Persons and Family Relations PDF

PERSONS
AND FAMILY RELATIONS DIGESTS

Fourth Year Batch (2016-‐2017)
Vice Dean Marciano Delson

EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS (Article 2) FACTS: The RTC found the petitioners guilty of gross negligence. On
appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in
Tanada v. Tuvera a decision, which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On
G.R. No. L-63915; April 24, 1985
September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal,
ESCOLIN J.
petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
Facts: Petitioners seek to compel respondents to publish or cause the reconsideration but it was denied in the Sept. 30, 1987 Resolution.
publication of various Presidential Decrees, Letters of Instructions, General Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but it
Orders, Proclamations, Executive Orders, Letters of Implementation and was also denied in the October 27, 1987 Resolution. Petitioner now seeks to
Administrative Orders on the ground that for laws to be valid and annul the said 2 resolutions of the CA. Petitioner argues that the rule
enforceable, they must be published in the Official Gazette. Respondents on enunciated in the Habaluyas case cannot be applied in this case because of
the other hand contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine
its non-publication in the Official Gazette.
qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves
provide for their own effectivity dates.
ISSUE: Does the Habaluyas case (Supreme Court decision) need to be
Issue: Is publication an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of laws published in the Official Gazette before they can be applied to the case at
bar?
Ruling: Yes. Publication is still required despite the fact that the laws have
special provisions as to their date of effectivity.
HELD: No, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court
Respondents' argument is logically correct only insofar as it equates the
decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a
effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other
statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as
said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated,
and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s)
The phrase "unless otherwise provided by law" refers to the 15-day period and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA)
and not to the requirement of publication. and law journals. CA correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Case,
that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public
reconsideration cannot be extended.
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no PEOPLE v. QUE PO LAY
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." G.R. No. L-6791, 29 March 1954
MONTEMAYOR, J:
De Roy vs. CA
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
FACTS: Que Po Lay was found guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No.
CORTES, J.:
20 due to the possession of foreign exchange amounting to $7000 and failing
to sell it to Central Bank through its agents within one day following its
1
receipt. Que Po Lay appealed and contended that such circular has no force
because it was not published in the Official Gazette at the time of the act. On
the other hand, the Solicitor general answered and said that such circular In April 2003, NPC published an invitation for the pre-qualification of bidders
requires no publication. for the public sale of its scrap ACSR cables. Respondent Pinatubo
Commercial, a trader of scrap materials such as copper, aluminum, steel and
ISSUE: Should circulars of general applicability be published in order be other ferrous and non-ferrous materials, submitted a pre-qualification form to
effective? NPC, but application for pre-qualification had been denied for not being a
“partnership[s] or corporation[s] that directly use aluminum as the raw
HELD: Yes the circulars shall be published. material in producing finished products xxx.” Petitioner asked for
reconsideration but NPC denied it.
It is based on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound
by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular
must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of
said contents and its penalties. Pinatubo then filed a petition in the RTC for the annulment of NPC Circular
No. 99-75 for being unconstitutional as it violated, among others, of the due
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is being issued for the implementation of process clauses of the Constitution. The RTC upheld Pinatubos position and
the law authorizing its issuance. As a rule, circulars and regulations declared items 3 and 3.1 of the circular unconstitutional. The RTC ruled that
especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which it was violative of substantive due process because the circular had not been
prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming published.
effective.
Therefore, for such circular to be effective, it must be published.

NPC appealed the decision and insists that there was no need to publish the
NPC VS PINATUBO COMMERCIAL circular since it was not of general application. It was addressed only to
G.R. No. 176006; March 26, 2010 particular persons or class of persons, namely the disposal committees,
J. CORONA heads of offices, regional and all other officials involved in the disposition of
ACSRs.
FACTS: NPC Circular No. 99-75 dated October 8, 1999 set the guidelines in ISSUE: Is the NPC Circular No. 99-75 required to be published in compliance
the disposal of scrap aluminum conductor steel-reinforced or ACSRs in order with due process clause of the Constitution?
to decongest and maintain good housekeeping in NPC installations and to
generate additional income for NPC. Items 3 and 3.1 of the circular provide: RULING: No. The NPC Circular No. 99-75 remained valid despite absence of
publication.
3. QUALIFIED BIDDERS
Tañada v. Tuvera stressed the need for publication in order for
3.1 Qualified bidders envisioned in this circular are statutes and administrative rules and regulations to have binding force and
partnerships or corporations that directly use effect, viz.:
aluminum as the raw material in producing finished x x x all statutes, including those of local application
products either purely or partly out of aluminum, or and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
their duly appointed representatives. These bidders
after publication unless a different effectivity is fixed by the
may be based locally or overseas. legislature.
2
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS DIGESTS

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and testified before the respondent Committees regarding the NBN-ZTE project.
executive orders promulgated by the President in the He disclosed that COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him 200
exercise of legislative power or, at present, directly conferred million pesos in exchange for his approval of the said project. He narrated
by the Constitution, Administrative Rules and Regulations
further that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of the bribery
must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. attempt and she instructed him not to accept the bribe. When he was further
probed on President Arroyo, he invoked “executive privilege.”
Tañada, however, qualified that:
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal He was again required to testify but he did not appear. The
in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of respondent Committees issued a show-cause letter requiring him to explain
the administrative agency and not the public, need not be why he should not be cited in contempt. However, the Commitees found his
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called explanation unsatisfactorily. A contempt order was issued against him and
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors ordering his arrest.
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties. Petitioner contended that the contempt order was not issued properly
because they violated Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution since their
In this case, NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be published since it inquiry was not in accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure."
was merely an internal rule or regulation. It did not purport to enforce or
implement an existing law but was merely a directive issued by the NPC Issue: Is the Senate required to publish its Rules of Procedure even if the
President to his subordinates to regulate the proper and efficient disposal of same was published in 1995 and 2006?
scrap ACSRs to qualified bidders. Thus, NPC Circular No. 99-75 defined the
responsibilities of the different NPC personnel in the disposal, pre- Ruling: Yes, the Senate is required to publish its Rules of Procedure.
qualification, bidding and award of scrap ACSRS. All these guidelines were
The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7)
addressed to the NPC personnel involved in the bidding and award of scrap
ACSRs. It did not, in any way, affect the rights of the public in general or of days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter
any other person not involved in the bidding process. Assuming it affected does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they
individual rights, it did so only remotely, indirectly and incidentally. are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two
sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative
THUS, being a mere internal rule or regulation affecting NPC personnel only, inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next
the NPC Circular No. 99-75 need not be published and will remained valid Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which
despite absence of such.
come within the rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring
ROMULO L. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules
G.R. No. 180643; March 25, 2008 for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses
or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
Facts: Petitioner Romulo Neri, the Secretary of the DOTC, appeared and Hence, the Senate must publish the Rules of Procedure.
3
their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not be
published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the
Pimentel vs. Senate Committee of the Whole rules can take effect.
G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011
CARPIO, J.:
In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole
Facts: Senator Panfilo Lacson delivered a privilege speech entitled Kaban ng affect only members of the Senate since the proceedings involve the
Bayan, Bantayan. Senator Lacson’s privilege speech was centered on the Senates exercise of its disciplinary power over one of its members. Clearly,
congressional insertion in the 20008 General Appropriations Act of the P200 the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to the Senate.
million budget for the construction of the President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue However, Section 81, Rule 15 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Extension from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Paranaque City Whole provides:
and another P200 million for the the extension of C-5 road including ROW.
Sec. 81. EFFECTIVITY. These Rules shall be effective after publication in
Senator Lacson further stated that the double insertion for the C-5 Road 29
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
Extension Project was made by the then Senate President Villar. Senator
Madrigal then introduced a Resolution to direct the matter to the Committee Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
on Ethics. The Ethics Committee was reorganized and Senator Lacson was Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules can
elected as the Chairperson. Thereafter, a new Rules of the Senate take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution,
Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Committee Rules) was adopted by publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required
because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. The majority of the
senate. The Committee Rules was published in the Official Gazette.
members of the Senate approved the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole, and the publication requirement which they adopted should be
Due to the allegations that the Ethics Committee will not be able to act fairly
considered as the will of the majority. Respondent cannot dispense with the
on the case. Senator Lacson move that the investigation be done by the publication requirement just because the Rules of the Ethics Committee had
senate as a whole. The senate the adopted new amendments on the Rules already been published in the Official Gazette. To reiterate, the Rules of the
of the Senate Committee of the Whole. Senator Pimentel then raised the Senate Committee of the Whole expressly require publication before the
issue on the need to publish the proposed amended Rules of the Senate Rules can take effect. To comply with due process requirements, the Senate
Committee of the Whole. Petitioners then filed a petition for prohibition with must follow its own internal rules if the rights of its own members are
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary affected.
restraining order to the Supreme Court alleging among others that the
Hence, the proposed amended Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole
Senate Committee violated the due process clause of the Constitution when
must be published.
it refused to publish the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. The
respondents then argued that The Rules of the Ethics Committee, which IGNORANCE OF THE LAW (Article 3)
have been duly published and adopted, allow the adoption of supplementary
rules to govern adjudicatory hearings. GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
Issue: Is there a need to publish the proposed amended Rules of the Senate G.R. No. 138322; October 2, 2001
Committee of the Whole for it to be effective? PANGANIBAN, J.:
Held: Yes, the proposed amended Rules of the Senate Committee of the FACTS:Respondent Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an
Whole must be published. Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together
as husband and wife in Australia before a decree of divorce, purportedly
The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court was issued
House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect only
4

on May 18, 1989. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan and Bulacan. Then, the team proceeded to
citizen. Petitioner Garcia, a Filipina, and respondent were married on the Integrated National Police Central Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where
January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. they saw petitioner as he was about to board a tricycle. SPO2 Disuanco and
In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as single his team approached petitioner. They put him under arrest, informed him of
and Filipino. his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. Found tucked in his waist
was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial Number 52315 with five (5) live
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without ammunition.
prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the Petitioner was brought to the police station for questioning. A verification of
ground of bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at
the subject firearm at the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame
the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned
of respondent’s marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997. revealed that it was not issued to the petitioner but to another person.
Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of firearm and
ISSUE: Are foreign laws covered by Article 3 of the Civil Code? ammunition under PD No. 1866 as amended.
HELD: No. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our On May 6, 1998 trial court found petitioner guilty as charged and sentenced
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the him to suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum plus fine.
foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the Petitioner moved to reconsider but his motion was denied. He appealed to
alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not the CA. On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed the RTC disposition.
take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts,
both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and SC affirmed CA’s decision.
proven according to our law on evidence.
Issue: Should RA 8249, reducing the penalty provided in PD 1866, be given
retroactive effect?
PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF LAWS (Article 4) Ruling: YES. Petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition under the first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No.
VALEROSO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 1866, as amended. It provides that the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
GR no. 164815. February 22, 2008. maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person
REYES, J. who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any
firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
Facts: On July 10, 1996, SPO2 Antonio Disuanco of the Criminal
Investigation Section Division, Central Police District Command received a P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time petitioner
dispatch order which directed him and three (3) other personnel to serve a committed the offense on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended
warrant of arrest against petitioner in a case for kidnapping with ransom. P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial
After briefing, team conducted necessary surveillance on petitioner, checking court. The present law now states:
5
Subsequently, the subdivision developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed on
the mortgage. As highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, the bank became
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, owner of the lots. They later asked the buyers of the lots to pay again the
Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or purchase price of the said property.
Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in
the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty The HLURB, invoking P.D. 957, ruled that PNB - without prejudice to seeking
of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of relief against Marikina Village, Inc. - may collect from private respondents
only the "remaining amortizations, in accordance with the land purchase
not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000) shall be
agreements they had previously entered into with" Marikina Village, Inc., and
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, cannot compel private respondents to pay all over again for the lots they had
deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low-powered already bought from said subdivision developer.
firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other
firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or ISSUE: May a buyer of a property at a foreclosure sale dispossess prior
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in purchasers on installment of individual lots therein, or compel them to pay
the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, again for the lots which they previously bought from the defaulting
That no other crime was committed. mortgagor-subdivision developer, on the theory that P.D. 957, "The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree", is not applicable
to the mortgage contract in question, the same having been executed prior to
the enactment of P.D. 957?
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest
they acquire the character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, HELD: NO. They cannot disposses the prior purchasers. Normally, pursuant
however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused. According to Mr. to Article 4 of the Civil Code, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless
Chief Justice Araullo, this is not as a right of the offender, but founded on the the contrary is provided." However, it is obvious and indubitable that P.D.
very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the commination 957 was intended to cover even those real estate mortgages, like the one at
of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on issue here, executed prior to its enactment, and such intent (as succinctly
political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice. captured in the preamble quoted below) must be given effect if the laudable
purpose of protecting innocent purchasers is to be achieve:
Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the
same is still advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, yet
is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period from reclusion the same can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law to
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866. protect innocent lot buyers from scheming subdivision developers. As
between these small lot buyers and the gigantic financial institutions which
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
G.R. No. 104528; January 18, 1996 the developers deal with, it is obvious that the law - as an instrument of social
PANGANIBAN, J.: justice - must favors the weak. Indeed, the petitioner Bank had at its disposal
vast resources with which it could adequately protect its loan activities, and
FACTS: The private respondents in this case were buyers on installment of therefore is presumed to have conducted the usual "due diligence" checking
subdivision lots from Marikina Village, Inc. The subdivision developers, and ascertained (whether thru ocular inspection or other modes of
without the knowledge of the buyers of the lots, entered into a mortgage investigation) the actual status, condition, utilization and occupancy of the
agreement with PNB over the said lots. Private respondents duly complied property offered as collateral. It could not have been unaware that the
with their obligations as lot buyers and constructed their houses on the lots in property had been built on by small lot buyers. On the other hand, private
question. respondents obviously were powerless to discover the attempt of the land
6

developer to hypothecate the property being sold to them. It was precisely in or three years after 1968, the last year that petitioner had withheld taxes
order to deal with this kind of situation that P.D. 957 was enacted, its very under General Circular No. V-334. The assessment and demand on
essence and intendment being to provide a protective mantle over helpless petitioner to pay deficiency withholding income tax was also made three
citizens who may fall prey to the razzmatazz of what P.D. 957 termed years after 1968 for a period of time commencing in 1965. The company was
"unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers." no longer in a position to withhold taxes due from foreign corporations
because it had already remitted all film rentals and had no longer control over
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp vs CTA them when the new circular was issued.
GR No. L-52306; October 12, 1981
Melencio-Herrera, J: Therefore, the CIR cannot issue a deficiency assessment against
petitioner for General Circular 4-71 cannot be applied retroactively.
Facts: ABS-CBN Corporation was engaged in the business of telecasting
local as well as foreign films acquired from foreign corporations not engaged WAIVER OF RIGHTS (Article 6)
in trade or business within the Philippines. Pursuant to General Circular V-
D. M. Consunji, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO
334, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. dutifully withheld and turned over to the
G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001
BIR 30% of ½ of the film rentals paid by it to foreign corporations not
KAPUNAN, J.:
engaged in trade or business in the Philippines. The last year that the
company withheld taxes pursuant to the Circular was in 1968. FACTS: Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14
floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. The investigation
On 27 June 1968, RA 5431 amended Section 24 (b) of the Tax Code report revealed that Jose Juergo was were on board a platform when
increasing the tax rate from 30% to 35%. performing work as carpenter at the elevator core of the said building. Jose
was crushed to death when the platform fell due to removal or looseness of
In 1971, the CIR issued Memorandum Circular No. 4-71, revoking the pin, which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block
General Circular V-334. On the basis of this new Circular, Commissioner of and platform but without a safety lock.
Internal Revenue issued against petitioner a letter of assessment and
demand requiring them to pay deficiency withholding income tax on the Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a
complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.
remitted film rentals for the years 1965 through 1968.
The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of
the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Respondent avers, among
Issue: Can Memorandum Circular No. 4-71 apply retroactively?
others that the widow cannot recover for from the company anymore an civil
damages on the account that it has recovered damages under the Labor
Ruling: No, Memorandum Circular No. 4-71 cannot be applied retroactively.
Code.
Rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner have no After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow and awarded
retroactive application where to so apply them would be prejudicial to actual and compensatory damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC in
taxpayers. toto. D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision.
Herein, the prejudice the company of the retroactive application of ISSUE: Did the private respondent, by recovering death benefits provided
Memorandum Circular 4-71 is beyond question. It was issued only in 1971, for under the Labor Code, waived her rights to claim from the deceased’s
7
employer damages under the Civil Code and is therefore precluded from There is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the
availing the same? elevator crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her
application for death benefits. There is also no showing that private
HELD: NO, the private respondent may still claim from the deceased’s respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the
employer damages under the Civil Code. Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) was filed. On the contrary,
private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights. Accordingly,
The Court declared in Floresca vs.Philex Mining Corporation, following the her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.
rule in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, that an injured worker has a
choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the The Supreme Court remanded to RTC to determine whether the award
Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against decreed in its decision is more than that of the Should the award decreed by
the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already
action simultaneously. Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted
petitioners in said case to proceed with their suit under the Civil Code despite therefrom.
having availed of the benefits provided under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act.
Emeterio Cui v. Arellano University
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between G.R. No. 15127; May 30, 1961
inconsistent remedies, the election is final and bars any action, suit, or CONCEPCION, J.:
proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by
the other party. The first act of election acts as a bar. The choice of a party
between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. FACTS:Emeterio Cui took up preparatory law course in the Arellano
University (Arellano) and thereafter, enrolled in its College of Law. He studied
th
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is an act of law in Arellano up to and including the first semester of 4 year. During his
understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but entire stay in Arellano, Francisco Capistrano – brother of his mother was the
chooses not to assert them. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is dean of College of Law and Legal Counsel. He was also awarded
no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact scholarship grants for scholastic merit, where he was made to sign a contract
negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under
covenant and agreement, to wit:
a mistake or misapprehension of fact. A person makes a knowing and
intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and has
adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision. Waiver "In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I
requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, hereby waive my right to transfer to another school without having
with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly refunded to the University (defendant) the equivalent of my scholarship
and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence. cash.”
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the When he enrolled for last semester of his law studies in Arellano, he failed to
basis for the exception in Floresca vs.Philex Mining Corporation. pay tuition fees because his uncle, having severed his connection with
Arellano and having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the
The private respondent’s case came under the exception because private
College of Law of the Abad Santos University. Thus he also transferred to
respondent was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim
for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed Abad Santos University.
the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police
investigation report and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the After Graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to take the
criminal complaint against petitioner’s personnel. bar examination. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed the
transcript of his records in Arellano but the latter refused to issue such
8

transcript not until he paid back the 1,003.87 – amount refunded by Arellano students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help
University. gifted students in whom society has an established interest or a first lien.
Emeterio Cui hence paid such amount under protest. Philippine National Bank (PNB) v. NEPOMUCENO PRODUCTIONS, INC.,
FILM ADVERTISING MEDIA EXHIBITIONS, INC. (FAME), Luis
ISSUE: Whether the provision of the said contract between Cui and Arellano Nepomuceno, Amparo Nepomuceno, and Jesus Nepomuceno
(Cui waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the G.R. No. 139479; December 27, 2002
Arellano University the equivalent of his scholarships in cash) is valid or not. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.
RULING: No, the said contract is not valid.

FACTS: Petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) granted respondents a 4
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law,
Million Pesos credit line to finance the filming of a movie. Such loan was
public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third
secured by mortgages on respondents real and personal properties.
person with a right recognized by law.
Respondents failed to pay their obligation so petitioner sought foreclosure of
If Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of scholarships the mortgaged properties. The auction sale was initially scheduled on August
and the motives which prompted this office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 12, 1976 but it was re-scheduled several times without need of republication
1949, it should have not entered into a contract of waiver with Cui on of the notice of sale, until finally, the auction sale was held on December 20,
September 10, 1951, which is a direct violation of our Memorandum and an 1976. Respondents filed an action for annulment of foreclosure sale and
open challenge to the authority of the Director of Private Schools because damages with injunction on the ground that the foreclosure sale is null and
the contract was repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty. void for lack of publication and notice of sale. Petitioner on the other hand
alleged that the posting and publication requirements can be dispensed with
Thus conceived, it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also since the parties agreed in writing that the auction sale may proceed without
good morals. Manresa has defined Morals as good customs; those generally need of re-publication and re-posting of the notice of sale.
accepted principles of morality, which have received some kind of social and
practical confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract ISSUE: Whether the parties to the mortgage can validly waive the posting
students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has it received and publication requirements mandated by Act No. 3135
some kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private
HELD: No. the parties cannot waive the posting and publication requirements
institutions as in Arellano University. The University of the Philippines which
provided in Act No. 3135.
implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with reference to the
giving of free scholarships to gifted children, does not require scholars to Act. No. 3135, as amended, governing extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages
reimburse the corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer to on real property provides:
other schools. So also with the leading colleges and universities of the United
States after which our educational practices or policies are patterned. In
these institutions scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant
Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not
less than twenty days in at least three public places of the
9
municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such On November 4 and 11, 1991, presentation of evidence for the defense was
property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall reset as appellant was not ready to testify and he manifested his intention to
also be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks secure the services of a counsel de parte. On March 3, 1992, Atty. Lina-ac
in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city. was relieved as counsel de oficio in view of appellants manifestation and
refusal to cooperate with said counsel. On April 6, 1992 appellant appeared
without counsel, forcing the trial court to appoint another counsel de oficio,
Bella Antonano.
While it is established that rights may be waived, Article 6 of the Civil
Code explicitly provides that such waiver is subject to the condition that it is Subsequently, hearings had to be reset as appellant was still looking for a
not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or counsel de parte. In other instances, that the appellant appeared without
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. What Act No. counsel, the court would appoint a counsel de oficio in his behalf. He now
3135 requires is: (1) the posting of notices of sale in three public places; and, claims that he was deprived of the right to counsel de parte.
(2) the publication of the same in a newspaper of general circulation. Failure
to publish the notice of sale constitutes a jurisdictional defect, which ISSUE: Is the right to counsel de parte absolute or waivable?
invalidates the sale.
HELD: The right to counsel de parte is not absolute and is waivable. In its
The principal object of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is Decision, the trial court noted that appellant simply refused to secure the
not so much to notify the mortgagor as to inform the public generally of the services of a counsel de parte and to present evidence in his defense despite
nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place, and ample opportunity accorded to him.
terms of the sale. Notices are given to secure bidders and prevent a sacrifice
of the property. The statutory requirements of posting and publication are He refused to present any evidence despite several opportunities afforded by
mandated, not for the mortgagors benefit, but for the public or third the Court. As early as the arraignment stage, accused refused to be assisted
persons. In fact, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure by a counsel de oficio from the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) insisting that
proceedings is not even necessary, unless stipulated. It is imbued with public he be assisted by a counsel of his own choice. For several settings, accused
policy considerations and any waiver thereon would be inconsistent with the and his mother were allowed to secure the services of a counsel de parte.
intent and letter of Act No. 3135. However, they failed to present one. Hence, the Court, to avoid further delay
in the proceedings of the case, was constrained to assign a counsel de oficio
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIO SERZO, JR. from the PAO.
G.R. No. 118435. June 20, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.: Accordingly, an accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to be
represented either by a court-appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice.
FACTS: Appellant Mario Serzo was convicted of murder by the lower court While his right to be represented by counsel is immutable, his option to
for killing of Alfredo Alfonso after the latter rescued minors being held by the secure the services of counsel de parte, however, is not absolute. The court
former. is obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the
states and the offended party’s equally important right to speedy and
On February 11, 1991, appellant appeared without a counsel de parte. He adequate justice. Thus, the court may restrict the accused option to retain a
was nonetheless arraigned with the assistance of Counsel de oficio Wilfredo counsel de parte if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or the
Lina-ac. He pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial was waived and trial was set. The chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or the attorney declines to
hearings continued wherein in both days appellant appeared with Atty. Lina- represent the accused for a valid reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the like.
ac. On behalf of appellant, Atty. Lina-ac also cross-examined the witnesses.
10

Also, the right to counsel de parte is, like other personal rights, waivable so Meanwhile, the Estate was purchased by the Government from the Roman
long as (1) the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, Catholic. In due time, petitioner filed an application with the defunct Rural
morals or good customs; or prejudicial to a third person with a right Progress Administration for the purchase of Lot 18-B, Block 23, claiming
preferential right as bona fide occupant. The application was opposed by
recognized by law and (2) the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly and
Aquino, who also filed her own application, alleging that as bona fide tenant
intelligently made. or lessee she had the preferential right to purchase the lot. Director of Lands
rendered a decision approving petitioner’s application, he being the actual
In the present case, appellant claims that he was not given sufficient time to occupant. On appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
engage a counsel de parte, thereby preventing him from presenting evidence set aside the order of the Director of Lands and gave due course to Aquino’s
in his defense. In his Brief he adds, but without giving particulars or proof, application.
that allegedly his counsels de oficio did not exert their utmost efforts in
representing him. Appellant had been given ample time to secure the Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the Land
services of a counsel de parte, but his subsequent appearances in court Tenure Administration. He then appealed to the Office of the President,
which affirmed the decision of the Land Tenure Administration. The Land
without such counsel and his act of allowing this situation to continue until the
Tenure Administration executed a deed of sale of Lot 18-B in favor of Aquino,
presentation of his evidence betrays his lack of intention to do so. It even as a result of which she obtained, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84738 in
appears that he was merely delaying his own presentation of evidence on her name.
purpose to the prejudice of the offended party, the trial court and the orderly
administration of justice. Petitioner filed the instant case to annul the decisions of the Land Tenure
Administration and of not in question to him; to cancel its registration in the
Furthermore, appellant did not demonstrate in what way the services of his name of Aquino and to have it registered in his name instead.
counsels de oficio were unsatisfactory. He did not cite any instance
The lower court dismissed the complaint. The petitioner elevated the case to
substantiating his claim that he was not effectively represented. In short, he
the Court of appeals but denied the same court pointing out that the finding
was afforded a chance to be heard by counsel of his own choice, but by his of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, to the effect that
own neglect or mischief, he effectively waived such right. appellant Gongon had waived whatever right he might have had over the lot
in question was factual in nature and could not be reviewed by the courts.
Matias Gongon vs. Court of Appeals
32 SCRA 412; April 30, 1970 ISSUE: Is the alleged waiver of right of the petitioner valid?
MAKALINTAL, J.:
RULING: No. His preferential right could not be validly waived, such waiver
FACTS: Lot 18-B, Block 23, is a portion of an Estate, which used to belong in being against public policy. Under Article 6 of the new Civil Code "rights may
its entirety to the Roman Catholic Church. The lot was originally leased to be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
Aquino who in turn sublet it in 1934 to herein petitioner for a term of 15 years morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
at a nominal monthly rental of P6.00. The sublessee constructed his recognized by law." The old Civil Code (Art. 4) carried a similar provision,
residential house on the property and since then has been living there, although it mentioned only public interest or public order.
together with his family.
That Commonwealth Act No. 539 lays down a public policy there can be no
doubt. In the case of Juat v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. L-17080,
11
January 28, 1961, this Court, thru Mr. Justice Felix Angelo Bautista. ruled in states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent
this wise: member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and
-‐ that Article 8 of the Family Code applies to the case in question.
. . . It may also be stated that the avowed policy behind the adoption of such
measure, is, as aptly observed by the Court of Appeals, ‘to provide the
ISSUE:Was Judge Domagtoy authorized to solemnize marriage outside his
landless elements of our population with lots upon which to build their homes assigned jurisdictional area.
and small farms which they can cultivate and from which they can derive
their livelihood without being beholden to any man’ (Pascual v. Lucas, 51 HELD: No. Judge Domagtoy is not authorized to solemnize marriages
O.G., No. 4, p. 2429), such measure having been adopted in line with the outside his assigned jurisdictional area.
policy of social justice enshrined in our Constitution to remedy and cure the
social unrest caused by the concentration of landed estates in the hands of a Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code provides:
few by giving to the landless elements a piece of land they can call their
own."
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
Being contrary to public policy, the alleged waiver of his right made by herein (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
petitioner should be considered null and void. jurisdiction;
xxxx
REPEAL OF LAWS (Article 7)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers
Navarro vs. Judge Domagtoy the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088; July 19, 1996 office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may
be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on
ROMERO, J.:
the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29
of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in
writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or
FACTS: Mayor Navarro has charged Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
Hernando Domagtoy for gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office
and ignorance of the law. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the
judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the
Navarro alleged that Judge Domagtoy performed a marriage ceremony point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon
between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is
court's jurisdiction. Judge Domagtoy holds office and has jurisdiction in the no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The the remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the
respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.
wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the
municipality of Dapa, which fall outside his jurisdictional area of the More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal
away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under
Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent
Judge Domagtoy, on the other hand argued: member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a
directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and
-‐ that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in
he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which
12

the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the Beso for no clear reason. Beso went to check the marriage contract with the
marriage. Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog, from which she learned that the marriage
has not been registered. Beso inquired about the non-registration of her
Article 7 and Article 8 of the Family Code had repealed Articles 56 and 57 of
marriage with the Judge. Responding to Beso’s letter about the matter,
the Civil Code which provides:
Daguman told her that all the copies of the marriage contract were taken by
Art. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by: Yman.
xxx xxx xxx In Daguman’s comment, he said that he solemnized the marriage in good
faith that by doing so, he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so
(5) Municipal judges and justices of the peace; that it may not be too expensive and complicated for the citizens to get
maried
xxx xxx xxx
ISSUE: Did Judge Daguman commit nonfeasance in office when he
Art. 57. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the office of the
solemnized a marriage outside his jurisdiction?
judge in open court or of the mayor; or in the church, chapel or
temple, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
RULING: YES. Respondent Judge has not only committed nonfeasance in
marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in
accordance with Article 72 of this Code, or in case of marriage office, he also undermined the very foundation of marriage, which is the
referred to in Article 76 or when one of the parents or the guardian of basic social institution in our society whose nature, consequences, and
the female or the latter herself if over eighteen years of age request it incidents are governed by law.
in writing, in which cases the marriage may be solemnized at a
house or place designated by said parent or guardian of the female A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must
or by the latter herself in a sworn statement to that effect. (5a) also live and abide by it and render justice at all times without resorting to
shortcuts clearly uncalled for. A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the
Hence, Judge Domagtoy was not clothed with authority to solemnize a
law; he must be conscientious and thorough in doing so.
marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8
and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws - let alone that enacted in
authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of
the basic principles of civil law. order to preserve so sacrosant an inviolable social institution as marriage -
and the stability of judicial rulings laid down by superior authority should
Beso v. Daguman have given judge pause and made him more vigilant in the exercise of his
A.M.MTJ-99-1211, 28 January 2000 authority and the performance of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A judge
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: is, furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the authority or
jurisdiction of his court.
FACTS: Respondent Juan Daguman, MCTC Judge of Sta. Margarita-
Tarangan Pagsanjan, Samar, solemnized the marriage of complainant MECANO vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Zenaida Beso to Bernardito Yman at the Judge’s residence in Calbayog City, G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992
Samar, or outside his jurisdiction, because complainant was to leave abroad CAMPOS, JR., J.:
the same day as she was an OFW. After the wedding, Yman abandoned
13
FACTS: Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation CASTRO, J
(NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26, 1990 to April 7,
1990, on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, FACTS: On December 3, 1965, Rafael Licera was charged with illegal
possession of firearm. After trial, in a judgment dated August 14, 1968, he
the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA. He filed for
was convicted by the CFI of the crime charged for his possession of a
reimbursement with the NBI however upon endorsement to the DOJ it was Winchester rifle. He appealed the said conviction with the CA and invoked as
denied. Justice Undersecretary Bello denied the claim since the RAC relied his legal justification his appointment as secret agent on December 11, 1961
upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. by the governor. He claims that as a secret agent, he was a "peace officer"
and, thus, pursuant to People vs. Macarandang (decided in 1959), was
Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari, seeks to nullify the exempt from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess
decision of the Commission on Audit (COA, for brevity) embodied in its 7th firearms. The CA upheld Licera's conviction relying on People vs. Mapa
Indorsement, dated January 16, 1992, denying his claim for reimbursement (decided in 1967) which held that section 879 of the Revised Administrative
under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), as amended, Code provides no exemption for persons appointed as secret agents by
in the total amount of P40,831.00. provincial governors from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Did the Administrative Code of 1987 repeal Section 699 of the RAC?
ISSUE: Did the CA correctly rely on the subsequent ruling in People vs.
Mapa to uphold Licera's conviction?
What is the nature of the repealing clause of the Administrative Code of
1997?
RULING: No, the CA did not correctly rely on the subsequent ruling in People
vs. Mapa to uphold Licera's conviction.
HELD: NO, there was no repeal of Section 699 of the RAC.
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions
The nature of the repealing clause is an implied repeal. There are two applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this
categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two jurisdiction's legal system. The application or interpretation placed by the
acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said
to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the, construed law purports to carry
The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and
into effect. Where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine
is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. should operate prospectively only and should not adversely affect those
favored by the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover faith thereof. This holds more especially true in the application or
nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are interpretation of statutes in the field of penal law, for, in this area, more than
several matters treated in the old Code which are not found in the new Code, in any other, it is imperative that the punishability of an act be reasonably
such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding foreseen for the guidance of society.
law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699,
and still others. At the time of Licera's designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of
his apprehension for possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite
license or permit therefor in 1965, the Macarandang rule formed part of the
JUDICIAL DECISIONS FORM PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND (Article SC jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction's legal system. Mapa
8) revoked the Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Pursuant to the
Macarandang rule, Licera incurred no criminal liability for possession of the
People v. Licera said rifle, notwithstanding his non-compliance with the legal requirements
G.R. No. L-39990; July 22, 1975 relating to firearm licenses.
14

law originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the
Hence, the CA did not correctly rely on the subsequent ruling in People vs. contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed intends to
Mapa to uphold Licera's conviction effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a
restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" — the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force
PEOPLE vs. JOSE JABINAL of law.
G.R. No. L-30061. February 27, 1974
The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the
ANTONIO, J.:
jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found
in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial
Facts:The accused was charged of Illegal Possession of Firearm and court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but
Ammunition. He admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the
of a revolver and ammunition, without license or permit. He, however, new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties
claimed exoneration on the basis of his appointment as Secret Agent (1962) who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
and as Confidential Agent (1964) which expressly carries the authority to
Therefore, the appellant should be acquitted.
possess and carry firearm. He based this on the Supreme Court's decision in
People vs. Macarandang (1959) and People vs. Lucero (1958) which held DUTY OF JUDGES (Article 9)
that the appointment with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and
ammunition exonerates the accused. People of the Philippines V. Hon. Lorenzo Veneracion
The trial court nevertheless convicted the accused on the ground that G.R. Nos. 119987-88 October 12, 1995
Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa KAPUNAN, J.:
(1967). In Mapa, the Court sustained conviction on the ground that no
provision in the law is made for a secret agent such that he is exempt. Facts: On Aug 2, 1994 a cadaver of a young girl identified as Angel Alquiza
was seen floating in Binondo, Manila. She was wrapped in a sack &
Issue: Should the appellant be acquitted based of the prevailing doctrine at
yellow table cloth tied with a nylon cord with both feet and left hand
the time of the commission of the offense?
protruding from it was seen floating along. Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a.
Held: Yes, the appellant should be acquitted based on the prevailing doctrine Jr. Jeofrey and Henry Lagarto were later charged with the crime of
at the time of commission of the offense. Rape with Homicide filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The Trial
Court rendered a decision on January 31,1995 finding the defendants
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless Henry Lagarto and Ernesto Cordero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused with the
the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the “penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon law.” On February 8, 1995 , the City Prosecutor of Manila filed a Motion for
a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that Reconsideration praying that the Decision be “modified in that the penalty
15
of death be imposed” against respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in FACTS: A match was held in the cockpit between two cocks belonging to the
place of the original penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. The said motion was plaintiff and to the defendant respectively. Each of said persons had put up a
denied. wager of P160; and as the referee of the cockpit had declared the
defendant's cock the winner in the bout, the plaintiff brought suit against the
Issue: After finding that an accused individual in a criminal case has, on the defendant in the justice of the peace court of the said pueblo, asking that his
own rooster be declared the winner. The justice of the peace court decided
occasion of Rape, committed Homicide, is the judge allowed any discretion in
that the bout was a draw. From this judgment the defendant appealed to the
imposing either the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or Death? Court of First Instance of the province. The said Court of First Instance
rendered judgment dismissing the appeal without special finding as to costs.
Held: No. Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of The grounds for the dismissal pronounced by the lower court in the judgment
justice. If judges, under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed appealed from ere that the court has always dismissed cases of this nature,
to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by that he is not familiar with the rules governing cockfights and the duties of
law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A referees thereof; that he does not know where to find the law on the subject
government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary and, finally, that he knows of no law whatever that governs the rights to the
powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are plaintiff and the defendant in questions concerning cockfights.
guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear
ISSUE: Does the ignorance of a special law applicable to a case justify the
or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the
court in terminating the case?
interference of their own personal beliefs.
HELD: No. Ignorance of the special law applicable to a case does not justify
the court in terminating the proceeding by dismissing it without a decision.
The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law
In the case at bench, respondent judge, after weighing the evidence
applicable to a case submitted to him for decision, the fact that the court
of the prosecution and the defendant at trial found the accused guilty beyond does not know the rules applicable to a certain matter that is the subject of
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide. Since the law in force an appeal which must be decided by him and his not knowing where to find
at the time of the commission of the crime for which respondent judge found the law relative to the case, are not reasons that can serve to excuse the
the accused guilty was Republic Act No. 7659, he was bound by its court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing them without deciding the
provisions. issues. Such an excuse is the less acceptable because, foreseeing that a
case might arise to which no law would be exactly applicable, the Civil Code,
in the second paragraph of article 6, provides that the customs of the place
shall be observed, and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law.
Under the law, the penalty imposable for the crime of Rape with
Homicide is not Reclusion Perpetua but Death. The law plainly and Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs. Palomar
unequivocably provides that "[w]hen by reason or on the occasion of rape, a No. L-19650. September 29, 1966
homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death." The provision leaves no CASTRO, J.
room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge to impose a
penalty under the circumstances described, other than a sentence of death.
FACTS: To increase their patronage, Caltex (Philippines) Inc. launched
“Caltex Hooded Pump Contest”. Anticipating the extensive use of the mails
CHU JAN VS. LUCIO BERNAS for its publicity and communication, Caltex sought for a clearance and sent a
G.R. No. 10010 ; August 1, 1916 letter to the Postmaster General attaching a copy of the contest rules to
ARAULLO, J. justify that the contest does not violate the “The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the
Postal Law”. However, Enrico Palomar, the acting Postmaster General
16

denied the request on the ground that the contest involves a "gift enterprise" the instant case, is to settle, and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity
which is prohibited by the Postal Law. Thus, Caltex filed a petition for with respect to, rights and duties under a law—we can see in the present
declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar praying that case any imposition upon our jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity in our
the 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' be declared not violative of the Postal intervention.
Law and be allowed to use mails for its publicity. Appellant interposed there
was no question of construction because it merely applied the clear Therefore, the court may take cognizance of the declaratory relief to
provisions of the law thus declaratory relief is improper. determine the validity of the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest.
ISSUE: May the court resolve if Caltex’s proposed contest is in violation of THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAFAEL LICERA
the Postal law through a declaratory relief? G.R. No. L-39990. July 22, 1975.
CASTRO, J.:
HELD: Yes, the court may take cognizance of the declaratory relief filed by
Caltex and resolve the issue. FACTS: Rafael Licera was charged of illegal possession of a firearm. The
Municipal court rendered judgment finding him guilty of the crime charged.
Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and On appeal, the trial court affirmed the decision of the lower court. Licera then,
expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was certified to this Court, as
to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, it involved question of law. He invoked that his possession of the rifle was
amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly legal for his appointment as secret agent by Governor Leviste of Batangas
provided for in the law on December 11, 1961. That as a secret agent, he is considered as a peace
officer and thus, as enunciated in People vs. Macarandang (1959), exempt
This is precisely the case here. Whether or not the scheme proposed
from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms.
by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the
He also alleges that the lower court erred in relying their decision on the later
Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the
case of People vs. Mapa (1967).
words used therein. To deny declaratory relief to the appellee in the situation
would be to force it to choose between undesirable alternatives. If it cannot
ISSUE: Does the lower court erred in relying on the decision enunciated in
obtain a final and definitive pronouncement as to whether the anti-lottery
the later case of People vs. Mapa.
provisions of the Postal Law apply to its proposed contest, it would be faced
with these choices: 1) If it launches the contest and uses the mails for
HELD: Yes. The doctrine enunciated in the said case is not applicable.
purposes thereof, it not only incurs the risk, but is also actually threatened
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial
with the certain imposition, of a fraud order with its concomitant stigma which
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this
may attach even if the appellee will eventually be vindicated; 2) If it abandons
jurisdiction’s legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not laws,
the contest, it becomes a self-appointed censor, or permits the appellant to
constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation
put into effect a virtual fiat of previous censorship which is constitutionally
placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the
unwarranted. As we weigh these considerations in one equation and in the
enactment of the said law since the Court’s application or interpretation
spirit of liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be interpreted in order
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed
to promote their object (section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court)—which, in
law purports to carry into effect.
17
At the time of Licera’s designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would
time of his apprehension for possession of the Winchester rifle without the result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions.
requisite license or permit therefor in 1965, the Macarandang rule—the Court
s interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code—formed In the case, when P.D. no. 9 was promulgated, there was no intent to work a
part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction’s legal system. Mapa hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of
revoked the Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new oppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose hardship on
doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate prospectively another, and so on. The act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon must be
only and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially with a motivation connected with the desired result of Proclamation 1081
those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This holds more (suppressing criminality, etc.) that is within the intent of P.D. no. 9.
especially true in the application or interpretation of statutes in the field of
Hence, the intention of P.D. no. 9 is not just the mere carrying of arms.
penal law, for, in this area, more than in any other, it is imperative that the
punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society. IN RE: TESTATE ESTATE OF NARCISO A. PADILLA
Hence, the decision of the lower court is reversed and Rafael Licera G.R. No. L-48137; October 4, 1943
is hereby acquitted, finding the reliance on the doctrine enunciated in BOCOBO, J.:
People vs. Mapa not proper.
FACTS: In order that the estate of Narciso Padilla may be divided according
DOUBTFUL STATUES (Article 10) to his last will and testament, it is necessary first to liquidate the conjugal
partnership. It was in connection with such liquidation that the widow,
People of the Philippines v. Purisima Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla, filed a petition wherein she prayed that
No. L-42050-66, November 20, 1978 her paraphernal property be segregated from the inventoried estate and
MUÑOZ-PALMA, J. delivered to her together with the corresponding reimbursements and
indemnities; that she be given one-half of the conjugal partnership property;
and that her usufructuary right over one-half of the portion pertaining to the
FACTS: Several Informations were filed against Purisima, et. al. charging heir instituted in the will be recognized. The conjugal partnership of gains
them with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” particularly a bladed weapon regime governed the properties of the spouses. Included in the estate are 3
in violation of P.D. No. 9. On a Motion to Quash filed by the accused, the trial parcels of land, all which are recorded in the Torrens System under the name
courts granted the same on the ground that the Informations did not allege of both spouse. Concepcion claimed that 2 out of the 3 parcels of land were
rd
facts which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9 because it failed to bought using her exclusive property while the 3 parcel of land one half of
state one element of the crime, that the carrying of arms should be related to said land was paid using her exclusive property. Isabel Bibby De Padilla,
subversive activities. People argued that the act proscribed is essentially a executrix, contends that considering the presumption in Art. 1407 in the Civil
malum prohibitum and hence, need not be related to subversive activities. Code, these properties must be hold to be of the conjugal partnership.
ISSUE: Is it the intention of P.D. no. 9 to punish the mere carrying of arms? ISSUE: Is a torrens title conclusive and incontestable?
SC RULING: No, it is not the intention of P.D. no. 9 to punish the mere RULING: No. The torrens title has certain exceptions in cases it is registered
carrying of arms. between husband and wife.
In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule In such instances, the property may be shown to be really of either spouse,
is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative though recorded in the names of both. The underlying reason is the same in
intent is the controlling factor. Whatever is within the spirit of a statute is all cases, which is the confidential relation between husband and wife.
18

Because of the feelings of trust existing between the spouses, certificates of cochero, That for the purpose of delivery the cochero driving the team as
title are often secured in the name of both, or of either, regardless of the true defendant's employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of
ownership of the property, and regardless of the source of the purchase the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the wagon for the purpose
money. It is thus but fair that on liquidation of the partnership, the trust should of unloading the forage to be delivered; that while unloading the forage and
be recognized and enforced, so that the real ownership of the property may in the act of carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of
be established. which cracked a whip and made some other noises, which frightened the
horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away, and the driver was
There is another reason why evidence of the nature of any property as thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground
paraphernal should be allowed, despite the Torrens certificate. It is this: the and was unable to stop the horses;
manager of the conjugal partnership is the husband. He may, without let or
hindrance, deal with and dispose of any property appearing in the names of The court found the defendant guilty of negligence
both spouses, even if the property should really be paraphernal. In the
course of years, any such property may have been sold, transformed or Issue: Whether the act of the defendant in leaving the horses in the such a
substituted. Upon liquidation of the conjugal partnership, to forbid an manner constitute negligence.
investigation of the true source of the purchase price of the original property,
Held: NO, the act of the defendant in leaving the horses in the such a
after many years of marriage, would make liquidation a mockery, for it would
manner constitute negligence.
be well-nigh impossible to trace and identity the paraphernal property.
The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was
Hence, Concepcion has exclusive rights over the properties in question.
not unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not
CUSTOMS (Articles 11-12) proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced
in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, can not
S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, vs. WILLIAM be held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent.
VAN BUSKIRK, G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910
It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the
MORELAND, J.:
damage were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was experienced and
capable; that he had driven one of the horses several years and the other
Facts: Plaintiff was a riding a carromata when the delivery wagon belonging five or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of
to the defendant used for the purpose of transportation of fodder ran into the leaving them in the condition in which they were left on the day of the
carromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely accident; that they had never run away up to that time and there had been,
wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses and
injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse which was assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of
drawing it. the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the
character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant
The facts are undisputed but the defendant presented evidence that the on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers.
cochero was a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable
19
Therefore, the practice has ripen into a custom and it does not constitute Facts: The surviving spouse of Atty. Her minis Ozaeta filed a petition praying
negligence on the part of the defendant by leaving such horses the way they that they be allowed to continue using, in the name of the firm, the names of
are during the accident. their partner who passed away. One of the petitioners’ arguments stated that
no local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner’s name in
YAO KEE VS SY-GONZALES a professional firm’s name insofar as law firm necessarily identifies the
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
individual members of the firm. They also stated that the continued use of a
CORTES, J.
deceased partner’s name in the firm name of law partnerships has been
FACTS: Sy Kiat, a chines national died in Caloocan City, leaving behind his consistently allowed by U.S. courts and is an accepted practice in the legaL
real and personal properties in the Philippines worth P 300,000 more or less. profession of most countries in the world.
Aida Sy-Gonzales, et. al. filed a petition for the grant of letters of
administration claiming among other things that they are children of the Issue: Is the law firm “Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes” allowed
deceased with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina. The petition was opposed by Yao to sustain the name of their deceased partner, Atty. Ozaeta, in the name of
kee who alleged that she is the lawful wife of the deceased whom he married their firm?
in China and that one of her children, Sze Sook Wah, should be the
administrator of the deceased. The CFI decided in favor of Yao Kee’s petition Ruling: It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits
but was modified and set aside by the court of appeals. or allows the continued use of a deceased or former partner's name in the
firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, Identify the
ISSUE: Whether or not Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee in accordance with
Chinese Law and custom conclusive. more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law firm. A
glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this
RULING: No. Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee according to Chinese law and country would show how their firm names have evolved and changed from
custom is not conclusive. time to time as the composition of the partnership changed. The possibility of
The Supreme Court ruled that evidence may prove the fact if deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a
marriage between Sy Kiat and Yao Kee is valid, but it is not sufficient to
deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in
establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law and
custom. A custom must be proved as a fact according to the rules of search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished
evidence and that a local custom as a source of right cannot be considered name appearing in a firm title.
by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent
evidence. In the case at bar, petitioners did not present any competent The arguments with regard to U.S. Courts sustaining the use of name in the
evidence relative to the law of China on marriage. In the absence of proof of firm name is not applicable in the Philippines, Unlike in U.S. where such
the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any statutory provision
that of the Philippines. or legislative policy, in the Philippines, there is no local custom that sanctions
The Supreme Court affirmed (all of them were acknowledged as the practice.
natural children, hence given equal rights) the decision of the Court of
Appelas. COMPUTATION OF PERIOD AND TIME (Article 13)
In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name Garcia vs. Recio
“Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon…” etc. G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001.
92 SCRA 1, July 30, 1979 PANGANIBAN, J.
Melencio-Herrera, J.
FACTS: Rederick A. Recio (Husband);Editha Samson (Wife); andGrace J.

Garcia-Recio (2nd marriage)
20

March 1, 1987: Respondent Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino was married to On July 7, 1998-or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the
Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal. suit for the declaration of nullity was pending-respondent was able to secure
a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the
May 18, 1989: a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was “marriage had irretrievably broken down.” Respondent prayed in his Answer
issued by an Australian family court. that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of
action.
June 26, 1992: Recio became an Australian citizen, as shown by a
"Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. Issue: (1) Was the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson proven,
and (2) was the
January 12, 1994: Recio married Grace j. Garcia, a Filipino, in Cabanatuan
City. Recio declared himself as "Single" and "Filipino." respondent legal capacity to marry petitioner proven?
October 22, 1995: Recio and Petitioner Grace J. Garcia (Garcia-Recio) Ruling: No. Based on the records of the case, both issues were not
begun to live separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. sufficiently proven.
May 16, 1996: In accordance to the Statutory Declarations secured in

Australia, their conjugal assets were divided.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized, the party pleading it must
March 3, 1998: Garcia-Recio filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
Marriage on the ground of bigamy claiming she only learned of the prior allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
marriage in November, 1997. Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given
presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
the Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a
decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.
marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did
The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body
not have legal capacity to remarry.
or tribunal of a foreign country.
On the other hand, Respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had
Fortunately for respondent’s cause, when the divorce decree of May 18,
revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He
1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its
contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly
admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local
dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989; thus, he was
Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible,
legally capacitated to many petitioner in 1994. Additionally, Respondent
subject to petitioner’s qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document-a written
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner’s failure to object properly
official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof
rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court
of its authenticity and due execution.
of Sydney, Australia.
21
The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of FACTS: Respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc. filed its final adjusted
the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family tax return on April 14, 1998 for the year 1997 and paid the tax due thereon.
Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of Due to losses, it subsequently applied for a tax refund. However, said
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and application was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, respondent filed a
admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). However, the CTA
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. dismissed the petition for having been filed beyond the two-year prescriptive
period for filing judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit. According to the
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents CTA, respondent only had 730 days (each year being equivalent to 365 days
legal capacity to marry petitioner. Based on the records, the Court cannot pursuant to art. 13 of the Civil Code) after the filing of its final adjusted return.
conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was Since year 2000 was a leap year, the period from April 14, 1998 to April 14,
legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. The Court 2000 consists of 731 days. Thus, the petition for judicial tax refund was filed
agrees with petitioner’s contention that the court a quo erred in finding that one (1) day beyond the prescriptive period. The Court of Appeals reversed
the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to the CTA’s ruling and held that the petition was filed within the prescriptive
remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the period for filing judicial claim for tax refund.
Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his
legal capacity to contract the second marriage. Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an exemption,
should be strictly construed against claimants. Hence, the claim should have
Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to been filed on or before April 13, 2000 or within 730 days, reckoned from the
respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out time respondent filed its final adjusted return.
that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a
direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, the Court believes that the most ISSUE: If the final adjusted tax return was filed on April 14, 1998, was the
judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, petition for judicial claim for refund of taxes which was filed on April 14, 2000
if any, which show petitioner’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in within the two-year prescriptive period for?
that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties’ marriage on the
ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage RULING: Yes. It is within the two-year prescriptive period. EO 292, which
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, impliedly repealed art. 13 of the New Civil Code, provides:
Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve
January 12, 1994.
calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific
Therefore, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the
Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of
evidence which conclusively show respondent’s legal capacity to marry twentyfour hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset.
petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the partiesÊ marriage void on the
A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to
ground of bigamy, as above discussed.
the number of days it may contain." It is the "period of time running from the
CIR v. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC. beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the
G.R. No. 162155; August 28, 2007 corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a
CORONA, J.: sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last
day of that month." To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31,
2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month
from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008.
22

Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the
to this case, the two-year prescriptive period (reckoned from the time country in which it may be situated."
respondent filed its final adjusted return34 on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24
calendar months. Hence, respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary
filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did
not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter,
its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period.
and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the
same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36
Phil.,472.)
CIVIL LAWS (Articles15-17)
2). No. The said condition is void, being contrary to law, for
Miciano v. Brimo article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:
G.R. No. L-22595; November 1, 1927
ROMUALDEZ, J. "Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good
morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not
prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever,
Facts: Juan Miciano, as administrator, filed for partition of the estate of even should the testator otherwise provide."
Joseph Brimo, which was opposed by Andre Brimo based on the ground that
the partition puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimo's will which are Therefore, it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a
not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, and are thus void manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the
as being violative of Article 10 of the Civil Code (now Art. 15 of the NCC). legatees.
The trial court granted the partition and also denied his participation in the
inheritance. Van Dorn vs. Ronillo, Jr. et al.,
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
Issues: 1).Which law will govern the distribution of the estate of Joseph MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Brimo
FACTS: Petitioner is a Filipino while private respondent is an American.
2).May a condition made by the deceased be imposed They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and established their residence in
despite not being in accordance with his national law the Philippines. They decided to divorce in 1982. Later on, petitioner married
Theodore Van Dorn. Private respondent filed a suit against petitioner alleging
Ruling: 1).Turkish laws shall govern the distribution of the estate of Joseph that they have a conjugal property in Manila and asking the court to give him
Brimo. the right to manage the said property. Petitioner contends that the case
should be dismissed because it is already barred by previous judgment in the
Art. 10 of the Civil Code (now Art. 16 of the NCC) provides that "legal and divorce proceedings before the Nevada court wherein both the respondent
testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to and petitioner stated that they had no community property. However, court
the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that it involves property located
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose in the Philippines and that the divorce decree has no effect in the case.
Hence, this petition.
23
ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties? The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage, the person who shall file the complaint shall be the spouse.
Is it valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law
and public policy? Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute
the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status,
HELD: The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the
For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack
any State of the Union. It is true that owing to the nationality principle of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, “ Laws relating to family rights and
determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition. After the divorce has
duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.” only Philippine been decreed, the innocent spouse has no longer the right to institute the
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being prosecution for adultery.
considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Therefore, marital bonds must be unsevered before commencement of
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this action for adultery or concubinage.
case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the BARRETO VS GONZALES
marriage. G.R. No. L-37048; March 7, 1933
J. Hull
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below FACTS: Augusto Gonzales and Manuella Barreto Gonzales are citizen of the
as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As
Philippine.They were married in the City of Manila on January 19, 1919, and
he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, lived together as man and wife in the Philippine until the spring of 1926,
he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting when they voluntarily separated. Of this union four children were born.
his right over the alleged conjugal property. Negotiations between the parties for support ensued, both being represented
by attorneys, whereupon it was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for her
PILAPIL v. IBAY-SOMERA support and that of her children, five hundred pesos (P500) monthly, an
GR No. 80116; June 30, 1989 amount to be increased in necessity, and the title of certain properties to be
REGALADO, J: put in her name. Shortly after this agreement the husband left for Nevada,
FACTS: Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and Erik Ekkehard Gelling, a where he secured an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion, which
German national were married in Germany. They were divorced before the decree was dated November 28, 1927. Shortly thereafter the defendant
Schoneberg Local Court for failure of marriage. Five months after the moved to California and returned to Philippines in August 1928, where he
German divorce decree, Gelling filed two complaints for adultery before the has since remained. On the same date that he secured a divorce in Nevada
City Fiscal of Manila for having an affair with William Chia in 1982 and he went through the forms of marriage with another citizen of Philippines and
another man named Jesus Chua in 1983. now has three children as a result of that marriage. Defendant, after his
departure from these Islands, reduced the amount he had agreed to pay
ISSUE: Is it necessary in the commencement of a criminal action of adultery monthly for the support of his wife and four minor children and has not made
that the marital bonds between the parties be unsevered and existing at the the payments fixed in the Nevada divorce as alimony. Shortly after his return
time of the institution of the action. his wife brought action in the Court of First Instance of Manila requesting that
the courts confirm and ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of the
HELD: Yes the marital bonds must be unsevered.
State of Nevada, invoking section 9 of Act No. 2710, which reads as follows:
24

The decree of divorce shall dissolve the community of property as The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
soon as such decree becomes final, but shall not dissolve the bonds condition and legal capacity or persons, are binding upon Spaniards
of matrimony until one year thereafter. even though they reside in a foreign country.
The bonds of matrimony shall not be considered as dissolved with

And article 11, the last part of which reads:
regard to the spouse who, having legitimate children, has not
delivered to each of them or to the guardian appointed by the court,
within said period of one year, the equivalent of what would have . . . the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their
been due to them as their legal portion if said spouse had died property, and those intended to promote public order and good
intestate immediately after the dissolution of the community of morals, shall nor be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or
property. judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered into a
foreign country.
While the parties are in dispute over financial matters they are in unity in
trying to secure the courts of this jurisdiction to recognize and approve of the The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the
Nevada divorce.
case was submitted to this court, in which they all prayed that the divorce be
ratified and confirmed, clearly indicates a purpose to circumvent the laws of
ISSUE: By mutual agreement of the parties, can they now compel the court
the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to secure for themselves a
to recognize the foreign divorce decree pursuant to Act No. 2710 (Divorce
change of status for reasons and under conditions not authorized by our law.
Law)?
RULING: No. Litigants by mutual agreement cannot compel the courts to

approve of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the citizens of It being duty of the courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the
these Islands to be affected by decrees of foreign courts in a manner which Legislature if they are constitutional. The Court, THEREFORE, has no right
our Government believes is contrary to public order and good morals.
to recognize the foreign divorce degree, despite mutual agreement and
conduct of the parties, where they remained to be a citizen and resident of
At all times the matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the the Philippines.
Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the
husband of the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. GEORGE I. FRANK
and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of that State to dissolve the G.R. No. L-2935; March 23, 1909
bonds of matrimony. While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing JOHNSON, J.
to recognize the validity of foreign divorce have been based upon lack of
matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, we have not overlooked the Facts: In 1903, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, Frank entered into a contract
provisions of the Civil Code now in force in these Islands. Article 9 thereof for a period of two (2) years with the plaintiff, Government of the Philippine
reads as follows: Islands, by which Frank was to receive a salary as a stenographer in the
service of the plaintiff. In addition to such salary, the plaintiff will shoulder
expenses incurred in travelling from Chicago to Manila and the one-half
salary during the said period of travel.
25
The contract contained a provision that in case of its violation, Frank Facts: Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yanes were married in the city of
will be liable for the amount expended by the plaintiff. Malaga, Spain. Fuster then settled in the Phillippines and acquired real and
personal properties. In 1986, Yanes came to Manila and decided to live with
Frank entered upon the performance of his contract from April 30, her husband Fuster until 1899. However, on that year they decided to make
1903 until June 4, 1903. Thereafter, he left the service and refused to make a an agreement whereby they “ resolved to separate and live apart, both
further compliance with their contract. The plaintiff commenced an action consenting to such separation., and by virtue thereof the husband authorized
against Frank to recover the amount expended for his benefit. Frank the wife to move to Spain, there to reside in such place as the said lady
pleases.” In 1909, Yanes decided to return to the Philippines and filed a
interposed the defense that he cannot be liable on the ground of
divorce against her husband. In her petition, Yanes alleged that the cause of
minority/infancy when he entered into the contract. such action was the adultery committed by her husband.
For his part, the defendant alleged that either he or his wife was a resident of
Issue: What law will govern? The law of the country where the contract is the city of Manila and that their domicile is in Barcelona, Spain. He also
executed or the law of the country where the contract is being enforced? alleged that they are both natives and subjects of Spain and not of the
Phillippines. Thus, the court has no jurisdiction to try and to grant the decree
Ruling: The law that should govern in this case is the law of the country of divorce.
where the contract was executed.
Issue: Does the court have jurisdiction to issue a decree of divorce for
The record discloses that, at the time the contract was entered into in residents of the Philippines but are natives of Spain?
the State of Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of that State and had full
authority to contract. The plaintiff [the defendant] claims that, by reason of Held: Yes, the court has jurisdiction over the petition for decree of divorce.
the fact that, under the laws of the Philippine Islands at the time the contract
The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is not
was made, male persons in said Islands did not reach their majority until they
comprised within the personal status of the husband and wife, simply
had attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said contract, because the whole theory of the statutes and of the rights which belong to
contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed. It is not disputed everyone does not go beyond the sphere of private law, and the authority
— upon the contrary the fact is admitted — that at the time and place of the and jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter of the private law of persons,
making of the contract in question the defendant had full capacity to make but of the public or political law of the nation. "The jurisdiction of courts and
the same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the other questions relating to procedure are considered to be of a public nature
and consequently are generally submitted to the territorial principle.
execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law
of the place where the contract is made. (Scudder vs. Union National Bank, In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city of
91 U. S., 406.) Manila did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although
The defendant's claim that he was an adult when he left Chicago but Spanish Catholic subjects, they were residents of this city and had their
domicile herein.The Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands have
was a minor when he arrived at Manila; that he was an adult at the time he the power and jurisdiction to try actions for divorce. That of the city of Manila
made the contract but was a minor at the time the plaintiff attempted to did not lack jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter of the litigation.
enforce the contract, more than a year later, is not tenable.
Hence, the court has jurisdiction over the petition for decree of divorce.
Hence, the law that governs Frank in this case is the law of the
country where the contract is executed based on the principle of lex loci Note: This ruling is no longer controlling.
celebrationis.
TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE TRUST
Barnuevo V. Fuster
CO., executor-appellee, vs. MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C.
G.R. No. L-7487 December 29, 1913
BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA BOHANAN, oppositors-appellants
JOHNSON, J.
G.R. No. L-12105; January 30, 1960
26

LABRADOR, J.: Facts: Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of
the United States. He had 5 legitimate children with his 1st wife, Mary Mallen,
FACTS: The court finds that the testator C.O. Bohanan was at the time of whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd wife, Violet
his death a citizen of the United States and of the State of Nevada and his
Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children in the Philippines.
will and testament is fully in accordance with the laws of the states of Nevada
and admits the same to probate. The named executor filed a project of
Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his
partition in accordance with the provisions of the will. It will be seen that out
of the total estate (after deducting administration expenses) of P211,639.33 distributable estate should be divided in trust in the following order and
in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares manner:
of stock of several mining companies and to his brother and sister the same
amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each, or a total of a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;
P12,000. The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question
the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
manner above indicated, claiming that they have been deprived of the
legitimate that the laws of the forum concede to them which in accordance c. The remainder shall go to his surviving legitimate children by his 1st and
with the laws of the forum, it should be two-thirds of the estate left by the 2nd wives, in equal shares.
testator.
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His
ISSUE: Is the failure of the testator to give his children two-thirds of the will was admitted to probate in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust
estate left by him at the time of his death, in accordance with the laws of the Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein.
forum valid?
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
HELD: Yes. The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the
“Executor’s Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition”
testator died in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights to personal
property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by
succession is in question. the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies
of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of
As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of P120,000. In the project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate
testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the into 7 equal portions for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by
testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national his 1st and 2nd marriages.
law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above,
which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, as Among the three illegitimate children, Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis
in the case at bar, the order of the court approving the project of partition
filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that
made in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be, as it is
hereby affirmed. they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore,
compulsory heirs of the deceased.
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS BELLIS v. EDWARD BELLIS
G.R. No. L-23678. June 6, 1967. This argument is based on the rules on legitimes provided for in Philippine
BENGZON, J. Laws.
27
Issue: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an
successional rights of the illegitimate children acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but
left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a
Ruling: YES. National law of the decedent (Texas Law) applies. decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been declared as an
acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen claims that under
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied, the matter is
national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with returned back to the law of domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately
applicable, that the share of Helen must be increased in view of successional
regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the other hand,
successional rights; (c) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and counsel for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of
(d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that — the New Civil Code, the national of the deceased must apply, our courts
must apply internal law of California on the matter. Under California law,
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator should dispose
law of the country where it is situated. any property possessed by him in absolute dominion.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the

order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the ISSUE: Is the will of the decedent Edward Christensen governed by his
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national national law or the law of his domicile?
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
HELD: Applying the renvoi ruling, the will of the decedent is governed by
property may be found.
the law of his domicile.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation The laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its
of the decedent. citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws
State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of
California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our
heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the
the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
Amos G. Bellis.
The national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law
Aznar v. Garcia on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which
G.R. No. L-16749; January 31, 1963 authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's
domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,
LABRADOR, J.:
precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The
FACTS: Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to
court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California;
California where he resided and consequently was considered a California
such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the
Citizen for a period of nine years to 1913. He came to the Philippines where
he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two
entire period of his residence in this country, he had always considered states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the
himself as a citizen of California. country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as
directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question
has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
28

California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them. civil law on the status of persons.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen,
a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated
will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be December 16, 1997 has not been challenged by either of the parties. In fact,
governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil save for the issue of parental custody, even the trial court recognized said
Code of California, not by the internal law of California.. decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private respondent the
capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the
Roehr v. Rodriguez award of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine,
G.R. No. 142820; June 20, 2003 to petitioner. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
Quisumbing, J.: judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it
must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
Facts: Roehr (German) married respondent Rodriguez (Filipina) in ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of
Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified in Negros the Rules of Court.
Oriental. Their union brought about 2 children. Rodriguez filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati RTC. Meanwhile, Therefore, the divorce obtained by Roehr may be recognized by our
Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from Germany. Said decree also courts in view of the nationality principle.
provides that the parental custody of the children should be vested to
Grace J. Garcia vs. Rederick A. Recio
Wolfgang. Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001
a divorce decree had already been promulgated, and said motion was PANGANIBAN, J.:
granted.
Rodriguez filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer FACTS: The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an
that the case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife
children and the distribution of the properties between her and Wolfgang. in Australia. In 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. In 1992, respondent
ISSUE: Is the legal divorce obtained by foreigners in other countries acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina,
cognizable in our jurisdiction in view of the nationality principle in our civil herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage
license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino”. Since October
law?
1995, they lived separately; and in 1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal
assets were divided.
RULING: Yes. The divorce obtained by foreigners in other countries is
cognizable in our jurisdiction. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondent’s former
The Court specifically recognized the validity of a divorce obtained marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he
by a German citizen in his country. The court held in the Pilapil case that a told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married.
29
Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a capacity to remarry according to the alleged foreign law. Neither can the
divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally Court grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and
capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian
marriage was dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia as law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the
valid and recognized in the Philippines. The Australian divorce had ended the divorce decree.
marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.Hence,
this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court. Hence, the case was remanded to the trial court to receive evidence, if any,
which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then
ISSUE: Does the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of
ipso facto capacitate him to remarry, without first securing a recognition of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates.
the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts or adducing
sufficient evidence to prove his legal capacity to contract the second The People of the Philippine Islands v. Lol-lo and Saraw
marriage? G.R. No. 17958; February 27, 1922
MALCOLM, J.:
HELD: NO, the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia does
not ipso facto capacitate him to remarry.
FACTS: Six vintas intercepted 2 Dutch boats- carrying men, women and
The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even children, which were on its way between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in
by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil the Dutch East Indies. There the six vintas were manned by twenty-four
Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat,
the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by
the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or methods too horrible to the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat,
her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge. The Moros finally
respective national laws. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-
they are valid according to their national law. Therefore, before a foreign lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women
divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must were able to escape. Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and
allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. It is well- were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy.
settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the
laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian
marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court
by reason of their judicial function. of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts
In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine
appears to be authentic, issued by an Australian family court. Although, Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had,
appearance is not sufficient; and compliance with the rules on evidence and a judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty.
regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated. While the respondent
claims that the Australian divorce decree, was validly admitted as evidence,
there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to
marry petitioner. Respondent failed to produce sufficient evidence showing ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the
the foreign law governing his status. No proof has been presented on the crime of piracy are still in force.
legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws. Together
with other evidences submitted, they don’t absolutely establish his legal
30

RULING: Yes, the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional Trial Court,
piracy are still in force. Cagayan de Oro City, and the Private Respondents, the petitioners in Sp.
Proc. No. 88-55, for "Habeas Corpus", namely: CRISANTA VARGAS-
Article 17: xxx “Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN
property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and G.R. No. 86470; May 17, 1990
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments PADILLA, J.
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.”
FACTS: The full blood brothers and sisters of Vitaliana Vargas, unaware of
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code the latter’s death, filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that Vitaliana
dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 was forcibly taken from her residence and was confined by petitioner Tomas
of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. They alleged
Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not only to that Vitaliana was deprived of her liberty without any legal authority.
Spaniards but to Filipinos.
The respondent court issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was not
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same
satisfied because the petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana
thing as piracy by the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The specific alleging that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus proceeding
provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to statutory provisions and that he had already obtained a burial permit from the Undersecretary of
elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so, the Department of Health, which authorized the burial at the palace
considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc. He also
the Novelas, the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion. alleged that as the common law husband of Vitaliana, he has legal custody of
her body.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United
States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles ISSUE: Whether Eugenio, a common law spouse can claim custody of the
dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is body of the deceased as against the deceased’s full blood brothers and
mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and sisters.
wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the
HELD: NO. The common law spouse cannot claim custody of the body of the
expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine
deceased as against the full blood brothers and sisters.
Islands."
The custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her
Thus, it is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in
surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised
the Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding
Administrative Code provides:
provisions in force in the United States.
Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The
Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, DEPUTY SHERIFF immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased person,
31
regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage, private
shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified: respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany,
which later promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of
xxx xxx xxx marriage of the spouses.
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
or woman, or a child, and left any kin, the respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that, while still married
duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest to said respondent, petitioner “had an affair with a certain William Chia as
of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and
and with yet another man named Jesus Chua”.
within the Philippines and in possession of
sufficient means to defray the necessary
ISSUE: Can private respondent Erich Geiling file the criminal case for
expenses.
adultery against petitioner?
Although the petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294
RULING: NO. Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of
of the Civil Code, the Philippine Law does not recognize common law
adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted
marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many
except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. In other
years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as
words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the the action therefor.
community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce
in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce
and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on
relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community the matter of status of persons. Under the same considerations and
of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had
law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that
he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with
another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana. Therefore, he cannt claim custody over the body of the
Van Dorn vs. Romillo
deceased as against the latter’s brothers and sisters.
G.R. No. L-68470; October 8, 1985
PILAPIL v. IBAY-SOMERA MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
G.R. No. 80116, 30 June 1989
REGALADO, J.: FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent celebrated their marriage in Hong
Kong. Petioner is a Filipino citizen while Private respondent is a US citizen.
FACTS: Petitioner Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Geiling, a They established their residence in the Philippines and had two children.
German national, got married in Germany. The marriage started auspiciously Three years thereafter, they secured a divorce decree in Nevada, USA.
enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where Petitioner remarried. A suit against petitioner was filed, stating that
their only child, Isabella was born. Thereafter, marital discord set in, with petitioner’s business is a conjugal property with Private respondent and
mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de
32

prayed therein that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of the absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property. public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal
funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As
Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly
declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting
Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction. his right over the alleged conjugal property.
ISSUE: Does the alien spouse have a legal standing on the alleged conjugal Republic vs. Iyoy
assets in the Philippines. G.R. No. 152577; September 21, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
RULING: No. For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine
whether the property relations between petitioner and private respondent,
after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, FACTS:Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy were married on 16
upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal December 1961. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus
fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties. discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984,
Fely left the Philippines for the USA leaving all of their five children to the
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained care of Crasus.
jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during
After one year, Crasus received a letter from Fely requesting that he sign the
the trial of the case. There can be no question as to the validity of that
enclosed divorce papers. He did not sign. Later, Crasus learned, through the
Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is
letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American.
binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
Fely returned to the Philippines for several times. She did not however,
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union.
sought reconciliation with Crasus. Eventually, Crasus filed for the declaration
What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding
of nullity of their marriage before the RTC.
in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
During the trial Crasus argued that Fely was psychologically incapacitated to
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the perform the essential marital obligations.
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
33
Fely on the other hand, argued and admitted that: foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained
by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
-‐ She left the Philippines in 1984. Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
-‐ Later in the same year (1984), she obtained divorce from Crasus
-‐ She married her American husband in 1985. OSG contends that Article 26 paragraph 2 is not applicable because it only
-‐ She became an American citizen in 1988. applies to valid mixed marriage and that the proper remedy is to file a petition
-‐
for annulment or for legal separation. Since there is also no law governing
ISSUE: Was the divorce obtained by Fely valid?
Cipriano’s case, it is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.
RULING: No. The divorce was not valid.
ISSUE: Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of
Article 15 of the Civil Code provides: the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
“Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of HELD: YES. Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the
the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)” rule of reason, Supreme Court held that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To
living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead
to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
Hence, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
Crasus.
necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases
Republic of the Philippines v. Cipriano Orbecido III not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005 spirit or intent. If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to
QUISUMBING, J.: avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to
FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva in the the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming
Philippines. A few years later, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26. In view of the
bringing along their son Kristoffer. Later on, Cipriano discovered that his foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph
wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, his 2 of Article 26 as follows:
wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain
Innocent Stanley. 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code which 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The him or her to remarry.
Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
34

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, but theircitizenship at the time a valid The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code was included as an
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to amendment thru Executive Order 227, to avoid the absurd situation of a
Filipino as being still married to his or her alien spouse though the latter is no
remarry. In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an
longer married to the Filipino spouse because he/she had obtained a divorce
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been abroad which is recognized by his/her national law, and considering
celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the further the effects of the termination of the marriage under Article 43 in
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating relation to Article 50 and 52 of the same Code, which include the dissolution
her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of of the property relations of the spouses, and the support and custody of their
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, children, the Order dismissing this case is partially set aside with respect to
the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. these matters.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries

are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on
ROEHR vs RODRIGUEZ custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our
G.R. No. 142820. June 20, 2003 court. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
QUISUMBING, J.: judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it
must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of
FACTS: Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in
Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February ARTICLES 19-21
14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. They have two children named
Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine. DBP v. CA, Cucio, and Spouses Gotangco
On August 28, 1996, Rodriguez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of G.R. No. 137916; December 08, 2004
marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February CALLEJO, SR., J.
6, 1997, Roehr filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied. A motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence a petition for certiorari was filed with the FACTS: Private respondent spouses Jacinto Gotangco and Charity Bantug
Supreme Court. During the pendency of the case, Roehr obtained a decree were the owners of seven parcels of land. They were also the awardees of a
of divorce from Germany. Rodriguez subsequently filed a motion to dismiss parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 168. They secured a loan for their poultry
for the marriage has been dissolved. Motion was granted. project from the petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and
Judge Salonga partially set aside her decision after a motion for then executed a real estate mortgage over the seven parcels of land.
reconsideration was filed. She ordered for the dissolution of property Subsequently, they executed in favor of private respondent Elpidio O. Cucio
relations of the spouses, support and custody of the children. a contract to sell over the seven parcels of land mortgaged to DBP which
transaction was known to DBP. It was agreed that the purchase price shall
ISSUE: Did the Court err when it ordered the dissolution of property relations be paid directly to DBP and applied to the mortgage indebtedness of the
and support of their children despite the issuance of valid divorce decree Spouses Gotangco. The Spouses Gotangco also requested that Lot No. 168
from the German court? be substituted as security over the mortgage upon full payment of Cucio of
the purchase price, and that upon substitution, the Spouses Gotangco would
HELD: No. have to issue a deed of absolute sale in favor of Cucio.
35
Cucio sued by way of injunction both DBP and the Spouses Gotangco for ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING and RAMAS UYPITCHING SONS, INC. v.
DBP's refusal to turnover the titles of the seven parcels of land to the ERNESTO QUIAMCO
Spouses Gotangco so that the latter could execute a deed of absolute sale in
G.R. No. 146322. December 6, 2006.
favor of Cucio in view of Cucio's payment of the full purchase price. While the
said case was pending, DBP filed an application for the extrajudicial CORONA, J.:
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed in its favor by the Spouses
Gotangco which the latter sought to enjoin by way of injunction and which
was granted. Meanwhile, the RTC rendered judgment ordering DBP to Facts: To settle a case filed against them, Juan Davalan, Josefino Gabutero
release the titles of the seven parcels of land. The RTC also ordered DBP to and Raul Generoso surrendered to Ernesto Quiamco a motorcycle and a
pay the Spouses Gotangco moral damages based on Article 19 of the New photocopy of its certificate of registration.
Civil Code as a result of the former's pendente lite application for foreclosure
of real estate mortgage because the same was made to harass the It turned out that the said motorcycle was sold on installment basis and was
respondent spouses. Said judgment was affirmed by CA, hence this petition. mortgaged to Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc. managed by Ernesto Uypitching.
Davalan stopped paying the installments and told the corporation that the
Petitioner assails, among others, the award of moral damages to the
motorcycle had been "taken by respondent’s men."
Spouses Gotangco contending that it cannot be held liable for moral
damages for exercising its right under the real estate mortgage and the law.
Uypitching accompanied by policemen went to Quiamco’s establishment to
ISSUE: Is there an abuse of right to foreclose the mortgage on the part of recover the motorcycle. While the police and the clerk were talking,
DBP so as to justify the award of moral damages in favor of the Spouses Uypitching paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering "Quiamco
Gotangco under Article 19 of the New Civil Code? is a thief of a motorcycle." Unable to find respondent, the policemen, on
Uypitching’s instruction and over the clerk’s objection, took the motorcycle.
RULING: No, there is no abuse of right to foreclose the mortgage on the part Petitioner filed a criminal complaints against the respondent but was
of DBP so as to justify the award of moral damages in favor of the Spouses
eventually dismissed.
Gotangco under Article 19 of the New Civil Code.
Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners. The trial court
The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal
right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of held petitioners liable to respondent for damages.
prejudicing or injuring another. Malice or bad faith is at the core of said
provision. Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty Issue: Does petitioners’s exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee make them
to prove the same. not liable for damages?
The Spouses Gotangco failed to prove malice on the part of the petitioner. Held: No, the petitioners’s exercise of their right was not proper.
DBP was constrained to file its application for the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the mortgage for the Spouses Gotangco's past due obligation because Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a
despite the fact that it had sent notices to the respondent spouses and person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith,
demanded the updating of their account and the payment of the balance otherwise he opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or the
thereof, the latter failed to comply. Instead of settling their accounts, the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.
respondent spouses sought to enjoin the foreclosure application of DBP
which was granted by the lower courts. In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners’
instance was not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the
Hence, there is no abuse of right to foreclose the mortgage on the part of
DBP so as to justify the award of moral damages in favor of the Spouses procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory
Gotangco under Article 19 of the New Civil Code. statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle
36

was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity,
considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right to only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners’ actions
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule Article 21 aforesaid.
respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the
prejudice of respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused damage
to respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden and Ruby Lim V. Roberto Reyes a.k.a Amay
Bisaya
Hence, the petitioners are liable for damages. G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER VS. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ
G.R. No. 20089 ; December 26,1964
BENGZON,J.P.,J.
Facts: Amay Bisaya was having a coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko when
FACTS: Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual allegedly an old friend, Dr. Filart, asked him to join the party of the former
promise of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the manager of the said hotel, Mr. Tsuruoka. When he was helping himself at the
big day. On September 2 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be: “Dear Bet - buffet table, Ms. Ruby Lim approached him and said to leave the party for it
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the was intended for a number of guests. Amay Bisaya claimed that he was
Convair today. Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — humiliated by the manner Ms. Lim asked him to leave. He alleged that Ms.
That would only create a scandal. Paquing”. But the next day, September 3,
Lim asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the other
he sent her the following telegram: “Nothing changed rest assured returning
very soon apologize mama papa love Paking”. Thereafter Velez did not guests. He was accompanied by a Makati policeman in leaving the
appear nor was he heard from again. Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez penthouse. He was more embarrassed when Dr. Filart denied that she
filed no answer and was declared in default. A judgment was rendered in invited him on the said party.
favor of Wassmer. Defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law.
The reason given is that there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing an Issue: Do the actions of Ruby Lim constitute an Abuse of Right so as to
action for breach of promise to marry. make her and the petitioner hotel liable for damages?
ISSUE: Is mere breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong? Held: No. In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to
humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly
HELD: No. Mere breach to marry is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim
that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the
having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and
provisions that would have it so. It must not be overlooked, however, that the
extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she
not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible.
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." Surely the latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each
this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have
37
been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiffs marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
transpired between them. proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof
that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept
party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but
employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor
employee and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such
injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993 In the case, it was the petitioner's fraudulent and deceptive
DAVIDE, JR., J. protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her
surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise. His profession of
FACTS: Petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh, an Iranian citizen, courted and
love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to deceive the
proposed to marry private respondent Marilou Gonzales, 22 years old, single,
poor woman into believing that, indeed, he loved her and would want her to
which the latter accepted. Before the supposed marriage, Baksh forced her
be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied
to live with him in, but he maltreated her. Thereafter, Baksh repudiated their
by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and
marriage agreement. It was later found that Baksh is already married to
proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security.
someone, who is living in Bacolod City. Thus, Marilou filed a complaint
Baksh clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and so brazenly
against Baksh to claim of damages for a breach of promise to marry. In his
defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women.
defense, Baksh denied proposing marriage to Marilou nor having lived with
her. Therefore, damages pursuant to Article 21 may be awarded not
because of promise to marry but because of fraud and deceit behind it.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou. In his appeal, he avers that
Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong
CECILIO PE, ET AL., vs. ALFONSO PE
or injury or violated any good custom or public policy. He interposes that the
G.R. No. L-17396. May 30, 1962.
Filipino tradition cannot be used as basis of the decision because he is a
BAUTISTA ANGELO,J.:
foreigner, with Moslem upbringing, is unfamiliar with the Filipino tradition.
ISSUE: May damages be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the FACTS:Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe.
basis of Article 21? Defendant Alfonso Pe, on the otherhand, is a married man and was an
adopted son of a Chinaman, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Plaintiffs
HELD: Yes, damages may be awarded for a breach of promise to marry. and defendant are close and even considered the latter as a member of their
family. The defendant is frequented in the house of Lolita, who was staying
Article 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in with her parents, on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray
this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of the rosary. The two then fell in love with each other. Upon knowing the love
moral wrongs, which is impossible for human foresight to specifically affairs of the two, Lolita's parents forbidden the defendant from seeing Lolita.
enumerate and punish in the statute books. Thus, where a man's promise to
38

They filed a deportation proceedings against the defendant, him being a Hence, the complaint filed against the defendant is an actionable and
Chinese national. Despite of this, the affair of the two continued. based on a valid cause of action.
Sometime, thereafter, when Lolita was staying with her siblings at
their residence, Lolita disappeared from said house. Upon checking up her Quisumbing v. MERALCO
things, it was found that Lolita's clothes were gone. Her disappearance was G.R. No. 142943, April 7, 2002
PANGANIBAN, J
reported to the police authorities but still, her whereabouts is unknown. At
that time of her disapperance she was already 24 years old. Plaintiffs then, FACTS: Inspectors of MERALCO conducted a routine-on-the-spot inspection
filed an action for damages based on the fact that defendant, being a married of all single phase meters at the house of Spouses Quisumbing with the
man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in permission of the secretary of the Quisumbings. After the inspection, it was
a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. However, the found out that the meter had been tampered with. The result was relayed to
same was dismissed by the trial court. Hence, this appeal. the secretary who conveyed the information to the owners. The inspectors
advised that the meter be brought in the laboratory for verifications. After an
hour, inspectors returned and informed them that based on the findings, the
ISSUE: Does the complaint filed againt the defendant not actionable, for
meter was tampered. The inspectors asked for payment for the differential
failure to prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win bill, otherwise their electric supply will be disconnected.
Lolita's affection. Spouses Andamo filed a complaint for damages alleging that they
acted maliciously in disconnecting their power supply which was done
HELD: No. The complaint is considered to be an actionable one. without due process. MERALCO admitted the disconnection but denied
The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code liability citing the Terms and Conditions of Service.
which provides: "Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
ISSUE: Did MERALCO act maliciously and in a malevolent manner done
manner which is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
without due process, and lack of regard of the Quisumbing’s rights?
compensate the latter for the damage."
The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's SC RULING: Yes, MERALCO acted with utter disregard of the
affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an Quisumbing’s rights.
ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her Under the applicable special law, MERALCO may immediately
fall in love with him. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against disconnect electric service on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but
only if the discovery of the cause is personally witnessed and attested to by
defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his
an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the Energy
love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, Regulatory Board.
no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that In the case, there was no government official or ERB representative
defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in during the inspection as mandated by law. MERALCO had no legal right to
winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations immediately disconnect Spouses Quisumbing’s electrical supply without
with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed observing the requisites of law which, in turn, are akin to due process.
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has Therefore, MERALCO acted without due process and lack of regard
of the Quisumbing’s rights.
committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil GLOBE MACKAY CABLE VS COURT OF APPEALS
Code. 176 SCRA 778; August 25, 1989
39
CORTES, J.: primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself
legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
FACTS: Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner
GLOBE in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
to the engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of
lost several thousands of pesos. According to Tobias, he was the one who conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of
discovered the anomalies. Hendry, who was then the EVP and GM of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
GLOBE, confronted Tobias and informed him that he was the No.1 suspect
in the said anomalies. Hendry then informed Tobias to take a leave for a Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
week in order for GLOBE to investigate on the anomalies. Upon the return of that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
Tobias, Hendry accused him as the crook and swindler, and ordered him to the latter for the damage.
take a lie detector test and submit specimen of his handwritings for
investigation. Both test turned out to be negative. Not contented, Hendry Notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias who reported
called for the service of a private detective who reported that Tobias is the the possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry showed
culprit but with a disclaimer that the report was still not complete. Despite the belligerence to Tobias and dismissed the latter despite the result of the test
result of the 3 test, Hendry dismissed Tobias. Tobias then filed an illegal taken. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." The scornful
dismissal case against GLOBE and during the pendency of the case Hendry remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias
filed 5 charges of estafa through falsicication and another charge of being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal
discovering of secrets. All the charges were dropped by the fiscal founding dignity. But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several
no probable cause. Tobias then looked for another job at RETELCO. other tortious acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias after the
However, Hendry, despite the fact that RETELCO does not ask for the latter's termination from work such as filing the malicious information. The
recommendation, wrote a letter stating that the reason of his dismissal was next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to
for dishonesty. As a result of the said letter, Tobias was not able to land a job RETELCO which causes Tobias to lose the opportunity to obtained a work.
at RETELCO.
Hence, there is a clear violation of Art 19 which justifies damages in favor of
ISSUE: Can Tobias claim damages against GLOBE and Hendry under the Tobias.
New Civil Code.
University of the east vs. Romeo a. Jader
G.R. No. 132344; February 17, 2000
RULING: Yes. Tobias may claim damages under Art.19 and 21.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
Facts: Plaintiff Romeo Jader is a law student in the University of the East
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and College of Law. He failed to take the final examination in Practice court I for
observe honesty and good faith. which he was given a Incomplete Grade. During the second semester of his
fourth year he applied for the removal of his incomplete grade which was
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of approved by Dean Celedonio after payment of required fees.
abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in
the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. After deliberations, plaintiff name appeared in the tentative list of candidates
These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his for graduates and on the invitation for the Graduation Ceremonies. Plaintiff
due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a attended the graduation ceremony during which he went up the stage when
40

his name was called and his Tassel was turned from left to right and Dean Prior or subsequent to the ceremony, the school has the obligation to
Celedonio handed him a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of law promptly inform the student of any problem involving the latter's grades and
diploma. Thereafter he prepared himself for the bar exams. Having learned performance and also most importantly, of the procedures for remedying the
of the deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able to take the same.
bar exams.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their
Consequently he sued the petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former.
moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings and sleepless nights when he was not able to take the Hence, the Petitioner is Liable for its failure to promptly inform respondent of
1988 bar examinations arising from the latter's negligence. In its answer with the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he
counterclaim, petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that it never led had satisfied all requirements for the course.
respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor of
Laws degree when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating AZNAR V, CITIBANK, N.A., (PHILIPPINES)
students. G.R. No. 164273 March 28, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Issue: May an educational institution be held liable for damages for
misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the Facts: Aznar, a known businessman is a holder of a Preferred Master Credit
requirements for graduation when such is not the case? Card (Mastercard) issued by Citibank with a credit limit of P150,000.00. As
he and family, on an Asian tour, Aznar made a total advance deposit with
Held: Yes, an educational institution be held liable for damages for Citibank with the intention of increasing his credit limit. With the use of his
misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the Mastercard, Aznar purchased plane tickets to Kuala Lumpur for his group
requirements for graduation when such is not the case. worth P237,000.00. Aznar claims that when he presented his Mastercard in
some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the same was
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the not honored. And when he tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and Travel
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase plane tickets to Bali, it was
observe honesty and good faith. again dishonored for the reason that his card was allegedly blacklisted by
Citibank. Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank. To prove that
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes they did not blacklist Aznar‘s card, Citibank‘s Credit Card Department Head,
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Dennis Flores, presented Warning Cancellation Bulletins which contained the
list of its canceled cards covering the period of Aznar‘s trip.
When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a
contract of education is entered into between said institution and the student.
Issue: Whether Aznar is entitled to damages as a result of his credit card
Since the contracting parties are the school and the student, the latter is not
being declared over the limit?
duty-bound to deal with the former's agents, such as the professors with
respect to the status or result of his grades, although nothing prevents either
RULING: No. Aznar in his testimony admitted that he had no personal
professors or students from sharing with each other such information. It is the
contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient knowledge that his Mastercard was blacklisted by Citibank and only
notice and information to each and every student as to whether he or she presumed such fact from the dishonor of his card. There is no allegation in
had already complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a the Complaint or evidence to show that there was gross negligence on the
degree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate.
41
part of Citibank in declaring that the credit card has been used over the limit. Ruling: No. In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights
While the Court commiserates with Aznar for whatever undue principle, the following requisites must concur: (a) the existence of a legal
embarrassment he suffered when his credit card was dishonored by Ingtan right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of
Agency, especially when the agency‘s personnel insinuated that he could be prejudicing or injuring another.
a swindler trying to use blacklisted cards, the Court cannot grant his present
petition as he failed to show by preponderance of evidence that Citibank In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and
breached any obligation that would make it answerable for said suffering. her counsel, Atty. Del Prado, acted in bad faith or malice in sending the
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm demand letters to respondent. In the first place, there was ground for Nala's
which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or actions since she believed that the property was owned by her husband
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage Eulogio Duyan and that respondent was illegally occupying the same. She
without injury to those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result had no knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust imposed on them
of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion of the property to respondent. It
by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting was only after respondent filed the case for damages against Nala that she
from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These learned of such sale.
situations are often called damnum absque injuria
Moreover, respondent failed to show that Nala and Atty. Del Prado's acts
Heirs of Purisima Nala vs. Cabanasag were done with the sole intention of prejudicing and injuring him. It may be
G.R. No. 161188, June 13, 2008 true that respondent suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety and sleepless
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. nights when he received the demand letters; however, there is a material
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the legal invasion of a legal
Facts: Cabansag bought a 50-square meter property from spouses Eugenio right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury.
and Felisa Gomez. It is part of a 400-square meter lot registered in the name Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the
of the Gomez spouses. Afterwards, he received a demand letter from Atty. loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases,
Del Prado, in behalf of Purisima Nala, asking for the payment of rentals from the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone; the law affords
1987 to 1991 until he leaves the premises, as said property is owned by no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a
Nala, failing which criminal and civil actions will be filed against him. Another legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque
demand letter was sent. Respondent alleged that he suffered damages and injuria.
was constrained to file the case against Nala and Atty. Del Prado.
Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty. Del Prado to
Atty. Del Prado claimed that he sent the demand letters in good faith and that send the demand letters. She had to take all the necessary legal steps to
he was merely acting in behalf of his client, Nala, who disputed respondent's enforce her legal/equitable rights over the property occupied by respondent.
claim of ownership. Nala alleged that said property is part of an 800-square One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. Thus, whatever
meter property owned by her late husband. It was divided into two parts and damages are suffered by respondent should be borne solely by him.
the other half was allegedly conveyed to spouses Gomez through a fictitious
Carpio vs. Valmonte
deed of sale. RTC ruled in favor of respondent and awarded damages. CA
G.R. No. 151866. September 9, 2004.
affirmed the decision of RTC, hence this petition.
TINGA, J.:
Issue: Is Cabansag entitled to damages?
Facts: Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del

Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged her services for their church wedding. After
42

reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the items principle commonly known as “abuse of rights” under Article 19 of the Civil
needed for the wedding rites and the gifts from the principal sponsors. Upon Code. It provides that “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
entering the suite, the bride accused Valmonte of stealing her bag. It turned the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and
out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties, petitioner observe honesty and good faith.” To find the existence of an abuse of right,
discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort the following elements must be present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2)
room in a paper bag were lost. The jewelry pieces consist of two (2) diamond which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
rings, one (1) set of diamond earrings, bracelet and necklace with a total another.
value of about one million pesos. The hotel security was called in to help in
the search. The bags and personal belongings of all the people inside the In the case at bar, petitioner’s verbal reproach against respondent was
room were searched. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched, interrogated certainly uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew that
and trailed by a security guard throughout the evening. Later, police officers she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. This
arrived and interviewed all persons who had access to the suite and being the case, she had no right to attack respondent with her innuendos
fingerprinted them including Valmonte. During all the time Valmonte was which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly accusatory. By openly
being interrogated by the police officers, petitioner kept on saying the words accusing respondent as the only person who went out of the room before the
“Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto.” Valmonte’s car which was parked at the loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests therein, and ordering that
hotel premises was also searched but the search yielded nothing. she be immediately bodily searched, petitioner virtually branded respondent
as the thief. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain the identity of the
A few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the
demanding a formal letter of apology which she wanted to be circulated to one who actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by any standard or
the newlyweds’ relatives and guests to redeem her smeared reputation as a principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to
result of petitioner’s imputations against her. Petitioner did not respond to the respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. Her
letter. Thus, Valmonte filed a suit for damages. firmness and resolve to find her missing jewelry cannot justify her acts
toward respondent. She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently,
Issue: Are the Petitioners liable for damages for abuse of rights under Article she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly,
19 of the New Civil Code? petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for
which she should be held accountable.
Ruling: Yes. The Petitioners liable for damages for abuse of rights under
Article 19 of the New Civil Code. Thus, a person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate
exercise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and good faith; but
In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or
not when he acts with negligence. One is not allowed to exercise his right in
omission, whether done willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy
a manner which would cause unnecessary prejudice to another or if he would
or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained.
thereby offend morals or good customs.
Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also
universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Article 22)
spring from the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve as
guides for human conduct. First of these fundamental precepts is the VILLALVA v. RCBC SAVINGS BANK
43
G.R. No. 165661; August 28, 2006 Tenchavez v. Escano
PUNO, J.: G.R. No. L-19671; November 29, 1965
REYES, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: Petitioners executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Toyota for the Facts: Pastor Tenchavez married Vicenta Escano. The spouses became
estranged and Escano left for the US. On August 22, 1950, she filed a
purchase of a car. Under the chattel mortgage, petitioner shall insure the car
complaint for divorce and was subsequently able to secure a decree of
for loss, damages, theft etc. for the entire duration of the chattel mortgage divorce from the Nevada Court. She acquired American citizenship on
and to deliver the policy to the mortgagee. Later, the chattel mortgage was August 8, 1958. Tenchavez filed a complaint for legal separation and
assigned to RCBC, then to respondent RCBC Savings Bank. Petitioners damages against Vicenta and her parents contending that the latter alienated
faithfully complied with their obligations under the mortgage except that for the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct towards him. The
the period August 14, 1996 to August 14, 1997, petitioners procured the parents filed a counterclaim.
required insurance but did not deliver the policy to the respondent. As a
Issues:
consequence, respondent insured the vehicle; however, the policy that
respondent procured was later on cancelled due to the insurance policy 1. Can the divorce decree be recognized under our jurisdiction
already procured by the petitioners. The insurance company reimbursed the
respondent but for P3, 583.5 less than what it paid in procuring the cancelled 2. Can the parents of Vicenta be held liable for damages on the
policy. allegations of alienation
Respondent claims that its payment of insurance premiums on behalf of the Ruling: 1). No. The divorce decree cannot be recognized.
petitioners unjustly enriched the latter.
At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano was still a Filipino citizen.
She was then subject to Art. 15 of the NCC. Philippine law does not admit
ISSUE: Is the mortgagee who obtained insurance policy but did not deliver
divorce but only provides for legal separation, for to recognize foreign divorce
said policy to the mortgagor as required by the terms of a chattel mortgage decrees between Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of
unjustly enriched when the mortgagor paid for the premiums to obtain the declared policy of the State, especially in view of the 3rd par. of Art. 17 of
insurance policy covering the same chattel and the same period? the NCC.
RULING: No. The mortgagee who obtained insurance policy but did not 2). No. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaños'
deliver said policy to the mortgagor as required by the terms of a chattel animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration
mortgage is not unjustly enriched when the mortgagor paid for the premiums and is belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun. In
to obtain insurance policy covering the same chattel and the same period. these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them"
and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and
Enrichment consists of every patrimonial, physical or moral advantage, so "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity".
long as it is appreciable in money. It may also take the form of avoidance of
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives,
expenses and other indispensable reductions in the patrimony of a person. It aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce;
may also include the prevention of a loss or injury. In the case at bar, she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled
petitioner spouses were not enriched when respondent obtained insurance to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her
coverage for the mortgaged vehicle as the petitioner spouses had already parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections
obtained the required insurance coverage for the vehicle from August 14, in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown,
good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
1996 to August 14, 1997.
RESPECT FOR OTHER’S PRIVACY, PERSONALITY, ETC. (Article 26)

44

Therefore, the legal separation is granted but Petitioner is held liable to pay St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil
for damages. and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday
Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and
explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification
". Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the
distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio
St Louis Realty vs. CA, 133 SCRA 179
or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was
G.R. No. L-46061 November 14, 1984 mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income
AQUINO, J.: and mental anguish.
FACTS: In 1968, petitioner published an advertisement in a newspaper with

the heading “WHERE THE HEART IS” with a photograph of the residence of
Doctor Aramil (without his permission) and Arcadio family. In 1969, the same PREJUDICIAL QUESTION (Article 36)
advertisement was published. Doctor Aramil, a faculty member of the UERM
Memorial Hospital, noticed the mistake and wrote a letter of protest to the CHING v. COURT OF APPEALS
petitioner. The advertising officer of St. Louis Realty stopped the publication G.R. No. 124642, 23 February 2004
of the said advertisement and contacted Dr. Aramil to offer his apologies.
CALLEJO,SR., J:
However, no rectification was published.
Aramil's counsel demanded damages from petitioner however, the latter FACTS: Alfredo Ching was charged with four counts of estafa punishable
claimed that there was an honest mistake and rectification would be
under Article 315 par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
published in another newspaper. It published a new advertisement with the
Arcadio family and their real house but it did not publish any apology and Presidential Decree 115, otherwise known as the "Trust Receipts Law" for
explanation of the error to the respondent. Respondent filed his complaint for having executed a trust receipt agreement in favor of Allied Banking
damages that prompted the petitioner to published a "NOTICE OF Corporation in consideration of the receipt of some goods. Under the terms
RECTIFICATION". of the agreement, the accused agreed to sell those goods for cash with the
express obligation to remit to the bank the proceeds of the sale and/or to turn
The trial court found that the said mistake violated respondent’s right to over the goods, if not sold, on demand. But Ching, once in possession of
privacy under Article 26 of the NCC and awarded damages in favor of Dr. said goods, misappropriated misapplied and converted to his own personal
Aramil. The CA affirmed the judgment. Hence, this petition.
use and benefit the said goods and/or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and
despite repeated demands, failed and refused to account for and/or remit the
ISSUE: Is he liable for violation of respondent’s right to privacy under the
New Civil Code? proceeds of sale thereof to the bank. Thereafter, petitioner Ching, together
with Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc., filed a case before the Regional Trial
HELD: Yes, St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under Court of Manila for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages
Articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements entitled "Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. et. al. vs. Allied Banking Corporation."
pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Then, Ching filed a petition before the said court for the suspension of the
Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed. criminal proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question in a civil action.
45
ISSUE: Does the pendency of a civil action for damages and declaration of
nullity of documents, specifically trust receipts, warrant the suspension of
criminal proceedings instituted for violation of Article 315 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to P.D. 115, otherwise known as the "Trust Receipts
Law”?
HELD: No, it does not warrant suspension.

66. Arthur Te vs. Court of Appeals
The law requires the concurrence of two essential requisites:
G.R. No. 126746; November 29, 2000
Kapunan, J.
1. The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and FACTS:
Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married. They did not live together
2. The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action after their marriage but they would meet each other regularly. After Choa
may proceed. gave birth, Te stopped visiting her.
While their marriage was subsisting, Te contracted a second
The alleged prejudicial question in the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage with Julietta Santella. When Choa learned about this, she filed a
documents and for damages, does not juris et de jure determine the guilt or Bigamy case against Te. Te, on the other hand, filed an action for the
innocence of the accused in the criminal action for estafa. Thus, even on the annulment of his marriage to Choa on the ground that he was only forced to
assumption that the documents are declared null, it does not ipso facto follow marry her. Te also alleged that Choa concealed her pregnancy by another
man at the time of their marriage and that she was psychlogically
that such declaration of nullity shall exonerate the accused from criminal
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.
prosecution and liability. Choa also filed with the PRC an administrative case against Te and
Santella to revoke their engineering licenses on the ground that they
The criminal liability of the accused for violation of Article 315 1(b) of the committed acts of immorality by living together and subsequently marrying
Revised Penal Code, may still be shown through the presentation of each other despite their knowledge that at the time of their marriage, Te was
evidence to the effect that: (a) the accused received the subject goods in already married to Choa.
trust or under the obligation to sell the same and to remit the proceeds Te filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the administrative
thereof to Allied Banking Corporation, or to return the goods, if not sold; (b) case on the ground of prejudicial question. It was denied by the Boards. Te
filed for a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals against the
that accused Ching misappropriated or converted the goods and/or the
Boards on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals
proceeds of the sale; (c) that accused Ching performed such acts with abuse ruled that there is no prejudicial question existed since the action sought to
of confidence to the damage and prejudice of Allied Banking Corporation; be suspended is administrative in nature and the other action involved is a
and (d) that demand was made by the bank to herein petitioner. civil case.
ISSUE: Is the there a prejudicial question between a civil case of annulment
Therefore, the pendency of a civil action for damages and declaration of and criminal case of bigamy or administrative proceeding?
nullity of documents, specifically trust receipts does not warrant the RULING:
suspension of criminal proceedings. No, there is no prejudicial question between a civil case of
annulment and criminal case of bigamy or an administrative proceeding.
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
46

based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be FACTS: Dr. Vincent Mercado married complainant Consuelo Tan on June
determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case 27, 1991 (second marriage) before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge
in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. Gorgonio J. Ibañez further confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29,
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage 1991. Based on the records, at the time of the celebration of the wedding
to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners with Tan, accused was actually in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 (first marriage). On
for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant Tan
the time the second marriage is contracted. The prevailing rule is found in which eventually resulted in the institution of the present case against said
Article 40 of the Family Code, which states that the absolute nullity of a accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado. On November 13, 1992, or more than a
previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor's Office, accused
there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V.
the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed Oliva and on May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In Landicho vs. Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Relova, we held that: Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge Family Code.
for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of Ruling of the RTC: RTC convicted Dr. Mercado of the crime of bigamy. Since
competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it no declaration of the nullity of his first marriage had yet been made at the
be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption time of his second marriage, it is clear that accused was a married man when
of marriage exists. he contracted such second marriage with complainant on June 27, 1991.
It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for Ruling of CA: CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and mentioned Article 40 of
annulment of petitioners marriage to private respondent did not give rise to a the Family Code as its basis.
prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in Contention of the Accused: That he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of
the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of his first marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it
the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting. void ab initio as such deemed never to have taken place at all.
Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the ISSUE: Should the accused be convicted of the crime of bigamy even if there
suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. As was already a Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of the first obtained
discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a after the case for bigamy was filed?
criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question HELD: Yes, the accused should be convicted of the crime of Bigamy. Article
where one case is administrative and the other is civil. 40 of the Family Code, a new provision, expressly requires a judicial
The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as follows: “ART. 40. The
an administrative case in another judicial body against an examinee or absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
registered professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage
filed or to be filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the void.” Such declaration is now necessary before one can contract a second
proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed independently with marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and
the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without convicted of bigamy. In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second
awaiting for the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body. marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared
67. Vincent Paul G. Mercado v. Consuelo Tan void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with
G.R. No. 137110, August 01, 2000 bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting,
Panganiban, J. he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
47
Code. That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of which we here declare to commence only after the trial court ordered
the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been respondent to vacate in accordance with its order of 26 July 1979. Being a
consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without paying
the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property owned in
declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as common so long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is
a prejudicial question in the criminal case. Therefore, Vincent Paul Mercado intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners.
should be convicted of the crime of bigamy. Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the
whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than
68. Virgilio B.Aguilar v. CA, and Senen B. Aguilar . that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, the reason being that
[G.R. No. 76351, October 29, 1993 until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined
Bellosillo, J. and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants joint
ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and
th th
FACTS: Petitioner Virgilio (7 child) and respondent Senen (5 child) are enjoyment of the same. When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of
brothers who purchased a house and lot in Parañaque where their father the property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment
could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to
Initially, the brothers agreed that Virgilio's share in the co-ownership was enjoy the possession jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the continued stay of
two-thirds while that of Senen was one-third. Later on, by virtue of a written respondent and his family in the house prejudiced the interest of petitioner as
memorandum dated 23 February 1970, Virgilio and Senen agreed that their the property should have been sold and the proceeds divided equally
interests in the house and lot should be equal, with Senen assuming the between them. To this extent and from then on, respondent should be held
remaining mortgage obligation of the original owners with the Social Security liable for monthly rentals until he and his family vacate.
System (SSS) in exchange for his possession and enjoyment of the house
together with their father. Since Virgilio was then disqualified from obtaining a 69. SPS YU vs PCIB
loan from SSS, the brothers agreed that the deed of sale would be executed G.R. No. 147902 March 17, 2006
and the title registered in the meantime in the name of Senen. After AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974, Virgilio demanded from Senen that the
latter vacate the house and that the property be sold and proceeds thereof Facts : Spouses Vicente Yu and Demetria Lee-Yu (petitioners) and spouses
divided among them. Senen refused so Virgilio filed an action to compel the Ramon T. Yu and Virginia A. Tiu, or Yu Tian Hock aka Victorino/Vicente Yu,
sale of the house and lot so that the they could divide the proceeds between mortgaged their title, interest, and participation over several parcels of land
them. When the case was set for pre-trial, Senen and his counsel whom he located in Dagupan City and Quezon City, in favor of the Philippine
granted a Special Power of Attorney to attend pre-trial failed to attend Commercial International Bank (respondent) as security for the payment of a
5
resulting to the rendition of judgement in default. Trial Court ruled that loan in the amount of P9,000,000.00.
petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal As the petitioners failed to pay the loan, the interest, and the penalties due
shares; either one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any thereon, respondent filed on July 21, 1998 with the Office of the Clerk of
time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City a
the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests; to Petition for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage on the
6
pay plaintiff P1,200.00 as rentals from January 1975 up to the date of Dagupan City properties. On August 3, 1998, the City Sheriff issued a
decision plus interest. CA set aside this decision that is why Virgilio filed a Notice of Extra-Judicial Sale scheduling the auction sale on September 10,
petition for review on certiorari. 1998 at 10:00 o’clock in the morning or soon thereafter in front of the Justice
7
Hall, Bonuan, Tondaligan, Dagupan City.
ISSUE: Did the CA erred in setting aside the decision of the trial court on the At the auction sale on September 10, 1998, respondent emerged as the
8
merits of the case and remanding the same for pre-trial? highest bidder. On September 14, 1998, a Certificate of Sale was issued in
9
favor of respondent. On October 1, 1998, the sale was registered with the
HELD: Yes, the CA erred in setting aside the decision of the trial court. The Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City.
Court uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner, except as to the About two months before the expiration of the redemption period, or on
effectivity of the payment of monthly rentals by respondent as co-owner August 20, 1999, respondent filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Writ of Possession
48

before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, docketed as Special 3135, (c) the filing of Civil Case No. 99-03169-D is an afterthought and
Proceeding No. 99-00988-D and raffled to Branch 43 (RTC Branch dilatory in nature, and (d) legally speaking what seems to exist is litis
10
43). Hearing was conducted on September 14, 1999 and respondent pendentia and not prejudicial question.
11
presented its evidence ex-parte. The testimony of Rodante Manuel was The Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA.
admitted ex-parte and thereafter the petition was deemed submitted for Issues :
resolution. Does the pendency of a prejudicial issue renders the issues in Special
On September 30, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss and to Strike Proceedings No. 99-00988-D as [sic] moot and academic.
Out Testimony of Rodante Manuel stating that the Certificate of Sale dated Held :
September 14, 1998 is void because respondent violated Article 2089 of the No. A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which
Civil Code on the indivisibility of the mortgaged by conducting two separate is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgage properties in Dagupan City and which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into play in a situation
Quezon City and indicating in the two notices of extra-judicial sale that where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in
12
petitioners’ obligation is P10,437,015.20 as of March 31, 1998, when the former an issue that must be pre-emptively resolved before the criminal
13
petitioners are not indebted for the total amount of P20,874,031.56. action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
In the meantime, petitioners filed a complaint for Annulment of Certificate of resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of
Sale before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of
No. 99-03169-D and raffled to Branch 44 (RTC Branch 44). prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
On February 14, 2000, RTC Branch 43 denied petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for Annulment of
and to Strike Out Testimony of Rodante Manuel, ruling that the filing of a Extrajudicial Sale is a civil action and the respondent’s petition for the
motion to dismiss is not allowed in petitions for issuance of writ of possession issuance of a writ of possession of Lot No. 3-A, Block 1, Psd-07-021410,
14
under Section 7 of Act No. 3135. TCT No. 44668 is but an incident in the land registration case and, therefore,
On February 24, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, further no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of the two actions.
arguing that the pendency of Civil Case No. 99-03169-D in RTC Branch 44 is At any rate, it taxes our imagination why the questions raised in Case No.
a prejudicial issue to Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D in RTC Branch 43, the 98-0868 must be considered determinative of Case No. 9011. The basic
resolution of which is determinative on the propriety of the issuance of a writ issue in the former is whether the respondent, as the purchaser in the
of possession. extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, may be compelled to have the property
On May 8, 2000, RTC Branch 43 denied petitioners’ Motion for repurchased or resold to a mortgagor’s successor-in-interest (petitioner);
Reconsideration, holding that the principle of prejudicial question is not while that in the latter is merely whether the respondent, as the purchaser in
applicable because the case pending before RTC Branch 44 is also a civil the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, is entitled to a writ of possession
case and not a criminal case. after the statutory period for redemption has expired. The two cases,
On certiorari, the CA dismissed petitioners’ Petition for Certiorari on the assuming both are pending, can proceed separately and take their own
34
grounds that petitioners violated Section 8 of Act No. 3135 and disregarded direction independent of each other.
the rule against multiplicity of suits in filing Civil Case No. 99-03169-D in RTC In the present case, Civil Case No. 99-01369-D and Spec. Proc. No. 99-
Branch 44 despite full knowledge of the pendency of Spec. Proc. No. 99- 00988-D are both civil in nature. The issue in Civil Case No. 99-01369-D is
00988-D in RTC Branch 43; that since the one-year period of redemption has whether the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed
already lapsed, the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of respondent by the petitioners in favor of the respondent and the sale of their properties at
becomes a ministerial duty of the trial court; that the issues in Civil Case No. public auction are null and void, whereas, the issue in Spec. Proc. No. 99-
99-03169-D are not prejudicial questions to Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D 00988-D is whether the respondent is entitled to a writ of possession of the
because: (a) the special proceeding is already fait accompli, (b) Civil Case foreclosed properties. Clearly, no prejudicial question can arise from the
No. 99-03169-D is deemed not filed for being contrary to Section 8 of Act No.
49
existence of the two actions. The two cases can proceed separately and take G.R. No. L-26795; July 31, 1970
their own direction independently of each other. REYES, J.:
70. LEONILO C. DONATO v. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA FACTS:

GR No. 53642, April 15, 1988
GANCAYCO, J.: Carmen Quimiguing, a minor, sued through her parents Antonio Quimiguing
and Jacoba Cabilin. Parties were neighbors and had close and confidential
FACTS: relations. Defendant Felix Icao, although married, succeeded in having
Petitioner was charged with bigamy. Before his arraignment, his second wife carnal intercourse with Carmen several times by force and intimidation, and
filed a case for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground that without her consent. As a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and
she did not know the existence of the first marriage when they got married. drugs supplied by defendant, and Carmen had to stop studying. She claimed
Respondent judge refused to suspend the criminal case on the basis of support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney’s fees. Icao moved to
prejudicial question. dismiss for lack of cause of action, since the complaint did not allege that the
child had been born. The trial judge dismissed the complaint. Carmen moved
ISSUE/S: Does the concept of prejudicial question applies in this case? to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, she had
later given birth to a baby girl; but the trial court sustained the defendant’s
HELD: No. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a objection. Carmen appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be ISSUE: Is a child entitled to support, although yet unborn?
shown that the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that HELD:
was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act Yes, a child, although yet unborn, is entitled to support under Article 40 of the
in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his New Civil Code.
conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in
February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Further, Article 742 of the Civil
contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not Code provides “donations made to conceived and unborn children may be
the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats accepted by those persons who would legally represent them if they were
and intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as already born.” Article 854 also provides that “the preterition or omission of
defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at
spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming that the first shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact insofar as they are not inofficious. If the omitted compulsory heirs should die
would not be material to the outcome of the case. Parties to the marriage before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must right of representation."
be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the The unborn child has a right to support from it progenitors, particularly of the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as defendant-appellee, whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of
there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. the motion to dismiss, even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;"
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the
prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court therefore, has not abused much less parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls
gravely abused, its discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after
petitioner. the death of the testator (Article 854, Civil Code). It is clear that the lower
court’s theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an
71.CARMEN QUIMIGUING, suing through her parents, ANTONIO obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support
QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN v. FELIX ICAO to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a
condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article
50

40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for ail Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or
purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action
the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on
at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb). This proviso is account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on
first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective. behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death,
Therefore, Carmen’s child with respondent Felix Cao, although yet unborn at since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical
the time of the filing of the complaint, has the right to receive support from personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act).
respondent. This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at
all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as
72. Antonio Geluz v. Court of Appeals and Oscar Lazo distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his
G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961 right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either
Reyes, J.B.L., J. help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be
Facts: In 1950, before Nita Villanueva and Oscar Lazo were married, limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of
Villanueva became pregnant. To conceal her pregnancy from her parents the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish
and upon her aunt’s advice, she had an abortion by Antonio Geluz, a attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations,
physician. After Villanueva and Lazo got married, she became pregnant for as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them.
the second time. As she was an employee of the Commission on Elections But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have
and found it inconvenient, she had her second abortion by Geluz in October not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the
1953. In less than two years, she again became pregnant. On 21 February appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by
1955, Villanueva went to the clinic of Geluz in Manila accompanied by her the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the
sister and her niece. Unknown to Lazo and without his consent, his wife had frustration of his parental hopes and affections. Even after learning of the
an abortion for the third time, an abortion of a two-month old fetus. Villanueva third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the
paid Geluz fifty pesos. At that time, Lazo was in Cagayan campaigning for administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern
his election to the provincial board. appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money
On the basis of the last abortion, Lazo instituted an action in the Court of payment.
First Instance of Manila against Geluz. The trial court ordered Geluz to pay Hence, the decision appealed from is reversed.
Lazo damages, attorney’s fees and costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court. Hence, Geluz filed a petition 73. DE JESUS vs. SYQUIA
for certiorari. G.R. No. 188832; November 28, 1933
STREET, J.
Issue: Did the couple’s unborn child acquire civil personality?
FACTS: Antonia Loanco de Jesus had amorous relations with Cesar Syquia,
Ruling: No, the unborn child did not acquire civil personality. Article 40 of the and as a consequence, De Jesus got pregnant with a baby boy born on June
Civil Code expressly limits the provisional personality by imposing the 17, 1931. In February of 1931, Syquia wrote a note to the priest who was
condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: “provided it be expected to christen the baby stating that the baby due in June was his and
born later with the condition specified in the following article.” In the present that he would like his name to be given to the baby. While Syquia was
case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its abroad for a trip, he wrote Loanco several letters telling her to take care of
mother's womb. herself so that “junior” might be strong and healthy.
51
When the baby was born, Syquia took Loanco and her mother to a house
where they lived together as a family for over a year. After a few months,
Loanco discovered that she was pregnant with their second child. At this FACTS: Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for
point, Syquia began to feel differently for Loanco and told her that he was a certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San
already married to another woman. As a result, Syquia caused the name of Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the
Ismael Loanco to be given to the baby instead of what was originally planned proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of
to be Cesar Syquia JR. public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said
Antonia Loanco then filed a civil case against Cesar Syquia to compel the Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the
latter to recognize Ismael and Pacita Loanco as his natural children and to proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said
pay for their maintenance and support. Defendant refused to acknowledge plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is
Ismael Loanco as his natural child stating that he never acknowledged a contravention of law arguing that the estate of Pedro Fragante is not a
paternity over the latter. person within the meaning of the Public Service Act.
ISSUE: Can several notes made by the putative father during the ISSUE: Can the estate of Pedro Fragante be extended juridical personality?
pregnancy of the mother prove acknowledgment of paternity?
HELD: Yes, the estate of Pedro Fragante may be extended juridical
RULING: YES, the notes made by defendant are sufficient to prove personality. The Supreme Court citing the decision of The Supreme Court of
acknowledgment of paternity. Indiana held that:
The Supreme Court ruled that the acknowledgment contemplated in “The estate of the decedent is a person in legal contemplation. "The word
subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code must be made in a single "person" in its legal signification, is a generic term, and includes artificial as
document or may be made in more than one document, of indubitable well as natural persons. It said in another work that 'persons are of two kinds:
authenticity, written by the recognizing father. Recognition can be made out natural and artificial. A natural person is a human being. Artificial persons
by putting together the admissions of more than one document, include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons forming a
supplementing the admission made in one letter by an admission or corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law attributes the
admissions made in another. In this case, the note to the priest and the other capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of artificial persons is
letters suffice to connect that admission with the child then being carried by recognized only to a limited extent in our law. "Examples are the estate of a
Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall bankrupt or deceased person." Our own cases inferentially recognize the
be addressed to one, or any particular individual. It is merely required that correctness of the definition given by the authors from whom we have
the writing shall be indubitable. quoted, for they declare that it is sufficient, in pleading a claim against a
Moreover, the writings in the notes are legally sufficient. The words of decedent's estate, to designate the defendant as the estate of the deceased
recognition contained in the notes are not capable of two constructions. They person, naming him. Unless we accept this definition as correct, there would
refer to a baby then conceived which was expected to be born in June and be a failure of justice in cases. To our minds, it seems reasonable that the
which would thereafter be presented for christening. The baby came, and estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. It is the
though it was in the end given the name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be
Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child whom the defendant intended to properly made, and, although natural persons as heirs, devises, or creditors,
acknowledge is clear. Any doubt that might arise on this point is removed by have an interest in the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal
the letters defendant himself sent. In these letters the defendant makes entity.”
repeated reference to junior as the baby which Antonia, to whom the letters In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of
were addressed, was then carrying in her womb. Pedro O. Fragrante is considered a "person", for quashing of the
Hence, the notes made by defendant while the baby was in Loanco’s womb proceedings for no other reason than his death would entail prejudicial
are sufficient to prove acknowledgment of paternity. results to his investment amounting to P35,000.00 as found by the
commission, not counting the expenses and disbursements which the
74.LIMJOCO vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, proceeding can be presumed to have occasioned him during his lifetime, let
G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948 alone those defrayed by the estate thereafter.
HILADO, J.:
52

Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for No.
the legal fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate of the deceased As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil
person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice Case is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could
resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling not have been, validly served with summons. He had no more civil
such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of
fiction is indulged. Substantially the same reason is assigned to support the legal relations, was lost through death. Since no jurisdiction was acquired
same rule in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana, as announced in over Oria, the judgment against him is a patent nullity
Billings vs. State, supra, when the Supreme Court of said State said:
. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as 76. MO YA LIM YAO v. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
an artificial person. it is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971
disposition of the assets to be properly made . . . . Barredo, J.
Hence, the estate of Pedro O. Fragante may be extended juridical FACTS: Lau Yuen Yeung, an alien, entered the Philippines as a non-
personality. immigrant on March 13, 1961 and was permitted to stay in the country for a
period of one (1) month. After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen
75. Dionisio Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962. On
G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976 January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
AQUINO, J. Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of respondent Commissioner of Immigration, to
FACTS: confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the
In a civil case filed by the Quality Plastic Products, Inc., the court ordered expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with
Pedro Oria and other defendants in the said case to pay solidarity Quality preliminary injunction. Lau Yuen Yeung claims that by her marriage to Mo Ya
Plastic Products a sum of money plus interest. Further, the court directed Lim Yao (alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim), a Filipino citizen, she has been
that in case the defendants failed to settle the amount of money, it authorizes lawfully naturalized.
the sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria which was given as The petition was however, denied by the Court of First Instance (CFI)
security under the bond. The defendants failed to pay. Hence, the court stating, among others, that Lau Yuen Yeung while claiming not to be
ordered for the foreclosure of the land of Oria. However, it turned out that disqualified, does not and cannot allege that she possesses all the
Oria already died long before the civil action was filed. The respondent was qualifications to be naturalized by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen,
unaware of such fact. At the onset of the case, the summons and copies of as she lacks at least, the requisite length of residence in the Philippines. Also
the complaint for the defendants had been personally served by a deputy according to the CFI, Lau Yuen Yeung’s marriage to her co-petitioner was
sheriff on Soliven, one of the defendants, who acknowledged such service by effected merely for convenience to defeat or avoid her then impending
signing on the back of the original summons in his own behalf and again compulsory departure, not to say deportation.
signing for his co-defendants. ISSUE: Did Lau Yuen Yeung become ipso facto Filipino Citizen upon her
The petioners, as heirs of the deceased Oria sued Quality Plastic Products, marriage to a Filipino citizen?
Inc for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against HELD: Yes. Accordingly, the Court holds that under Section 15 of
his land due to lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Oria. On Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
the other hand, the respondent alleged that Oria's heirs were aware of the naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to
suit against Soliven and his sureties and that the said heirs were estopped to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
question the court's jurisdiction over Oria. Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any
ISSUE: Did the court acquire jurisdiction over the deceased Pedro Oria? woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
RULING:
53
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be RULING:YES. Repatriation cured his ineligibility as it is likewise given
deemed a citizen of the Philippines. retroactive effect.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines," laws shall have
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled
naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or
moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS. A reading of P.D.
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a
Sec. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. — new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. While it is true that the
In case a petitioner should die before the final decision has been law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American
rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be
proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to
widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of
effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner. his application therefor, August 17, 1994.
Section 16 is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent
applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events i.e.,
not required to go through a naturalization preceeding, in order to be situations and transactions existing even before the law came into being in
considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby
Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of
and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and
them differently. expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a
retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions
Hence, alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, subsequent to the passage of such law.
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can
of the Philippines under Section 4 of C.A. 473. and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier
mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a
77. FRIVALDO v. COMELEC contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no
G.R. No. 120295, 28 June 1996 showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious
PANGANIBAN, J.: would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee
FACTS: Juan Frivaldo was disqualified to run for the office of Governor of shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation,
Sorsogon because of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines, and Raul Lee, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
petitioner in the disqualification case and candidate with the second highest
number of votes, was sworn in to office. On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with 78. Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
the COMELEC a new petition, praying for the annulment of the proclamation G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995
of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at Kapunan, J.
2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the
Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed Facts: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of
with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the First District
granted. As such, when the June 21, 1995 COMELEC ORDER was released of Leyte. She provided in her COC that she has resided for “seven months
and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, immediately preceding the election in the constituency where she seeks to
there was no more legal impediment to the Frivaldo’s proclamation as be elected.”
governor. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
ISSUE: Can Frivaldo’s repatriation cure his ineligibility and may it be given Representative and a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition
retroactive effect? for Cancellation and Disqualification” with the Commission on Elections
alleging that petitioner lacked the Constitution’s one year residency
requirement for candidates to the House of Representatives on the
54

evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record and Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother’s house, an act which supports
in her Certificate of Candidacy. the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG
Petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it
changing the entry “seven” months to “since childhood” in item No. 8 was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her
of the amended certificate. Petitioner raised that the printed word “Seven” “homes” and “residences” following her arrival in various parts of Metro
(months) was a result of an “honest misinterpretation or honest mistake” on Manila merely qualified as temporary or “actual residences,” not domicile.
her part and that she thought that what was asked was her “actual and Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations
physical” presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a
First Legislative District, to which she could have responded “since new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical
childhood. for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death
The COMELEC declared petitioner as disqualified for running as of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations
representative. Subsequently, the COMELEC issued first a Resolution exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a
allowing petitioner’s proclamation should the results of the canvass show that domicile different from her husband.
she obtained the highest number of votes. On the same day, however, the The facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a
COMELEC reversed itself . conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the
Petitioner has obtained the highest number of votes in the election. First District of Leyte.
Issue: Does the petitioner have her legal residence or domicile in the First 79.ENGRACE NINAL V. NORMA BAYADOG
District of Leyte? GR NO. 133778 March 14, 2000
Ynares-Santiago, J.
Held: Yes. Petitioner has her legal residence or domicile in the First District
of Leyte. Facts:
The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the
Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that The petitioners in this case are children of Pepito Ninal and Teodulfa
insofar as the Civil Code is concerned—affecting the rights and obligations of Bellones. The latter was shot by Pepito on April 24,1985. On December 11,
husband and wife—the term residence should only be interpreted to mean 1986, about one year and eight months after Teodulfa’s death, Pepito Ninal
“actual residence.” The inescapable conclusion derived from this contracted a second marriage with respondent Norma Badayog. Their
unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married marriage was contracted without any marriage license. Pepito and Norma
the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely executed an affidavit attesting thereto that they had lived together for at least
gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium. five years and were thus exempt from procuring a marriage license.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new Sometime thereafter, Pepito died in a car accident. The petitioners then, filed
“domicile” after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging
after her husband died, petitioner’s acts following her return to the country that the said marriage was void for lack of marriage license. The case was
clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This marriage would affect their successional rights.
“choice” was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the
PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG’s permission to “rehabilitate (our) Issue:
ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them (1) Can the parties to a common law relationship dispensed with the
livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland.”47 essential requirement of marriage license when they counted their
Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in
55
cohabitation from the time that one of the parties is still legally married to Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
another? citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband
and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly
(2) May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
nullity of his marriage after his death? On June 26, 1992, Rederick Recio became an Australian citizen, as shown
Ruling: by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian
(1) No. The five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back government.
from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union On January 12, 1994, Rederick and Grace got married at Our Lady of
had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.
the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a On March 3, 1998, Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly
was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity — that is had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12,
unbroken. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with 1994.
every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre- Rederick contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been
conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989; thus, he
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while
required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to
in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia.
impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce
registrar issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the
marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be the marriage; that is, respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry.
said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five ISSUE:
years prior to their wedding day. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time Was the trial court correct in declaring the marriage ended not on the ground
when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they of capacity to remarry.
lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his HELD: YES, for lack of evidence, hence the case was remanded to receive
lawful spouse. further evidence.
The case was remanded for the purpose of receiving evidence which
(2) Yes. Any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. "Under conclusively show respondents legal capacity to remarry.
ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points
conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce;
taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot
be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and
material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent
the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple,
who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
80. GARCIA v. RECIO consistent with their respective national laws.
GR No. 138922, October 2, 2002 It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
Panganiban,J.: foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are
FACTS: supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial
56

notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated
subject should be resolved in the negative. by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal
capacity to marry petitioner. Based on the above records, we cannot ISSUE:
conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was May a Filipino [Cipriano] be entitled to remarry by virtue of Article 26
legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with of Family Code, where his Filipina wife became naturalized as a foreign
petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce citizen and thereafter obtained divorce decree capacitating her to remarry?
decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry YES
without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian
personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal RULING:
capacity to contract the second marriage. YES. Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen
that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed
direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. absurdity and injustice.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the
81. Republic of the Philippines vs. Cipriano Orbecido III application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
QUISUMBING, J. citizen and a foreigner;
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
FACTS: her to remarry.
Cipriano Orbecido was married Lady Villanueva in the Philippines. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of
The couple have two children, Kristoffer and Lady Kimberly. the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
Thereafter, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had remarry.
been naturalized as an American citizen. In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American
Sometime thereafter, Cipriano learned that his wife had obtained a citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her
divorce decree and then was married to another. and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in
was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The OSG, this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
sought reconsideration but it was denied. remarry.
In this petition for review, the OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it 82. Edgar San Luis v. Felicidad San Luis
only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated G.R. No. 133743, February 6, 2007
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. Ynares-Santiago, J.
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly FACTS: In this consolidated petitions for review assailing the decision of the
applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained Court of Appeals, petitioner Edgar San Luis is contending that respondent
57
Felicidad San Luis does not have legal capacity to file the petition for letters the United States. Petitioner re-married also in Nevada to Theodore Van
of administration for the administration of the estate of the deceased Dorn.
Felicisimo San Luis.
Felicisimo, during his lifetime, contracted three marriages. His first marriage Richard filed a suit against Alice claiming that the latter’s business in Manila
was with Virginia, who predeceased him, out of which 6 children were born, is conjugal property of the parties. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on
including Edgar. Then, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, an American the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the
citizen, with whom he had a son. Merry Lee filed for and was issued a decree divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
granting absolute divorce before the family court in Hawaii. A year after the acknowledged that they had "no community property". The Court denied the
divorce decree was granted, Felicisimo married respondent in California. motion on the ground that the property is located in the Philippines so that
They lived together for 18 years until Felicisimo died. Respondent sought the the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate but this was opposed petitioner contending that Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the
respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the
a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still divorce proceedings. Respondent avers that the Divorce Decree cannot
legally married to Merry Lee. Petitioner further averred that the divorce prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national
decree obtained by Merry Lee is void under the Philippine law insofar as his policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if
deceased father was concerned. the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
ISSUE: Can Felicisimo validly remarry after an absolute divorce decree was entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
granted to his alien spouse?
ISSUE: Does an alien divorced from a Filipina spouse have legal standing to
RULING: Yes. Felicisimo can validly remarry after an absolute divorce sue?
decree was granted to his alien spouse, Merry Lee.
Under paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code, it is provided that where HELD: No, the alien spouse have no standing to sue in the case as
a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over the conjugal assets.
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have the Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
capacity to remarry under Philippine Law. only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case case, the divorce decree the same being considered contrary to our concept of public morality.
allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of reposondent and Felicisimo under marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
the laws of the USA. the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
Thus, the case should be remanded to the trial court for further receotion of longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of case. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, he is
respondent and Felicisimo. estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
83. VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO, JR., and RICHARD UPTON
G.R. No. L-68470; October 8, 1985 Hence, private respondent having been divorced from petitioner, has no legal
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J: standing to sue.
FACTS: Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino citizen married private 84. PILAPIL VS. SOMERA
respondent Richard Upton, an American citizen. The parties were divorced in G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989
REGALADO, J:
58

supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged
Facts: offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private In cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in the must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person
Federal Republic of Germany. The couple lived for some time in Malate, who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is
Manila and had their only child Pilapil Geiling. Later on, the marriage turned meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing
sour and there was separation de facto between them. of the complaint.
Private respondent initiated divorce proceeding in the German court. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce
separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
Subsequently, the divorce decree was granted in the foreign court. However, respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on
more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private the matter of status of persons. Private respondent, being no longer the
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case
alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Hence, the criminal case must be dismissed.
Jesus Chua. , Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ground that the court
is without jurisdiction because it involves a private offense that cannot be 85. EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS
prosecuted de officio and since the complainant is a foreigner, does not G.R. No. 133743, 06 February 2007
qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
his national law prior to his filing of the criminal complaint. The motion was
denied hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a FACTS: This case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San
prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order Luis.
of the lower court denying her motion to quash. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages: first, with Virginia
Issue: Can a former spouse be held liable for adultery filed by her ex- Sulit who predeceased him in 1963; second, with Merry Lee Corwin, an
husband who has obtained a divorce decree prior to the filing of the criminal American who in 1973 obtained a decree of absolute divorce from the Family
case. Court of the First Circuit in Hawaii dissolving their marriage; and third, with
Held: NO. Felicidad, whom he married in 1974 in Los Angeles, California and with
Criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, whom he resided in the Philippines until his death.
through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the Felicidad filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over his
complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes", or estate. The children from the first marriage filed a motion to dismiss, claiming
those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for inter alia that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition because
adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant she was only a mistress of Felicisimo, who was still legally married to Merry
role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a Lee. To establish her status as the surviving spouse, Felicidad submitted
matter exclusively within his power and option. This policy was adopted out photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family
of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the Law Act of California.
outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. Hence, The trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that Felicidad had no legal
as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus capacity to file the petition because her marriage with Felicisimo was
presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the bigamous, therefore void ab initio. It found that the divorce decree was not
institution of the criminal action for adultery. This is a logical consequence valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen.
nd
since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the It also ruled that Art. 26, 2 par. of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
59
applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect,
children. Art. 148 governs.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, ruling in turn that 2. No. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
nd
Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry Felicidad by virtue of Art. 26, 2 par. pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments, and held
of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that
Ibay-Somera. It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. With
was validly dissolved by virtue of the divorce decree; thus, under paragraph regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized
2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage. in California, U.S.A., she merely submitted photocopies of the
Consequently, under Article 130 of the Family Code, Felicidad as the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of California. Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court
Felicisimo’s estate. for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by
ISSUE: Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
1. Substantive issue--May Felicisimo, as a Filipino who is divorced by
his alien spouse abroad, validly remarry under the Civil Code (i.e. 86. Republic v. Iyoy
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code), such that Felicidad, his G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005
surviving spouse, would have the legal capacity to file a petition for Chico-Nazario, J.:
letters of administration?
2. Evidentiary issue--Has Felicidad proven with sufficient evidence the FACTS:
validity of the divorce decree and her marriage to Felicismo? This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
3. by the Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General
HELD: (OSG), seeking the reversal of the CA Decision. The assailed CA Decision
1. Yes. Felicidad's legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of affirmed the RTC Decision which declared the marriage between
administration may arise from her status as an interested person Respondent Crasus Iyoy (Crasus) and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy (Fely) null and
under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court by virtue of their cohabitation. It void under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
may also arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or
as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of The spouses were married in 1997 and had five children. After the
nd
the Family Code. Art. 26, 2 par. of the Family Code does not have celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was
to be applied retroactively considering that Van Dorn v. Romillo is "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines
sufficient basis in resolving a situation, as in the present case, where for the USA, leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six
a divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse. years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely’s
If Felicidad proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s departure, Crasus received a letter from Fely asking him to sign divorce
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was papers. Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a
validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be child.
considered a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code which
governs the property relations between parties who live together as In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family. Crasus
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to
void from the beginning. Under Art. 144, the property acquired by bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages Philippines several times more for various reasons although she continued to
and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. live with her American family in USA.
Meanwhile, if Felicidad fails to prove the validity of both the divorce
and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Art. 148 of the At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and
Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of
Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living reconciliation between them. Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that
together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. As held Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly
in Saguid v. Court of Appeals, even if the cohabitation or the demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential
60

obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in Philippine law.
relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
This refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be
was now married to an American. While she admitted being previously applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the
married to respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely refuted time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint.
Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her
On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent
marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she
ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged
plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses. that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for
divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality
The RTC and the CA declared the marriage of Crasus and Fely void ab initio principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was
under Art. 36 of the Family Code. still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition,
and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine
ISSUE: laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between
1. Was there a proper finding of Art. 36? Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from
2. Will Art. 26 par. (2) apply? respondent Crasus.
HELD: 87. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,

1. No. The requisites of Art. 36 have not been satisfied in this case. Hence, G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
the marriage between the parties remains valid. QUISUMBING, J.:
At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Facts: Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva in 1981 in the
Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Philippines. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly.
Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under In 1986, the wife went to the United States with their son Kristoffer. A few
Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and American citizen, obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain
loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor Innocent Stanley. Cipriano filed a petition for authority to remarry invoking
society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. The OSG contends that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable only to a valid
2. No. Art. 26 par. (2) does not apply. mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and
an alien and the proper remedy is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
Art. 26 par. (2) of the Family Code provides that where a marriage between a separation.
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter Issue: Is Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applicable to a case where at the time of
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
61
Ruling: Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 provides: testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly Administratrix of his estate. Before the proceedings could be terminated,
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien Lorenzo died.
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was
The Supreme Court ruled that it should be interpreted to include Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should the conjugal property. Without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the court gave due course to Paula’s petition.
time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to CA affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC.
sanction absurdity and injustice.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of ISSUE: Was the divorce obtained by Lorenzo valid?
the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce RULING: Yes the divorce was valid.
,
is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. the SC held that owing to the nationality
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being
and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in are valid according to their national law. That once proven that respondent
this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner,
remarry. the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very
well lose her right to inherit" from him.
88. PAULA T. LLORENTE v. CA and ALICIA F. LLORENTE
G.R. No. 124371 In this case, Lorenzo was already a U.S. citizen when he filed for
PARDO, J.: divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the
County of San Diego.
FACTS:
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of Hence, the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first
the U.S. Navy. He and petitioner Paula Llorente were married. Lorenzo wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
departed for the United States and thereafter admitted to United States However, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the
citizenship. Upon his return to the Philippines, he discovered that his wife decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship
with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live 89. CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI
with her. G.R. No. 119190; January 16, 1997
Lorenzo returned to the United States and filed for divorce with the TORRES, JR., J.:
Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Facts: Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral,
Paula was represented by a counsel, and actively participated in the Intramuros, Manila as evidenced by their marriage contract. After the
proceedings. The court issued a divorce decree. Lorenzo thereafter married celebration they had a reception and then proceeded to the house of the
Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first Ching Ming Tsoi’s mother. There they slept together on the same bed in the
marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose same room for the first night of their married life.
the marriage or cohabitation. Their 25-year union produced three children. Gina’s version: that contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds they
Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. In the will, Lorenzo were supposed to enjoy making love that night of their marriage, or having
bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children. Lorenzo filed sexual intercourse, with each other, Ching however just went to bed, slept on
with RTC, for a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and one side and then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual
62

intercourse between them that night. The same thing happened on the Issue: Did Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife
second, third and fourth nights. constitute psychological incapacity.
In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they can enjoy Ruling: Yes, Chi Ming Tsoi’d refusal to consummate the marriage by having
together during their first week as husband and wife they went to Baguio sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological incapacity.
City. But they did so together with Ching’s mother, uncle and nephew as they The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and
were all invited by her husband. There was no sexual intercourse between Court of Appeals in rendering as VOID the marriage entered into by Ching
them for four days in Baguio since Ching avoided her by taking a long walk and Gina on May 22, 1988. No costs.
during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to
room. have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply
1988 (day of their marriage) until March 15, 1989 (ten months). But during refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal
this period there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Gina is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
claims that she did not even see her husband’s private parts nor did he see psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted
hers. refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. procreate children basedon the universal principle that procreation of children
Eufemio Macalalag. Results were that Gina is healthy, normal and still a through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant non-
virgin while Ching’s examination was kept confidential up to this time. fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of
The Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did the parties to fulfill this marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
not show his penis. She said she had observed him using an eyebrow pencil incapacity.
and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. She also said her While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to
husband only married her to acquire or maintain his residency status here in live together, observer mutual love, respect and fidelity, the sanction
the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man therefore is actually the “spontaneous, mutual affection between husband
Ching’s version: he claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason and wife and not any legal mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno,
of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with Gina. He does not want their 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no
marriage annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her very much (2) that he man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say “I could
has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable (3) not have cared less.” This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self.
since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy
between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that according to him, that brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the
not be cured. hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual contact
between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that 90. JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO v. MANUEL SIAYNGCO
everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always G.R. NO. 158896 : October 27, 2004
avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
removed his hands.
Facts: After 24 years of marriage wherein petitioner was unable to bear a
child, respondent filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of
63
psychological incapacity of petitioner. He alleged that his wife always able to fulfill is the obligation of fidelity. Sexual infidelity, per se, however,
complained about everything and anyone connected with him; showed no does not constitute psychological incapacity. It must be shown that
respect for his office and position as judge; did not give him moral support respondent’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality
and encouragement; obsessive about cleanliness; jealous; that her which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
psychological incapacity arose before marriage and is permanent and the marital state and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his
incurable. On the other hand, petitioner alleged that respondent invented own flesh and blood. The same report also showed that the actuations of
stories against her so that he could marry his paramour. petitioner are not grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from
complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Also, it showed that the
As witness, respondent presented Dr. Garcia who concluded that both root cause of petitioner’s behavior is traceable - not from the inception of
parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the duties of their marriage as required by law - but from her experiences during the
marriage for they both display narcissistic psychological repertoire and failed marriage - her husband’s philandering, admitted no less by him, and her
to empathize with each other. In her defense, petitioner presented Dr. Maaba inability to conceive.
who concluded that petitioner was a mature, conservative, religious and
highly intelligent woman and psychologically capacitated to comply with the Hence, mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting
basic and essential obligations of marriage. personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. Both parties
are psychologically capacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage.
RTC denied respondent’s petition for failure to support his allegations with
enough evidence. MR was denied. CA reversed the RTC decision, relying on 91. Republic vs. Molina
the evaluation of Dr. Garcia and on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA. It G.R. No. 108763
declared the marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity Panganiban, J.
of both parties.
Facts:
Issue: Whether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the
a finding of psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of
respondent Manuel. psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year,
Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as
Held: No, the evidence is not enough to sustain a finding of psychological husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he
incapacity against either or both of the parties. squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and
was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the
In Republic v. Dagdag we held that whether or not psychological incapacity couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was
exists in a given case calling for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio
must be closely scrutinized and judged according to its own facts as there City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since
can be no case that is on "all fours" with another. The CA perfunctorily then he abandoned them.
applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a clear divergence in its factual
milieu with the case at bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the couple involved therein, Issue:
despite sharing the same bed from the time of their wedding night until their Is the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
separation never had coitus. On the other hand, sexual intimacy for
procreation is a non-issue herein. Held:
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid.
In Republic v. CA we expounded that the burden of proof to show the nullity What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of
of marriage belongs to the plaintiff; the incapacity must be proven to be irreconcilable differences and conflicts on personalities. It is indispensable
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage; such illness must be that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential
grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the marital responsibilities and duties due to some psychological illness.
essential obligations of marriage. The psychological report of Dr. Garcia Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such
showed that the only essential marital obligation which respondent was not characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity.
64

The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision; 3) The incapacity must be
cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage; 4) Such
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incurable; 5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity. of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; 6) The essential
marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
laid set forth in this case: and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children; 7)
Burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
Such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage be given great respect by our courts; 8) The trial court must order the
Such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
the essentials of marital obligations of marriage for the state. The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
Such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological
225 of the Family Code incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and
Decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
must be respected examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the
on behalf of the state. presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological
condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
92. Marcos vs Marcos sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination
G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000 of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
PANGANIBAN, J.: Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical
Facts: Petitioner Brenda Marcos and Respondent Wilson Marcos were abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion
married in 1982 and such relationship bore them 5 children. Respondents’ of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that
failure to provide for his family and subjecting them to violence led the wife to his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that
file a case for the nullity of the marriage based on psychological incapacity. they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the
The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36. However the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court. more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently
Issue: Is psychological examination a requirement for a declaration of drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family
psychological incapacity? home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period
Held: No. Personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no
not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is
In Republic v. CA and Molina, the Court laid down the guidelines gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
governing the application and the interpretation of psychological incapacity In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for
referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code and they are as follows: 1) The failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is
burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; 2) characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
65
93. Noel Buenaventura vs. Court of Appeals contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If
G.R. No. 127358 & 127449 March 31, 2005 the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the
Azcuna, J. part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without
basis in law and in fact. It follows that the grant of exemplary damages
Facts: A petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed by Noel cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are
Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological imposed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura. After Isabel filed her damages. The complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be
answer, Noel, with leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both considered as unduly compelling the private respondent to litigate, since both
he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the are grounded on petitioner’s psychological incapacity.
essential obligations of marriage. In response, Isabel filed an amended
answer denying the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated. 2. The property relation is co-ownership under Article 147 of the Family
Code. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses
The Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, declaring the marriage through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-
void ab initio, and ordering Noel to pay Isabel moral damages in the amount ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed
of 2.5 million pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
interest from the date of the said decision plus attorney’s fees participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as
of P100,000.00; and also, liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care
property. Petitioner appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals. The and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of
appellate court promulgated a Decision dismissing Noel’s appeal for lack of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-
merit and affirming in toto the trial court’s decision. ownership.
Issue: 94. Imelda Marbella-Bobis vs. Isagani Bobis

1. Is the award of damages and attorney’s fees proper in case of declaration G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000
of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity? YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
2. What property relations govern the parties to a void marriage who Facts:
do not have legal impediment to contract marriage? Respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce
B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or
Held: terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with
1. No. The RTC awarded damages on the basis of Article 21 and 2217 of the petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis, and allegedly a third marriage with a
Civil Code of the Philippines. Art. 21 and 2217 will apply only if; a person certain Julia Sally Hernandez. An information for bigamy was filed by the
should willfully cause loss or injury to another. It is contradictory to Petitioner Imelda Bobis against respondent. Sometime thereafter,
characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity
beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage
same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the
petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first
damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge
damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the granted the motion to suspend the criminal case. Petitioner filed a motion for
marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with reconsideration, but the same was denied.
malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent
concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage
this case. before entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial
question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code.
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must assume and Issue:
discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the
66

1. Is the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a court found petitioner guilty of bigamy for the reason that want of a valid
previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for marriage ceremony is not a defense against the charge of bigamy. Petitioner
bigamy. filed an appeal with the CA. While the same was pending, the trial court ruled
Held: in the civil case for judicial declaration of nullity that petitioner and Lucia’s
No, the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a marriage was void ab initio. The CA then rendered a decision affirming the
previous marriage does not constitute a prejudicial question to a criminal judgment of conviction by the trial court in criminal case of bigamy against
case for bigamy. A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the petitioner, for the reason that what is sought to be punished by the RPC is
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. Its the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage has been
two essential elements are:(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or dissolved. Both the trial court and the CA held that the divorce obtained by
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the Lucia in Canada cannot be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code, and that it is contrary to public policy.
proceed. In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first
having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not Petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon
be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current the divorce decree of the Ontario court. His lack of criminal intent is material
jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like
such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage other felonies punished under the RPC, is mala in se, and hence, good faith
will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses
the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, that there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the
respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his
at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit
legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the bigamy.
fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence
of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that good faith
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. Under Art. 40 of the
question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may
malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him. remarry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said article is immaterial
because everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that
95. Lucio Morigo y Cacho v. People of the Philippines petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the
G.R. No. 145226; February 6, 2004 divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case
QUISUMBING, J. No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were married on August 30, 1990 in ISSUE: Is a judicial declaration of nullity required in order to be able to
Bohol. A few days after, Lucia left for Canada, leaving petitioner Lucio contract a second marriage where no marriage ceremony was conducted
behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario court, a petition for during the first marriage?
divorce against petitioner, which was granted by the court on January 17,
1992 and took effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, petitioner RULING: No.
remarried. He then filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Lucia on September 21, 1993 at the RTC of Bohol, on the In Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis, we laid down the elements of bigamy as follows:
ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October 19, 1993, (1) the offender has been legally married;
he was charged of bigamy in the same court. On August 5, 1996, the trial
67
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her was still subsisting, which fact, however, Lipana concealed from the second
spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared wife. The spouses of the second marriage acquired by purchase a piece of
presumptively dead; land, registered in the name of "Joaquin Lipana married to Isidra Gomez."
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and Isidra Gomez died intestate and childless, and survived only by her sisters as
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the the nearest relatives. Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of her estate,
existence of the first. commenced the present suit, praying for the forfeiture of the husband's share
in the property in favor of the said estate. Reliance is placed on Article 1417
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the of the old Civil Code. The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was
pendency of the appeal to the CA of the bigamy case, the trial court found void ab initio and that the husband was the one who gave cause for its
that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and nullity, applied the aforequoted provision and declared his interest in the
Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing disputed property forfeited in favor of the estate of the deceased second wife.
of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing In the present appeal by the defendant he attributes two errors to the trial
officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in court: (1) in allowing a collateral attack on the validity of the second marriage
accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. This simply means that and in holding it to be bigamous and void ab initio; and (2) in holding that
there was no marriage to begin with, and that such a declaration of nullity Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is applicable in this case.
retroacts to the date of the first marriage. ISSUES: 1. Did the trial court erred when it ruled the second marriage void
ab initio?
The first element of bigamy requires that the accused must have been legally 2. Can the share of Lipana, husband, be fortfeited in favor of the estate of the
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married Isidra Gomez?
to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. The contract of HELD:1. NO. The first error has not been committed. The controlling statute
marriage is null and bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical is Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature, the Marriage Law which became
conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time effective on December 4, 1929 and was in force when the two marriages
he contracted the second marriage. The existence and the validity of the first were celebrated. The pertinent provisions are as follows:
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical SEC. 29. Illegal Marriages. — Any marriage subsequently
that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
marriage to speak of. spouse of such person with any person other than such first
spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
Hence, since no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly unless;
authorized solemnizing officer and the mere private act of signing a marriage (a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
contract alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly (b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent present having news of the absentee being alive, or the
marriage, the petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge of absentee being generally considered as dead and believed
bigamy. to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting
such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being
valid in either case until declared null and void by a
96. OFELIA GOMEZ, as Administratrix of the Estate of the late ISIDRA competent court.
GOMEZ Y AQUINO, SEC. 30. Annullable marriages. — A marriage may be
vs. JOAQUIN P. LIPANA annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time
G.R. No. L-23214; June 30, 1970 of the marriage:
MAKALINTAL, J.: xxx xxx xxx
(b) That the former husband or wife of either was living and
FACTS:The defendant-appellant, Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in
two marriages: the first with Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the second with force;
Isidra Gomez y Aquino in 1935. At the time of the second marriage the first xxx xxx xxx
68

SEC. 31. Time for filing action for decree of nullity. — The termination of the partnership by either of said causes that the forfeiture of
action to obtain a decree of nullity of marriage, for causes the guilty spouse takes place. Now then, when did the conjugal partnership
mentioned in the preceding section, must be commenced formed by virtue of the marriage of the defendant to the deceased Isidra
within the periods and by the parties as follows: Gomez terminate? Obviously when the marriage was dissolved by the latter's
xxx xxx xxx death in 1958. By that time Article 1417 was no longer in force, having been
(b) For causes mentioned in subdivision (b); by either party eliminated in the new Civil Code, which took effect in 1950. The legal
during the life of the other, or by the former husband or wife. situation arising from these facts is that while insofar as the second wife was
xxx xxx xxx concerned, she having acted in good faith, her marriage produced civil
The appellant, relying on Section 30(b) quoted above, maintains that his effects and gave rise, just the same, to the formation of a conjugal
marriage to Isidra Gomez was valid and could be annulled only in an action partnership wherein she was entitled to an equal share upon dissolution, no
for that purpose, which in the light of Section 31 could be filed only by either action lies under Article 1417 for the forfeiture of the husband's share in her
party thereto, during the lifetime of the other, or by the former spouse. favor, much less in favor of her estate, with respect to which there are after
However, it is not Section 30 but Section 29 which governs in this case, all no children, but only collateral relatives, who are entitled to succeed. It
particularly the first paragraph thereof, which says that "any marriage would not do to say that since the second marriage, in this case was void ab
contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such initio the application of Article 1417 should be reckoned as of the date it was
person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void celebrated in 1935. This article speaks from the moment of the termination of
from its performance." This is the general rule, to which the only exceptions the conjugal partnership (either by the dissolution of the marriage or by the
are those mentioned in subsections (a) and (b) of the same declaration of its nullity); and it would be self-contradictory to consider that
provision.<äre||anº•1àw>There is no suggestion here that the defendant's the conjugal partnership was formed and terminated at the same time and by
1930 marriage to Maria Loreto Ancino had been annulled or dissolved when the same act, that is, by the celebration itself of the marriage.
he married Isidra Gomez in 1935, and there is no proof that he did so under There is, to be sure, a statement of Manresa that in case of nullity it is
the conditions envisioned in sub-section (b). The burden is on the party presumed, with respect to the spouse who acted in bad faith, that neither the
invoking the exception to prove that he comes under it; and the defendant marriage nor the conjugal partnership ever existed, and hence such spouse
has not discharged that burden at all, no evidence whatsoever having been has no right to a share in the conjugal properties; but this legal effect of such
adduced by him at the trial. Indeed, he contracted the second marriage less presumption derives from the premise that Article 1417 is still in force, and in
than seven years after the first, and he has not shown that his first wife was any event is of doubtful application if it would be in derogation of and to the
then generally considered dead or was believed by him to be so. prejudice of the right of the other spouse of the first marriage in the conjugal
2. NO. There is one primordial fact which must be considered, namely, that partnership formed thereby, which includes properties acquired by the
since the defendant's first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void husband during its existence.
the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the
has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her right of the second wife to her husband, and consider the other half as
husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.
death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in
a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the 97. Niñal vs. Bayadog
husband's share in the property here in dispute, even if it was acquired G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000
during the second marriage, of which interest she would be deprived if his YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
share should be declared forfeited in favor of the second wife.
The first paragraph of Article 1417 states two causes for the termination of Facts: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September
the conjugal partnership: (1) dissolution of the marriage and (2) declaration of 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa
nullity. Under the second paragraph of the same Article it is upon the was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year
69
and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to their
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. marriage; he never cohabited with her after their marriage.
In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an afdavit dated December Orlando cited several incidents that created on his mind a
11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his
at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from the Lilia and strangers
license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University
their father's death, petitioners led a petition for declaration of nullity of of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a
the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New People’s Army whom he
void for lack of a marriage license. The case was led under the claimed to have been hired by Lilia and who accompanied him in going to her
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would home province of Palawan to marry her.
affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma led a motion to dismiss Lilia filed for the dismissal of the petition arguing that petitioner freely
on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her for almost a month
not among the persons who could le an action for "annulment of after their marriage; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her
marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code. pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely.
The trial court dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Issue: Is the second marriage of Pepito falls within the exemption for a decision of the trial court.
marriage license, hence valid? ISSUE: Can the marriage be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent
based on harassment in phone calls, unwarranted visits by unknown men
Held: NO. In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's and presence of an NPA member ?
marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as RULING: No. Those enumerated cannot be a basis for vitiated consent.
husband and wife for at least ve years prior to their wedding day. The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger
From the time Pepito's rst marriage was dissolved to the time of his to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was
assuming that Pepito and his rst wife had separated in fact, and allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank.
thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant
other that has already lasted for ve years, the fact remains that their knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to
veyear period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by keep himself out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were
law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding
contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform
cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful Orlando also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual believe by Lilia that the latter was pregnant with his child when they were
severance of the lial companionship between the spouses cannot make married. Orlando’s excuse that he could not have impregnated the Lilia
any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and
"husband and wife." an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his
inability to copulate with the Lilia.
98. Orlando Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals Orlando cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due to the
G.R. No. 132955; October 27, 2006 absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation
Ynares – Santiago, J. is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a
marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the
FACTS: Orlando Villanueva and Lilia Canalita-Villanueva were married. 4 marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes
years after their marriage, Orlando filed a petition for annulment of marriage relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds
alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence. Since the Orlando failed to justify his failure
70

to cohabit with the Lilia on any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be
must be upheld. rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
Therefore, the dismissal of the petition for annulment of marriage is affirmed. manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
99. Leouel Santos v. CA, and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos party involved. The use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article
G.R. No. 112019, January 04, 1995 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases
Vitug, J. of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. The factual
FACTS: Leouel Santos, a First Lieutenant, first met Julia in the Philippine settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the
Army. They subsequently get married and have a child (Leouel Santos Jr.). standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and
Later on, the couple who lived with the parents’s of Julia, started having understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
frequent quarrels over a number of things. Julia decided to left for the United situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the
States of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade specific answers to every individual problem.
her. And it was only seven months after her departure, that she called up
Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone and promised to return 100. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989 which she never did. RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA
Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 10 PANGANIBAN, J.
April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get
in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail. Leouel filed with the FACTS:
Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, a complaint for "Voiding of Marriage Respondent Roridel O. Molina filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity
Under Article 36 of the Family Code". However a possible collusion between of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Roridel and Reynaldo were married and
the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the has a son, Andre O. Molina. As alleged in the petition, after a year of
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. RTC ruling: The case was dismissed for marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a
lack of merit. husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers
and friends on whom he squandered his money. He depended on his parents
CA: Affirmed the ruling of the RTC. for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
Contention of the Leouel: That the failure of Julia to return home, or at the finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them. Reynaldo was also
very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to breadwinner of the family. The couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result
enter into married life. of which their relationship was estranged. Roridel resigned from her job in
ISSUE: Is abandonment for more than five years constitutes psychological Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City. A few weeks later,
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, and as such the marriage Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them.
should be declared void ab initio? Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of
HELD: No, abandonment for more than five years does not constitutes complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Mere difficulty habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be
of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, served and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their
obviously does not constitute incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. be an incompatible marriage from the start. It is stipulated in the pre-trial that
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years, petitioner is not
71
asking support for her and her child, respondent is not asking for damages (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
and that the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner celebration" of the marriage.
wife. Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent permanent or incurable.
quarrels were due to Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
her group of friends even after their marriage, her refusal to perform some of party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The illness must be
her marital duties such as cooking meals and her failure to run the household shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
and handle their finances. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the much less ill will.
marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse. up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
The petitioner argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not children.
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them be given great respect by our courts.
incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties." (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
ISSUE:
Does irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities of the parties be In this case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect
considered as psychological incapacity to warrant annulment of their spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not
marriage? outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her
HELD: husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of
No. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
personalities" between Roridel and Reynaldo in no wise constitutes The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder
psychological incapacity. but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified. In
the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that "psychological were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to
and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on
to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." The to the faults and blemishes of the beloved. It is not enough to prove that the
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
antecedence, and (c) incurability." essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following psychological (nor physical) illness.
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code
are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: Hence, the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the remains valid.
plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or 101. Hernandez vs CA
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by G.R. No. 126010 December 8, 1999
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family MENDOZA, J.:
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical.
72

FACTS: Petitioner, who is five years older than private respondent, was then promiscuity during the latter part of 1986, private respondent contracted
a teacher at the Philippine Christian University. Private respondent, a gonorrhea and infected petitioner.Petitioner stated that during a heated
college freshman, was her student for two consecutive semesters. They argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who was then barely a
became sweethearts in February 1979 when she was no longer private year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he was
respondent's teacher. On January 1, 1981, they were married. never affectionate and hardly spent time with them.
Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents In October 1992, petitioner learned that private respondent left for the Middle
paid for his tuition fees, while petitioner provided his allowances and other East. Since then, private respondent's whereabouts had been unknown.
financial needs. The family income came from petitioner's salary as a faculty Petitioner then filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage under Article 36 of
member of the Philippine Christian University. Petitioner augmented her the Family Code citing these incidents as grounds for the action.
earnings by selling "Tupperware" products, as well as engaging in the buy- On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the petition
and-sell of coffee, rice and polvoron. for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner stating that he petitioner’s claim
From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it that respondent was "psychologically incapacitated" to marry her are among
was agreed that he would help petitioner in her businesses by delivering the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for the grant of legal separation
orders to customers. However, because her husband was a spendthrift and (Article 55 of the Family Code) — not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of
had other women, petitioner's business suffered. Private respondent often marriages or annulment thereof.
had smoking and drinking sprees with his friends and betted on fighting
cocks. In 1982, after the birth of their first child, petitioner discovered two love Issue :
letters written by a certain Realita Villena to private respondent. She knew Are the grounds presented by Pettioner enough to support an Annulment of
Villena as a married student whose husband was working in Saudi Arabia. Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code ?
When petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted having an extra-
marital affair with Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end her Held:
relationship with private respondent. For his part, private respondent said he No. If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions
would end the affairs, but he did not keep his promise. Instead, he left the psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration of the nullity of a
conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their child. When private marriage, has intended to include the above-stated circumstances as
respondent came back, however, petitioner accepted him, despite private constitutive of such incapacity, then the same would not have been
respondent's infidelity in the hope of saving their marriage. enumerated as grounds for legal separation.
Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological
get a job at Reynolds Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmariñas, Cavite in incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullify of marriage,
1986. However, private respondent was employed only until March 31, 1991, must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual
because he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by the infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not
company. He received P53,000.00 in retirement pay, but instead of spending grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.
the amount for the needs of the family, private respondent spent the money The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened after
on himself and consumed the entire amount within four months of his the marriage and there is no proof that the same have already existed at the
retirement. time of the celebration of the marriage to constitute the psychological
While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking, incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
drinking, gambling and womanizing became worse. Petitioner discovered In Santos v. Court of Appeals, we held:
that private respondent carried on relationships with different women. When "Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
petitioner confronted private respondent about his relationship with one of physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
them, he beat her up, as a result of which she was confined at a hospital marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
because she suffered from concussion. As a result of respondents the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
73
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the ISSUE/S: Is the alleged physchological incapacity of respondent the is the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity contemplated by Article 36?
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality, disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and HELD: No. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. It should refer to no less than a
time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. The intendment of
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
void marriage to be "legitimate." most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The
state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, Court cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact of Eulogios
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment,
marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his family. These circumstances
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur by themselves cannot be equated with psychological incapacity within the
only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, manifestations of a disordered personality, which make Eulogio completely
do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. At best, the
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the circumstances relied upon by Norma are grounds for legal separation under
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. Article 55.
Petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married,
private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact 103.JOSE LAM v. ADRIANA CHUA
deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its G.R. No. 131286; March 18, 2004
concomitant responsibilities. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the
precise cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in FACTS:A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed by Adriana
order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of Chua against Jose Lam. Adriana alleged in the petition that Jose Lam is
proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon rests petitioner. The psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and of marriage, but such incapacity was not then apparent. She alleged that the
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage psychological incapacity of Jose became manifest only after the celebration
as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the marriage when he frequently failed to go home, indulged in
of the validity of the marriage. womanizing and irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal
partnership of gains. Despite service of summons, no answer was filed on
102. DEDEL v. CA the part of Jose. Trial proceeded after determining that there was no
421 SCRA 461; March 31, 2006 collusion between the parties. Adriana prayed that the marriage between her
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. and Jose be declared null and void.
After her testimony, her counsel made a formal offer of evidence. Afterwards,
FACTS: In 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married and had five children. In Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Open the case. The RTC admitted into
1996, Norma filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of evidence the Marriage Contract dated May 25, 1977 between Jose and one
Eulogios psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital Celia Santiago, and another Marriage Contract dated May 6, 1982 between
obligations. According to Norma, the manifestations of Eulogios Jose and one Evan Lock, showing that Jose had been married twice before
psychological incapacity are his immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable he married Adriana in 1984. The RTC declared the marriage between
jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his Adriana and Jose null and void for being bigamous by nature and ordered
family since December 27, 1985. Jose to give a monthly support to his son John Paul Chua Lam in the amount
74

of P20,000.00. Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but only insofar as the issue of jurisdiction of the Pasay RTC to receive evidence and render
the decision awarded monthly support to his son. He did not appeal the judgment on his previous marriages with other woman which were not
decision declaring his marriage with Adriana null and void. On appeal, the alleged in the petition filed by Adriana. Petitioner Jose is estopped from
Court of Appeals affirmed the Pasay RTC in toto. Hence, this petition. questioning the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Adriana and
therefore, the Court will not undo the judgment of the Pasay RTC declaring
Issue: Is the marriage between Adriana and Jose null and void on the the marriage of Adriana and Jose null and void for being bigamous.
ground of Jose’s prior bigamous marriages, although the original complaint of Wherefore, Adriana and Jose’s marriage remains null and void, because
Adriana alleged psychological incapacity as the sole ground to nullify the Jose is estopped from claiming otherwise.
same?
104. Oscar Mallion v. Editha Alcantara
Held: G.R. No. 141528, October 31, 2006
Yes, the marriage of Adriana and Jose remains to be null and void, not Azcuna, J.
because of his psychological incapacity or prior bigamous marriages, but by
his failure to question Pasay RTC’s jurisdiction to decide the same. Facts: In 1995, Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court
Considering that in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage or annulment of (RTC) of San Pablo City for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Editha
marriage, there can be no default pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18 of the Alcantara due to Alcantara’s alleged psychological incapacity under Article
Revised Rules of Court in relation to Article 48 of the Family Code, it is with 36, Family Code. In 1997, the RTC denied the petition because Mallion
more reason that petitioner should likewise be entitled to notice of all “failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he
proceedings. Insofar as the declaration of nullity of the marriage between is seeking.” On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for failure
Adriana and Jose for being bigamous is concerned, the decision rendered by of Mallion to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary
the Pasay RTC could be declared as invalid for having been issued beyond period. The case attained finality.
its jurisdiction, but petitioner Jose is estopped from claiming the same.
The Court notes several circumstances that taint the regularity of the In 1999, Mallion filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
proceedings and the decision rendered by the trial court. The only ground with the RTC of San Pablo City, alleging that his marriage with Alcantara was
alleged in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Adriana null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage
with the Pasay RTC is the psychological incapacity of Jose. On a motion to license. Alcantara filed an answer with a motion to dismiss, praying for the
re-open filed by her, the trial court set the case for reception of evidence on dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping. In
July 6, 1994 and subsequently allowed Adriana to present evidence of two its October 8, 1999 order, the RTC granted Alcantara’s motion to dismiss.
previous marriages contracted by Jose with other women to prove that the Mallion filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, Mallion
marriage between Adriana and Jose was null and void for being bigamous. filed a petition for review on certiorari.
The ground relied on for nullity of the marriage was changed from the
psychological incapacity of Jose to that of existence of previous marriages of Issue: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration
Jose with two different women with an additional claim for support of the of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent
child. Such substantial changes were not reflected in the petition filed with petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage
the trial court, as no formal amendment was ever made by Adriana. The license?
Pasay RTC did not give Jose an opportunity to be present for the Ruling: Yes, a previous denial by final judgment based on the ground of
presentation of evidence by Adriana and to refute the same. Nonetheless, psychological incapacity bars a new petition on the ground of lack of
Jose did not assail the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Adriana in marriage license. Res judicata is defined as “a matter adjudged; a thing
his Motion for Reconsideration which he filed with the Pasay RTC. In the judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It also
petitions he filed in the Court of Appeals and with us, he likewise did not raise refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
75
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies partner relational problem which affects their competence to maintain love
in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit.” and respect that they should give to each other.
The concept of res judicata is embodied in Section 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 39
of the Rules of Court. Section 47 (b) pertains to it in its concept as “bar by ISSUE: Can sexual infidelity and irreconcilable difference be grounds
prior judgment” or “estoppel by verdict,” which is the effect of a judgment as a for a declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand Code?
or cause of action. On the other hand, Section 47 (c) pertains to res
judicata in its concept as “conclusiveness of judgment” or otherwise known RULING: No, sexual infidelity and irreconcilable differences is not
as the rule of auter action pendant which ordains that issues actually and psychological incapacity as provided for in the Family Code.
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case The Supreme Court ruled that the only essential marital obligation which
between the same parties involving a different cause of action. Res respondent was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity. Sexual
judicata in its concept as a bar by prior judgment obtains in the present case. infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity under
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following the Family Code. It must be shown that respondent unfaithfulness is a
requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
or an order on the merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and the second Furthermore, the Court ruled that an unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and
actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. void marriage. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity.
ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness
there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
subsequent action. Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking Hence, the fact of respondent’s sexual infidelity and the spouses’ differences
different grounds for the same cause of action. By definition, a cause of are not sufficient to render the marriage null and void.
action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. In
both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his 106. NARCISO S. NAVARRO, JR vs. CYNTHIA CECILIO-NAVARRO
marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of G.R. No. 162049 April 13, 2007
action is predicated. These grounds essentially split the various aspects of QUISUMBING, J.:
the actual status of petitioner and respondent’s marriage.
Hence, the petition is denied. FACTS:
Petitioner Narciso and respondent Cynthia are married. Petitioner was still a
105. CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. SIAYNGCO medical student, while respondent was a student of pharmacy, living with
G.R No. 158896; October 27, 2004 petitioner’s parents, on whom they were financially dependent. They have
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. four children. Narciso filed an action for declaration of nullity of his marriage
FACTS: Petitioner Juanita and Respondent Manuel were married in 1973. with Cynthia based on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article
After discovering that they could not have a child of their own, they adopted a 36 of the Civil Code. He complained she constantly quarreled with him even
baby boy in 1977. 24 years after their marriage, Respondent filed an action before marriage when he could not give her the things she wanted. He also
for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Psychological added that when they quarreled, she refused to have sex with him and even
Incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleges that his wife told him to look for other women. A certain Abdona T. de Castro, a marriage
exhibited domineering and selfish behavior and she complains about counselor duly accredited by the Department of Social Welfare and
everything from the respondent’s parents to trivial matters. He further alleges Development, testified that when petitioner saw her, he was distraught,
that Juanita showed no regard for his high position as MTC judge. In her harassed, and unhappy. She concluded from meetings with the petitioner
defense, Juanita claims that the respondent crafted the malicious stories that the marriage was dysfunctional, destructive, and reconciliation was out
against her so that the latter can be free to marry his paramour. Respondent of the question since he claims he would go insane if he were to go back to
presented evidence of a psychiatric evaluation stating that the spouses has his wife. The housemaid of petitioner’s parents also testified that petitioner
76

and respondent were always quarreling because respondent was always (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
jealous of petitioner’s classmates. A certain Dr. Natividad Dayan, testified celebration" of the marriage.
that tests showed that petitioner was a perfectionist, short-tempered, critical, (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
argumentative and irritable when people do not meet his expectations. permanent or incurable...
Cytnhia on the other hand avers that she had no marital problems, not until (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
petitioner had an illicit affair with a certain Dr. Lucila Posadas. The trial court the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage...
held that petitioner and respondent were both psychologically incapacitated (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
to perform their marital obligations. Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
ISSUE: to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included
Do the above-mentioned circumstances constitute psychological incapacity in the text of the decision.
as a ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage of Narciso and (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Cynthia? Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts...
HELD: (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
No. The above-mentioned circumstances do not constitute psychological the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
incapacity. The Supreme Court held n Santos v. Court of Appeals, we shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
categorically said that psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) be, to the petition...
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital In the present case, the spouses’ frequent squabbles and respondent’s
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the refusal to sleep with petitioner and be supportive to him do not constitute
parties to the marriage. These include the obligations to live together, psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
support. The intention of the law is to confine the meaning of "psychological obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and the marriage. Therefore, psychological incapacity does not exist in this case.
significance to the marriage. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court gave
the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 which are as 107. Leonilo Antonio vs. Marie Ivonne F. Reyes
follows: G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to TINGA, J.
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and FACTS:
nullity...
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) After one year of courtship, the petitioner and respondent got married at
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) Manila City Hall and followed by a church wedding a year after. Out of their
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the union, a child was born, who sadly died five months later.
decision...
77
Leonilo filed an action to declare his marriage with Marie null and void based relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As
on the psychological incapacity of the latter. As manifestations of concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is
respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.
respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her
occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. For It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as
instance; a) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly,
illegitimate son and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from
child of her family. b) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court
David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred. were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the
c) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist and told some of her friends pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory
that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither. d) of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential obligations
She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and
Blackgold Recording Company yet, not a single member of her family ever reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the
witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. e) She invented marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding
friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere
lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional
the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 commitments.
million. Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who
wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their
quarrels. He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only 108. REPUBLIC V. LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO
figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004
connected with Blackgold. f) She represented herself as a person of greater Corona, J.
means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a
higher income. g) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the FACTS:
extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts.
Respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano, Filipino and Toshio Hamano, a
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. However the Court of Appeals Japanese national, were married on January 15, 1988. One month after their
reversed the lower court’s ruling. marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for
ISSUE: two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. Respondent wrote him
several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent
Does the propensity of telling lies about almost anything constitutes learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not
psychological incapacity? bother to see her and their child.
HELD: Yes. Thereafter, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for

declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano on the
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is ground of psychological incapacity. The trial court declared the marriage of
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of the respondent to her husband null and void. The trial court ratiocinated that
marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has Toshio failed to fulfill his obligations as a husband and father to his daughter.
that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her Toshio remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare
state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic of his family. Such indifference, according to the trial court, is a clear
ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which
a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give characterizes a very immature person. The trial court held that such behavior
meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and could be traced to respondent’s mental incapacity and disability of entering
constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of into marital life.
78

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner, medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied. The appellate formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the
court found that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated in performing his norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any
marital obligations. person regardless of nationality.
ISSUES:
(1) Does abandonment of one spouse of his family tantamount to 109. ROLANDO LANDICHO v. HON. LORENZO RELOVA
psychological incapacity? G.R. No. L-22579, 23 February 1968
(2) Do the guidelines set forth in the Molina case and Santos case apply in FERNANDO, J.:
case of mixed marriages?
FACTS:
HELD Petitioner was charged before the CFI of Batangas, Branch I, presided over
(1) No. Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground by respondent Judge Relova, with the offense of bigamy. It was alleged in
of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code of the the information that petitioner, Rolando Landicho "being then lawfully married
Philippines. The guidelines in the Molina case incorporate the three basic to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did
requirements of psychological incapacity outlined in Santos case: then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage
“It must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, with Fe Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the
and (c) incurability. The foregoing guidelines do not require that a CFI of Batangas, likewise presided by respondent Judge Relova where Fe
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically Lourdes Pasia seeks to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be “medically or clinically initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly
identified.” What is important is the presence of evidence that can employed by Landicho and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On
adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, June 15, 1963, Landicho as defendant in said case, filed a third-party
if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the first
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be
person concerned need not be resorted to.” declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and
intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her
The Court found that the totality of evidence presented fell short of before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal. Landicho moved to suspend
proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital the hearing of the criminal case pending the decision on the question of the
responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil suit. Judge Relova
but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological on November 19, 1963 denied the motion for lack of merit. Then came a
illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no motion for reconsideration to set aside the above order, which was likewise
other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a denied on March 2, 1964. Hence this petition.
psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual ISSUE:
medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had Is the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the instance of
she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This the second wife against petitioner and a third party complaint against the first
could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not spouse for the annulment of the first marriage by the petitioner constitutes a
do. Thus, mere abandonment is not tantamount to psychological incapacity. prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy against him?
(2) Yes. In proving psychological incapacity, the Court found no RULING:
distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. The Court cannot NO. It is not a prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy.
be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged
to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy, the fact that two marriage
79
ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. Then on Issue:
March 15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not petitioner who filed an action Should a criminal case for bigamy be suspended in view of a civil case for
for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. It was sometime annulment of marriage pending before another court on the ground that the
later, on June 15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the latter constitutes a prejudicial question?
civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that
his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of Held:
force, threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed in the answer of No. A criminal case for bigamy should not be suspended in view of a civil
respondent Judge relying on Viada, parties to a marriage should not be case for annulment of marriage pending before another court on the ground
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question.
such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first
marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then The rule on prejudicial questions cannot apply since a case for annulment of
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case
against the accused only if it is proved that petitioner’s consent to the
110. Donato vs Luna marriage was obtained by duress, violence and intimidation. The preceding
G.R. No. L-53642, April 15, 1988 elements do not exist in the case at bar. Obviously, petitioner merely raised
Gancayco, J. the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal
case. The records reveal that prior to petitioner’s second marriage on
Facts: The City Fiscal of Manila filed an information for bigamy against September 26, 1978, he had been living with private respondent Paz B.
petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato. Before the petitioner’s arraignment, private Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of
respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a marriage. Thus, petitioner’s averments that his consent was obtained by
civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner. Said civil private respondent through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence
case was based on the ground that private respondent consented to entering in entering a subsequent marriage is belied by the fact that both petitioner
into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato’s second one, since she had and private respondent executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived
no previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five years, one
Rosalinda R. Maluping. Petitioner Donato’s answer in the civil case for nullity month and one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the
interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it was second marriage and that it was private respondent who eventually filed the
solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation civil action for nullity.
and undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain
petitioner’s consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the Hence, the civil case for annulment of marriage pending before another court
subsequent or second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived does not constitute a prejudicial question in a criminal case for bigamy and
together and deported themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of therefore, should not suspend its proceedings.
wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit
executed by them for which reason, the requisite marriage license was 111. LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL v. HONORABLE ALICIA SEMPIO-DY
dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to GR No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
marriages of exceptional character. Paras, J.
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case, petitioner Facts:
filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of said case contending that the Karl Wiegel filed a case before the sala of Judge Sempio-Dy a petition for
Civil Case seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed by private declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia Wiegel. He averred that their
respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined or marriage was celebrated while Lilia was still legally married to one Eduardo
decided before the criminal case can proceed. A. Maxion. On her defense, Lilia admitted the existence of prior subsisting
marriage but assailed that her marriage with Eduardo was null and void
Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the proceedings in because allegedly they were forced to enter said marital union.
Criminal Case for bigamy.
Issue:
80

Is it material to establish that the party to a previously contracted marriage absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
had a vitiated consent to exculpate her from any liability for entering a of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
subsequent marriage while the first marriage was still subsisting? projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void.
Ruling: Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
No. There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision
is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify
first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing the need
Civil Code). for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the Committee
members, the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
112. DOMINGO v. CA remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for
GR No. 104818; September 17, 1993 purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the interpretation
Romero, J. of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of
a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus
FACTS: rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment
Private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the declaring such previous marriage void.”
Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes
Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo. that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be
They were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg. obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of
Unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a
April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing. She came to know of previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an
the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property
for bigamy. She has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and
the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive
leave. Sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or
discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier
knowledge or consent. He failed and refused to turn over the possession and final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in
administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not the instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which
authorized to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally
their marriage. unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an
ISSUES: Was a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage necessary. absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment
If in affirmative, was the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage. declaring such previous marriage void.
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an
HELD: A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly "inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall
required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the be protected by the State." In more explicit terms, the Family Code
81
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man Is the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage based
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of on psychological incapacity, a prejudicial question that should merit the
conjugal, and family life." So crucial are marriage and the family to the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his
stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and wife? NO
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." As a matter
of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of RULING:
contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the 1. NO. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of
perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case.
respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause
void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it
must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution
113. Meynardo L. Beltran vs. People of the Philippines, and Hon. Judge of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or
Florentino Tuazon, Jr. innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000 Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground
BUENA, J. alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the
FACTS: criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine Felix were married themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the
in Quezon City. After sometime, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
Family Code before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
In her answer, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman. assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Upon Charmaine’s complaint, a criminal case for concubinage Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the
against Petitioner Beltran and his paramour against petitioner and his marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
paramour was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City. same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only
Petitioner filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings. Judge Alden Vasquez when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
Cervantes as well as the RTC denied the foregoing. long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage
Petitioner filed the instant petition for review. exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes
of nullity of his marriage based on psychological incapacity is a prejudicial the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.
question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for Therefore the pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does
concubinage filed against him by his wife. not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting
decisions might result from the civil case for annulment of marriage and the 114.Mercado v Tan
criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case, the trial court might declare G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000
the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's complaint but in the criminal Panganiban, J.
case, the trial court might acquit petitioner because the evidence shows that
his marriage is void on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner submits Facts: In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner Mercado is assailing
that if petitioner's marriage is declared void by reason of psychological the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the
incapacity then by reason of the arguments submitted in the subject petition, Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City convicting him of bigamy.
his marriage has never existed. Mercado and complainant Tan got married. In their marriage contract, the
status of accused was single. However, there is no dispute that at the time of
ISSUES: the celebration of the wedding with Tan, accused was actually a married
man, having been in lawful wedlock with Oliva. A letter-complaint for bigamy
82

was filed by complainant eventually resulted in the filing of an information for bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous
the crime of bigamy against Mercado. More than a month after the bigamy marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
case was lodged in the Prosecutor’s Office, the accused filed an action for question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that. Under the circumstances
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Oliva, and this marriage was of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.
subsequently declared null and void.
Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code for having contracted a second marriage with herein complainant Ma. 115. Republic of the Philippines v. Nolasco
Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united G.R. No. 94053; March 17, 1993
in lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, FELICIANO, J:
Mercado, while acknowledging the existence of the two marriages, posited
the defense that his previous marriage had been judicially declared null and FACTS: Respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed a petition for the declaration of
void and that the private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, a British subject. The
accused. On the other hand, Tan stated since no declaration of the nullity of Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition arguing that he did not
his first marriage had yet been made at the time of his second marriage, it is possess a "well-founded belief” that the absent spouse was already dead.
clear that accused was a married man when he contracted such second Respondent married Janet in Antique. After the wedding, he continued
marriage with complainant. working as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in Antique. Sometime
in January 1983, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him
ISSUE: Can Mercado be held guilty of the crime of bigamy despite having his that Janet had left for England. Respondent claimed that he immediately
previous marriage declared void ab initio? asked permission to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
Respondent testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship
RULING: Yes. Mercado can be held, and is guilty of bigamy. docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had
It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning sent to his spouse were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired
is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must from among friends but they too had no news of Janet. He also testified that
be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the he did not report the matter of Janet’s disappearance to the government
second marriage. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, it is provided that the authorities. Respondent presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness.
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of She testified that her daughter-in-law Janet left on 22 December 1982. She
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage further claimed that she had no information as to the her present
void. The Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should whereabouts.
not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the fact, The trial court granted Nolasco's petition and declared as presumptively
but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before dead Janet. The Republic appealed contending that the trial court erred in
they should be allowed to marry again. declaring Janet presumptively dead because respondent had failed to show
In the instant case, Mercado contracted a second marriage although there that there existed a well founded belief for such declaration.
was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he ISSUE: Did respondent conduct a search for his missing wife with such
instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after diligence as to give rise to a “well-founded belief” that she is dead?
complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By HELD: NO. Respondent failed to sufficiently establish a basis to form a belief
contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he that his absent spouse had already died.
committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. One of the requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first 41 of the Family Code is the presence of a well-founded belief that the
marriage was immaterial. The crime had already been consummated by absentee is dead.
then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of
83
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of
conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet’s whereabouts is Teodorico Calisterio, and contending that the marriage between the latter
too sketchy to form the basis of a well-founded belief that she was already and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and
dead. Instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British thereby null and void. Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. She
Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went to London. contended that her first marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved
Respondent's testimony showed that he confused London for Liverpool and due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more than
this casts doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. We do eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico.
not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in
simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there can be the administration of the estate of the decedent.
regarded as a reasonably diligent search. The Court also views respondent's Issue: Is a declaration of presumptive death over absentee spouse is
claim that Janet declined to give any information as to her personal required in order for the present spouse to remarry?
background even after she had married respondent too convenient an Held: No.
excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was
the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code,
were all returned to him. Neither can this Court give much credence to not the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of
respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her the Family Code itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where
whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
testimony. Also, respondent failed to explain why he did not even try to get accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Verily, the applicable specific
the help of the police or other authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the New Civil Code. Under
to find his wife. Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his the foregoing provision, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime
mother's letter sometime in January 1983, he cut short his employment of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first
contract to return to Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of nine annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from the
(9) months from January 1983 to November 1983. The circumstances of above rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional
Janet’s departure and respondent's subsequent behavior make it very cases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present (not the
difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a well- absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done so in
founded one. good faith. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief and conscious doing of wrong — it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach
required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. The Court does
issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead. not find these circumstances to be here extant. (Par.2 of Art. 83 of NCC:
“The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of
the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the
116. ARMAS VS. CALISTERO absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less
G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000 than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by
Vitug, J: the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if
the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The
Facts: marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared
Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land. He was null and void by a competent court.”)
survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta Calisterio. Teodorico was A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as
the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that
William Bounds at Caloocan City. the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of
Teodorico and Marietta were married without Marietta having priorly secured Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent
a court declaration that James was presumptively dead. Later on, petitioner court." It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the party assailing the second marriage.
Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, a petition entitled, "In the Matter In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent
of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following
84

conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party absentee is dead. He insists that he was able to prove that he had not heard
must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there from Rubylus since 1975 and that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts
is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil or whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the
Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well- presumptive death of Gaa had arisen by operation of law, as the two
founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The petitioner
the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.
which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in The Solicitor General (OSG) argues that what is applicable is Article 41 of
court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in the Family Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing
consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent Republic v. Nolasco, the OSG posited that as provided in Article 41 of the
marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, 10 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death
Family Code. of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even assuming
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto should not be permitted to
husband, James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for judge for themselves the nullity of the marriage.
more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 ISSUE: Should Eduardo’s marriage to Rubylus be considered subsisting at
with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been the time of his marriage to Tina, so as to make Eduardo criminally liable for
contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid bigamy?
notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of HELD: YES. The Family Code amended Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
James Bounds. Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case
Hence, the declaration of presumptive death is not necessary for purposes where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may
of remarriage. contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the
presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and
117. EDUARDO MANUEL v. PEOPLE convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that
G.R. No. 165842, 29 November 2005 he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such
CALLEJO, SR., J. judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a
FACTS: Eduardo Manuel (Eduardo) was married to Rubylys Gaa. However, subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with
Rubylys was convicted of estafa in 1975 and, since then, had not heard from bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the
her again. Twenty years later, 38-year-old Eduardo met Tina, who was 21 crime.
years old at the time. They eventually married, and were happy together for In this case, the prosecution has proved the elements of bigamy, i.e. that
the first three years. Thereafter, Eduardo visited their conjugal home only Eduardo was married to Rubylus in 1975, and such marriage was not
twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, but Eduardo would slap her judicially declared a nullity and was therefore subsisting, and that the
whenever she would ask him for money. One day, Eduardo packed up his petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of
things and left. Curious as to Eduardo’s whereabouts, Tina made inquiries the Family Code. Eduardo, however, failed to discharge the burden of
with the NSO, where she found out to her humiliation that Eduardo had all showing that he acted in good faith in marrying Tina, since he did not show
along been married to Rubylys. This led to the filing of a bigamy case against that he procured a declaration of Rubylus' presumptive death.
Eduardo.
For his part, Eduardo points out that the prosecution failed to prove beyond 118. Morigo v. People
reasonable doubt that his marriage to Rubylus was subsisting at the time of G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004
his marriage to Tina. He asserts that the presumptive death of the absent Quisimbing, J.:
spouse arises by operation of law upon the satisfaction of two requirements:
the specified period; and the present spouses’ reasonable belief that the FACTS:
85
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the CA
Decision which affirmed the RTC Decision, finding Petitioner Lucio Morigo The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential
(Morigo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.
Morigo and Lucia Barrete (Barrete) were married in 1990. A month later, Hence, Morigo must be acquitted.
Barrete resumed work in Canada, leaving Morigo behind. In 1991, Barrete
filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce which was granted and took NOTE: SC Comparison of Morigo v. People with Mercado v. Tan
effect in 1992. Morigo married one Maria Jececha Lumbago (Lumbago) that It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually
same year. solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage
certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in
In 1993, Morido filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of his religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have
marriage with Barrete on the ground that no marriage actually took place. transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
The City Prosecutor then filed a Bigamy case against Morigo. Morigo moved
for the suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by
judicial nullification of his marriage with Barrete posed a prejudicial question a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Here, the parties merely signed a
in the bigamy case. The motion was denied. When arraigned in the bigamy marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage
case, Morigo pleaded not guilty to the charge. contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
The RTC found Morigo guilty of bigamy. While the criminal case is pending constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held
resolution in the CA, the RTC in the civil case declared the marriage between liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before
Morigo and Barrete void ab initio because no marriage ceremony actually he contracts a subsequent marriage.
took place and because what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The CA
affirmed the RTC conviction, noting that the subsequent declaration of nullity 119. VERONICO TENEBRO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
of Morigo’s marriage to Barreto could not acquit the former. The reason is G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
that what is sought to be punished by Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code is YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been
dissolved. Facts: Veronico Tenebro married Leticia Ancajas in 1990. Tenebro and
Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter
ISSUE: Was the conviction for bigamy proper notwithstanding the part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously
subsequent declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio? married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Invoking this
previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he
HELD: shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In
No, the conviction was not correct for the absence of one of the elements of 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas.
bigamy. Morigo must be acquitted. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten
One of the elements of bigamy is that the accused must have been legally letter,Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her
married. Here, there is no first marriage to speak of as there was no actual husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.
marriage ceremony performed between the parties. There was only a mere During the trial, petitioner argues that the subsequent judicial declaration of
signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,
solemnizing officer. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential
declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was
contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to celebrated. Hence he cannot be held liable for bigamy due the nullity of the
its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to second marriage with Ancajas.
Barrete at the time he contracted the second marriage.
86

Issue: Does subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the second NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” while respondent Susan Yee received a total of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity exculpate the petitioner P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).”
from the crime of bigamy? Respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of
Ruling: No. Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000.00, collectively
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been denominated as “death benefits.”
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place
proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however,
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met
April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her
bigamy had already been consummated. action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the
As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, was solemnized without the required marriage license. The trial court ruled in
notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void favor of respondent, which the CA affirmed.
ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ISSUE: Is a final judgment of declaration of nullity necessary only for
ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s purposes of remarriage?
marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites
for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential HELD:
(legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the No. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, a prior and separate
presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent
officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married
personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial
the presence of at least two witnesses). decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said
second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same
120. SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO v. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties are
G.R. No. 132529 not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for
collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no
FACTS: During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party
contracted two marriages, the first was with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño, has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary that would
with whom he had two offsprings; and the second was with respondent prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid.
Susan Yee Cariño, with whom he had no children in their almost 10-year Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the issues before it,
cohabitation. will rule on the status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the
When Santiago passed away, both petitioner and respondent filed rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the jurisprudence.
deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was In the case at bar, the marriage between Susan Nicdao and the
able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license,
87
and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license marriage. Both cases involved the same factual milieu. Accused contracted a
requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio. Accordingly, the declaration in the second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. After the death
instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and Susan of his first wife, accused contracted a third marriage during the subsistence
Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with Susan of the second marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for
Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first bigamy. The Court acquitted accused on the ground that the second
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of Susan Nicdao and the marriage is void, having been contracted during the existence of the first
deceased void. Hence, the marriage of Susan Yee and the deceased is, marriage. There is no need for a judicial declaration that said second
likewise, void ab initio. marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void, and the first one
terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid
Hence, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a marriages. Hence, there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in
suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the both cases, saying that it is not for the spouses but the court to judge
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may whether a marriage is void or not.
arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),the Court held that there is a
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia
“on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel
Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be filed a petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to declare his
obtained only for purpose of remarriage. marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid marriage. The
Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that:.
121. OFELIA P. TY vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing
REYES prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for
[G.R. No. 127406. November 27, 2000] then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial
QUISUMBING, J.: declaration (citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
Facts: Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the
Villanueva in a civil ceremony in March 1977 in Manila and subsequently had marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the
a church wedding in August 1977. Both weddings were declared null and law.
void ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent of the parties. Even
before the decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was
herein petitioner on April 1979 and had their church wedding in Makati on entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was
April 1982. The decree was only issued in August 1980. In January 1991, found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private
Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his marriage with petitioner be respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for
declared null and void. AC ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second
prior marriage with Anna must first be secured before a subsequent marriage marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondents
could be validly contracted. However, SC found that the provisions of the second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case for doing so
would prejudice the vested rights of the petitioner and of her children. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24, 1996 and its
st
Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed partially, so that the
Issue: Is a decree of nullity of the 1 marriage required before a subsequent marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes
marriage can be validly entered into is hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING; and the award of the
amount of P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly support to
Ruling: Yes. Article 40 of the Family Code states “Art. 40. The absolute their two children, Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long as
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto. Costs against
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.” private respondent.
[
Originally, in People v. Mendoza, and People v. Aragon this Court held that
no judicial decree is necessary to establish the nullity of a void 122. FELIX SARAO v. PILAR GUEVARRA
88

G.R. No. 47063; 40 OG 263 Thus, the defendant’s sterility cannot be a ground for annulment since what
Reyes, A.J. the law provides as a ground for annulment is the incapacity to copulate, and
not to procreate.
Facts: In the afternoon of their wedding day, plaintiff tried to have coitus with
defendant but the latter begged for him to wait until that evening. When night 123. Buccat v Buccat
came, plaintiff again attempted to have carnal knowledge with his wife but G.R. No. 47101
the latter complained that her vagina was in pain. Plaintiff noticed purulent Horrilleno, J.
matter offensive to the smell coming out from her genital. Afterwards, several
attempts were made by the plaintiff to have coitus but to no avail because
defendant was still in pain. Facts: Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March
1938, became engaged in September, and got married in November 26,
After a visit to the physician, defendant was advised to submit herself to an 1938. On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9
operation wherein her uterus and ovaries will be removed because they were months pregnant, gave birth to a son. After knowing this, Godofredo left
affected by a tumor. Defendant was operated on with the consent of the Luida and never returned to married life with her. On March 23, 1939, he filed
plaintiff. The removal of said organs rendered defendant incapable of for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to
procreation, but not of copulation. married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin.
Plaintiff declared that from the time of the operation, he lost all desire to have The Lower court decided in favor of Luida. The court found it untenable that
sexual relations with defendant and has not tried since then. He filed a petitioner did not notice that defendant was pregnant at the time of marriage
complaint for annulment of marriage on the ground of impotency. CFI because she was about 6 months pregnant then. Upon appeal, said decision
dismissed the complaint. was affirmed.
Issue: Can the defendant’s incapacity to procreate be construed as Issue:

“physically incapable of entering into the married state” and is such a valid Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat’s marriage be granted on the
ground for annulment. grounds that Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?
Held: No, it may not be construed as such. Held:

No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a
According to Article 45 (5) of the Family Code, marriage may be annulled sacred institution in which the State is interested and where society rests.
if “either party was, at the time of marriage, physically incapable of entering In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of
into the married state, and such incapacity continues, and appears to be pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. It was unlikely that
incurable”. It is held that the test of impotency is not the ability to procreate, Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything about Luida’s
but the ability to copulate. condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy
(highly developed physical manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach ) when they
In this case, the defendant was not impotent at the time the marriage was got married. His claim of developed abdomens being normal is not
celebrated, as supported by the opinion of the doctor that the existence of something the court can accept because it was not just a normal developed
fibrous tumor in the ovaries did not necessarily render her incapable of abdomen but one in an advanced and severe stage of pregnancy. The court
copulation or even procreation. The removal of her uterus and ovaries cannot accept that there is fraud.
rendered her sterile but did not make her unfit for sexual intercourse.
124. Aquino vs. Delizo
89
G.R. No. L-15853 July 27, 1960 provincial fiscal has been ordered of represents the Government precisely to
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.: prevent such collusion. As to the veracity of the contents of the motion and
its annexes, the same can best be determined only after hearing evidence. In
Facts: Fernando Aquino filed a complaint for annulment against Conchita the circumstance, we think that justice would be better served if a new trial
Delizo based on the ground of fraud. According to Aquino, Conchita were ordered. Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the
concealed from him the fact that she was pregnant by another man and that case remanded to the court.
about four months after marriage she gave birth to a child. But the defendant
claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and 125. Emilio Tuason vs. Court of Appeals
the petitioner. During trial it was only the petitioner who testified and the only G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996
documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract between the Puno, J.
parties. The trial court — noting that no birth certificate was presented to
show that the child was born within 180 days after the marriage between the Facts:
parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff In 1989, Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the Regional Trial Court of
does not constitute such fraud as would annul a marriage — dismissed the Makati a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to
complaint. On appeal to the Court of Appeals it nevertheless affirmed the petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. In her complaint, she alleged that she and
dismissal of the complaint. petitioner were married on June 3, 1972 and from this union, begot two
children. She allege that Emilio has psychological incapacity, inflicts physical
Issue: Does concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the injuries against her, a womanizer, leave the conjugal home, and a
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes spendthrift.
fraud so as to be a ground for annulment of marriage?
During presentation of private respondent’s evidence, petitioner, on April 18,
Held: Yes Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that 1990, filed his Opposition to private respondent’s petition for appointment as
at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her administratrix of the conjugal partnership of gains. Two days before the
husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. scheduled hearing, a counsel for petitioner moved for a postponement on the
Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months ground that the principal counsel was out of the country and due to return on
pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not the first week of June. The court granted the motion and reset the hearing to
prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since June 8, 1990. On June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of
she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical private respondent, the court declared petitioner to have waived his right to
authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis
woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement of the evidence presented.
is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and
may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of
abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of private respondent’s marriage to petitioner and awarding custody of the
the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the children to private respondent. Petitioner appealed before the Court of
roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. If, as claimed by Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order
plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to know, of the trial court.
merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their
marriage more so because she must have attempted to conceal the true Issue:
state of affairs. Whether or not the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack
Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, of collusion between the contending parties is fatal to the validity of the
taken together with what has already been adduced would, in our opinion, be proceedings in the trial court.
sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals
should, therefore, not have denied the motion praying for new trial simply Held:
because defendant failed to file her answer thereto. Such failure of the No. A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught
defendant cannot be taken as evidence of collusion, especially since a with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of
90

nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether
ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to
collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the fabricated. Thus, the report of the Public Prosecutor is a condition sine qua
complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should non for further proceedings to go on in the case. Respondent judge ignored
order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the this procedural rule.
parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for Considering the foregoing, the Court rules that the respondent judge
legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, violated Mrs. Macias right to due process when he completely ignored the
if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. pertinent rules. Mrs. Macias had already filed her Motion to Dismiss where
she indicated her address. Hence, Judge Ochotorena should have ordered
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and the Public Prosecutor to make an investigation after Mrs. Macias
legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists whereabouts was known.
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or While the record shows that Public Prosecutor Arturo M. Paculanag
]
fabricated. Petitioners vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings had filed a Certification with the respondent judges court, stating, among
negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is others, that he appeared in behalf of the Solicitor General during the ex-
no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by parte presentation of plaintiffs evidence, even cross-examining the plaintiff
any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the and his witness, the psychiatrist Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos, and that he had no
non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion objection to the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage,
between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings such Certification does not suffice to comply with the mandatory requirement
in the trial court. that the court should order the investigating public prosecutor whether a
collusion exists between the parties. Such directive must be made by the
126. Argie Macias Corpus vs. Judge Wilfredo Ochotorena court before trial could proceed, not after the trial on the merits of the case
A.M. No. RTJ- 04-1861. July 30, 2004 had already been had. Notably, said Certification was filed after the
TINGA, J., respondent judge had ordered the termination of the case.
Facts: Mariano Macias filed a petition for the nullification of his marriage with 127. In the Matter of the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus of Minor
Margie Macias. Judge Ochotorena immediately served summons to Margie Angelie Anne C. Cervantes, Nelson L. Cervantes and Zenaida Carreon
which she did not receive as her whereabouts were unknown. When Margie Cervantes v. Gina Carreon Fajardo and Conrado Fajardo
found out about ut through a newspaper, she filed a motion to dismiss which G.R. No. 79955; January 27, 1989
Judge Ochotorena disregarded. The judge proceeded with the hearing PADILLA, J.
without a resolution of the motion.
FACTS: A petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed over the minor,
Issue: Is the respondent Judge justified in disregarding the motion and Angelie Cervantes, daughter of common-law spouses Conrado Fajardo and
deciding the case ex parte? Gina Carreon. Angelie was offered for adoption to petitioners Nelson
Cervantes and Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes, who was the sister of Gina
Held: No, the judge is not justified in disregarding the motion and deciding Carreon. Petitioners took care and had custody of the child when the latter
the case ex parte. The Rules of Court prohibits default proceedings in cases was barely two weeks old. Gina Carreon executed and affidavit of consent to
involving declaration of nullity of marriage. Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 the adoption of the child by petitioners, and the court later approved the
Rules of Civil Procedure states: If the defending party in an action for petition for adoption. A few months after, the biological parents of Angelie
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to demanded from the adoptive parents, herein petitioners, the payment of
91
P150,000, or else they will get back their child. Petitioners refused, and as a
result, Gina took the child from petitioners’ residence and would only return 128. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRASUS L. IYOY
the child if the said amount will be paid to her. According to Gina, the consent G.R. No. 152577; September 21, 2005
for the adoption was not fully explained to her, but this appears to be CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
contrasted by her declarations during an interview by a social worker who
conducted the case study for the said adoption. FACTS:
Respondent Crasus married Fely. After the celebration of their marriage,
ISSUE: Considering the circumstances in life of the natural parents as Crasus discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.
compared to that of the adoptive parents, the latter being in a better position, Thereafter Fely left the Philippines for the U.S.A., leaving all of their five
are the adoptive parents entitled to the custody of the child? children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of
respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left, Crasus received a letter
RULING: Yes. from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded
the said request. Sometime thereafter, Crasus learned, through the letters
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with
the latter's welfare is paramount. In all controversies regarding the custody of whom she eventually had a child. Fely came back to the Philippines with her
minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare American family. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because
of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral, as well he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had
as social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more. Fely
from this criterion. continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had
been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines
It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a and in the U.S.A. Crasus filed a compalint for the declaration of nullity of
woman other than respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the marriage. He alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and
latter is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity
with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that desirable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being
atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral- incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of
minded person. Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family
to another child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three Code of the Philippines. Fely, in her answer, asserted therein that she was
(3) years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor (like Angelie already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen
Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose “father” is not her true Micklus. While she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus
father, it could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon and having five children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by
the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, respondent Crasus in his Complaint. RTC, in its decision, declared the
physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, premised on
her a future better than what the natural mother (herein respondent Gina its finding that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of
Carreon), who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as striving for
married man, can most likely give her. Besides, the minor has been legally family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From
adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents. A the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant
decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority practically abandoned him. Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-
vested in natural parents over the adopted child. The adopting parents have quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an
the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and shall exercise appeal with the CA. However, the CA affirmed its decision.
parental authority and responsibility over him.
ISSUE: 1. Does respondent Crasus sufficiently established Physchological
Hence, said petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus was granted. The custody Incapacity?
and care of the minor Angelie Anne C. Cervantes were hereby granted to 2. Is Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines
petitioners to whom they properly belong, and respondents were ordered to applicable to the case at bar?
deliver said minor to the petitioners immediately upon notice thereof.
92

HELD: 1. NO. In Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law"
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such
psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation
evidence presented during the trial. wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the
other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain
and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time
Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although
failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer
Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus
under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The evidence may sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she
have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged
Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed
extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the
American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and
with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already
identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and
be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have
serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal
examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory
for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family 129. Espiritu vs. CA
Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos v. G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995
Marcos, respondent Crasus must still have complied with the requirement MELO, J.:
laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina that the root cause of
the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its Facts: In 1984, Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a
incapacitating nature be fully explained. common law relationship of husband and wife. On August 16, 1986,
their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. On October 7, 1987, while
they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second
marriage. No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on
and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as January 12, 1988. cdl The relationship of the couple deteriorated until
the foundation of the family. they decided to separate sometime in 1990. Teresita blamed Reynaldo
for the break-up, stating he was always nagging her about money
matters. Reynaldo, on the other hand, contended that Teresita was a
2. NO. According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the spendthrift, buying expensive jewelry and antique furniture instead of
Philippines "Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner attending to household expenses. Instead of giving their marriage a
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left
93
Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. She claims, are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to grant
however, that she spent a lot of money on long distance telephone custody to the mother. The children understand the unfortunate
calls to keep in constant touch with her children. Reynaldo brought his shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional
children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in growth by her behavior.
Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company
to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner
Guillerma Layug and her family. Teresita led the petition for a writ of 130. Ma. Belen Mangonon vs. Court of Appeals
habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the G.R. No. 125041; June 30, 2006
children. Chico – Nazario, J.
Issue: Should the custody of the children should be rendered in favor of FACTS:
Teresita? Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children
Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with
Held: NO. application for support pendente lite. In said petition, it was alleged that
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are Mangonon and Federico Delgado were civilly married. At that time,
mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant Mangonon was only 21 years old while Federico was only 19 years old. As
considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law the marriage was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of
presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is the New Civil Code, it was annulled by the Quezon City Juvenile and
strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling Domestic Relations Court.
reasons." If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again,
the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may Seven months after the annulment of their marriage, Mangonon gave
nd the chosen parent unt and award custody to the other parent, or birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to Mangonon, she, with the
even to a third party as it deems t under the circumstances. The assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin
record also shows that it was Teresita who left the conjugal home and daughters as Delgado had totally abandoned them. At the time of the
the children, bound for California. When Perdencio Gonzales was institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the
reassigned to the Philippines, Teresita followed him and was seen in United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters
his company in a Cebu hotel, staying in one room and taking and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. However, they are
breakfast together. More signicant is that letters and written messages financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education because the expenses
from Teresita to Perdencio were submitted in evidence (p. 12, RTC they will incur is beyond the means of their family.
Decision). The argument that moral laxity or the habit of irting from
one man to another does not fall under "compelling reasons" is neither Petitioner said that demands were made upon Federico and
meritorious nor applicable in this case. Not only are the children over Francisco, Federico’s father, for support and educational expenses but the
seven years old and their clear choice is the father, but the illicit or demands remained unheeded. Mangonon also alleged that Rica
immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional and Rina are her legitimate daughters by respondent Federico since the twin
disturbances, personality conicts, and exposure to conicting moral sisters were born within seven months from the date of the annulment of her
values, at least in Rosalind. This is not to mention her conviction for marriage to respondent Federico. However, as respondent Federico failed to
the crime of bigamy, which from the records appears to have become sign the birth certificates of Rica and Rina, it was imperative that their status
final. The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of as legitimate children of respondent Federico, and as granddaughters of
the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. respondent Francisco, be judicially declared pursuant to Article 173 of the
From all indications, Reynaldo is a t person, thus meeting the two Family Code.
requirements found in the rst paragraph of Article 213 of the Family
Code. The presumption under the second paragraph of said article no In his Answer, respondent Francisco stated that as the birth
longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that the certificates of Rica and Rina do not bear the signature of his son, Federico, it
presumption should have persuasive value for children only one or two is essential that their legitimacy be first established as there is no basis to
years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the statute, there claim support until a final and executory judicial declaration has been made
94

as to the civil status of the children. He, likewise, averred that the order of Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica
liability for support under Article 199 of the Family Code is not concurrent and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their
such that the obligation must be borne by those more closely related to the parents. Having been established that respondent Francisco has the financial
recipient. means to support his granddaughters education, he, in lieu of petitioner and
respondent Federico, should be held liable for support pendente lite.
ISSUE: Can the alleged father and grandfather be liable for support for the
children of Mangonon?
RULING: Yes. They can be both liable.
Under this provision, a court may temporarily grant

support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final
order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully
into the merits of the case before it can settle an application for this relief. All
that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence AURORA A. ANAYA vs. FERNANDO O. PALAROAN
which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough G.R. No. L-27930; November 26, 1970
that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence REYES, J.B.L., J.:
appearing in the record.
FACTS:
After the hearings conducted on this matter as well as the evidence Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married on December 4, 1953.
presented, we find that petitioner was able to establish, by prima facie proof, On January 7, 1954, Fernando filed an action for annulment of his marriage,
the filiation of her twin daughters to private respondents and the twins alleging that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. This
entitlement to support pendente lite. complaint was dismissed, the marriage was upheld, and Aurora’s
counterclaim was granted. While the amount of the counterclaim was
An eminent author on the subject explains that the obligation to give negotiated, Fernando revealed to Aurora that several months prior to their
support rests principally on those more closely related to the marriage, he had a marital relationship with his close relative. Thus, Aurora
recipient. However, the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the filed an action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud, alleging that
responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called upon to the non-divulgement to her of the marital relationship constituted fraud in
provide support do not have the means to do so. obtaining her consent. Fernando, however, denied having a pre-marital
relationship.
In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held
respondent Federico liable to provide monthly support pendente lite in the ISSUE:
total amount of P10,000.00 by taking into consideration his supposed income Is the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship
of P30,000.00 to P40,000.00 per month. with another woman a ground for annulment of marriage?
There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and RULING:
respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and NO. The non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital
respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their childrens college relationship with another woman is not a ground for annulment of marriage.
education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said
support should be borne by respondent Francisco. Under Article 199 of the
95
Fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be a cause for its JUANARIA FRANCISCO vs. LOPE TAYAO
annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code, which provides: G.R. No. L-26435; March 4, 1927
MALCOLM, J.:
ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: FACTS:
xxx xxx xxx Juanaria Francisco and Lope Tayao were married in 1912 but were
separated in 1917. Lope moved to Zamboanga and there, he was convicted
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, of adultery with Bernardina Medrano when the latter’s husband filed the
unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts criminal action. As such, Juanaria sought to dissolve her marriage with Lope
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her in accordance with the Philippine Divorce Law on the ground that the latter
husband or his wife, as the case may be; has been convicted of adultery. However, the trial court denied the same,
arguing that Juanaria is not an innocent spouse in accordance with such law.
This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or
species of fraud enumerated in Article 86, as follows: ISSUE:
Is the wife entitled to a decree of divorce in accordance with the Philippine
ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute Divorce Law where her husband has been convicted of adultery?
fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article:
RULING:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the NO. The wife is not entitled to a decree of divorce where her husband has
contracting parties; been convicted of adultery.
(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other
party of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the penalty In the Philippine Islands, the causes for divorce are prescribed by statute.
imposed was imprisonment for two years or more; The grounds for divorce are two: Adultery on the part of the wife or
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the concubinage on the part of the husband. The Philippine Divorce Law, Act No.
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her 2710, is emphatically clear in this respect. Section 1 of the law reads: "A
husband. petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife
or concubinage on the part of the husband . . . ." Note well the adverb "only"
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, and the conjunctive "or." The same thought is again emphasized in section 3
fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give of the Divorce Law which provides that "The divorce may be claimed only by
grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent
to the adultery or concubinage, as the case may be. . . .” Later on comes
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is section 8 providing that "A divorce shall not be granted without the guilt of the
not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for defendant being established by final sentence in a criminal action"—that is,
annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, in relation with section 1 of the same law, by final sentence in a criminal
providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall action for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the
give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest husband.
such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby
cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does Counsel argues along the line that the plaintiff is here the innocent spouse
not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon and that acts for which the defendant was convicted of adultery also
marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself constitute concubinage. But the undeniable fact remains that the defendant
alone, is interested. was prosecuted for, and was convicted of, the crime of adultery and not the
crime of concubinage. The criminal case was instituted on the complaint of
Hence, the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital the injured husband. It was not instituted by the injured wife which is
relationship with another woman is not a ground for annulment of marriage. essential for the proper initiation of a prosecution for concubinage.

96

Therefore, the wife is not entitled to a decree of divorce in accordance with to be established by final judgment in a criminal action. That requirement has
the Philippine Divorce Law where her husband has been convicted of not been reproduced or adopted by the framers of the present Civil Code,
adultery. and the omission has been uniformly accepted as a modification of the
stringent rule in Francisco v. Tayao. Therefore, the complaint for
FROILAN C. GANDIONCO vs. HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA, as concubinage need not be resolved first for an action for legal separation to
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch proceed because conviction is not necessary for the resolution of the latter
18, Cagayan de Oro City, and TERESITA S. GANDIONCO action.
G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987
Padilla, j. ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG vs.LUCITA G. ONG
G.R. No. 153206 October 23, 2006
FACTS: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
On 29 May 1986, Teresita filed with the RTC-Misamis Oriental, Branch,
presided over by Judge Penaranda, a complaint against Froilan for legal FACTS: On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation
separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code before the RTC - Dagupan City,
payment of damages. She also filed with the MTC-General Santos City, a Branch 41 alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence,
complaint against Froilan for concubinage. On 23 October 1986. On 14 threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct.
November 1986, Teresita applied for the provisional remedy of support
pendente lite, pending a decision in the action for legal separation.. The Lucita claimed that william physically and emotionally maltreat her and their
Judge Penaranda. on 10 December 1986, ordered The payment of support children. She also Clamied that there was once a violent quarrel ensued
pendente lite. Froilan then moved to suspend the hearings in the action for between her and William hit her on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and
legal separation filed by Teresita. However, Judge Penaranda denied the sae arms. When William hit her on the stomach and she bent down because of
in an Order dated 5 August 1997. Aggrieved, Froilan then filed a special civil the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to
action for certiorari, with application for injunction, to annul the Order the leave the house; she then went to her sister’s house in Binondo where she
Orders before the Supreme Court. He argued that his conviction for was fetched by her other siblings and brought to their parents house in
concubinage will have to be first secured before the action for legal Dagupan. The RTC rendered a decision decreeing legal separation, On
separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for legal appeal by William, the CA affirmed the decree of legal separation. The CA
separation is his alleged offense of concubinage. likewise denied the motion for reconsideration filed by William. On petition for
review before the Supreme Court, William assereted that since Lucita has
ISSUE: Should the action for legal separation be suspended pending the abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted,
resolution of the complaint for concubinage? following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal
separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal
RULING: No, the action for legal separation may proceed independently separation.
even without resolution of the complaint for concubinage. A decree of legal
separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by ISSUE: Did Lucalso ita gave a ground for legal separation when she left to
3
preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal Dagupan?
proceeding or conviction is necessary. To this end, the doctrine in Francisco
4
vs. Tayao has been modified, as that case was decided under Act. No. RULING: No, the abandonment for valid or justifiable ground is not a ground
2710, when absolute divorce was then allowed and had for its grounds the for legal separation.
same grounds for legal separation under the New Civil Code, with the
requirement, under such former law, that the guilt of defendant spouses had
97
Without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the HELD:
family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, 1. No. The facts are insufficient to support the finding of psychological
par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be incapacity of Fely. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and
denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation. The Molina, the Supreme Court issued definitive guidelines in the
abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was established that Lucita left Philippines, one of which is that:
William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment
contemplated by the said provision. “(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
Therefore, in order for abandonment to constitute a ground for legal by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
separation, it must be for without justifiable cause and for more than one Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
year. physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
Republic of the Philippines v. Crasus L. Iyoy was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
G.R. No. 152577; September 21, 2005 have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
FACTS: provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
In 1961, Crasus Y. Iyoy (Crasus) and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy (Fely) entered into cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
a contract of marriage. As a result of their union, they begot five children. nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
After the celebration of their marriage, Crasus discovered that Fely was hot- psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.”
tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines and
barely a year thereafter, she sent divorce papers to Crasus requesting that In this case, the evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that
the latter should sign the same. In 1985, Fely married an American citizen hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her
with whom she had another child. Subsequently, Fely would visit the hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent
Philippines from time-to-time openly using the surname of her American Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her
husband in the Philippines and in USA. American family and her American surname, may indeed be
manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital
13 years after Crasus was abandoned, he filed a Complaint for the obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the
Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Fely alleging that Fely’s acts root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be
brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time
Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer
Philippines. In her Answer, Fely asserted that she was already an American mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36
citizen since 1988 and is thus governed by her national law. She likewise of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling in
refuted all the allegations of Crasus and added that she left abroad for Marcos v. Marcos, respondent Crasus must still have complied with the
financial reasons. requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina that
the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness
ISSUE: and that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.
1. Are the foregoing facts sufficient to declare Fely psychologically
incapacitated? Since the facts are not sufficient to declare Fely psychologically
2. May the divorce decree obtained by Fely be recognized in the incapacitated, her marriage therefore with Crasus is still valid and
Philippines? subsisting.
98

2. No, the divorce decree will not produce effect in the Philippines. sister-in-law and some from anonymous writers informing him of alleged acts
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the of infidelity of his wife. Ginez admitted through a letter to Bugayong that a
Philippines, “where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner certain Eliong kissed her. Subsequently, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad looked for his wife. They met in the house of the Ginez’ godmother. They
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino proceeded to the house of Pedro, cousin of the Bugayong where they stayed
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.” As for 1 day and 1 night as husband and wife. The next day, they slept together
it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein in their own house. He tried to verify with Leonila the truth on the information
one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a he received but instead of answering, she merely packed up and left which
foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. He then filed a complaint
for legal separation.
By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied
to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time ISSUE: Will the action for legal separation prosper?
Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the
exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed HELD:
before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus No. Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground
sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she for legal separation or, as stated in I Bouver's Law Dictionary, p. 585,
married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged condonation is the "conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or
that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed". We agree with
for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality the trial judge that the conduct of the plaintiff-husband above narrated
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she despite his belief that his wife was unfaithful, deprives him, as alleged the
was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, offended spouse, of any action for legal separation against the offending
condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. wife, because his said conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of
Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize the Civil Code.
divorce between Filipino spouses.
The only general rule in American jurisprudence is that any cohabitation with
Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent the guilty party, after the commission of the offense, and with the knowledge
Crasus. or belief on the part of the injured party of its commission, will amount to
conclusive evidence of condonation; but this presumption may be rebutted by
evidence (60 L. J. Prob. 73).
If there had been cohabitation, to what extent must it be to constitute

Benjamin Bugayong v. Leonila Ginez condonation?
G.R. No. L-10033; December 28, 1956
FELIX, J.: Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the
parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation, and
FACTS: where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation (27 C. J. S.,
Ginez in Pangasinan while on furlough leave. Immediately after their section 6-d).
marriage, they lived with the sisters of Bugayong in Pangasinan before he
went back to duty. Thereafter, Bugayong began receiving letters from his
99
A divorce suit will not be granted for adultery where the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy from
parties continue to live together after it was known (Land vs. the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in
Martin, 15 South 657; Day vs. Day, 80 Pac. 974) or there is favor of the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and
sexual intercourse after knowledge of adultery (Rogers vs. disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested
Rogers, 67 N. J. Eq. 534) or sleeping together for a single exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent,
night (Toulson vs. Toulson, 50 Atl. 401, citing Phinizy vs. such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or
Phinizy, 114 S. E. 185, 154 Ga. 199; Collins vs. Collins, 193 transmissible. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of
So. 702), and many others. The resumption of marital Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines could be resolved and
cohabitation as a basis of condonation will generally be determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the
inferred, nothing appearing to the contrary, from the fact of heirs of the appellant.
the living together as husband and wife, especially as
against the husband (Marsh vs. Marsh, 14 N. J. Eq. 315). In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only
voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the
There is no ruling on this matter in our jurisprudence but we have no reason second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been an
to depart from the doctrines laid down in the decisions of the various absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally
supreme courts of the United States above quoted. believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as
one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87,
Therefore, the action will not prosper. paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be
brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved.
CARMEN LAPUZ-SY VS. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY
G.R. No. L-30977; January 31, 1972 CERVANTES VS. FAJARDO
GR. No. 79955. January 27, 1989
FACTS: Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against
Eufemio S. Eufemio. According to Carmen, they married in 1934 and lived FACTS: Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes are the brother-
together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband in-law and sister-in-law of respondent herein Gina Carreon Fajardo who
abandoned her. She discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese adopted the child of both respondents Gina and Conrado Fajardo, Angelie.
woman named Go Hiok. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal After a decree of adoption was granted by the court, respondents demanded
separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. from petitioners to be paid the amount of 150,000, otherwise, they would get
Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. their child back. Petitioners’ failure to heed respondents’ demand prompted
Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on two (2) them to take Angelie away, when the adoptive parents are at work and still
grounds, namely: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the demanding 150,000 pesos for the return of the child, thus causing petitioners
one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the to file a petition for habeas corpus.
death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.
ISSUE/S: Does a natural parent, especially the natural mother, have a better
ISSUE/S: Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for right as to the custody of a child than those of the adoptive parents who are
legal separation, abate the action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the leading a life better than the natural parent?
action involves property rights?
HELD: No. In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of
HELD: An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the children, the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall
bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the
this jurisdiction) is purely personal. Being personal in character, it follows that Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise.
the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself —
actio personalis moritur cum persona. The right to the dissolution of the In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost
conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute community of property), the consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned,
loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the
100

taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the awarded sole parental authority to Reynaldo. The Court of Appeals awarded
contending parents. the custody to Teresita.
Conrado Fajardo's relationship with the Gina Carreon is a common-law Issue: Is the custody of the children determined by the age of the minor
husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with Gina will not child?
accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and
develop into an upright and moral-minded person. Gina Carreon previously Ruling:
gave birth to another child by another married man with whom she lived for
almost three (3) years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor No. The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not
to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true father, could also affect a ministerial function to be determined by a simple determination of the age
the moral outlook and values of said minor. On the other hand, petitioners of a minor child.
who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and
socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than Art. 363 of the Civil Code provides that “In all questions on the care, custody,
what the natural mother, who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit education and property of the children, the latter's welfare shall be
relation with a married man, can most likely give her. Minor has been legally paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years
adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and the consent of of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure”. Also,
respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect of dissolving the authority Art. 213 of the Civil Code procides that “In case of separation of the parents
vested in natural parents over the adopted child. The adopting parents have parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court.
the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and to exercise The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the
parental authority and responsibility over her. choice of the child over seven years of age unless the parent chosen is unfit”.
Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the paramount criterion
Reynaldo Espiritu v. Court of Appeals must always be the child's interests. Discretion is given to the court to decide
G.R. No. 115640; March 15, 1995 who can best assure the welfare of the child, and award the custody on the
Melo, J. basis of that consideration.
Facts: In this case, the Court of Appeals was unduly swayed by an abstract
presumption of law rather than an appreciation of relevant facts and the law
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding are married having two Rosalind which should apply to those facts. In the present case, both Rosalind and
and Reginald. They were living in the United States. When Teresita left them, Reginald are now over seven years of age. Their choice of the parent with
Reynaldo brought the children to the Philippines. Teresita returned to the whom they prefer to stay is clear. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit
Philippines and filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over person, thus meeting the two requirements found in the first paragraph of
the minor children under seven years of age children at that time. A child Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the second
psychologist reported the feelings of insecurity and anxiety of Rosalind paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children are over seven
arising from strong conflict with the mother. This shows that she chooses years. Assuming that the presumption should have persuasive value for
Reynaldo over Teresita. A social welfare case study conducted also revealed children only one or two years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in
that Rosalind felt unloved and uncared for and was suffering from emotional the statute, there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to
shock caused by her mother's infidelity. Teresita argues that moral laxity or grant custody to the mother. The children understand the unfortunate
the habit of flirting from one man to another does not fall under "compelling shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional
reasons". The trial court suspended Teresita’s parental authority and growth by her behavior.
101
Therefore, the custody of the children not necessarily determined by the age makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of
of the minor child. assaulting her. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate
support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is
Eloisa Goitia De La Camara v. Jose Campos Rueda regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger
G.R. No. 11263; November 2, 1916 policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation
Trent, J. is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals may be
considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract
Facts: or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
Eloisa Goitia De La Camara filed an action against her husband, Jose Hence, the power to grant support is not dependent upon the power to grant
Campos Rueda, for support outside the conjugal domicile. She alleged in her divorce.
complaint that Jose continually demanded of her to perform unchaste and
lascivious acts on his genital organs. She always refused these demands
inducing Jose to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries on ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ
different parts of her body. She then left the conjugal abode and take refuge 42 Phil 54, August 11, 1921
in the home of her parents. The defendant argued that he cannot be STREET, J.:
compelled to support Eloisa, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue
of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from the defendant. FACTS: Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were married
in the year 1910 and since then, with a few short intervals of separation, they
Issue: have lived together as husband and wife in the city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920,
Is the power to grant support in a separate action is dependent upon a power when the wife went away from their common home with the intention of living
to grant a divorce? separately from her husband. After efforts had been made by the husband to
induce her to resume marital relations, this action was initiated by him to
Ruling: compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful
No. The power to grant support is not dependent upon the power to grant wife.
divorce which is apparent from the very nature of the marital obligations of The wife answered, admitting the fact of marriage, and that she had
the spouses. left her husband's home without his consent; but she averred by way of
defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave by cruel
The provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties treatment on the part of her husband.
and obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and The lower court gave judgment in favor of the wife, authorizing her to
support each other. The husband must live with and protect his wife. The live apart from her husband. Hence, this appeal by the husband.
wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes
his domicile or residence, except when he removes to a foreign country ISSUE: Can the court grant the petition of the husband to compel his wife to
live with him?
The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to
support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or HELD:
implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of NO. It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to
the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the
to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are impaired, an
wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. However, what is
judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable either as involved in this case is a purely personal right which cannot be enforceable
damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, by process of contempt. At best, the court may render a judicial declaration
but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by that his wife has presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her
the mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to duty to return.
preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife; as where the husband
102

VALDEZ vs. RTC Branch 102 of Quezon City their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-
G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996 ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed
VITUG, J.: to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
FACTS: Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, Therefore, petitioner and private respondent own the family home
1971. Begotten during the marriage were five children. In 1991, Valdes and all their common property in equal shares, and that, in the liquidation and
sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-
Family Code. The trial court granted the petition and directed the petitioner ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to
and the respondent to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail.
properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with
the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code. ERLINDA A. AGAPAY vs. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision GR No. 116668; July 28, 1997
directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. The trial Romero, J.
court clarified that considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly
provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the Facts:
absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained Miguel Palang is married to Cornelia Palang (respondent). Miguel has been
through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal working in Hawaii and subsequently wanted to divorce his wife Cornelia. He
shares, the parties will own their family home and all their other properties for does not want to live with Cornelia when he is in the country.
that matter in equal shares. It held that in the liquidation and partition of the
properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on Then, the 63 year old Miguel contracted a second marriage with a 19 year
co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply. old Erlinda Agapay (petitioner). They then bought a riceland and a house and
lot. They had one son.
Valdes submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102
and 129 of the Family Code should be held controlling since Article 147 of The two were eventually convicted with concubinage.
the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological
incapacitated. Issue: Who owns the real property considering that the parties are not
lawfully married?
ISSUE: Does Article 147 of the Family Code govern the property relations of
void marriages by reason of psychological incapacity? Held: Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be
HELD: owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It
YES. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance
by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition
the Family Code. Article 147 states that “when a man and a woman who are of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-
and wife…under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.” Under this Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase
property regime, property acquired by both spouses through price of the riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her
103
co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, We are, therefore, of the opinion and hold that plaintiff was the owner of the
as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership automobile in question and had an insurable interest therein; that there was
property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang. no fraud on her part in procuring the insurance; that the valuation of the
automobile, f or the purposes of the insurance, is binding upon the defendant
MRS. HENRY E. HARDING vs. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE corporation.
COMPANY
G.R. No. L-12707; August 10, 1918 Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez
Fisher, J. G.R. No. L-23002. July 31, 1967
Facts: FACTS:
Harding was the owner of a Studebaker automobile and in consideration of Concepcion Felix sold to her daughter, Concepcion Calderon her exclusive
the payment to the defendant of the premium of P150, made its policy of property who later sold the same to her father for the purpose of converting
insurance in writing upon said automobile. such property of the mother to conjugal property, thereby vesting half interest
on the husband and evading the prohibition against donations from one
On March 24, 1916, the automobile was totally destroyed by fire-- this spouse to another during coverture.
within the period mentioned in the policy of insurance. Harding furnished the
defendant the proof of the said loss and interest but the defendant has not ISSUE:
paid said loss Does the deed of transfer circumvent the legal prohibition regarding donation
despite due demand. between spouses?
Defendant maintains that there were deception and misrepresentation in the HELD:
policy especially on the price of the automobile signed by Harding. Yes. What would invalidate the conveyances now under scrutiny is the fact
that they were resorted to in order to circumvent the legal prohibition against
Issue: Can the petitioner claim insurance from the defendant? donations between spouses contained in Article 1334, paragraph 1, of the
Civil Code of 1889, then prevailing. However, they refused to grant relief to
Held: We hold are supported by the evidence, the trial judge decided that the wife who filed a case to nullify the transactions on the ground that, while
there was no proof of fraud on the part of plaintiff in her statement of the the cause involved an illicit consideration, all the parties knew the illicit
value of the automobile, or with respect to its ownership; that she had an purpose of the scheme and thus, were guilty and therefore no one can
insurable interest therein; and that defendant, having agreed to the estimated recover what was given by virtue of the contract.
value, P3,000, and having insured the automobile f or that amount, upon the Unfortunately for herein appellant, in contracts invalidated by illegal subject
basis of which the premium was paid, is bound by it and must pay the loss in matter or illegal causa, Articles 1305 and 1306 of the Civil Code then in force
accordance with the stipulated insured value. The assignments of error made apply rigorously the rule in pari delicto non oritur action, denying all recovery
on behalf of appellant put in issue the correctness of those conclusions of to the guilty parties inter se. And appellant is clearly as guilty as her husband
law, and some others of minor importance relating to the exclusion of in the attempt to evade the legal interdiction of Article 1334 of the Code,
evidence. Disposing of the minor objections first, as we have reached the already cited. Wherefore, her present action to reivindicate the, conveyed
conclusion that the trial court was right in holding that the defendant is bound properties was correctly repulsed by the Court below.
by the estimated value of the automobile upon which policy was issued, and
that the plaintiff was not guilty of fraud. Cirila Arcaba, vs. Erlinda Tabancura Vda. De Batocael
G.R. No. 146683. November 22, 2001
Appellant contends that Mrs. Harding was not the owner of the automobile at Mendoza, J.
the time of the issuance of the policy, and, therefore, had no insurable
interest in it. The court below found that the automobile was given to plaintiff FACTS:
by her husband shortly after the issuance of the policy here in question. Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered
owners of a lot in Zambaonga. Since Francisco do not have any children to
take care of him after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s
104

cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcab to take care of Francisco’s house as well bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not
as the store inside. According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin
since they slept in the same room. On the other hand, Tabancura, another to husband and wife. Aside from Erlinda Tabancuras testimony that her uncle
niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was his mistress. told her that Cirila was his mistress, there are other indications that Cirila and
However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper. She denied Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura presented
having sexual intercourse with Francisco. He worked as a helper under documents apparently signed by Cirila using the surname Comille. These are
Francisco when she was 34 years old and the latter was 75. Few months an application for a business permit to operate as a real estate lessor a
before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate, and
donating a land and his house to Cirila who accepted the same. This was the death certificate of Francisco. These documents show that Cirila saw
made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. The herself as Franciscos common-law wife, otherwise, she would not have used
deed was notarized and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner. his last name. Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a
Then, Francisco died. The decedent’s nephews and nieces and his heirs by regular cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver-
intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of employee, but Franciscos common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to
Francisco. a regular cash wage under the law. It is difficult to believe that she stayed
with Francisco and served him out of pure beneficence. Human reason
ISSUE: Does the donation of the house and lot to Cirila fall under the would thus lead to the conclusion that she was Franciscos common-law
prohibition in Article 87 of the family code? spouse.
HELD: Hence, Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without
YES. It falls under the prohibition in Article 87. a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by
Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
In Bitangcor v. Tan, the Supreme Court held that the term cohabitation
or living together as husband and wife means not only residing under one BA FINANCE CORPORATION v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, APPEALS, AUGUSTO YULO, LILY YULO (doing business under the
means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is name and style of A & L INDUSTRIES) G.R. No. L-61464 May 28, 1988
already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least, GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital
relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves Facts:
out to the public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent Augusto Yulo, respondent, obtained a loan from the petitioner, BA Finance
together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; Corp., as evidenced by his signature on a promissory note in his own behalf
they are merely meretricious. In this jurisdiction, this Court has considered as and in behalf of the A & L Industries which was managed and registered
sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations between the under the name of his wife, respondent Lily Yulo. However, two months prior
parties, a conviction of to the loan, Augusto Yulo had already left his wife and their children. He had
concubinage,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/nov2001/146683.htm also abandoned their conjugal home. Augusto Yulo failed to pay the
-‐ _edn31 or the existence of illegitimate children. obligation when it became due and demandable.
Was Cirila Franciscos employee or his common-law wife? Cirila Petitioner filed its amended complaint against the spouses on the basis of
admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long time. It is the promissory note. They also prayed for the issuance of a writ of
very possible that the two consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave attachment that the said spouses were guilty of fraud in contracting the debt.
Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same The trial court issued the writ of attachment thereby enabling the petitioner to
105
attach the properties of A & L Industries. Private respondent Lily Yulo filed As explained in the decision now under review: "It is true that the husband is
her answer with counterclaim, alleging that Augusto had already abandoned the administrator of the conjugal property pursuant to the provisions of Art.
her and their children five months before the filing of the complaint and that 163 of the new Civil Code. However, as such administrator the only
they were already separated when the promissory note was executed. She obligations incurred by the husband that are chargeable against the conjugal
also alleged that her signature was forged in the special power of attorney property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession
procured by Augusto. or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the
family. This is not true in the case at bar for we believe that the husband in
Petitioner contends that even if the signature was forged or even if the acting as guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity agreement as that
attached properties were her exclusive property, the same can be made involved in this case did not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
answerable to the obligation because the said properties form part of the Such inference is more emphatic in this case, when no proof is presented
conjugal partnership of the spouses Yulo. that Vicente Garcia in acting as surety or guarantor received consideration
therefore, which may redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.(Ibid,
However, petitioner contends that even if A & L Industries is a single pp. 46-47).
proprietorship and is registered under private respondent Lily Yulo, the xxx xxx xxx
company was formed and its assets were acquired during the marriage. xxx xxx xxx
Thus, there is a presumption that this property forms part of the conjugal In the most categorical language, a conjugal partnership under that provision
partnership of the spouses Yulo and it can be attached so that it can be is liable only for such "debts and obligations contracted by the husband for
answerable for the obligations contracted by Augusto Yulo, as the the benefit of the conjugal partnership." There must be the requisite showing
administrator of the partnership. then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses.
There is none in this case.
Issue: Can it be presumed that exclusive property of private respondents be
a considered a part of the conjugal partnership and be made answerable to xxx xxx xxx
the obligation? Moreover, it would negate the plain object of the additional requirement in the
present Civil Code that a debt contracted by the husband to bind a conjugal
Ruling: No. The petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by partnership must redound to its benefit. That is still another provision
Augusto Yulo against his conjugal properties with respondent Lily Yulo. Thus, indicative of the solicitude and tender regard that the law manifests for the
it follows that the writ of attachment cannot issue against the said properties. family as a unit. Its interest is paramount; its welfare uppermost in the minds
There is no dispute that A & L Industries was established during the marriage of the codifiers and legislators.
of Augusta and Lily Yulo and therefore the same is presumed conjugal and
the fact that it was registered in the name of only one of the spouses does We, therefore, rule that the petitioner cannot enforce the obligation
not destroy its conjugal nature (See Mendoza v. Reyes, 124 SCRA 161, contracted by Augusto Yulo against his conjugal properties with respondent
165). However, for the said property to be held liable, the obligation Lily Yulo. Thus, it follows that the writ of attachment cannot issue against the
contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the said properties.
conjugal partnership under Article 161 of the Civil Code. In the present case,
the obligation which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal
property managed by the private respondent Lily Yulo was undoubtedly MARMONT RESORT HOTEL ENTERPRISES v FEDERICO GUIANG,
contracted by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because at the time he AURORA GUIANG, and COURT OF APPEALS
incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left their G.R. No. 79734 December 8, 1988
conjugal home. Worse, he made it appear that he was duly authorized by his FELICIANO, J.:
wife in behalf of A & L Industries, to procure such loan from the petitioner.
Clearly, to make A & L Industries liable now for the said loan would be unjust FACTS:
and contrary to the express provision of the Civil Code. As we have ruled in Petitioner Marmont Resort Hotel Enterprises, Inc. ("Marmont") and Maris
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Gracia (30 SCRA 111, 115-117): Trading executed a Memorandum of Agreement for the creation of a water
supply facility. The latter was able to drill a well and install a water pump on a
106

portion of land occupied by respondent spouses Federico and Aurora
Guiang. HELD: Yes. The wife may not validly bind the conjugal partnership without
the consent of the husband, who is legally the administrator of the conjugal
After five months, Maris Trading and Aurora Guiang executed a second partnership.
Memorandum of Agreement stating that the latter is selling, transferring and Article 165 and 172 state the general principle under our civil law, that the
ceding all her possessory rights, interest and claims over the portion where wife may not validly bind the conjugal partnership without the consent of the
the water source was located to the former. The execution was witness by husband, who is legally the administrator of the conjugal partnership. In this
her husband, respondent Federico. particular case, however, as noted earlier, the second Memorandum of
Eventually, Marmont Resort Hotel water supply became insufficient for its Agreement, although ostensibly contracted solely by Aurora Guiang with
hotel guests. Petitioner Marmont asked another contractor to fix this problem Maris Trading, was also signed by her husband Federico, as one of the
and the latter suggested that submersible pump be installed. The hotel witnesses thereto. This circumstance indicates not only that Federico was
manager asked the spouses Guiang if they can check the pump previously present during the execution of the agreement but also that he had, in fact,
installed by Maris Trading but the spouse refused. This prompted petitioner given his consent to the execution thereof by his wife Aurora. Otherwise, he
to file a complaint against spouse Guiang for for damages resulting from their should not have appended his signature to the document as witness.
refusal to allow petitioner and the new contractor to enter the water facility. Respondent spouses cannot now disown the second Memorandum of
However, the Guiang spouses denied the existence of the first Memorandum Agreement as their effective consent thereto is sufficiently manifested in the
of Agreement and contended that the second Memorandum of Agreement document itself.
was invalid for not having complied with the formalities of the law. The
spouses added a counterclaim for damages. That the land in dispute was, at the time of execution of the second
Memorandum of Agreement, public land, is of no consequence here.
After a pre-trail conference between the parties, the Guiang spouses moved Pending approval of Federico's Miscellaneous Sales Application over said
to dismiss the Complaint. The spouses attacked the validity of the second land, respondent spouses enjoyed possessory and other rights over the
Memorandum of Agreement, alleging that the portion of the land where the same which could validly be assigned or transferred in favor of third persons.
water facility was located involved conjugal property alienated by Aurora In this case, respondent spouses chose to transfer such rights (over the
Guiang without the marital consent of her husband, Federico. Moreover, they portion upon which the water pump was installed) to Maris Trading, as
assert that the land in question formed part of the public domain and was evidenced by the fourth paragraph of the second Memorandum of
then still the subject of a Miscellaneous Sales Application submitted by Agreement, quoted earlier. Furthermore, assuming (though only for the sake
Federico Guiang. of argument) that the alienation to Maris Trading was legally objectionable,
respondent spouses are not the proper parties to raise the issue of invalidity,
The trial court found that Aurora Guiang had validly alienated her rights over they and Maris Trading being in pari delicto. Only the government may raise
the disputed portion of land to Maris Trading, but held that the evidence that issue.
failed to show that Maris Trading, in turn, had transferred such rights to
petitioner Marmont. Philippine National Bank, Vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-57757; August 31, 1987
Petitioner Marmont appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Gancayco, J.
decision of the trial court and dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.
FACTS:
ISSUE: Is a memorandum of agreement involving a conjugal property be In 1952, Donata Montemayor, through her son, Salvador M. Vitug,
considered invalid if the wife executed it without the marital consent of mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) several parcels of
husband? land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2289 —
107
Pampanga to guarantee the loan granted by the PNB. On December the rights of innocent third parties are involved. The PNB had a reason
1, 1963, Donata Montemayor also mortgaged in favor of PNB certain to rely on what appears on the certificates of title of the properties
properties covered by TCT Nos. 2887 and 2888-Pampanga to mortgaged. For all legal purposes, the PNB is a mortgagee in good
guarantee the payment of the loan account of her son Salvador Vitug. faith for at the time the mortgages covering said properties were
The above-mentioned Transfer Certificates of Titles covering said constituted the PNB was not aware to any flaw of the title of the
properties were all in the name of Donata Montemayor, of legal age, mortgagor.
Filipino, widow and a resident of Lubao, Pampanga at the time they
were mortgaged to PNB and were free from all liens and Hence, the presumption under Artticle 160 of the Civil Code does not apply
encumbrances. When the loan was not paid, the mortgaged properties to property covered by a Torrens certificate of title in the name of the
were foreclosed by PNB and were sold at public auction. PNB, the highest widow.
bidder, acquired the titles over the properties. Later, PNB sold the properties
to some of the children of Donata. In 1970, two of the children of De La Cruz vs. De La Cruz
Donata filed an action for partition and reconveyance with damages G.R. No. L-19565; January 30, 1968
against the administratrix of Donata‘s estate, their siblings and PNB. Castro, J.
They claimed that the properties were conjugal and they claim the
share of 2/11 of ½ thereof. They assailed the mortgage to the PNB FACTS:
and the public auction of the properties as null and void. They invoked Plaintiff and defendant were married in 1938. Plaintiff alleged that since 1955
the case of Vitug vs. Montemayor decided by the Court in 1953 which the defendant had not slept in the conjugal dwelling, although in the said year
is an action for partition and liquidation of the said 30 parcels of land he paid short visits during which they engaged in brief conversations. After
wherein the properties were found to be conjugal in nature. 1955 up to the time of the trial, the defendant had never visited the conjugal
abode and has abandoned Plaintiff and their children, to live in Manila with
ISSUE: his concubine, Hernandez. The defendant, with vehemence, denied that he
Does the presumption of conjugality of properties acquired by the has abandoned his wife and family, averring that he has never failed, even
spouses during coverture provided for in Article 160 of the Civil Code for a single month, to give them financial support. He avers that he never
apply to property covered by a Torrens certificate of title in the name of failed to visit his family, particularly the children. His wife was always in bad
the widow? need of money because she played mahjong. The defendant denied that he
ever maintained a mistress in Manila. Plaintiff declared that the defendant
RULING: refused and failed to inform her of the progress of their various business
NO, the presumption of conjugality of properties acquired by the concerns. Although she did not allege, much less prove, that her husband
spouses during coverture does not apply to property covered by a had dissipated the conjugal properties, she averred nevertheless that her
Torrens certificate of title in the name of the widow. husband might squander and dispose of the conjugal assets in favor of his
concubine. Hence, the urgency of separation of property.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved ISSUE:
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The (1) Did the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constitute
presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the abandonment in law that would justify a separation of the conjugal
husband and wife. partnership properties?
(2) Was the defendant's failure and/or refusal to inform the plaintiff of the
In this case, it appears on the face of the title that the properties were state of their business enterprises such an abuse of his powers of
acquired by Donata Montemayor when she was already a widow. administration of the conjugal partnership as to warrant a division of the
When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and matrimonial assets?
there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said
spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to RULING:
said spouse. And this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code (1) No. The separation of the defendant from the plaintiff did not constitute
cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and abandonment.
108

granted to the wife by articles 167 and 178 are not to be construed as
The extraordinary remedies afforded to the wife by article 178 when she has condonation of the husband's act but are designed to protect the conjugal
been abandoned by the husband for at least one year are the same as those partnership from waste and shield the wife from want. Therefore, a denial of
granted to her by article 167 in case of abuse of the powers of administration the wife's prayer does not imply a condonation of the husband's act but
by the husband. To entitle her to any of these remedies, under article 178, merely points up the insufficiency or absence of a cause of action.
there must be real abandonment, and notmere separation. The
abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to Hence, failure and/or refusal to inform the wife of the state of their business
financial and moral desertion. To constitute abandonment of the wife by the enterprises does not warrant a division of the matrimonial assets.
husband, there must be absolute cessation of marital relations and duties
and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Tan
G.R. No. 163712; November 30, 2006
The defendant did not intend to leave his wife and children permanently. The CARPIO MORALES, J.
record conclusively shows that he continued to give support to his family
despite his absence from the conjugal home. This fact is admitted by the FACTS:
complainant, although she minimized the amount of support given.There is at A day before the scheduled public auction of four mortgaged parcels of land
all no showing that the plaintiff and the children were living in want. On the registered in the name of respondent Jose B. Tan, legally married to Eliza Go
contrary, the plaintiff admitted, albeit reluctantly, that she frequently played Tan, respondent spouses filed a complaint against petitioners for removal of
mahjong, from which we can infer that she had money; to spare. cloud on the title in question and injunction. Respondents claimed that Eliza
Go Tan never gave her consent or conformity to encumber the title in
Hence, the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff did not constitute question and that the real estate mortgages are null and void because
abandonment in law that would justify a separation of the conjugal respondent Jose B. Tan had already fully paid the obligations secured by the
partnership properties. mortgages. The public auction took place as scheduled following which
petitioner Metrobank was the highest bidder. Petitioners alleged that
(2) No. Mere refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal respondents together with their two sons obtained a credit line from them and
partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the family businesses does that the mortgage constituted on the four lots was for the entire credit line.
not constitute abuse of administration.
ISSUE:
For "abuse" to exist, it is not enough that the husband perform an act or acts Can the properties be foreclosed despite respondent spouses’ claim of a
prejudicial to the wife. Nor is it sufficient that he commits acts injurious to the cloud in title under an absolute community of property regime?
partnership, for these may be the result of mere inefficient or negligent
administration. Abuse connotes willful and utter disregard of the interests of RULING:
the partnership, evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts and/or omissions Yes, the subject properties may be validly foreclosed. All document-exhibits
prejudicial to the latter. of petitioners which are original copies bear the signature of respondent Jose
If there is only physical separation between the spouses (and nothing more), B. Tan, as solidary co-debtor of his sons Rey John Tan and Ariel Tan. And
engendered by the husband's leaving the conjugal abode, but the husband these documents were annotated at the back of the title in question. In
continues to manage the conjugal properties with the same zeal, industry, absence of proof, nay allegation, that the signatures of respondent Jose B.
and efficiency as he did prior to the separation, and religiously gives support Tan on the abovementioned documents were forged, this Court is
to his wife and children, as in the case at bar, we are not disposed to grant constrained to uphold their genuineness. As for the claim that respondent
the wife's petition for separation of property. This decision may appear to Eliza Go Tan did not give her consent to the mortgage of the title in question,
condone the husband's separation from his wife; however, the remedies the same is belied by her signature on Exhibit 18-Real Estate Mortgage
109
which is annotated as Entry No. 174644 at the back of the title. Her bare G.R. No. 141323; June 8, 2005
denial that the signature was forged, without more, does not lie. In any event,
lack of respondent Eliza Go Tan’s consent to the mortgage covering the title FACTS: David Pelayo conveyed to Melki Perez two parcels of agricultural
in question would not render the encumbrance void under the second land. They executed a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on January 11, 1988,
paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code. For proof is wanting that the where Loreza Pelayo, wife of David, and another one whose signature is
property covered by the title is conjugal that it was acquired during illegible witnessed the execution of the deed. Loreza, however, signed only
respondent’s marriage which is what would give rise to the presumption that on the third page in the space provided for witnesses on account of which
it is conjugal property. In fine, the extra-judicial foreclosure and subsequent Perez’ application for registration of the deed with the Office of the Register
sale of the mortgaged property covered by the title in question was valid. of Deeds was denied. Perez thereupon asked Loreza to sign on the first and
second pages of the deed but she refused, thus, he instituted on August 8,
Rodriguez v. De La Cruz 1991 the instant complaint for specific performance against her and her
G.R. No. L-3629; September 28, 1907 husband David.
JOHNSON, J.
ISSUE: Is the signature of the wife, Loreza, as witness on the Deed of
FACTS: Absolute Sale tantamount to and implied consent thereto?
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint to recover from defendant certain
parcels of land alleging that she was the owner of said lands and had HELD: YES. There is implied consent.
acquired said lands during her first marriage from her deceased father. She
alleged that she had been in possession of said lands and enjoyed the fruits Petitioner Lorenza, by affixing her signature to the Deed of Sale on the space
of the same and that Hilarion de la Cruz, her second husband, had no provided for witnesses, is deemed to have given her implied consent to the
interest or right in said property. Defendants, children of Hilarion de la Cruz, contract of sale.
commenced an action against him for the partition of the lands described in Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere consent, which may
the present cause. either be express or implied. A wife’s consent to the husband’s disposition of
conjugal property does not always have to be explicit or set forth in any
ISSUE: particular document, so long as it is shown by acts of the wife that such
Did Hilarion de la Cruz acquire ownership over said properties via his second consent or approval was indeed given. In the present case, although it
marriage insofar as to allow the children of his first marriage to claim an appears on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza signed only as an
interest therein? instrumental witness, circumstances leading to the execution of said
document point to the fact that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their
RULING: conjugal property and consented to the sale.
No. Article 1382 of the Civil Code provides that the wife shall retain the
9
ownership of her property which she brings to the marriage relation. It is true In their Pre-Trial Brief, petitioners admitted that even prior to 1988, they
that Article 1384 prescribes that she shall have the management of the have been having serious problems, including threats to the life of petitioner
property, unless she was delivered the same to her husband by means of a David Pelayo, due to conflicts with the illegal occupants of the property in
public document, providing that he may administer said property; but it can question, so that respondent, whom many feared for being a leftist/activist,
not be claimed, from the mere fact that she has permitted her husband to offered his help in driving out said illegal occupants.
administer her property without having his authority to do so evidenced by a Human experience tells us that a wife would surely be aware of serious
public document, that she has thereby lost her property and that the same problems such as threats to her husband’s life and the reasons for such
has become the property of her husband. The said lands in question were threats. As they themselves stated, petitioners’ problems over the subject
acquired by Matea E. Rodriguez by inheritance during the existence of her property had been going on for quite some time, so it is highly improbable for
first marriage, from her deceased father. Thus, petitioner is the owner and Lorenza not to be aware of what her husband was doing to remedy such
entitled to the possession of the lands described in the amended complaint problems. Petitioners do not deny that Lorenza Pelayo was present during
presented in this cause. the execution of the deed of sale as her signature appears thereon. Neither
do they claim that Lorenza Pelayo had no knowledge whatsoever about the
DAVID V. PELAYO and LORENZA B. PELAYO vs.MELKI E. PEREZ
110

contents of the subject document. Thus, it is quite certain that she knew of
the sale of their conjugal property between her husband and respondent. HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs.MIGUELA C. DAILO
G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005
Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to Article 166, both of the New Civil
Code, which was still in effect on January 11, 1988 when the deed in FACTS:
question was executed, the lack of marital consent to the disposition of Spouses Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August
conjugal property does not make the contract void ab initio but merely 8, 1967. They purchased a house and lot during their marriage. Marcelino
voidable. Said provisions of law provide: executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Lilibeth Gesmundo,
authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings
“Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailo’s house and lot in San
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount
husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal of P300,000.00 from petitioner and executed a Real Estate Mortgage
property without the wife’s consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The
consent, the court may compel her to grant the same. abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of
... Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the The loan remained outstanding upon maturity. As a result, petitioner
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property.
the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of
required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the
impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to property being redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof by
exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute
demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.” Sale.
Hence, it has been held that the contract is valid until the court annuls the Marcelino died on December 20, 1995. Respondent, Miguela visited the said
same and only upon an action brought by the wife whose consent was not properties and came to learn that petitioner had already employed a certain
11
obtained. In the present case, despite respondent’s repeated demands for Roldan Brion to clean its premises. Thus, she instituted with the RTC a civil
Lorenza to affix her signature on all the pages of the deed of sale, showing case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of
respondent’s insistence on enforcing said contract, Lorenza still did not file a Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for
case for annulment of the deed of sale. It was only when respondent filed a Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. The trial ruled in favor
complaint for specific performance on August 8, 1991 when petitioners of respondent and so as the Court of Appeals.
brought up Lorenza’s alleged lack of consent as an affirmative defense.
Thus, if the transaction was indeed entered into without Lorenza’s consent, Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of the Family Code requires the
we find it quite puzzling why for more than three and a half years, Lorenza consent of the other spouse to the mortgage of conjugal properties, the
did absolutely nothing to seek the nullification of the assailed contract. framers of the law could not have intended to curtail the right of a spouse
The foregoing circumstances lead the Court to believe that Lorenza knew of from exercising full ownership over the portion of the conjugal property
the full import of the transaction between respondent and her husband; and, pertaining to him under the concept of co-ownership. Furthermore, petitioner
by affixing her signature on the deed of sale, she, in effect, signified her imposes the liability for the payment of the principal obligation obtained by
consent to the disposition of their conjugal property. the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the conjugal partnership to the extent that it
redounded to the benefit of the family.
Therefore, there is implied consent given by the wife.
111
ISSUES: determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the
1. Does each spouse has the right to exercise full ownership over the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of
portion of the conjugal property pertaining to him under the concept respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4
of co-ownership? on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by
2. Is the mortgage constituted by Marcelino Dailo (husband) valid even the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former
without the consent of his wife? prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when
the Family Code is silent on the matter.
3. Is the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan
obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. for having redounded to the
benefit of the family? 2. No. The mortgage constituted by the husband without the consent of
his wife is void.
RULING:
1. No. The spouse does not have the right to exercise full ownership In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the sale of a conjugal property
under the concept of co-ownership. requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of
the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one
renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal
“ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. The same
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
principle in Guiang squarely applies to the instant case.
or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the
ownership.
absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part: The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. . . . the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the
law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, both the trial
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to court and the appellate court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondent’s consent.
may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the
powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the 3. No. The petitioner has not adduced adequate proof to prove that the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such debt redounded to the benefit of the family.
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .”
There is no legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code as an
exception to Article 124 of the Family Code: Under Article 121 of the Family Code, "[T]he conjugal partnership shall be
liable for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without
the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of benefited; . . . ." For the subject property to be held liable, the obligation
respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a suppletory manner. contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the
The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the requisite showing then
where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses.
fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should
or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed
community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity
suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules and well-being of the family as a unit.
on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly
112

another person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the
conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as benefit of the conjugal partnership. To hold the conjugal partnership liable for
such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he an obligation pertaining to the husband alone defeats the objective of the
who denies, must prove). Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the loan Civil Code to protect the solidarity and wellbeing of the family as a unit.
obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of
housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without In this case, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between
adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioner and respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter.
petitioner’s bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual
compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent
Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal corporation was similarly for the latter’s benefit. Petitioner had the burden of
partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation. proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from
the transaction. It failed to discharge that burden.
Security Bank and Trust Company vs. Mar Tierra Corporation
G.R. No. 143382. November 29, 2006 Therefore, the petition was denied.
CORONA, J.: Villanueva vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 143286. April 14, 2004
Facts: Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, Carpio, J
applied for a P12,000,000 (later increased to P14,000,000)credit
accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company secured by Facts:
an indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C.
Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves Eusebia Napisa Retuya . herein plaintiff, and Nicolas Retuya were married
jointly and severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan. on October 7, 1926. During their marriage they acquired real properties and
As respondent corporation failed to pay the balance of the loan, a complaint all improvements situated in Mandaue City, and Cebu City. In 1945, Nicolas
for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment was filed against Retuya left his family and cohabited with Pacita Villanueva, herein defendant.
respondent corporation and individual respondents. Consequently, the Pacita had no means of livelihood at the time of said cohabitation. When
conjugal house and lot of the spouses Wilfrido and Josefina Martinez was Nicolas suffered a stroke, one of his legitimate children Natividad went to
levied on. Finding for the Martinez, the trial court held that the loan Procopio, Nicolas illegitimate son, to negotiate about the income from said
agreement did not redound to the benefit of the family and so the attachment properties which were received by the latter but to no avail. This compelled
was lifted. The appellate curt affirmed said decision; hence this petition. Eusebia to file an action for Reconveyance of the subject properties. Both the
trial and appellate courts favored Eusebia. Hence, this petition. Petitioner
maintained that the trial court erred in applying the presumption under Article
Issue: May the conjugal partnership be held liable for an indemnity 116 instead of Article 148 as regards the subject properties. Particularly,
agreement entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party? petitioner claims ownership of Lot No. 152 which was purchased on 4
October 1957 as her exclusive property. Petitioner also alleged that the
Held: Yes. subject properties were not conjugal but rather exclusive properties of
Nicolas as evidenced by the tax declarations.
Where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family
business, there is a legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the Issue(s):
benefit of the conjugal partnership, but if the money or services are given to
113
(1) Were the subject properties including lot no. 152 conjugal properties of the presumption remains even if the property is “registered in the name of
Nicolas and Eusebia? one or both of the spouses.” Whether a property is conjugal or not is
(2) Are tax declarations sufficient to overcome the presumption under Article determined by law and not by the will of one of the spouses. No unilateral
116 of the Family Code? declaration by one spouse can change the character of conjugal property.
(3) Even assuming that Pacita had the financial capacity, should Article 148
automatically apply in this case? In this case, the clear intent of Nicolas in placing his status as single
is to exclude Eusebia from her lawful share in the conjugal property, an act
Held: which the law does not allow.
(1) Yes. (3) No.
Under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the Even assuming that Pacita had the financial capacity to buy the lot in
marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is question, a reading of Article 148 readily shows that there must be proof of
on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counterbalanced by “actual joint contribution” by both the livein partners before the property
the requirement that the properties must first be proven to have been becomes coowned by them in proportion to their contribution. The
acquired during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal. The presumption of equality of contribution arises only in the absence of proof of
presumption in Article 116, which subsists “unless the contrary is proved,” their proportionate contributions, subject to the condition that actual joint
stands as an obstacle to any claim the petitioners may have. The burden of contribution is proven first. Simply put, proof of actual contribution by both
proving that a property is exclusive property of a spouse rests on the party parties is required, otherwise there is no coownership and no presumption of
asserting it and the evidence required must be clear and convincing. equal sharing.
In the case at bar, both the trial and appellate courts agreed that the Here, petitioners failed to show proof of actual contribution by Pacita
subject properties were in fact acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and in the acquisition of Lot No. 152.
Eusebia. Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and
Pacita started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Therefore, the petition was denied.
Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16 December 1996. Petitioners
themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October 1957. The Consolacion Villanueva v. Intermediate Appellate Court
date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas G.R. No. 74577 December 4, 1990
and Eusebia. Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were NARVASA, J.
acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. The fact that Lot no. Facts: The spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa owned a parcel of
152 was acquired during the cohabitation of Nicolas and Pacita was of no land. After their death, the said land was adjudicated between their two
moment. The cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even for a long children Modesto Aranas (who got the southern portion of the land) and
period, does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Even if Frederico Aranas (who got the northern portion of the land) under a deed of
Pacita had the financial capacity, this does not prove that Pacita bought Lot extrajudicial partition. Modesto Aranas registered his portion (Lot 13-C) and
No. 152 with her own money. To rebut the presumption that Lot No. 152 is obtained a Torrens title in his name. His wife, Victoria Comorro predeceased
conjugal, petitioners must prove that Pacita used her own money to pay for him while Modesto Aranas died on 1973. Modesto did not have children with
Lot No. 152. Petitioners failed to prove this. Victoria but it appeared that he was survived by two illegitimate children,
Dorothea Aranas Ado and Teodoro Aranas. The children of Modesto Aranas
(2) No. obtained a loan from respondent Jesus Bernas and mortgaged their father’s
property as security for their loan claiming that they were absolute co-owners
All property acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless of the said property. Raymundo Aranas served as a witness to the
in whose name the property is registered, is presumed conjugal unless agreement. Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan, Thus, Jesus
proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the Bernas caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage over the land.
certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one He consolidated his ownership over the land after the mortgagors failed to
of the spouses only. Article 116 of the Family Code expressly provides that redeem the property within the reglementary period.
114

Modesto's acquisition by succession of Lot 13-C took place during his
Later on, Petitioner Consolacion Villanueva and the relative/witness marriage to Victoria Comorro, the lot would nonetheless be his "exclusive
Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against Jesus Bernas and his spouses property" because acquired by him, "during the marriage, by lucrative title."
Remedios Bernas claiming that the latter’s title should be cancelled and that
they should be declared co-owners of the land in question. Allegedly, the will 2) No. The improvements are not conjugal property.
of Victoria Comorro bequeathed to Consolocaion Villanueva, Raymundo Proof is needful of the time of the making or construction of the
Aranas, and to Dorothea and Teodoro Aranas in equal shares pro indiviso, improvements and the source of the funds used therefor, in order to
all her interests, rights and properties as her net share from the conjugal determine the character of the improvements as belonging to the conjugal
partnership property with her husband Modesto Aranas. Meanwhile, Modesto partnership or to one spouse separately. No such proof was presented or
Aranas' will bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro Aranas all his interests in proferred by Consolacion Villanueva or any one else. What is certain is that
his conjugal partnership with Victoria "as well as his own capital property the land on which the improvements stand was the exclusive property of
brought by him to (his) marriage with his said wife. Modesto Aranas and that where, as here, property is registered in the name
of one spouse only and there is no showing of when precisely the property
The trial court ruled in favour of the respondents. Thus, Consolacion was acquired, the presumption is that it belongs exclusively to said spouse. It
Villanueve appealed the judgment. is not therefore possible to declare the improvements to be conjugal in
character.
Issues
1) What right was acquired by Consolacion Villanueva over Lot 13-C by Hence, Consolacion Villanueva has no right whatsoever over both Lot 13-C
virtue of Victoria Camorro's last will and testament giving to her all of said or the improvements thereon.
Victoria's "interests, rights and properties, real and personal . . . as her net
share from (the) conjugal partnership property with her husband, Modesto Alfonso Tan and Eteria Teves Tan v. Court of Appeals
Aranas? G.R. No. 120594 June 10, 1997
2) Are the improvements on Lot 13-C conjugal property over which KAPUNAN, J.
Consolacion Villanueva may make a claim?
Facts: Alfonso Tan (married to Eteria Tan), Celestino Tan (married to
Ruling: Rosario Dy Kushin) and Maximo Tan (married to Teresita Tan) were co-
1) Consolacion Villanueva acquired no right whatsoever over Lot 13-C and owners of a 906 square meter parcel of land. The brothers likewise put up an
the improvements thereon. Lot 13-C was not conjugal partnership property of autosupply business. As co-owners, petitioners sought the partition of the lot
Modesto Aranas and Victoria Comorro. in question. They also filed an action for accounting claiming they are entitled
Article 148 of the Civil Code clearly decrees: that to be considered as "the to the fruits, proceeds and profits of the said family business, thus an
exclusive property of each spouse" is inter alia, "that which is brought to the accounting is proper.
marriage as his or her own," or "that which each acquires, during the
marriage, by lucrative title." The private respondents claimed that an accounting is not feasible
Lot 13-C was the Modesto Aranas’ exclusive, private property, which he had because the company had long en dissolved by the partners due to financial
inherited from his parents — Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa, the losses and that whatever was due to each partner was already given him;
original owners of the property — registered solely in his name. Whether that Alfonso’s one-third (1/3) share of the subject property was mortgaged by
Modesto succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to his marriage to him to his sister, Lolita Tan-Go, in order to secure a loan he obtained from
Victoria Comorro — the record being unfortunately none too clear on the her. Alfonso Tan later sought the dismissal of the case stating that it was filed
point — is inconsequential. The property should be regarded as his own only at the instance of his enstranged wife Eteria. Meanwhile Eteria Teves
exclusively, as a matter of law. Likewse, even if it be assumed that Tan testified that she is married to Alfonso Tan but they were already legally
115
separated. She said that during their marriage, they bought a residential lot house was constructed with the loan she and her husband obtained duly
consisting of 906 square meters and that the funds used in the construction substantiated.
of the house standing thereon were drawn from a loan she and her husband
secured, although it was her husband and mother-in-law who drew the loan. Thus, it cannot be said that the 1/3 portion of the lot was conjugal
property over which she has a share.
The trial court rendered a decision stating that the 906-square meter lot
with improvements was acquired by the three (3) brothers by sale through Florentino Genato, Francisco Genato and Genato Commercial
installments and hence must be partitioned equally among them and their Corporation vs. Felisa Genato De Lorenzo
respective wives. Since the lot was acquired during the marriage of Eteria G.R. No. L-24983; May 20, 1968
and Alfonso, the former could not be deprived of her share of the one-third REYES, J.B.L., J.
portion which is the conjugal property of the spouses. However, with respect
to the business dealing in auto spare parts, the same had been dissolved FACTS:
due to losses. Aggrieved, the respondent spouses appealed raising that Genato Commercial Corporation is a family corporation founded by the
although the subject property was acquired during the marriage of the spouses Vicente Genato and Simona B. de Genato. The spouses had six
spouses Eteria and Alfonso, it was established by the Tan brothers that the children named Francisco, Florentino, Manuel, Carmen, Felisa and Juan all
same was inherited from their mother, hence, their exclusive property. surnamed Genato. Majority of the members of the Board of Directors held a
Issue: Is Eteria Tan entitled to her share in 1/3 portion of the subject lot, meeting where Florentino Genato was elected and designated Assistant
which allegedly is her and Alfonso’s conjugal property? Secretary-Treasurer of the Corporation. Thereafter, Florentino Genato
cancelled share certificates Nos. 7 and 18 and in lieu thereof issued share
Ruling: No, Eteria Tan is not entitled to any share in the 1/3 portion of the certificate No. 118 for 265 shares in favor of Florentino Genato and share
subject 906 sqm lot. certificate No. 119 for 265 shares in favor of Francisco Genato. Upon the
death of Simona B. Vda. de Genato, an intestate proceeding of her estate
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the was filed. The Philippine Trust Company, judicial administrator of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be intestate estate, and the legal heirs Manuel Genato, Felisa Genato de
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Lorenzo and Juan Genato filed a complaint to recover from Florentino and
Francisco the 530 shares of stock in order that they may be included in the
This presumption is, however, rebuttable with strong clear, categorical, inventory of the intestate estate of their deceased mother. Florentino and
and convincing evidence that the property belongs exclusively to one of the Francisco alleged that they had acquired the ownership of the 530 shares by
spouses and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it. In the case simple donation from their mother.
at bar, conclusive evidence points to the fact that the undivided one-third
(1/3) of the parcel of land in question is not the conjugal partnership property ISSUE:
of the spouses Alfonso Tan and Eteria Teves Tan. It is the former's exclusive Is the simple donation of the 530 shares to Florentino and Francisco Genato
property which he had inherited from his mother, Trinidad Uy, the original valid?
owner of the property as appearing in the Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs
and Adjudication of Properties. RULING:
No, there was no valid donation.
There can be no doubt then, that although acquired during Alfonso's
marriage to Eteria, the one-third portion of the property should be regarded The delivery by the donor and the acceptance by the donee must be
as Alfonso's own exclusively, as a matter of law pursuant to Article 148 of the simultaneous and the acceptance by a person other than the true donee
Civil Code which provides that a property acquired, during the marriage, by must be authorized by a proper power of attorney set forth in a public
lucrative title is the exlusive property of each spouse. document.
Eteria Tan did not adduce any evidence at all that the lot was acquired In this case, the late Simona Vda. de Genato gave the Certificates of Stock
by her and her husband with their funds. Neither was her allegation that the Nos. 7 and 18 to Florentino with instructions to transfer the same to him and
his brother. This act did not constitute a valid manual donation in law for lack
116

of proper acceptance (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 630). Incontestably, one of the RULING:
two donees was not present at the delivery, and there is no showing that Yes, the proceeds are part of the community property.
Francisco had authorized Florentino to accept for both of them. The donation
intended was a joint one to both donees, one could not accept independently The estate of a deceased person cannot be placed on the same footing as
of his co-donee, for there is no accretion among donees unless expressly so an individual heir. The proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the
provided or unless they be husband and wife. estate of the insured passed to the executor or administrator of such estate,
and forms part of its assets; whereas the proceeds of a life-insurance policy
Since there was no valid donation, the shares in question are deemed never payable to an heir of the insured as beneficiary belongs exclusively to said
to have ceased to be property of Simona. Hence, they form part of the assets heir and does not form part of the deceased's estate subject to administrator.
of her estate.
As all the premiums on the life-insurance policy taken out by the late Adolphe
BPI vs. Posadas Oscar Schuetze, were paid out of the conjugal funds, with the exceptions of
G.R. No. L-34583; October 22, 1931 the first, the proceeds of the policy, excluding the proportional part
Villa-Real, J. corresponding to the first premium, constitute community property,
notwithstanding the fact that the policy was made payable to the deceased's
FACTS: estate, so that one-half of said proceeds belongs to the estate, and the other
The Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the estate of the half to the deceased's widow, Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze.
deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, sought to recover from Juan Posadas,
Jr., Collector of Internal Revenue the amount of P1,209 paid as inheritance Hence, BPI may recover the amount that it paid to Poasadas.
tax upon the sum of P20,150, which is the amount of an insurance policy on
the deceased's life, wherein his own estate was named the beneficiary. The Moises Jocson vs. Hon. Court Of Appeals, Agustina Jocson-Vasquez,
records show that deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze married Rosario Ernesto Vasquez
Gelano. All the money used for paying the premiums is conjugal property G.R. No. L-55322; February 16, 1989
inasmuch as it does not appear to have exclusively belonged to him or to his MEDIALDEA, J.
wife. BPI claimed that since the sum of P20,150 is a product of such
premium it must also be deemed community property because it was FACTS:
acquired for a valuable consideration during said Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's Petitioner Moises and respondent Agustina are the only surviving offsprings
marriage with Rosario Gelano at the expense of the common fund except for of the Sps. Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. Alejandra Poblete
the small part corresponding to the first premium paid with the deceased's predeceased her husband without her intestate estate being settled.
own money. On the other hand, Posadas alleged that it is a fundamental Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died intestate. The case stemmed from the
principle that a life-insurance policy belongs exclusively to the beneficiary validity of 3 documents executed by Emilio Jocson during their lifetime. In
upon the death of the person insured. Since the late Adolphe Oscar these documents, Emilio sold to Agustina 6 parcels of land for the sum of
Schuetze named his own estate as the sole beneficiary of the insurance on 10,000 and 2 rice mills for the sum of 5,000. These documents were
his life, upon his death the latter became the sole owner of the proceeds, registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds and the TCTs covering the
which therefore became subject to the inheritance tax. properties therein in the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete," were cancelled and new certificates of title were issued in the name
ISSUE: of Agustina.
Are the proceeds of the life insurance policy part of the community property
of Adolphe and Rosario? Petitioner claimed, among others, that the properties mentioned in the
documents are the unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and
117
Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore, cannot validly sell. He further Thus, there being no showing also that the lots and the 2 ricemills were
argues that the certificates of title he presented as evidence showing that the conjugal properties of the Sps. Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, they
properties were registered in the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to should be considered, likewise, as the exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson.
Alejandra Pblete” were enough proof to show that the properties covered
therein were acquired during the marriage of their parents, and, therefore, Hermogenes Maramba vs. Nieves De Lozano, et al.
under Article 160 of the Civil Code, presumed to be conjugal properties. G.R. No. L-21533; June 29, 1967
Makalintal, J.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. CA reversed the CFI decision.
Thus, this case. FACTS:
Plaintiff Maramba, in an action for collection of sum of money, was able to
ISSUE: secure a judgment ordering Sps. Nieves de Lozano and Pascual Lozano to
Are the properties registered in the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to pay him the amount of P3,500.07. A corresponding writ of execution was
Alejandra Poblete" included in the conjugal properties? rendered and a levy was made on a lot covered by a TCT in the name of
Nieves de Lozano. On the scheduled date of public auction, Nieves made a
RULING: partial payment and filed a motion requesting for an adjournment of the sale
No, the subject properties do not form part of the spouses’ conjugal but to no avail. Later, she filed an amended motion praying that her liability
properties. Art. 160 of the Civil Code provides that: “All property of the be fixed at ½ of the amount awarded on account of the death of Pascual
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be Lozano during the pendency of the case. She further alleged that the lot
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” Further, it is levied and sold is her paraphernal property. The trial court ruled in favor of
well-settled that the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that Nieves. Thus this case.
the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. In other words,
proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the Plaintiff argues that the entire judgment debt can be satisfied from the
operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. proceeds the property sold at public auction in view of the presumption that it
is conjugal in character although in the name of only one of the spouses. She
In this case, before petitioner may validly invoke the presumption under further contends that if the land levied upon were originally paraphernal, it
Article 160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties were became conjugal property by virtue of the construction of a house thereon at
acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The the expense of the common fund, pursuant to Article 158 paragraph 2 of the
certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is Civil Code.
insufficient. The fact that the properties were registered in the name of
"Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties ISSUE:
were acquired during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and Does the subject lot form part of the conjugal partnership which would allow
registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration the satisfaction of the entire judgment debt from the proceeds of its sale?
does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. It may be that
the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was RULING:
still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra No, the subject lot does not form part of the conjugal partnership thus the
Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as entire judgment debt cannot be enforced upon it. First, Art. 160 of the Civil
married to the latter. Code provides that: “All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
Also, the words "married to' preceding "Alejandra Poblete” are merely husband or to the wife.” This presumption applies only to property acquired
descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson. In other words, the import from during the marriage. But in the instant case there is no showing as to when
the certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the the property in question was acquired and hence the fact that the title is in
same having been registered in his name alone, and that he is married to the wife's name alone is determinative. Furthermore, appellant himself
Alejandra Poblete. admits in his brief that the property in question is paraphernal.
118

Second, it has been repeatedly held by the Court that the construction of a any claim to the land other than by virtue of her supposed marriage to
house at conjugal expense on the exclusive property of one of the spouses Lacerna. As a mere mistress, she cannot pretend to any right thereto.
does not automatically make it conjugal. It is true that meantime the conjugal
partnership may use both in the land and the building, but it does so not as But whether the petitioner is a lawful wife or a mere "live-in" partner, the
owner but in the exercise of the right of usufruct. The ownership of the land Court simply cannot believe that she never became aware of the litigation
remains the same until the value thereof is paid, and this payment can only concerning the land until presented with the writ of execution. What is far
be demanded in the liquidation of the partnership. In this case, records do more probable and credible is that she has known of the lawsuit since 1956
not show that there has already been a liquidation of the conjugal partnership when Martin Lacerna "married" her. Her silence and inaction since then and
between the late Pascual Lozano and Nieves de Lozano. Consequently, the until barely a year ago bespeak more than anything else, a confession that
property levied upon, being the separate property of defendant Nieves de she had and has no right to the land and no defense to offer to the action,
Lozano, cannot be made to answer for the liability of the other defendant. either on her part or on the part of Martin Lacerna. Had she even the
semblance of a right, there is no doubt she would have lost no time asserting
Magalon vs. Montejo it.
G.R. No. 73733; December 16, 1986
Narvasa, J. Therefore, the decision is binding against the conjugal property.
Facts: A writ of execution was issued against Martin Lacerna, the spouse of In Re: Estate of Narcisco Padilla
the petitioner in this case, to compel the partition of a parcel of land located G.R. No. L-48137; October 4, 1943
in Barrio Kasuga Municipality of Magsaysay, Davao del Sur. Petitioner Bocobo, J.
opposed the said writ on the ground that she was not impleaded in the said
suit and the property in question is conjugal in character. Facts: Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla, commenced this case by filing a
petition wherein she prayed, inter alia, that her paraphernal property be
Issue: Can a decision be enforced against the conjugal partnership even if segregated from the inventoried estate and delivered to her together with the
the wife was not impleaded in the said case? corresponding reimbursements and indemnities.
Held: Yes. It has been held that a judgment against the husband in an action Petitioner posed this question: whether the value of the paraphernal land to
involving community property, is conclusive on the wife even if she is not a be reimbursed to the wife is that obtaining at the time of the liquidation of the
party, but it has also been held that a judgment against either husband or conjugal partnership. With conjugal funds the husband constructed buildings
wife with respect to community property in an action to which the other on the wife's lots on Arquiza, Juan Luna, Camba and Martin Ocampo streets.
spouse is not a party does not prevent the other spouse from subsequently The court a quo ordered that the value of the lots occupied by these
having his or her day in court, although, of course, a judgment against both constructions, to be paid to the widow, should be that prevailing at the time of
husband and wife is binding on both. In the particular circumstances the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
obtaining here, the Court can as it does in good conscience and without Appellant claims such pronouncement of the trial court to be erroneous
doing violence to doctrine, adopt the affirmative view and hold the petitioner because from the time of the construction of the buildings, the conjugal
bound by the judgment against Martin Lacerna, despite her not having in fact partnership became the owner of the whole property (lot and building) in
been impleaded in the action against the latter. This ruling presumes that each instance, and therefore the subsequent increase in value should accrue
petitioner is, as she claims, the legal wife of Lacerna though, as observed by to the conjugal partnership, and any depreciation should be suffered by the
the Intermediate Appellate Court, no marriage contract was presented by partnership.
Lacerna to prove his marriage to the petitioner either before or after the
death of Eustaquia Pichan. Indeed, it is clear that the petitioner cannot assert Issue: Are the lots in question conjugal in nature?
119
Held: Yes. The ownership of the land is retained by the wife until she is paid ISSUE: 1. Does the parcel of land bought by private respondent is
the value of the lot, as a result of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. consider as an exclusive property?
The mere construction of a building from common funds does not 2. Does the execution of a decision in an action for collection of
automatically convey the ownership of the wife's land to the conjugal a sum of money may be nullified on the ground that the real properties
partnership. Such a mode of using the land, namely, by erecting a building levied upon and sold at public auction are the alleged exclusive
thereon, is simply an exercise of the right of usufruct pertaining to the properties of a husband who did not participate in his wife's business
conjugal partnership over the wife's land. transaction from which said action stemmed.
SPOUSES RICKY WONG and ANITA CHAN, LEONARDO JOSON, RULING: 1. NO. On the matter of ownership of the properties involved,
JUANITO SANTOS, EMERITO SICAT and CONRADO LAGMAN vs. HON. however, the Court disagrees with the appellate court that the said properties
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ROMARICO HENSON are exclusively owned by Romarico. Having been acquired during the
26
G.R. No. 70082 August 19, 1991 marriage, they are still presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership
FERNAN, C.J.: even though Romarico and Katrina had been living separately.
FACTS:Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda on The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the
January 6, 1964. They have three children but even during the early years of absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said
their marriage, Romarico and Katrina had been most of the time living presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively owned by
separately. The former stayed in Angeles City while the latter lived in Manila. Romarico. While there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties with
money he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear where he obtained
During the marriage private respondent bought parcel of land in Angeles City the money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then the money
for P11,492 from his fathe with money borrowed from an officemate. is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on this matter is
of paramount importance considering that in the determination of the nature
Meanwhile, in Hongkong, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan of a property acquired by a person during covertrue, the controlling factor is
whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale valued at the source of the money utilized in the purchase.
199,895 Hongkong dollars or P321,830.95.
2. Yes. The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's
When Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day period indebtedness may not be paid for with them her obligation not having been
agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value. shown by the petitioners to be one of the charges against the conjugal
partnership.
Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a check for P55,000 which, however,
was dishonored for lack of funds. Hence, Katrina was charged with estafa In addition to the fact that her rights over the properties are merely inchoate
before the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga and Angeles City, prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the consent of her
Branch IV. husband and her authority to incur such indebtedness had not been alleged
in the complaint and proven at the trial.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case on the
ground that Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in nature as no estafa Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of the Family Code
was committed by the issuance of the check in payment of a pre-existing on August 3, 1988), a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she
obligation. purchases things necessary for the support of the family or when she
borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary for the
32
In view of said decision, Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed support of the family if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum; when
against Katrina and her husband Romarico Henson, an action for collection the administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the
33 34
of a sum of money also in the same branch of the aforesaid court. The court courts or by the husband and when the wife gives moderate donations
then issued a writ of execution and levied the parcel of land belonging to for charity. Having failed to establish that any of these circumstances
Romarico.
120

occurred, the Wongs may not bind the conjugal assets to answer for Spouses Carandang contend that the RTC should have dismissed the case
Katrina's personal obligation to them. for failure to state a cause of action, considering that Milagros de Guzman,
allegedly an indispensable party, was not included as a party-plaintiff
ARCADIO and MARIA LUISA CARANDANG vs. HEIRS OF QUIRINO A.
DE GUZMAN, namely: MILAGROS DE GUZMAN, VICTOR DE GUZMAN, The spouses Carandang claim that, since three of the four checks used to
REYNALDO DE GUZMAN, CYNTHIA G. RAGASA and QUIRINO DE pay their stock subscriptions were issued in the name of Milagros de
GUZMAN, JR., Guzman, the latter should be considered an indispensable party. Being such,
G.R. No. 160347 November 29, 2006 the spouses Carandang claim, the failure to join Mrs. de Guzman as a party-
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: plaintiff should cause the dismissal of the action because "(i)f a suit is not
brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to
FACTS: [Quirino de Guzman] and [the Spouses Carandang] are dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of
stockholders as well as corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System action.”
(MBS for brevity), with equities at fifty four percent (54%) and forty six
percent (46%) respectively. ISSUE: Does the both spouse should institute an action for the
recovery of the conjugal properties?
The capital stock of MBS was increased, from P500,000 to P1.5 million and
P345,000 of this increase was subscribed by [the spouses Carandang]. RULING: NO. The joint account of spouses Quirino A de Guzman and
Thereafter, MBS again increased its capital stock, from P1.5 million to P3 Milagros de Guzman from which the four (4) checks were drawn is part of
million, [the spouses Carandang] yet again subscribed to the increase. They their conjugal property and under both the Civil Code and the Family Code
subscribed to P93,750 worth of newly issued capital stock. the husband alone may institute an action for the recovery or protection of
the spouses’ conjugal property.
[De Guzman] claims that, part of the payment for these subscriptions were
paid by him, P293,250 and P43,125 or a total of P336,375. Thus, [de Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal
Guzman] sent a demand letter to [the spouses Carandang] for the payment partnership. In fact, he is the sole administrator, and the wife is not entitled
of said total amount. as a matter of right to join him in this endeavor. The husband may defend the
conjugal partnership in a suit or action without being joined by the wife. x x x
[The spouses Carandang] refused to pay the amount.
Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs
Consequently, [de Guzman] filed his complaint, seeking to recover the to the husband and the wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or
P336,375 together with damages. The trial court ruled in favor of de encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is required, joint
Guzman. management or administration does not require that the husband and wife
always act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power of
The spouses Carandang appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases
Appeals, which affirmed the previous decision. as provided under Article 124 of the Family Code. x x x."
The spouses Carandang then filed an instant Petition for Review on Quirino and Milagros de Guzman were married before the effectivity of the
Certiorari. Family Code on 3 August 1988. As they did not execute any marriage
settlement, the regime of conjugal partnership of gains govern their property
relations.
121
All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to Art. 147. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the
have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly
spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. Credits determined in this Chapter.
are personal properties, acquired during the time the loan or other credit
transaction was executed. Therefore, credits loaned during the time of the In this connection, Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides that "[a] partner is
marriage are presumed to be conjugal property. a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership property." Taken
with the presumption of the conjugal nature of the funds used to finance the
Consequently, assuming that the four checks created a debt for which the four checks used to pay for petitioners’ stock subscriptions, and with the
spouses Carandang are liable, such credits are presumed to be conjugal presumption that the credits themselves are part of conjugal funds, Article
property. There being no evidence to the contrary, such presumption 1811 makes Quirino and Milagros de Guzman co-owners of the alleged
subsists. As such, Quirino de Guzman, being a co-owner of specific credit.
partnership property, is certainly a real party in interest. Dismissal on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action, by reason that the suit was Being co-owners of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de Guzman may
allegedly not brought by a real party in interest, is therefore unwarranted. separately bring an action for the recovery thereof.
Under Rule 3 Sec. 4. Spouses as parties. – Husband and wife shall sue or In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in
be sued jointly, except as provided by law. Pro-forma parties can either be interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant
indispensable, necessary or neither indispensable nor necessary. The third jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for
case occurs if, for example, a husband files an action to recover a property the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners,
which he claims to be part of his exclusive property. The wife may have no namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned
legal interest in such property, but the rules nevertheless require that she be property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not
joined as a party. indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete
relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the
In cases of pro-forma parties who are neither indispensable nor necessary, suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
the general rule under Section 11, Rule 3 must be followed: such non-joinder
is not a ground for dismissal. Hence, in a case concerning an action to Therefore, Milagros de Guzman is not an indispensable party in the action for
recover a sum of money, we held that the failure to join the spouse in that the recovery of the allegedly loaned money to the spouses Carandang. As
case was not a jurisdictional defect. The non-joinder of a spouse does not such, she need not have been impleaded in said suit, and dismissal of the
warrant dismissal as it is merely a formal requirement which may be cured by suit is not warranted by her not being a party thereto.
amendment.
Aleko Lilius, et. al., v. The Manila Railroad Company
Milagros de Guzman, being presumed to be a co-owner of the credits G.R. No. 42551; September 4, 1935
allegedly extended to the spouses Carandang, seems to be either an GODDARD, J.:
indispensable or a necessary party. If she is an indispensable party,
dismissal would be proper. If she is merely a necessary party, dismissal is Facts:
not warranted, whether or not there was an order for her inclusion in the
complaint pursuant to Section 9, Rule 3. The case arose from an earlier decision granting the spouses Lilius damages
for the liability of MRR. Due to the husband’s insolvency, several parties such
Article 108 of the Family Code provides: as creditors, doctors, nurses and the hospital placed their claim for the
Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the judgment secured against MRR. The creditors allege that the award given by
contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly the court to the wife partake conjugal property which should be answerable
determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. to the husband’s debt. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the
damages award are personal in nature which shows its paraphernal
This provision is practically the same as the Civil Code provision it character.
superceded:
122

Issue:
Can the damages rewarded for the personal injury of the wife be considered Issue:
as a conjugal property? Is the registration in the name of only one spouse an indication of its
paraphernal character?
Held:
No, it is paraphernal. Held:
Article 1401 of the same Code, in enumerating the property belonging to the No. The property retains its nature as Conjugal property in absence of a clear
conjugal partnership, does not mention damages for personal injury. and convincing evidence to the contrary.
It was promulgated in an earlier decision that the damages awarded to the Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage
wife are "patrimonial and moral." Furthermore the claim of the husband for is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
the sum of money as damages on account of the loss of the services of pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
Sonja Maria Lilius as secretary and translator, her particular work as a
member of the conjugal partnership was disallowed. The mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not
destroy its conjugal nature. Hence, it cannot be contended in the present
Hence, the sum of damages with interest thereon awarded to the case that, simply because the title and the Deed of Sale covering the parcel
wifeparaphe rnal property. of land were in the name of Muriel alone, it was therefore her personal and
exclusive property. The record would lead us to conclude that the contested
Spouses Josephine Mendoza & Henry Go v. Leonardo Yamane property was indeed acquired during the marriage of herein [respondent] and
G.R. No. 160762; May 3, 2006 Muriel. To prove that it is nonetheless paraphernal property, it is incumbent
Panganiban, CJ: upon [petitioners] to adduce strong, clear and convincing evidence that
Muriel bought the same with her exclusive funds. [Petitioners] failed to
FACTS: discharge the burden. Nowhere in the evidence presented is an indication
The disputed land was registered in the name of the wife of Leonardo that the land in question was acquired by Muriel with her exclusive funds.
Yamane, Respondent herein. The land was levied in order to satisfy the lien
for attorney’s fees in a civil case where the plaintiffs were Pucay sisters. Prior Hence, the presumption not having been overthrown, the conclusion is that
to the public auction, Respondent filed a Third-Party Claim to stop the public the contested land is conjugal property.
auction on the ground that the subject property is conjugal property therefore,
should not be held answerable for the personal obligation of the Pucay JOVELLANOS vs CA
sisters. However, the Sheriff proceeded with the auction sale. The subject G.R. No. 100728, June 18, 1992
property was sold to spouses Go as highest bidder. Regalado, J.
Respondent filed a Complaint for annulment and cancellation of auction sale FACTS:
upon the ground that the disputed property is conjugal property and it should Daniel Jovellanos and Philippine American Life Insurance Company
not be answerable for the obligations of the Pucay sisters. In their Answer, (Philamlife) entered into a contract of lease and conditional sale agreement
Petitioners claim the Deed of Absolute Sale of the property is in the sole over Lot 8, Block 3 of the latter's Quezon City Community Development
name of Muriel, had the spouses jointly purchased this piece of land, the Project, including a bungalow thereon, located at Philamlife Homes, Quezon
document should have indicated this fact or carried the name of respondent City. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to Leonor Dizon, with whom
as buyer. he had three children, the petitioners herein. Leonor Dizon died on January
123
2, 1959. On May 30, 1967, Daniel married private respondent Annette H. second wife. As found by the trial court, the parties stipulated during the pre-
Jovellanos with whom he begot two children, her herein co-respondents. trial conference in the case below that the rentals/installments under the
Petitioner Mercy Jovellanos married Gil Martinez and, at the behest of Daniel lease and conditional sale agreement were paid as follows (a) from
Jovellanos, they built a house on the back portion of the premises. With the September 2, 1955 to January 2, 1959, by conjugal funds of the first
lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed to Daniel Jovellanos a marriage; (b) from January 3, 1959 to May 29, 1967, by capital of Daniel
deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter donated to herein Jovellanos; (c) from May 30, 1967 to 1971, by conjugal funds of the second
petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the lot and bungalow thereon. marriage; and (d) from 1972 to January 8, 1975, by conjugal funds of the
On September 8, 1985, Daniel Jovellanos died, resulting in the filing by spouses Gil and Mercy Jovellanos Martinez. Both courts, therefore, ordered
private respondents of civil case. Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos that reimbursements should be made in line with the pertinent provision of
claimed in the lower court that the property was acquired by her deceased Article 118 of the Family Code that "any amount advanced by the partnership
husband while their marriage was still subsisting and which forms part of the or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners
conjugal partnership of the second marriage. Petitioners, on the other hand, upon liquidation of the partnership.
contend that the property, specifically the lot and the bungalow erected
thereon, as well as the beneficial and equitable title thereto, were acquired by Hence, the property is part of the conjugal funds of the second marriage.
their parents during the existence of the first marriage under their lease and
conditional sale agreement with Philamlife. The Court a quo rendered Castillo vs Pasco
judgment ordering the liquidation of the partnership of the second marriage G.R. No. L- 16857, May 29, 1964
and directing the reimbursement of the amount advanced by the partnership Reyes, J.B.L., J.
of the first marriage as well as by the late Daniel Jovellanos and the
defendants spouses Gil and Mercia. The CA affirmed the said judgment with FACTS:
the modification that private respondents should also reimburse to petitioners Marcelo Castillo, Sr., being a widower, married Macaria Pasco. Petitioners
their proportionate shares on the proven hospitalization and burial expenses were children and grandchildren of Marcelo Castillo, Sr. by his previous
of the late Daniel Jovellanos. marriage. Marcelo Castillo, Sr. died, and his widow married her fourth
husband, Luis San Juan. Gabriel and Purificacion Gonzales, as co-owners of
ISSUE: the litigated fishpond, executed a deed of sale conveying said property to the
Is the property part of conjugal property of the deceased and his second wife, spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria Pasco, payable in three installments.
Annette Jovellanos? Against the contention of petitioners-appellants that the fishpond thus bought
should be considered conjugal for its having been acquired during coverture,
HELD: the Court of Appeals declared it to be paraphernalia because it was
Yes, the property is part of the conjugal funds of the second marriage. purchased with exclusive funds of the wife, Macaria Pasco. She was
admittedly a woman of means even before she married Marcelo Castillo, Sr.
Article 118 of the Family Code provides: and the latter's principal source of income was only his P80 a month salary,
Art. 118. Property bought on installment paid partly from exclusive funds of as provincial treasurer. The initial payment of P1,000 for the fishpond now in
either or both spouses and partly from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or litigation was made up of P600, that one of the vendors (Gabriel Gonzales)
buyers if full ownership was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal owed to appellee Pasco, and P400 in cash, which the latter paid out of the
partnership if such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case, proceeds of the sale of one of her nipa lands. The second installment of
any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall P2,000 appears to have been paid with the proceeds of the loan from Dr.
be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership. Nicanor Jacinto, to whom the fishpond was mortgaged by both spouses. Dr.
Jacinto later assigned his interest to Dr. Antonio Pasco. The last payment of
The Court have earlier underscored that the deed of absolute sale was P3,000 was derived from a loan secured by a mortgage on 2 parcels of land
executed in 1975 by Philamlife, pursuant to the basic contract between the assessed in the name of Macaria Pasco, and one of which she had inherited
parties, only after full payment of the rentals. Upon the execution of said from a former husband, Justo S. Pascual, while the other lot encumbered
deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in Daniel Jovellanos. Since. was assessed, in her exclusive name. That upon the death of Marcelo
as early as 1967, he was already married to Annette H. Jovellanos, this Castillo, Sr., the loan and mortgage in favor of Dr. Jacinto, later assigned by
property necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said him to Dr. Antonio Pasco, was still outstanding. Unable to collect the loan,
124

Dr. Pasco foreclosed the mortgaged, and the encumbered fishpond was sold account, and not for the account of the partnership. The finding of the Court
to him; but the sale was subsequently annulled. Macaria Pasco judicially of Appeals is that Gabriel Gonzales owed this particular indebtedness to
consigned P12,300 on account of the mortgage debt and its interest, and Macaria Pasco alone, and in the absence of proof that the husband
completed payment by a second consignation of P752.43 made on April 24, authorized her to use community funds therefore, the appellate Court's
1950. As the estate of Castillo had no assets adequate to pay off the claims finding cannot be disturbed by us. Appellants next assail the conclusion of
against it, the Court of Appeals concluded that the amounts consigned the Court of Appeals that the other two installments of the purchase price
belonged to the widow Macaria Pasco. should be, like the first one, deemed to have been paid with exclusive funds
of the wife because the money was raised by loans guaranteed by mortgage
ISSUE: on paraphernalia property of the wife. The position thus taken by appellants
Is the litigated property part of the conjugal funds? is meritorious, for the reason that the deeds show the loans to have been
made by Dr. Nicanor Jacinto, and by Gabriel and Purificacion Gonzales, to
No, it is partly exclusive property and conjugal property. both spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria Pasco, as joint borrowers. The
loans thus became obligations of the conjugal partnership of both debtor
Under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, the property acquired for onerous spouses, and the money loaned is logically conjugal property. While the
consideration during the marriage was deemed conjugal or separate property securing mortgage is on the wife's paraphernalia the mortgage is a purely
depending on the source of the funds employed for its acquisition. Thus, accessory obligation that the lenders could, waive if they so chose, without
Article 1396 of said Code provided: affecting the principal debt which was owned by the conjugal partnership,
and which the creditors could enforce exclusively against the latter it they so
ART. 1396. The following is separate property spouse: desired. The two installments, totalling P5,000, of the price of the fishpond
were paid with conjugal funds, unlike the first installment of P1,000 that was
4. That bought with money belonging exclusively to the wife or to the paid exclusively with money belonging to the wife Macaria Pasco.
husband.
Hence, the litigated fishpond was purchased partly with paraphernal funds
On the other hand, Article 1401, prescribed that: and partly with money of the conjugal partnership, justice requires that the
property be held to belong to both patrimonies in common, in proportion to
ART. 1401. To the conjugal property belong: the contributions of each to the total purchase price of P6,000. An undivided
one-sixth (1/6) should be deemed paraphernalia and the remaining five-
1. Property acquired for valuable consideration during the marriage at the sixths (5/6) held property of the conjugal partnership of spouses Marcelo
expense of the common fund, Castillo and Macaria Pasco.
whether the acquisition is made for the partnership or for one of the spouses
only. Ayala Investment & Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 118305; February 12, 1998
Court of Appeals determined that the initial payment of P1,000 for the MARTINEZ, J.
fishpond now disputed was made out of private funds of Macaria Pasco.
Appellants, however, argue that since there is no express finding that the FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan
P600 debt owed by Gabriel Gonzales came exclusively from private funds of from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation. As added
Pasco, they should be presumed conjugal funds, in accordance with Article security for the credit line extended to PBM, Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice
1407 of the Civil Code of 1889. The argument is untenable. Since the wife, President of PBM, executed security agreements making himself jointly and
under Article 1418, cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the consent severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay
of the husband, her private transactions are presumed to be for her own the loan. Thus AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and
125
respondent-husband Alfredo Ching. The court rendered judgment ordering Alfredo Ching v. Court of Appeals
PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay G.R. No. 124642; February 23, 2004
AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending appeal the lower court CALLEJO, SR., J
issued a writ of execution. Thereafter, Deputy Sheriff caused the issuance
and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on three (3) FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained two
of their conjugal properties. Respondent sought to enjoin the auction sale loans from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). By virtue of this loan, the
alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal PBMCI, through its Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching, executed a
partnership levied on the ground that the subject loan did not redound to the promissory and as an added security, he executed together with Emilio
benefit of the said conjugal partnership. On the other hand, Petitioners point Tañedo and Chung Kiat Hua a continuing guaranty with the ABC for the
out that there is no need to prove that actual benefit redounded to the benefit payment of the said loan. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans
of the partnership; all that is necessary is that the transaction was entered so ABC filed a complaint for sum of money against the PBMCI. Trial court
into for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. issued a writ of preliminary attachment against Alfredo Ching requiring the
sheriff of to attach all the properties of said Alfredo Ching to answer for the
ISSUE: Does a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into payment of the loans. Encarnacion T. Ching, wife of Alfredo Ching, filed a
by the husband alone in favor of his employer chargeable to the conjugal Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment alleging that the 100,000 shares
partnership? of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband
during their marriage out of conjugal fund and that the indebtedness covered
HELD: No, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety by the continuing guaranty/comprehensive suretyship contract executed by
agreement entered into by respondent husband in favor of PBM. petitioner Alfredo Ching for the account of PBMCI is not in pursuit of his
profession or business and did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal
The wordings of Article 161(1) of the Civil Code and Art 121 (2) is very clear: partnership. She avers that contrary to the ruling of CA, the source of funds
for the partnership to be held liable, the husband must have contracted the in the acquisition of the levied shares of stocks is not the controlling factor
debt ‘for the benefit of’ the partnership. On the other hand, Article 122 of the when invoking the presumption of the conjugal nature of stocks and that such
Family Code provides that “The payment of personal debts by the husband presumption subsists even if the property is registered only in the name of
or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal one of the spouses, in this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching. Furthermore, she
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. alleges that where conjugal assets are attached in a collection suit on an
obligation contracted by the husband, the wife should exhaust her motion to
If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the quash in the main case and not file a separate suit.
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself,
alone be categorized as falling within the context of “obligations for the ISSUE:
benefit of the conjugal partnership.” The contract of loan or services is clearly (1) Does the 100,000 shares of stocks be presumed to be part of the
for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No conjugal partnership despite of being registered under the name of Alfredo
presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of Ching?
surety or accommodation agreement, it is “for the benefit of the conjugal (2) Can 100,000 shares of stocks be levied on by the sheriff to answer for the
partnership.” Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the loans guaranteed by petitioner Alfredo Ching?
conjugal partnership. AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality HELD:
distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they
happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity. (1) Yes, the shares of stocks are presumed to be the conjugal partnership
property of the petitioners.
Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as
surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings. Hence, conjugal Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired
partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was during the marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
clearly for the benefit of PBM. unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife.
In Tan v. Court of Appeals, we held that it is not even necessary to prove that
126

the properties were acquired with funds of the partnership. As long as the advantages accrued to the spouses.In this case, the private respondent
properties were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they are failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited
presumed to be conjugal in nature. In fact, even when the manner in which by the petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty and
the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI.
apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal. The presumption of The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the PBMCI,
the conjugal nature of the properties acquired during the marriage subsists in solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the
the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation
same. agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be
benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish that such
In this case, the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.
Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate books in the name
of the petitioner-husband. This was done during the subsistence of the Hence, the shares of stock being a conjugal property cannot be levied on to
marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The private respondent failed to adduce answer for the loans guaranteed by petitioner Alfredo Ching.
evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive
money. The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO
corporate books of Citycorp Investment Philippines solely in the name of the G.R. No. 153802; March 11, 2005
petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that the petitioner-husband, not TINGA, J.
the conjugal partnership, owned the same.
FACTS:
Therefore, the shares of stocks are thus presumed to be the conjugal
property of the petitioners. Marcelino Dailo, Jr. and respondent Miguela C. Dailo were married
on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, they purchased a house and lot.
(2) No, the shares of stock being a conjugal property cannot be levied on to The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino
answer for the loans guaranteed by petitioner Alfredo Ching. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife. Marcelino executed a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the
Article 161(1) of the New Civil Code (now Article 121[2 and 3] of the Family latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to
Code of the Philippines) provides: The conjugal partnership shall be liable be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot. Pursuant to the SPA,
for: Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of P300,000.00 from petitioner. As
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership. abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of
Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of respondent,
The petitioner-husband signed the continuing guaranty and suretyship Miguela. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result,
agreement as security for the payment of the loan obtained by the PBMCI. petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged
The signing as surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession. property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued
It is not embarking in a business. No matter how often an executive acted on in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without
or was persuaded to act as surety for his own employer, this should not be the property being redeemed, petitioner, through its vice-president,
taken to mean that he thereby embarked in the business of suretyship or consolidated the ownership thereof by executing an Affidavit of Consolidation
guaranty. For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale. Thereafter, Marcelino died.
appertain to the husband alone, there must be a showing that some Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the
127
subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
RTC for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition
Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for or encumbrance shall be void. . . .
Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the latter’s Answer
with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of the Family Code
ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late requires the consent of the other spouse to the mortgage of conjugal
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. The RTC and CA held that the subject property was properties, the framers of the law could not have intended to curtail
conjugal in nature, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to rebut the right of a spouse from exercising full ownership over the portion
the presumption that the subject property acquired during the marriage of of the conjugal property pertaining to him under the concept of co-
spouses Dailo belongs to their conjugal partnership. The CA declared as void ownership. Thus, petitioner would have this Court uphold the validity
the mortgage on the subject property because it was constituted without the of the mortgage to the extent of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.s share
knowledge and consent of respondent, in accordance with Article 124 of the in the conjugal partnership.
Family Code. Thus, ordered to reconvey the subject property to respondent.
In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the sale of a conjugal
ISSUE/S: property requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In
1. Is the mortgage constituted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the applying Article 124 of the Family Code, the Court declared that the
subject property as co-owner thereof valid as to his undivided share? absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void,
2. Is the conjugal partnership liable for the payment of the loan including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the
obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. the same having redounded husband who contracted the sale. The same principle
to the benefit of the family? in Guiang squarely applies to the instant case. As shall be discussed
next, there is no legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code
RULING: as an exception to Article 124 of the Family Code.
1. No, the mortgage constituted by Marcelino as a co-owner of the
property is not valid. Petitioner takes issue with the legal provision Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on
applicable to the factual milieu of this case. It contends that Article August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system
124 of the Family Code should be construed in relation to Article 493 of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the
of the Civil Code, which states: property relations between respondent and her late husband. With
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4
ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. under the Civil Code or other laws.
But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. relations of respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a
suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a
Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part: special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a
common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. . . . through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of
property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of
do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the
128

property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be family. Even on appeal, petitioner never claimed that the family
governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of benefited from the proceeds of the loan.
Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on
partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former Hence, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the
prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only payment of the principal obligation.
when the Family Code is silent on the matter.
SOLEDAD L. LACSON, ET AL. vs. ABELARDO G. DIAZ
Hence, the mortgage is not valid because the rules on co-ownership G.R. No. L-19346; May 31, 1965
do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late Barrera, J.
Marcelino.
FACTS:
2. No, the conjugal partnership is not liable for the payment of the loan. The Court of First Instance (CFI) issued a writ of execution ordering
Petitioner imposes the liability for the payment of the principal appellant Abelardo Diaz to pay the money-judgment rendered by the said
obligation obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the conjugal court in a previous case between herein parties (Soledad L. Lacson, et al. v.
partnership to the extent that it redounded to the benefit of the family. Abelardo G. Diaz). The Provincial Sheriff sent to the manager of Talisay-
Silay Milling Company, wherein Diaz was employed, a notice to garnish one-
Under Article 121 of the Family Code, “The conjugal partnership third of his monthly salary and of any other personal properties belonging to
shall be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either respondent. Diaz filed with the court a motion to quash the writ of execution
spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family and to lift the notice of garnishment (of his salary) on the ground that the
may have been benefited; . . . .” same are not enforceable against his present family. He claimed that since
the money-judgment arose out of a contract entered into by him during his
For the subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted first marriage said judgment cannot be enforced against his salaries which
by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the benefit of form part of the conjugal properties of the second marriage. Appellees
the conjugal partnership. There must be the requisite showing then opposed the said motion alleging that re-marriage is not a cause for
of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the extinction of obligations. Appellant does not dispute the existence of the
spouses. The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the money-judgment against him, which decision was rendered in 1947 and
benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party affirmed by the appellate court in 1950. It appears, however, that appellant,
litigant claiming as such. Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the who became a widower in 1951, remarried in 1960. The writ of execution and
loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the notice of garnishment in this case were issued and implemented in 1961. It is
construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the now contended that, as the conjugal partnership resulting of the second
benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not marriage is different from that of the first marriage, during which existence
persuade this Court. Other than petitioner’s bare allegation, there is the obligation arose, such obligation, as far as the second conjugal
nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, partnership is concerned, is personal to the husband and cannot be charged
the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the against the properties of the second union. And, since his salaries form part
benefit of the family. In addition, a perusal of the records of the case of the conjugal asset the same cannot be garnished to satisfy his personal
reveals that during the trial, petitioner vigorously asserted that the obligations. In support of this proposition, appellant cites Article 163 of the
subject property was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino new Civil Code and the ruling of this Court that the right of the husband to
Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it one-half of the assets of the conjugal partnership does not vest until the
alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the dissolution of the marriage.
129
Hence, the conjugal partnership of Diaz’s second marriage is not
liable for the obligations which arose during the pendency of his first
ISSUE: marriage.
Does the conjugal partnership of Diaz’s second marriage liable for the
obligations which arose during the pendency of his first marriage? People vs Lagrimas
G.R. No. L-25355, August 28, 1969
RULING: FERNANDO, J.
No, the conjugal partnership of Diaz’s second marriage is not liable.
FACTS:
Article 163 of the new Civil Code provides: Froilan Lagrimas was found guilty of murder and sentenced to him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify the heirs of victim
ART. 163. The payment of debts contracted by the husband or the Pelagro. A writ of preliminary attachment on the properties of the accused
wife before the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal was issued by the court to satisfy the judgment. However, accused spouse
partnership. moved to quash the writ contending that the properties belong to
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them conjugal partnership. She alleged that conjugal partnership properties
be charged to the partnership. cannot be held to answer for pecuniary indemnity the husband was
However, the payment of debts contracted by the husband or the required to pay. Heirs-appellants on the other hand, contend that fines
wife before the marriage, and that of fines and indemnities imposed and indemnities are obligations of the husband which can be charged
upon them, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the to the conjugal partnership when his exclusive property is not
responsibilities enumerated in article 161 have been covered, if the sufficient to cover it.
spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it
should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the ISSUE:
partnership such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for May fines and indemnities of a spouse found guilty of a crime be enforced
the purpose above-mentioned. against conjugal partnership assets?
As a general rule, therefore, debts contracted by the husband or the RULING:

wife before the marriage, as well as fines and pecuniary indemnities No, conjugal partnership assets can not be held to answer for civil obligations
imposed thereon, are not chargeable to the conjugal partnership. However, of a spouse found guilty of a crime unless the responsibilities of conjugal
such obligations may be enforced against the conjugal assets if the partnership has been satisfied.
responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the new Civil Code have already
been covered, and that the obligor has no exclusive property or the same is The applicable Civil Code provision is not lacking in explicitness. It states that
insufficient. Considering that the enforceability of the personal obligations of "Fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife may be
the husband or wife, against the conjugal assets, forms the exception to the enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated
general rule, it is incumbent upon the one who invokes this provision or the in article 161 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no
creditor to show that the requisites for its applicability are obtaining. exclusive property or if it should be insufficient." It is made a condition under
this article of the Civil Code that the responsibilities enumerated in Article
In the instant case, although it is not controverted that there is due 161, covering primarily the maintenance of the family and the education of
and owing the plaintiffs-appellees a certain sum of money from the appellant- the children of the spouses or the legitimate children of one of them as well
debtor — a personal obligation yet, it has not been established that the latter as other obligations of a preferential character, are first satisfied. It is thus
does not have properties of his own or that the same are not adequate to apparent that the legal scheme cannot be susceptible to the charge that for a
satisfy appellees' claim. Furthermore, there is no showing that the transgression of the law by either husband or wife, the rest of the family may
responsibilities named in Article 161 of the new Civil Code have already been be made to bear burdens of an extremely onerous character.
covered in order that the personal obligation of the husband may be made In the case at bar, there being no evidence presented that the conjugal
chargeable against the properties of the second marriage. partnership has satisfied the obligations under Article 161, the case is
remanded to the lower court. The Civil Code provision, as thus worded,
130

precisely minimizes the possibility that such additional liability of an accused Are rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family
would be rendered nugatory. In doing justice to the heirs of the murdered Code applicable where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or
victim, no injustice is committed against the family of the offender. It is made incompetent to give consent?
a condition under this article of the Civil Code that the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 161, covering primarily the maintenance of the family RULING:
and the education of the children of the spouses or the legitimate children of No, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under Article 124 of the
one of them as well as other obligations of a preferential character, are first Family Code does not apply when the non-consenting spouse is
satisfied. It is thus apparent that the legal scheme cannot be susceptible to incapacitated or incompetent.
the charge that for a transgression of the law by either husband or wife, the
rest of the family may be made to bear burdens of an extremely onerous Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows: "The administration and
character. Considering that the obligations mentioned in Article 161 are enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
peculiarly within the knowledge of the husband or of the wife whose conjugal jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject
partnership is made liable, the proof required of the beneficiaries of the to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy which must be
indemnity should not be of the most exacting kind, ordinary credibility availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
sufficing. Otherwise, the husband or the wife, as the case may be, decision."
representing the conjugal partnership, may find the temptation to magnify its
obligation irresistible so as to defeat the right of recovery of the family of the In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the
offended party. Family Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code.
The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated
Hence, fines and liabilities incurred by a spouse found guilty of a crime may in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be
only be enforced if the conjugal partnership assets have first satisfied the obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse
responsibilities enumerated under Article 161. is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court
found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or
Uy vs. Court of Appeals semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident,
Gr No. 109557, November 2, 2000 without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct.
PARDO, J. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under
Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Even assuming that the rules of
FACTS: summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code may apply to the wife's
While Dr. Ernesto was on comatose, his wife assumed the administration of administration of the conjugal property, the law provides that the wife who
their conjugal partnership assets by virtue of a court order on a summary assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a
judicial proceeding under Article 124 of the Family Code.. In lieu thereof, a guardian under the Rules of Court. Consequently, a spouse who desires to
real property was sold by the wife allegedly to answer for the medical bills of sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must observe
Dr. Ernesto. After the sale, one of the sons of the spouses filed assailed the the procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians
validity of such administration alleging that there can be no summary under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial
proceedings for guardianship unless both spouses can give consent. On the proceedings under the Family Code. In the case at bar, the trial court did not
other hand, petitioners contend that private respondent has no legal standing comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, the trial
considering that the properties involved are part of conjugal partnership.. court did not even observe the requirements of the summary judicial
proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve notice
ISSUE: of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show
cause why the petition should not be granted.
131
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
Therefore, in case the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
incompetent to give consent, summary judicial proceedings under Article 124 husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife
is inapplicable, the proper remedy being judicial guardianship proceedings for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date
under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. of the contract implementing such decision.
Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
G.R. No. 147978; January 23, 2002 participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse
KAPUNAN, J. may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the
powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the
FACTS: court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
Thelma Jader-Manalo came across an advertisement placed in a authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However,
newspaper for the sale of a ten-door apartment in Makati, as well as that in the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
Taytay, Rizal owned by the Spouses Norma and Edilberto Camaisa. The consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
properties were conjugal in nature. Petitioner met with the respondent contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
spouses. She made a definite offer to buy the properties to respondent court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of his wife, Norma.
The formal typewritten Contracts to Sell were thereafter prepared by The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal;
petitioner. After Edilberto signed the contracts, petitioner delivered to him two hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband
checks. The contracts were given to Edilberto for the formal affixing of his and wife must concur. Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give
wife’s signature. Petitioner was surprised when respondent spouses her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma actively
informed her that they were backing out of the agreement because they participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she
needed spot cash for the full amount of the consideration. Norma refused to denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity.
sign the contracts prompting petitioner to file a complaint for specific Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to sign the
performance and damages against respondent spouses. The trial court contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have been aware of the
rendered a summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties. However, being merely
under Art. 124 of the Family Code, the court cannot intervene to authorize aware of a transaction is not consent. It should be stressed that court
the transaction in the absence of the consent of the wife since said wife who authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where the spouse
refused to give consent had not been shown to be incapacitated. The CA who does not give consent is incapacitated.[26] In this case, petitioner failed
affirmed the RTC’s decision explaining that the properties subject of the to allege and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her
contracts were conjugal properties and as such, the consent of both spouses consent to the contracts. In the absence of such showing of the wifes
is necessary to give effect to the sale. Since private respondent Norma incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought.
Camaisa refused to sign the contracts, the sale was never perfected.
Hence, Edilberto may not validly dispose of the conjugal property
ISSUE: without Norma’s written consent.
May Edilberto (husband) validly dispose of a conjugal property
without the written consent of Norma (wife)? Spouses Guiang v. CA
G.R. No. 125172; June 26, 1998
RULING: PANGANIBAN, J.
No. The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by
the husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires the written FACTS:
consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus, Article 124 of the Private respondent Gild Corpuz is legally married to Judie Corpuz.
Family Code provides: Gilda and Judie sold one-half of the lot owned by them to Spouses Guiang.
Gilda left for Manila to look for work abroad but unfortunately, she was
victimized by an illegal recruiter. Harriet Corpuz, daughter of Gilda and
132

Judie, learned that her father intended to sell the remaining one-half portion powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the
including their house, of their home lot to defendants Guiangs. She wrote a court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
letter to her mother informing her. Gilda replied that she was objecting to the authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However,
sale. Harriet, however, did not inform her father about this; but instead gave the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
the letter to Luzviminda Guiang so that she would advise Judie. In the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
absence of his wife Gilda Corpuz, defendant Judie Corpuz pushed through contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
the sale of the remaining one-half portion of the subject lot to Luzviminda court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.(165a) (Italics
Guiang thru a document known as Deed of Transfer of Rights. Gilda went supplied)
home from Manila. For staying in their house sold by her husband, Gilda
was complained against by defendant Luzviminda Guiang and her husband Neither can the amicable settlement be considered a continuing offer
Antonio Guiang before the Barangay authorities of Barangay General that was accepted and perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of
Paulino Santos, Koronadal, South Cotabato, for trespassing. The parties Article 124. The order of the pertinent events is clear: after the sale,
thereat signed a document known as amicable settlement. Believing that she petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private respondent, after
had received the shorter end of the bargain, plaintiff went to the Barangay which the barangay authorities secured an amicable settlement and
Captain of Barangay Paulino Santos to question her signature on the petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement,
amicable settlement. however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an
acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private
ISSUE: respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can
Is the contract (Deed of Transfer of Rights) executed by Judie void or the Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article
voidable? 124.
RULING: To reiterate, the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of

It is void. Article 1390, par. 2, refers to contracts visited by vices of both the husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders
consent, i.e., contracts which were entered into by a person whose consent the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable.
was obtained and vitiated through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.
influence or fraud. In this instance, private respondents consent to the
contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-
The said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the VALDEZ, respondents.
Family Code, which was correctly applied by the two lower courts: G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996
VITUG, J.:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married. Begotten
husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife during the marriage were five children. Valdez sought the declaration of
for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code before the
the contract implementing such decision. RTC, which granted the same and provided in the decision, among others,
that The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start proceedings on
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to the liquidation of their common properties inclusive of the family home as
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions
may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code. Petitioner in this case asserted
133
that Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto
are psychologically incapacitated and that Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the
family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or
spouses. when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only
the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of
ISSUE: Does Article 147 of the Family Code apply to marriage declared null money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to
on the ground of psychological incapacity? their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares,
however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who
Held: Yes. Article 147 of the Family Code apply to marriage declared null on is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
the ground of psychological incapacity. partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall
be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or
through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co- the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid
ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For law spouses. The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit
the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under
the acquisition thereof in the former's efforts consisted in the care and Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage
maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially
or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired declared void.
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other,
until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties Hence, Article 147 of the Family Code apply to petitioner’s marriage ehich
to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the was declared null on the ground of psychological incapacity.
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO,
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the innocent party. In all G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Article 147 provides for particular kind of co-ownership between when a man
and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so FACTS: SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, first was on
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or 1969 with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (Nicdao) and the second was on
without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the 1992 with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (Yee) After his demise, both
first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial
marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.
not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Petitioner Nicdao was able to collect from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
Code. NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,”. Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum
of money against Nicdao praying, inter alia, that she be ordered to return to
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their her at least one-half of petitioner’s claimed death benefits from said
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any government agencies. Respondent Yee admitted that her marriage to the
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the
134

deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous Therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
marriage. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license,
contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license
initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate
of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license (2) No, the second marriage invalid for failure of the contracting parties to
number; and 2) a certification of no marriage from the Local Civil Registrar. obtain judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous

marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
ISSUES: final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the
(1) Is the presumed validity of the 1st marriage sufficiently overcome by the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
presentation of the certification of no marriage from the Local Civil Registrar? of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
(1) Is the second marriage valid despite failure of the contracting parties to projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring
obtain judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage? the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no
(3) To which marriage should “death benefits” accrue? judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
HELD: The declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
(1) Yes, the validity of 1st marriage sufficiently overcome by the presentation deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second
of the certification of no marriage from the Local Civil Registrar. marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void.
marriage license is a requisite of marriage (Article 53 NCC) and the absence
thereof, subject to certain exceptions (Article 58) renders the marriage void Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise,
ab initio (Article 80). void ab initio.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the (3) The “death benefits” shall accrue to the first marriage between Petitioner
deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license Susan Nicdao and SPO4 Santiago.
requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity
of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number the property of the spouses according to the applicable property
and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable
office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of property regime is governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the
Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage”. Article 148
non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous
as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine,
enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons,
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. multiple alliances of the same married man, “... [O]nly the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
135
respective contributions ...”On the other hand, Article 147 of the Family Code declaring the marriage null and void ab initio, and ordering, among others,
applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property, particularly
any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless the plaintiffs separation/retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank
void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. and Trust Company, by paying her fifty percent (50%) of the net amount
together with 12% interest per annum from the date of this decision and one-
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is half (1/2) of his outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and
a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a Provident Group of Companies.
previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the
deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order. Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals which
promulgated a decision dismissing petitioners appeal for lack of merit and
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], affirming in toto the trial courts decision. In the Petition for Review
NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, on Certiorari, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred when it
incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased ordered him to pay defendant-appellee one-half of his retirement benefits
as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co., notwithstanding that the said
contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry retirement are gratuitous and exclusive property of petitioner, and also to
in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in deliver to defendant-appelle one-half of his shares of stock with the Manila
common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone Memorial Park and The Provident Group of Companies, as said shares of
and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate stock were acquired by petitioner before his marriage to respondent and are
succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal therefore, again his exclusive properties.
heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of
them. ISSUE:
Are the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Trust Co. and the shares of stock in the Manila Memorial Park and the
Article 147 of the Family Code governs. The wages and salaries earned by Provident Group of Companies considered exclusive properties of the
either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal petitioner?
shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party
earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. Conformably, RULING:
even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by the deceased alone as
a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect No. The retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and
thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no Trust Co. and the shares of stock in the Manila Memorial Park and the
allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage Provident Group of Companies are not exclusive properties of the petitioner.
are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject “death
benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a
regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42
succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao. and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute
community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not
51. Noel Buenaventura v. CA apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is
G.R. No. 127358; March 31, 2005 declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated,
AZCUNA, J. partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
FACTS: Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo

were found, both by the RTC and the CA, to have been acquired during the
Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No
marriage, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been
Isabel Singh Buenaventura. The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision included or involved in said distribution.
136

through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal
51. Gonzales v. Gonzales shares.
G.R. No. 159521; December 16, 2005 While it is true that all the properties were bought from the proceeds
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: of the pizza business, petitioner himself testified that respondent was not a
plain housewife and that she helped him in managing the business. It
FACTS: appeared that before they started living together, petitioner offered
respondent to be his partner in his pizza business and to take over its
Respondent, Erminda Gonzales, filed a complaint for annulment of operations. Respondent started managing the business in 1976. Her job was
marriage against the petitioner, Francisco Gonzales, and for the dissolution to: (1) take care of the daily operations of the business; (2) manage the
of the conjugal partnership of gains, on the ground that petitioner is personnel; and (3) meet people during inspection and supervision of outlets.
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. She She reported for work everyday, even on Saturdays and Sundays, without
alleged that she managed their pizza business and worked hard for its receiving any salary or allowance.
development. However, petitioner alleged in his answer to the complaint that
it is respondent who is psychologically incapacitated. He denied that she was Therefore, the properties are owned by them in equal shares.
the one who managed the pizza business and claimed that he exclusively
owns the properties existing during their marriage. Agapay vs. Palang
G.R. No. 116668; July 28, 1997
The trial court rendered its decision, declaring the marriage null and Romero, J.
void ab initio and ordering, inter alia, the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains and dividing the conjugal properties equally between the FACTS:
plaintiff and the defendant
Miguel Palang married Carlina Palang in 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a
Not satisfied with the manner their properties were divided, petitioner few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in 1950.
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the assailed Decision of the When Miguel returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with Carlina.
trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied,
hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari. In 1973, Miguel who was then 63 years old contracted a subsequent
marriage with 19-year old Erlinda Agapay. Two months earlier, they jointly
ISSUE: purchased a riceland. A house and lot was likewise purchased, allegedly by
Did the Court of Appeals err in ruling that the properties should be Erlinda as the sole vendee. Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son
divided equally between the parties? named Kristopher.
RULING: 1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of

compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. The
No, the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that the properties parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six
should be divided equally between the parties. parcels of land to their only child, Herminia.
In void marriages, the property relation shall be governed by the In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s
provisions of Article 147 of the Family Code. Under this property regime of complaint. Two years later, Miguel died. Carlina and Herminia instituted a
co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties during their union, in the case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against
absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained Erlinda, seeking to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly
137
purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. The lower court
dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision. In the nature of an afterthought, Erlinda claims that the riceland was bought 2
months before she and Miguel actually cohabited to exclude their case from
ISSUES: the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the precise date
when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having been
1. Who owns the riceland? adduced, we cannot state definitively that the riceland was purchased even
2. Who owns the house and lot? before they started living together. In any case, even assuming that the
3. Does the trial court’s decision adopting the compromise agreement subject property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership
partake the nature of judicial confirmation of the separation of property would still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.
between Miguel and Carlina and the termination of their conjugal
partnership? Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase
4. Can Kristopher’s status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir be price of the riceland, there is no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel
adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for recovery of ownership and over the same. Consequently, the riceland should revert to the conjugal
possession? partnership property of Miguel and Carlina.
5. Should Kristopher Palang be considered as party-defendant in the
case? 2. With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for
P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The
RULING: testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the
property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified
1. The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and that Miguel provided the money for the purchase price and directed that
Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee. The transaction was properly
Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and
not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as inexistent by Article 739 of the Civil Code because it was made between
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.
While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the
was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations
susbsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation. between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through out to be better than those in legal union.
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be 3. No. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not
stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there
Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment which
and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common resulted from the parties’ compromise was not specifically and expressly for
property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the separation of property and should not be so inferred.
actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership
and no presumption of equal shares. 4. No. Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of
illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and
Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special
business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store. Worth noting is the fact proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant
that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, she was only around 22 years ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession.
of age and Miguel was already 64 and a pensioner of the U.S. Government.
Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she 5. No. Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was not a party to the case at
contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property, bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was
there being no proof of the same. not involved in the case at bar.
138

of Nevada. Then, Trinidad Teodoro married Jose Corominas. The conjugal
partnership between Lizares and Corominas was dissolved by the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Manila.
ISSUE:
Is Article 144 of the Civil Code applicable in this case?
RULING:
(Family Code not yet effective) NO. This Article provides: “When a man and
a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both
of them through then work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.”
There is no doubt that the decree of divorce granted by the Court of Nevada
in 1954 is not valid under Philippine law, which has outlawed divorce
altogether; that the matrimonial bonds between Jose Corominas, Jr. and
Sonia Lizares have not been dissolved, although their conjugal partnership
was terminated in 1957; and that the former's subsequent marriage in
Hongkong to Trinidad Teodoro is bigamous and void.
The particular properties involved here which were admittedly acquired by

respondent Teodoro, cannot be deemed to belong to such co-ownership
because, as found by the trial court and confirmed by the Court of Appeals,
the funds used in acquiring said properties were fruits of respondent's
paraphernal investments which accrued before her "marriage" to Corominas.
In other words they were not acquired by either or both of the partners in the
void marriage through their work or industry or their wages and salaries, and
hence cannot be the subject of co-ownership under Article 144. They remain
respondent's exclusive properties, beyond the reach of execution to satisfy
the judgment debt of Corominas.
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. Inc. vs. Teodoro
20 SCRA 463; June 29, 1967 JOSEPHINE BELCODERO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Makalintal, J. G.R. No. 89667, October 20, 1993
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
A writ of execution against properties of Trinidad Teodoro was issued to FACTS: Alayo Bosing was married to Juliana Oday with whom he had three
satisfy a judgment issued against Jose Corominas. The pertinent facts are as children. He left the conjugal home and started to live with Josefa Rivera in
follows: Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares were married in Iloilo on 1946, with whom he had a child, Josephine Belcodero. Alayo purchased a
January 5, 1935. A decree of divorce was granted by the Court of the State parcel of land on installment basis. In the deed, he indicated his civil status
139
as, "married to Josefa R. Bosing," the common-law wife. The lot was G.R. Nos. L-50127-28. March 30, 1979
transferred with Alayo’s authority to the name of his “wife Josefa Bosing”. DE CASTRO, J.:
The final deed of sale was executed and a TCT was issued in the name of
"Josefa R. Bosing, . . . married to Alayo Bosing. FACTS: Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the
passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of
In 1958, Alayo married Josefa even while his prior marriage with Juliana was the PNR that resulted in the 7 deaths and physical injuries of 5 of its
still subsisting. Alayo died on 1967. About three years later, Josefa and passengers. That time, Eugenio was married to Socorro but had been
Josephine executed a document of extrajudicial partition and sale of the lot in cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo, defendant-appellant for 16 years as husband
question, which was there described as "conjugal property" of Josefa and and wife. Trial court decision rendered Eugenia and Rosalia jointly and
deceased Alayo. In this deed, Josefa's supposed one-half (1/2) interest as severally liable to pay damages to the heir of the deceased, Victor Juaniza.
surviving spouse of Alayo, as well as her one-fourth (1/4) interest as heir, Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying that the
was conveyed to Josephine for a P10,000.00 consideration, thereby decision be reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay damages jointly
completing for herself, along with her one-fourth (1/4) interest as the and severally with her co-defendant, but was denied.
surviving child of Alayo, a full "ownership" of the property.
ISSUE: Is Article 144 of the Civil Code applicable in a case where one of the
On 1980, Juliana and her three legitimate children filed with the court a quo parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry?
an action for reconveyance of the property.
RULING: No. The co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code
NOTE: The property subject of the case had been bought by the husband on requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be
installment basis prior to the effectivity of the Civil Code of 1950 but the final incapacitated to contract marriage.
deed, as well as the questioned conveyance by him to his common law
spouse, has ensued during the latter Code's regime. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an
impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the
ISSUE: The ownership over a piece of land acquired by a husband while aforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the
living with a paramour and after having deserted his lawful wife and children. jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his
legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages
RULING: The property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of
Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article the jeepney which figured in the collision.
160) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407), "all property of the marriage is Francisco v. Master Iron Works and Construction Corp.
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it Gr no. 151967, February 16, 2005
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This presumption has not Callejo, SR, J.
been convincingly rebutted.
Facts: Josefina Castillo was only 24 years old when she married Eduardo
It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because the property was titled G. Francisco. Eduardo was then the vice president in a private corporation.
in the name of Josefa at Alayo's request, she should thereby be deemed to One year and seven months thereafter, Imus Rural Bank executed a deed of
be its owner. The property unquestionably was acquired by Alayo. absolute sale for 320,000 in favor of Josefina Castillo Francisco covering two
parcels of residential land.
As regards the property relation between common-law spouses, Article 144
of the Civil Code merely codified the law established through judicial On February 15, 1985 the Register of Deeds recorded an entry at the dorsal
precedents under the old code. In both regimes, the co-ownership rule had portion of said titles referring to an affidavit of waiver executed by Eduardo
more than once been repudiated when either or both spouses suffered from where he declared that Josefina purchased the two parcel of land with her
an impediment to marry. The present provisions under Article 147 and Article own savings.
148 of the Family Code did not much deviate from the old rules
On June 11, 1990, Eduardo who was then the General Manager and
VICTOR JUANIZA, v. EUGENIO JOSE President of Reach out Trading International bought 7,500 bags of cement
140

worth P768,750 from Master Iron Works and Construction Corporation Held: No.. The subject property is the conjugal property of Carmelita and
(MIWCC) but failed to pay for the same. MIWCC filed a complaint for the Eduardo.
return of said commodities, or value thereof.
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only
The Court rendered judgment in favor of MIWCC and such became final and the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
executory. The court issued a writ of execution. Sheriff Alejo issued a Notice contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
of Levy on Execution over the said lots for the recovery of the balance of the common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
amount due under the RTC’s decision. proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint
Josefina filed a third party complaint alleging that the lands were her deposits of money and evidences of credit.
paraphernal property. The sale on public auction later on ensued. She filed
amended complaint. The petitioner asserts that inasmuch as her marriage to Eduardo is void ab
initio, there is no occasion that would give rise to a regime of conjugal
In its answer, MIWCC cited Article 116 of the Family Code and averred that partnership of gains. The petitioner adds that to rule otherwise would render
the property was conjugal property of Josefina and Eduardo who purchased moot and irrelevant the provisions on the regime of special co-ownership
the same after their marriage. It also asserted that Eduardo executed the under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code of the Philippines, in relation
affidavit of waiver to evade satisfaction of the decision in the civil case, to Article 144 of the New Civil Code.
hence, said affidavit was null and void.
The petitioner avers that since Article 148 of the Family Code governs their
Before she could commence presenting her evidence, Josefina filed a property relationship, the respondents must adduce evidence to show that
petition to annul her marriage to Eduardo in the RTC of Parañaque, Metro Eduardo actually contributed to the acquisition of the subject properties. The
Manila, on the ground that when they were married on January 15, 1983, petitioner asserts that she purchased the property before her marriage to
Eduardo was already married to one Carmelita Carpio. Eduardo with her own money without any contribution from him; hence, the
subject property is her paraphernal property. Consequently, such property is
Josefina averred that she acquired property with the help of her mother, not liable for the debts of Eduardo to private respondent MIWCC.
brother and sisters.
The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal
RTC of Parañaque rendered judgment declaring the marriage between funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she is the sole owner of
Josefina and Eduardo as null and void for being bigamous. the property. Other than plaintiff-appellee’s bare testimony, there is nothing in
the record to support her claim that the funds she used to purchase the
RTC held that the property levied by the sheriff was the sole and exclusive subject properties came from her mother and sister. She did not, for
property of Josefina declaring that the levy is null and void. instance, present the testimonies of her mother and sister who could have
corroborated her claim. It is to be noted that plaintiff-appellee got married at
The CA ruled that the property was presumed to be the conjugal property of the age of 23. At that age, it is doubtful if she had enough funds of her own
Eduardo and Josefina, and that the latter failed to rebut such presumption. It to purchase the subject properties as she claimed in her Affidavit of Third
also held that the affidavit of waiver executed by Eduardo was contrary to Party Claim.
Article 146 of the New Civil Code and, as such, had no force and effect.
Since the subject property was acquired during the subsistence of the
Issue: Is the subject property conjugal property of Josefina and Eduardo? marriage of Eduardo and Carmelita, under normal circumstances, the same
should be presumed to be conjugal property.
141
Lupo Atienza v. Yolanda De Castro Lupo argued that pursuant to Art 144(6) of the Civil Code, he has no burden
Gr no. 169698, November 29,2006 to prove that he contributed to the acquisition of the property, because with
Garcia, J. or without the contribution he is deemed a co-owner, adding Art 484(7) of the
Civil Code, as long as the porperty was acquired during the extra-marital
Facts: Lupo Atienza, President and General Manager of Enrico Shipping union.
Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation, hired Yolanda De Castro as
accountant for the two corporations. In the course of time the two of them Issue: Is Lupo a co-owner of the disputed property acquired during their
became intimate despite of Lupo being legally married to another. They later extra-marital union without proving his contribution?
lived together and had 2 children. After the birth of the second child their
relationship turned sour until they parted ways. Held: No.Lupo is not a co-owner.
Lupo filed with the RTC a complaint for judicial partition between him and It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each
Yolanda for a parcel of land including the improvements,located in Bel-Air other because petitioner Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman
Subdivision in Makati City. He alleged that the subject property was acquired at the time of his cohabitation with the respondent. Their property regime,
his union with Yolanda as common law husband and wife, hence it is co- therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to
owned by them. bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
Contention of the Parties: persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime,
only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
Lupo: The property was acquired by Yolanda using his exclusive funds and contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
that title was transferred to her name by the seller without his knowledge and common in proportion to their respective contributions….. Proof of actual
consent. He did not object because at that time their affair was still thriving. It contribution is required. As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of
was only after they separated and upon receipt of information by Lupo that property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to
Yolanda allowed her new live in-partner to live in the property, when he marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife,
demanded his share as co-owner. applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their
respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the
Yolanda: She insisted that she acquired the said property for P2,600,000.00 proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the
using her exclusive funds from her own savings and earnings as a extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
businesswoman. presumed to be equal.
RTC declared that the property was co-owned by them. Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in
1983, or way before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998,
Yolanda appealed to the CA arguing that the evidence on record shows that Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to
she purchased the disputed property in her own name with her own money. fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the
She maintained that the documents pertaining to her acquisitions are best Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing property
evidence to prove who actually bought it. relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even
if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the
CA: reversed the RTC decision and adjudged Yolanda as exclusive owner of Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
the property.
Hence, as the applicable law being settled, petitioner has the burden to prove
It ruled that under the provisions of Article 148 of the Family Code, the his contributions in the acquisition of the property. Contentions must be
evidence on record and attending circumstances of Yolanda’s claim of sole proved by competent evidence. Mere allegation is not evidence.
ownership is meritorious. Lupo failed to overcome the burden of proving his Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam and
allegation that the property was purchased using his exclusive funds. Rodolfo Jr.-- all surnamed Reyes
G.R. No. 154645; July 13, 2004
142

PANGANIBAN, J.
RULING
FACTS 1. Yes. Under Article 145 thereof, a conjugal partnership of gains
(CPG) is created upon marriage end lasts until the legal union is
Lourdes Reyes is the widow of Rodolfo Reyes who died on dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation or judicial separation
September 12, 1981. Lourdes and Rodolfo married in 1947 in Manila and of property. Conjugal properties are by law owned in common by the
have four (4) children: Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam, and Rodolfo Jr. Rodolfo, husband and wife. As to what constitutes such properties are laid out
in the course of their marriage, had illicit relations with Milagros Joaquino in Article 153 of the Code, which we quote:
with whom he also had three (3) children: Jose Romillo, Imelda May and "(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
Charina. Rodolfo and Milagros decided to buy a house and lot which expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
executed in the name Milagros. Lourdes alleges that the funds used to partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
purchase this property were conjugal funds and earnings of the deceased. (2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the
Aside from the house, Rodolfo allegedly "put into custody" some of the spouses, or of either of them;
couple's conjugal properties under the care of his paramour. These (3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage,
properties include his earnings and retirement benefits from working as the coming from the common property or from the exclusive property of
Vice President and Comptroller of Warner Barnes and Company and two each spouse."
cars. Under Article 160 of the Code, all properties of the marriage,
unless proven to pertain to the husband or the wife exclusively, are
Lourdes prayed that the properties be declared conjugal, that presumed to belong to the CPG. For the rebuttable presumption to
Milagros surrenders the possession thereof, and that damages be awarded. arise, however, the properties must first be proven to have been
Milagros, on the other hand, contends that she purchased the mentioned acquired during the existence of the marriage.
properties in her exclusive capacity. She also contends that she had no 2. No. Article 144 of the Civil Code mandates a co-ownership between
knowledge of the Rodolfo's first marriage was never a beneficiary of the a man and a woman who are living together but are not legally
latter's earnings, and that her living together with Rodolfo for nineteen (19) married. For Article 144 to apply, the couple must not be
years, along with the fact that she had children with him, be considered by incapacitated to contract marriage.
the court in rendering judgment. Lourdes, however, died and was later It has been held that the Article is inapplicable to common-
represented by her children with Rodolfo. Subsequently, the trial court law relations amounting to adultery or concubinage, as in this case.
granted Lourdes' complaint. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, Milagros The reason therefor is the absurdity of creating a co-ownership in
reiterated her stand and questioned the findings of the trial court. CA affirmed cases in which there exists a prior conjugal partnership between the
the ruling of the trial court and likewise held that the property had been paid man and his lawful wife.
out of the conjugal funds of Rodolfo and Lourdes, because the funds used to In default of Article 144 of the Civil Code, Article 148 of the
pay the house off was sourced from Rodolfo's earnings as part of the Family Code has been applied.The latter Article provides:
conjugal partnership. "Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
ISSUES through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
1. Do the properties in question pertain to the conjugal partnership of contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
gains? contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
2. Does the petitioner have the right of co-ownership with the The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
deceased? money and evidence of credit.
143
"If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her
share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for
conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party ejectment against Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and Gina Tumlo. Spouses
which acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her Fernandez alleged that they are absolute owners of an apartment building
share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph and that they allowed herein petitioners to occupy said building for seven (7)
of the preceding Article. years through tolerance. It was agreed that after a few months, Guillerma will
"The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if pay P1, 600 per month while the others P1, 000 each as rental. However,
both parties are in bad faith." such agreement was not complied with. Spouses Fernandez also alleged
Thus, when a common-law couple have a legal impediment that they have demanded the defendants to vacate the premises and
to marriage, only the property acquired by them -- through payment incurred to no avail.
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry -- shall Upon appeal to the RTC of the defendants in the ejectment case,
be owned by them in common and in proportion to their respective they alleged that Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had an amorous
contributions. relationship and they acquired the said property in as their "love nest." ;that
The present controversy hinges on the source of the funds they lived together in the said apartment building with their two (2) children
paid for the house and lot in question. Upon the resolution of this for around ten (10) years, and that Guillerma administered the property by
issue depends the determination of whether the property is conjugal collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until she
(owned by Rodolfo and Lourdes) or exclusive (owned by Milagros) or discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage.
co-owned by Rodolfo and Milagros. Further, she alleged that the spouses have no cause of action against her as
All told, respondents have shown that the property was she is a co-owner or the property in question as the Contract to Sell shows
bought during the marriage of Rodolfo and Lourdes, a fact that gives that she is a co-vendee together with Mario.
rise to the presumption that it is conjugal. More important, they have ISSUE
established that the proceeds of the loan obtained by Rodolfo were May the petitioner be considered as a co-owner of the property in
used to pay for the property; and that the loan was, in turn, paid from question?
his salaries and earnings, which were conjugal funds under the Civil RULING
Code. No. Herein petitioner cannot be considered as a co-owner of the
Under the circumstances, therefore, the purchase and the property in question.
subsequent registration of the realty in petitioner’s name was The applicable law is not Article 144 of the Civil Code, but Article 148
tantamount to a donation by Rodolfo to Milagros. By express of the Family Code which provides:
provision of Article 739(1) of the Civil Code, such donation was void, Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
because it was "made between persons who were guilty of adultery Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
or concubinage at the time of the donation." their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
persons living together as husband and wife without a valid money and evidences of credit.
marriage." If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in
Hence, the property belongs to the conjugal partnership of the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
gains and that the petitioner paramour shall not be co-owners with partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
the married deceased. bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
Guillerma Tumlos v. Spouses Mario and Lourdes Fernandez forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
G.R. No. 137650 April 12, 2000 preceding Article.
PANGANIBAN, J.: The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both
parties are in bad faith.
FACTS
144

Art. 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
man and a woman who are not incapacitated to marry each other, or to one ownership.
in which the marriage of the parties is void from the beginning. It does not
apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it would In the absence of proof to the contrary,
be absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists a prior conjugal properties acquired while they lived together shall be
partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife. presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts,
Therefore, petitioner cannot be a co-owner with Mario Fernandez work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
because the latter is incapacitated to marry petitioner and cohabited with him shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
in a state of concubinage. not participate in the acquisition by other party of any
JOHN ABING vs. JULIET WAEYAN property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
G.R. No. 146294; July 31, 2006 the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted
GARCIA, J. in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
FACTS
The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary,
A man and a woman who, during the good old days, lived together any property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint efforts and is
cohabitation, they acquired properties. Later, they parted ways, and with it owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by
this litigation between them involving one of their common properties, a the rules on co-ownership. And under this regime, they owned their
structure which house a sari-sari store. properties in common in equal shares.
ISSUE PEDRO GAYON vs. SILVESTRE GAYON and GENOVEVA DE

G.R. No. L-28394; November 26, 1970
Who is entitled to the subject property? CONCEPCION, C.J.
HELD FACTS
The structure which house a sari-sari store is owned by the common- Pedro Gayon filed a complaint against spouses Silvestre Gayon and
law spouses in common. Genoveva De Gayon. Pedro Gayon is the brother of now deceased Silvester
Gayon. Genoveva Gayon, in her answer to the complaint, alleged among
In this connection, Article 147 of the Family Code is instructive. It others that the complaint should be dismissed because Pedro Gayon failed
reads: to exert efforts for the amicable settlement before filing the complaint as
required under Article 222 of the Civil Code (Now Article 149 of the Family
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are Code) which provides that “No suit shall be filed or maintained between
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed,
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and subject to the limitations in article 2035”.
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and
the property acquired by both of them through their ISSUE
145
Does Pedro Gayon’s failure to seek a compromise before filing his
complaint a ground for dismissal of the complaint? Petitioner spouses aver that the complaint should have been dismissed since
the complaint failed to aver that earnest efforts towards a compromise were
HELD exerted considering that the suit involved members of the same family and
that not trust relationship was established.
No, Pedro Gayon’s failure to seek a compromise before filing his
complaint is not a ground for dismissal of the complaint. ISSUE:
Was the failure to amend the complaint to allege that earnest efforts towards
The impediment arising from Article 222 of the Civil Code (Now a compromise were exerted a ground for the its dismissal?
Article 149 of the Family Code) applies to suits "filed or maintained between
members of the same family." This phrase, "members of the same family," HELD:
should, however, be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code (Now No, the failure to allege the same was not a ground for the dismissal of the
Article 150 of the Family Code), pursuant to which family relations shall complaint.
include those (1) between husband and wife, (2) between parent and child,
(3) among other ascendants and their descendants and (4) among brothers While respondent-spouses did not formally amend their complaint, they were
and sisters. nonetheless allowed to introduce evidence purporting to show that earnest
efforts toward a compromise had been made, that is, respondent O Lay Kia
Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas her children are his importuned Emilia O'Laco and pressed her for the transfer of the title of the
nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as none of them is included in the Oroquieta property in the name of spouses O Lay Kia and Valentin Co Cho
enumeration contained in said Art. 217 — which should be construed strictly, Chit, just before Emilia's marriage to Hugo Luna. But, instead of transferring
it being an exception to the general rule — and Silvestre Gayon must the title as requested, Emilia sold the property to the Roman Catholic
necessarily be excluded as party in the case at bar, it follows that the same Archbishop of Manila. This testimony was not objected to by petitioner-
does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's failure to seek a spouses. Hence, the complaint was deemed accordingly amended to
compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same. conform to the evidence, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court
which reads —
Spouses O'laco and Luna v. Spouses Co Cho Chit and O Lay Kia and
CA "SECTION 5. Amendment to conform
G.R. No. 58010; March 31, 1993 to or authorize presentation of evidence.
BELLOSILLO, J.: — When issues not raised by the
pleadings are tried by express or implied
FACTS: consent of the parties, they shall be
Petitioner Emilia O'laco and respondent O Lay Kia are half-sisters. A parcel treated in all respects, as, if they had
of land was sold to O'laco naming her as the vendee in the Deed of Absolute been raised in the pleadings . . ."
Sale and evidence by a Transfer Certificate of Title in her name. Later,
O'laco sold the parcel of land to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. Indeed, if the defendant permits evidence to be introduced without objection
Respondent spouses, upon knowledge of the sale, instituted an action and which supplies the necessary allegations of a defective complaint, then
against the petitioner spouses alleging that they were the real vendees and the evidence is deemed to have the effect of curing the defects of the
that a relationship of trust was established and that the sale constituted a complaint. The insufficiency of the allegations in the complaint is deemed
breach of the trust. Petitioner spouses countered saying that no relationship ipso facto rectified.
of trust was established and that the title to the property was merely
delivered to the respondent spouses for safekeeping. Thus, even if the complaint was not amended to show that earnest efforts
towards a compromise were exerted, its dismissal is not warranted.
Finding no trust relationship, the trial court dismissed the complaint as well
as the counterclaim. On appeal, the appellate court favored the respondent Florante Manacop v. CA
spouses. GR No. 97898, August 11, 1997
146

Panganiban, J. precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or
head of the family who owns the home.
FACTS:
Florante Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased on 1972 a residential Under the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject
lot with a bungalow located in Quezon City. E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a property became his family home under the simplified process embodied in
complaint against Florante and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. to Article 153 of said Code. However, Modequillo explicitly ruled that said
collect an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45 however they were able to enter provision of the Family Code does not have retroactive effect. In other words,
into a compromise agreement which the trial court approved. E & L filed a prior to August 3, 1988, the procedure mandated by the Civil Code had to be
motion for execution of the judgment which the lower court granted levying followed for a family home to be constituted as such. There being absolutely
several vehicles and personal properties of Florante and sold at public no proof that the subject property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted
auctions. Florante filed a motion to quash the alias writ of execution alleging as a family home, it follows that the laws protective mantle cannot be availed
among others that the subject property is considered a family home and thus of by petitioner. Since the debt involved herein was incurred and the assailed
exempt from execution. On the other hand, E&L opposed that the subject orders of the trial court issued prior to August 3, 1988, the petitioner cannot
property cannot be considered as a family home on the grounds that Florante be shielded by the benevolent provisions of the Family Code.
was already living abroad and that the property, having been acquired in
1972, should have been judicially constituted as a family home to exempt if Hence, the writ of execution can be executed against petitioner’s
from execution. The lower court denied the motion on the ground that the family home.
residence was not exempt from execution as it was not duly constituted as a
family home pursuant to the Civil Code. On appeal, the CA agreed with the
trial court.
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in holding that his residence
was not exempt from execution in view of his failure to show that the property
involved has been duly constituted as a family home in accordance with
law. He asserts that the Family Code and Modequillo require simply the
occupancy of the property by the petitioner, without need for its judicial or
extrajudicial constitution as a family home.
ISSUE: Can a writ of execution be issued before the effectivity of the Family
Code be executed on a family home constituted under the said Code?
RULING:
Yes, a writ of execution issued before the effectivity of the Family code
can be executed on a family home constituted under the said Code.
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a

house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no
need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil
Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family
home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary
147
Jose Modequillo v Hon. Augusto V. Breva (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before
G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990 or after such constitution; and
GANCAYCO, J.:
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects,
builders, material men and others who have rendered
FACTS: The RTC issued a writ of execution to satisfy the judgment on the service or furnished material for the construction of the
goods and chattels of the Modequillo and Malubay after it became final and building.
executory. The sheriff then levied on a residential and agricultural lands
Art. 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing
registered in the name of Modequillo.
family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash alleging that the residential house
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was
and lot was occupied since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and
not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the
as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles
Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article
152 and 153 of the Family Code and that the judgment debt sought to be
153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the
enforced is not one of those enumerated under Article 155. effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after
The trial court ruled that the residential land only became a family its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap
home on August 4, 1988 when the Family Code took effect. It stated that: (1) year). The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home
the Code cannot be interpreted in such a way that all family residences are from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the
occupancy and that (2) they are exempt from execution for the payment of provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar
obligations incurred before its effectivity. as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153
of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences
ISSUE: Is the residential house of Modequillo, which was occupied since
are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
1969, exempt from execution?
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from
RULING: No, it is not exempt from execution of the money judgment arising execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the
from the vehicular accident. Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at
Articles 152, 153, 155 and 162 of the Family Code provide as follows: the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes
and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of
wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is
situated. Hence, the exemption from execution cannot be availed of.
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot
from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of
its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided
and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family
home;
148

GOMEZ-SALCEDO vs. STA. INES been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior
G.R. No. 132537, October 14, 2005 to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution
Chico-Nazario, J for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the
Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family
FACTS: In 1986, the petitioners filed a complaint for damages against
residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are
Marrieta Sta. Ines (spouse and mother of the respondents) for failure to
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the
account the produce of the rice land entrusted by the petitioners' mother to
Marrieta since 1977. The RTC rendered a judgment in default in favor of the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article
petitioners and it issued a writ of execution. A parcel of land together with 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a
retroactive effect.
improvements registered in the name of Marrieta was levied upon and sold at
a public auction to one of the petitioner as highest bidder. The respondents In the case at bar, the house and lot of respondents was not
seek the annulment of the sale based on the ground that the house and lot constituted as a family home, whether judicially or extrajudicially, at the time
auctioned was their family residence, and is thus exempt from execution. Marietta incurred her debts. Neither is it correct to say that the obligation
They also argued that the family residence occupied by them since 1972 sought to be satisfied by the levy of the property was incurred only upon the
became a family home by operation of law in accordance with the Family issuance of the judgment in the original case in January of 1989. As stated
Code's effectivity in 1988 and the judgment for the complaint was made only by herein petitioners, the complaint against Marietta was instituted on 17
in 1989. On the other hand, the petitioners moved to dismiss the case June 1986 to seek redress for damages suffered by them due to acts and
contending that the respondents has no legal capacity to sue and that they omissions committed by Marietta as early as 1977 when she assumed
cannot claim exemption because the debt was incurred prior to the management and supervision of their deceased mothers rice land. This
constitution of the family home. means to say that Marietta's liability, which was the basis of the judgment,
arose long before the levied property was constituted as a family home by
operation of law in August 1988.
ISSUE: Is the family home of the respondent not considered as exempt from
execution based on Article 155 (2) which excludes debts incurred prior to the Hence, under the circumstances, it is clear that the liability incurred
constitution of the family home from the exemption? by Marietta falls squarely under one of the instances when a family home
may be the subject of execution, forced sale, or attachment, as provided for
by Article 155 of the Family Code, particularly, to answer for debts incurred
HELD: Yes, the family home of the respondents is not exempt from
execution. prior to the constitution of the family home.
Under Article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be
exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment except for, among other
things, debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home. Under
prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as such only upon the
effectivity of the Family Code on 03 August 1988, thus, the debts were
incurred before the constitution of the family home. As stated in the case of
Modequillo v. Breva:
. . . Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that
the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family
residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does not
mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive
effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have
149
Perla G. Patricio v. Marcelino G. Dario III and CA Spouses Eduardo and Elsa Versola vs. Court of Appeals
GR no. 164740
G.R. No. 170829; November 20, 2006
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS: Private Respondent Dr. Victoria T. Ong, one Dolores Ledesma, and
herein petitioners Spouses Eduardo and Elsa Versola are parties to a series
FACTS: On July 5, 1987, Marcelino Dario died intestate and was survived by of transactions involving a loan, a sale, a real estate mortgage, and finally, a
his wife, petitioner Perla and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and levy on execution. The property involved in all said transactions is a house
private respondent Marcelino Dario III. He left a residential house and a pre- and lot located at Tandang Sora, Quezon City originally owned by Ledesma.
school building in Cubao, Quezon City. Petitioner and Marcelino Marc Ledesma used the property as a security for her loan with Ong. Then, she
informed private respondent of their intention to terminate the co-ownership sold the same to the petitioners. To facilitate payment of the loan with Ong, it
but the latter refused. Hence, they instituted an action for partition, which was was also subject to a real estate mortgage with Asiatrust Bank. Ultimately,
granted by the RTC. upon non-payment by Ledesma of outstanding debts, the trial court ordered
payment of the loan to Ong (P 1.5 M plus interests). The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision. Upon Motion for Execution filed by Ong, the property
Private respondent contends that the family home cannot be involved was levied upon. The Sheriff set the sale of the property at public
partitioned because his 12 year-old son, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, is a auction on September 19, 2000. Petitioners were served a notice of the sale.
minor beneficiary who is still living therein. On the other hand, the petitioner On September 18, the petitioners filed with the sheriff an
contends that the family home remained as such only up to July 5, 1997, or “Objection/Exception to the Sheriffs Sale of Defendant Sps. Eduardo and
th
the 10 year from the decedent’s death. Likewise, there is no more minor Elsa Versolas Family Home Pending Court Order or Clearance”, wherein the
beneficiary because Marcelino Marc and private respondents were already of petitioners stated that the property involved is their family home and that the
age. On appeal, CA dismissed the action for partition. Hence, this petition. sheriff has knowledge of such fact. Despite petitioners’ objections, however,
the property was still sold at public auction and was awarded to private
respondent at a price covering the total loan amount plus interests (P 2.835
ISSUE: Is the partition of the family home proper even if a minor beneficiary M).
still lives therein? When Ong filed with the court an Ex-parte Motion for Issuance of
Confirmation of Judicial Sale of Real Property of Sps. Eduardo and
Elsa Versola, petitioners opposed on the gound that the property sold at the
HELD: Yes, the partition of the family home is proper. Under Art. 159 of the
public auction is exempt from execution as it is the Family Home, pursuant to
Family Code, three requisites: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of
Art. 153 of the Family Code.
the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent
for legal support upon the head of the family. The first and second requisites ISSUE: Is the act of alleging that the house involved in the present case is
are satisfied. the family home sufficient to exempt it from execution?
HELD: NO, merely alleging that a property is the Family Home is insufficient
to avail of the exemption from execution under Art. 153 of the Family Code.
As to the third requisite, it is not complied with because Marcelino Lorenzo R.
Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153
parents who are capable of supporting him. Thus, the partition of the family of the Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor
home is proper since there is no minor beneficiary actually living therein. and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself
before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the
person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a
family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the
Sheriff. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the
exception.
On the day immediately prior to the scheduled sale of the subject property,
petitioners filed with the sheriff an Objection/Exception to Sheriffs Sale of
150

Defendant Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versolas Family Home. Petitioners simply Taneo vs. Court of Appeals
alleged there that the property subject of the intended auction sale was their
G.R. No. 108532, March 9, 1999
family home. Instead of substantiating their claim, petitioners languidly
presupposed that the sheriff had prior knowledge that the said property was Kapunan, J.
constituted by them as their family home. Lamentably, in the said objection,
petitioners did not set forth therein any evidence to substantiate their
claim that the property to be sold at the execution sale was indeed FACTS: As a result of judgment in a civil case, two of the properties of Pablo
exempt for having been constituted as a family home. Taneo were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of about PhP 5,000: one
was a lot about five hectares and a family home both located in Misamis
Hence, not being able to timely and rigorously prove the status of the Oriental. The said properties were sold at public auction on February 12,
property as the Family Home, petitioners’ claim is denied – it is not exempt 1966 to Abdon Gilig, the highest bidder. For failure to redeem the property, a
from execution. final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968, definitely
selling, transferring, and conveying said properties to Gilig.
To forestall such conveyance, petitioners who are the children of Pablo

Taneo, filed an action on November 5, 1985 to declare the deed of
conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. In their complaint, it was alleged that they were in
continuous, open and peaceful possession of the land and that on February
9, 1968. Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay issued a Sheriffs Deed of
Conveyance in favor of Gilig over the subject property including their family
home which was extrajudicially constituted in accordance with law. They
alleged that being a family home, such is not subject to execution in
accordance with the provisions of the Family Code. As a result of the alleged
illegal deed of conveyance, Gilig was able to obtain in his name Tax
Declaration No. 851920 over the land, thus casting a cloud of doubt over the
title and ownership of petitioners over said property.
ISSUE: Can the family home of the Taneos be exempt from execution under
the Family Code?
HELD: No, the family home of the Taneos cannot be exempt from execution
under the Family Code.
A family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family. It is said,
however, that the familyhome is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable
and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on
151
which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such that all existing family residences, petitioner's included, are deemed to
such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to
heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain specials cases. the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution
for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988 (Mondequillo vs. Breva, 185 SCRA 766). Neither
Under the Civil Code (Articles 224 to 251), a family home may be constituted does Article 162 of said Code state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V
judicial and extrajudicially, the former by the filing of the petition and with the thereof have retroactive effect. It simply means that all existing family
approval of the proper court, and the latter by the recording of a public residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are considered
instrument in the proper registry of property declaring the establishment of family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
the family home. The operative act then which created the family home family home under the Family Code (Modequillo vs. Breva, supra). Since
extrajudicially was the registration in the Registry of Property of the petitioner's debt was incurred as early as November 25, 1987, it preceded
declaration prescribed by Articles 240 and 241 of the Civil Code. the effectivity of the Family Code. His property is therefore not exempt from
attachment.
Under the Family Code, however, registration was no longer necessary.

Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed The applicable law, therefore, in the case at bar is still the Civil Code where
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied in the family. It registration of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite.
reads: Nonetheless, the law provides certain instances where the family home is not
exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment.
The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as Art. 243 reads:
its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be
such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, except as
hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment, except:
It is under the foregoing provision which petitioners seek refuge to avert

execution of the family home arguing that as early as 1964, Pablo Taneo had (1) For nonpayment of taxes;
already constituted the house in question as their family home. However, the
(2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the Registry of
retroactive effect of the Family Code, particularly on the provisions on the
Property;
family home has been clearly laid down by the court as explained in the case
of Manacop v. Court of Appeals to wit: (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
record of the declaration;
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material-men
Finally, the petitioner insists that the attached property is a family home,
and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the
having been occupied by him and his family since 1972, and is therefore construction of the building.
exempt from attachment.
The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the
The contention is not well-taken.
house in question, erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family
home. The instrument constituting the family home was registered only on
January 24, 1966. The money judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered
While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is
deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the "debt" was incurred, the
family residence, it does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect family home was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners'
152

alleged family home, as constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls SSS vs. Aguas
under the exception of Article 243 (2).
483 SCRA 383
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Moreover, the constitution of the family home by Pablo Taneo is even
doubtful considering that such constitution did not comply with the
requirements of the law. The trial court found that the house was erected not FACTS: Pablo Aguas is a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a
on the land which the Taneos owned but on the land of one Plutarco pensioner. Pablo’s surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with
Vacalares. By the very definition of the law that the "family home is the the SSS for death benefits. Rosanna indicated in her claim that Pablo was
dwelling house where a person and his family resides and the land on which likewise survived by his minor child, Jeylnn, who was born on October 29,
it is situated," it is understood that the house should be constructed on a land 1991. Her claim for monthly pension was settled. The SSS received a sworn
not belonging to another. Apparently, the constitution of a family home by letter from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister, alleging that Pablo had
Pablo Taneo in the instant case was merely an afterthought in order to no legal children with Rosanna as after the baptism Jenlynn there was a
escape execution of their property but to no avail. commotion at the house because Romeo dela Peña was claiming that he
was the father of the child and since then, Pablo and Rosanna separated. As
a result, the SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnn’s monthly
pension.The claimants appended to their petition, among others, photocopies
of marriage certificate of Pablo and Rossana and Jeylnn’s certificate of live
birth among others bearing the signature of Pablo as the father. The said
documents were confirmed as authentic by the civil registers. Respondents,
for their part, asserted that Jeylnn’s legitimacy may be impugned only on the
grounds stated in Article 166 of the Family Code, none of which were proven
in this case.
The SSC ruled that Rosanna and Jeylnn were not entitled to the benifits. On
appeal, the CA reversed the said decision
ISSUE: Is Jeylnn considered as legitimate child of Pablo Aguas and thus

entitled to the death benefits of the latter?
HELD: Yes. She is the legitimate child of Pablo Aguas. Jeylnn’s claim is
justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the signature of
Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from the Civil
Registry showing that she was born on October 29, 1991. The records also
show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4, 1977 and the
marriage subsisted until the latter’s death on December 8, 1996. It is
153
therefore evident that Jeylnn was born during Rosanna and Pablo’s MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA
marriage. It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR
children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994
This Court, in De Jesus v. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon, PUNO, J.:
extensively discussed this presumption –This presumption indeed becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of FACTS: Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various
access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which properties in Laguna Isabel died first. Vicente followed. He died intestate.
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity Private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar
of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the (Vicente’s sister and nephew, respectively) instituted a special proceeding
husband and wife are living separately in such way that sexual intercourse is praying for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate in
not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents favor of private respondent Aguilar. Petitioner Marissa Benitez-Badua
sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set (Marissa) opposed the petition.Petitioner Marissa alleged that she is the sole
forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of administering his
(which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of estate. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the
the child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She submitted documentary
presumption becomes fixed and unassailable. evidence, among others: her Certificate of Live Birth. She also testified that
the said spouses reared an continuously treated her as their legitimate
daughter. Respondent argues that the decedent is survived by no other heirs
Indeed, impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the or relatives be they ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate,
husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. In this case, there is no showing illegitimate or legally adopted; that Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised
that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime. Hence, and cared by them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood,
Jeylnn’s status as a legitimate child of Pablo can no longer be contested. nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir The trial court decided in
favor of the petitioner. However, the Decision of the trial court was reversed
by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition
ISSUES:
1. Is the petitioner the biological child of the Vicente Benitez and

Isabel Chipongian
2. If not, did they legally adopt her?
RULING:
1. No, petitioner is not the biological child of the spouses and they did
not validly adopt her. The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and
growing big with child, as well as her delivering a baby, are matters that
cannot be hidden from the public eye, and so is the fact that a woman never
became pregnant and could not have, therefore, delivered a baby at all.
Hence, if she is suddenly seen mothering and caring for a baby as if it were
her own, especially at the rather late age of 36 (the age of Isabel Chipongian
when appellee Marissa Benitez was allegedly born), we can be sure that she
is not the true mother of that baby.
154

In this case, the evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel Antonio Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals and Elizabeth Mejias
Chipongian never became pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a child. G.R. No. L-49542; September 12, 1980
There were also several disinterested neighbors of the couple who testified in MAKASIAR, J:
this case and declared that they used to see Isabel almost everyday
especially as she had drugstore in the ground floor of her house, but they
never saw her to have been pregnant, in 1954 (the year appellee Marissa FACTS: Elizabeth Mejias is married to Crispin Anahaw. During such
Benitez was allegedly born, according to her birth certificate) or at any time at marriage, Elizabeth had an affair with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang
all, and that it is also true with the rest of their townmates. sometime in March of 1967. It was alleged that the spouses separated due to
the affair. Seven months or 210 days following the illicit act, Elizabeth gave
2. No, the spouses did not legally adopt her. The mere registration of birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang. Elizabeth filed
a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed a complaint afterwards for recognition and support against Antonio claiming
parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the that Rolando is their illegitimate child, but petitioner Macadangdang opposed
status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even such complaint. The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioner stating that
amounts of simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her Rolando shall be presumed a legitimate child of Elizabeth and Crispin. The
birth certificate, which is a public document. Court of Appeals ruled, however, that Rolando is the illegitimate son of
Antonio.
It has become a practice in recent times for people who want to
avoid the expense and trouble of a judicial adoption to simply register the ISSUE: May Rolando be presumed the legitimate child of Elizabeth Mejias
child as their supposed child in the civil registry. Perhaps Atty. Benitez, and Crispin Anahaw?
though a lawyer himself, thought that he could avoid the trouble if not the
expense of adopting the child Marissa through court proceedings by merely
putting himself and his wife as the parents of the child in her birth certificate. RULING: Yes. Rolando may be presumed as the legitimate child of
Or perhaps he had intended to legally adopt the child when she grew a little Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw.
older but did not come around doing so either because he was too busy or
for some other reason. The applicable law then was Art. 255 and 256 of the Civil Code (Now Art.
166 and 167 of the Family Code) which states that:
Hence, this petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit. Marissa Art. 255 Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
is not the biological daughter of Vicente and Isabel, nor was she validly celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its
adopted. dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate.
Against this presumption, no evidence shall be admitted other than that
of the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife
within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which
preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were separately, in such a way
that access was not possible;
155
(3) By the serious illness of the husband. Teofista Babiera v. Presentacion Catotal
G.R. No. 138493; June 15, 2000
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother Panganiban, J.
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as an adulteress.
FACTS: Respondent Presentacion asserted that she is the only
The baby boy subject of this controversy was born only seven (7) months surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa.
after the illicit intercourse between respondent and petitioner took place, and Flora Guinto, the housemaid of said spouses, gave birth to a baby girl
also, seven months from their separation (if there really was a separation). It delivered by hilot in the house of the spouses.Without the knowledge of said
must be noted that as of March, 1967, respondent and Crispin Anahaw had spouses, Flora Guinto caused the registration/recording of the facts of birth
already four children; hence, they had been married years before such date. of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio,
The birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days following then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54 years old. Flora Guinto made
the celebration of the said marriage and before 300 days following the Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging the latter’s signature.
alleged separation between aforenamed spouses. Presentacion, then 15 years old, saw with her own eyes and personally
witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted
The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and
by 'hilot'. Presentacion filed a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth
her spouse, Crispin Anahaw. This presumption becomes conclusive in the
of Teofista Babiera in the Civil Registry. She contended that the birth
absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the
certificate of petitioner Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, since it was totally a
spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child.
simulated birth, the signature of informant was forged, and it contained false
In this case, no concrete or even substantial proof was presented to establish
entries. She alleged that Teofista was made to appear as the legitimate child
physical impossibility of access between respondent and her spouse. From
of the late spouses when she is not and the signature of Hermogena
her very revealing testimony, respondent declared that she was bringing two
Cariosa, the mother, is falsified/forged.
sacks of rice to Samal for her children; that her four children by her husband
in her mother's house in the said town; that her alleged estranged husband
also lived in her mother's place.
Teofista, on the other hand, contended that Presentacion has no
It must be stressed that Article 256 of the Civil Code which provides that the standing to sue, because Article 171 of the Family Code states that the
child is presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared against child's filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress has been circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a child is not subject
adopted for two solid reasons. First, in a fit of anger, or to arouse jealousy in to a collateral attack. She asserted that the petition states no cause of action,
the husband, the wife may have made this declaration. Second, the article is it being an attack on her legitimacy as the child of the spouses Eugenio
established as a guaranty in favor of the children whose condition should not Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa Babiera. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
be under the mercy of the passions of their parents. And more importantly, declared the Certificate of Birth of Teofista Guinto as null and void ab initio.
that at the moment of conception, it cannot be determined when a woman The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA held
cohabits during the same period with two men, by whom the child was that the evidence adduced during trial proved that petitioner was not the
begotten, it being possible that it be the husband himself. biological child of Hermogena Babiera. The CA deemed inapplicable Articles
170 and 171 of the Family Code, which stated that only the father could
Hence, the child Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son
impugn the child's legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a
of respondent and her husband.
collateral attack. It held that said provisions contemplated a situation wherein
the husband or his heirs asserted that the child of the wife was not his. In this
case, the action involved the cancellation of the child’s Birth Certificate for
being void ab initio on the ground that the child did not belong to either the
father or the mother.
ISSUES:
156

A) Does respondent Presentacion have legal capacity to file legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal
the special proceeding for the cancellation of the entry of fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased."
birth of Teofista Guinto?
B) Is the petition barred by prescription?
B) No, the action has not yet prescribed.
RULING:
"Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought
A) Yes, Presentacion has the requisite standing to file the petition. within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil
register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in
the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within
"If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of
the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:
birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period
(1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if
bringing his action; abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or
therefrom; or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth,
whichever is earlier."
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
The present action involves the cancellation of petitioner’s Birth Certificate; it

Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in
reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the action to nullify the
impugns the legitimacy of his wife’s child. The provision, however, Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab initio.
presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The
present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to
petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is
an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the
latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioners
filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no
blood relation to impugn in the first place.
In Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 the
SC likewise ruled:
Petitioners recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the
Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal provision refers to an action to
impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action
to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents
to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They
do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the
deceased, but that she is not the decedent’s child at all. Being neither [a]
157
Corazon Dezoller Tison vs. Court of Appeals The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of
G.R. No. 121027; July 31, 1997 Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the present action
REGALADO, J. for reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the further consideration that
private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein
petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of
FACTS: Spouses Teodora Dezoller Guerrero and Martin Guerrero owned a petitioners unless and until it is rebutted.
parcel of land in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. Teodora died
intestate, and was survived only by Martin and herein petitioners Corazon
Dezoller Tison and Rene Dezoller. Petitioners are the niece and nephew of Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this case, the
the deceased Teodora through Teodora’s brother, Hermogenes Dezoller. burden of proof rests not on herein petitioners who have the benefit of the
Martin adjudicated the land unto himself as sole heir, and sold the same to presumption in their favor, but on private respondent who is disputing the
private respondent Teodora Domingo. Martin died and subsequently, same.
petitioners filed an action for reconveyance, claiming that they are entitled to
inherit one-half of the property by right of representation. Private respondent,
through a Demurrer to Evidence, alleged that petitioners failed to prove their Accordingly, the Certificate of Marriage (Exhibit S) wherein it is indicated that
legitimate filiation with decedent Teodora in accordance with Article 172 of the parents of Teodora Dezoller are Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, as
the Family Code, and as such, they are not entitled to one-half of the estate. well as the Certificates of Baptism of Teodora Dezoller (Exhibit H) and
The trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of private respondent Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit J) which both reflect the names of their
and found that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation to Teodora. parents as Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, to show that Hermogenes
Dezoller is the brother of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; and the Death
Certificate of Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit K) the entries wherein were
ISSUE: Were petitioners able to prove their legitimate filiation to Teodora to made by petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison as his daughter, together with the
entitle them to one-half of her estate? Joint Affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar (Exhibits N and P), to
prove that herein petitioners are the children of Hermogenes Dezoller—these
RULING: “The rulings of both lower courts in the case are basically can be deemed to have sufficiently established the relationship between the
premised on the erroneous assumption that, in the first place, the issue of [decedent] and herein petitioners.
legitimacy may be validly controverted in an action for reconveyance, and, in
the second place, that herein petitioners have the onus probandi to prove
their legitimacy and, corollarily, their filiation. We disagree on both counts. It Hence, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are
seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of herein private respondent’s
regrettably overlooked the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as
There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted.”
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the
issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is
the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of
his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or
expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in
exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy.
Outside of these cases, none—even his heirs—can impugn legitimacy; that
would amount to an insult to his memory.
158

Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have
GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992 happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits
Bidin, J: of life.
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is
FACTS: Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted founded on the following rationale:
3 marriages during his lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he
was still a bachelor. He had 4 children with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, “The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of
who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano and marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a
Ireneo. On the other hand, Lupo’s second wife is Flaviana Montellano where new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
they had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans towards
in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to
Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband and that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order
wife, and were known in the community to be such. Lupo’s descendants by of society and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.”
whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate
and was subjected to a voluntary registration proceedings and a decree
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife
ordering the registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in the third
and such relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their
marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased
being married must be admitted as a fact.
father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.
2) Yes. The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate
ISSUE: filiation may be proven. However, considering the effectivity of the Family
1) Is the marriage of Lupo with Felipa valid in the absence of a marriage Code of the Philippines, the case at bar must be decided under a new if not
license? entirely dissimilar set of rules because the parties have been overtaken by
events, to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
2) Are the respondents Jacinto Mariategui et al legitimate children of Lupo
No. 76873, October 26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, there
Mariategui?
are only two classes of children — legitimate and illegitimate. The fine
distinctions among various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated
HELD: (Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]).
1) Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children
Felipa’s marriage, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. may be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. legitimate child.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents.
place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, Jacinto's birth certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article.
deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was
contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other private
159
respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence FRANCISCO L. JISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON
any of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed G.R. No. 124853; February 24, 1998
the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Jacinto.
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and
FACTS: Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against
lacking in substance as to certain dates and names of relatives with whom
petitioner, Francisco Jison, for recognition as illegitimate child.
their family resided, these are but minor details. The nagging fact is that for a
considerable length of time and despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the Petitioner, while married to Lilia Lopez Jison, impregnated Esperanza
private respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupo's death in 1953. It Amolar, Monina’s mother, who was then employed as a nanny. Monina
should be noted that even the trial court mentioned in its decision the claims that since childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied
admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the recognition as the illegitimate child of Francisco by his acts and that of his
petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay family. Monina further alleged that Francisco gave her support and spent for
pawang mga kapatid ko sa ama . . ." her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a certified
public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner.
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private
respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and On the other hand, Francisco alleged that he could not have had sexual
therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified as she had
recognition is inapplicable to this case. ceased to be in his employ and did not know of her whereabouts since then;
further, he never recognized Monina, expressly or impliedly, as his
illegitimate child. As affirmative and special defenses, Francisco contended
that Monina had no right or cause of action against him and that her action
was barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription.
ISSUE/S:
1. Is Monina Jison the recognized illegitimate daughter of Francisco
Jison by the latter’s own acts and those of his family?
2. Is Monina Jison barred from instituting or prosecuting the present
action by estoppels, laches and/or prescription?
RULING:
1. YES, Monina Jison is the recognized illegitimate daughter of
Francisco Jison.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as

MONINA's, may be established in the same way and on the same
evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides
the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is
established, thus:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by

any of the following:
160

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register We readily conclude that the testimonial evidence offered by
or a final judgment; or MONINA, woven by her narration of circumstances and events that
occurred through the years, concerning her relationship with
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
FRANCISCO, coupled with the testimonies of her witnesses,
document or a private handwritten instrument signed
overwhelmingly established the following facts:
by the parent concerned.
1) FRANCISCO is MONINA's father and she was conceived

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
at the time when her mother was in the employ of the former;
filiation shall be proved by:
2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his
(1) The open and continuous possession of the
overt acts and conduct which the Court of Appeals took
status of a legitimate child; or
pains to enumerate, thus:
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws. [L]ike sending appellant to school, paying for
her tuition fees, school uniforms, books,
board and lodging at the Colegio del
For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under Sagrado de Jesus, defraying appellant's
the second paragraph, which MONINA relies upon given that she hospitalization expenses, providing her with
has none of the evidence mentioned in the first paragraph, a "high [a] monthly allowance, paying for the funeral
standard of proof" is required. Specifically, to prove open and expenses of appellant's mother,
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there acknowledging appellant's paternal
must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of greetings and calling appellant his "Hija" or
the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and child, instructing his office personnel to give
clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be appellant's monthly allowance,
attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that recommending appellant to use his house in
they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent Bacolod and paying for her long distance
desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society telephone calls, having appellant spend her
and in life, not accidentally, but continuously. long distance telephone calls, having
appellant spend her vacation in his
apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes
By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not residence, allowing appellant to use his
require any particular length of time. surname in her scholastic and other records
(Exhs Z, AA, AA-1 to AA-5, W & W-5) . . .
3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and
The foregoing standard of proof required to establish one's filiation is manifested throughout the years publicly, spontaneously,
founded on the principle that an order for recognition and support continuously and in an uninterrupted manner.
may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the
family or lives of the parties, so that it must be issued only if paternity
or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. All told, MONINA's evidence hurdled "the high standard of proof"
required for the success of an action to establish one's illegitimate
161
filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding "open and
continuous possession'' or "any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws;" moreover, MONINA proved her filiation by Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if
more than mere preponderance of evidence. illegitimate, MONINA filed her action well within the period granted
her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on
ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust.
2. NO, Monina Jison is not barred from instituting the said action.
The last assigned error concerning laches likewise fails to convince.

The essential elements of laches are:
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which the
complaint seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice of the
defendant's conduct as having been afforded an opportunity
to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant
that the complaint would assert the right in which he bases
his suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complaint, or the suit is not held barred.
The last element is the origin of the doctrine that sale demands apply
only where by reason of the lapse of time it would be inequitable to
allow a party to enforce his legal rights.
As FRANCISCO set up, laches as an affirmative defense, it was

incumbent upon him to prove the existence of its elements. However,
he only succeeded in showing MONINA's delay in asserting her
claim, but miserably failed to prove the last element. In any event, it
must be stressed that laches is based upon grounds of public policy
which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of state
claims, and is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of
permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. There is no
absolute rule as to what constitutes laches; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of
laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since it
is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetuate
fraud and injustice.
162

CASIMIRO MENDOZA, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
TEOPISTA TORING TUÑACAO, Respondents. ISSUE:
G.R. No. 86302; September 24, 1991

CRUZ, J. Was Teopista able to sufficiently establish her status as an
illegitimate child of Casimiro based on her claims and the evidence she
presented?
FACTS:
RULING:
Respondent Teopista Toring Tuñacao (Teopista, for brevity) claimed
that she was the illegitimate child of Petitioner, the late Casimiro Mendoza
(Casimiro, for brevity). Teopista averred she was born on August 20, 1930 to Yes, Teopista was able to sufficiently establish her status as an
Brigida Toring (Brigida) and Casimiro, the latter being married at that time to illegitimate child of Casimiro based on her claims and the evidence she
Emiliana Barrientos. Teopista claimed that Casimiro recognized and treated presented.
her as an illegitimate child, the following acts, among other reasons: her In finding for Teopista, the Supreme Court did not rely on Art. 283 of
mother, Brigida, told her (Teopista) that Casimiro was her father and that the Civil Code and Art. 172 of the Family Code in proving the continuous
Respondent called Petitioner Papa Miroy; she (Teopista) lived with her possession of the status of a recognized illegitimate child (of Casimiro
mother because Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at his house; Mendoza). Instead, the Supreme Court ruled that Teopista was able to
when Teopista married Valentin Tuñacao, Casimiro gave them a truck as a establish such illegitimacy through another method: “any other means
means of livelihood, which was later on sold and the proceeds were given to allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws” (Civil Code) or “by evidence
them as spouses; Casimiro allowed Teopista’s son, Lolito to build a house on or proof in [her] favor that the defendant is [her] father” (Family Code, and
the former’s lot and he (Casimiro) also gave money to Teopista so that the other kinds of admissible proof under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
latter could purchase a lot from Vicente Toring, Respondent’s brother;
Says the Supreme Court: “xxx What both the trial court and the
Casimiro opened a joint savings account with Teopista as co-depositor. Her
respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is
son Lolito, Gaudencio and Isaac, both surnamed Mendoza (relatives of
allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the
Casimiro), corroborated Teopista’s claims. On the other hand, Vicente Toring
Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by
(Vicente) testified to contradict Teopista’s claims, since Casimiro failed to
evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to
testify due to his advanced age. Vicente averred that it was he who was the
the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a
only illegitimate child of Casimiro and Brigida because Teopista’s father was
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered,
a carpenter named Ondoy; that he was the one who allowed Lolita to build a
common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
house on Casimiro’s lot and sold a lot to Teopista, his half-sister; that
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130
Teopista never once visited Casimiro during the latter’s hospitalization, this
of the Rules of Court xxx The trial court conceded that "the defendant's
allegation being shared by another defense witness, Julieta Ouano, niece of
parents, as well as the plaintiff himself, told Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac
Casimiro. The trial court ruled against Teopista’s claim of illegitimacy, stating
Mendoza, that Teopista was the daughter of the defendant." It should have
that the latter failed to prove such status in accordance with Art 283 of the
probed this matter further in light of Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of
Civil Code, substantially reproduced in Art. 172 of the Family Code. The
Court xxx The said declarations have not been refuted. Casimiro could have
appellate court ruled otherwise, finding that Teopista had sufficiently proven
done this by deposition if he was too old and weak to testify at the trial of the
her continuous possession of such illegitimate status. Hence, the present
case.”
petition for certiorari.
163
Therefore, Teopista is the illegimate child of the late Casimiro Marcelo Lee v. CA
Mendoza and is entitled to all the rights appurtenant thereto.
GR No. 118387, October 11, 2001
De Leon, Jr., J.
FACTS: Lee Tek Seng had two sets of children with two different women. The
private respondents were the children of Lee Tek Seng with Keh Shiok
Cheng. While, the petitioners are the children of Lee Tek Seng with his
concubine, Tiu Chuan. When their mother died, the respondents were
instructed by their father to include the names of the petitioners in the
obituary notice of Keh Shiok Cheng’s death. It was this irrational act that
aroused their suspicion, prompting them to request the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to conduct the investigation. As per report, NBI concluded
that the mother of the petitioners is not Keh Shiok Cheng, but a much
younger woman, which is most probably Tiu Chuan. Lee Tek Seng intended
to give his eight (8) children the legitimate status to secure their future. That
is why every time, his concubine gives birth to these children, he manipulates
their birth records by indicating there that their mother is Keh Shiok Cheng.
This report led the private respondents to file the petition for cancellation/
correction of the entries in the petitioners’ birth record under Rule 108. The
petitioners contend that the resort to Rule 108 is improper as the Private
Respondents seeks to make substantial changes and not merely corrections
in the name. The private respondents seek a declaration that petitioners are
not Keh Shiok Chen’s children, making them illegitimate children. Such
collateral attack on their legitimacy should not be allowed. Further, the
petitioners asserted that private respondents have no cause of action to
pursue the case, because under Art. 171 of the FC, the heirs of the husband
may impugn the filiation of the child within the prescribed period, only in the
following cases: (1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the
period fixed to bring the action;(2) If he should die after the filing of the
complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or (3) If the child was born after
the death of the husband.
ISSUE: May the legitimate heirs of Lee Tek Seng question the legitimacy/
filiation of the petitioners in this case? May they file a petition to cancel their
mother’s name in the petitioner’s birth records?
RULING: Yes. The court ruled that Art. 171 of the FC is not applicable
in this case, because it only applies in instances in which the father impugns
the legitimacy of his wife’s child, on the ground that: (1) it was physically
impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first
164

120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; William Liyao, Jr v. Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have G.R. No. 138961; March 7, 2002
been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial DE LEON, JR, J.:
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was
obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence.
Article 171 of te FC presupposes that the child is the undisputed offspring of FACTS: William Liyao Jr. claims that he is the illegitimate child
the mother. While that is not the situation in this case, because the private because his mother, at the time he was born, has been living separately for
respondents are not disputing whether the petitioners are the illegitimate 10 years from her husband, and it was physically impossible for them to have
child of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish the fact they are not her children sexual relations. The marriage of his mother to her husband still subsists and
at all. The court also ruled that the private respondents can resort to Rule there is no showing of legal separation or annulment. He further claims that
108 of the Revised Rules of Court to effect substantial changes or he is the son of William Liyao because his mother cohabited with him at the
corrections in entries of the civil register. The only requisite is that the time of his conception.
proceedings under Rule 108 be an appropriate adversary proceeding as
contra-distinguished from a summary proceeding.
ISSUE: Can a child impugn his own legitimacy in order to become an
illegitimate child of another?
Thus, if the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the clerical errors, the
court may, issue an order for its correction in a summary
procedure. However, when the changes are substantial as it affects the civil HELD: No, a child cannot impugn his own legitimacy and choose his own
status from legitimate to illegitimate, such changes can only be effected filiation.
after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with
issues involved, and all the parties who may be affected by the entries his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, the
should be notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of
allegations of the complaint. the Civil Code (Article 166 of Family Code) may only be invoked by the
husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under
Article 262 of the Civil Code (Article 171 of the Family Code). Impugning the
legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife
produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that
infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved.
The fact that the mother had been living separately from her husband at the
time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. It is settled that a
child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress. The clear mandate of the law is that only the
husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the
legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself
165
cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father Eceta v. Eceta
does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is G.R. No. 157037; May 20, 2004
fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers alleged Ynares-Santiago, J.
paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown,
the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated
the presumption. FACTS: Vicente was the son of Petitioner Rosalina Eceta who was
married to Isaac Eceta. During the marriage of the spouses Eceta they have
acquired several properties including the disputed property in this case which
Therefore, a child cannot impugn his own legitimacy and choose his own is located at Stanford, Cubao, Quezon City. Isaac died in 1967 in which
filiation. Rosalina and Vicente are the compulsory heirs. Vicente died in 1977 leaving
as compulsory heirs his mother, petitioner Rosalina and an illegitimate
daughter, Maria Theresa. Maria Theresa filed a case in the RTC of Quezon
City for Partition and Accounting with Damages against petitioner alleging
that she became a co-owner and co-heir of Rosalina as to the disputed
property due to her father’s death. Petitioner Rosalina on the other hand
alleges that the said property is paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to
her exclusively.
The RTC ruled that Theresa Eceta and Rosalina Eceta are the only surviving
co-heirs and co-owners over the disputed property and Rosalina is ordered
to account for the value corresponding the ¼ share of Theresa Eceta.
Rosalina appealed to the CA which affirmed the decision of RTC with the
modification that the share of Theresa Eceta is reduced to 1/8 undivided
share over the disputed property.
ISSUE: Is the certified xerox copy from a xerox copy of the certificate of live
birth of Maria Theresa is competent evidence to prove the alleged filiation of
the respondent as an "illegitimate daughter" of her alleged father Vicente
Eceta?
HELD: YES. The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is

established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the
absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court
action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not
require a separate action for judicial approval. Maria Theresa successfully
established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated birth
166

certificate. Vicente himself signed Maria Theresa’s birth certificate thereby Reynaldo Rodriguez and Nancy Rodriguez vs. Concordia Ong Lim,
acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed Eurestes Lim and Elmer Lim
to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa.
G.R. No. 135817; November 30, 2006
FACTS: Pablo Goyma Lim. Jr. filed with the court a complaint for cancellation
of certificate of title over the 2 properties, the subject properties of this case,
against the Rodriguez spouses. He alleges that the title issued in the name
of the spouses were fraudulently obtained as they caused the cancellation of
the title held by his deceased mother Dominga Goyma. He also alleges that
he is the spurious son acknowledged and recognized by her and that upon
her death, the subject lots, passed on to him a the sole surviving heir. He
offered documentary evidence to prove that he was the illegitimate and
acknowledged son of Dominga. For their defense, the spouses alleged that
Dominga Goyma was not the mother of Paolo and that the lots were owned
by Dominga and her husband Frisco Gudani and that upon her death, Frisco
inherited the property as the sole heir. Pablo died during the pendency of the
case and was substituted by respondents.
ISSUE: Is Pablo the legitimate child of Dominga?
RULING: Yes it was sufficiently established through documentary

evidence.
The Court has laid down the manner of establishing the filiation of children,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, as follows:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by

(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2)
an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence
thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child
in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in, any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the
167
child, and no further action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated Verceles vs. Posada
not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary G.R. No. 159785; April 27, 2007
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Quisimbing, J.
FACTS: Petitioner, mayor of Pandan, Catanduanes, offered
respondent a job in the mayor’s office, which the latter accepted. On one
Various documentary evidence were proffered by Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. to
occasion, petitioner made amorous advances on respondent, which she
prove that he was the illegitimate and acknowledged son of Dominga
resisted. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident to herself and went on as
Goyma. Among them were his certificate of birth indicating that his mother
a casual employee in the mayor’s office. But a month after the incident, the
was Dominga Goyma; statement of assets, income and liabilities for 1958 of
mayor again made advances on respondent. This time, she succumbed to
Dominga Goyma indicating him as her son and; income tax returns for
his advances. Nine months after, respondent gave birth to a baby girl, Verna
calendar years 1953 up to 1955 of Dominga Goyma where she invariably
Aiza Posada.
claimed personal exemption as head of the family and stated therein that she
was separated from her husband and claimed an exemption for her son, The Posadas filed a Complaint for Damages coupled with Support
Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. These pieces of documentary evidence, whose Pendente Lite before the RTC against petitioner. The RTC issued a judgment
authenticity were not refuted by petitioners, were properly considered by the in favor of the Posadas and ordered petitioner to pay a monthly support to
court a quo and the appellate court to establish that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. Verna as he was proven to be the natural father of the above-named minor
was acknowledged by Dominga Goyma to be her illegitimate son. as shown by the exhibits and testimonies of the Posadas. Petitioner
appealed to the CA, which affirmed the RTC’s judgment. Hence, this petition.
There is no doubt that Pablo is the illegitimate child of Dominga and is the
rightful owner of the property. ISSUES:
(1) Was it proper for the RTC to resolve the issue of paternity and filiation in
an action for damages with support pendente lite case?
(2) Were the evidence presented by respondent sufficient to prove that
petitioner is the father of Verna?
RULING:
(1) YES, a perusal of the Complaint before the RTC shows that although the
caption states “Damages couples with Support Pendente Lite,” the
respondent’s averments therein, her meeting with petitioner, his offer of a
job, his amorous advances, her seduction, their trysts, her pregnancy, birth of
her child, his letters, her demand for support for her child, all clearly establish
a case for recognition of paternity.
(2) YES, the evidences presented by respondent were sufficient to prove that
petitioner is the father of Verna. The letters of petitioner (Exhibits A to D) are
declarations that lead nowhere but to the conclusion that he sired Verna.
Although petitioner used an alias in these letters, the similarity of the
penmanship in these letters vis the annotation at the back of petitioner’s faing
photograph as a youth is unmistakable.
Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for
establishing filiation.
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
168

xxx Belen Sagad Angeles v. Aleli Corazon Angeles Maglaya
G.R. No. 153798; September 2, 2005
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
GARCIA, J.:
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate FACTS: Respondent Aleli Corazon Maglaya filed a petition for letters
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as of administration and her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate
legitimate children. of Francisco M. Angeles (Francisco). She alleged to be the sole legitimate
child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado (Genoveva). Petitioner Belen
The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner, which
Angeles opposed the petition and prayed that she be appointed instead.
establish Verna’s filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In
Petitioner argued that she was married to Francisco. She also averred that
addition, the array of evidence presented by respondents, the dates, letters,
respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was
pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable evidence that
recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth
Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner’s illegitimate child.
certificate was not signed by him. Also, she has not presented the marriage
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable
presented no evidence of his own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is document to prove such union.
the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and cannot be given
greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify On the other hand, respondent alleged that the reason why she cannot
on affirmative matters. present the marriage certificate of her parents was because as per
certification of the appropriate offices, the records of marriages of the Civil
Therefore, the assailed decision is affirmed. Petitioner is the father of
Registrar of Bacolod were destroyed. Instead, she offered in evidence her
Verna.
birth certificate, which contained an entry stating that she was born to
Francisco and Genoveva.
The lower courts ruled in favor of respondent on the ground that the
presumption on respondent’s legitimacy stood unrebutted.
ISSUE: Can respondent be presumed as the legitimate child of decedent

Francisco and Genoveva?
RULING: No, respondent does not enjoy the presumption of a

legitimate child.
The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may be
availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the
child’s parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth
169
occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the presumption of Arnel L. Agustin vs. CA and Minor Martin Jose Prollamante,
law that a child is legitimate does not arise. Represented by his Mother Fe Angela Prollamante
G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005
CORONA, J.:
Here, save for respondent’s gratuitous assertion and an entry in her
certificate of birth, there is absolutely no proof of the decedent’s marriage to
respondents mother, Genoveva. To stress, no marriage certificate or FACTS: Martin Jose Prollamante (Martin), through his representative/mother
marriage contract doubtless the best evidence of Francisco and Genoveva’s Fe Angela Prollamante (Fe), filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
marriage, if one had been solemnized was offered in evidence. No priest, City (RTC) an action for support against Arnel Agustin (Arnel). Fe claimed
judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority was called to the witness box to that Arnel sired Martin, evidenced by Arnel’s signature on Martin’s birth
declare that he solemnized the marriage between the two. None of the four certificate. Arnel denied such claim, alleging that his signature was forged.
(4) witnesses respondent presented could say anything about, let alone Thereafter, in the same case, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an
affirm, that supposed marriage. At best, their testimonies proved that order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing
respondent was Francisco’s daughter. pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel opposed said motion by
invoking his right against self-incrimination and that Martin is not entitled to
support because he was not recognized by him (Arnel) as his putative father.
Moreover, the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco
against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was
signed by the attending physician who certified to having attended the birth of Subsequently, the RTC granted the motion, which was later affirmed
a child. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as by the CA. Arnel questioned the RTC resolution on the ground that it was
validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be improper for it to convert a complaint for support to a petition for recognition
signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father and that DNA testing cannot be ordered in an action for support.
refuses.
ISSUES:
Hence, there can no be a presumption that she is indeed a legitimate child of
Must a person asking for support first establish his filiation in a
the late Francisco and Genoveva.
separate action?
Can DNA testing be ordered in an action for support?
HELD:
NO, a complaint for support may prosper without necessity of first
proving filiation in a separate action. The assailed resolution and order did
not convert the action for support into one for recognition [as claimed by
Arnel] but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action
against petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary
evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and
order effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an
action for support, such was valid and in accordance with
jurisprudence. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to support
depends completely on the determination of filiation. A separate action will
only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the main
issues in both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag [a case cited in support of
this decision], the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to these
proceedings.
170

Rosendo Herrera v. Rosendo Alba, minor, represented by his mother
Armi Alba (CASE 216)
Consequently, DNA testing can be ordered in an action for support to
G.R. No. 148220; June 15, 2005
determine filiation.
Carpio, J.
[Note: The Court said that this was the first time the issue of whether or not
FACTS: In a Petition for Compulsory Recognition, Support and Damages,
DNA testing can be used to determine filiation was raised as a focal issue. In
petitioner was alleged to be the biological father of the respondent, who was
its discussion, the Court visited series of Philippines and American
a minor and was represented by his mother, Armi Alba. Armi asserted that
jurisprudence on the matter. It would be too long if I copy and paste in this
she and the petitioner had a relationship though the use of letters and photos
digest parts of said discussion. The conclusion, nonetheless, is that DNA
as corroborative evidence. Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of
testing can be used to determine filiation.]
DNA paternity testing to expedite the case which the trial court granted. On
the other hand, petitioner opposed such motion and contended that DNA
paternity testing has not gained acceptability in the Philippines in proving
filiation and that it violates his right against self-incrimination.
ISSUE: Is DNA paternity testing acceptable to prove the filiation of the

respondent child with his putative father, the petitioner?
HELD: Yes, the result of the DNA paternity testing could be

admitted to prove or disprove the filiation of the child with his putative father.
The relevant provisions of the Family Code in establishing filiation

provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation

in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of

the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
171
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE
proved by: DAYRIT CUYUGAN
GR No. 95229; June 9, 1992
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
REGALADO, J.
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
FACTS: Petitioner is the known administratrix of the real and

So far, the laws, rules, and jurisprudence seemingly limit evidence of personal properties left by her deceased father, Atty. Ocampo, who died
paternity and filiation to incriminating acts alone. However, advances in intestate in Angeles City on September 28, 1983. Respondent is the mother
science show that sources of evidence of paternity and filiation need not be and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan, who claims to be an
limited to incriminating acts. There is now almost universal scientific illegitimate child of the late Atty. Ocampo.
agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive on non-paternity,
although inconclusive on paternity. Parentage will still be resolved using Petitioner contends that the action to claim for inheritance filed by Emilie in
conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways behalf of the minor child is premature and the complaint states no cause of
available. Courts should apply the results of science when completely action. She submits that the recognition of the minor child, either voluntarily
obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny or by judicial action, by the alleged putative father must first be established
progress. before the former can invoke his right to succeed and participate in the estate
of the latter. Petitioner further contends that since there is no allegation of
such recognition in the complaint denominated as "Claim for Inheritance,"
Hence, DNA testing can be admitted as evidence to prove or
then there exists no basis for private respondent's claim and, consequently,
disprove paternity and filiation between the child and his putative father.
the complaint should be dismissed.
However the Court ruled that despite the fact that the complaint filed by
private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an
illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, the
allegations therein may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further,
it ruled that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other
to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint.
ISSUE: Has the action to compel recognition prescribed?
RULING: No. The action to compel recognition has not prescribed.

Petitioner argues that assuming arguendo that the action is one to compel
recognition, private respondent's cause of action has prescribed for the
reason that since filiation is sought to be proved by means of a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, then under
paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code, the action to establish filiation of
the illegitimate minor child must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
putative father. In the case at bar, considering that the complaint was filed
after the death of the alleged parent, the action has prescribed and this is
another ground for the dismissal of the complaint. Petitioner theorizes that
Article 285 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar and, instead,
paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code should be given retroactive
172

effect. The theory is premised on the supposition that the latter provision of therefore, to determine whether the right of the minor child to file an action for
law being merely procedural in nature, no vested rights are created, hence it recognition is a vested right or not.
can be made to apply retroactively.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right
of action of the minor child bas been vested by the filing of the complaint in
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides: court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code.
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in
question is procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of
the following cases:
procedure may affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the language
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so pervasive that it may be
which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effective,
years from the attainment of his majority; since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the
On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads: question of procedure arises especially where vested rights may be
prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right
in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. of private respondent and, consequentially, of the mind child she represents,
The action must be brought within the same period specified in both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not
during the lifetime of the alleged parent. yet prescribed.
Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the
record of birth of the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of
the child's filiation in a public document or in a private handwritten signed
instrument, then the action may be brought during the lifetime of the child.
However, if the action is based on the open and continuous possession by
the child of the status of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws, the view has been expressed that the
action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case
the complaint should have been filed during the lifetime of the putative father,
failing which the same must be dismissed on the ground of prescription.
Private respondent, however, insists that Article 285 of the Civil Code is
controlling and, since the alleged parent died during the minority of the child,
the action for filiation may be filed within four years from the attainment of
majority of the minor child.
Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." It becomes essential,
173
In the matter of the adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
Honorato Catinding, petitioner Diwata Ramos Landingin v. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 148311; March 31, 2005 G. R. No. 164948; June 27, 2006
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS: Honorato Catindig, who was now a widower, filed a petition to adopt FACTS: Diwata Ramos Landingin filed a petition for the adoption of minor-
his minor illegitimate child, Stephany Nathy Astorga Garcia. He also prayed siblings Elaine, Elma, and Eugene Ramos who are the natural children of
that Stephanie’s middle name “Astorga” (mother’s middle name) be changed deceased Manuel Ramos, Diwata’s brother, and Amelia Ramos.
to “Garcia” (mother’s surname) and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to Diwata alleged in her petition that when Manuel died, the children
“Catindig,” his surname. The court granted the adoption. Petitioner then filed were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Ramos. Their mother, Amelia,
a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying the Stephanie should allegedly went to Italy upon the death of Manuel, re-married and no longer
be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her communicated with them nor gave them support.
middle name. Trial court denied, hence, this petition.
When Maria died, Diwata instituted this petition. A case study
conducted by the DSWD yielded favorable result to Diwata, hence, the RTC
ISSUE: Can Stephanie, an adopted child, use the surname of her mother as granted the petition.
her middle name? However, the OSG appealed the decision to the CA contending that
the petition lacked written consent of Amelia, written consent of Diwata’s
children and failure by Diwata to show that she is in a position to support the
RULING: Yes, Stephanie can use the surname of her mother as her proposed adoptees.
middle name.
The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. Thus, Diwata filed the instant
There is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176 of the petition for review on certiorari.
Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as
“An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father”
is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Also, Article 365 of the Civil ISSUE:
Code merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter.” Article 189 of the Family Code enumerating legal effects of Is Diwata entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of
adoption is likewise silent as to the matter. their biological mother?
The Supreme Court further ruled that being a legitimate child by virtue of Is the affidavit of consent executed by Diwata’s children compliant
adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law with the law?
to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to Is Diwata financially capable of supporting the children?
bear the surname of her father and her mother. By the continued use of
Garcia as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage.
RULING:
Hence, Stephanie can use the surname of her mother as her middle name.
No. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural
parents is intended to protect the natural relationship from the unwarranted
interference by interlopers and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best
interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. The written
consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the
decree of adoption. In the Report by DSWS Officer Pagbilao, she narrated
that she was able to interview Amelia when she arrived in the Philippines but
it was incredible that Pagbilao did not require a written consent to the
adoption from Amelia. Also, Amelia was not presented as a witness.
174

No. The written consent of Amelia’s children was notarized in Guam, MA. BELEN B. MANGONON, for and in behalf of her minor children
USA. The same may only be considered authentic if acknowledged and REBECCA ANGELA DELGADO and REGINA ISABEL DELGADO v. CA
authentication were made in accordance with law (eg must be done before a G.R. No. 125041 June 30, 2006
consular officer of the Philippines). Since in this case, no proof was CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
introduced to authenticate the written consent of her children, the same is
inadmissible.
FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by
No. Since the primary consideration in adoption proceedings is the
the City Court Judge in Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old
best interest of the child, it follows that the financial capacity of the
while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was
prospective adopters should also be carefully evaluated. In this case, Amelia
solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil
is already of age at 57 years old and only employed on a part time basis as a
Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and
waitress. While she claims that she has the financial support of her children
Domestic Relations Court.
and siblings, the ability to support is personal to the adopter. Hence, the
petition is denied. Within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave
birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance
of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as
private respondents had totally abandoned them.
Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the USA where petitioner,
together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally
settled in.The twins were both admitted to 2 different schools. Petitioner was
however, financially incapable of providing collegiate education to the twins
as she was merely earning a meager USD 1,200 while the tuition for the
twins was pegged at USD 44,000 per annum.
Petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor

children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support,
with application for support pendente lite with the RTC.
Petitioner averred that demands were made upon Federico and the latter’s
father, Francisco,
for generl support and for the payment of the required college education of
Rica and Rina.
Federico continues to deny having sired the twins and that under the law, he
had the option under the law on how to provide support.
175
The grandfather on his part, contended that it should be the parents who Carmelita Zaguirre v. Atty. Alfredo Castillo
should be liable for support. A.C. No. 4291, August 3, 2005
ISSUE: Could the grandfather be held liable for the educational support of FACTS: An administrative case was filed against Respondent Castillo for
his granddaughters? gross immoral conduct for failure to acknowledge and support the child of
complainant with whom he had an affair. He was found guilty by the Court of
such charge and was imposed the penalty of indefinite suspension. In his
HELD: Yes, the grand father could be held liable for the support of the grand motion for reconsideration of the decision, the complainant opposed as he
daughters. still failed to support the child.
Under ART. 199 of the FC, ”Whenever two or more persons are obliged to ISSUE: May a claim for support be made through an administrative case?
give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the
order herein provided:
RULING: No. Complainants claim for support of her child should be
(1) The spouse;
addressed to the proper court in a proper case.
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent
Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent
Federico are primarily charged to support their children’s college education
but being restricted by their financial income respondent Francisco, as the
next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his
granddaughters indefault of their parents, it having been established that
respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his granddaughters’
education
Hence, the Grandfather, being the nearest relative in the order provided in
Article 199, he could be obliged to give support.
176

Aurelia Dadivas De Villanueva v. Rafael Villanueva
G.R. No. L-29959; December 3, 1929
STREET, J.
FACTS: Plaintiff instituted a case against her husband to obtain

separate maintenance (monthly allowance), custody of their two younger
minor children Guillermo and Sergio and attorney’s fees and costs. The trial
court decided in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff appealed the decision.
Plaintiff’s action for separate maintenance is grounded on infidelity and
cruelty of the defendant. Proof showed that the defendant is guilty of
repeated acts of infidelity with 4 different woman prior to the case and with
another after the case begun. Defendant also exhibited brutality towards the
plaintiff which caused her to leave their home and have a separate abode
together with the two minor children.
ISSUE: Is it proper to grant separate maintenance to a wife in case of

conjugal infidelity?
RULING: Yes, the wife is entitled to a separate maintenance in case

repeated acts of conjugal infidelity on the part of the husband are proved.
The law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations
with a husband whose incurable propensity towards other women makes
common habitation with him unbearable. In the case of Goitia vs. Campos
Rueda (35 Phil., 252, 262) the court ruled that a husband cannot, by his own
wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his wife imposed by
law; and where a husband by wrongful, illegal, and unbearable conduct,
drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of
her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relations and
repudiate his duties thereunder.
In the case before us repeated acts of conjugal infidelity on the part of the
husband are proved, and he appears to be a recurrent, if not an incurable
offender against the sanctity of the marriage tie. This give the wife an
undeniable right to relief.
Hence, the court ruled that the plaintiff’s right to custody of her children will
no longer be disturbed and that she is entitled to P500 monthly allowance,
attorney’s fees and other expenses.
177
Maria Quintana vs. Gelasio Lerma Mendoza vs. Parungao
GR No. L-7426; February 5, 1913 41 Phil 271
Per Curiam
FACTS: Mrs. Parungao contracted a second marriage with Mr.
Mendoza, his first husband being absent for more than seven(7) years. A
FACTS: Quintana and Lerma were lawfully married in 1901 and in February judgment annulling the second marriage has been entered on the ground of
1905, they entered into a written agreement of separation whereby each reappearance of the first husband. The judgment has been appealed.
renounced certain rights as against the other and divided the conjugal Pending appeal, Mrs. Parungao filed a case for support against Mr.
property between them, the defendant undertaking in consideration of the Mendoza.
premises to pay the plaintiff the sum of P20 every month for her support and
maintenance. ISSUE: Is a wife entitled for support pending appeal of the judgment
annulling a subsequent marriage on the ground of reappearance of the first
The wife filed an action for the enforcement of her right to support as husband?
embodied in the contract. In the defendant’s original answer, he set up as a
special defense that the wife forfeited her right to support by committing RULING: No. The right to support between spouses arises from law
adultery. This allegation was stricken out by the court on motion, upon the (Art. 143 of the Civil Code) and is based upon their obligation to mutually
ground that the commission of adultery is not recognized as a ground upon help each other created by the matrimonial bond. After the complaint for
which the obligation to support ceases. After plaintiff had filed an amended annulment of marriage has been filed by the wife and admitted she is entitled
complaint, the defendant inserted the same defense in his answer to the to support during the pendency of the suit (arts. 67 and 68, par. 4, Civil
amended complaint. The court upon the trial, however, refused to recognize Code), but once the nullity is decreed, the right ceases, because the mutual
such defense or to permit any evidence to be introduced in support thereof. obligation created by the marriage is extinguished.
ISSUE: Did the lower court err in not appreciating adultery as valid defense
to relieve the husband of the obligation to support his wife?
HELD: YES. The lower court erred in not entertaining the defense of
adultery.
We are of the opinion that the special defense of adultery set up by

the defendant in his answer both to the original and the amended complaint
is a good defense, and if properly proved and sustained will defeat the
action. The judgment of the court below is reversed and the cause remanded
for a new trial, with instructions to permit the interposition of the special
defense of adultery and such amendments of the complaint and answer as
may be necessary to carry this judgment into effect.
178

FRANCISCO VS. ZANDUETA having the legal status of natural children and (5) brothers and sisters. In all
these cases it is a civil status or a juridical relation which is the basis of the
G.R. No. L -43794 (1935)
action for support, the civil status of marriage or that of relationship.
GODDARD, J.: Paraphrasing the language used in the decision in the Yangco case it may
be said that in the present case the action for support is brought by a minor,
through his guardian ad litem, who alleges that he is the son of the petitioner;
FACTS: The respondent in this case Eugenio Leopoldo Francisco, therefore it is necessary for him to prove his civil status as such son. His
aged two years, through his natural mother and guardian ad litem, Rosario alleged civil status being in litigation, it is evident that nothing can be taken
Gomez, filed an action for support against the herein petitioner in the Court of for granted upon the point in issue. There is no law or reason which
First Instance of the City of Manila. authorizes the granting of support to a person who claims to be a son in the
The plaintiff alleged that he is the acknowledged son of Luis Francisco and same manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof that he is such
as such is entitled to support. The defendant in his answer alleged that he son.
never acknowledged the plaintiff as his son and that he was not present at
the baptism of the plaintiff and that he was married at the time it is alleged In the latter case the legal evidence raises a presumption of law,
that the plaintiff was born. while in the former there is no presumption, there is nothing but a mere
Despite the denial of paternity however, respondent judge Francisco allegation, a fact in issue, and a simple fact in issue must not be confounded
Zandueta issued an order granting Eugenio monthly support, pendente lite. with an established right recognized by a final judgment. The civil status of
Luis moved for reconsideration on the ground that the order it was issued in sonship being denied and this civil status, from which the right to support is
excess of jurisdiction in view of the fact that the civil status of the plaintiff was derived, being in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be given to such a
placed in issue by the pleadings and that the plaintiff has no right to monthly claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of
support from the defendant until his status as a child of the latter is finally the cause. It is also evident that there is a substantial difference between the
determined in his favor. The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence capacity of a person after the rendition of a final judgment in which that
the writ for certiorari. person is declared to be in possession of the status of a son and his capacity
prior to such time when nothing exists other than his suit or claim to be
declared in possession of such a status.
ISSUE: Is Eugenio Francisco is entitled to support without first establishing

his status as petitioner’s son?
HELD: NO. Eugenio Francisco is not entitled to support from petitioner Luis
Francisco.
Under article 143 of the Civil Code the following are bound to support
each other: (1) Husband and wife, (2) legitimate ascendants and
descendants, (3) parents and acknowledged natural children and the
legitimate descendants of the latter, (4) parents and illegitimate children not
179
Carmen Quimiguing v Felix Icao of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970 action was doubly in error.
REYES, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: Carmen Quimiguing sued Felix Icao averring that: (1) they were
neighbors who had close and confidential relations; (2) Icao, although
married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with her several times by
force and intimidation, and without her consent; (3) as a result she became
pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and (4) plaintiff
had to stop studying. She is now claiming for support, damages and
attorney's fees.
On the other hand, Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action
since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born.
Carmen amended her complaint alleging that she later on gave birth
to a baby girl.
The trial court ruled dismissed the complaint. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Is the conceived child of Quimiguing entitled to a right to support

from Icao whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion
to dismiss?
RULING: Yes, the conceived child has a right to support from Icao.
The Court applied the following articles in deciding the case at bar:
Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child
shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable
to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in
the following article.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil
Code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate
children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates
Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in
the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived
child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds
further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following
article" (i.e., that the fetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from
the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to
the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would
become entirely useless and ineffective.
Thus, independently of the right to support of the child she was
carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms
180

Advincula vs. Advincula
G.R. No. L-19065, January 31, 1964
Paredes, J.:
FACTS: Plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant for

acknowledgement and support which was dismissed based on the motion of
both parties. Later, the plaintiff filed another complaint for acknowledgement
and support against defendant. The latter moved for the dismissal of the
case alleging that the dismissal of the previous case was with prejudice and
bars the filing of the subsequent complaint. On the contrary, the plaintiff
contends that the dismissal of the previous case does not affect the action for
support because judgment for support does not become final.
ISSUE: Does the dismissal of an action for support bars the filing of another
action for support?
HELD: No, the dismissal of a previous action for support does not
bar the filing of another.
The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support is
provisional because the amount may be increased or decreased depending
upon the means of the giver and the needs of the recipient (Art. 297).
Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such
nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period
that needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or
altered, in accordance with his increase or decreased needs, and with the
means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.
This being true, it is indisputable that the present action for support
can be brought, notwithstanding the fact that the previous case filed against
the same defendant was dismissed. Once the needs of plaintiff arise, she
has the right to bring the action for support, for it is only then that her cause
of action accrues. The right to ask support is demandable from the date in
which plaintiff was in need of the same.
Hence, the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and cannot
bar the filing of another action, asking the same relief against the same
defendant.
181
Enrique T. Jocson and Jesus T. Jocson v. The Empire Insurance Baltazar vs. Serfino
Company GR no. L-17315
G.R. No. L-10792; April 30, 1958
FACTS: Armenio Serafino was born on December 19, 1943. He is the minor
Reyes, A., J.
son of Olympia Baltazar (petitioner), a widow, and Sergio Serfino, a married
man with a wife and three legitimate children. Upon judicial demand, the trial
court ordered that Serfino pay to said minor P 15 per month as support from
FACTS: Agustin Jocson was appointed as the guardian of the persons and
July 1960 (the time when such decisions was rendered). Petitioner appealed,
properties of his then minor children: Carlos, Rodolfo, Perla, Enrique and
contending that the amount should be raised to P 50 per month considering
Jesus. As guardian, he had a bond with the respondent as surety. He
the total income of Serfino and the amount demandable must be from the
submitted periodic accounts to the court for expenses incurred for the
time Armenio was born, except for May 1957 to April 1959 when he was
education and clothing his children.
living with his father (Serfino).
When he died, Perla was appointed guardian of the remaining minors,

ISSUES:
Enrique and Jesus. She filed a petition in the guardianship proceedings to
reopen the accounts of Agustin. When petitioners reached majority, they a.) Is the amount of the total income of the father the only basis for the
contend that the expenses for their education and clothing during their amount of support due to a child?
minority were part of support they were entitled to receive from their father so
b.) Should the support demable in this case be deemed from the time of the
that when the latter paid those expenses from the guardianship funds, he
minor’s birth?
made illegal disbursements therefrom for which his bond as guardian should
be made to answer. Respondent opposed the motion.
HELD:
ISSUE: Are the expenses for the children’s education and clothing during a) No, the total income of the father is not the only basis for the computation
their minority part of the support they were entitled to receive from their of the support due.
father? The amount of support, according to Article 296 of the Civil Code [now Article
201 in the Family Code], shall be in proportion to the resources or means of
the giver and to the needs of the recipient.
HELD: Yes, the expenses for the children’s education and clothing
during their minority are not part of the support they were entitled to receive The lower court found that appellee was earning P365.00 yearly from his rice
from their father. However, the need for support cannot be presumed. It must mill and P720.00 from his ten-hectare parcel of land, the yearly produce of
be demanded and the right to it must be established before it becomes which was 120 cavans of palay, valued at P6.00 per cavan. The court thus
payable. In the circumstances, the petitioners never demanded for support concluded that his average annual income was P1,085.00 and used this as
and the disbursements made by the Agustin, with the approval of the court, basis in computing the amount of support due to Armenio, taking into
cannot be said to be illegal, so that the guardian's bond is not liable for the consideration that appellee was also supporting a wife and three legitimate
same. Furthermore, the claim for support should be enforced in a separate children.
action and not in these guardianship proceedings.
b.) No, the amount demandable should be computed from the time support
was extrajudicially demanded.
As to when payment thereof should begin, the law says that the obligation to
give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right
to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except
from the date it is extrajudicially demanded (Article 298, Civil Code) [now
Article 203 in the Family Code]. In this case, payment should begin June
182

1959, for it was then that appellant made the extrajudicial demand on Jose V. Ramirez and Eloisa De Marcaida vs. J. R. Redfern
appellee. G.R. No. L-26062, December 31, 1926
Malcolm, J.
FACTS: In 1908, J. R. Redfern took his wife and three minor children
to England and left them there. He returned to the Philippines the following
year. Beginning with 1910 and continuing until 1922, Mr. Redfern provided
his wife with funds for her expenses. In 1920; while still in England, Mrs.
Redfern obtained from her sister, Eloisa De Marcaida-Ramirez, the sum of
£600. Mrs. Redfern later secured an additional £185 from her sister in
England. Mrs. Redfern did not make use of this money until 1922. Eight
hundred seventy-five pesos were advanced by Mr. and Mrs. Ramirez to Mrs.
Redfern after the latter had return to Manila. Due to the said advances made,
the spouses Ramirez are now seeking for reimbursement from Mr. Redfern
under Article 1894 of the Old Civil Code. Mr. Redfern refused to reimburse
the spouses alleging that he amply provided for his wife and children in
England, thus, this case.
ISSUE: Are spouses Ramirez entitled to reimbursement for the advances

made in favor of Mrs. Redfern under Article 1894 of the Old Civil Code?
HELD: No, the Spouses Ramirez are not entitled to

reimbursements for the advances made in favor of Mrs. Redfern.
Article 1894 provides: "When without the knowledge of the person who is
bound to give support to a dependent, a stranger supplies it, the latter shall
be entitled to recover the same from the former, unless it appears that he
gave it out of charity, and without the expectation of recovering it." For one to
recover under the provisions of article 1894 of the Civil Code, it must be
alleged and proved, first, that support has been furnished a dependent of one
bound to give support but who fails to do so; second, that the support was
supplied without the knowledge of the person charged with the duty. The
negative qualification is when the support is given without the expectation of
recovering it.
183
The husband and wife are mutually bound to support each other. By support Santos vs. CA
is understood all that is necessary for food, shelter, clothing and medical
242 SCRA 407
attendance, according to the social standing of the family. Parents are also
required to bring up and educate their children. But in this connection, the ROMERO, J.:
point of interest is that the wife accepted assistance from another, when it is
not shown that she had ever made any complaint to her husband or any of
his agents with regard to her allowance. The testimony of the husband is FACTS:
uncontradicted that he had given his English agent instructions to furnish his Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia were
wife with any reasonable sum she needed bearing in mind his financial married and they have a son named Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born on
condition, but that she never took advantage of this offer. Mr. Redfern's 1987. Petitioner and Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary
reason for reducing the allowance, he says, was his precarious financial custody of the maternal grandparents of Leouel Jr., respondents. Julia then
situation in 1921 and 1922. Before one can tender succor to the wife of left for the United States to work. Respondents contend that through deceit
another with an expectation or recouping himself for the loan, the husband and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited
should be given an opportunity to render the needful assistance. him away when he visited them on 1990. The respondents then filed a
"Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.,”
The trial Court and CA granted the custody to the respondents.
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the court is of the opinion
that defendant was amply providing for his wife and children in London, and
that defendant is not liable to plaintiffs for the sums of money here sought to Petitioner adds that the reasons relied upon by the private respondents in
be recovered, which were delivered to defendant's wife without his having custody over the boy, are flimsy and insufficient to deprive him of his
knowledge or consent and when there was no necessity therefore. natural and legal right to have custody. On the other hand, private
respondents aver that they are financially well-off and that the petitioner did
not give a single centavo for the boy's support and maintenance.
ISSUE: Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel

Santos, Jr.?
HELD:
The right to custody shall be awarded to the petitioner, Leouel Santos Sr.
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of
parental authority. Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and
may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The
right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather,
even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does
not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated

children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and
184

company. The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority
over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA PAZ
either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental CORDERO-OUYE
authority.Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may G.R. No. 116773. January 16, 1997
substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent. The TORRES, JR., J.:
situation obtaining in the case at bench is one where the mother of the minor
Santos, Jr., is working in the United States while the father, petitioner Santos,
Sr., is present. FACTS: Petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were
married. They had two children named Leslie and Angelica. After their
marriage, the couple stayed with respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of the
While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the husband Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of petitioner's mother
severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the while Angelica stayed with her parents at respondent Teresita's house.
unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his Reynaldo Eslao died. Petitioner Maria intended to bring Angelica with her to
custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To Pampanga but respondent Teresita asked Maria to entrust the custody of
award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. It Angelica to her, since she needed the company of the child to assuage her
would also give the father a chance to prove his love for his son and for the grief for the loss of her late son. In the meantime, the petitioner returned to
son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give. her mother's house in where she stayed with Leslie. Subsequently, petitioner
Maria married Dr. James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American, who is an
orthodontist practicing in the United States. The petitioner migrated to San
Francisco, California, USA, to join her new husband. Petitioner Maria
returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to
the United States However, respondent resisted the idea by way of
explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was ten days old and
accused the petitioner of having abandoned Angelica. When the demand
remained unheeded, the petitioner instituted the present action. After the trial
on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision in favor of the petitioner.
Respondent Teresita Sagala-Eslao or anyone acting under her behalf is
directed to cause the immediate transfer of the custody of the minor Angelica
Cordero Eslao, to her natural mother, petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye. On
appeal, the respondent court affirmed in full the decision of the trial court.
Hence, the instant petition by the minors paternal grandmother.
ISSUE: Was there abandonment or renunciation of parental authority by the

mother in this case as to warrant the giving of custody of her minor child to
the paternal grandmother?
185
Bonifacia P. Vancil v. Helen G. Belmes
G.R. No. 132223; June 19, 2001
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:
RULING: No. There was no abandonment and renunciation of parental

FACTS: Reeder Vancil was a former US Navy serviceman who died in the
authority. US. He had two children named Valeria and Vincent with his common-law
wife, respondent Helen Belmes. His mother, Bonifacia Vancil, filed a petition
When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a for guardianship, and was appointed as the legal and judicial guardian over
friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely the persons and properties of Valerie and Vincent. Helen Belmes filled a
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One.
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still
disallows the same. The father and mother, being the natural guardians of Petitioner’s argument: Bonifacia Vancil argued that the preferential right of a
unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their parent to be appointed guardian over the persons and estate of the minors is
custody and company. not absolute, and that Helen is not suited as a guardian because Valerie was
raped seven times by Helen’s live-in partner.
In the instant petition, when private respondent entrusted the custody of her Respondent’s argument: Helen argued that she is the natural mother in
minor child to the petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors at
temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently
parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being purely residing.
personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of While the case was pending, Valerie turned eighteen and hence, the petition
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan has become moot with respect to her.
institution which do not appear in the case at bar. Of considerable
importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that the right of parents to
the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to ISSUE:
parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an
inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but Who between Helen Belmes, the mother, and Bonifacia Vancil, the
derives from the nature of the parental relationship. grandmother, of Vincent shall be his guardian?
Hence, this petition is dismissed. The custody of the minor child cannot be RULING:
given to the grandmother. The mother in this case did not effectively
renounced parental authority. The mother, Helen Belmes, shall be Vincent’s guardian.
Art. 211 of the Family Code states that the father and the mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In
case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a
judicial order to the contrary.
As previously ruled by the Court, the right of parents to the custody of their
minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right
supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which
is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the
nature of the parental relationship.
Bonifacia’s claim to be the guardian is based on the substitute parental
authority pursuant to Art. 214 of the Family Code stating that in case of
186

death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority Reynaldo Espiritu v. Court of Appeals
shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
G.R. No. 115640; March 15, 1995
Melo, J.
In this case, Bonifacia has not proffered convincing evidence showing that
Helen is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists
that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that FACTS: Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita
Helen’s live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of Masauding first met in Iligan City. Thereafter, Teresita worked in Los
major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding. Angeles, while Reynaldo was assigned in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. They
lived as husband and wife and their daughter, Rosalind, was born. They
Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still
visited the Philippines, got married, and returned to the United States. Their
petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she
son, Reginald, was born thereafter. After several years, they decided to
is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be
separate. Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California.
able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In
She claimed, however, that she kept in constant touch with her children.
fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a Reynaldo brought his children back to the Philippines and left the them with
guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate his sister. He returned to Pittsburgh to finish his assigned work. Teresita
those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.
returned to the Philippines and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to
Hence, Helen shall be the guardian of minor Vincent instead of Bonifacia. gain custody over the children. The trial court suspended Teresita’s parental
authority and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them
but with visitation rights. The trial court considered the findings of a child
psychologist who found that Rosalind has a negative reaction with her
mother. The child saw her mother hugging and kissing another man who
lived in their house and worked for her father. Rosalind also fears going back
to live with Teresita as she felt unloved and uncared for. The Court of
Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court’s decision. The CA based its decision
on the report of the Code Commission which drafted Article 213 that a child
below seven years still needs the loving, tender care that only a mother can
give and which, presumably, a father cannot give in equal measure.
ISSUE: Should the mother be awarded the custody of the children?
RULING: No, the mother should not be awarded the custody of the
children taking into consideration all the relevant considerations.
The Court of Appeals was unduly swayed by an abstract presumption of law

rather than an appreciation of relevant facts and the law which should apply
to those facts. The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be
awarded is not a ministerial function to be determined by a simple
187
determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or over Zenaida Medina vs. Dra. Venancia Makabali
seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child's G.R. No. L-26953; March 28, 1969
interests. Discretion is given to the court to decide who can best assure the REYES, J. B. L., J.
welfare of the child, and award the custody on the basis of that consideration.
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are
mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant FACTS: Petitioner Zenaida Medina gave birth to Joseph Casero in the
considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that Makabali Clinic, owned and operated by respondent Dra. Venancia Makabali,
the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not who assisted in the delivery. Joseph was petitioner’s third, had with a married
conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over man, Feliciano Casero. Petitioner was then living with Feliciano with the
seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that tolerance of Feliciano’s lawful wife who reside elsewhere. Casero makes
choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award P400/month as a mechanic while petitioner earns P4-5/day. From birth,
custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the petitioner left the child with respondent, who took care and reared Joseph as
circumstances. her own son, paid for his poliomyelitis treatment, and sent him to school.
Petitioner never visited Joseph and never paid for his expenses. Several
years later, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus to claim the custody
In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years of of Joseph. The lower court denied the writ, holding that it was for the child’s
age. Rosalind celebrated her seventh birthday on August 16, 1993 while best interst to be left with respondent.
Reginald reached the same age on January 12, 1995. Both are studying in
reputable schools and appear to be fairly intelligent children, quite capable of
thoughtfully determining the parent with whom they would want to live. Once ISSUE: Is petitioner entitled to the custody of her son Joseph?
the choice has been made, the burden returns to the court to investigate if
the parent thus chosen is unfit to assume parental authority and custodial
responsibility. All of the 8 recommendations of the child psychologist show RULING: No, petitioner is not entitled to the custody of her son
that Rosalind chooses petitioners over the private respondent and that her Joseph.
welfare will be best served by staying with them
“We see no reason to disturb the order appealed from. While our law
Hence, the custody of the children should be awarded to their father, recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not
Reynaldo Espiritu. lose sight of the basic principle that ‘in all questions on the care, custody,
education and property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be paramount,’
and that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered
separated from the mother. This is as it should be, for in the continual
evolution of legal institutions, the patria potestas has been transformed from
the jus vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the Roman law, under which
the offspring was virtually a chattel of his parents, into a radically different
institution, due to the influence of Christian faith and doctrines. The
obligational aspect is now supreme. As pointed out by Puig Peña, now ‘there
is no power, but a task; no complex of rights (of parents) but a sum of duties;
no sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.
As a result, the right of parents to the company and custody of their children
is ancillary to the proper discharge of parental duties to provide the children
with adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and civic training and
development. As remarked by the Court below, petitioner Zenaida Medina
proved remiss in these sacred duties; she not only failed to provide the child
188

with love and care but actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in his IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
tenderest years, when he needed his mother the most. It may well be OF MINOR ANGELIE ANNE C. CERVANTES, NELSON L. CERVANTES
doubted what advantage the child would derive from being coerced to and ZENAIDA CARREON CERVANTES vs. GINA CARREON FAJARDO
abandon respondent’s care and love to be compelled to stay with his mother and CONRADO FAJARDO
and witness her irregular menage a trois with Casero and the latter’s G.R. No. 79955 January 27, 1989
legitimate wife.” PADILLA, J.:
FACTS: Angelie Anne Cervantes, a minor, born on Feb. 14, 1987 to
respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are Common-law
spouses, was offered for adoption to Gina Carreon’s sister and brother-in-
law, therein petitioners Zennaida Carreon-Cervantes ND Nelson Cervantes.
Petitioners took care and custody of the child when she was barely two
weeks old. An affidavit of Consent of adoption of the child by the petitioners
was executed by respondent Gina Carreon on April 29, 1987 and file before
the RTC of Rizal. Sometime during March or April of 1987, the adoptive
parents received from the respondents a demand to be pay the amount of
P150,000.00, otherwise, they would not get their child back. Petitioners
refused. And as a result, while petitioners were out for work, Gina Carreon
took the child from their yaya and brought her to her house in Paranaque
and thereupon said that she had no desire to give up her child and that the
affidavit consent was not fully explained to her and she will return the child
only if she were paid the amount of P150,000.
ISSUE: Are the adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of
their adopted child and exercise parental authority over the child
HELD: Yes. As an adopted child, the child will be ‘freed from
parental authority of her natural parents as well as the legal obligation and
maintenance to them and that from now on shall be, for all legal intents and
purposes, known as Angelie Anne Cervantes, a child herein petitioners and
capable of inheriting their estate. Consequently, even though the child was
below 7 years of age, the courts can still decide where it best suites the
interest of the child and deprive Gina Carreon of custody on grounds that the
child will not have a suitable environment with her, unlike with the adoptive
parents who appear to be morally, physical, financially and socially capable
of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than that of her natural
mother.
189
HORACIO LUNA and LIBERTY HIZON-LUNA vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
ISSUE:
G.R. No. L-68374; June 18, 1985 Will the grant of custody in favour of the petitioners serve the best interest
CONCEPCION, JR., J.: and welfare of the minor child?
FACTS: RULING:
Maria Lourdes Santos and Sixto Salumbides are the parents of Shirley YES, it would be for Shirley’s welfare and best interest to remain in the
Salumbides, who is the subject of this child custody case. After the birth of custody of the petitioners.
Shirley, her parents gave her to petitioners Horacio and Liberty Hizon-Luna,
a childless couple with considerable means, who thereafter showered her
with love and affection and brought her up as their very own child. In the instant case, the petitioners claim that the child's manifestation to the
trial court that she would kill herself or run away from home if she should be
forced to live with the private respondents is a supervening event that would
Petitioners decided to take Shirley abroad, but when petitioners asked for the justify the cancellation of the execution of the final decision rendered by the
private respondents' consent, they refused. As a result, the petitioners had to Court of Appeals.
leave without Shirley whom they left with the private respondents. When the
petitioners returned, private respondents refused to return Shirley to them. In
view thereof, the petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus. A decision was We find merit in the petitioner. The manifestation of the child Shirley that she
rendered declaring the petitioners entitled to the child's custody. On appeal, would kill herself or run away from home if she should be taken away from
however, the decision was reversed. Upon finality of the judgment, the case the herein petitioners and forced to live with the private respondents, made
was remanded to the court of origin and an order directing the issuance of a during the hearings on the petitioners' motion to set aside the writ of
writ of execution to enforce the resolution of the Supreme Court affirming the execution and reiterated in her letters to the members of the Court dated
decision of the Court of Appeals was had. September 19, 1984 and January 2, 1985, and during the hearing of the case
before this Court, is a circumstance that would make the execution of the
judgment rendered inequitable, unfair and unjust, if not illegal. Article 363 of
Petitioners opposed and filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody,
and to set aside the writ of execution on the ground of supervening events education and property of the children, the latter's welfare is paramount. This
and circumstances, more particularly, the subsequent emotional, means that the best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and
psychological, and physiological condition of the child which make the even the rights of parents to the custody of their children. Since, in this case,
enforcement of the judgment unduly prejudicial, unjust and unfair, and would the very life and existence of the minor is at stake and the child is in an age
cause irreparable damage to the welfare and interests of the child. when she can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do no less than
respect, enforce and give meaning and substance to that choice and uphold
her right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral and
The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that there are no supervening intellectual development. The threat may be proven empty, but Shirley has a
developments and circumstances since these events are not new as the right to a wholesome family life that will provide her with love, care and
Court of Appeals had taken into account the physiological and emotional understanding, guidance and counselling, and moral and material
consideration of the transfer of custody of Shirley when it reversed the security. But what if the threat is for real?
decision of the trial court and gave to the private respondents the custody of
the child Shirley; and besides, the wishes and desires of the child is no
hindrance to the parents' right to her custody since the right of the parents to Besides, in her letters to the members of the Court, Shirley depicted her
the custody of their children paramount. biological parents as selfish and cruel and who beat her often; and that they
do not love her. And, as pointed out by the child psychologist, Shirley has
190

grown more embitered cautious and dismissing of her biological parents. To
return her to the custody of the private respondents to face the same
Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto
emotional environment which she is now complaining of would be indeed
traumatic and cause irreparable damage to the child. As requested by her, let G.R. No. 154994, June 28, 2005.
us not destroy her future. Panganiban, J.
Therefore, the decision granting herein petitioners custody of the child FACTS:
Shirley Salumbides should be maintained.
Respondent Crisanto Gualberto filed before the RTC of Paranaque a petition
for declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner Joycelyn Pablo-
Gualberto with an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their 4 year-old
son, Rafaelito. In support of his prayer for custody, respondent presented as
witness, a private investigator who conducted a surveillance on the petitioner
and testified that the petitioner was having lesbian relations with Noreen Gay.
The testimony of the investigator was corroborated by the househelper of the
spouses who added that she saw the petitioner slap the child on one
occasion and that petitioner often goes out of the house evincing lack of care
for the child. The RTC denied custody on the ground that under Art. 213 of
the Family Code a minor shall not be separated from the mother unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise and the reasons presented
by respondent are not compelling reasons. On certiorari, however, the CA
awarded custody to respondent on the ground of mere technicalities in
procedure which were not observed before the RTC. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Is lesbianism a compelling reason to deny the mother of custody of her minor
child?
RULING:
NO. Sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect
or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been
unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor
child. To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that
her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or
have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental care.
191
Thus, it is not enough for respondent to show merely that petitioner was a Petitioner Multi-realty Development Corporation (Multi-realty) constructed a
lesbian. He must also demonstrate that she carried on her purported condo with 270 parking lots. As reflected in the condo's floor plan, 164 of the
relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or parking lots were allocated to unit owners, 8 to guests and 98 were retained
under circumstances not conducive to the child's proper moral development. by Multi-realty for sale to unit owners who want to have additional slots.
Such a fact has not been shown here. There is no evidence that the son was Subsequently, the Condominium Act took effect, pursuant to which
exposed to the mothers alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper moral respondent Makati Tuscany Condominium Corporation (MATUSCO) was
and psychological development suffered as a result. All told, no compelling created to manage the condominium units. Accordingly, Multi-realty executed
reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mothers custody. the master deed and declaration of restrictions of MATUSCO stating that
parking lots other than those allocated to each unit owner shall be part of the
common areas and then it executed a deed of transfer in favor of MATUSCO
over all such common areas. It appeared therefore, that Multi-realty has
transferred ownership of all unallocated parking lots to MATUSCO.
Nevertheless, Multi-realty was able to sell 26 of the 98 unallocated parking
lots without the objection of MATUSCO. In fact, the board of directors of
MATUSCO passed a resolution to negotiate with Multi-realty for the purchase
of all 72 unsold and unallocated parking lots. During negotiations, Multi-realty
requested MATUSCO to allow two Muti-realty executives to park in two
unallocated slots. This request was denied by MATUSCO which, for the first
time after 11 years from the registration and execution of the master deed,
asserted ownership over the unallocated parking lots as part of the common
areas provided in the master deed which were transferred to it.
Consequently, Multi-realty filed before the RTC of Makati a complaint for
reformation of instrument with damages against MATUSCO alleging that it
committed a mistake in stating in the master deed that all unallocated lots
shall be part of the common areas for it was never its intention to transfer
ownership of said lots to MATUSCO. The RTC dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action. On appeal, the CA affirmed the dismissal
on a different ground that is prescription, since the action for reformation is
founded on a written contract and under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, such
actions prescribe within 10 years. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Does an action for reformation of an instrument on the ground of mistake in
drafting its terms cpntrary to the true intention of the parties prescribe within
10 years from the registration or execution of the instrument subject of the
action?
Multi-realty Development Corporation v. Makati Tuscany Condominium
Corporation
G.R. No. 146726, June 16, 2006. RULING:
Callejo, Sr., J. NO. The statute of limitations does not begin to run against an equitable
cause of action for the reformation of an instrument because of mistake until
the mistake has been discovered or ought to have been discovered. The
FACTS: mere recording of a deed does not charge the grantor with constructive
notice of a mistake therein, but is to be considered with other facts and
192

circumstances in determining whether the grantor be charged with notice When Mauricio and Simona died, the respondents filed an action for the
actual or constructive. judicial partition of the lots and annulment of sale, claiming that they and the
petitioners are co-owners of the lots by succession and that the sale of the
same during the lifetime of the spouses to the petitioners was void. The RTC
Here, Multi-realty only discovered the mistake after its request to allow its rejected respondents' claims and dismissed the complaint. On appeal,
executives to park in the common areas was denied by MATUSCO in 1989. however, the CA decreed partition on the ground that Mauricio could not
It was only then that petitioners cause of action for a reformation of the have validly sold the lots under a GPA because such disposition requires an
Master Deed accrued. Prior to that, Multi-realty could not be charged with SPA, consequently, it was a sale of conjugal property without the wife's
actual or constructive notice of the mistake, considering that it had sold 26 consent contrary to Art. 166 of the Civil Code. Hence, this appeal.
lots without the objection of MATUSCO and it was likewise negotiating the
sale of the remaining unallocated lots to MATUSCO before the latter decided
to assert ownership over the same. Indubitably, the action for reformation ISSUE:
filed in 1990 had not yet prescribed.
1. Is the sale of conjugal property without the wife's consent void?
2. Does the respondents have the right to ask for the partition of the lots?
RULING:
1. NO. It is well-settled that contracts alienating conjugal real property without
the wife's consent are merely voidable under the Civil Code that is, binding
on the parties unless annulled by a competent court and not void ab initio.
Under the Civil Code, only the wife can ask to annul a contract that disposes
of conjugal real property without her consent. The wife must file the action for
Bravo-Guerrero v. Bravo annulment during the marriage and within ten years from the questioned
G.R. No. 152658, July 29, 2005. transaction. Article 173 is explicit on the remedies available if the wife fails to
exercise this right within the specified period. In such case, the wife or her
Carpio, J. heirs can only demand the value of the property provided they prove that the
husband fraudulently alienated the property. Fraud is never presumed, but
must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
FACTS:
The petitioners and the respondents are grandchildren of the spouses
Mauricio and Simona Bravo. Simona executed a General Power of Attorney Here, respondents action to annul the sale based on Article 166 must fail for
(GPA) appointing Mauricio as her attorney-in-fact pursuant to which Mauricio having been filed out of time. The marriage of Mauricio and Simona was
was able to mortgage their conjugal lots to PNB and DBP. Subsequently, dissolved when Mauricio died in 1973. More than ten years have passed
Mauricio sold the lots to Roland Bravo, Sr. (who is the father of the since the execution of the Deed of Sale. Further, respondents, who are
petitioners and respondent Edward) and to two petitioners conditioned on the Simonas heirs, are not the parties who can invoke Article 166. Article 173
assumption of the vendees of payment of the mortgage loans. reserves that remedy to the wife alone. Only Simona had the right to have
193
the sale of the Properties annulled on the ground that Mauricio sold the lots Charlton Lee v. Adre
without her consent. Consequently, the sale must be upheld.
450 SCRA 145; January 31, 2005
Chico- Nazario, J.
2. YES. Petitioners have consistently claimed that their father is one of the
vendees who bought the Properties. As Roland Bravo, Sr. is also the father
of respondent Edward Bravo, Edward is thus a compulsory heir of Roland Facts:
Bravo, Sr. and entitled to a share, along with his brothers and sisters, in his
fathers portion of the Properties. In short, Edward and petitioners are co-
owners of the Properties. A petition for habeas corpus was filed by, Rosanna Reyes- Tan
against the complainant, Charlton Tan in another case, ordering him to bring
the body of their child before the court. The respondent judge issued the writ
As such, Edward can rightfully ask for the partition of the Properties. Any co- and gave the provisional custody of the child to the mother. The complainant
owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless filed an administrative complaint against the judge who issued the writ,
a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership. This action for partition does questioning his decision of awarding the provisional custody to his wife. In his
not prescribe and is not subject to laches. complaint, he alleged that the judge acted with grave abuse of authority,
when he did not pass upon the fitness or qualification of his wife as a mother.
He alleged that his wife, Rosanna, was unfit as a mother, as she works in
(It appears that Edward is the only respondent entitled to ask for partition in Japan and comes only to the Philippines for a short vacation; that she is
view of the validity of the sale, the other grandchildren not begotten of presently in a relationship with another man; that she is not financially
Rolando Bravo, Sr. are not). capable of supporting their daughter. On the other hand, the respondent
judge maintained that his order was supported by law and jurisprudence.
Issue: To whom does the provisional custody of the child belong?
Ruling:
The court ruled that the provisional custody of the child belong to the
mother, pursuant to Art. 213 of the FC, “No child under seven years of age
shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise.” In this case, the child was only four (4) years old
and therefore, its custody should be given to the mother. However, such
custody, being provisional does not prevent the father from proving
“compelling reasons” in a full blown trial for that purpose.
194

Joey D. Briones v. Maricel P. Miguel St. Mary’s Academy v. William Carpitanos
G.R. No. 156343; October 18, 2004
G.R. No. 143363; February 6, 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Pardo, J.
FACTS: Michael is the minor illegitimate child of Loreta and Joey. Joey and
Loreta are not living together, and the latter already has a Japanese
husband. Joey insists that as the biological father of Michael, he should have FACTS: St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive
the custody of the child while the mother, Loreta, is working in Japan. and part of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of different schools to
ISSUE: May the natural father have the custody and parental care of his own entice prospective enrollees. Sherwin Capistanos was a student of St. Mary’s
child in the absence of the mother who is away? Academy and part of the campaigning group. Sherwin, along with other high
school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by one of the
HELD: No, the natural father cannot have custody and parental care of the
defendants, Vicencio Villanueva and driven by James Daniel II, also a
child while the mother is away.
student of the same school, in a reckless manner which as a result the jeep
Article 176 of the Family Code explicitly provides that illegitimate children over turned. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries sustained
shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their from the accident. Spouses Carpitanos are now claiming damages for the
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. This is death of their only son Sherwin Carpitanos against James Daniel II and his
the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity. The law explicitly parents, spouses Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vicencio Villanueva and St.
confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it Mary’s Academy. Judgment was rendered by the RTC of Dipolog holding
follows that only if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority petitioners liable for damages in which St. Mary’s Academy was prinicipally
over the minor. Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother’s liable with spouses Daniel being only subsidiarily liable.
unfitness to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of
parental authority and the award of custody to someone else.
ISSUE: Should St. Mary’s Academy be held principally liable for the death of
Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental authority over the Sherwin Carpitanos due to the Special Parental Authority exercised by the
minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has the right to keep him in her
former over the latter?
company. She cannot be deprived of that right, and she may not even
renounce or transfer it except in the cases authorized by law.
Therefore, the natural father cannot have custody and parental care of the HELD: NO. Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have
child while the mother is away. special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2)
the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental
authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside
or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such
authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs
of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized
by the school or its teachers. Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the
person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority
are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision,
instruction, or custody.
195
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act Republic of the Philippines vs CA and Maximo Wong
or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury G.R. No. 97906; May 21, 1992
caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the REGALADO, J.
accident. In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must
FACTS: Maximo Wong was adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and
be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalize Filipinos. Maximo filed this petition for
consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and change of surname asking the court that he be allowed to use the name
the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
given to him by his biological parents which is Maximo Alcala, Jr. The reason
intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the
given by Maximo is that his name causes embarrassment because it
proximate cause of the injury.
suggests Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino
The respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the living in a Muslim community and that his friends make fun of his name and
proximate cause of the death of the victim. Respondents Daniel spouses and this affects his business and social life. It is worthy to note that his adoptive
Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the mother does not oppose the petition and his adoptive father is already
negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the deceased.
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Further, there was no
evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the
jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of ISSUE: Are the reasons given sufficient to warrant the grant of the petition?
respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the
jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to
RULING: Yes the reasons provided are sufficient.
drive the jeep at the time of the accident. The negligence of petitioner St.
Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the Under Article 376 by the Civil Code, "(n)o person can change his name or
remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors surname without judicial authority." The application for change of name
parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Since the thereunder involves a special proceeding governed by and conducted under
accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the strictures of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court and one which involves
the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall substantial changes, with the declared objective of such judicial proceedings
be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. being the prevention of fraud. The purpose of the statutory procedure
authorizing a change of personal name is simply to have, wherever possible,
a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, court to
which application is made should normally make its decree recording such
change of name.
From the testimony of petitioner-appellee and of his adopter mother
Concepcion Ty-Wong, We discern that said appellee was prompted to file the
petition for change of name because of the embarrassment and ridicule his
family name "Wong" brings in his dealings with his relatives and friends, he
being a Muslim Filipino and living in a Muslim community. Another cause is
his desire to improve his social and business life. It has been held that in the
absence of prejudice to the state or any individual, a sincere desire to adopt
a Filipino name to erase signs of a former alien nationality which only
hamper(s) social and business life, is a proper and reasonable cause for
change of name.
Therefore, the petition of the Republiic is denied and the change of the
surname is granted.
196

VALERIO KALAW V. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article
G.R. No. 166357; September 19, 2011 36 of the Family Code which provides: “A marriage contracted by any party
Del Castillo, J. who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
FACTS: The parties to this case are husband and wife, legally married, who marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
were blessed with four children. Shortly after respondent gave birth to their becomes manifest only after its solemnization.” Psychological incapacity is
the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the
youngest child, petitioner had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano
basic marital obligations. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is
with whom he had four children. The respondent left the conjugal home while
on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on
petitioner went to the US with Jocelyn and their children.
his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that
Nine years after the de facto separation from respondent, petitioner completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be
Family Code. Respondent denied being psychologically incapacitated. After grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.
summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the RTC concluded
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual
that both parties are psychologically incapacitted to perform the essential
marital obligations under the Family Code and declared the parties marriage basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. The petitioner failed to
prove that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity. What transpired
void abinition.
between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have
Respondent appealed the RTC’s decision to the CA, which reversed constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and
the assailed decision on the ground that it is not supported by the facts on to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not
record. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Did petitioner, by presenting the testimonies of two supposed expert

witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacited,
prove that the respondent suffers from psychological incapacity?
RULING: NO, the testimonies of the supposed expert witnesses

heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong
sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and
neglect of their children, which have not been sufficiently proven. The said
expert witnesses opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed
constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her
duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of
narcissistic personality disorder (NPD). However, respondent presented
contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner, which was
corroborated by their children.
197
Glenn Viñas v Mary Grace Parel-Viñas The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a
psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the
G.R. No. 208790; January 21, 2015
declaration of nullity of marriage. "If the totality of evidence presented is
REYES, J.: enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to."
FACTS:
In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr.
Tayag and Rodelito, and the documentary evidence offered do not
Petitioner Glenn Viñas married Mary Grace Parel who was already pregnant sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mary Grace’s
then. The couple lived together under one roof. Sometime in March of 2006, condition. The evidence merely shows that Mary Grace is outgoing, strong-
Mary Grace suddenly left their home to work in Dubai without telling Glenn. willed and not inclined to perform household chores. Further, she is
Later on, Glenn filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage employed in Dubai and is romantically-involved with another man. She has
with Mary Grace. He alleged that Mary Grace was insecure, extremely not been maintaining lines of communication with Glenn at the time the latter
jealous, outgoing, and prone to regularly resorting to any pretext to be able to filed the petition before the RTC. Glenn, on the other hand, is conservative,
leave the house. She thoroughly enjoyed the nightlife, and drank and family-oriented and is the exact opposite of Mary Grace. While Glenn and
smoked heavily even when she was pregnant. Further, Mary Grace refused Mary Grace possess incompatible personalities, the latter’s acts and traits do
to perform even the most essential household chores of cleaning and not necessarily indicate psychological incapacity.
cooking. She lived as if she were single and was unmindful of her husband’s
needs. She was self-centered, selfish and immature. When Glenn confronted
her about her behavior, she showed indifference. It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more or
less seven years from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing established fact shows
that living together as spouses under one roof is not an impossibility. Mary
To ease their marital problems, Glenn sought professional guidance and Grace’s departure from their home in 2006 indicates either a refusal or mere
submitted himself to a psychological evaluation by Clinical Psychologist Nedy difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply with her obligation to live with
Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Dr. Tayag found him as "amply aware of his marital roles" her husband.
and "capable of maintaining a mature and healthy heterosexual relationship."
On the other hand, Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits. Hence, the totality of the evidence presented provides inadequate basis to
conclude that Mary Grace is indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply
with her obligations as Glenn’s spouse.
Dr. Tayag concluded that Mary Grace and Glenn’s relationship is not
founded on mutual love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each other.
Hence, Dr. Tayag recommended the propriety of declaring the nullity of the
couple’s marriage.
ISSUE: Is Mary Grace psychologically incapacitated to comply with her

obligations as Glenn’s spouse?
RULING: No, Mary Grace is not psychologically incapacitated.
198

Robert Mallilin vs. Luz Jamesolamin and the Republic of the Philippines ISSUES:
G.R. No. 192718. February 18, 2015. Whether sexual infidelity and failure to perform ones role as a mother
and wife, without being clinically identified, are sufficient to declare a
MENDOZA, J.:
marriage void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code?
FACTS:
Whether the decision of the NAMT annulling a marriage due to a
This is a petition to nullify Robert Mallilin’s (Robert) marriage with finding that a person is suffering from a grave lack of discretion of judgment
Luz Jamesolamin (Luz) on the ground of psychological incapacity under concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations (Canon 1095,
Article 36 of the Family Code. Robert alleged that Luz is psychologically par. 2) should be given great weight in deciding a case for declaration of
incapacitated due to her failure to comply with her role as a wife and as a nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code?
mother manifested in her sexual infidelity and deliberate refusal to prepare
their meals, do the laundry, and accompany their child to school, among
others. Luz, on the other hand, claimed that it was Robert who is HELD:
psychologically incapacitated. In a case for annulment filed before the
NO, the requirements laid down in Molina case, one of which is that
Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila
alleged incapacity should be clinically identified, should still be observed.
(Metropolitan Tribunal), said tribunal found their marriage invalid ab initio on
the ground of grave lack of due discretion on the part of both parties as
contemplated by the second paragraph of Canon1095. This decision was [T]he root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was
affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT). Later on, in not medically or clinically identified, and sufficiently proven during the trial.
a case filed before the Family Court for declaration of nullity of marriage Based on the records, Robert failed to prove that her disposition of not
based on Article 36 of the Family Code, said court found and declared Luz to cleaning the room, preparing their meal, washing the clothes, and propensity
be psychologically incapacitated based on Robert’s allegations. for dating and receiving different male visitors, was grave, deeply rooted, and
Consequently, it declared the marriage void ab initio. incurable within the parameters of jurisprudence on psychological incapacity.
The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as a

Representing the State, the Solicitor General questioned the court a mother, as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity,
quo’s decision and contends that sexual infidelity is only a ground for legal cannot rise to the level of psychological incapacity that justifies the
separation and not for a finding that the infidel was psychologically nullification of the parties' marriage. The Court has repeatedly stressed that
incapacitated. It further argued that the decision was not in accordance with psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to
the Molina doctrine in a sense that the alleged psychological incapacity of take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations," not merely
Luz was not clinically declared and that the decision of NAMT was based on the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant
grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning matrimonial rights and spouse.
obligations due to outside factors other than psychological incapacity as
contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code. That being so, the NAMT As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and
decision could not be given great weight in deciding the case at hand. Ruling abandonment do not, by themselves, constitute grounds for declaring a
in favor of the State, the CA reversed the Family Court’s decision. Hence, marriage void based on psychological incapacity.
this petition.
NO. In order to be given great weight by the Court in deciding a case
for declaration of marriage based on psychological incapacity, the NAMT’s
199
decision in annulling a marriage must be based on par.3 of Canon 1095 and Philippine National Bank v. Jose Garcia and children
not one based on par. 2 thereof. G.R. No. 182839; June 02, 2014
Robert’s reliance on the NAMT decision is misplaced. To repeat, the Brion, J.

decision of the NAMT was based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095
which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment
FACTS: Spouses Garcia initially obtained a loan from petitioner bank and
concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given
secured it by a mortgage over their property (TCT No. 177585).
and accepted, a cause not of psychological nature under Article 36 of the
Subsequently, they increased their loan and secured it with another property
Family Code. A cause of psychological nature similar to Article 36 is covered
(TCT No. 75324) and respondents’ property (TCT No. T-44422). TCT No. T-
by the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law (Santos v.
44422 was under the name of Jose Sr. who acquired such property during
Santos 19), which for ready reference reads:
his marriage with Ligaya Garcia, who later died but was survived by four
children who were also respondents in this case. Jose Sr. executed Special
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage: xxx par 3. Powers of Attorney to expressly authorize the Spouses Garcia to secure any
Those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to loan from the petitioner bank and use the subject property as additional
assume the essential obligations of marriage. collateral security, however, it was without the consent of the children.
Spouses Garcia failed to pay their loan upon maturity. Later, Jose Sr.’s
To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the NAMT under the second children filed a Complaint for Nullity of the Amendment of Real Estate
paragraph of Canon 1095 should also be covered would be to expand what Mortgage claiming that they were not parties to the contract and thus, not
the lawmakers did not intend to include. binding upon them. Spouses Garcia alleged that Jose Sr. was indebted to
them and as a settlement, the latter volunteered to give the subject property
(Note: The NAMT decision was not presented during the trial and thus, as additional collateral. On the other hand, petitioner bank claimed that the
according to the Court, cannot be considered.) subject property was not part of the conjugal properties because the TCT
was registered in the name of Jose Sr. alone and that the mortgage was
done in good faith.
ISSUES:
1) Is the subject property (TCT No. T-44422) part of the conjugal
property?
2) Are Jose Sr.’s children bound by the mortgage executed upon
the said property?
HELD:
1) Yes, the subject property is part of the conjugal property.
Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, “all property of the marriage
is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it can
be proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.”
Because of the petitioner bank’s failure to rebut the allegation
that the subject property was acquired during the Jose Sr.’s
marriage to Ligaya, the legal presumption of the conjugal nature
of the property, in line with Article 160 of the Civil Code, applies
to this property. Proof of the subject property’s acquisition during
200

the subsistence of marriage suffices to render the statutory RODOLFO S. AGUILAR, Petitioner, vs. EDNA G. SIASAT, Respondent
presumption operative
G.R. No. 200169; January 28, 2015
Therefore, the said property is considered conjugal property.
DEL CASTILLO, J.
2) No, the children are not bound by the Real Estate Mortgage.
Article 493 of the Civil Code states that, “Each co-owner shall
have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits FACTS: Spouses Alfredo Aguilar (Alfredo) and Candelaria Siasat-
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or Aguilar (Candelaria), together known as the Aguilar spouses, died intestate
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, and without debts, their estate including two parcels of land situated in
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the Bacolod City. Claiming to be the only son and sole surviving heir of the
alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners shall Aguilar spouses, Petitioner Rodolfo Aguilar (Rodolfo) sued Respondent Edna
be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the Siasat (Edna), niece of Candelaria, for the return of the missing titles of the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership.” above-mentioned lands. Edna claimed that Rodolfo was not the son and sole
Consequently, the conjugal partnership was converted into an surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses but was merely a stranger who was
implied ordinary co-ownership between the surviving spouse, on raised as a son, out of generosity and kindness; that Rodolfo was neither a
the one hand, and the heirs of the deceased, on the other. Jose natural nor adopted son of the said spouses; that she did not steal the
Sr. constituted the mortgage over the entire subject property subject land titles but the same were entrusted to her by her late aunt for
after the death of Ligaya, but before the liquidation of the safekeeping. To prove his filiation to the Aguilar spouses, Rodolfo presented
conjugal partnership. While under Article 493 of the Civil Code, several documents including school records, his individual income tax return,
even if he had the right to freely mortgage or even sell his Alfredo’s SSS Form E-1 (a duly notarized public document) and Information
undivided interest in the disputed property, he could not dispose Sheet of Employment at the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company, all of which
of or mortgage the entire property without his children’s consent. indicated that he was the son of the Aguilar spouses. Rodolfo also presented
As correctly emphasized by the trial court, Jose Sr.’s right in the a Certification (1996) from the Bacolod City Civil Registry stating that birth
subject property is limited only to his share in the conjugal records from 1945-1946 were all destroyed by nature hence no true copy of
partnership as well as his share as an heir on the other half of the Certificate of Live Birth of Petitioner. Rodolfo presented his wife and aunt
the estate which is his deceased spouse’s share. as witnesses. For her part, Edna averred she was not related to Rodolfo; that
Accordingly, the mortgage contract is void insofar as it extends she attended to her aunt during the latter’s sickness and that Candelaria
to the undivided shares of his children because they did not give executed an affidavit to the effect that she had no issue and that she is the
their consent to the transaction. sole heir to her husband Alfredo who predeceased her. The RTC Bacolod
ruled that Rodolfo failed to prove he was the son of the Aguilar spouses. On
appeal and with particular reference to Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1,
Rodolfo asserted he was able to prove his filiation under Art. 172 of the
Family Code. The Court of Appeals rejected his claim and affirmed the trial
court’s decision. Hence, the present action.
ISSUE: Did Rodolfo present sufficient evidence, including Alfredo’s SSS

Form E-1 which a duly notarized public document, in order to satisfy the legal
requirements of proving filiation?
201
RULING: Yes, Rodolfo was able to present sufficient evidence, BBB vs. AAA
including the said SSS Form E-1, which satisfies the legal requirements of GR No. 193225; February 9, 2015
the proving filiation. REYES, J.
The Supreme Court relied upon Art. 172 of the Family Code and its
pronouncement in the 2001 case of De Jesus vs. Estate of Dizon (418 SCRA FACTS: BBB and AAA first met in 1991 but started to date seriously only in
768). 1996. AAA was then a medical student and was raising her first child borne
CCC from a previous relationship, with the help of her parents. During the
Says the Supreme Court: “The filiation of illegitimate children, like relationship with BBB, AAA bore two more children namely, DDD (born on
legitimate children, is established by xxx (2) an admission of legitimate December 11, 1997) and EEE (born on October 19, 2000). To legalize their
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and relationship, BBB and AAA married in civil rights on October 10, 2002 and
signed by the parent concerned xxx The due recognition of an thereafter, the birth certificates of the children, including CCC’s, was
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court amended to change their civil status to legitimated by virtue of the said
of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of marriage.
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In
fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory Eventually, BBB & AAA parted ways. Now, BBB points out that CCC is not
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a his biological son; hence, CCC is not entitled to receive support from him.
separate action for judicial approval xxx Thus, applying the foregoing
pronouncement to the instant case, it must be concluded that petitioner – ISSUE: Is a legitimated child by representation entitled to support?
who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the marriage of Alfredo Aguilar
and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar and before their respective deaths – has HELD: Yes. CCC is entitled to support.
sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses. As
petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the Article 177 of the Family Code provides that “[o]nly children conceived and
requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes an former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be
“admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten legitimated.” Article 178 states that “[l]egitimation shall take place by a
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.” xxx It was erroneous for the subsequent valid marriage between parents.”
CA to treat said document as mere proof of open and continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172 In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is not CCC’s
of the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the second paragraph biological father. Such being the case, it was improper to have CCC
thereof, the same being an express recognition in a public instrument.” legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAA’s marriage. Clearly then,
Therefore, Rodolfo Aguilar is the son and sole surviving heir of the the legal process of legitimation was trifled with. BBB voluntarily but falsely
Aguilar spouses and is thus, entitled to the titles and ownership of the lands acknowledged CCC as his son. Article 1431 of the New Civil Code
in question which he inherited from his deceased parents. pertinently provides:
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered

conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as
against the person relying thereon.
At least for the purpose of resolving the instant petition, the principle of
estoppel finds application and it now bars BBB from making an assertion
contrary to his previous representations. He should not be allowed to evade
a responsibility arising from his own misrepresentations. He is bound by the
effects of the legitimation process. CCC remains to be BBB’s son, and
pursuant to Article 179 of the Family Code, the former is entitled to the same
rights as those of a legitimate child, including the receipt of his father’s
202

support. Felina Rosaldes v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 173988; October 8, 2014
Notwithstanding the above, there is no absolute preclusion for BBB from BERSAMIN, J.
raising before the proper court the issue of CCC’s status and filiation.
However, BBB cannot do the same in the instant petition before this Court
now. In Tison v. CA, the Court held that “the civil status [of a child] cannot be
FACTS: Michael Ryan Gonzales was hurriedly entering his classroom when
attacked collaterally.” The child’s legitimacy “cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose.”
34 he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, herein petitioner, who was
The instant petition sprang out of AAA’s application for a PPO before the then asleep on a bamboo sofa. Petitioner asked Michael to apologize to her
RTC. Hence, BBB’s claim that CCC is not his biological son is a collateral but the latter did not obey which prompted her to pinched him on his thigh.
issue, which this Court has no authority to resolve now. Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. Michael’s
body hit a desk and he lost consciousness. She then proceeded to pick
Michael up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor. RTC
convicted Rosaldes for violation of R.A. 7610. Petitioner contends that she
did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries and such were just an act of
discipline under the doctrine of in loco parentis. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: Is the petitioner-teacher exempted from liability under the doctrine of

in loco parentis?
RULING: No, petitioner is still liable.
Article 233 stated that the person exercising substitute parental authority
shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the parents. In
no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in
child care exercising special parental authority inflict corporal
punishment upon the child.
Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline Michael as

her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary,
violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her
hands. She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of
disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited
by no less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of
corporal punishment by a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged
in child care exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis).
203
Therefore, petitioner is liable and her contention is utterly bereft of merit. Virginia Ocampo v. Deogracio Ocampo
Hence, the petition is denied. G.R. No. 198908; August 3, 2015
PERALTA, J.
FACTS:
Virginia Ocampo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Deogracio Ocampo which was approved by the trial court on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
The decision became final and the court directed the parties to
submit a project of partition of their inventoried properties. Since they failed
to do so, a hearing ensued and the trial court rendered an order stating that
the properties declared by the parties belonged to each one of them on a 50-
50 sharing.
Virginia filed an appeal but the same was denied. Hence, this petition
for review.
ISSUE:
Should Deogracio be denied of his share in the conjugal partnership
of gains because of bad faith and psychological perversity?
RULING:
No. Under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the
marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof then
is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal.
Here, since the marriage was declared void under Article 36, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
by either Article 147 or 148. The marriage of spouses Ocampo was governed
by Article 147 since they suffered no legal impediment to marry each other.
Property acquired by them then through their work and industry
should therefore be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any
property acquired during their union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed to the
same jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family household.
Thus, the trial court and the CA correctly held that the parties will
share on equal shares since Virginia failed to prove that the properties were
acquired solely on her own efforts.
204

VICENTE D. CABANTING AND LALAINE V. CABANTING v. BPI FAMILY dealing with the dominant bargaining party and is reduced to the alternative
SAVINGS BANK, INC. of taking it or leaving it, completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on
G.R. No. 201927 February 17, 2016 equal footing, Nevertheless, contracts of adhesion are not invalid per se; they
Peralta, J. are not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality
free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent.”
Facts:
The validity or cnforceability of the impugned contracts will have to be
Peitioners bought on installment basis from Diamond Motors, a Mitsubishi determined by the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and the
Adventure .They also executed a Promissory Note with Chattel Mortage with situation of the parties concerned. Indeed, Article 24 of the New Civil Code
an acceleration clause such that failure to pay any installment will make the provides that "in all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the
balance due and demandable without a need for a prior demand from BPI. parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance,
Having failed to pay the installments due, a complaint was filed by BPI indigence, mental weakness, tender age, or other handicap, the courts must
Family against petitioners for Replevin and damages before the RTC, be vigilant for his protection."
praying that petitioners be ordered to pay the unpaid portion of the vehicle's
purchase price, accrued interest thereon at the rate of 36% per annum, 25%
Here, there is no proof that petitioners were disadvantaged, uneducated or
attorney's fees and 25% liquidated damages, as stipulated on the Promissory
utterly inexperienced in dealing with financial institutions; thus, there is no
Note with Chattel Mortgage. BPI Family alleged that petitioners failed to pay
reason for the court to step in and protect the interest of the supposed
three (3) consecutive installments and despite written demand sent to weaker party.
petitioners through registered mail, petitioners failed to comply with said
demand to pay or to surrender possession of the vehicle to BPI Family.
Verily, petitioners are bound by the aforementioned stipulation in the
Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage waiving the necessity of notice and
Both RTC and CA ruled in favor of BPI.
demand to make the obligation due and demandable.
Petitioner contends that the acceleration clause should be struck down as
being a contract of adhesion.
Issue:
Is a contract of adhesion invalid per se?
Held:
No. A contract of adhesion, wherein one party imposes a ready-made form of

contract on the other, is not strictly against the law. A contract of adhesion is
as binding as ordinary contracts, the reason being that the party who
adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely. Contrary to petitioner's
contention, not every contract of adhesion is an invalid agreement. The SC
held in one case that: ”It bears stressing that a contract of adhesion is just as
binding as ordinary contracts. It is true that we have, on occasion, struck
down such contracts as void when the weaker party is imposed upon in
205
Carmelita Zaguirre v. Atty. Alfredo Castillo Smart Communications Inc., Napoloeon Nazareno, and Ricardo Isla v.
A.C. No. 4291, August 3, 2005 Jose Leni Solidum
G.R. No. 204646 April 15, 2015
FACTS:
J. Carpio
An administrative case was filed against Respondent Castillo for gross
immoral conduct for failure to acknowledge and support the child of
complainant with whom he had an affair. He was found guilty by the Court of FACTS: Solidum was terminated on the ground of dishonesty. In an illegal
such charge and was imposed the penalty of indefinite suspension. In his dismissal case, the Labor Arbiter held that he was illegally dismissed and
motion for reconsideration of the decision, the complainant opposed as he thereby entitled to reinstatement and full back wages. Solidum received the
still failed to support the child. copy of LA’s decision on July 13, 2006. Smart appealed before the NLRC.
While appeal was pending, the LA issued writs of execution covering the
period of July 21, 2006 to January 22, 2009 for the collection of Solidum’s the
ISSUE: May a claim for support be made through an administrative case? accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses. The LA
issued seven other alias writs of execution from August 2007 to January
2009 ordering the sheriff to collect from petitioners Solidum’s accrued
RULING: No. Complainants claim for support of her child should be salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses. In January 26, 2009,
addressed to the proper court in a proper case. the NLRC reversed the LA’s decision. Solidum filed a motion for
reconsideration.
On May 4, 2009, Solidum filed before the LA an ex parte motion for a writ of
execution to be issued ordering the sheriff to collect from Smart his salaries,
etc. which accrued from January 21, 2009 to April 20, 2009. The LA,
however, denied the issuance of writ of execution on the ground that the
NLRC has reversed its decision, so that Solidum is no longer entitled to his
claim of reinstatement when the NLRC decision was rendered.
In May 29, 2009, the NLRC denied Solidum’s motion for reconsideration of
the reversal of the January 2009 decision of the NLRC. Copy of the decision
was mailed to Solidum on July 11, 2009. In its entry of judgment, it was
confirmed that the NLRC May 29, 2009 resolution has become final and
executory on August 10, 2009.
ISSUE: Did the NLRC correctly ruled that August 10, 2009 is the true date of
finality of the May 29, 2009 decision?
RULING: Yes. The NLRC’s 29 May 2009 Decision became final and
executory on 10 August 2009 as shown on the entry of judgment. The
Decision was promulgated on 29 May 2009 and the same was mailed on 11
June 2009. In the absence of return cards, the decision had become final
and executory on 10 August 2009, (after sixty (60) calendar days from the
date of mailing) Since the NLRC’s 29 May 2009 Decision became final and
executory on 10 August 2009, Solidum is entitled to P2,881,335.86,
206

representing his accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and Social Security Commission v. Edna A. Azote
bonuses for the period 21 January to 20 July 2009. G.R. No. 209741; April 15, 2015
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS: Edgardo Azote submitted his SSS form E-4 designating his
wife Edna and their three older children as beneficiaries. His three younger
children were added as beneficiaries in a subsequent SSS form E-4
submitted by Edgardo. After Edgardo died, Edna filed a claim for death
benefits but it was denied because it appeared on the record that Edgardo
submitted another form designating his former wife Rosemarie Azote as his
wife and Elmer Azote as dependent. Edna then filed a petition with the Social
Security Commission where Rosemarie was declared in default for not
answering the petition. SSC however dismissed the petition on the ground
that the form designating Rosemarie and her child as beneficiary was not
revoked by Edgardo, and that Rosemarie was still presumed to be the legal
wife as Edna could not proved that Edgardo’s previous marriage was
annulled or divorced. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision and held that
SSC could not make a determination of the validity or invalidity of the
marriage of Edna to Edgardo.
ISSUE: Did the CA erred in ruling that the commission is bereft of authority to
determine the validity and invalidity of the marriage of the private respondent
and member Edgardo Azote?
RULING: Yes, the CA erred in ruling that the commission is authority

to determine the validity and invalidity of the marriage of the private
respondent and member Edgardo Azote.
The law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death was Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8282 the amendatory law of R.A. No. 1161 or the "Social Security Law."
Applying Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282, it is clear that only the legal
spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the
latter’s SS benefits. In this case, there is a concrete proof that Edgardo
contracted an earlier marriage with another individual as evidenced by their
marriage contract. Edgardo even acknowledged his married status when he
filled out the 1982 Form E-4 designating Rosemarie as his spouse. It is
undisputed that the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated at
207
the time when the Family Code was already in force.1âwphi1 Article 41 of the SM Land, Inc. vs. Bases Conversion and Development Authority and
Family Code expressly states: Arnel Casanova
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a G.R. No. 203655; August 13, 2014
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the Velasco, Jr., J.
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well- FACTS: BCDA opened for disposition and development its Bonifacio South
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of Property. SM Land, Inc. (SMLI) submitted to the BCDA a series of unsolicited
disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances set proposals for the development of the lot through a public-private joint venture
forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of agreement by Swiss Challenge. BCDA accepted the proposal of the
only two years shall be sufficient. petitioner and the parties embarked on the detailed negotiations as
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding mandated under the NEDA JV Guidelines. After the negotiations turned out
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as to be fruitful, a Certification of Successful Negotiations (Certification) was
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the issued by the BCDA and signed by both parties. Through the said
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent Certification, the BCDA undertook to "subject SMLI’s Original Proposal to
spouse. Competitive Challenge” and further committed itself to commence the
activities for comparative proposals. Pursuant thereto, the respondent issued
Using the parameters outlined in Article 41 of the Family Code, Edna, without
a Terms of Reference (TOR) that prescribed the procedure to be followed in
doubt, failed to establish that there was no impediment or that the
the Competitive Challenge.
impediment was already removed at the time of the celebration of her
marriage to Edgardo. Settled is the rule that "whoever claims entitlement to
the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by Among the entities that joined said competitive challenge is Ayala
substantial evidence." Edna could not adduce evidence to prove that the Land, Inc., which moved for the postponement of the submission of eligibility
earlier marriage of Edgardo was either annulled or dissolved or whether requirements. BCDA acted favorably thereon. After almost two years of
there was a declaration of Rosemarie’s presumptive death before her repeatedly postponing the deadline, BCDA decided to unilaterally cancel the
marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that Edna was the second wife of Competitive Challenge procedure and subject said property to public bidding.
Edgardo. Considering that Edna was not able to show that she was the legal
spouse of a deceased-member, she would not qualify under the law to be the SMLI alleged in its petition that the Certification issued by the BCDA and
beneficiary of the death benefits of Edgardo. signed by the parties constituted a contract and that under the said contract,
Therefore, although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to determine the BCDA cannot renege on its obligation to conduct and complete the
validity of marriages, it is required by Section 4(b) (7) of R.A. No. 8282 to Competitive Challenge. The BCDA, on the other hand, relies chiefly on the
examine available statistical and economic data to ensure that the benefits reservation clause in the TOR, which allegedly authorized the agency to
fall into the rightful beneficiaries. unilaterally cancel the Competitive Challenge; said provision reads:
“3. BCDA further reserves the right to call off this disposition prior to
acceptance of the proposal(s) and call for a new disposition process under
amended rules, and without any liability whatsoever to any or all of the PSEs,
except the obligation to return the Proposal Security.”
ISSUES:
1. Did the NEDA JV Guidelines have the force and effect of law?
2. Did BCDA commit grave abuse of discretion in unilaterally cancelling
the competitive challenge upon its reliance on the terms of
reference?
208

part and parcel of Stage Three of the Swiss Challenge Process, that is,
the requirements for and the determination of an interested PSE’s
eligibility to participate in the Competitive Challenge.
HELD:
1. YES. The NEDA JV Guidelines have the force and effect of law.
Well established is the rule that administrative issuances––such as the
NEDA JV Guidelines, duly promulgated pursuant to the rule-making
power granted by statute––have the force and effect of law. Being an
issuance in compliance with an executive edict, the NEDA JV
Guidelines, therefore, has the same binding effect as if it were issued by
the President himself. As such, no agency or instrumentality covered by
the JV Guidelines can validly stray from the mandatory procedures set
forth therein, even if the other party acquiesced therewith or not.
2. YES. The BCDA gravely abused its discretion in unilaterally cancelling
the Competitive Challenge.
An outline of the three-stage framework for the Swiss Challenge reveals

that there are only two occasions where pre-termination of the Swiss
Challenge process is allowed: at Stage One, prior to acceptance of the
unsolicited proposal; and at Stage Two, should the detailed negotiations
prove unsuccessful. In the Third Stage, the BCDA can no longer
withdraw with impunity from conducting the Competitive Challenge as it
became ministerial for the agency to commence and complete the same.
The BCDA is duty-bound to proceed with and complete the competitive
challenge if the detailed negotiations proved successful. Afterwards, it
becomes mandatory for the competitive challenge to proceed. Whatever
rights and obligations that may have accrued to the parties by that time
can no longer be altered by a new disposition process. At most, the
reservation clause in the TOR can only serve to alter the rules of the
eligibility process under the Competitive Challenge.
It is worthy to point out that the TOR containing the reservation clause
details the requirements for eligibility to qualify as a Private Sector Entity
that may submit its proposal for the JV, as well as the procedure to be
followed in the assessment of the eligibility requirements submitted and
in the conduct of the Competitive Challenge. It basically governs only
209
Abella vs Heirs of Francisca CASTILLO VS. DE LEON CASTILLO
GR no. 182629 G.R. No. 189607; APRIL 18, 2016
Sereno, J:
FACTS: Francisca is a tenant of a parcel of land granted to her by
virtue of P.D. 27. He entered into a “contract of relocation” of the same parcel FACTS: On May 25, 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea)
of land with Dr.Abella, wherein the latter will give a parcel of land of the same contracted her first marriage with Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). Seven years
size. Francisca died. Now the heirs of Francisca is asking Dr. Abella to bring later, on January 06, 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A.
back the original parcel of land which belongs to their mother. Dr. Abella Castillo (Renato).
contends that there was a consummated contract between him and
Francisca and therefore all the rights of the latter toward the same property On May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration
has been extinguished. of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due
to her subsisting marriage to Bautista and her psychological incapacity under
ISSUE: What is the status of a contract of conveyance of a property entered Article 36 of the Family Code. The petitioner however, did not pursue the
into in violation of the provisions of PD 27 prohibiting the conveyance of land ground of psychological incapacity. Respondent opposed the Petition, on the
granted to tenants. ground that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not
secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the
denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.
RULING: Void. PD 27 provides for only two exceptions to the
prohibition on transfer, namely, (I) transfer by hereditary succession and (2)
transfer to the Government. On January 03, 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first
marriage to Baustista void. The trial court granted her petition and declared
that her first marriage to Bautista null and void. Thereafter, respondent filed a
Torres v. Ventura explained the provision, thus: xxx The law is clear and Demurrer of Evidence claiming that the evidence presented by petitioner was
leaves no room for doubt. Upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. insufficient to warrant a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground
27 on October 21, 1972, petitioner was DEEMED OWNER of the land in that it was bigamous. Petitioner countered that whether or not the first
question. As of that date, he was declared emancipated from the bondage of marriage of respondent was valid, and regardless of the fact that she was
the soil. As such, he gained the rights to possess, cultivate, and enjoy the able to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity, she still could not deny that at
landholding for himself. Those rights over that particular property were the time she entered into marriage with him, her previous marriage was valid
granted by the government to him and to no other. To insure his continued and subsisting. The RTC denied respondent's demurrer and declared the
possession and enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law, make marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void on the ground that
any valid form of transfer except to the government or by hereditary it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code.
succession, to his successors.
The intended exchange of properties by the parties as expressed in the Both parties appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which
Agreement and in the Deed of Donation entailed transfer of all the rights and reversed RTC’s decision and upholding the validity of marriage between the
interests of Francisca over the Balatas propery to Dr. Abella. It is the kind of petitioner and respondent. The Court of Appeals said that since Lea's
transfer contemplated by and prohibited by law. Thus, petitioners' argument marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of
that the Agreement was merely a relocation agreement, or one for the the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since
exchange or swapping of properties between Dr. Abella and Francisca, and it is the law in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the
not a transfer or conveyance under PD 27, has no merit. A relocation, Family Code. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
exchange or swap of a property is a transfer of property. They cannot excuse
themselves from the prohibition by a mere play on words.
ISSUE: Did the trial court err when it applied the Family Code in determining
the validity of marriage between the petitioner and respondent?
210

of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was
no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second
HELD: YES. The trial court erred when it applied the Family Code in
marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent's
determining the validity of marriage between the petitioner and respondent.
second marriage to petitioner is valid. Moreover, we find that the provisions
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to
accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case, do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As
the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect
Code. The children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that
effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent.
using the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular,
Articles 80,81,82, and 83 (first paragraph); and those on voidable marriages
are Articles 83 (second paragraph),85 and 86. Under the Civil Code, a void Therefore, the Civil Code is the applicable law in determining the
marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways: (1) a void validity of the marriage between the petitioner and respondent for the validity
marriage is nonexistent i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning while of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the
in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent law in effect at the time of its celebration.
court; (2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can
be ratified by cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be
collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be collaterally
attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the
offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable marriage
there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the decree of
annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no judicial
decree to establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable marriage
there must be a judicial decree. Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court
has held in the cases of People v. Mendoza, People v. Aragon, and Odayat
v. Amante, that the Civil Code contains no express provision on the necessity
of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Mendoza (1954),
appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941, and 1949. The second
marriage was contracted in the belief that the first wife was already dead,
while the third marriage was contracted after the death of the second wife.
The Court ruled that the first marriage was deemed valid until annulled,
which made the second marriage null and void for being bigamous. Thus, the
third marriage was valid, as the second marriage was void from its
performance, hence, nonexistent without the need of a judicial decree
declaring it to be so.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private

respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the
prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage
211

Persons and Family Relations PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Persons and Family Relations PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

PERSONS

AND FAMILY RELATIONS DIGESTS

Therefore, for such circular to be effective, it must be published.

RULING: No, the said contract is not valid.

FACTS: Rederick A. Recio (Husband);Editha Samson (Wife); andGrace J.

May 16, 1996: In accordance to the Statutory Declarations secured in

The bonds of matrimony shall not be considered as dissolved with

RULING: No. Litigants by mutual agreement cannot compel the courts to

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries

Facts: Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del

RESPECT FOR OTHER’S PRIVACY, PERSONALITY, ETC. (Article 26)

FACTS: In 1968, petitioner published an advertisement in a newspaper with

HELD: No, it does not warrant suspension.

70. LEONILO C. DONATO v. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA FACTS:

HELD: 87. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,

Issue: 94. Imelda Marbella-Bobis vs. Isagani Bobis

HELD: Yes. Thereafter, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for

Issue: Can the defendant’s incapacity to procreate be construed as Issue:

Held: No, it may not be construed as such. Held:

RULING: Yes. They can be both liable.

Under this provision, a court may temporarily grant

If there had been cohabitation, to what extent must it be to constitute

(1) Yes. (3) No.

As a general rule, therefore, debts contracted by the husband or the RULING:

RULING: To reiterate, the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous

FACTS: Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo

RULING: 1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of

The particular properties involved here which were admittedly acquired by

ISSUE PEDRO GAYON vs. SILVESTRE GAYON and GENOVEVA DE

Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a

To forestall such conveyance, petitioners who are the children of Pablo

Under the Family Code, however, registration was no longer necessary.

It is under the foregoing provision which petitioners seek refuge to avert

ISSUE: Is Jeylnn considered as legitimate child of Pablo Aguas and thus

1. Is the petitioner the biological child of the Vicente Benitez and

The present action involves the cancellation of petitioner’s Birth Certificate; it

Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by

1) FRANCISCO is MONINA's father and she was conceived

The last assigned error concerning laches likewise fails to convince.

As FRANCISCO set up, laches as an affirmative defense, it was

G.R. No. 86302; September 24, 1991

HELD: YES. The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is

ISSUE: Is Pablo the legitimate child of Dominga?

RULING: Yes it was sufficiently established through documentary

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by

ISSUE: Can respondent be presumed as the legitimate child of decedent

RULING: No, respondent does not enjoy the presumption of a

ISSUE: Is DNA paternity testing acceptable to prove the filiation of the

HELD: Yes, the result of the DNA paternity testing could be

The relevant provisions of the Family Code in establishing filiation

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of

FACTS: Petitioner is the known administratrix of the real and

ISSUE: Has the action to compel recognition prescribed?

RULING: No. The action to compel recognition has not prescribed.

Petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor

FACTS: Plaintiff instituted a case against her husband to obtain

ISSUE: Is it proper to grant separate maintenance to a wife in case of

RULING: Yes, the wife is entitled to a separate maintenance in case