TH E S E LF AN D TH E O TH E R

something reductive ( a specifc element) , something identifable, and

something immutable. ESSENTIALISM
VERSUS
Philosophical terms EXISTENTIALISM
 C onsciousness Essentialism is oten
contrasted with
Awareness or experience o the world See also the discussion o
existentialism. These
C onsciousness in Human Nature ( C hapter 2 )
approaches can be
 E ssence explained by highlighting
An essence is the intrinsic or indispensable property or properties that the existentialist
that characterize or identiy an entity. understanding does not
ocus on conceiving
 Material
identity in the same way
The substance or substances out o which a thing is or can be made we understand an entity.
 S ubstance Rather, existentialism is
a concept o the sel that
That which has mass and occupies or is extended space
ocuses on relationships,
 Temporality thus rej ecting the
The condition o being temporal or bounded in time as in past, notion o a predefned
present and uture. entity as the defnitive
aspect o identity. A
 S patiality
valid question to ask is
The conditions o being involved in, or having the nature o space. What is an essence?
It has characteristics or
properties but does it exist
The ancient positions: Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine in time and space? Is it
The oundational concept o the sel has been an enduring one. immutable? Essentialists
Essentialism has been the dominant ramework or Western philosophy requently believe that the
or over 2 ,5 00 years. Plato is regarded as the frst signifcant essentialist essence is metaphysical
as a result o his argument or the Form o the Good as an outcome o and accessible through
his amous Theory o the Forms in various dialogues throughout his lie. 5 introspection. This
These include Timaeus, Phaedo, The Republic, Hippias Major, The Symposium, approach was established
and Parmenides. It was not a perect concept, oten remaining vague with in the western tradition
limited analysis and justifcation. In Parmenides, a later dialogue, Plato even by Plato.
oers six o his own objections to his Theory o the Forms. Nonetheless,
the idea o a metaphysical essence was very attractive and, partly because
o the overall inuence o Platos works, became the defning conceptual
ramework or later philosophical debate and integrated in a C hristian
worldview rom around 400 C E onwards. C onsequently, it has been the
dominant concept in the Western tradition until the mid to late
1 9th century. The original concept is quite simple  the sel is a soul that
is immortal and only exists within a body or a limited amount o time.

The self as psyche or soul

The p syche or soul is an immaterial, thinking substance, which exists
so long as some orm o thought is going on in this substance. It usually
involves a rej ection o the body ( soma) . Plato and D escartes are the key

5
Platos Republic is one of the prescribed titles for Paper 2. The best-known discussion of his Theory of the Forms
is found in this text, and in particular through his famous Allegory of the Cave.

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5 B E I N G H U M AN

philosophers who have held this view. I we start with Plato we can see
how he establishes the notion o the sel as a metaphysical issue.
Plato agrees with pre-S ocratic philosophers such as Pythagoras and
Heraclitus that psyche or soul is the source or our rational and moral
sel, as well as our biological sel. This concept o the sel already had
a long history. It was present in ancient Greek thought through the
inuence o O rphism, a set o religious belies and practices o the
Thracians and requently associated with literature ascribed to the
mythical poet O rpheus. Platos own philosophical understanding also
reects this view, and the inuence o Plato meant that this concept o
the sel became a common reerence point in debates about the sel.

Understanding the context

The philosophical ambition throughout Platos philosophical writings
was to fnd certainty. This desire, arguably determined by the turbulent
political times he was experiencing, drove him to create a philosophical
system aimed at establishing this certainty. As a consequence, Plato was
unwilling to include anything that could not provide this oundation.
In the ollowing extract rom Phaedo, Socrates, the Athenian philosopher
and teacher eatured in Platos dialogues, is arguing or the existence o the
soul. In the process, he displays a distinct attitude towards other concepts
such as purity, eternity, immortality, and unchangeableness, indicating
clearly an evaluative ramework or determining the source o truth.

Socrates: And were we not saying long ago that Socrates: And to which class is the soul more
the soul when using the body as an instrument nearly alike and akin, as ar as may be inerred
o perception, that is to say, when using the rom this argument, as well as rom the
sense o sight or hearing or some other sense (or preceding one?
the meaning o perceiving through the body is
Cebes: I think, S ocrates, that, in the opinion
perceiving through the senses) were we not
o everyone who ollows the argument,
saying that the soul too is then dragged by the body
the soul will be ininitely more like the
into the region o the changeable, and wanders and
unchangeab leeve n the most stupid person
is conused; the world spins round her, and she is
will not deny that.
like a drunkard, when she touches change?
Socrates: And the body is more like the changing?
Cebes: Very true.
Cebes: Yes.
Socrates: B ut when returning into hersel
she reects, then she passes into the other Plato 6
world, the region o purity, and eternity, and
immortality, and unchangeableness, which are
her kindred, and with them she ever lives, when Questions
she is by hersel and is not let or hindered; then
According to Socrates, what is the relationship
she ceases rom her erring ways, and being in
between the body and the soul?
communion with the unchanging is unchanging.
And this state o the soul is called wisdom? Based on this passage, how does he argue/
Cebes: That is well and truly said, S ocrates. justify this position?

6
Plato, Phaedo, p. 65; see also Plato, The Trial and Death of Socrates: Four Dialogues, edited by Shane Weller
(New York: Dover Publications, 1992) , pp. 7879.

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 TH E S E LF AN D TH E O TH E R

Plato argued that the sel was an entity that existed in the metaphysical
world. This concept is an abstract concept o the sel and also a rej ection
o the body. As Plato states in Phaedo, the body flls us with all kinds
o lusts, desires, ears, phantoms and a great deal o nonsense, with
the result that we really and truly never ever get a chance to think
about anything at all. 7 This cannot, Plato suggests, be the oundation
o the true sel and the search or knowledge: it has been well and
truly proved to us that i we are ever going to gain pure knowledge
o anything, we must get rid o the body. And we must look at things
themselves with the soul itsel. 8 This claim existed within Platos
broader philosophical system and urther analysis is required to ully
understand the claim Plato is making about the sel.
Plato argues that reality is dualistic, or consists o two dierent realms o
being. One is a realm o change and the other is a realm o permanence.
The frst realm, the realm o change, is transient, where things come and
go. This makes it imperect and unreliable. Socrates suggests that when
the soul touches this region it becomes like a drunkard. This is the
realm o particulars, the realm we perceive with our senses.
The second realm is the opposite; it is the realm o  purity, and
eternity, and immortality, and unchangeableness . I we were to
look or our  sel , as Plato did, we would surely preer it to be
present in the permanent ( even perect) realm. This was Platos
assumption. C onsequently the sel must exist in the permanent
realm, or as he labelled it, the metap hysical realm, or the realm
 beyond the physical .
This view o reality initially seems speculative, even mystical. This is
especially the case when viewed by the modern scientifc mind, an
approach that looks or observable evidence to determine whether
something exists. However, it underpins the Western view o reality.
Plato explained, but did not argue, his theory o metaphysics in his
amous Allegory o the C ave ound in The Republic. In terms o the sel,
Plato identifes the physical realm with the body, and the metaphysical
realm with the true sel or the psyche. In doing so Plato rej ects the body,
even argues that it hinders the sel:

Those who rightly love wisdom are practicing dying, and death to
them is the least terrible thing in the world. Look at it in this way:
I they are everywhere at enmity with the body, and desire the soul
to be alone by itsel, and i, when this very thing happens, they shall
ear and obj ect  would not that be wholly unreasonable? S hould
they not willingly go to a place where there is good hope o fnding
what they were in love with all through lie ( and they loved wisdom)
and o ridding themselves o the companion which they hated?
Plato 9

7
In Plato, Great Dialogues of Plato, translated by W. H. D. Rouse (New York: Signet Classic, 1999) , p. 145.
8
Ibid., p. 146.
9
Ibid., pp. 182183.

189
5 B E I N G H U M AN

Plato clearly discriminates between the physical body and the metaphysical
sel based on a distrust o the body as a changing orm. This attitude
pervades Platos concept o the body.

The Mind/Soul The Body

1. must be the ruler 1. must be ruled

2. is rational 2. is irrational

3. is the crown o virtue/ 3. is shameul/degraded

knowledge and existence

4. is the path to all that is good 4. is an obstacle to all that is good

5. is temporarily imprisoned 5. is a tomb, a prison

6. is important 6. is insignifcant

When looking or a defnitive expression o Platos concept o the sel,

it is not always clear what he means by the psyche. The inuence o
C hristian scholarship has usually interpreted the ancient Greek notion o
psyche as soul. Neither is Platos psyche a mind in the modern sense o
the word. However, there is greater conceptual clarity i it is translated as
inner sel as it avoids the religious overtones that are incorporated into
the notion o the soul.
Further investigation indicates that there are essentially two aspects to
the Platonic inner sel. The frst is that it is the seat of knowledge,
perorming the unctions that we attribute to minds. The second is that
it is the bringer of life; having an inner sel distinguishes a living
thing rom a non- living thing. ( This is where calling the psyche a soul
becomes attractive or C hristian interpretations.) Plato has defned his
sel as the essence o an individual lie.
Plato details the particular eatures o this sel by using reason to
draw an interesting conclusion. In the ollowing dialogue he explains
why the sel is not a unitary sel. Instead the sel is divided and
these divisions are in conict. Again, Plato has S ocrates explain his
j ustifcation o this claim:

Socrates: Isnt it sometimes true that the thirsty person also, or some
reason, may want not to drink?
Glaucon: Yes, oten.
Socrates: What can we say, then, i not that in his soul there is a part
that desires drink and another part that restrains him? This latter part
is distinct rom desire and usually can control desire.
Glaucon: I agree.

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 TH E S E LF AN D TH E O TH E R

Socrates: And isnt it true in such cases such control originates in

reason, while the urge to drink originates in something else?
Glaucon: So it seems.
Socrates: Then we can conclude that there are in us two distinct parts.
O ne is what we call reason, and the other we call the nonrational
appetites. The latter hungers, thirsts, desires sex, and is subj ect to
other desires.
Glaucon: Yes, that is the logical conclusion.
Socrates: B ut what about our emotional or spirited element: the part
in us that eels anger and indignation?  Anger sometimes opposes
our appetites as i it is something distinct rom them  Yet this
emotional part o ourselves is [also] distinct rom reason.
Plato 1 0

In other writings, Plato indicates that the inner sel is divided into three
parts: a rational part, an appetitive part, and a spirited part. This is called
his trip artite soul. This is where Plato urther develops the concept o
the sel as an inner sel. The sel is now dynamic, sometimes in conict
that can only be resolved by the dominance o one part ( though,
notably, not the exclusion o the others) . This is a seminal concept o the
sel in the Western tradition.

The tripartite soul

Plato communicates this concept o the sel with a very vivid metaphor:
the chariot.

READING ACTIVITY
Read the ollowing passage. Draw and label the images being described.

Let me speak briey about the nature o the soul
by using an image. Let the image have three
parts: two winged horses and a charioteer 
O ne o the horses is o noble breed, the other
ignoble. The charioteer controls them with
great difculty  The vicious steedwhen it
has not been thoroughly trainedgoes heavily,
weighing down the charioteer to the earth
Above them, in the heaven above the heaven 
there abides the true reality with which real
knowledge is concerned: the Forms which are
visible only to the mind and have no color,
shape, or hardness. The souls that are most like
gods are carried up there by their charioteer,
although troubled by their steeds and only with
great difculty beholding true being  Other
souls rise only to all again, barely glimpsing it
and then altogether ailing to see because their
steeds are too unruly.
Plato 1 1

10
From Platos Republic, Book IV; quote taken from Manuel Velasquez, Philosophy: A Text with Readings, 12th
edition (Wadsworth: Cengage Learning, 2014) , p. 56.
11
From Platos Phaedrus, selections from 246a247e; quoted in Velasquez, Philosophy, p. 5657.

191
5 B E I N G H U M AN

It should look something like this:

Ration al self Desire & Spirit

An ancient critique: Diotima of Mantinea

Platos views were not immediately accepted. In his dialogue The Symposium,
Plato reers to the views o a emale philosopher Diotima who, it has been
suggested, was Socrates teacher. She argued or a dierent perspective on
the nature o the sel:

Although we speak o an individual as being the same so long as he

continues to exist in the same orm, and thereore assume that a man
is the same person in his old age as in his inancy, yet although we
call him the same, every bit o him is dierent, and every day he is
becoming a new man, while the old man is ceasing to exist, as you can
see rom his hair, his esh, his bones, his blood, and all the rest o his
body. And not only his body, or the same thing happens to his soul.
And neither his manners, nor his dispositions, nor his thoughts, nor
his desires, nor his pleasures, nor his suerings, nor his ears are
the same throughout his lie, or some o them grow, while others
disappear  Thus, unlike the gods, a mortal creature cannot remain
the same throughout eternity; it can only leave behind new lie to fll
the vacancy that is let as it passes away  . And so it is no wonder
that every creature prizes its own ospring, since everything is
inspired by this love, this passion or immortality.
Plato 1 2

D iotima, a character in a dialogue and possibly a real philosopher, rej ects

the idea o the sel as a constant and thereore the oundation o identity.
It was not until Locke explored the issue o personal identity ( see
C hapter 7: Identity) in the 1 7th century that philosophy systematically
explored the issue o the enduring sel.

12
Plato, The Symposium; quote taken from Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (eds) , The Collected Dialogues
of Plato, including the Letters, translated by Michael Joyce (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961) ,
pp. 559560.
192
 TH E S E LF AN D TH E O TH E R

A modern critique: a feminist critique of Platos view of the self

There are three dominant eminist perspectives when considering the body:
1 . B ody as nature  biological entity.
2 . B ody as socially constructed  this ocuses on the sex/gender
distinction and theories o socialization.
3 . Embodiment  this reers to the lived body and the position that
we are our bodies.
All o these are relevant to the discussion o What is human? and the
concept o the sel. However, the last is most relevant or an evaluation
o Platos concept o the sel. Elizabeth V. S pelman highlights in her
article Woman as B ody a concern about Platos emphasis on the
metaphysical at the expense o the physical. Spelman argues that Plato
raised the worth o the soul above that o the body:

Platos dialogues are flled with lessons about knowledge, reality, and
goodness, and most o the lessons carry with them strong praise or the
soul and strong indictments against the body. According to Plato, the
body, with its deceptive senses, keeps us rom real knowledge; it rivets
us in a world o material things which is ar removed rom the world o
reality; and it tempts us away rom the virtuous lie. It is in and through
the soul, i at all, that we shall have knowledge, be in touch with reality,
and lead a lie o virtue. Only the soul can truly know, or only the soul
can ascend to the real world, the world o the Forms or Ideas. 1 3

To illustrate the superiority o the soul Plato used examples o perceived

emale behaviours:

For example, how are we to know when the body has the upper
hand over the soul, or when the lower part o the soul has managed
to smother the higher part? We presumably cant see such conict,
so what do such conicts translate into, in terms o actual human
lives? Well, says Plato, look at the lives o women. It is women who
get hysterical at the thought o death; obviously, their emotions have
overpowered their reason, and they cant control themselves. 1 4

While this demonstrates clearly that Platos position on the role

o women as Philosopher Queens in The Republic requires urther
investigation, it also demonstrates that he was constructing his position
rom a specifc perspective. How viable is this perspective that involves
wholesale the rejection o the body? Perhaps the body is the source o
our sel due to the importance o the lived experience? As Adrienne Rich
suggests, [i] n order to live a ully human lie we require not only control
o our bodies ( though control is a prerequisite) ; we must touch the

13
Elizabeth V. Spelman, Woman as Body: Ancient and Contemporary Views, Feminist Studies 8, No. 1 (Spring
1982) : 111.
14
Ibid., p. 115.
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5 B E I N G H U M AN

unity and resonance o our physicality, our bond with the natural order,
the corporeal grounds o our intelligence. 1 5 The physical ( corporeal)
dimension o our existence is being ignored in Platos argument due to
its changeability yet isnt this central to your sel, especially i you are
a women? For example, the power o birth means that change begins
about lie. Spelman questions whether or not Plato could understand this
possibility. This provides a strong indication as to why essentialism in this
orm was rej ected and a position on the embodied sel ( the sel embedded
in the body) was welcomed as an alternative. ( This is a position that will
be explored in more detail in the section on existentialism.)

Aristotle and the body

Aristotle, the most amous student o Plato, continued the momentum
initiated by Plato (and Socrates) but also reacted to his mentors philosophy in
a number o ways and especially its reliance on rationalism as a methodology
and the infuence o Pythagoras. He has a more empirical approach to
philosophical issues, resulting in a dierent emphasis in the analysis and
thereore some dierent conclusions. Whereas Plato had been dismissive o
the body, Aristotle saw it as essential. He rejected the premise that there were
two distinct and separable types o entity: soul and body. He still retained the
basic outline o the mind/body but he changed the relationship. As Aristotle
states in On the Soul (known also as De Anima) , The soul must be a substance
in the sense o the orm o a material body having lie potentiality within it.
But substance is actuality, and thus soul is the actuality o a body. 1 6
When this short explanation is analysed the ollowing connections are
evident:

Soul = Substance similar to Form (of a Body) with life potentiality

Substance is Actuality
Thereore
Soul = Actuality (of the Body)

As part o Aristotles overall philosophical ramework, he regarded a

thing as a combination o substance, 1 7 matter, and orm. A thing
exists ( with an ontological or metaphysical reality) and is thereore
not nothing because it has a substance. A substance equals matter
in a orm. The concept o substance is at the oundation o Aristotles
philosophical understanding and thereore essential to his conceptual
ramework. Aristotle argues that substance is the undamental
building block o the universe. A modern belie is that it is elementary
particles. These seem similar. However, Aristotles notion o substance
is somewhat dierent rom our modern one. For Aristotle, substance is
the whatness o a thing. It is primary. All other eatures o our reality
such as quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, and
aection are dependent on the category o substance.

15
Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976) , p. 62.
16
Aristotle, On the Soul, Book II, Part 1, available at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/soul.2.ii.html (accessed
23 October 2014) .
17
This is the frst ever recorded philosophical account o substance.
194