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The tangled US-

Taliban-Afghan web
The future of Afghanistan seems to be predicated on a truce by trial
and error
By MATTHEW CROSSTON and SAJAD ABEDI FEBRUARY 24, 2020

Taliban negotiators attend talks in Qatar. Photo: Karim Jaafar / AFP

The United States this month concluded a so-called truce with the Taliban.
Unfortunately, if one bothers to view the actual amorphous details of this
“truce,” then it is fairly obvious that the only political consequences it is
meant to ensure is to give President Donald Trump the opportunity to keep
his pledge to remove American troops from Afghanistan.

The fact that he wants to do this in 2020, a presidential election year,

regardless of whether or not Afghanistan is capable of civilly mending all
internal strife and disagreements, shows just how much this instance of
international negotiation is more about voters in Ohio, Michigan and
Florida than people in Kabul or Kandahar.

But before the various obstacles to real peace are discussed, a few
comments that might allow for a small beacon of potentiality are
appropriate. The presence of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, one of the core
founders of the Taliban, is important in the talks and could help the Taliban
make important decisions in negotiations.

Mullah Baradar is a prominent commander who has a background in the

former Taliban government. His entry into the US-Taliban talks, which
technically began only with the fifth round, could have a major intra-
organizational impact in making the Afghanistan peace process more
substantive.

Since part of the Taliban’s most important decision-making circle has now
come into these talks with the United States, it could result in final
decisions that have more teeth than in the past.

Despite repeated calls by the Afghan government to be allowed into these

initial negotiations with the Taliban, the group has so far refused to
negotiate directly with the government. The US, however, has implicitly
insisted that a deal with the Taliban be conditional on a ceasefire and
ultimately talks between the Taliban and Afghan government. So while the
outcome of the talks without the presence of the Afghan government is
unknowable, the small recent success in Doha might have a positive impact
on accelerating the peace process and could at least de-escalate internal
conflicts with the Taliban.

Unfortunately, this tiny possibility is largely blocked by several significant

difficulties, not just with the conditions of this mini-truce but also when
examining what comes next when the Taliban actually are meant to sit at
the negotiation table across from official representatives of the Afghan
government.

First, right off the bat, it should be emphasized how to date, in the context
of the Taliban’s political approach, the group has negotiated with various
countries, including Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United
States. But any real achievement for peace in Afghanistan has usually been
dashed because the Taliban have not altered their totalitarian nature and
seek absolute supremacy in Afghanistan.

The Taliban disregard not only the official Afghan government but all other
ethnic groups in-country, including Hazaras, Uzbeks and Tajiks. So as long
as there is no attitudinal change in the Taliban in terms of shared authority
across the Afghan governing space, even a real ceasefire is unlikely to
produce long-term political success. But this, alas, is no real ceasefire.

Second, logically, the truce declares that hostilities must cease for one week
before the next steps can begin. Alas, a true ceasefire was deemed too
controversial and too difficult to ensure, thus leaving the truce dead in the
water before it even began. So the sides settled on the term “significant
violence reduction” instead of “ceasefire.”

How “significant” is defined is unclear, given that the Taliban averaged

nearly 75 attacks per day throughout all of 2019. The Taliban, for their part,
are magnanimously promising not to attack “major population centers,
highways, and government institutions,” but reserve the right to get violent
against the formal Afghan government if they suspect it of doing anything
they deem inappropriate.

Third, senior Afghan governmental officials have emphasized that

successfully toning violence down for one week will not mean very much if
this reduction does not hold long-term, as negotiations between Kabul and
the Taliban will undoubtedly be protracted, difficult, and tense.

The US, for its part, has actually pushed back against the Afghan
government for this “unreasonable” expectation, simply saying that while it
 will not support the government any more with boots on the ground, it will
occasionally lend air support against Taliban positions if they get uppity
again and attack the government. Unsurprisingly, the Afghan government
is not exactly thrilled with this assurance.

Fourth, it should be pointed out that this initial truce was inexplicably
concluded between the United States and Taliban jihadists – that is, it was
concluded while excluding any representatives of the formal Afghan
government.

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani remains skeptical about the sincerity of the
Taliban to honor the long-term point of the truce, which is to make them
come to the negotiating table in a civil and amicable manner to engage real
long-term negotiations with the government. His acid test of sincerity is
about the Taliban’s willingness to agree to the regular holding of open, fair
elections, something the Taliban have never agreed to.

So, for those of you keeping score:

• A tri-party negotiation about the future of Afghanistan took place with only
two parties participating in Qatar. The actual government of Afghanistan
was deemed unnecessary.
• The truce is not a real ceasefire and technically allows the Taliban
opportunity to commit violence, as long as it is less violence than usual and
against the “proper” government targets.
• The US is using the agreement as a foundational reason to remove troops
permanently and physically from Afghanistan, even though the actual
agreement lasts only seven days.
• The truce is meant to settle peacefully the future political construction of
Afghanistan, even though there is no language in it about its territorial
integrity or how to hold real elections.
• True success likely means very close monitoring and third party oversight
of the continued negotiations, something the United States pledges to do
only cursorily.

Thus, concerning the effects of this US effort on the future of Afghanistan,

there seems to be no peace with US troops present and no prospects for
peace with US troops removed.
For what it is worth, many local actors in Afghanistan believe the only thing
that carries the chance of bringing peace is the withdrawal of foreign forces,
especially the United States. To many locals, the Americans de facto
brought about Islamic State (ISIS), thereby worsening an already bad
domestic situation. They believe the reality is that the Taliban have been
the most effective in trying to keep Afghanistan secure from Islamic State,
but ISIS’ presence in the country continues to be destabilizing. So as long as
US troops are in Afghanistan, ISIS will continue to be a problem.

Also, as long as US troops are in Afghanistan, the Afghan Army will not be
powerful because it is de facto dependent on US leadership.

Thus, ironically, there is a significant portion of Afghan society currently

agreeing with Trump, even if his actions are completely self-serving for the
American electoral cycle: namely, the United States is the cause of
insecurity in Afghanistan and if it wants to be independent and at peace,
there is no other way than to try a future era without the US actively
involved.

As a result, the future of Afghanistan seems to be predicated on a truce by

trial and error.

MATTHEW CROSSTON
Matthew Crosston is Executive Vice Chairman of
ModernDiplomacy.eu and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for
National Security Studies

SAJAD ABEDI
Sajad Abedi is a Resident Fellow at a National Defense and Security
Think-Tank in Iran and a Postdoctoral Student at University of
Tehran. Also he is Advisory Board of Cyber Security Research Center
at Islamic Azad University.

https://asiatimes.com/2020/02/the-tangled-us-taliban-afghan-web/