G.R. No. 95551 March 20, 1997
who is an American and,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON VERGARA, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 62, Angeles
City and SPOUSES SAMUEL ROBERT DYE, JR. and
ROSALINA D. DYE, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye
filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City 1 to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R.
Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively,
younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr. a
member of the United States Air Force, is an
American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base
in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino
who became a naturalized American. They have
two children. Both Maricel and Alvin Due, as well
as their natural parents, gave their consent to the
adoption.
After trial, the lower court GRANTED said petition.
Respondent Regional Trial Court disregarded the
sixteen-year age gap requirement of the law, the
spouses being only fifteen years and three months
and fifteen years and nine months older than
Maricel Due, on the ground that a literal
implementation of the law would defeat the very
philosophy behind adoption statutes, namely, to
promote the welfare of a child.3
The Republic filed petition for review on a pure
question of law, contending that the spouses Dye
are not qualified under the law to adopt Maricel
and Alvin Due
ISSUE:
WON Spouses Due are qualified to adopt under
the law
HELD: NO.
As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt
Filipino citizens as this is proscribed under Article
184 of the Family Code (read art184)
Samuel Robert Dye, Jr.
therefore, an alien is disqualified from adopting
the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he does
not fall under any of the three aforequoted
exceptions laid down by the law. He is not a former
Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's
legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt with
his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not
married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was
already a naturalized American at the time the
petition was filed, thus excluding him from the
coverage of the exception. The law here does not
provide for an alien who is married to a former
Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or
her spouse a relative by consanguinity, as an
exception to the general rule that aliens may not
adopt.
On her own, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her
brother and sister for the law mandates joint
adoption by husband and wife, subject to
exceptions. Article 29 of Presidential Decree No.
603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) retained the
Civil Code provision 4 that husband and
wife may jointly adopt. The Family Code amended
this rule by scrapping the optional character of
joint adoption and making it now mandatory.
Article 185 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 185. Husband and wife must
adopt, except in the following
cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to
adopt his own illegitimate child;
(2) When one spouse seeks to
adopt the legitimate child of the
other.
None of the above exceptions applies to
Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they did not
petition to adopt the latter's child but her
brother and sister.
G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P.
LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL
JUDE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
DECISION
FACTS:
On 23 June 1974,petitioner (Monina) married
Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor
children, whose parents were unknown, were
entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban
(Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their
own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to
make it appear that they were the children’s
parents. The children2 were named Michelle P. Lim
(Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael).
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if
they were their own. Unfortunately, on 28
November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000,
petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an
American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the
children by availing of the amnesty5 given under
Republic Act No. 85526 (RA 8552) to those
individuals who simulated the birth of a child.
Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate
petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael
before the trial court.
At the time of the filing of the petitions for
adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already
married, while Michael was 18 years and seven
months old.
Michelle and her husband,Michael and Olario,
gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by
their Affidavits of Consent.
The DSWD certified that Michelle & Michael were
considered as an abandoned child and the
whereabouts of her natural parents were
unknown.
the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner
had remarried, petitioner should have filed the
petition jointly with her new husband. The trial
court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and
the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III
of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
On MR,Petitioner’s argued that mere consent of
her husband would suffice. And that the adoptees
are already emancipated and joint adoption is
merely for the joint exercise of parental authority,
the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only
for the purpose of exercising parental authority
because an emancipated child acquires certain
rights from his parents and assumes certain
obligations and responsibilities.
Issue
whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can
singly adopt.
HELD:
No.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife is
mandatory
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. She filed the petitions by herself,
without being joined by her husband Olario. Dura
lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III
of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may
adopt:
(a)xxx
(b) xxx
(c)xxx
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt,
except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate son/daughter of the
other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt
his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto;
or
 (iii) if the spouses are legally
separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one
spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the
other, joint parental authority shall be exercised
by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted
provision means that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to
the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses.12
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity.
Petitioner, having remarried at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly
adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed
only by petitioner herself, without joining her
husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in
denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three
exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the
children to be adopted are not the legitimate
children of petitioner or of her husband Olario.
Second, the children are not the illegitimate
children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and
Olario are not legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the
adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does
not suffice. There are certain requirements that
Olario must comply being an American citizen. He
must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7
of RA 8552
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is
not anymore necessary since the children have
been emancipated having reached the age of
majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing
the children for civic consciousness and efficiency
and the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being.13 The father
and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common
children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving
parent shall not affect the parental authority over
the children, unless the court appoints another
person to be the guardian of the person or
property of the children.15
It is true that when the child reaches the age of
emancipation — that is, when he attains the age
of majority or 18 years of age16 — emancipation
terminates parental authority over the person and
property of the child, who shall then be qualified
and responsible for all acts of civil life.17 However,
parental authority is merely just one of the effects
of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates
the effects of adoption.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that
subsequent events would show that joint adoption
could no longer be possible because Olario has
filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to
petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of
the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of
no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of
dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is
a judicial decree for the dissolution of the
marriage between petitioner and Olario, the
marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is required.
We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the
time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is
mandatory.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF
STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein
petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.
He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie
was born on June 26, 1994;2 that her mother
is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has
been using her mother’s middle name and
surname; and that he is now a widower and
qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed
that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed
to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her
surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his
surname.
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the
assailed Decision granting the adoption, thus:
“Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the minor shall be known as
STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.”
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for
clarification and/or reconsideration5 praying that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname
of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle
name.
On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding
that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an
adopted child to use the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name.
ISSUE:
whether an illegitimate child may use the surname
of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
HELD:
YES.
xxx
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name –
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no
law regulating the use of a middle name. Even
Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An
Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The
Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what
middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only
considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case
there is identity of names and surnames between
ascendants and descendants, in which case, the
middle name or the mother’s surname shall be
added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what
middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of
the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted
child shall bear the surname of the adopter." Also,
Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the
legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the
matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall
be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal
rights and obligations arising from the relationship
of parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
x x x"
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees that drafted the Family
Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding
the surname of the child’s mother as his middle
name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the
members approved the suggestion that the initial
or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father,
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides
that "the adopted shall bear the surname of the
adopters."13 Again, it is silent whether he can use
a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a
matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee
to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance
of the decree of adoption.14
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted
is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter
for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article
18921 of the Family Code and Section 1722 Article V
of RA 8552.23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption,
it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother, as discussed above. This is consistent
with the intention of the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees as earlier
discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the
initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties,
Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s
surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain
her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article
189(3) of the Family Code and Section 1824, Article
V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the
adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her
biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert
or claim her hereditary rights from her natural
mother in the future.
To allow Stephanie to use her mother’s surname
as her middle name will not only sustain her
continued loving relationship with her mother but
will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting
an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her
mother’s surname, we find no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so.
G.R. No. 164948 June 27, 2006
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a
citizen of the United States of America (USA), of
Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA,
filed a petition3 for the adoption of minors Elaine
Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31,
1986;4 Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on
September 7, 1987;5 and Eugene Dizon Ramos
who was born on August 5, 1989.6 The minors are
the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s
brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition
that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990,7 the
children were left to their paternal grandmother,
Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother,
Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now
has two children by her second marriage and no
longer communicated with her children by Manuel
Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left
up to the institution of the adoption; the minors
are being financially supported by the petitioner
and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria
passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner
desires to adopt the children; the minors have
given their written consent8 to the adoption; she is
qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is
a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who
are already married, gainfully employed and have
their respective families; she lives alone in her own
home in Guam, USA, where she acquired
citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She
came back to the Philippines to spend time with
the minors; her children gave their written
consent9 to the adoption of the minors.
Petitioner’s brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns
substantial income, signified his willingness and
commitment to support the minors while in
petitioner’s custody.
The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also
presented Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the
adoptees, to testify on the written consent
executed by her and her siblings.15 The petitioner
marked in evidence the Affidavit of Consent
purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol,
Dennis and Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed
Landingin, and notarized by a notary public in
Guam, USA, as proof of said consent.16
On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social
Welfare Officer II of the DSWD, Field Office III,
Tarlac, submitted a Child Study Report,and Trial
custody was further recommended.in her report,
Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her
interview
However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as
witness and offer in evidence the voluntary
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption;
petitioner, likewise, failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia
assents to the adoption.
On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in
the petition for adoption, rendered a decision
granting said petition.
On appeal by OSG, CA reversed the decision of
RTC.
ISSUES:
(1) whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the
minors without the written consent of their
biological mother, Amelia Ramos;
(2) whether or not the affidavit of consent
purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopter’s
children sufficiently complies with the law; and
(3) whether or not petitioner is financially capable
of supporting the adoptees.
HELD:
1.NO. Clearly, the written consent of the
biological parents is indispensable for the validity
of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right
of a parent to his child requires that his consent
must be obtained before his parental rights and
duties may be terminated and re-established in
adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to
submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to
the adoption.
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise
known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,
provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the
Adoption. - After being properly counseled and
informed of his/her right to give or withhold
his/her approval of the adoption, the written
consent of the following to the adoption is hereby
required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or
over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if
known, or the legal guardian, or the
proper government instrumentality which
has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted
sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or
over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten
(10) years of age or over, of the adopter, if
living with said adopter and the latter’s
souse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person
adopting or to be adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice to
the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the
child in the manner of the proposed adoption.32
We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that
she was able to interview Amelia Ramos who
arrived in the Philippines with her son, John Mario
in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in the
Philippines and Pagbilao was able to interview her,
it is incredible that the latter would not require
Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent to the
adoption of her minor children. Neither did the
petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as
witness in support of the petition.
Rep. Act No. 8552 Section 9 thereof provides that
if the written consent of the biological parents
cannot be obtained, the written consent of the
legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as
claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother
of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she
should, thus have adduced the written consent of
their legal guardian.
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the
adoption of his child without his consent, is a
conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego
all parental duties.33 The term means neglect and
refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of
love and support. If a parent withholds presence,
love, care, the opportunity to display filial
affection, and neglects to lend support and
maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the
child.34
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time
undisturbed in the care of others is not such an
abandonment.35 To dispense with the
requirement of consent, the abandonment must
be shown to have existed at the time of
adoption.36
In this case, petitioner relied solely on her
testimony and that of Elaine Ramos to prove her
claim that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her
children.
When Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to
abandon her children, or to permanently sever
their mother-child relationship. She was merely
impelled to leave the country by financial
constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not
surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly
obligations of rearing the children to her now
deceased mother-in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine
herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for
serious personal problems. Likewise, Amelia
continues to send financial support to the children,
though in minimal amounts as compared to what
her affluent in-laws provide.
Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the
adoption of the minors herein will have the effect
of severing all legal ties between the biological
mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the
same shall then be vested on the adopter.42 It
would thus be against the spirit of the law if
financial consideration were to be the paramount
consideration in deciding whether to deprive a
person of parental authority over his/her children.
More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has
emotionally abandoned the children, and that the
latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if
they are given to an adopting parent.43 Again, it is
the best interest of the child that takes
precedence in adoption.
2.NO.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides
that the Court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered. The purpose for which
the evidence is offered must be specified. The offer
of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of
the Court to rest its findings of fact and its
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted
by the court in evidence for the purpose or
purposes for which such document is offered, the
same is merely a scrap of paper barren of
probative weight. Mere identification of
documents and the markings thereof as exhibits do
not confer any evidentiary weight on documents
unless formally offered.44
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s
Report and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent
purportedly executed by her children; the
authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove.
The joint written consent of petitioner’s
children45 was notarized on January 16, 2002 in
Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of
Court in the same way as a document notarized in
this country it needs to comply with Section 2 of
Act No. 2103,46 which states:
Section 2. An instrument or document
acknowledged and authenticated in a
foreign country shall be considered
authentic if the acknowledgment and
authentication are made in accordance
with the following requirements,
a.xxx(read sec2 of act) 2103.
As the alleged written consent of petitioner’s
legitimate children did not comply with the afore-
cited law, the same can at best be treated by the
Rules as a private document whose authenticity
must be proved either by anyone who saw the
document executed or written; or by evidence of
the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the makers.47
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was
introduced by petitioner to authenticate the
written consent of her legitimate children, the
same is inadmissible in evidence.
3 NO.
the ability to support the adoptees is personal to
the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal
relation between the former and the latter.
Since the primary consideration in adoption is the
best interest of the child, it follows that the
financial capacity of prospective parents should
also
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly,
the adopter should be in a position to support the
would-be adopted child or children, in keeping
with the means of the family.
It is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be
able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of
rearing the three children in the US. She only has a
part-time job, and she is rather of age. While
petitioner claims that she has the financial support
and backing of her children and siblings, the OSG
is correct in stating that the ability to support the
adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption
only creates a legal relation between the former
and the latter. Moreover, the records do not prove
nor support petitioner’s allegation that her siblings
and her children are financially able and that they
are willing to support the minors herein.
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and
AURELIA TAMARGO, petitioners,
vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON
L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos
Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA
BUNDOC, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a
minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in
her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for
damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case
No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo,
Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses
Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural
parents against respondent spouses Victor and
Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with
whom he was living at the time of the tragic
incident. In addition to this case for damages, a
criminal information or Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V]
against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however,
was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability
on the ground that he bad acted without
discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the
spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a
petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc .
This petition for adoption was granted on, 18
November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot
and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc,
Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of
the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that
not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely
the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were
indispensable parties to the action since parental
authority had shifted to the adopting parents from
the moment the successful petition for adoption
was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since
Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his
natural parents, parental authority had not ceased
nor been relinquished by the mere filing and
granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987-dismissed
petitioners' complaint,
ISSUE:
1) whether or not the effects of adoption,
insofar as parental authority is concerned
may be given retroactive effect so as to
make the adopting parents the
indispensable parties in a damage case
filed against their adopted child, for acts
committed by the latter, when actual
custody was yet lodged with the biological
parents.
HELD: NO.
no presumption of parental dereliction on the
part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura
spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto
was not in fact subject to their control at the
time the tort was committed.
Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in
the adopting parents during the period of trial
custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of
adoption, precisely because the adopting parents
are given actual custody of the child during such
trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody
period either had not yet begun or had already
been completed at the time of the air rifle
shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto
was then with his natural parents, not the
adopting parents.
Under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability
for the torts of a minor child is the relationship
existing between the parents and the minor child
living with them and over whom, the law
presumes, the parents exercise supervision and
control.
Article 221 of the Family Code of the
Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the
requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act,
shall have been in the actual custody of the
parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing
damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons
exercising parental authority shall
be civilly liable for the injuries and
damages caused by the acts or
omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and
under their parental authority
subject to the appropriate defenses
provided by law. (Emphasis
supplied)
To hold that parental authority had been
retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as
to burden them with liability for a tortious act that
they could not have foreseen and which they could
not have prevented (since they were at the time in
the United States and had no physical custody over
the child Adelberto) would be unfair and
unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would
be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy
basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability.
G.R. No. 182367 December 15, 2010
CHERRYL B. DOLINA, Petitioner,
vs.
GLENN D. VALLECERA, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
In February 2008 petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed
a petition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary protection order against respondent
Glenn D. Vallecera before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tacloban City in P.O. 2008-02-071 for
alleged woman and child abuse under Republic Act
(R.A.) 9262.2 In filling out the blanks in the pro-
forma complaint, Dolina added a handwritten
prayer for financial support3 from Vallecera for
their supposed child. She based her prayer on the
latter’s Certificate of Live Birth which listed
Vallecera as the child’s father. The petition also
asked the RTC to order Philippine Airlines,
Vallecera’s employer, to withhold from his pay
such amount of support as the RTC may deem
appropriate.
Vallecera opposed the petition. He claimed that
Dolina’s petition was essentially one for financial
support rather than for protection against woman
and child abuses; that he was not the child’s
father; that the signature appearing on the child’s
Certificate of Live Birth is not his; that the petition
is a harassment suit intended to force him to
acknowledge the child as his and give it financial
support; and that Vallecera has never lived nor has
been living with Dolina, rendering unnecessary the
issuance of a protection order against him.
ISSUE:
whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed
Dolina’s action for temporary protection and
denied her application for temporary support for
her child.
HELD: YES.
It must be observed, however, that the RTC should
not have dismissed the entire case based solely on
the lack of any judicial declaration of filiation
between Vallecera and Dolina’s child since the
main issue remains to be the alleged violence
committed by Vallecera against Dolina and her
child and whether they are entitled to protection.
But of course, this matter is already water under
the bridge since Dolina failed to raise this error on
review. This omission lends credence to the
conclusion of the RTC that the real purpose of the
petition is to obtain support from Vallecera.
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain
support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262
under which she filed the case is the protection
and safety of women and children who are
victims of abuse or violence.6 Although the
issuance of a protection order against the
respondent in the case can include the grant of
legal support for the wife and the child, this
assumes that both are entitled to a protection
order and to legal support.
Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been
abusing her and her child.1avvphil But it became
apparent to the RTC upon hearing that this was not
the case since, contrary to her claim, neither she
nor her child ever lived with Vallecera. As it turned
out, the true object of her action was to get
financial support from Vallecera for her child, her
claim being that he is the father. He of course
vigorously denied this.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in
proper action, first establish the filiation of the
child, if the same is not admitted or
acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for support
for her son is based on her claim that he is
Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not
entitled to such support if he had not
acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved
his relation to him.7 The child’s remedy is to file
through her mother a judicial action against
Vallecera for compulsory recognition.8 If filiation is
beyond question, support follows as matter of
obligation.9 In short, illegitimate children are
entitled to support and successional rights but
their filiation must be duly proved.10
Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her
child an action against Vallecera for compulsory
recognition in order to establish filiation and then
demand support. Alternatively, she may directly
file an action for support, where the issue of
compulsory recognition may be integrated and
resolved.11
NOEL B. BAGTAS, Petitioner vs.HON. RUTH C.
SANTOS, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court,
Branch 72, Antipolo City, and ANTONIO and
ROSITA GALLARDO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Antonio and Rosita S. Gallardo (Spouses Gallardo)
are the parents of Maricel S. Gallardo (Maricel).
Two weeks after graduating from high school in
April 2000, Maricel ran away to live with her
boyfriend. Maricel became pregnant and gave
birth to Maryl Joy S. Gallardo (Maryl Joy). Maricel’s
boyfriend left her.
In February 2002, Maricel returned to her parents.
On the same day, Maricel ran away again and lived
with Noel B. Bagtas (Bagtas) and Lydia B. Sioson
(Sioson) at Ma. Corazon, Unirock, Barangay Sta.
Cruz, Antipolo City. Maricel went to Negros
Occidental and left Maryl Joy in the custody of
Bagtas and Sioson. In a letter5 dated 5 February
2001, Maricel relinquished her rights over Maryl
Joy to Bagtas and his wife.
In April 2002, the Spouses Gallardo tried to obtain
the custody of Maryl Joy from Bagtas and Sioson.
Bagtas and Sioson refused. Unable to settle the
matter, the Spouses Gallardo filed with the RTC a
petition6 for habeas corpus.
The Spouses Gallardo, Bagtas and Sioson entered
into a compromise agreement and the RTC
approved the same. The parties agreed that the
child should be placed in custody of the petitioners
on Friday, Saturday and Sunday; the rest of the
week to the respondents Bagtas, subject to
visitorial rights of the petitioners anytime of the
day; and that the child can be brought by the
respondents to Valenzuela but should be returned
to the petitioners on Friday morning. Violation of
said order shall put party in the pain of contempt
of court.
On 29 September 2002, Bagtas and Sioson learned
that Rosita S. Gallardo brought Maryl Joy to Samar.
Bagtas and Sioson filed a motion and prayed that
the Spouses Gallardo be directed to produce Maryl
Joy before the RTC, that they be directed to
explain why they violated the RTC’s 13 September
2002 Order, and that they be cited in contempt.
In its Order12 dated 15 October 2002, the RTC cited
the Spouses Gallardo in contempt, fined them
₱500, and ordered them to produce Maryl Joy
before the trial court.
In its Order13 dated 9 December 2002, the RTC
dismissed the action for having become moot. The
RTC stated:
In this petition, the prayer of the petitioners is to
produce the person of Meryl [sic] Joy S. Gallardo
before this court to be turned over to herein
petitioners who are the maternal [grandparents]
of said minor.
Since the person subject of the petition has
already produced [sic] to this court and has been
turned over to the petitioners, the issue on the
petition for habeas corpus is now moot and
academic without prejudice to the filing of the
proper action to determine as to the rightful
custody over the minor child.
In view thereof, x x x the Motion to Dismiss is
hereby granted but without prejudice on the
petitioners to file proper action for custody of the
minor. (Emphasis supplied)
ISSUE:
1. WON the sole purpose of the petition for habeas
corpus was the production of Maryl joy before the
court that with the delivery of the child for whom
the petition was filed, the petition for habeas
corpus has become moot and academic.
2. WON the Spouses Gallardo exercised substitute
parental authority (AUTOMATIC and ABSOLUTE)
over Maryl Joy.
HELD:
1. NO.
Section 1, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court states
that the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all
cases where the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the persons entitled thereto. In
cases involving minors, the purpose of a petition
for habeas corpus is not limited to the production
of the child before the court. The main purpose of
the petition for habeas corpus is to determine
who has the rightful custody over the child. In
Tijing v. Court of Appeals,18 the Court held that:
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody
of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable
parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if
the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own
free will. It may even be said that in custody cases
involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary
restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the
availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is
prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of
custody over a child. (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1
The RTC erred when it hastily dismissed the action
for having become moot after Maryl Joy was
produced before the trial court. It should have
conducted a trial to determine who had the
rightful custody over Maryl Joy. In dismissing the
action, the RTC, in effect, granted the petition for
habeas corpus and awarded the custody of Maryl
Joy to the Spouses Gallardo without sufficient
basis.
2. (Note: the case was remanded to lower court
to determine fitness of spouses Gallardo to
exercise parental authority/custody)
The fundamental policy of the State to promote
and protect the welfare of children shall not be
disregarded by mere technicality in resolving
disputes which involve the family and the youth.
Article 216 states that in default of parents or a
judicially appointed guardian, the surviving
grandparent shall exercise substitute parental
authority over the child.
In determining who has the rightful custody over
a child, the child’s welfare is the most important
consideration. The court is not bound by any legal
right of a person over the child (SOMBONG VS.
CA).
In Sombong v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court held
that:
the court is not bound to deliver a child into the
custody of any claimant or of any person, but
should, in the consideration of the facts, leave it
in such custody as its welfare at the time appears
to require. In short, the child’s welfare is the
supreme consideration.
Considering that the child’s welfare is an all-
important factor in custody cases, the Child and
Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in
all questions regarding the care and custody,
among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the
paramount consideration. In the same vein, the
Family Code authorizes the courts to, if the welfare
of the child so demands, deprive the parents
concerned of parental authority over the child or
adopt such measures as may be proper under the
circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)
In Sombong,23 the Court laid down three requisites
in petitions for habeas corpus involving minors:
(1) the petitioner has a right of custody over the
minor,
(2) the respondent is withholding the rightful
custody over the minor, and
(3) the best interest of the minor demands that he
or she be in the custody of the petitioner.
In the present case, these requisites are not clearly
established because the RTC hastily dismissed the
action and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to
the Spouses Gallardo without conducting any trial.
G.R. No. L-23253 March 28, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR BETTY
CHUA SY ALIAS "GRACE CABANGBANG" FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
PACITA CHUA, petitioner-appellant,vs.
MR. & MRS. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG ET
AL., respondents-appellees.
CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Pacita Chua, when still in the prime of youth,
supported herself by working in nightclubs as a
hostess. And sexual liaison she had with man after
man without benefit of marriage.She afterwards
cohabited with Sy Sia Lay by whom she had two
children named Robert and Betty Chua Sy. Shortly
after the birth of Betty, Pacita Chua and Sy Sia Lay
separated. Pacita Chua lingered in and around
nightclubs and gambling joints, until she met
Victor Tan Villareal. In due time she became the
latter's mistress. In 1960 another child, a girl, was
born to her. In 1961 when this last child was still
an infant, she and Villareal separated. Without
means to support the said child, Pacita Chua gave
her away to a comadre in Cebu.
Sometime in May 1958 Bartolome Cabangbang
and his wife, a childless couple, acquired the
custody of the child Betty who was then barely
four months old. They have since brought her up
as their own. They had her christened as Grace
Cabangbang.
Pacita Chua avers that in October 1958, while she
and Villareal were still living together, the latter
surreptitiously took the child away and gave her to
the Cabangbangs, allegedly in recompense for
favors received. She supposedly came to know of
the whereabouts of her daughter, only in 1960
when the girl, who was then about three years old,
was brought to her by Villareal, who shortly
thereafter returned the child to the Cabangbangs
allegedly thru threats intimidation, fraud and
deceit. The Cabangbang spouses assert in rebuttal
that Mrs. Cabangbang found the child, wrapped in
a bundle, at the gate of their residence; that she
reared her as her own and grew very fond of her;
and that nobody ever molested them until the
child was 5-½ years of age.
At all events, it is the lower court's finding that the
child was given to the Cabangbang spouses by
Villareal with the knowledge and consent of Pacita
Chua.
Pacita Chua filed a petition for habeas corpus with
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, praying that the
court grant her custody of and recognize her
parental authority over the girl.
ISSUE/s
1. WON petitioner can be legally separated from
her child. (Art. 363 of the Civil Code, which
prohibits the separation of a child under seven
years of age from her mother)
2. WON Petitioner was illegally deprived petitioner
of parental authority over her daughter because
not one of the grounds for the termination, loss,
suspension or deprivation of parental authority
provided in article 332 of the same Code obtains in
this case.
3. WON it is illegal and without basis the award of
the custody of Grace Cabangbang or Betty Chua Sy
to the Cabangbang spouses upon the grounds,
first, that the couple are not related by
consanguinity or affinity to the child.
HELD:
 1. NO.
It is an issue that is now moot and academic.
Having been born on December 15, 1957, the child
is now 11 years of age. Consequently, the second
paragraph of art. 363 of the Civil Code, which
prohibits the separation of a child under seven
years of age from her mother, "unless the court
finds compelling reasons for such measure," has
no immediate relevance.
2. NO. The petitioner can be deprived of her
parental authority.
The petitioner correctly argues, however, that the
reasons relied upon by the lower court
— i.e., "petitioner is not exactly an upright
woman" and "it will be for the welfare of the child"
— are not strictly speaking, proper grounds in law
to deprive a mother of her inherent right to
parental authority over her child.
For while in one breath art. 313 of the Civil Code
lays down the rule that "Parental authority cannot
be renounced or transferred, except in cases of
guardianship or adoption approved by the courts,
or emancipation by concession," it indicates in the
next that "The courts may, in cases specified by
law deprive parents of their [parental]
authority." And there are indeed valid reasons, as
will presently be expounded, for depriving the
petitioner of parental authority over the minor
Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang.
Art. 332 of the Civil Code provides, inter alia:
The courts may deprive the parents of
their authority or suspend the exercise of
the same if they should treat their children
with excessive harshness or should give
them corrupting orders, counsels, or
examples, or should make them beg or
abandon them. (emphasis supplied)
Abandonment is therefore one of the grounds
for depriving parents of parental authority over
their children.
Mere acquiescence — without more — is not
sufficient to constitute abandonment. But the
record yields a host of circumstances which, in
their totality, unmistakably betray the
petitioner's settled purpose and intention to
completely forego all parental response
possibilities and forever relinquish all parental
claim in respect to the child.
She surrendered the custody of her child to the
Cabangbangs in 1958. She waited until 1963, or
after the lapse of a period of five long years, before
she brought action to recover custody. Her claim
that she did not take any step to recover her child
because the Cabangbangs were powerful and
influential, does not deserve any modicum of
credence. A mother who really loves her child
would go to any extent to be reunited with her.
petitioner's attitude, to our mind, does nothing
but confirm her intention to abandon the child —
from the very outset when she allowed Villareal to
give her away to the Cabangbangs. It must be
noted that the abandonment took place when the
child, barely four months old, was at the most
fragile stage of life and needed the utmost care
and solicitude of her mother. And for five long
years thereafter she did not once move to recover
the child. She continuously shunned the natural
and legal obligations which she owed to the child;
completely withheld her presence, her love, her
care, and the opportunity to display maternal
affection; and totally denied her support and
maintenance. Her silence and inaction have been
prolonged to such a point that her abandonment
of the child and her total relinquishment of
parental claim over her, can and should be inferred
as a matter of law. 3
Note that this was not the only instance when she
gave away a child of her own flesh and blood. She
gave up her youngest child, named Betty Tan
Villareal, to her comadre in Cebu because she
could not support it.
3. NO.
The absence of any kinship between the child and
the Cabangbangs alone cannot serve to bar the
lower court from awarding her custody to them.
Indeed, the law provides that in certain cases the
custody of a child may be awarded even to
strangers, as against either the father or the
mother or against both. Thus, in proceedings
involving a child whose parents are separated —
either legally or de facto — and where it appears
that both parents are improper persons to whom
to entrust the care, custody and control of the
child, "the court may either designate the paternal
or maternal grandparent of the child, or his oldest
brother or sister, or some reputable and discreet
person to take charge of such child, or commit it to
and suitable asylum, children's home, or
benevolent society." 6
Sec 7, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, and under the
authority of the said rule, the court — if it is for the
best interest of the child — may take the child
away from its parents and commit it to, inter alia,
a benevolent person.
LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., petitioner-appellant,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO
and OFELIA BEDIA, respondents-appellees.
FACTS:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr and Julia
Bedia,married and beget only one child, Leouel
Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987.
From the time the boy was released from the
hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in
the care and custody of his maternal
grandparents, private respondents herein,
Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr.
in the temporary custody of the latter's parents,
the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged
that they paid for all the hospital bills, as well as
the subsequent support of the boy because
petitioner could not afford to do so.
The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the
United States in May 1988 to work.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his
two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where
three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private
respondents contend that through deceit and false
pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and
clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown
in Bacong, Negros Oriental.
According to petitioner, he contends that since
private respondents have failed to show that
petitioner is an unfit and unsuitable father,
substitute parental authority granted to the boy's
grandparents under Art. 214 of the Family Code is
inappropriate.
Petitioner adds that the reasons relied upon by the
private respondents in having custody over the
boy, are flimsy and insufficient to deprive him of
his natural and legal right to have custody.
On the other hand, private respondents aver that
they can provide an air-conditioned room for the
boy and that petitioner would not be in a position
to take care of his son since he has to be assigned
to different places. They also allege that the
petitioner did not give a single centavo for the
boy's support and maintenance. When the boy
was about to be released from the hospital, they
were the ones who paid the fees because their
daughter and petitioner had no money. Besides,
Julia Bedia Santos, their daughter, had entrusted
the boy to them before she left for the United
States.
The Bedias argue that although the law recognizes
the right of a parent to his child's custody,
ultimately the primary consideration is what is
best for the happiness and welfare of the latter. As
maternal grandparents who have amply
demonstrated their love and affection for the boy
since his infancy, they claim to be in the best
position to promote the child's welfare.
ISSUE:
Who should properly be awarded custody of the
minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
HELD: Leouel Santos Sr, the FATHER.
The law considers the natural love of a parent to
outweigh that of the grandparents, such that only
when the parent present is shown to be unfit or
unsuitable may the grandparents exercise
substitute parental authority, a fact which has
not been proven here.
The right of custody accorded to parents springs
from the exercise of parental authority. Parental
authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the
juridical institution whereby parents rightfully
assume control and protection of their
unemancipated children to the extent required by
the latter' s needs.7
 Parental authority and responsibility are
inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by
law. 10 The right attached to parental authority,
being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children's home
or an orphan institution. 11 When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such
as a friend or godfather, even in a document,
what is given is merely temporary custody and it
does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. 12 Even if a definite renunciation is
manifest, the law still disallows the same. 13
The father and mother, being the natural
guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-
bound and entitled to keep them in their custody
and company. 14 The child's welfare is always the
paramount consideration in all questions
concerning his care and custody. 15
The law vests on the father and mother joint
parental authority over the persons of their
common children. 16 In case of absence or death of
either parent, the parent present shall continue
exercising parental authority. 17 Only in case of the
parents' death, absence or unsuitability may
substitute parental authority be exercised by the
surviving grandparent. 18
Legitimate father is still preferred over the
grandparents.The latter's wealth is not a deciding
factor, particularly because there is no proof that
at the present time, petitioner is in no position to
support the boy. The fact that he was unable to
provide financial support for his minor son from
birth up to over three years when he took the boy
from his in-laws without permission, should not
be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent
right to the child's custody. While petitioner's
previous inattention is inexcusable and merits
only the severest criticism, it cannot be construed
as abandonment.
His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing
him custody over the boy. So many men in uniform
who are assigned to different parts of the country
in the service of the nation, are still the natural
guardians of their children. It is not just to deprive
our soldiers of authority, care and custody over
their children merely because of the normal
consequences of their duties and assignments,
such as temporary separation from their families.
HERALD BLACK DACASIN, Petitioner,vs. SHARON
DEL MUNDO DACASIN, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American,
and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin
(respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in
April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie,
born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999,
respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit
Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois
(Illinois court) a divorce decree against
petitioner.3 In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved
the marriage of petitioner and respondent,
awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie
and retained jurisdiction over the case for
enforcement purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent
executed in Manila a contract (Agreement4 ) for
the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose
Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate
disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent
undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an
order "relinquishing" jurisdiction to Philippine
courts.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial
court) to enforce the Agreement.
The trial court sustained respondent’s motion and
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
ISSUEs:
1. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of petitioner’s suit
2. WON petitioner can seek from the court to
enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the
parties’ child.
HELD:
1. YES. The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain
petitioner’s suit.
Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdiction
to Enforce Contracts
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At
the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court,
statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions
incapable of pecuniary estimation.9 An action for
specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to
enforce the Agreement on joint child custody,
belongs to this species of actions.10 Thus,
jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right
court.
Petitioner’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the
"various provisions" of the divorce decree but of
the post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody.
Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois
court’s so-called "retained jurisdiction."
2. NO.
Petitioner’s Suit Lacks Cause of Action
The trial court cannot enforce the Agreement
which is contrary to law.
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to
stipulate the terms of agreement subject to the
minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.12 Otherwise, the contract is denied legal
existence, deemed "inexistent and void from the
beginning."
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on
28 January 2002, two facts are undisputed: (1)
Stephanie was under seven years old (having been
born on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner
and respondent were no longer married under the
laws of the United States because of the divorce
decree. The relevant Philippine law on child
custody for spouses separated in fact or in
law15 (under the second paragraph of Article 213
of the Family Code) is also undisputed: "no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from
the mother x x x."16 (This statutory awarding of
sole parental custody17 to the mother is
mandatory,18 grounded on sound policy
19
consideration, subject only to a narrow exception
not alleged to obtain here.20 ) Clearly then, the
Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce
joint custody regime between respondent and
petitioner over their child under seven years old
contravenes Philippine law.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being
contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the
mother when she refused to allow joint custody by
the father. The Agreement would be valid if the
spouses have not divorced or separated because
the law provides for joint parental authority when
spouses live together.21 However, upon
separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole
custody under the law if the child is below seven
years old and any agreement to the contrary is
void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody
regime for (1) children under seven of (2)
separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a
child within this age bracket (and for
commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the
separated or divorced parents how best to take
care of the child and that is to give custody to the
separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents
cannot contract away the provision in the Family
Code on the maternal custody of children below
seven years anymore than they can privately
agree that a mother who is unemployed,
immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or
afflicted with a communicable disease will have
sole custody of a child under seven as these are
reasons deemed compelling to preclude the
application of the exclusive maternal custody
regime under the second paragraph of Article 213
Note: (the court remanded the case to RTC for the
determination of rightful custody subject to
proper remedy filed by the party, since when the
decision was promulgated, Stephanie is beyond
more than 7y/o)
AGNES GAMBOA-HIRSCH Petitioner,vs.HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and FRANKLIN HARVEY
HIRSCH, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Franklin and Agnes,married and established their
conjugal dwelling in Diniwid, Boracay Island,
Malay, Aklan. On December 21, 2002, a child was
born to them and was named Simone. In 2005, the
couple started to have marital problems as Agnes
wanted to stay in Makati City, while Franklin
insisted that they stay in Boracay Island. On March
23, 2006 (Simone the only more than 3y/o), Agnes
came to their conjugal home in Boracay, and asked
for money and for Franklin’s permission for her to
bring their daughter to Makati City for a brief
vacation. Franklin readily agreed, but soon
thereafter discovered that neither Agnes nor their
daughter Simone would be coming back to
Boracay.
Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus
CA ruled in favor of Franklin.
ISSUE:
WON joint custody be granted despite the
provisions of the Family Code, as to minors seven
(7) years of age and below, in relation to the
jurisprudence and pronouncements laid down by
the Honorable Supreme Court on the matter of the
said provision.
HELD:
NO.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides
that "in all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests
of the child shall be a primary consideration
(emphasis supplied)."5 The Child and Youth
Welfare Code, in the same way, unequivocally
provides that in all questions regarding the care
and custody, among others, of the child, his/her
welfare shall be the paramount consideration.6
The so-called "tender-age presumption" under
Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome
only by compelling evidence of the mother’s
unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to
have custody of her children in one or more of the
following instances: neglect, abandonment,
unemployment, immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of
the child, insanity, or affliction with a
communicable disease.7 Here, the mother was
not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of
caring for her minor child. All told, no compelling
reason has been adduced to wrench the child from
the mother’s custody.1avvphi1
AMADORAvs.COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE
SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P.
DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO
ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and
natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR
GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his
guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora
was looking forward to the commencement
exercises where he would ascend the stage and in
the presence of his relatives and friends receive his
high school diploma. These ceremonies were
scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned out,
though, fate would intervene and deny him that
awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they
were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito
Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo,
ending all his expectations and his life as well. The
victim was only seventeen years old. 1
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence . 2 Additionally, the herein
petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil
action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its
rector the high school principal, the dean of boys,
and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and
two other students, through their respective
parents.
ISSUE:
1.Whether or not Article 2180 covers even
establishments which are technically not schools
of arts and trades.
2. When the offending student is supposed to be
"in its custody."
3. WHO must answer in for student’s torts when
student is still in the school’s custody?
HELD:
1.NO
(YES sana based on courts perspective,but the law
is clear na applicable lang sya sa arts and trade
school , “the provision must be interpreted by
the Court according to its clear and original
mandate until the legislature, taking into account
the changes in the situation subject to be
regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary
amendment.”)
The Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held
directly liable under the article because only the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades is made responsible for the damage
caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can
it be held to answer for the tort committed by any
of the other private respondents for none of them
has been found to have been charged with the
custody of the offending student or has been
remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection
with such custody.
BUT IN COURT’S PERSPECTIVE: (read if you want
)
The provision should apply to all schools,
academic as well as non-academic. Where the
school is academic rather than technical or
vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student, following the
first part of the provision. This is the general rule.
In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it
is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held
liable as an exception to the general rule. In other
words, teachers in general shall be liable for the
acts of their students except where the school is
technical in nature, in which case it is the head
thereof who shall be answerable. Following the
canon of reddendo singula singulis "teachers"
should apply to the words "pupils and students"
and "heads of establishments of arts and trades"
to the word "apprentices."
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion
expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde where
he said in part:
… It cannot be seriously contended
that an academic teacher is
exempt from the duty of watching
that his pupils do not commit a tort
to the detriment of third Persons,
so long as they are in a position to
exercise authority and Supervision
over the pupil.
There is really no substantial distinction between
the academic and the non-academic schools
insofar as torts committed by their students are
concerned. The same vigilance is expected from
the teacher over the students under his control
and supervision, whatever the nature of the
school where he is teaching.
2. the student should be within the control and
under the influence of the school authorities at
the time of the occurrence of the injury.
In, Palisoc v. Brillantes, “in custody” does not mean
that the student must be boarding with the school
authorities, it does signify that the student should
be within the control and under the influence of
the school authorities at the time of the
occurrence of the injury. This does not necessarily
mean that such, custody be co-terminous with the
semester, beginning with the start of classes and
ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the
time before or after such period, such as the
period of registration, and in the case of
graduating students, the period before the
commencement exercises. In the view of the
Court, the student is in the custody of the school
authorities as long as he is under the control and
influence of the school and within its premises,
whether the semester has not yet begun or has
already ended.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in
the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate
student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the
responsibility of the school authorities over the
student continues. Indeed, even if the student
should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the
campus in the company of his classmates and
friends and enjoying the ambience and
atmosphere of the school, he is still within the
custody and subject to the discipline of the school
authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
3. Teacher-in-charge
During all these occasions, it is obviously the
teacher-in-charge who must answer for his
students' torts, in practically the same way that the
parents are responsible for the child when he is in
their custody. The teacher-in-charge is the one
designated by the dean, principal, or other
administrative superior to exercise supervision
over the pupils in the specific classes or sections to
which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at
the time of the injury, the teacher be physically
present and in a position to prevent it. Custody
does not connote immediate and actual physical
control but refers more to the influence exerted
on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a
result of such influence. Thus, for the injuries
caused by the student, the teacher and not the
parent shag be held responsible if the tort was
committed within the premises of the school at
any time when its authority could be validly
exercised over him.
But as long as the defendant can show that he had
taken the necessary precautions to prevent the
injury complained of, he can exonerate himself
from the liability imposed by Article 2180, which
also states that:
The responsibility treated of in this
article shall cease when the Persons
herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent
damages.
In this case, the director, the high school principal
and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because
none of them was the teacher-in-charge as
previously defined. Each of them was exercising
only a general authority over the student body and
not the direct control and influence exerted by the
teacher placed in charge of particular classes or
sections and thus immediately involved in its
discipline. The evidence of the parties does not
disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the
offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo
Amadora had gone to school that day in
connection with his physics report did not
necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent
Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's
killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-
in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was
negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or
that he had waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school or condoned their non-
observance. His absence when the tragedy
happened cannot be considered against him
because he was not supposed or required to
report to school on that day. And while it is true
that the offending student was still in the custody
of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was
physically absent when the tort was committed, it
has not been established that it was caused by his
laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student.
On the contrary, the private respondents have
proved that they had exercised due diligence,
through the enforcement of the school
regulations, in maintaining that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is
probably the dean of boys who should be held
liable especially in view of the unrefuted evidence
that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun
from one of the students and returned the same
later to him without taking disciplinary action or
reporting the matter to higher authorities. While
this was clearly negligence on his part, for which
he deserves sanctions from the school, it does not
necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as
it has not been shown that he confiscated and
returned pistol was the gun that killed the
petitioners' son.
G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002
ST. MARY'S ACADEMY, petitioner,
vs.
WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S.
CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II,
JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
FACTS:
From 13 to 20 February 1995, defendant-appellant
St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an
enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A
facet of the enrollment campaign was the
visitation of schools from where prospective
enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s
Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the
campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful
day, Sherwin, along with other high school
students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to
Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City.
The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15
years old and a student of the same school.
Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless
manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.
"Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries
he sustained from the accident."2
RTC ruled that St. Mary’s academy is subsidiarily
liable to with James Daniel.
ISSUE
1) Whether or not petitioner is held liable
for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
HELD: NO
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person
under custody is a minor, those exercising special
parental authority are principally and solidarily
liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions
of the unemancipated minor while under their
supervision, instruction, or custody.10
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be
a finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
caused because the negligence must have a
causal connection to the accident.11
In this case, the respondents failed to show that
the negligence of petitioner was the proximate
cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva
admitted that the immediate cause of the accident
was not the negligence of petitioner or the
reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep.
the cause of the accident was not the recklessness
of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the
jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Significantly,
respondents did not present any evidence to show
that the proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of the school authorities, or the
reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the
respondents’ reliance on Article 219 of the Family
Code that "those given the authority and
responsibility under the preceding Article shall be
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused
by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor"
was unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner
school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive
the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was
Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva, who had possession and control of the
jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed
James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the
time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused
by the negligence of the minor driver or
mechanical detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s
parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St.
Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the
accident. Between the remote cause and the
injury, there intervened the negligence of the
minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep.
Incidentally, the registered owner of any vehicle,
even if not used for public service, would primarily
be responsible to the public or to third persons for
injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was
being driven on the highways or streets."17 Hence,
with the overwhelming evidence presented by
petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that
the accident occurred because of the detachment
of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the
school, but the registered owner of the vehicle
who shall be held responsible for damages for the
death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
G.R. No. 157906 November 2, 2006
JOAQUINITA P. CAPILI, Petitioner,vs.
SPS. DOMINADOR CARDAÑA and ROSALITA
CARDAÑA, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
On February 1, 1993, Jasmin Cardaña was walking
along the perimeter fence of the San Roque
Elementary School when a branch of
a caimito tree located within the school premises
fell on her, causing her instantaneous death. Thus,
her parents - Dominador and Rosalita Cardaña -
filed a case for damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Palo, Leyte against petitioner.
The Cardañas alleged in their complaint that even
as early as December 15, 1992, a resident of
the barangay, Eufronio Lerios, reported on the
possible danger the tree posed to passersby.
Lerios even pointed to the petitioner the tree that
stood near the principal’s office. The Cardañas
averred that petitioner’s gross negligence and lack
of foresight caused the death of their daughter.
Petitioner denied the accusation and said that at
that time Lerios had only offered to buy the tree.
She also denied knowing that the tree was dead
and rotting. To prove her point, she presented
witnesses who attested that she had brought up
the offer of Lerios to the other teachers during a
meeting on December 15, 1992 and assigned
Remedios Palaña to negotiate the sale.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner(Capili) is negligent and liable for
the death of Jasmin Cardaña.
HELD: YES
(NOTE: whether petitioner was negligent or not is a question of fact
which is generally not proper in a petition for review, and when this
determination is supported by substantial evidence, it becomes
conclusive and binding on this Court.8 However, there is an
exception, that is, when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
incongruent with the findings of the lower court.9 In our view, the
exception finds application in the present case.)
The probability that the branches of a dead and
rotting tree could fall and harm someone is clearly
a danger that is foreseeable. As the school
principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the
maintenance of the school grounds and safety of
the children within the school and its premises.
That she was unaware of the rotten state of a tree
whose falling branch had caused the death of a
child speaks ill of her discharge of the responsibility
of her position.
As school principal, petitioner is expected to
oversee the safety of the school’s premises. The
fact that she failed to see the immediate danger
posed by the dead and rotting tree shows she
failed to exercise the responsibility demanded by
her position.
Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned disposal
of the tree to another teacher, she exercises
supervision over her assignee.17 The record shows
that more than a month had lapsed from the time
petitioner gave instruction to her assistant Palaña
on December 15, 1992, to the time the incident
occurred on February 1, 1993. Clearly, she failed to
check seasonably if the danger posed by the rotting
tree had been removed. Thus, we cannot accept
her defense of lack of negligence.
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be
merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary
prudence and may be one which creates a
situation involving an unreasonable risk to another
because of the expectable action of the other, a
third person, an animal, or a force of nature. A
negligent act is one from which an ordinary
prudent person in the actor’s position, in the same
or similar circumstances, would foresee such an
appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him
not to do the act or to do it in a more careful
manner.12
The fact, however, that respondents’ daughter,
Jasmin, died as a result of the dead and rotting tree
within the school’s premises shows that the tree
was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing
by and calls for application of the principle of res
ipsa loquitur.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1)
the accident was of such character as to warrant
an inference that it would not have happened
except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the
accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive management
or control of the person charged with the
negligence complained of; and (3) the accident
must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.14
The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to
warrant a presumption or inference that the mere
falling of the branch of the dead and rotting tree
which caused the death of respondents’ daughter
was a result of petitioner’s negligence, being in
charge of the school.
In the case of D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,15 this Court held:
x x x where it is shown that the thing or
instrumentality which caused the injury
complained of was under the control or
management of the defendant, and that the
occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in
the ordinary course of things would not happen if
those who had its control or management used
proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as
sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that the
injury arose from or was caused by the
defendant’s want of care.
The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is that petitioner’s negligence is presumed
once respondents established the requisites for
the doctrine to apply. Once respondents made out
a prima facie case of all requisites, the burden
shifts to petitioner to explain. The presumption or
inference may be rebutted or overcome by other
evidence and, under appropriate circumstances, a
disputable presumption, such as that of due care
or innocence, may outweigh the inference.16
G.R. No. 182356 December 4, 2013
DRA, LEILA A DELA LLANO, Petitioner,vs.
REBECCA BIONG, doing business under the name
and style of Pongkay Trading, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan
dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car
along North Avenue, Quezon City.4
His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front
passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the
backseat.5
Juan stopped the car across the Veterans
Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned
red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump
truck containing gravel and sand suddenly
rammed the car’s rear end, violently pushing the
car forward. Due to the impact, the car’s rear end
collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered.
Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana.
Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana
did not appear to have suffered from any other
visible physical injuries.6
the truck driver was identified as Joel Primero. It
stated that Joel was recklessly imprudent in driving
the truck.7
Joel later revealed that his employer was
respondent Rebecca Biong, doing business under
the name and style of "Pongkay Trading" and was
engaged in a gravel and sand business.8
In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana
began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left
side of her neck and shoulder. The pain became
more intense as days passed by. Her injury became
more severe. Her health deteriorated to the extent
that she could no longer move her left arm. On
June 9, 2000, she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda
Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist, to
examine her condition. Dr. Milla told her that she
suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused
by the compression of the nerve running to her left
arm and hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo
physical therapy to alleviate her condition. Dra.
dela Llana’s condition did not improve despite
three months of extensive physical therapy.9
She then consulted other doctors, namely, Drs.
Willie Lopez, Leonor Cabral-Lim and Eric Flores, in
search for a cure. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon,
finally suggested that she undergo a cervical spine
surgery to release the compression of her nerve.
On October 19, 2000, Dr. Flores operated on her
spine and neck, between the C5 and the C6
vertebrae.10
The operation released the impingement of the
nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the
practice of her profession since June 2000 despite
the surgery.11
Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded
from Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but
Rebecca refused to pay.12
Thus, on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued
Rebecca for damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (RTC). She alleged that she
lost the mobility of her arm as a result of the
vehicular accident and claimed for her medical
expenses (as of the filing of the complaint) and an
average monthly income of ₱30,000.00 since June
2000. She further prayed for actual, moral, and
exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees.13
RTC-Granted
CA-reversed RTC’s ruling
ISSUE:
whether Joel’s reckless driving is the proximate
cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury.
HELD: NO
(NOTE: It is not the function of this Court to examine, review
or evaluate the evidence in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We can only
review the presented evidence, by way of exception, when
the conflict exists in findings of the RTC and the CA.)
Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by
preponderance of evidence
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that
"[w]hoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict."
Under this provision, the elements necessary to
establish a quasi-delict case are:
(1) damages to the plaintiff;
(2) negligence, by act or omission, of the
defendant or by some person for whose
acts the defendant must respond, was
guilty; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect
between such negligence and the
damages.28
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it.
He who alleges has the burden of proving his
allegation by preponderance of evidence or
greater weight of credible evidence.34
The reason for this rule is that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent
to proof.
In short, mere allegations are not evidence.35
In the present case, the burden of proving the
proximate causation between Joel’s negligence
and Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra.
dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance
of evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produced her
whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash
injury would not have occurred.36
G.R. No. 162421 August 31, 2007
NELSON CABALES and RITO
CABALES, Petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS,
JESUS FELIANO and ANUNCIACION
FELIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
FACTS:
Rufino Cabales died on July 4, 1966 and left a
5,714-square meter parcel of land located in Brgy.
Rizal, Sogod, Southern Leyte, covered by Tax
Declaration No. 17270 to his surviving wife
Saturnina and children Bonifacio, Albino,
Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito.
On July 26, 1971, brothers and co-owners
Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold the subject
property to Dr. Cayetano Corrompido for
₱2,000.00, with right to repurchase within eight
(8) years. The three (3) siblings divided the
proceeds of the sale among themselves, each
getting a share of ₱666.66.
The following month or on August 18, 1971,
Alberto secured a note ("vale") from Dr.
Corrompido in the amount of ₱300.00.
In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife and son,
petitioner Nelson.
On December 18, 1975, within the eight-year
redemption period, Bonifacio and Albino tendered
their payment of ₱666.66 each to Dr. Corrompido.
But Dr. Corrompido only released the document of
sale with pacto de retro after Saturnina paid for
the share of her deceased son, Alberto, including
his "vale" of ₱300.00.
On even date, Saturnina and her four (4) children
Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold the
subject parcel of land to respondents-spouses
Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for ₱8,000.00. The
Deed of Sale provided in its last paragraph, thus:
It is hereby declared and understood that the
amount of TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
EIGHTY SIX PESOS (P2,286.00) corresponding and
belonging to the Heirs of Alberto Cabales and to
Rito Cabales who are still minors upon the
execution of this instrument are held in trust by
the VENDEE and to be paid and delivered only to
them upon reaching the age of 21.
On July 24, 1986, 24-year old petitioner Rito
Cabales acknowledged receipt of the sum of
₱1,143.00 from respondent Jesus Feliano,
representing the former’s share in the proceeds of
the sale of subject property.
In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson, then
residing in Manila, went back to his father’s
hometown in Southern Leyte. That same year, he
learned from his uncle, petitioner Rito, of the sale
of subject property. In 1993, he signified his
intention to redeem the subject land during a
barangay conciliation process that he initiated.
On January 12, 1995, contending that they could
not have sold their respective shares in subject
property when they were minors, petitioners filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Maasin,
Southern Leyte, a complaint for redemption of the
subject land plus damages.
ISSUE:
1. WON petitioner Nelson and Rito Cabales is a co-
owner of subject land;
2. WON Denial to Nelson and rito’s right of legal
redemption is valid.
HELD:
1. YES but as to Rito he now longer retains his pro-
inidiviso share because of his ratification of the
sale to the Felianos, Nelson on the other hand
retained ownership over their undivided share of
subject property.
In Paulmitan v. Court of Appeals,3 we held that a
co-owner who redeemed the property in its
entirety did not make her the owner of all of it.
The property remained in a condition of co-
ownership as the redemption did not provide for
a mode of terminating a co-ownership.4 But the
one who redeemed had the right to be
reimbursed for the redemption price and until
reimbursed, holds a lien upon the subject
property for the amount due.5
As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was
unenforceable as correctly held by the Court of
Appeals. Based on Articles 320 and 326 of the New
Civil and Rule 93, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of
Court of 1964 Saturnina was clearly petitioner
Rito’s legal guardian without necessity of court
appointment considering that thousand the
amount of his property or one-seventh of subject
property was ₱1,143.00, which is less than two
pesos. However, Rule 96, Sec. 110 provides that:
Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary
power of administration of the minor’s property.
It does not include the power of alienation which
needs judicial authority.11 Thus, when Saturnina,
as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the
latter’s pro-indiviso share in subject land, she did
not have the legal authority to do so.
Article 1403 of the New Civil Code provides, thus:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are
unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another
person by one who has been given no authority or
legal representation, or who has acted beyond his
powers;
xxxx
Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-
indiviso share of petitioner Rito was
unenforceable. However, when he acknowledged
receipt of the proceeds of the sale on July 24,
1986, petitioner Rito effectively ratified it. This
act of ratification rendered the sale valid and
binding as to him.
With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other
hand, the contract of sale was void. He was a
minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and
all the other co-owners were not his legal
guardians with judicial authority to alienate or
encumber his property. It was his mother who was
his legal guardian and, if duly authorized by the
courts, could validly sell his undivided share to the
property. She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina
and the others sold the subject property in its
entirety to respondents-spouses, they only sold
and transferred title to their pro-indiviso shares
and not that part which pertained to petitioner
Nelson and his mother.
2. NO. Nelson can no longer redeem said
property.
Art. 1088. –period to redeem within the period of
one month from the time they were notified in
writing of the sale by the vendor.
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or
redemption shall not be exercised except within
thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case
may be
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes
that of adjoining owners.
Clearly, legal redemption may only be exercised by
the co-owner or co-owners who did not part with
his or their pro-indiviso share in the property held
in common.
However, as likewise established, the sale as to the
undivided share of petitioner Nelson and his
mother was not valid such that they were not
divested of their ownership thereto. Necessarily,
they may redeem the subject property from
respondents-spouses. But they must do so within
thirty days from notice in writing of the sale by
their co-owners vendors.
In the instant case, the right of redemption was
invoked not days but years after the sale was made
in 1978. We are not unmindful of the fact that
petitioner Nelson was a minor when the sale was
perfected. Nevertheless, the records show that in
1988, petitioner Nelson, then of majority age, was
informed of the sale of subject property.
Moreover, it was noted by the appellate court that
petitioner Nelson was likewise informed thereof in
1993 and he signified his intention to redeem
subject property during a barangay conciliation
process. But he only filed the complaint for legal
redemption and damages on January 12, 1995,
certainly more than thirty days from learning
about the sale.
In the face of the established facts, petitioner
Nelson cannot feign ignorance of the sale of
subject property in 1978. To require strict proof of
written notice of the sale would be to
countenance an obvious false claim of lack of
knowledge thereof, thus commending the letter of
the law over its purpose, i.e., the notification of
redemptioners.
G.R. No. 169202 March 5, 2010
MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO, Petitioner,vs.THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married
Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was then
expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being
married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following
entries appear in her passport: "Rallonza" as her
surname, "Maria Virginia" as her given name, and
"Remo" as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of
the validity of her passport, petitioner, whose
marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of
her passport with the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with
a request to revert to her maiden name and
surname in the replacement passport.
Petitioner’s request was denied
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner, who originally used her
husband’s surname in her expired passport, can
revert to the use of her maiden name in the
replacement passport, despite the subsistence of
her marriage.
HELD:
NO.Once a married woman opted to adopt her
husband’s surname in her passport, she may not
revert to the use of her maiden name, except in
the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239.
These instances are: (1) death of husband, (2)
divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage.
Since petitioner’s marriage to her husband
subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in
the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a
married woman's reversion to the use of her
maiden name must be based only on the
severance of the marriage.
Petitioners marriage is still subsisting.
The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a
privilege. The law recognizes the passport
applicant’s constitutional right to travel.
However, the State is also mandated to protect
and maintain the integrity and credibility of the
passport and travel documents proceeding from
it as a Philippine passport remains at all times the
property of the Government. The holder is merely
a possessor of the passport as long as it is valid
and the same may not be surrendered to any
person or entity other than the government or its
representative.24
Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil
Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special
law specifically dealing with passport issuance
must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the
Civil Code which is the general law on the use of
surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction
is that a special law prevails over a general
law,18 thus:
As the OSG correctly pointed out:
[T]he issuance of passports is impressed with
public interest. A passport is an official document
of identity and nationality issued to a person
intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries.
It is issued by the Philippine government to its
citizens requesting other governments to allow its
holder to pass safely and freely, and in case of
need, to give him/her aid and protection. x x x
Viewed in the light of the foregoing, it is within
respondent’s competence to regulate any
amendments intended to be made therein,
including the denial of unreasonable and
whimsical requests for amendments such as in the
instant case.25
G.R. No. L-32181 March 5, 1986
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.LEONOR VALENCIA, as Natural mother and
guardian of her minor children, BERNARDO GO
and JESSICA GO; and THE HON. AGAPITO
HONTANOSAS, Judge of the COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF CEBU, Branch XI.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of
her minor children, Bernardo Go and Jessica Go
filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a
petition for the cancellation and/or correction of
entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in
the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu. The case was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3043-R.
The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the
petition alleging that the petition for correction of
entry in the Civil Registry pursuant to Article 412
of the New Civil Code of the Philippines in relation
to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court,
contemplates a summary proceeding and
correction of mere clerical errors, those harmless
and innocuous changes such as the correction of a
name that is merely mispelled, occupation of
parents, etc., and not changes or corrections
involving civil status, nationality, or citizenship
which are substantial and controversial.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and
substance, the trial court issued an order directing
the publication of the petition and the date of
hearing thereof in the Cebu Advocate, a
newspaper of general circulation in the city and
province of Cebu, once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks, and notice thereof, duly
served on the Solicitor General, the Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City and Go Eng.
Respondent Leonor Valencia, filed her reply to the
opposition wherein she admitted that the present
petition seeks substantial changes involving the
civil status and nationality or citizenship of
respondents, but alleged that substantial changes
in the civil registry records involving the civil status
of parents, their nationality or citizenship may be
allowed if- (1) the proper suit is filed, and (2)
evidence is submitted, either to support the
allegations of the petition or to disprove the same;
that respondents have complied with these
requirements by filing the present special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry pursuant to Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court and that they have
caused reasonable notice to be given to the
persons named in the petition and have also
caused the order for the hearings of their petition
to be published for three (3) consecutive weeks in
a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Subsequently, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that since
the petition seeks to change the nationality or
citizenship of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go from
"Chinese" to "Filipino" and their status from
"Legitimate" to Illegitimate", and changing also
the status of the mother from "married" to
"single" the corrections sought are not merely
clerical but substantial, involving as they do the
citizenship and status of the petitioning minors
and the status of their mother.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss.
After trial on the merits during which the parties
were given all the opportunity to present their
evidence and refute the evidence and arguments
of the other side, the lower court rendered a
decision granting the petition for cancellation
ISSUE:
WON THE GRANT OF PETITION OF VALENCIA FOR
CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF CITIZENSHIP
AND CIVIL STATUS AND THE CITIZENSHIP AND
CIVIL STATUS OF HER MINOR CHILDREN
BERNARDO GO AND JESSICA GO IS VALID.
HELD: YES
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of
a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors
of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one
involving nationality or citizenship, which is
indisputably substantial as well as controverted,
affirmative relief cannot be granted in a
proceeding summary in nature. However, it is
also true that a right in law may be enforced and
a wrong may be remedied as long as the
appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to
the principle that even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the
error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, the
opposition of the Solicitor General dated February
20, 1970 while questioning the use of Article 412
of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court admits that "the entries
sought to be corrected should be threshed out in
an appropriate proceeding.
Provided the trial court has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been
fully and properly developed, where opposing
counsel have been given opportunity to demolish
the opposite party's case, and where the evidence
has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the
suit or proceeding is appropriate.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a
proceeding concerning the cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register are-(1)
the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected
thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes
the duty of the court to-(l) issue an order fixing the
time and place for the hearing of the petition, and
(2) cause the order for hearing to be published
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
The following are likewise entitled to oppose the
petition: (I) the civil registrar, and (2) any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been
followed, a petition for correction and/or
cancellation of entries in the record of birth even
if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described
as "summary". There can be no doubt that when
an opposition to the petition is filed either by the
Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any
interest in the entries sought to be cancelled
and/or corrected and the opposition is actively
prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become
adversary proceedings.
G.R. No. 166102, August 05, 2015
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, v. THE
CITY ASSESSOR AND CITY TREASURER OF LUCENA
CITY, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
MERALCO has been successively granted
franchises to operate in Lucena City
On February 20, 1989, MERALCO received from
the City Assessor of Lucena a copy of Tax
Declaration No. 019-650013 covering the following
electric facilities, classified as capital investment,
of the company: (a) transformer and electric post;
(b) transmission line; (c) insulator; and (d) electric
meter, located in Quezon Ave. Ext., Brgy. Gulang-
Gulang, Lucena City. Under Tax Declaration No.
019-6500, these electric facilities had a market
value of P81,811,000.00 and an assessed value of
P65,448,800.00, and were subjected to real
property tax as of 1985.
MERALCO claimed that its capital investment
consisted only of its substation facilities, the true
and correct value of which was only
P9,454,400.00; and that MERALCO was exempted
from payment of real property tax on said
substation facilities.
ISSUE:
WON MERALCO is liable for real property tax on its
transformers, electric posts (or poles),
transmission lines, insulators, and electric meters,
beginning 1992.
HELD:YES
The Court finds that the transformers, electric
posts, transmission lines, insulators, and electric
meters of MERALCO are no longer exempted from
real property tax and may qualify as "machinery"
subject to real property tax under the Local
Government Code. Nevertheless, the Court
declares null and void the appraisal and
assessment of said properties of MERALCO by the
City Assessor in 1997 for failure to comply with the
requirements of the Local Government Code and,
thus, violating the right of MERALCO to due
process.
Section 234 of LGC
2. Other Exemptions Withdrawn. All other
exemptions previously granted to natural or
juridical persons including government-owned or
controlled corporations are withdrawn upon the
effectivity of the Code.44chanrobleslaw
The last paragraph of Section 234 had
unequivocally withdrawn, upon the effectivity of
the Local Government Code, exemptions from
payment of real property taxes granted to natural
or juridical persons, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, except as provided in
the same section.
MERALCO, a private corporation engaged in
electric distribution, and its transformers, electric
posts, transmission lines, insulators, and electric
meters used commercially do not qualify under
any of the ownership, character, and usage
exemptions enumerated in Section 234 of the
Local Government Code. It is a basic precept of
statutory construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all
others as expressed in the familiar
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.45 Not
being among the recognized exemptions from real
property tax in Section 234 of the Local
Government Code, then the exemption of the
transformers, electric posts, transmission lines,
insulators, and electric meters of MERALCO from
real property tax granted under its franchise was
among the exemptions withdrawn upon the
effectivity of the Local Government Code on
January 1, 1998.
The transformers, electric posts,
transmission lines, insulators, and electric
meters of MERALCO may qualify as
"machinery" under the Local Government
Code subject to real property tax.
The Court reiterates that the machinery subject to
real property tax under the Local Government
Code "may or may not be attached, permanently
or temporarily to the real property;" and the
physical facilities for production, installations, and
appurtenant service facilities, those which are
mobile, self-powered or self-propelled, or are not
permanently attached must (a) be actually,
directly, and exclusively used to meet the needs of
the particular industry, business, or activity; and
(2) by their very nature and purpose, be designed
for, or necessary for manufacturing, mining,
logging, commercial, industrial, or agricultural
purposes.
MERALCO insists on harmonizing the
aforementioned provisions of the Civil Code and
the Local Government Code. The Court disagrees,
however, for this would necessarily mean
imposing additional requirements for classifying
machinery as real property for real property tax
purposes not provided for, or even in direct
conflict with, the provisions of the Local
Government Code.
As between the Civil Code, a general law governing
property and property relations, and the Local
Government Code, a special law granting local
government units the power to impose real
property tax, then the latter shall prevail.
Nevertheless, the appraisal and
assessment of the transformers, electric
posts, transmission lines, insulators, and
electric meters of MERALCO as machinery
under Tax Declaration Nos. 019-6500 and
019-7394 were not in accordance with the
Local Government Code and in violation of
the right to due process of MERALCO and,
therefore, null and void.
CAPITOL WIRELESS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF BATANGAS, THE
PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF BATANGAS, THE
MUNICIPAL TREASURER AND ASSESSOR OF
NASUGBU, BATANGAS, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Capitol Wireless Inc. (Capwire) is a
Philippine corporation in the business of providing
international telecommunications services. 3 As
such provider, Capwire has signed agreements
with other local and foreign telecommunications
companies covering an international network of
submarine cable systems such as the Asia Pacific
Cable Network System (APCN) (which connects
Australia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong
Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Indonesia and the
Philippines); the BruneiMalaysia-Philippines Cable
Network System (BMP-CNS), the PhilippinesItaly
(SEA-ME-WE-3 CNS), and the Guam Philippines
(GP-CNS) systems. 4 The agreements provide for
co-ownership and other rights among the parties
over the network. 5
Petitioner Capwire claims that it is co-owner only
of the so-called "Wet Segment" of the APCN, while
the landing stations or terminals and Segment E of
APCN located in Nasugbu, Batangas are allegedly
owned by the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Corporation (PLDT). 6 Moreover, it alleges that the
Wet Segment is laid in international, and not
Philippine, waters. 7
Capwire claims that as co-owner, it does not own
any particular physical part of the cable system
but, consistent with its financial contributions, it
owns the right to use a certain capacity of the said
system. 8 This property right is allegedly reported
in its financial books as "Indefeasible Rights in
Cable Systems."9
However, for loan restructuring purposes, Capwire
claims that "it was required to register the value of
its right," hence, it engaged an appraiser to "assess
the market value of the international submarine
cable system and the cost to Capwire." 10 On May
15, 2000, Capwire submitted a Sworn Statement
of True Value of Real Properties at the Provincial
Treasurer's Office, Batangas City, Batangas
Province, for the Wet Segment of the system,
Capwire claims that it also reported that the
system "interconnects at the PLDT Landing Station
in Nasugbu, Batangas," which is covered by a
transfer certificate of title and tax declarations in
the name of PLDT. 11
As a result, the respondent Provincial Assessor of
Batangas (Provincial Assessor) issued the following
Assessments of Real Property (ARP) against
Capwire to include the submarine cable system
taxable. In essence, the Provincial Assessor had
determined that the submarine cable systems
described in Capwire's Sworn Statement of True
Value of Real Properties are taxable real property,
a determination that was contested by Capwire in
an exchange of letters between the company and
the public respondent. 12 The reason cited by
Capwire is that the cable system lies outside of
Philippine territory, i.e., on international waters. 13
ISSUE:
whether submarine wires or cables used for
communications may be taxed like other real
estate.
HELD: YES
Submarine or undersea communications cables are
akin to electric transmission lines which this Court
has recently declared in Manila Electric Company
v. City Assessor and City Treasurer of Lucena
City, 37 as "no longer exempted from real prope1iy
tax" and may qualify as "machinery" subject to real
property tax under the Local Government Code. To
the extent that the equipment's location is
determinable to be within the taxing authority's
jurisdiction, the Court sees no reason to distinguish
between submarine cables used for
communications and aerial or underground wires
or lines used for electric transmission, so that both
pieces of property do not merit a different
treatment in the aspect of real property taxation.
Both electric lines and communications cables, in
the strictest sense, are not directly adhered to the
soil but pass through posts, relays or landing
stations, but both may be classified under the term
"machinery" as real property under Article
415(5)38 of the Civil Code for the simple reason that
such pieces of equipment serve the owner's
business or tend to meet the needs of his industry
or works that are on real estate. Even objects in or
on a body of water may be classified as such, as
"waters" is classified as an immovable under
Article 415(8)39 of the Code. A classic example is a
boathouse which, by its nature, is a vessel and,
therefore, a personal property but, if it is tied to the
shore and used as a residence, and since it floats
on waters which is immovable, is considered real
property.40 Besides, the Court has already held
that "it is a familiar phenomenon to see things
classed as real property for purposes of taxation
which on general principle might be considered
personal property."41
Thus, absent any showing from Capwire of any
express grant of an exemption for its lines and
cables from real property taxation, then this
interpretation applies and Capwire's submarine
cable may be held subject to real property tax.
The jurisdiction or authority over such part of the
subject submarine cable system lying within
Philippine jurisdiction includes the authority to tax
the same, for taxation is one of the three basic and
necessary attributes of sovereignty,49 and such
authority has been delegated by the national
legislature to the local governments with respect
to real property.50 taxation.
Section 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. -
The following are exempted from payment of the
real property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the
Republic of the Philippines or any of
its political subdivisions except
when the beneficial use thereof has
been granted, for consideration of
otherwise, to a taxable person;
(b) Charitable institutions,
churches, parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques,
nonprofit or religious cemeteries
and all lands, buildings, and
improvements actually, directly,
and exclusively used for religious,
charitable or educational purposes;
(c) All machineries and equipment
that are actually, directly and
exclusively used by local water
districts and government-owned or
controlled corporations engaged in
the supply and distribution of water
and/or generation and
transmission of electric power;
 (d) All real property owned by duly
registered cooperatives as
provided for under R.A. No. 6938;
and

(e) Machinery and equipment used

for pollution control and
environmental protection.

Except as provided herein (Local Government

Code, which took effect on January l, 1992,
Sections 193 and 234)54, any exemption from
payment of real property tax previously granted
to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether
natural or Juridical, including all government-
owned or controlled corporations are hereby
withdrawn upon the cffectivity of this Code. 55

Such express withdrawal had been previously held

effective upon exemptions bestowed by legislative
franchises granted prior to the effectivity of the
Local Government Code.56 Capwire fails to allege
or provide any other privilege or exemption that
were granted to it by the legislature after the
enactment of the Local Government Code.
Therefore, the presumption stays that it enjoys no
such privilege or exemption. Tax exemptions arc
strictly construed against the taxpayer because
taxes are considered the lifeblood of the nation.57