CADALIN ET AL VS.

POEA ET AL
to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ employment on behalf of its foreign principals.

BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B.

The amended complaint sought the payment of the unexpired portion
EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1,767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS,
of the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and
thru and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL
secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel
MUNDOvs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
and Reserved Fund; interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage
ADMINISTRATION’S ADMINISTRATOR, NLRC, BROWN & ROOT
and salary differential pay; fringe benefits; reimbursement of SSS
INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA INTERNATIONAL
and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not
BUILDERS CORPORATION
remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as
GRN 104776, December 5,1994.
well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation
FACTS:
of BRII
This is a consolidation of 3 cases of SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the

Supreme Court for Certiorari.

On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the “Motion to

Strike Out of the Records” filed by AIBC but required the claimants to
On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in their own behalf
correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed out.
and on behalf of 728 other OCWs instituted a class suit by filing an

“Amended Complaint” with the POEA for money claims arising from
AIB and BRII kept on filing Motion for Extension of Time to file their
their recruitment by ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS
answer. The POEA kept on granting such motions.
CORPORATION (AIBC) and employment by BROWN & ROOT

INTERNATIONAL, INC (BRI) which is a foreign corporation with

headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction;

while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service contractor

On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions NLRC promulgated its Resolution, modifying the decision of the

for extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII declared in POEA. The resolution removed some of the benefits awarded in

default for failure to file their answers. favor of the claimants. NLRC denied all the MRs. Hence, these

petitions filed by the claimants and by AlBC and BRII.

On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order

directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers within ten days from The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by Bahrain where most

receipt of the order. of the complainants were deployed. His Majesty Ise Bin Selman Al

Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16,

(at madami pang motions ang na-file, new complainants joined the 1176, otherwise known re the Labour Law for the Private Sector.

case, ang daming inavail na remedies ng both parties) Some of the provision of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the

On June 19, 1987, AIBC finally submitted its answer to the claims of the complainants-appellants are as follows:

complaint. At the same hearing, the parties were given a period of 15

days from said date within which to submit their respective position “Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour

papers. On February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted position equivalent to his wage entitlement increased by a minimum of

paper. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a “Consolidated twenty-rive per centurn thereof for hours worked during the day; and

Reply,” POEA Adminitartor rendered his decision which awarded the by a minimum off fifty per centurn thereof for hours worked during

amount of $824, 652.44 in favor of only 324 complainants. Claimants the night which shall be deemed to being from seven o’clock in the

submitted their “Appeal Memorandum For Partial Appeal” from the evening until seven o’clock in the morning .”

decision of the POEA. AIBC also filed its MR and/or appeal in

addition to the “Notice of Appeal” filed earlier. Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full

pay.
If employee worked, 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him x of wages payable to the worker for the period of such notice or the

x x.” unexpired portion thereof.”

Art. 81; x x x When conditions of work require the worker to work on Art. Ill: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon

any official holiday, he shall be paid an additional sum equivalent to termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of his

150% of his normal wage.” employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days’ wages for each

year of the first three years of service and of one month’s wages for

Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one year’s continuous each year of service thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to

service with his employer shall be entitled to Laos on full pay for a payment of leaving indemnity upon a quantum meruit in proportion to

period of not less than 21 days for each year increased to a period the period of his service completed within a year.”

not less than 28 days after five continuous years of service.”

ISSUE:

A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in 1. WON the foreign law should govern or the contract of the

respect of the proportion of his service in that year.” parties.(WON the complainants who have worked in Bahrain are

entitled to the above-mentioned benefits provided by Amiri Decree

Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite No. 23 of Bahrain).

duration may be terminated by either party thereto after giving the

other party prior notice before such termination, in writing, in respect 2. WON the Bahrain Law should apply in the case. (Assuming it is

of monthly paid workers and fifteen days’ notice in respect of other applicable WON complainants’ claim for the benefits provided therein

workers. The party terminating a contract without the required notice have prescribed.)

shall pay to the other party compensation equivalent to the amount

3. Whether or not the instant cases qualify as; a class suit (siningit ko became applicable to said contracts if they offer terms and

nalang) conditions more favorable than those stipulated therein. However

(the rest of the issues in the full text of the case refer to Labor Law) there was a part of the employment contract which provides that the

compensation of the employee may be “adjusted downward so that

RULING: the total computation plus the non-waivable benefits shall be

1. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on equivalent to the compensation” therein agree,’ another part of the

Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law and same provision categorically states “that total remuneration and

admitted in evidence a simple copy of the Bahrain’s Amiri Decree benefits do not fall below that of the host country regulation and

No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the Private Sector). custom.”

NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be

greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it. Article

contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that where the laws of 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

the host country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, ‘The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall

then the laws of the host country shall form part of the overseas not favor the party who caused the obscurity.”

employment contract. It approved the observation of the POEA

Administrator that in labor proceedings, all doubts in the Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion

implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its where there is already a prepared form containing the stipulations of

implementing regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor. the employment contract and the employees merely “take it or leave

it.” The presumption is that there was an imposition by one party

The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC against the other and that the employees signed the contracts out of

and BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the host country necessity that reduced their bargaining power.
We read the overseas employment contracts in question as adopting 2. NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims

the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel of the complainants was 3 years, as provided in Article 291 of the

thereof. The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to Labor Code of the Philippines, and not ten years as provided in

be governed. In such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines nor one year as

“system” to regulate the relations of the parties, including questions provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

of their capacity to enter into the contract, the formalities to be

observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth. Instead of Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:

adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just “A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not actionable

agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed after the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of the

incorporated into their contract “as a set of terms.” By such reference Contract”.

to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not become a

foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the

not operate as a statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed forum (local court), Procedural matters, such as service of process,

written in the contract. joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are

governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is

A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties. based upon a foreign substantive law.

Such party expectation is protected by giving effect to the parties’

own choice of the applicable law. The choice of law must, however, A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in

bear some relationship the parties or their transaction. There is no the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive,

question that the contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have depending on the characterization given such a law. In Bournias v.

a direct connection with the Bahrain law because the services were Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir. [1955]), where

rendered in that country. the issue was the applicability of the Panama Labor Code in a case
filed in the State of New York for claims arising from said Code, the law even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum (local

claims would have prescribed under the Panamanian Law but not Court) on prescription of actions.

under the Statute of Limitations of New York. The U.S. Circuit Court

of Appeals held that the Panamanian Law was procedural as it was However the characterization of a statute into a procedural or

not “specifically intended to be substantive,” hence, the prescriptive substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum

period provided in the law of the forum should apply. The Court (local Court) has a “borrowing statute.” Said statute has the practical

observed: “. . . we are dealing with a statute of limitations of a foreign effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance.

country, and it is not clear on the face of the statute that its purpose A “borrowing statute” directs the state of the forum (local Court) to

was to limit the enforceability, outside as well as within the foreign apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based

country concerned, of the substantive rights to which the statute on a foreign law. While there are several kinds of “borrowing

pertains. We think that as a yardstick for determining whether that statutes,” one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the

was the purpose, this test is the most satisfactory one. place where it accrued will not be enforced in the forum even though

the local statute was not run against it.

The Court further noted: “Applying that test here it appears to us that

the libellant is entitled to succeed, for the respondents have failed to Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It provides: “If

satisfy us that the Panamanian period of limitation in question was by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose,

specifically aimed against the particular rights which the libellant the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.”

seeks to enforce. The Panama Labor Code is a statute having broad

objectives.” The American court applied the statute of limitations of Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of

New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there the Philippines. In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however,

was no showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains

intended to be substantive. Being considered merely a procedural

the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree The next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the

No. 23 of 1976. filing of the claims is 3 years, as provided by the Labor Code or 10

years, as provided by the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign

claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. To enforce the one-year Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the “The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time

claims in question would contravene the public policy on the the right of action accross:

protection to labor.

(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law;

In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 (3) Upon a judgment”

Constitution emphasized that:“The state shall promote social justice In this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on

in all phases of national development” (Sec. 10). the written contracts between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive

‘The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall period provided by Art. 1144(l) of the New Civil Code should govern.

protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare” (Sec. 18).

3. NO. A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the

In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 controversy is one of common or general interest to many and the

Constitution provides: parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all

“Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and before the court. When all the claims are for benefits granted under

overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment the Bahrain law many of the claimants worked outside Bahrain.

and equality of employment opportunities for all.” Some of the claimants were deployed in Indonesia under different

terms and condition of employment.

Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law.

Inasmuch as the First requirement of a class suit is not present

(common or general interest based on the Amiri Decree of the State

of Bahrain), it is only logical that only those who worked in Bahrain

shall be entitled to rile their claims in a class suit.

While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature

of the claims is the same (for employee’s benefits), there is no

common question of law or fact. While some claims are based on the

Amiri Law of Bahrain, many of the claimants never worked in that

country, but were deployed elsewhere. Thus, each claimant is

interested only in his own demand and not in the claims of the other

employees of defendants. A claimant has no concern in protecting

the interests of the other claimants as shown by the fact, that

hundreds of them have abandoned their co-claimants and have

entered into separate compromise settlements of their respective

claims. The claimants who worked in Bahrain can not be allowed to

sue in a class suit in a judicial proceeding.

WHEREFORE, all the three petitioners are DISMISSED.

PIA VS OPLE
the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one month before the

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE

wages equivalent to one month’s salary.

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES (PIA) CORPORATION vs
xxx xxx xxx
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Minister of Labor; HON.
10. APPLICABLE LAW:
VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister;
This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the
ETHELYNNE B. FARRALES and MARIA MOONYEEN MAMASIG
laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have
G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990
the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under this

agreement.
FACTS: On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International

Airlines Corporation (PIA), a foreign corporation licensed to do

Farrales & Mamasig (employees) were hired as flight attendants
business in the Philippines, executed in Manila 2 separate contracts
after undergoing training. Base station was in Manila and flying
of employment, one with private respondent Farrales and the other
assignments to different parts of the Middle East and Europe.
with private respondent Mamasig. 1 The contracts, which became

effective on 9 January 1979, provided in pertinent portion as follows:

roughly 1 year and 4 months prior to the expiration of the contracts of
5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY
employment, PIA through Mr. Oscar Benares, counsel for and official
This agreement is for a period of 3 years, but can be extended by the
of the local branch of PIA, sent separate letters, informing them that
mutual consent of the parties.
they will be terminated effective September 1, 1980.
xxx xxx xxx
Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, for illegal
6. TERMINATION
dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and bonuses,
xxx xxx xxx
against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE).
Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA

reserves the right to terminate this agreement at any time by giving

PIA’s Contention: The PIA submitted its position paper, but no ISSUE: (Relative to the subject) Which law should govern over the

evidence, and there claimed that both private respondents were case? Which court has jurisdiction?

habitual absentees; that both were in the habit of bringing in from HELD: Philippine Law and Philippine courts

abroad sizeable quantities of “personal effects”; and that PIA Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment

personnel at the Manila International Airport had been discreetly agreement which specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the

warned by customs officials to advise private respondents to applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for

discontinue that practice. PIA further claimed that the services of settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the

both private respondents were terminated pursuant to the provisions agreement “only [in] courts of Karachi Pakistan”.

of the employment contract. We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected

with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws

Favorable decision for the respondents. The Order stated that and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing

private respondents had attained the status of regular employees upon some other law to govern their relationship.

after they had rendered more than a year of continued service; that the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also

the stipulation limiting the period of the employment contract to 3 performed here, at least partially; private respondents are Philippine

years was null and void as violative of the provisions of the Labor citizens and respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign

Code and its implementing rules and regulations on regular and corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing business)

casual employment; and that the dismissal, having been carried out and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents

without the requisite clearance from the MOLE, was illegal and were based in the Philippines in between their assigned flights to the

entitled private respondents to reinstatement with full backwages. Middle East and Europe. All the above contacts point to the

Decision sustained on appeal. Hence, this petition for certiorari Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for

the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties.

Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment

agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies principle of autonomy of contracting parties is the equally general

and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. rule that provisions of applicable law, especially provisions relating to

Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake to matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into the

plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must contract. Put a little differently, the governing principle is that parties

therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of may not contract away applicable provisions of law especially

Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law. peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed with

[DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION, eh?] public interest. The law relating to labor and employment is clearly

Petition denied. such an area and parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and

_______ their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by

NOTES: simply contracting with each other. It is thus necessary to appraise

Another Issue: petitioner PIA invokes paragraphs 5 and 6 of its the contractual provisions invoked by petitioner PIA in terms of their

contract of employment with private respondents Farrales and consistency with applicable Philippine law and regulations.

Mamasig, arguing that its relationship with them was governed by

the provisions of its contract rather than by the general provisions of

the Labor Code.

A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected, as PIA

argues, since a contract is the law between the parties. The principle

of party autonomy in contracts is not, however, an absolute principle.

The rule in Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that the contracting

parties may establish such stipulations as they may deem

convenient, “provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good

customs, public order or public policy.” Thus, counter-balancing the

Bellis vs Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967 equal portions
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLE’S for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and
BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 2nd marriages.
executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS,
oppositors-appellants, VS. Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET. AL., heir-appellees Bellis filed their respective opposition to the project partition on the
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967 ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate
children.
FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.
of the United States. He had 5 legitimate children with his wife, Mary
Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd ISSUE:
wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children. Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.

Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in RULING:
which his distributable estate should be divided in trust in the It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and
following order and manner: a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming
Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same would not
a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen; result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still
b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each; refer to Texas Law.
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd
wives, in equal shares. Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex
rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
USA. His will was admitted to probate in the Philippines. The involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of
People’s Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the proofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
entire bequest therein. presumed different from our appellants, position is therefore not
rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and
filed its “Executor’s Final Account, Report of Administration and The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the
Project of Partition” where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of State of Texas, USA and that under the Laws of Texas, there are no
the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
$240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights has to
children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the be determined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law on legitimates
project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.
SPOUSES ZALAMEA VS. CA
daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ boarding.

SPOUSES ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA vs. CA and

Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her
TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC.
daughter, could not be accommodated because it was also fully
G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993
booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and
FACTS:
purchased two tickets from American Airlines. Upon their arrival in
Petitioners-spouses Cesar Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their
the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on
daughter, Liana purchased 3 airline tickets from the Manila agent of
breach of contract of air carriage before the RTC- Makati. The lower
respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los
court ruled in favor of petitioners . CA held that moral damages are
Angeles. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were purchased at a
recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of
discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All
carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is a matter of
three tickets represented confirmed reservations.
record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice

of airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the

On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in but were
Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, no
placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who had
fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on respondent TransWorld
checked in before them had already taken all the seats available on
Airlines. Thus petitioners raised the case on petition for review on
the flight. Out of the 42 names on the wait list, the first 22 names
certiorari.
were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including

petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two others were not able to fly. Those
ISSUE;
holding full-fare tickets were given first priority among the wait-listed
WON TWZ acted with bad faith and would entitle Zalameas to Moral
passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his
and Examplary damages.
daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and
RULING: where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court

The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and

never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Since the

the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in

be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official this case would be Philippine law.

publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the

legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to

a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be bad faith, entitling the passengers concerned to an award of moral

made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, where passengers

consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign with confirmed bookings were refused carriage on the last minute,

service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the this Court held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger

record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of

Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he

Lather, its customer service agent, in her deposition that the Code of would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the

Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Where

overbooking. No official publication of said code was presented as an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to

evidence. Thus, respondent court’s finding that overbooking is deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would

specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no show up for the check in. For the indignity and inconvenience of

basis in fact. being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is

Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the entitled to an award of moral damages.

same is not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the

principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place
For a contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold on to them as

duty — a duty to provide public service and convenience to its passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad faith. Evidently,

passengers which must be paramount to self-interest or enrichment. respondent TWA placed its self-interest over the rights of petitioners

under their contracts of carriage. Such conscious disregard of

Respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its petitioners’ rights makes respondent TWA liable for moral damages.

passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage To deter breach of contracts by respondent TWA in similar fashion in

even if they have confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. the future, we adjudge respondent TWA liable for exemplary

Respondent TWA should have incorporated stipulations on damages, as well.

overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its

passengers about these policies so that the latter would be prepared In the case of Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, this Court

for such eventuality or would have the choice to ride with another explicitly held that a passenger is entitled to be reimbursed for the

airline. cost of the tickets he had to buy for a flight to another airline. Thus,

instead of simply being refunded for the cost of the unused TWA

Respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of tickets, petitioners should be awarded the actual cost of their flight

its alleged policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets. Neither from New York to Los Angeles.

did it present any argument of substance to show that petitioners

were duly apprised of the overbooked condition of the flight or that WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of

there is a hierarchy of boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED

evident that petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of

respondent TWA, thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that

their tickets represented confirmed seats without any qualification.

The failure of respondent TWA to so inform them when it could easily

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,
v. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.
They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was
issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent
became an Australian citizen and was married again to
petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on January 12, 1994 in
Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license,
respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Respondent allegedly
had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her. On his
Answer, Rederick contended that his first marriage was validly
dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry Grace.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and
while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending , respondent
was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia because the “marriage had irretrievably broken down.”
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick
and Grace Recio dissolved on the ground that the Australian divorce
had ended the marriage of the couple thus there was no more
marital union to nullify or annul.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson was proven.
2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated
to marry petitioner
RULING:
1st issue:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce
decree of respondent’s marriage to Samson is insufficient. Before a
foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Furthermore, the divorce
decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned
rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
2nd issue:
Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree
becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorrecce obtained
by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which
erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on
this matter.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the
purpose of receiving evidence. The Court mentioned that they
cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to
respondent null and void because of the question on latter’s legal
capacity to marry.
ASIAVEST VS. CA AND PNCC
The High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ in favor of the petitioner and against the private respondent.

Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from private

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD vs. CA and
respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated the complaint
PNCC
before RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce the judgment of the
G.R. No. 110263, July 20, 2001
High Court of Malaya.
Facts: Petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a

corporation organized under the laws of Malaysia while private

Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to
respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation is a
Dismiss, contending that the alleged judgment of the High Court of
corporation duly incorporated and existing under Philippine laws.
Malaya should be denied recognition or enforcement since on in
Petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent,
face, it is tainted with want of jurisdiction, want of notice to private
then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the
respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of
Philippines, before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur
law or fact. Dismissal was, however, denied by the trial court
entitled “Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v. Asiavest CDCP
considering that the grounds relied upon are not the proper grounds
Sdn. Bhd. and Construction and Development Corporation of the
in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Philippines.”

Subsequently, private respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory

Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it
Counter claim’s and therein raised the grounds it brought up in its
had put up in favor of private respondent to guarantee the
motion to dismiss. In its Reply filed, the petitioner contended that the
completion of the Felda Project and the nonpayment of the loan it
High Court of Malaya acquired jurisdiction over the person of private
extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the completion of Paloh
respondent by its voluntary submission the court’s jurisdiction
Hanai and Kuantan By Pass; Project.
through its appointed counsel. Furthermore, private respondent’s
counsel waived any and all objections to the High Court’s jurisdiction convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and

in a pleading filed before the court. fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that the trial

upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation

In due time, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of

petitioner’s complaint. Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice;

of Appeals, but the appellate court dismissed the same and affirmed and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in

the decision of the trial court. the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the

judgment.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in denying recognition and

enforcement to the Malaysian Court judgment. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the

Ruling: Yes. country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of

Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due

bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a notice in the foreign forum Under Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the

tribunal of another country; however, the rules of comity, utility and Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the time the

convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized instant case was decided by the trial court and respondent appellate

states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent court, a judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country

jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of

certain conditions that may vary in different countries. a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a

subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by

In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,

may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n),

underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, a court, whether in the
Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in withdrew the same when it realized that the writ was properly served;

the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of that because private respondent failed to file a statement of defense

the foreign judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign within two (2) weeks, petitioner filed an application for summary

judgment, is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive judgment and submitted affidavits and documentary evidence in

validity. support of its claim; that the matter was then heard before the High

Court of Kuala Lumpur in a series of dates where private respondent

In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of was represented by counsel; and that the end result of all these

the money judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it proceedings is the judgment sought to be enforced.

offered. Petitioner’s sole witness, testified to the effect that he is in

active practice of the law profession in Malaysia; that he was In addition to the said testimonial evidence, petitioner also offered

connected with Skrine and Company as Legal Assistant up to 1981; the documentary evidence to support their claim.

that private respondent, then known as Construction and

Development Corporation of the Philippines, was sued by his client, Having thus proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence

Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad, in Kuala Lumpur; that the and authenticity of the foreign judgment, said foreign judgment

writ of summons were served on March 17, 1983 at the registered enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then fell upon the party

office of private respondent and on March 21, 1983 on Cora S. who disputes its validity, herein private respondent, to prove

Deala, a financial planning officer of private respondent for otherwise. However, private respondent failed to sufficiently

Southeast Asia operations; that upon the filing of the case, Messrs. discharge the burden that fell upon it – to prove by clear and

Allen and Gledhill, Advocates and Solicitors, with address at 24th convincing evidence the grounds which it relied upon to prevent

Floor, UMBC Building, Jalan Sulaiman, Kuala Lumpur, entered their enforcement of the Malaysian High Court judgment.

conditional appearance for private respondent questioning the

regularity of the service of the writ of summons but subsequently