GPPi Working Paper • July 2013
The EU-US Development Dialogue:
Past, Present and Future
Alexander Gaus & Wade Hoxtell
The United States and Europe are still the world
heavyweights of development assistance. Togeth-
er, the US, the European Commission and the 27
EU member states provide almost two-thirds of
global official development assistance. Despite
the much-discussed and growing role of “new
donors,” stronger transatlantic cooperation and
coordination can have an important impact on
development assistance: Together, the transat-
lantic partners can set priorities in development
cooperation, define approaches and increase the
effectiveness and efficiency of aid through greater
alignment and coherence.
Since both the EU and the US are currently defin-
ing their long-term development strategies, there
is a unique opportunity for the EU-US High-Lev-
el Consultative Group on Development (“EU-US
Development Dialogue”) to create stronger align-
ment and coherence and improve the effective-
ness of programs in fragile states.
This working paper provides background infor-
mation on the EU-US Development Dialogue –
its history, current setup, thematic focus, recent
activities on the security-development nexus and
issues of concern.
Alexander Gaus and Wade Hoxtell are researchers at GPPi.
This paper was prepared for and presented at the first Transatlantic Civil Society
Dialogue on Security & Development workshop entitled “Finding Common
Group on the Security and Development Nexus” which took place from 30-
31 May 2013 outside of Berlin, Germany. The workshop was convened to
provide inputs from a civil society perspective to the official EU-US High-Level
Consultative Group on Development.
The History of the EU-US Development
Dialogue
The idea of better coordinating European and
American development cooperation is not new.
Over the past decades, the EU und the US have
made repeated attempts to strengthen their coor-
dination and coherence through formal develop-
ment dialogues:
• In 1990, the “Transatlantic Declaration” set
the stage for deepened relations between the EU
and the US and created a regular transatlantic
dialogue on issues from economic cooperation
to strategies for addressing transnational chal-
lenges. On development policy, the common goal
stated in the declaration was to “help develop-
ing countries by all appropriate means in their
efforts towards political and economic reforms.”1
To achieve this goal, the US government and
the European Commission moved away from
ad-hoc meetings to more organized, regular and
intensive consultations. They did not, however,
succeed in institutionalizing the consultations.
Hindering the process were the ups and downs of
the transatlantic relationship, as well as the po-
litical tensions between Europe and the US that
Co-funded by the European Union
 The EU-US Development Dialogue: Past, Present and Future
stemmed from disagreements over issues such as
trade liberalization and securing the Balkans in
the early 1990s.2
• In 1995, the “New Transatlantic Agenda”
outlined a new framework for this relationship,
including four specific areas for joint action: pro-
moting peace, stability, democracy and develop-
ment; responding to global challenges; contribut-
ing to the liberalization and expansion of world
trade; and improving communication and ensur-
ing a long-term commitment to this partnership.
Working groups were formed to tackle these top-
ics, which generated new commitments, focus ar-
eas and an extensive joint EU-US Action Plan.
Again, however, the process could not be sus-
tained, and regular formal consultations ceased
in most areas.3
• In 2009, the EU-US Development Dialogue
was re-launched. In the early 2000s, a number of
prominent voices, including the European Com-
missioner for Development and Humanitarian
Aid, Louis Michel, called for closer transatlan-
tic relations on development issues.4 These calls
were heeded after the election of Barack Obama
in 2008 when development policy once again
became a priority issue for the US government.
The EU-US Development Dialogue was re-estab-
lished during the 2009 EU-US Summit in Wash-
ington, DC.
Setup of the EU-US Development
Dialogue
The purpose of the EU-US Development Dia-
logue is to increase information sharing, coordi-
nation and policy alignment. The dialogue op-
erates at several levels and includes discussions
among ministers and high-level officials, ex-
changes among working-level staff at headquar-
ters, and operational in-country coordination.
2
The most visible part of the dialogue is the high-
level meetings. They involve two to three in-per-
son meetings per year between the deputy heads
of the EU and US development agencies. These
meetings culminate in a yearly meeting between
the administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) and the
EU Commissioner for Development. On a work-
ing level, continuous exchanges between differ-
ent units address technical issues and are largely
facilitated by the EU delegation in Washington,
DC, and the US embassy in Brussels. Beyond
the development agencies, the respective foreign
policy branches, namely the European External
Action Service (EEAS) and the US Department
of State, also wield influence.
The figure on the next page gives an overview of
the main actors in the strategic dialogues with
specific reference to the discussions on security
and development.
Within the EU, the dialogue involves the Di-
rectorate-General Development and Coopera-
tion – EuropeAid (DG DEVCO) as well as the
EEAS. The International Development Dialogue
Unit at DEVCO acts as the formal focal point for
the dialogue, working in close cooperation and
consultation with EEAS and their US & Canada
Division. EU member states are also involved
through the Council Working Group on Devel-
opment (CODEV) and validate positions taken
by the EU in the dialogue. In the US, the setup
is similar, and both USAID and the US Depart-
ment of State participate in the dialogue. For US-
AID, the Office of Donor Engagement is the focal
point for the dialogue. The State Department is
represented by the Bureau for European Affairs.
Depending on the thematic focus, additional units
on both sides are either informally consulted or
become formally involved in the dialogue. For se-
 The EU-US Development Dialogue: Past, Present and Future 3

European Union United States

DEVCO EEAS US STATE DEPARTMENT USAID

Unit A6 International US & Canada Division Bureau for European Affairs Office of Donor Engagement
Development Dialogue (Jennifer Adams)
(Barbara Luecke)
Specific for security and development: Specific for security and development: Specific for security and development: Specific for security and development:

Unit 05 Fragility and Crisis Conflict prevention, J-Family offices Office of Conflict
Management Peacebuilding & Mediation Management and Mitigation
(Denisa-Elena Ionete) Instruments Division (Neil Levine)

EU Delegation in US Embassy in
Washington, DC Brussels / USAID
/ development representative
counselor (Karin (Sarah Gonzales)
Hundeboll)

HIGH-LEVEL
CONSULTATIVE GROUP
EU Council CODEV
(EU member states)
ON DEVELOPMENT
“EU-US DEVELOPMENT
DIALOGUE”

Figure: EU-US Development Dialogue Main Actors

Source: Author compilation

curity and development, these include for the EU
the Fragility and Crisis Management Unit within
DEVCO and the Conflict Prevention, Peacebuild-
ing & Mediation Instruments Division at EEAS.
On the US side, the US State Department “J”-
family, a line of departments that reports to the
Under-Secretary for Civilian Security, Democ-
racy, and Human Rights, provides input next to
the Conflict Management and Mitigation Office
at USAID.
Thematic Focus
Initially, the EU-US Development Dialogue fo-
cused on food security, climate change and the
Millennium Development Goals. Thereafter the
agenda evolved, reflecting changing priorities of
the transatlantic partners. Already by 2010, the
transatlantic partners planned to include the se-
curity-development nexus as a new focus area.
The issue was included in the 2012 agenda.5
Three trends explain why the transatlantic part-
ners pay increasing attention to the security-de-
velopment nexus:
• Widespread recognition in the EU and the US
that security, stability and development coopera-
tion need to be linked. From a development per-
spective, it is now more and more acknowledged
that security-related challenges such as organized
crime, abusive security forces and armed violence
 The EU-US Development Dialogue: Past, Present and Future
represent critical development obstacles in situa-
tions of fragility and conflict as well as in coun-
tries considered more stable, for example Nigeria,
Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya. Over the past six years,
the share of the world’s poor living in fragile states
like Afghanistan, the Central African Republic,
Somalia or South Sudan is estimated to have
doubled from 20 to 40 percent. Recent research
estimates that this share will exceed 50 percent in
the next few years.6 From a security perspective,
Afghanistan, Mali, Libya and other cases high-
light that civilian means, including development
cooperation, play a key role in addressing the root
causes of insecurity and fragility.
• A more favorable policy environment. Since
the establishment of the EEAS, the EU has been
pushing for a comprehensive approach in crisis
management to ensure that political, diplomatic,
economic, development, humanitarian and mili-
tary instruments are used in a coherent way to
address crises and conflict. Building on processes
initiated in 2007, particularly the Council Con-
clusions on Security and Development and the
Council Conclusions on an EU response to situa-
tions of fragility, the discussions around the com-
prehensive approach have clearly brought togeth-
er the distant realms of security and development
policy across the different EU institutions. The
US moved in a similar direction in 2010 when
the State Department called for a greater role of
diplomacy and development in American foreign
policy, alongside military means.7 Both sides of
the Atlantic see these recent policy shifts as an
opportunity to deepen the existing transatlan-
tic relationship on non-military issues related to
security. Moreover, in the US, the re-election of
President Barack Obama created a more consis-
tent and favorable policy environment for trans-
atlantic exchanges, pursued with less intensity
prior to the election.
4
• A reorganized political and institutional en-
vironment. The EU and the US had to grapple
with a reorganization of institutional structures
for much of the past three years, and these ef-
forts are slowly coming to fruition. In the US,
in early 2012 the State Department inaugurated
its new Office of Civilian Security, Democracy,
and Human Rights. This “super-office” formally
leads US activities on civilian security, combin-
ing critical non-military means for addressing
fragility. The new office includes the Bureau of
Conflict and Stabilization Operations as well as
the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor, both of which have an important stake
in defining the US approach to stabilization and
development in fragile and insecure states. In
the EU, the foreign policy branch underwent a
complete restructuring with the creation of the
EEAS in 2010. Especially until early 2012, inter-
nal coordination on security and development
remained challenging as the administration was
preoccupied with implementing the reforms and
defining the division of labor between the differ-
ent institutions, in particular between the EEAS
and DEVCO, in greater detail. Since then, the bu-
reaucratic environment in both the EU and the
US has become far more supportive in addressing
the security and development nexus.
Recent Activities on the Security-
Development Nexus
These trends, as well as (ultimately unfulfilled)
expectations of an EU-US summit in the summer
of 2013, spurred new activities around the EU-
US Development Dialogue in general and on the
security and development theme in particular. A
number of meetings between EU and US repre-
sentatives have taken place since October 2012 at
various levels:
 The EU-US Development Dialogue: Past, Present and Future
• In fall 2012, Ambassador Rick Barton, who
heads the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization
Operations at the State Department, and senior-
level staff from the US State Department Office
of Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human
Rights, visited Brussels to meet with counterparts
from the European Commission. They discussed
focusing the dialogue on security and develop-
ment on specific countries.
• In April 2013, a meeting between the depu-
ty directors of USAID and DEVCO took place
on the margins of the World Bank/IMF annual
spring meeting. While they discussed topics for
the EU-US Development Dialogue, they did not
specifically focus on the link between security
and development. Instead, this was left to the
foreign policy arms of the administrations.
• Starting on 13 May 2013, the EEAS and State
Department initiated a series of high-level video
conferences between the EEAS Deputy Secretary
General and his State Department counterpart to
discuss joint activities in specific countries.
These recent meetings determined that future
dialogues and coordination efforts will focus on
individual countries and regions such as Afghani-
stan, Mali, Myanmar and Latin America. This is
a departure from the earlier approach of focus-
ing on themes. An internal paper, prepared by
USAID and circulated in early 2012 between the
US Government and the European Commission,
had identified as relevant topics security sector
reform, the New Deal on Fragile States, crime
and conflict, and prevention of mass atrocities.
The greater emphasis on in-country coordination,
to be primarily led by the foreign policy branches
involved in the dialogue, arose when the strategic
discussions on development policy set out in the
initial roadmap were perceived as not achieving
5
enough substantial outcomes on the ground. Pol-
icy-level dialogue on various themes will, howev-
er, also remain a relevant part of future meetings.
Opportunities and Challenges
The EU-US Development Dialogue has consid-
erable potential for influencing priorities, foster-
ing policy coherence and promoting operational
coordination of EU and US development policy
in partner countries. Capitalizing on the more fa-
vorable environment for EU-US cooperation, the
dialogue can be a model for:
• Improving the effectiveness of international
efforts around security and development. In a
time of defining a post-MDG development frame-
work, numerous views exist on how to integrate
peacebuilding and conflict prevention goals into
a global development agenda. Closer EU-US co-
ordination on this issue has the potential for gen-
erating greater support for existing approaches,
such as the New Deal for Engagement on Fragile
States, and ensuring that conflict-affected and
fragile states are prioritized in the future.
• Leveraging existing knowledge and approach-
es for addressing the security and development
nexus. The dialogue can draw on established
processes such as the International Network on
Conflict and Fragility or the international dia-
logue surrounding the New Deal for Engagement
in Fragile States. This will elevate their relevance
further. Ideas and recommendations generated
in these forums have a greater chance for imple-
mentation if the EU and US agree in their own
transatlantic deliberations on jointly supporting
these efforts. The EU-US development dialogue
can thus act as an effective multiplier of existing
knowledge and approaches for addressing the se-
curity and development nexus.
 The EU-US Development Dialogue: Past, Present and Future
• Learning between like-minded partners. Both
the EU and US have experience working in con-
flict-affected and fragile states. They have tried,
failed and succeeded with different approaches
and policies. Closer coordination between the
two sides allows for sharing experiences, learn-
ing from each other and continuously improving
the policy and practice of supporting countries
affected by conflict, crises or instability.
• Coordinating technical programming. As
both the European Commission and USAID are
developing new cycles of country development
strategies and funding priorities, the EU-US
Development Dialogue, in particular its work-
ing-level meetings, provides opportunities for
aligning priorities and ensuring complementary
in-country activities. This would be an important
step forward in capitalizing on the comparative
advantages of each side and reducing inefficien-
cies. In times of fiscal restraint in both the EU
and US, this is a strong argument for improving
EU-US coordination.
However, observers have raised concerns that
need to be addressed to make the dialogue more
effective and reach its potential:8
• Bureaucratic inertia. The addition of the US
State Department and the EEAS elevates the
standing of the dialogue. At the same time, it
makes the dialogue process more complex and re-
quires extensive consultations between the devel-
opment and foreign policy branches on each side.
This stymies initiative and reduces expectations
on the dialogue itself. In Europe, internal guide-
lines require the EEAS and DEVCO to ensure
“full transparency, informing and consulting
each other, sufficiently in advance, on initiatives
or announcements that could have an impact on
each other’s areas of responsibility,” even if it
includes just “the preparation of policy and pro-
6
gramme documents of […] informal nature.”9 In
the US, the internal coordination between US-
AID and the State Department is equally chal-
lenging. Moreover, the position of the Under
Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and
Human Rights at the State Department is cur-
rently vacant. State Department officials are
therefore more cautious in their positioning since
US priorities regarding security and development
might shift with the new Under Secretary.
• Differences in approach and lack of clarity on
leadership roles. Foreign policy and development
institutions typically approach the issue of secu-
rity and development from different angles. The
EEAS and the State Department tend to focus on
the implications of fragility abroad in terms of
regional and international relations as well as na-
tional security at home. USAID and DEVCO, by
contrast, see stability and security primarily as a
means for supporting development and laying the
foundations for more effective pro-poor policies
abroad. Both types of institutions have their own
priorities, programs and approaches for address-
ing fragility and instability. While both the EU
and the US are working to achieve more consis-
tency internally, it is not clear which institution
or which approach could become more prominent
in the dialogue process.10 Thus, uncertainty about
leadership among the primary actors hinders ef-
fective dialogue between the EU and the US.
• EU-US strategic partnership versus short-term
crisis response. With the new focus of the EU-US
Development Dialogue on individual countries,
including those with acute crises such as Syria
and Mali, there are indications that the dialogue
is increasingly driven by imminent foreign policy
concerns. This more flexible approach for taking
on up-to-the-minute issues is appreciated by the
participants of the dialogue, particularly as oth-
er formal platforms for high- and working-level
 The EU-US Development Dialogue: Past, Present and Future 7

transatlantic exchange on such issues do not ex-
ist. While the flexibility to react to new topics
and political developments could be an asset of
the dialogue, in its current setup it is ill-suited for
ad-hoc diplomacy on current issues due to its de-
sign, timeframe and initial mandate. As the dia-
logue was originally formed to focus on, take ad-
vantage of and strengthen strategic cooperation
in the mid- to long-term, beyond acute crises, a
critical challenge for the dialogue is balancing its
original purpose with these new demands.
• Topic overload. The EU-US Development
Dialogue is overwhelmed by suggestions for its
agenda. In addition to the current themes of
MDGs, food security, climate change and se-
curity and development, additional proposals
have been floated to address topics such as aid
effectiveness, energy access for all, the future of
the OECD’s Donor Assistance Committee and
inclusive development. A group of EU member
states (eg, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and East-
ern European/Baltic states) have therefore voiced
concerns that taking on additional topics might
overburden the process. They advocate prioritiz-
ing security and development issues.
in the transatlantic discussions. Second, civil
society organizations and NGOs are usually the
primary implementing partners for EU and US
development policy. Their active participation in
the dialogue ensures that the suggested activities
and coordinated policies match both the priorities
and capabilities of the implementing partners,
and their inclusion serves as an important reality
check to the EU and US. Finally, openness to-
wards civil society organizations and aid experts
generates a level of accountability that can help
sustain activities; provide incentives for leader-
ship and more effective engagement among the
transatlantic partners; and draw attention to the
process as such. The fact that the European Com-
mission is funding a parallel civil society dialogue
to feed into the EU-US Development Dialogue is
a positive development in this regard. It is also
an opportunity that should be seized and further
supported by the European Union, the US gov-
ernment and, foremost, by civil society itself.

• Lack of transparency and openness. To date,

the dialogue takes place behind closed doors and
is little known among the development commu-
nity. For the past three years, few civil society
organizations, researchers and aid experts were
consulted on the agenda, the priorities, the activi-
ties for greater transatlantic coordination, or the
results and propositions. But such external input
is critical in three respects. First, it allows EU
and US officials to incorporate the latest find-
ings and best practices of the discussed topics
into the development of evidence-based policies
and recommendations. Civil society is a reposi-
tory of knowledge, learning and critical valida-
tion of policies that is not sufficiently included
 The EU-US Development Dialogue: Past, Present and Future
Endnotes
1 EC (1990), Transatlantic Declaration on EC-US Relations,
1990. Available at http://eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/trans_declara-
tion_90_en.pdf [last accessed, 18 May 2013]
2 Burwell, Frances (2003), Rethinking the New Transatlantic
Agenda. Paper prepared for the European Union Studies Associa-
tion meeting, March 27-29, 2003.
3 Pollack, Mark (2005), The New Transatlantic Agenda at Ten:
Ref lections on an Experiment in International Governance. Journal
of Common Market Studies, Vol. 43, No. 5, p. 899-919.
4 EC (2005), A New Transatlantic Agenda for Development.
Speech by Louis Michel, EU Commissioner for Development and
Humanitarian Aid.
5 EU (2010), EU-US Development Dialogue: Roadmap on the
Millennium Development Goals in 2010-2011.
6 Chandy, Laurence; Gertz, Geoffrey (2011), Poverty in Num-
bers: The Changing State of Global Poverty from 2005 to 2015.
Policy Brief 2011-1; Brookings: Washington DC.
Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi)
Reinhardtstr. 
 Berlin
Phone: + ·  ·   -
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gppi@gppi.net • www.gppi.net
8
7 US Department of State (2010), Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review (QDDR): Leading through Civilian Power. US
Department of State: Washington DC.
8 These observations stem from interviews with EU and US of-
ficials conducted in January and March 2013.
9 EC (2012), Working arrangements between Commission Services
and the European External Actions Service (EEAS) in relation to ex-
ternal relations issues, SEC (2012) 48, Ares (2012) 41133.
10 Anderson, William (2011), The U.S.-EU High Level Develop-
ment Dialogue: Building on the Legacy of the Marshall Plan. Policy
Brief, German Marshall Fund of the United States: Washington DC
This paper was prepared for the Transatlantic
Civil Society Dialogue, a joint effort of the Global
Public Policy Institute, InterAction and Saferworld.
The project is co-funded by the European Union.
SECURITY &
DEVELOPMENT
A TRANSATLANTIC CIVIL SOCIETY DIALOGUE
The views expressed in this publication are those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the Global Public Policy Institute, InterAction,
Saferworld or the European Union.