WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION V.

CITY OF MANILA
G.R. No. 122846 – 576 SCRA 416

FACTS: On December 3, 1992, then Manila City Mayor Afredo S. Lim signed into law the Manila
City Ordinance 7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time
Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension
Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila.” White Light Corp is an operator of
mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance nullified as the said Ordinance
infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of White
Light Corporation stating that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid
exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beer houses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.
The CA ruled in favor of the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7774 is a valid exercise of Police Power

RULING: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon
individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection
against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize, if not
eliminate, the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.
These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police
power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends does not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated
analysis of its guarantees to the people.
The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and
hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who
needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the
said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that
individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general
terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for
an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the
concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people.
Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product
and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the
legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More
importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the
means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public
interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck
down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of
police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected. However, this
is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise
enjoys the presumption of validity.
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MMDA V. TRACKWORKS RAIL TRANSIT
G.R. No. 179554 - December 16, 2009

FACTS: In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and

Communications (DTC), entered into a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT) with Metro Rail
Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to R.A. No. 6957 or the Build, Operate and
Transfer Law, under which MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC
would own MRT3 for 25 years and upon the expiration of which the ownership would transfer to
the Government.
In 1998, MRTC and respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending &
Promotions, Inc. (Trackworks) entered into a contract for advertising services. Trackworks
thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and other advertising media in the different
parts of the MRT3.
In 2001, however, MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle the billboards, signage and
other advertising media pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, whereby MMDA prohibited
the posting, installation and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers,
in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and open space. After
Trackworks refused the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the former’s
billboards and similar forms of advertisement.

ISSUE: Whether MMDA has the power to dismantle, remove or destroy the billboards, signage
and other advertising media installed by Trackworks on the interior and exterior structures of
the MRT3.

RULING: That Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signage and other advertising
media in the MRT3 from MRTC’s authority under the BLT agreement to develop commercial
premises in the MRT3 structure or to obtain advertising income therefrom is no longer
debatable. Under the BLT agreement, indeed, MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the
expiration of which MRTC would transfer ownership of the MRT3 to the Government.
Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time material to
this case, and until this date, MRTC’s entering into the contract for advertising services with
Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership by the former. In fact, in MMDA v. Trackworks Rail
Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc., this Court expressly recognized Trackworks’
right to install the billboards, signage and other advertising media pursuant to said contract. The
latter’s right should, therefore, be respected.
It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of
Trackworks’ advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle,
remove, or destroy the billboards, signage and other advertising media installed on the
MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., MMDA v. Viron
Transportation Co., Inc., and MMDA v. Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA’s
powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing in
Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
The Court also agrees with the CA’s ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC
Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks’ billboards, signage and other
advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards, signage
and other advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private property
pursuant to the BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the areas as
to which the prohibition applied.

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ACEBEDO OPTICAL CO. V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 100152 - March 31, 2000

Title of the Case: Acebedo Optical Co. vs. Court of Appeals

Nature: Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the dismissal by
the Court of Appeals of the original petition for certiorari
Keywords: Optical shop, Business Permit

Petitioner: Acebedo Optical Company, Inc.

Respondent: The Honorable Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. After
consideration of petitioner's application and the opposition interposed thereto by local
optometrists, respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No. 5342 subject to the following
conditions: (1) Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only a
commercial store; (2) It cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for
patients, because these are functions of optical clinics; (3) It cannot sell reading and similar
eyeglasses without a prescription having first been made by an independent optometrist or
independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the public, without need of a
prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses; (4) It cannot advertise optical lenses and
eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and frames; (5) It is allowed to grind
lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent optometrist.

On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI lodged a

complaint against the petitioner alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its
business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. On July 19,
1989, the City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit
effective as of said date and giving petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs.

Issue: Whether the City Mayor has the authority to impose special conditions, as a valid exercise
of police power, in the grant of business permits

Ratio: Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people. It is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business
permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this
power. The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond
cavil. However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be
exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due
process and equal protection of the law.

In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by respondent City Mayor to
petitioner was burdened with several conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding by the Court
of Appeals that respondent City Mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing such special
conditions in its permit as the same have no basis in the law or ordinance. Public respondents
and private respondent SOPI are one in saying that the imposition of said special conditions is
well within the authority of the City Mayor as a valid exercise of police power.

The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory
in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue or grant such

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licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the
contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code.

What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of
running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of
optometry. The objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner's business permit
could be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner's employ to produce a valid
certificate of registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business
permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot,
through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession. Such a function is
within the exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to
supervise the profession, in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of
Examiners in Optometry.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP
No. 22995 REVERSED: and the respondent City Mayor is hereby ordered to reissue petitioner's
business permit in accordance with law and with this disposition. No pronouncement as to costs.

Doctrine: The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass
almost all matters affecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and convenience of
the community. Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses
or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is
within the ambit of this power.

Requisites

1 - LAWFUL SUBJECT: The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the exercise of the police power

2 - LAWFUL MEANS: The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals

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