Judicial Review
Garcia vs. BOI, 191 SCRA 288
This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the
Board of Investments (BOI)/Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI) approving the transfer of the site of the proposed
petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and the shift of
feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to naphtha and/or
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).
PRINCIPLE:
We rule that the Court has a constitutional duty to step into
this controversy and determine the paramount issue. We grant
the petition.
The Court ruled that the BOI violated Garcia’s Constitutional
right to have access to information on matters of public
concern under Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution. The
Court found that the inhabitants of Bataan had an “interest in
the establishment of the petrochemical plant in their midst
[that] is actual, real, and vital because it will affect not only
their economic life, but even the air they breathe”. [p. 4] The
Court also ruled that BPC’s amended application was in fact a
second application that required a new public notice to be filed
and a new hearing to be held.
Although Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code provides
that “all applications and their supporting documents filed
under this code shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed
to any person, except with the consent of the applicant,” the
Court emphasized that Article 81 provides for disclosure “on
the orders of a court of competent jurisdiction”. [p. 4] The
Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to order disclosure of the
application, amended application, and supporting documents
filed with the BOI under Article 81, with certain exceptions.
The Court went on to note that despite the right to access
information, “the Constitution does not open every door to any
and all information” because “the law may exempt certain
types of information from public scrutiny”. [p. 4] Thus it
excluded “the trade secrets and confidential, commercial, and
financial information of the applicant BPC, and matters
affecting national security” from its order. [p. 4] The Court did
not provide a test for what information is excluded from the
Constitutional privilege to access public information, nor did it
specify the kinds of information that BPC could withhold under
its ruling.
Banco Filipino vs. Monetary Board, 204 SCRA 767
PRINCIPLE:
It is a well-recognized principle that administrative and
discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the
courts. In general, courts have no supervising power over the
proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of
the government. This is generally true with respect to acts
involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and findings
of fact. But when there is a grave abuse of discretion which is
equivalent to a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner, then there is a justification for the courts to set aside
the administrative determination reached (Lim, Sr. v. Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, L-26990, August 31,
1970, 34 SCRA 751)
The jurisdiction of this Court is called upon, once again,
through these petitions, to undertake the delicate task of
ascertaining whether or not an administrative agency of the
government, like the Central Bank of the Philippines and the
Monetary Board, has committed grave abuse of discretion or
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed order. Coupled with this task is the duty of this Court
not only to strike down acts which violate constitutional
protections or to nullify administrative decisions contrary to
legal mandates but also to prevent acts in excess of authority
or jurisdiction, as well as to correct manifest abuses of
discretion committed by the officer or tribunal involved.
The law applicable in the determination of these issues is
Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In Re: Sumulong Torres, 251 SCRA 709
PRINCIPLE:
A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the
sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted
criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter
subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the
terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve
the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. 10
By the pardonee’s consent to the terms stipulated in this
contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the
supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-
bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms
and conditions of the pardon. Under Section 64 (I) of the
Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized
to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person
who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or
conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." It
is now a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this
exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny.
The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon
rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive,
and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on
conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has
granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however
erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment
was ordered.
Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person’s
liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful. In
the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres remains legal
considering that, were it not for the grant of conditional pardon
which had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the
determination of which is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would
have served his final sentence for his first conviction until
November 2, 2000.
Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first
place was the exclusive author of the conditional pardon and of
its revocation, is the corollary prerogative to reinstate the
pardon if in his own judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee
from the subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the
same. Courts have no authority to interfere with the grant by
the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been
our fortified ruling that a final judicial pronouncement as to the
guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to
determine whether or not there has been a breach of the
terms of a conditional pardon. There is likewise nil a basis for
the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional
pardon revoked by the President in the exercise of powers
undisputedly solely and absolutely loaded in his office.
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