LINDAIN vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 95305 August 20, 1992

FACTS: When the plaintiffs (Elena, Oscar, Celia, Teresita and Virgilio) were still minors, they
were already the registered owners of a parcel of land. Their mother, Dolores Luluquisin, then
already a widow and acting as guardian of her minor children, sold the land for P2,000 under a
Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land to the defendants spouses Apolonia Valiente and
Federico Ila.

The defendants admitted that the property in question was sold to them by the mother of
the minors and although at first they were reluctant to buy the property as the sale would not be
legal, the registered owners thereof being all minors, upon advice of their counsel, the late Atty.
Arturo B. Pascual, and the counsel of Dolores Luluquisin, Atty. Eustaquio Ramos, who notarized
the documents, that the property could be sold without the written authority of the court,
considering that its value was less than P2,000, they bought the property and had it registered
in their names.

Plaintiffs contend, however, that the sale of the lot by their mother to the defendants is
null and void because it was made without judicial authority and/or court approval.

The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the sale was valid, as the value of the
property was less than P2,000, and, considering the ages of plaintiffs now, the youngest being
31 years old at the time of the filing of the complaint, their right to rescind the contract which
should have been exercised four (4) years after reaching the age of majority, has already
prescribed.

ISSUE: Whether or not judicial approval was necessary for the sale of the minors' property by
their mother.

RULING: YES. Under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal (as distinguished from
judicial) administrator of the property of his/her minor children, does not have the power to
dispose of, or alienate, the property of said children without judicial approval. The powers and
duties of the widow as legal administrator of her minor children's property as provided in Rule
84 by the Rules of Court entitled, "General Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators"
are only powers of possession and management. Her power to sell, mortgage, encumber or
otherwise dispose of the property of her minor children must proceed from the court, as
provided in Rule 89 which requires court authority and approval.
 IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF TELESFORO DE DIOS
G.R. No. L-7940 March 27, 1913

FACTS: The facts that Tomas Osmeña claims to have had a claim against the estate of
Telesforo de Dios, but did not present the same within the six months specified by the court for
the presentation of claims to the commissioners. The time having expired within which the
claims should have been presented, the claimant made a motion to the court asking for an
extension of the time within which he could present said claim. Said motion was founded upon a
statement alleging as the only foundation for the motion that said claimant "had not had an
opportunity to formulate his claim during the period of six months fixed by the court." Later the
statement was amended and amplified so as to been presented was, "that during said time one
of the heirs of said estate was making propositions to said Tomas Osmeña to pay on his own
account the debt which he had against the property of said estate; that said Tomas Osmeña,
under the belief that the said heir would pay the said debt, and in the hope that the proposed
settlement would terminate satisfactorily, could not duly formulate his claim before the
commission during said period of six months; that said heir did not pay the debt or any part
thereof to said Tomas Osmeña as he had at first offered to do." The trial court denied the
motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court was correct in denying the motion for extension of time
to present claim.

RULING: YES. The court below correctly said that there must be cause shown before it would
be authorized to extend the time within which claims may be presented against the estate. The
object of the law in fixing a definite period within which claims must be presented is to insure the
speedy settling of the affairs of a deceased person and the early delivery of the property of the
estate into the hands of the persons entitled to receive it. It is distinctly against the interests of
justice and in direct opposition to the policy of the law to extend unduly the time within which
estates should be administered and thereby to keep the property from the possession and use
of those who are entitled to it. Before the time in which claimants must present their claims
against an estate is extended the person asking the privilege must present sound reasons
therefor. Whether or not those reasons are sufficient and whether as a result of their
presentation the time ought or ought not to be extended rests in the sound discretion of
the court.This being so, a decision as to whether or not the time shall be extended will
not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of that
discretion. It is a doctrine followed by this court as by all others that, where a court has
discretion, the exercise thereof will not be interfered with except in case of abuse. The general
doctrine is to the effect that, "in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion, to the
complaining party's prejudice, matters purely within the discretion of the trial court are
not reviewable on appeal." Moreover, the doctrine is also stated in the same volume (p. 327)
that, "it will be presumed on appeal, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, that the
discretionary powers of the lower court have been exercised without abuse. The burden of
showing abuse is upon the party complaining."
 Gabriel v. Bilon, G.R. No. 146989

FACTS: Melencio Gabriel was the owner-operator of a public transport business,

“Gabriel Jeepney,” with a fleet of 54 jeepneys plying the Baclaran-Divisoria-Tondo route.
Petitioner had a pool of drivers, which included respondents, operating under a "boundary
system" of ₱400 per day. Nelson Bilon, Angel Brazil and Ernesto Pagaygay the herein
respondents filed separate complaints of illegal dismissal, illegal deductions and separation pay
against petitioner. The Labor Arbiter, Hon. Ricardo Nora rendered a judgment declaring the
illegality of dismissal and ordering Melencio Gabriel to pay the total amount of ONE MILLION
THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND PESOS [₱1, 034, 000,] representing respondents back wages and
separation pay. Incidentally, petitioner passed away. A copy of the above decision was
delivered personally to petitioner’s house. According to respondents, petitioner’s surviving
spouse, Flordeliza Gabriel, and their daughter, after reading the contents of the decision and
after they had spoken to their counsel, refused to receive the same. The counsel for petitioner
filed an entry of appearance with motion to dismiss the case for the reason that petitioner
passed away. The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that there is
no employer-employee relationship. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration; the NLRC
vacated its decision and the instant case is dismissed and complainants are directed to pursue
their claim against the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Melencio
Gabriel. The CA reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter with a modification that the
respondents be reinstated to their former position without loss of seniority rights and privileges,
with full backwages from the date of their dismissal until their actual reinstatement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the monetary claim of the respondents can be claimed during the
settlement of the estate of Melencio Gabriel.

RULING: Yes. Respondents’ monetary claim shall be governed by Section 21, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court which provides that when the action is for recovery of money arising from
contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in
which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall
instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by
the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner provided in these Rules for prosecuting
claims against the estate of a deceased person. This is in relation to Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court which provides that all claims for money against the decedent arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, and judgment for
money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they
are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the
executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Thus, in accordance with the above
Rules, the money claims of respondents must be filed against the estate of petitioner Melencio
Gabriel.
 Rio y Compania v. Maslog, G.R. No. L-12302

FACTS: Rio y Olabarrieta (predecessor-in-interest of appellant Rio y Compania)and the

late Anastacio Manalo, father of the defendant-appellee Elvira Maslog, entered into a contract
wherein the personal services of Anastacio Manalo were engaged by the plaintiff-appellant for
the administration and exploitation of its forest concession. Under the contract, plaintiff-appellant
was to extend to agent Manalo a credit not exceeding P5,000.00 with interest at 9% per annum.
On May 30, 1941, Manalo died intestate at Puerto Princesa, Palawan. Elvira Maslog carried on
the account of her late father and, made payments thereon up to December 31, 1941. As of
December 31, 1941, the balance of the account stood at P18, 614.58 due and owing to plaintiff-
appellant. On January 29, 1954, plaintiff-appellant filed a complaint with the CFI of Palawan for
the recovery of said amount from Elvira Maslog (joined with her husband) in her capacity as her
father's only heir, because through an affidavit of extrajudicial settlement of November 19, 1953
she had adjudicated to herself all the properties of the late Anastacio Manalo. But in spite of the
creditor's knowledge of the debtor's death on May 30, 1941 and its awareness of the existence
of the obligation, it did not take steps to institute administration proceedings, or collect the debt
in question until January 29, 1954, which is more than 12 years from the death of the decedent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to collect the debt from the estate of Anastacio Manalo
is already barred.

RULING: Yes. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of claims
against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay
off its debts and distribute the residue.The fact that the obligation arose from a written contract,
with a prescriptive period of ten years is irrelevant to the policy of speedy liquidation of
decedent's estates. Sec. 5, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, constitutes a special limitation that
overrides the ordinary rules of prescription. Under this provision, not only claims due, but also
claims not due or contingent, should be filed otherwise they are barred forever. So that even
where a claim arises upon a written contract and, therefore its period of limitation is ten years, if
the debtor dies, such claim should be presented in the estate or intestate proceeding of the
deceased debtor within the time fixed by the court, otherwise it is barred. It appearing that more
than 12 years had elapsed from the death of Anastacio Manalo before a complaint was filed to
recover the indebtedness of the deceased and without the filing of any intestate proceedings in
the court; the plaintiff-appellant's action is now barred and was correctly dismissed by the court
below.
 STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., v. REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS CORP

G.R. NO.147561 : June 22, 2006]

FACTS: Republic-Asahi Glass Corp. entered into a contract with Jose D. Santos, Jr., the
proprietor of JDS Construction, for the construction of roadways and a drainage system in
Republic-Asahi's compound where respondent was to pay JDS five million three hundred
thousand pesos (P5,300,000.00) which was supposed to be completed within a period of two
hundred forty (240) days. To guarantee the faithful and satisfactory performance of its
undertakings, JDS shall post a performance bond of seven hundred ninety five thousand pesos
(P795,000.00). JDS executed, jointly and severally with Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. (SICI)
Performance Bond. Asahi called the attention of JDS to the alleged alarmingly slow pace of the
construction, which resulted in the fear that the construction will not be finished within the
stipulated 240-day period. However, said reminders went unheeded by. Dissatisfied, Asahi
extrajudicially rescinded the contract without waiving the bond. Because of this, Asahi had to
hire another contractor to finish the project and incurred additional expense of 3 million. A letter
was then sent to the petitioner for a claim under the bond twice. Both letters allegedly went
unheeded. Asahi filed a complaint against JDS and SICI seeking the payment of the additional
expenses incurred and for damages. However, Jose D. Santos, Jr. died the previous year and
JDS Construction was no longer at its address and its whereabouts were unknown. Having
failed to liquidate, the liability have been extinguished by the death of Santos. The RTC
dismissed the complaint against the petitioner. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the
lower court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner's liability under the performance bond was automatically
extinguished by the death of Santos, the principal.

RULING: NO. As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not
extinguish the obligation. Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the
transmission is prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the
obligation. Only obligations that are personal or are identified with the persons themselves are
extinguished by death. Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the
prosecution of money claims arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor.
Evidently, those claims are not actually extinguished. What is extinguished is only the obligee's
action or suit filed before the court, which is not then acting as a probate court. In the present
case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts with
respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law.
Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which
merely passed on to his estate. Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe
out the obligations under the performance bond. As a surety, petitioner is solidarily liable with
Santos in accordance with the Civil Code.
MONTINOLA vs. VILLANUEVA G.R. No. L-26008 November 4, 1926

FACTS: In the proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Manuel
Seijo in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, herein plaintiff Gregorio Montinola presented a claim
for P16,337.70 which said estate owed him, to the committee on appraisal and claims. The
claim was approved by said committee, its report having been approved by the Court of First
Instance, without any appeal having been taken from said approval either by the administrator
of the estate or the heirs of Manuel Seijo. While said claim was pending payment, cadastral
proceedings for a claim over the nine lots of the deceased was filed by respondent Maria
Piedad Villanueva, wife of the deceased and their minor children. The court ordered the
adjudication and registration of said lots in said cadastral proceedings in the name of the
children. The court also authorized the administrator to sell the nine lots for the purpose of
paying the expenses of the administration and the claim of Gregorio Montinola for the amount of
P16, 337.70. Said administrator, however, could not make the sale for the reason that the lots
appeared to be the individual property of the heirs of Manuel Seijo in said cadastral
proceedings. The court ordered the administrator to return the ownership of all the lots to the
persons to whom they were adjudicated in the cadastral proceedings, without having paid the
claim of Gregorio Montinola, which gave rise to this action. A judgment was rendered in favor of
the plaintiff, ordering the defendants jointly to pay Gregorio Montinola the sum of P16, 337.70,
with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint, and costs. However, a
counterclaim was filed by the defendants invoking that Gregorio Montinola is also a debtor of
the defendant minors, and thus, the obligation should apply offset.

ISSUE: Whether the properties adjudicated to the minor children of the deceased are subject to
the payment of the deceased's debt.

RULING: YES. Citing the case of Pavia vs. De la Rosa, it held that it is understood that testate
or the intestate succession is always accepted with benefit of inventory, and the heirs, even
after taking possession of the estate of the deceased, do not make themselves responsible for
the debts of the deceased with their own property, but solely with that property coming from the
testate or intestate succession of the deceased. And in Lopez vs. Enriquez, the court stated:
Heirs are not required to respond with their own property for the debts of their deceased
ancestors. But even after the partition of an estate, heirs and distributees are liable individually
for the payment of all lawful outstanding claims against the estate in proportion to the amount or
value of the property they have respectively received from the estate. The hereditary property
consist only of the part which remains after the settlement of which the entire estate is first
liable. The heirs cannot, by any fact of their own or by agreement among themselves, reduce
the creditors' security for the payment of their claims.
PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY vs. LUZON SURETY G.R. No. L-13031 May 30, 1961

FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Manila appointed Francis R. Picard, Sr. as Administrator
the Intestate Estate of the deceased James R. Burt upon a bond of P1,000.00. Thereafter he
submitted and the Court approved his bond in the required amount, with appellant Luzon Surety
Co., Inc. as his surety. However, the Court dismissed Picard, as administrator and appointed
the Philippine Trust Co. in his place. After qualifying for the position, the latter, submitted an
inventory-report showing that the only asset of the Intestate Estate of Burt that had come into its
possession was the sum of P57.75 representing the balance of the checking account of said
deceased with the Philippine National Bank.A review, however, of the record of the case reveals
that former Administrator Francis Picard, filed on February 6, 1941, an inventory of the estate of
the deceased, from which it appears that the sole property he found was the amount of
P8,873.73 in current account with the Philippine National Bank. The Court ordered Francis
Picard, to deliver within forty-eight hours (48) from the receipt of a copy of the order the
difference of P7,063.58 to the present Administrator, Philippine Trust Company; otherwise he
will be ordered committed to prison for contempt until he shall have complied with this order. In
compliance with the above order, Picard, submitted an itemized statement of disbursements
made by him as administrator of the estate. After considering this statement, the Court, on
September 18, 1948, issued an order finding Picard, guilty of having disbursed funds of the
estate amounting to about P8,000.00, without authority.The Court issued an order requiring
appellant Luzon Surety Co., Inc. to show cause why the administrator's bond filed by it on behalf
of Picard would not be confiscated. Appellant filed a motion to set aside said order upon the
following grounds: firstly, that the Court cannot order the confiscation of the administrator's
bond, on prejudice or injury to creditors, legatees or heirs of the estate of James R. Burt having
been shown, and secondly, that "a probate court cannot, ex propriomotu, prosecute the probate
bond."

ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court can confiscate or forfeit the administrator’s bond.

RULING: YES. Whatever may be the rule prevailing in other jurisdictions, in ours probate court
is possessed with an all-embracing power not only in requiring but also in fixing the amount, and
executing or forfeiting an administrator's bond. The execution or forfeiture of an administrator's
bond, is deemed be a necessary part and incident of the administration proceedings as much as
its filing and the fixing of its amount. The rule, therefore, is that the probate court may have said
bond executed in the same probate proceeding.

Moreover, the condition of the administrator's bond in question is that Francis L. Picard shall
faithfully execute the orders and decrees of the court; that if he did so, the obligation shall
become void, otherwise it shall remain in full force and effect. In having been established that
Picard disbursed funds of the estate without authority, the conclusion follows that he had and
his surety became bound upon the terms of their bond.
CAMIA DE REYES vs. REYES DE ILANO G.R. No. L-42092 October 28, 1936

FACTS: Andres Reyes died on April 20, 1932, leaving a will which was duly probated on June
21, 1933. He was survived by his wife, the herein executrix and appellant FelisaCamia, his only
son had with her, named Bibiano Reyes, and his daughter by his first marriage, the herein
oppositor-appellee Juana Reyes de Ilano. Felisa Camia qualified as executrix of the estate left
by the deceased husband Andres Reyes. On October 16, 1933, the executrix-appellant Felisa
Camia de Reyes filed a project of partition, which was also opposed by the oppositor-appellee
Juana Reyes de Ilano in a pleading of October 20, 1933, alleging, among other things, that the
valuation of the properties made by the commissioners on claims and appraisal is inadequate
and unjust; that said project does not contain all the properties that should be partitioned; that it
contains properties belonging to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage; and that said
project is based upon the will, some of the provisions of which are inofficious and illegal; at the
same time submitting a counterproject of partition with an appraisal of the properties therein
enumerated, which appraisal is different from that made by the commissioners on claims and
appraisal. This counterproject of partition presented by the oppositor-appellee is the one
admitted and approved by the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in accepting the counterproject of partition
presented by the oppositor-appellee Juana Reyes de Ilano.

RULING: NO. There is nothing in the law imposing upon the executor or administrator the
obligation to present a project of partition for the distribution of the estate of a deceased person.
Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the court to assign ". . . the residue of the
estate to the persons entitled to the same, and in its order the court shall name the persons and
proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled . . ." (See also article 1052, Civil Code.) It is
referred from these legal provisions that it is the Court of First Instance of Cavite alone that may
make the distribution of his estate and determine the persons entitled, and it may require the
executrix to present a project of partition to better inform itself of the condition of the estate to be
distributed and so facilitate the prompt distribution thereof. The project of partition that the
executor or administrator might have presented would not be conclusive and the interested
parties could oppose the approval thereof and enter their counterproject of partition which the
court might accept and approve, as it did in this case. In adopting the project of partition of the
oppositor-appellee Juana Reyes de Ilano, said court acted within its discretionary power and
committed no error of law.
 Romualdez v. Tiglao.G.R. No. L-51151

FACTS: Paz Romualdez and others sued Antonio Tiglao and his sureties
(including FelisaTiglao) in 1960 for the payment of unpaid rentals for the lease of a
hacienda and its sugar quota. CFI Rizal decided in favor of Romualdez adjudging Tiglao
et al liable for P22, 767.17. A writ of attachment was issued but the judgment was not
satisfied. Romualdez sought the revival of the judgment in 1970. When this was filed,
Felisa was already dead; therefore, her estate was made a defendant represented by
the Special Administratrix Maningning Tiglao-Naguiat. Maningning filed a Motion to
Dismiss arguing that under Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, "No action upon a
claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against
the executor or administrator.” The lower court nevertheless granted the revival. An
appeal is taken by the estate of Felisa.

ISSUE: Whether the action for revival was proper instead of presenting the claim
in the Special Proceeding in the settlement of Felisa’s estate

RULING: The action for revival was proper. The present action is one for the
recovery of a sum of money so that it is barred by Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court and that the remedy of Romualdez et al is to present their claim in Special Proc.
No. Q-10731 of the CFI of Rizal. The original judgment, which was rendered on May 31,
1960, has become stale because of its non-execution after the lapse of five years (Sec.
6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court). Accordingly, it cannot be presented against the Estate
of Felisa Tiglao unless it is first revived by action. This is precisely why Romualdez et al
have instituted the second suit whose object is not to make the Estate of Felisa Tiglao
pay the sums of money adjudged in the first judgment but merely to keep alive said
judgment so that the sums therein awarded can be presented as claims against the
estate in Special Proc. No. Q-10731 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
 Ramos v. Ortuzar, G.R. No. L-3299

FACTS: Percy A. Hill, an American and retired officer of the Philippine Constabulary,
cohabited with Martina Ramos from 1905 to 1914 and had with her six children, two of whom
are Richard Hill and Marvin Hill and the others died in infancy. He started acquiring lands by
purchase or homestead and improving and cultivating them until at the time of his death on July
23, 1937, his holdings were worth over P100,000. In 1914, Percy canonically married an
American woman by the name of Helen Livingstone and of that union three children were born,
all of whom now reside in the US. Helen died in 1922, and in 1924, Hill married Caridad Ortuzar
by whom he had one daughter. On September 3, 1937, proceedings for the settlement of
Percy’s estate were commenced and Caridad was appointed administratrix. During the Intestate
proceedings, Marvin and Richard Hill intervened claiming to be the deceased’s children. The
court conducted a hearing as to the rights of the two but declared in order that they are not
rightful heirs of Hill, thereby excluding them from participating in the distribution of the estate.
Marvin and Richard failed to appeal the decision.By order of the court, the administratrix
submitted an accounting and a project of partition, and both of these having been approved,
distribution of the estate was made accordingly and the estate was closed. On March 27, 1947,
the declared heirs and distributes sold six tracts of land left by Hill to Maximo Bustos for
P120,000, this being the sale which the trial court would annul.Six years after the partition,
Martina came before the CFI claiming that she was the lawful wife and her children were the
legitimate children of the deceased. The CFI decided against her because no certificate of
marriage was produced and no record was made in the civil registry. The court also found out
that during the duration of the alleged marriage, the deceased came to Martina and introduced
another wife. Because of this, Martina asked the deceased to have another house constructed
for her right in front of their old house. The court said that this act of a lawful wife is unbelievable
because why would she instantly give up her right to use the house that the two of them built
together.

ISSUE: Whether or not Martina, after six years could still raise the issues already
answered by the CFI in the special proceedings?

HELD: No.There being no other matters to attend to the administratrix submitted a final
accounting and a project of partition by order of the court, both were in due time approved, the
partition was carried out, and the expediente was closed.It thus appears beyond doubt that all
the facts raised in the present suit were alleged, discussed, and definitely adjudicated in the
expediente of Hill's intestate. Thus, it is res judicta. The proceeding for probate is one in
rem and the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested, through the publication of the
notice and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of them." A final order of
distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the
distributees. There is no reason why, by analogy, these salutary doctrines should not be applied
to intestate proceedings. Moreover, the only instance that the Court can think of in which a party
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation SET ASIDE is when he is left out
by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence.
VERA v. NAVARRO G.R. No. L-27745 October 18, 1977

FACTS: Elsie M. Gaches died without a child and left awill leaving her properties to her driver,
lavandero, gardener, three friends and to her sister Bess Lauer who is at California. Respondent
Judge Tan filed with the Court of First instance of Pasig, Rizal a petition for the probate of the
aforesaid will and was appointed as executor of the testate estate of without a bond. In a letter,
Judge Tan informed the Commissioner that the testate estate was worth about ten million pesos
and that the estate and inheritance taxes due thereon were about P9.5 million. Hence, the
Commissioner filed a claim in the probate court.The will was allowed to be probated. Petitioner
Commissionerfiled a petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and injunction against the
aforesaid orders of the respondent Judge. The petition at bar is invokes that the distributive
shares of an heir can only be paid after full payment of the death taxes and while partial
distribution of the estate of a deceased may allowed, a bond must be filed by the distributees to
secure the payment of the transfer taxes.

ISSUES:
1. Should the herein respondent heirs be required to pay first the inheritance tax before the
probate court may authorize the delivery of the hereditary share pertaining to each of
them?
2. Are the respondent heirs who are citizens and residents of the Philippines liable for the
payment of the Philippine inheritance tax corresponding to the hereditary share of
another heir who is a citizen and resident of the United States of America.

RULING:
1. YES. Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court erases this hiatus in the statute by
provides that the distribution of a decedent's assets may only be ordered under any of
the following three circumstances, namely, (1) when the inheritance tax, among others,
is paid; (2) who bond a suffered bond is given to meet the payment of the tax and all the
other options of the nature enumerated in the above-cited provision; or (3) when the
payment of the said tax and at the other obligations mentioned in the said Rule has been
provided for one of these thru Camar as the satisfaction of the tax due from the estate is
present when the question orders were issued in the case at bar.

2. NO. The liability of the herein respondents to pay the inheritance tax corresponding to
the share of Bess Lauer in the inheritance must be negated. The inheritance tax is an
imposition created by law on the privilege to receive property. The inheritance tax
imposed by Section 86 shall, in the absence of contrary disposition by the predecessor,
be charged to the account of each beneficiary, in proportion to the value of the benefit
received, and in accordance with the scale fixed for the class or group to which is
pertains: Provided, That in cases where the heirs divide extrajudicially the property left to
them by their predecessor or otherwise convey, sell, transfer, mortgage, or encumber
the same without being the estate or inheritance taxes within the period prescribed in the
preceding subsections (a) and (b), they shall be solidarity liable for the payment of the
said taxes to the extent of the estate they have received. This is a clear indication that
beyond those cases, the payment of the inheritance tax should be taken as'the individual
responsibility, to the extent of the benefits received, of each heir.
SOLIVIO v. CA G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990

FACTS: Esteban Javellana, Jr. died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers,
sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner
Celedonia Solivio, and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his
deceased father. He left properties that he inherited only from the paraphernal properties of her
mother. During his lifetime, Esteban, more than once, expressed his plan to place his estate in a
foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college
education. Celedonia filed a petition for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate
of Esteban Javellana, that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole
heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and
accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her. Her petition was granted and she proceeded to set
up the foundation. Four months later, Concordia filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's
order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the
deceased. Her motion was denied. Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed a case for
partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. The Court rendered a judgment in
favor of her. Celedonia filed a Motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. The CA affirmed
such decision.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain a petition for partition and
recovery of an estate even while the probate proceedings are still pending.

RULING: NO. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia
Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.
while the probate proceedings for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of
the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of the
administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and
terminating the proceedings. It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of
the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts
an end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties. The
separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to
make a just and legal distribution of the estate. A court should not interfere with probate
proceedings pending in a co-equal court.