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Sam Regonini

Philosophy of Sport

April 15, 2011

Definition of Sport

“Sport permeates any number of levels of contemporary society, and it touches upon and

deeply influences such disparate elements as status, race relations, business life, automotive

design, clothing styles, the concept of hero, language, and ethical values. For better or worse it

gives form and substance to much in American life” (Loy 24). Sport, as Loy points out in his

article “The Nature of Sport: A Definitional Effort,” is a social institution in Western culture

because it has become so popular. As seen in the above quote, sport is not only extremely

popular but also influential in the shaping and developing of Western culture. It seems that, due

to its influential power, sport ought to be defined in order to enable people to understand the

different layers and influences of Western society. This is no easy task, but through many essays,

critiques, and reformations from philosophers dedicated to understanding sport, most notably

Bernard Suits, a seemingly workable definition has been found.

In Western culture, and more specifically America, a great deal of play (a term of great

importance later in this paper) time exists and for most is filled by some sort of hobby or sport.

The difference between the two has been contested especially in regards to borderline activities

such as NASCAR, cheerleading, billiards, and fishing. This confusion stems from a lack of clear

defining characteristics of sport compared to hobbies, and therefore demands a definition to

settle these situations.

The first step to take in creating a definition is to find if defining the term, in this case

sport, is possible. Graham McFee attempts to show that defining sport is not only impossible but
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also undesirable. McFee critiques two common views of definitions: “1. If one does not have a

definition of such-and-such, then one does not understand such-and-such and 2. If one has a

definition of such-and-such then one understands such-and-such” (McFee 22). To refute the first

point he argues that it is possible to understand a concept without being able to define it (a point

that holds weight) so therefore one can understand such-and-such without being able to define

such-and-such. His argument loses validity with his refutation of the second point. He says that

in order to use a definition, one must have an understanding of the concept. At best, he says,

definitions offer a new word for something already understood which does not aid in

understanding. Since definitions do nothing to aid in understanding, there is no use for them.

Instead, the use of examples suffices in providing clarity in understanding. In saying this, he

overlooks the times when examples are disputed, such as the activities mentioned in the second

paragraph, and a definition that provides clear characteristics becomes necessary. If Bubba were

to claim that auto racing is a sport but Maxwell disagrees claiming a mistake in the judgment of

the sporting characteristics of NASCAR, then understanding would be of little use to them in

reconciling this discrepancy. Bubba and Maxwell would have to work together to create a

definition, based on their understandings of sport, that provides clear standards so that they may

objectively decide if NASCAR is a sport. Basic understanding may be possible without a

definition, but to have a clear grasp and the ability to apply it to experiences, as is the job of

philosophy, one must have a definition.

Now that it is obvious a clear definition is necessary for full understanding, the difficult

process of creating a strict, workable definition for an abstract concept must begin. For assistance

in developing this definition, this paper will rely heavily on the work of Bernard Suits, a

distinguished philosopher of sport that has greatly contributed to the task ahead of us. Suits’ first
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attempt at a definition of sport occurred in his essay titled “The Elements of Sport” which

appeared the anthology The Philosophy of Sport (A Collection of Original Essays) published in

1973 (Suits “The Elements of Sport” 48). Suits begins his article by defining games by finding

four elements of games. The first element is what he calls the pre-lusory goal. The pre-lusory

goal is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs without regard to how this is to happen.

There is a difference between winning and achieving the pre-lusory goal; winning involves

playing by the rules while achieving the pre-lusory goal does not take into account rules. The

pre-lusory goal of golf is to the get ball into the cup, but not necessarily by using a golf club. The

second element of sport is lusory means, or the means permitted by the rules. The lusory means

provide the rules for achieving the pre-lusory goal, so only hitting the golf ball with a golf club

would be the lusory means of golf. These rules must also prohibit the use of more efficient in

favor of less efficient means, known as constitutive rules. Running the ball up to the green and

then dropping it into the hole would be a much more efficient way of getting the ball into the cup

then hitting the ball with a golf club. The final element of games is that these constitutive rules

must be accepted just because they make the activity possible, which is called the lusory attitude.

Golf would not be golf if the more efficient means of running the ball up the hole and dropping it

in the cup was accepted (55).

Suits continues his article by stating that sports are essentially games with four

distinguishing characteristics. The first characteristic is that the game be that of skill rather than

that of chance. He says a major requirement in sports is that what the participants do must be

admirable in some respect and that the exercise of any skill will elicit some degree of admiration

(58). The second characteristic is that the skill exhibited must be physical, a critical distinction

between sport and other activities. Chess and bridge are not sports because they do not require
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physical skill. The third and fourth characteristics are that the game must have a wide following

and the following achieve a certain level of stability, respectively. The former to rule out made-

up games between small groups of people and the latter is to prevent against fads. Suits could,

with his elements of games and sports, look at any activity and decide if it was in fact a sport or

not, a major development in the definition of sport.

Of course like any new idea, Suits’ definition of game and sport was open for criticism.

Frank McBride wrote a critique essay to “The Elements of Sport” that targeted the narrowness

and broadness of Suits’ definition (McBride 49). McBride states that he finds Suits’ definition

remarkable, but only in describing a large class of cases and not for all cases. McBride provides

instances where he feels Suits’ definition is to narrow and where it is too broad. McBride quotes

a passage from Norman Malcolm, which speaks of a game in which three people imitate the

solar system, one being the sun and walking at a steady pace across a field, one being the earth

and circling the sun at a trot, and the third being the moon and running around the earth. This is

considered a game by Malcolm, yet does not have a “distinguishable pre-lusory goal, no

specification of means, not constitutive rules prohibiting the use of more over less efficient

means and no choice as to why the rules are accepted but only the choice to play or not” (50).

McBride then uses the example of marathoning, not thought of as a game, to show broadness

since it does fit the criteria of a game yet to most participants it is not a game or even a race (52).

Suits would reply to McBride’s critique in an article titled “On McBride on the Definition

of Games” (Suits “On McBride” 55). Suits has two main arguments against McBride’s ideas;

first that the motives of the participants entering the activity have a great bearing on whether or

not the activity is a game and the second point is that an activity is or is not a game simply

because it is or is not called a game. Suits questions the motives of both the marathoners and the
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players of Malcolm’s game, saying that if their intentions were to do something other than the

pre-lusory goal, possibly continuing tradition in the marathon and representing the solar system

in Malcolm’s game, then the activity is not a game but something else. Suits also brings up the

point that even though activities are called games, Malcolm calls the solar system activity a

game, or not games, races are generally not called games, this has no bearing on whether or not

the activity is in fact a game; a definition proves an activity to be a game, not whether the

activity is commonly referred to as a game (55-59). This critique with McBride helps to better

explain Suits’ elements of games and also advances the definition of sport.

After fifteen years of thought and critiques, Suits developed a new definition of sport in

order to include the new finding that not all games are sports. In his article “Tricky Triad:

Games, Play, and Sport” Suits puts forth a definition with a Venn diagram in order to explain the

interrelationship between play games and sports. Suits starts with play putting forth two types of

play, primitive and sophisticated. Primitive play is free activity that is enjoyed because of the

new experiences felt and sophisticated play is play that occurs in games and that seeks to develop

skills. Suits introduces a new and more correct idea about sports: sports are competitive athletic

events and can take the form of either games or performances. This is an insightful and smart

move on Suits’ part because it allows for a wider variety or activities to be called sport, while

still recognizing the differences among sports. It is clear that there is a difference between game

sports like baseball and basketball and performance sports like diving or gymnastics. Game

sports fit the definition of games stated above and are characterized by artificial barriers that

must be overcome by rule-based skill. Performance sports do not fit the definition of games

because they seek to achieve an ideal rather than overcome an obstacle. He keeps the same

definition for games in this article but now, as stated before, does not make sports be contained
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entirely in the realm of game. Anything area in the Venn diagram outside of play is a

professional activity in which the participants are paid and anywhere outside of games but inside

of sports is part of the new domain of performance sports (Suits “Tricky Triad” 29-35). This

provides an excellent description of the way in which play, game, and sport are related and

allows distinction between performances and games among sports.

I would submit Suits got it right in “Tricky Triad” but think it necessary to add more

criteria for sport. I will attempt to lay out the definition of sport with respect to the characteristics

set forth by Loy in the aforementioned article. Sport, as Loy puts it, is a playful activity that is

voluntary, separate from everyday life, has an uncertain ending, produces no material goods, is

governed by rules (Loy does not take into account the difference between the constitutive rules

of games and the rules of skill that Suits points out but this paper will), and has a set way to

determine a winner (Loy 17-19). Loy says that sports share these traits with games, which does

not bring much objection if we keep Suits’ diagram in mind. Loy also requires, like Suits, that

sport be institutionalized, or have a wide following over a long period of time. This protects

against the more physical backyard games from entering the realm of sport.

Loy suggests that the main trait that separates sport from game is that sport demands “the

demonstration of physical prowess” (Loy 20). This means that participants in sport must

demonstrate exceptional physical ability, physical skill, and physical strength. Billiards would

not be granted sport status according to this criterion since the main activity of this game deals

with understanding angles and force along with the ability to see shots. Physical skill and ability

only play a minor role in billiards. I would like to put forth my own defining characteristic that

deals with the same idea of physical prowess. The activity done during sport must not only

demonstrate physical prowess but the majority of work (in the sense of physics) must be done by
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the athlete. This can be seen in the activity of a basketball player. The player must do the work to

move themselves up and down the court and must do work on the ball in order to make a basket,

pass or dribble. This characteristic would mean that NASCAR is not a sport since the majority of

work is done by the engine of the car, even though superior strength and skill are necessary to

drive the cars. Other activities that could not be considered sports are sailing, dirt bikes,

snowmobiling, flying, fishing and archery or shooting.

This definition eliminates some activities that have generally been considered sports in

the past, such as fishing or shooting, but we must remember Suits’ warning to McBride.

Sometimes we give the wrong name to certain activities and the ultimate test is to see if the

activity fits the definition rather than what it is generally considered. This principle can be seen

with glass. For a long time glass was thought to be in the solid state but not scientists have

discovered that class is in fact a super cooled liquid. Just because glass was called a solid did not

make it a solid. This same principle applies to sports. Only games or performances with Loy’s

characteristics of games (which can still encompass Suits’ difference between games and

performances), an institutionalized following, and that demonstrate physical prowess on the part

of the athlete and force him or her to do the majority of the work can be considered sports.
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Works Cited

Loy, Jr., John W. "The Nature of Sport: A Deffinital Effort." 1968. Philosophy of Sport: Critical

Readings, Crucial Issues. By M. Andrew Holowchak. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice

Hall, 2002. 16-26. Print.

McBride, Frank. "A Critique of Mr. Suits' Definition of Game Playing." 1979. Philosophic

Inquiry in Sport. By William John Morgan and Klaus V. Meier. Champaign, IL: Human

Kinetics, 1988. 49-53. Print.

McFee, Graham. Sport, Rules, and Values: Philosophical Investigations into the Nature of Sport.

London: Taylor & Francis, 2004. Electronic.

Suits, Bernard. "On McBride on the Definition of Games." 1981. Philosophic Inquiry in Sport.

By William John Morgan and Klaus V. Meier. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 1988.

55-61. Print.

Suits, Bernard. "The Elements of Sport." The Philosophy of Sport: A Collection of Original

Essays. By Robert G. Osterhoudt. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas, 1973. 48-63. Print.

Suits, Bernard. "Tricky Triad: Games, Play, and Sport." 1988. Philosophy of Sport: Critical

Readings, Crucial Issues. By M. Andrew Holowchak. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice

Hall, 2002. 29-36. Print.