Case # 71 People vs.

Valenzuela

Contention of the State

Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon were charged and convicted of the
crime of consummated theft. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended by the
security guard of Super Sale Club after stealing cases of Tide detergent from said
establishment.

Defense of the Accused

Petitioner concedes having performed the felonious acts imputed against him,
but instead insists that as a result, he should be adjudged guilty of frustrated theft only,
not the felony in its consummated stage of which he was convicted. Petitioner argues
that at the time of he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely
dispose of the articles stolen.

Ruling:

The Revised Penal Code provisions on theft have not been designed in such
fashion as to accommodate the Adiao, Dio and Empelis rulings. Again, there is no
language in Article 308 that expressly or impliedly allows that the “free disposition of the
items stolen” is in any way determinative of whether the crime of theft has been
produced. The Court thus concludes that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no
crime of frustrated theft.

*Adiao ruling: Theft was consummated by the actual possession of the property
belonging to another.

*Dio ruling: The ability of the actor to freely dispose of the items stolen at the time of
apprehension is determinative as to whether the theft is consummated of frustrated.

*Empelis ruling: The crime was only frustrated because the actors were not able to
perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the felon as a
consequence.

Case # 72. Miranda vs People

Contention of the State:

Anita Miranda was convicted of qualified theft by the RTC of Manila, Branch 20.

Miranda was employed as bookkeeper in Video City Commercial, Inc. and Viva
Videocity, Inc. As such she was entrusted and had access to the financial records,
documents and checks and transactions of the aforesaid firm. Miranda took and stole
a total amount of Php797, 187.85 from the firm by making herself the payee in forty-two
checks in the account of Video City and Jefferson Tan.

Defense of the Accused:

Petitioner insists that she should not have been convicted of qualified theft as the
prosecution failed to prove the private complainant’s absolute ownership of the thing
stolen.

Ruling:

The subject of the crime of theft is any personal property belonging to another.
Hence, as long as the property taken does not belong to the accused who has a valid
claim there over, it is immaterial whether said offender stole it from the owner, a mere
possessor, or even a thief of the property.

Case # 73. People vs. Asamuddin

Contention of the State:

Consolidated cases for violation of RA 6539, the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as

amended, and Qualified Theft were filed against accused Julkipli Asamuddin.

Emelina hired appellant as messenger in E. Gloria Money Charger with the main
function of delivering local or foreign currencies to clients or other money changers.
Assigned to appellant to be used in the performance of his work is a blue Honda XRM
motorcycle. On July 11, 2007, Emelina handed the appellant the cash amount of Php
800,00.00, and various foreign denominations with a peso value of Php 277, 995.00.
Asamuddin was instructed to bring the currencies to her friend Rina Rosalial. The same
was not delivered to Rosalina.

Defense of the Accused:

Appellant denies the accusations. Appellant asserts that he cannot be

convicted of Qualified Theft because his employment as messenger did not create a
fiduciary relationship that will qualify the crime of theft.

Ruling:

All the elements of Qualified Theft is present in the instant case. A fiduciary
relationship between appellant and Emelina, his employer, existed. Emelina testified
that she does not have proof that he handed to appellant Php 800,00.00 and various
foreign currency on July 11, 2007 because of her total trust and high degree of
confidence on appellant. This exhibited the trust and confidence of Emelina to the
appellant which he exploited to enrich himself to the damage and prejudice of the
former.
 Case # 74. People vs. Gulinao

Contention of the State:

Gulinao shot Dr Chua in the act of taking and stealing a Toyota Corona Silver
Edition, colored blue, then left. Gulinao went back to get Dr Chua’s diamond ring. He
was convicted of illegal possession of firearm, carnapping, and robbery.

Defense of the Accused:

The accused-appellant contends that the Trial Court gravely erred in finding him
guilty of robbery under article 294, paragraph 5, of The Revised Penal Code.

Ruling:

Gulinao should have been convicted of the crime of theft under Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code, not robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of
a person under par. 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. The taking of the ring of
Dr. Chua was merely an afterthought. The force employed in the killing of Dr. Chua has
no bearing on the taking of his ring.

Case # 75. Santos vs. People

Contention of the state:

Petitioner Santos was originally charged with Estafa for failure to deliver the car of
private respondent which he allegedly repaired and re-painted after two months from
the time private respondent left her car in his care. Petitioner was found guilty and
convicted of Estafa but on appeal, his conviction was affirmed but modified and found
the accused guilty of qualified theft but since the object of the crime which is a car was
not alleged as a qualifying circumstance, it is only an aggravating circumstance for the
crime theft once proven, therefore, the accused was charged with the crime of theft
with 1 aggravating and no mitigating circumstance.

Defense of the accused:

That the petitioner bought the car from private respondent showing his copy of the
deed of sale with right to repurchase and that there was no intent to gain at the time of
the taking of the vehicle so there was no crime committed.

Ruling:

Guilty. Although the information charged the petitioner with estafa, the crime
committed was theft. It is settled that what controls is not the designation of the offense
but the description thereof as alleged in the information. And as described therein, the
offense imputed to Santos contains all the essential elements of theft, to wit: (1) that
there be a taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3)
that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the
consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of
violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things.

Furthermore, the SC held that the subsequent appropriation by the accused of the
thing earlier delivered to him supplied the third element that made the crime theft
instead of estafa.

Case # 76. Laurel vs. Abrogar

Contention of the State:

Laurel was charged with Theft under Art. 308 of the RPC for allegedly taking,
stealing, and using PLDT's international long distance calls by conducting International
Simple Resale (ISR) – “a method of outing and completing international long-distance
calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency which connect directly
to the local/domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined”.
PLDT alleged that this service was stolen from them using their own equipment and
caused damage to them amounting to P20,370,651.92. PLDT alleges that the
international calls and business of providing telecommunication or telephone service
are personal properties capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft.

Defense of the accused:

He averred that the Revised Penal Code, or any other special penal law for that
matter, does not prohibit ISR operations. He claimed that telephone calls with the use of
PLDT telephone lines, whether domestic or international, belong to the persons making
the call, not to PLDT. He argued that the caller merely uses the facilities of PLDT, and
what the latter owns are the telecommunication infrastructures or facilities through
which the call is made. He also asserted that PLDT is compensated for the caller’s use of
its facilities by way of rental; for an outgoing overseas call, PLDT charges the caller per
minute, based on the duration of the call. Thus, no personal property was stolen from
PLDT. According to Laurel, the P20,370,651.92 stated in the Information, if anything,
represents the rental for the use of PLDT facilities, and not the value of anything owned
by it.

Ruling:

The petitioner is not charged, under the Amended Information, for theft of
telecommunication or telephone services offered by PLDT. Even if he is, the term
"personal property" under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be interpreted
beyond its seams so as to include "telecommunication or telephone services" or
computer services for that matter. The word "service" has a variety of meanings
dependent upon the context, or the sense in which it is used; and, in some instances, it
may include a sale. For instance, the sale of food by restaurants is usually referred to as
"service," although an actual sale is involved. It may also mean the duty or labor to be
rendered by one person to another; performance of labor for the benefit of another. In
the case of PLDT, it is to render local and international telecommunications services and
such other services as authorized by the CPCA issued by the NTC. Even at common law,
neither time nor services may be taken and occupied or appropriated. A service is
generally not considered property and a theft of service would not, therefore,
constitute theft since there can be no caption or asportation. Neither is the
unauthorized use of the equipment and facilities of PLDT by the petitioner theft under
the aforequoted provision of the Revised Penal Code.

Case # 77. Hizon v CA

Contention of the state:

Petitioners were charged with a violation of P.D. 704 illegal fishing with the use of
obnoxious or poisonous substance. Report was received by the Task force Bantay
Dagat that a boat and several small crafts were fishing by muro ami within the shoreline
of Barangay San Rafael of Puerto Princesa. Task force Bantay Dagat immediately
proceeded to the area and found several men fishing in motorized sampans and a big
fishing boat identified as FB/Robinson. They boarded the boat and inspected it with the
consent of the boat captain. In the course of their inspection, the police saw two
foreigners in the captain’s deck. They examined their passports and found them to be
mere photocopies. The police also discovered a large aquarium full of live lapu-lapu
and assorted fish at the bottom of the boat. They checked the license of the boat and
its fishermen and found them to be in order. nonetheless, the policemen brought the
boat captain, the crew and the fishermen to Puerto Princesa for further investigation.
The boat captain was ordered to get random samples of fish from the fish cage of FB/
Robinson for laboratory examination. The samples were delivered to the NBI for
examination to determine the method of catching the same for record or evidentiary
purposes. The Forensic Chemist conducted two tests on the fish samples and found that
they contained sodium cyanide.

Defense of the accused:

Petitioners were arraigned and they pled not guilty to the charge. In their defense, they
claimed that they are legitimate fishermen of the First Fishermen Industries, Inc., a
domestic corporation licensed to engage in fishing. They alleged that they catch fish
by the hook and line method and that they were intimidated by the policemen.
Ruling:

Not guilty. The offense of illegal fishing is committed when a person catches, takes or
gathers or causes to be caught, taken or gathered fish, fishery or aquatic products in
Philippine waters with the use of explosives, electricity, obnoxious or poisonous
substances. The law creates a presumption that illegal fishing has been committed
when: (a) explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or equipment or device for
electric fishing are found in a fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman; or (b)
when fish caught or killed with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances
or by electricity are found in a fishing boat. Under these instances, the boat owner,
operator or fishermen are presumed to have engaged in illegal fishing.

The SC stresses, however, that the statutory presumption is merely prima facie. It cannot,
under the guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude the
accused from presenting his defense to rebut the main fact presumed. At no instance
can the accused be denied the right to rebut the presumption.

Here, after the information was filed in court and petitioners granted bail, petitioners
moved that the fish specimens taken from the FB/ Robinson be re-examined. The trial
court granted the motion. The re-examination revealed that there is negative presence
of sodium cyanide. The absence of cyanide in the second set of fish specimens
supports petitioners claim that they did not use the poison in fishing. Also, the only basis
for the charge of fishing with poisonous substance is the result of the first laboratory test
on the four fish specimens. Apparently, the members of the PNP Maritime Command
and the Task Force Bantay Dagat were the ones engaged in an illegal fishing
expedition. As sharply observed by the Solicitor General, the report received by the
Task Force Bantay Dagat was that a fishing boat was fishing illegally through muro ami
on the waters of San Rafael. Muro ami is made with the use of a big net with sinkers to
make the net submerge in the water with the fishermen surrounding the net. This
method of fishing needs approximately two hundred fishermen to execute. That the
apprehending officers instead discovered were twenty eight fishermen in their sampans
fishing by hook and line. The authorities found nothing on the boat that would have
indicated any form of illegal fishing. And the documents of the boat and the fishermen
were in order. It was only after the fish specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious
circumstances, that petitioners were charged with illegal fishing with the use of
poisonous substances.

Case no. 78. Yongco vs. People.

Contention of the State

The accused, Joel Yongco, Julieto Lanojan and Anecito Tangian, being a security
guard and a truck driver of City Engineer’s office (CEO) was charged of qualified theft
by grave abuse of confidence with conspiracy when they stole and carried away the
unit transmission, boom, differential of Tamaraw and l-beam of Nissan belonging to the
City government of Ilagan.

Facts

Tangian, the truck driver, loaded the stolen items into his truck. Yongco, the security
guard at that time, allowed the Tangian to exit the premises without securing a gate
pass and helped the said driver in loading the items. After the arrival of the stolen items
to the junk shop, Lanojan, another security guard of the CEO, secured the stolen items
into his possession.

Defense of the Accused

Tangian’s defense is that he should not be considered as a conspirator since he merely

innocently obeyed Lanojans instructions on the assumption that the latter was his
superior. In their joint brief, Yongco’s defense is that Tangian and his two other helpers
asked for his assistance which he extended in good faith. Lañojan, on the other hand,
insisted that he cannot be considered as a conspirator since he was not present at the
time of taking.

Ruling

Guilty. Art. 310 of the RPC states that it is qualified theft when it is committed with grave
abuse of confidence. Synthesizing the foregoing provisions, the elements of Qualified
Theft, committed with grave abuse of discretion, can simply be enumerated as follows:

1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;

3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;

4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;

5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against

persons, nor of force upon things; and

6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

As correctly observed by the appellate court, all of the elements of Qualified

Theft are present in this case. There is no dispute that the items which are the subject matter
of this case belong to the CEO of Iligan City. There is no dispute that these items, although
considered "heap of scrap," have not yet been declared unserviceable or waste by the proper
authority or office. There is also no dispute that these items were taken away from the CEO and
were already under complete and effective control of the persons taking the same. Apparently,
the taking of these items was without the consent of the CEO of Iligan City because there was
no gate pass issued to that effect.

Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful
taking by the offender of the thing subject to asportation. Actual gain is irrelevant as the
important consideration is the intent to gain. Since these items were brought to the junk store,
intent to gain becomes obvious. The presumption of animus lucrandi has not been overturned.

It is equally patent that the taking of these items was done with grave abuse of
confidence. The accused in this case, it bears stressing, were guards and drivers with access to
the entrance and exit of the CEO premises. In other words, they enjoyed the trust and
confidence reposed on them by their employer (the City of Iligan) to have access throughout the
CEO premises on account of their respective duties.

Case no. 79. Empelis vs Iac

Contention of the State

The accused was charged of qualified theft after being caught in the act of stealing
fifty coconuts from the coconut plantation of Guillermo Catarining.

Defense of the Accused

It is only simple theft instead of qualified theft.

Ruling

Guilty. Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code states that it is qualified theft if the
property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation. Thus, the
stealing of coconuts when they are still in the tree or deposited on the ground within the
premises is qualified theft. When the coconuts are stolen in any other place, it is simple
theft.

In the case of People vs. Isnain the Supreme Court held that "in the matter of
theft of coconuts, the purpose of the heavier penalty is to encourage and protect the
development of the coconut industry as one of the sources of our national economy.
Unlike rice and sugar cane farms where the range of vision is unobstructed, coconut
groves cannot be efficiently watched because of the nature of the growth of coconut
trees; and without a special measure to protect this kind of property, of will be as it has
been in the past the favorite resort of thieves."
 In the case at bar, petitioners were seen arriving away fifty coconuts while they
were still in the premises of the plantation. They would therefore come within the
definition of qualified theft because the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from
the premises of a plantation.

Case No. 80 Mustang Lumber Inc vs. CA

Contention of the State

The petitioner was charged of illegal possession of lumber in violation of Sec. 68

of PD 705. Acting on information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts and slabs
were seen inside petitioner’s lumberyard, a team of foresters and policeman organized
and sent to conduct surveillance. In the course thereof, the team members saw
coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner’s truck loaded with lumber. The driver
could not produce the required invoices and transport documents. The team seized
the truck together with its cargo and impounded them.

Defense of the Accused

The petitioner argues that the information does not charge an offense, for
possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No.
705

Ruling

The court held that the term ‘lumber’ as used in the information against petitioners,
although not mentioned in express terms as among the prohibited articles
under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705(Revised Forestry Code) must be understood in its
ordinary and common usage. Lumber is to be understood as a processed log or timber.
Even if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items confiscated fall within the
ambit of the said section, and as to them, the information validly charges an offense.
The court held that the petitioners were then correctly charged with the offense of
violating Sec68 of PD No 705 as alleged by the facts in the information.

The court further ruled that the exclusion of lumber from Section 68 would defeat
the very purpose of the law, i.e., to minimize, if not halt, illegal logging that has resulted
in the rapid denudation of our forest resources