an
object as pertaining to the "facts."

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 SATORI: TOWARD A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 111

The question we now face is whether a return to spontaneous

ble-roofing, while expressed paradoxically, and while avoiding t
self, does indeed demand giving up a subject-object dualism
"facts."

It can only be outlined here, but I propose a hypothesis that we will work within
for the remainder of this paper-although a rejection of the hypothesis does not
entail a rejection of the phenomenology of satori that follows. I propose that a suf-
ficient condition for an unhealthy consciousness is ignorance of our finitude. In our
ignorance we have somehow come to consider things external as ontologically imma-
nent to consciousness, rather than merely intentionally immanent to it. In other
words, we have come to identify ourselves with external reality qua intentionally
related to us. While our soul is "in a way" all things, we have come to consider all
things, to paraphrase St. Augustine, as limbs of our soul.50 As a result of this mis-
placed identity, our ontological security depends on something actually outside of
our control. Under our veil of ignorance, however, we think we are able to control
external reality as a mere extension of ourselves in order to quell our insecurity. We
regard ourselves as able to control things directly by and through consciousness,
which is precisely the trademark attaching and clinging found in consciousness from
which Zen Buddhists admirably seek to escape. Were we able to control our world
in this way, we would need to be the infinite Deity of classical theism, equipped with
a direct ontological relationship between a creating consciousness and reality.
When we begin to understand that we are trying to do the impossible in the
attempt to control things outside of our jurisdiction, we turn toward subjectivity in
order to control ourselves, thereby engaging in double-roofing. The attempt to dou-
ble-roof is in effect just the attempt through our reflective consciousness to be the
ground of our own consciousness, and if this were really possible, we again would
take on the hue of the infinite Deity of Western theism in whom consciousness and
existence coincide. In our ignorance, however, we mistake the idea of ourselves for
ourselves still under the supposition that double-roofing is possible-if we did not
think it possible, we would never attempt it. We attach and cling to this false self,
regarding ourselves as directly controlling ourselves. In this state, to cease attaching
and clinging to this false self by letting go becomes an impossibility, for it always
appears as a concession to insecurity.
With this hypothesis in hand, let us walk through a phenomenological sketch of
satori. Let us suppose that a subject has incurred a false self in an effort to control
itself, clinging to this false self in the same way that such a subject clings to objects
of consciousness in an attempt to control them. At the moment of satori, it is
revealed that consciousness of external reality is not external reality and the thought
of the self is not the self-in the language of Suzuki, that words are words and facts
are facts. In broad and traditional terms, it is revealed that thought is not reality.
As a result of this experience, the subject lets go of the "mind and its objects."
Recognized are not only the misplaced identity but also the impossibility of cross-
ing the qualitative gap between thought and reality for a finite consciousness. It is
worth considering whether this experience is similar to what Maritain calls the

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112 AVERY M. FOUTS

"intuition of existence," the descr

tions of satori: 51

... here there is no question of rat

tive procedure, or of a syllogistic
is a primary fact. .... [T]he eyes
opened; . . . [W]hether, alternati
natural grace at the sight of a bl
perception of the reality of the s
ity with which the being of thing
evident to us . . . . What counts is
tual intuition, the sense of being
that lie in the act of existing.52

At this juncture, the subject doe

the object in any sense implying nu
dualism with the object defined b
unimpeded by thought working ag
of intentional identity in which
becomes something else-in the w
something other than what one is
language that "to be itself is not t
false self is incurred, the subject is
identity. As soon as the subject let
becomes itself by entering a pure i
sense is "not to be itself." I urge t
such as these:

On the other hand, Nature becom

nized as Nature, as pour-soi. It c
altogether unrelated to me. I am
participation in each other, but
Hence, the mountains are mounta
before me. The reason I can see th
as waters is because I am in them

We can also note that if we expr

object in formalized terms, we get
ically speaking, A is A; intentiona
Suzuki's efforts to express satori in
expresses satori in terms implying
tional identity is simply not at his
notion has gone practically undet
conviction of the numerical distin
first place-along with a conviction

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 SATORI: TOWARD A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 113

With the notion of intentional identity understandably exc

junction surfaces: either the subject and the object are numeric
are numerically identical. While in a way this disjunction is a f
the respective exclusion, it is unique in that it appears to be a ta
since the subject and the object can only be represented in th
distinct, and since the unity found in satori cannot be represen
legitimately appears that the only interpretative framework to
nondualism is one implying numerical identity and that the
between "the mind and its objects" has therefore been transc
"specially constructed logic or dialectic" is needed in order to a
ence. "To understand it one must have the experience, and at
must be a specially constructed logic or dialectic-by whatev
known-to give to the experience a rational or an irrational inte
comes first, followed by an intellectualization." 54 It is here tha
pretation" of satori has its origin.
Moreover, from the vantage point of this newly found unity
tional identity could be represented in thought, reflective thou
subject and the object in their present experience anyway. With
there is no self, that is, no objective or false self, and any atte
refer directly to itself in the present would necessarily result in
for the reasons we have already examined. The subject would ne
bial dog that finally catches its tail. In this sense, discrimination
and the object would indeed be a sufficient condition for an unh
Suzuki is quite correct then that satori transcends an objective
falling outside a dualistic interpretation. Not only would a false
also representation of the subject and the object in thought w
intentional unity. It therefore appears to consciousness that re
ates the numerical distinction between the subject and the ob
neously serves as the sufficient condition for an unhealthy cons
a false self in its bid to conceptualize the present.
Furthermore, given that the lived nondualism in satori goes b
crimination, and given that this nondualism is interpreted in te
ical identity, it can readily be seen how the numerical distincti
general is also deemed as merely relative to reflection. Or, s
around, it can readily be seen how reflective discrimination bet
general is deemed, in Suzuki's language, mere "words" in contra
At this point, Suzuki might charge me with begging the qu
conceded that satori transcends a reflective discrimination betw
the object, he might protest that the subject has been illicitly
cally discrete entity back into the experience. This is an unders
its underlying assumption is that the only grounds for claim
tinction between the subject and the object is by way of reflec
and Suzuki seems to operate under this very assumption.
By way of a transcendental deduction, it was argued earlier t

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114 AVERY M. FOUTS

reflective consciousness of myself in

argument is correct, since Suzuki also
seems he must also admit such a prere
experience "in dualities." If so, it aga
sciousness, and thereby a subject-objec
not follow from a state of "no-mind"
workings that there is not in fact a su
very experience (and a subject is im
cially inviting since the prereflective
any given present moment, so the la
point of fact, I see no reason to suppo
ity for reflective thought, should not
mere fact of its sensory experience; t
as other. And, again, we can recall tha
yet in dualities." To the degree all this
door is opened to resolve all the logica

CONCLUSION

The truth of satori, on the interpretation given it here, cannot

direct means since, strictly speaking, it cannot directly be though
ful means" yet has a function. But there is nothing in this tha
the absoluteness of the law of noncontradiction. What this does i
for Zen Buddhists and, for instance, the followers of Kierkegaar
conversation since it is one of the latter's tenets that existential t
municated only by indirect means.
Speaking of Kierkegaard, although it is too much for us to del
of the koan on this occasion, I suggest that it should be look
much the same role for Zen Buddhists as the Absolute Paradox do
For Kierkegaard, the Absolute Paradox brings rationalism to a
opportunity to attain subjective truth, that is, an opportunity to
We have noted Suzuki's adamant denial that rationalism satisfies
tions. I suggest that the koan, paralleling the role of the Absol
the grip the individual has on "reality," forcing thought back on its
viding an opportunity to become the truth through seeing the
is in effect a lived rationalism.

NOTES

1. And/or the law of identity; the latter is also part of our discussion. For ou
however, it is not necessary to enter the debate on which law is primary.
2. Aristotle, Metaphysics, in The Basic Works ofAristotle, ed. and intro. Ri
(Random House: New York, 1941), p. 738 (bk. IV, ch. 4).
3. D. T. Suzuki, The Zen Doctrine ofNo Mind, ed. Christmas Humphreys (L
& Company, 1983), p. 138.

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 SATORI: TOWARD A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 115

4. Heinrich Dumoulin, Zen Buddhism in the 20th Century, trans. Joseph S.

York: Weatherhill, 1992), p. 32.
5. See D. T. Suzuki, "Illogical Zen," in An Introduction to Zen Buddhism (New
Press, Inc., 1964), pp. 58-65.
6. Ibid., pp. 59-60.
7. D. T. Suzuki, "Existentialism, Pragmatism and Zen," in Zen Buddhism: Se
ings of D. T Suzuki, ed. William Barrett (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Ancho
263-264.
8. D. T. Suzuki, "Practical Methods in Zen Instruction," in ibid., pp. 112-113.
9. Suzuki, No Mind, p. 79.
10. D. T. Suzuki, "What Is the 'I'?" in The Buddha Eye: An Anthology of the Kyoto School,
ed. Frederick Franck (New York: Crossroad, 1982), p. 44.
11. D. T. Suzuki, "The Buddhist Conception of Reality," in ibid., p. 100.
12. Suzuki, No Mind, pp. 146-147.
13. Suzuki, "Conception of Reality," p. 100.
14. Suzuki, "Existentialism," p. 261.
15. Ibid., p. 262.
16. Suzuki, "Conception of Reality," p. 101.
17. John Hick, "Religion as 'Skilful Means,"' in Disputed Questions in Theology and the
Philosophy of Religion (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 121.
18. Suzuki, "Existentialism," p. 270.
19. Suzuki, No Mind, p. 81.
20. Suzuki, "Conception of Reality," p. 100.
21. See, for example, Etienne Gilson, Thomist Realism and the Critique ofKnowledge, trans.
Mark A. Wauck (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), p. 60. Consonant with Gilson, the force
of my own experience makes it reasonable to wonder if all the arguments against direct real-
ism are somehow incorrect. As a matter of fact, the consideration of immateriality, which is
almost universally omitted from theories of perception, would render the arguments against
direct realism less persuasive-including the time-lag argument. Concerning the latter, if the
existential Thomists are correct that perception proper does not take place in space, there
might be a timeless element also.
22. Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, trans. Gerald B. Phelan (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), p. 112.
23. Yves R. Simon, An Introduction to Metaphysics of Knowledge, trans. Vukan Kuic and
Richard J. Thompson (New York: Fordham University Press, 1990), p. 6.
24. Speaking of Aristotle, St. Thomas says, "sed dixit quodammodo animam esse omnia,
inquantum est in potentia ad omnia; per sensum quidem ad sensibilia, per intellectum vero
ad intelligibilia." See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (hereafter ST), Blackfriars
Edition, Pt. la, Q. 84, art. 2, ad. 2. See also ST, Pt. Ia, Q. 14, art. 1 and ST Pt. la, Q. 80,
art. 1.

25. Simon, Metaphysics, p. 6.

26. Maritain, Degrees, p. 88.
27. Ibid., p. 87.
28. Etienne Gilson, The Philosophy ofSt. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Edward Bullough, ed. G.
A. Erlington (New York: Dorset Press), p. 265.
29. Maritain, Degrees, p. 114.
30. Ibid., pp. 114-115. See also Simon, Metaphysics, pp. 9-13.
31. Ibid., p. 103.
32. Ibid., p. 104.
33. Ibid., pp. 115-116.
34. Gilson, Philosophy, p. 267.
35. Simon, Metaphysics, p. 9.

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116 AVERY M. FOUTS

36. The general argument in this sec

cate: A Phenomenological Analysis," A
(2001): 86-89.
37. David Hume, A Treatise ofHuman
ed. by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Claren
38. Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue a
pp. 66-67. Wittgenstein does not thin
however, the mistake he was looking f
will be discussing in the next section.
three things: the respective term, a cor
that the respective term itself can be th
39. In affirming this, I am not affir
transcendence intrinsic to human con
rience allows referral to the seat of su
40. Suzuki, Introduction, p. 62.
41. Suzuki, No Mind, p. 72.
42. Ibid., p. 62.
43. Ibid., p. 106.
44. Ibid., p. 62.
45. Ibid., p. 106.
46. Ibid., p. 72.
47. Suzuki, "Practical Methods in Ze
48. Alan Watts, The Way ofZen (Ne
49. Suzuki, No Mind, p. 102.
50. St. Augustine, On Free Choice of
anapolis: Hackett, 1993), p. 26.
51. See, for example, D. T. Suzuki, "S
tion, p. 92.
52. Jacques Maritain, Existence and
Phelan (New York: Pantheon, 1948),
53. D. T. Suzuki, "The Role of Natur
54. Suzuki, No Mind, p. 79.

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