LEGAL ETHICS

Case:
1. A.C. No. L-1117 March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant, vs. ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.

OZAETA, J.:

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:

Marriage

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired,
and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything
confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105

Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but
subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence and
mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself
to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement
was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason thereof.

Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent committed a malpractice in advertising and soliciting legal
business.

Held:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127
expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney
to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The
lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice
with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and
effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the
period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters.
That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were repeatedly made and
were more elaborate and insistent.

Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the
opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
2. G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs.

HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay
City, respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:

Legal Ethics : Definition

Facts:
Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala of the
respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of
Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his
position as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge denied him and also appointed him as counsel de oficio for
the two defendants. On November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio,
because the Comelec requires full time service which could prevent him from handling adequately the
defense. Judge denied the motion. So Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.

Issue:
Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of the petitioner is a grave abuse of
discretion?

Holding:
No, Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty rqeuired of the legal
profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal
profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as
counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such services are
rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.

Ratio:
“The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office are Judges, or other officials or
employees of the superior courts or the office of the solicitor General (Section 32 Rule 127 of the Rules of
Court [Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court]. The lawyer involved not being among them,
remained as counsel of record since he did not file a motion to withdraw as defendant-appellant’s counsel
after his appointment as Register of Deeds. Nor was substitution of attorney asked either by him or by the new
counsel for the defendant-appellant (People vs. Williams CA G.R. Nos. 00375-76, February 28, 1963)

To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may
be required to act as counsel de officio (People v. Daban) Moreover, The right of an accused in a criminal case
to be represented by counsel is a constitutional right of the highest importance, and there can be no fair
hearing with due process of law unless he is fully informed of his rights in this regard and given opportunity to
enjoy them (People vs. Holgado, L-2809, March 22, 1950)

The trial court in a criminal case has authority to provide the accused with a counsel de
officio for such action as it may deem fit to safeguard the rights of the accused (Provincial Fiscal of Rizal vs.
Judge Muñoz Palma, L-15325, August 31, 1930)
3. G.R. No. L-18727 August 31, 1964

JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant, ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Facts:

This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The office in
contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27 April
1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the
intervenor, Romulo Cui.

Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and DoñaBenigna Cui,
now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless
persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation and endowed with extensive properties by the said
spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation.-Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the
initial management to the founders jointly and, incase of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they
may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them."-Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow
continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to
Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem who both died. Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the
administrator.-Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano
Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then
incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio"
entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui
took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's
assumption of the position.-Dr. Teodoro Cui died on August 27, 1960; on Sept 5, 1960 the plaintiff wrote a
letter tothe defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and the demand not having been
complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to
the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of
the Hospicio in their deed of donation.

-As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the
position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances would be
preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the
deed gives preference to the one, among thel egitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que
posea titulo de abogado, omedico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al
estadomayor impuesto o contribucion."-The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo de
abogado." Jesus Ma.Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class1926)
but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on
the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court, he was reinstated by resolution
promulgated on 10 February1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the
Hospiciode Barili.

-Court

a quo - decided in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado,"taken alone, means that of
a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donation and considering the function or purpose of the
administrator, it should not be given astrict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law
degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the
intervenor.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of administrator. (YES)
RATIO:

Whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the
academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one
for the practice of law. A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain
academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of
"abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to
that class of persons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend,
and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. In this
jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme Court.
According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and
receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license to practice the profession. The
academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of
compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all the
prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this
purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses
may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil
Procedure, where persons who had not gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to
take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the
necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such persons do not
possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law
school or university. The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing
test advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor
or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays the highest
taxes among those otherwise qualified.

A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make
regulations for the government of said institution; shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and
incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute"; shall see to it that the rules and
conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall administer
properties of considerable value — for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the law
and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset. Under this particular criterion we hold that
the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of administrator. As far as moral character is
concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less
exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed
in this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting
from his previous disbarment were wiped out. For the claim of intervener and appellant Romulo Cui. This party
is also a lawyer, grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by
them in the deed of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a
son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui,
Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The
interven or contends that the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by line and
successively to the descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he
argues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cuiline, the next
administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the interven or belongs. This interpretation,
however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside, and
the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs equally against plaintiff-
appellee and intervenor-appellant.
4. A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a DistrictCourt, Marawi City,
respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Facts:

Ashary Alauya transacted with Sophia Alawi to avail of a contract for the purchase of one housing unit
from EB Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd., a real estate and housing company. Shortly thereafter Alauya wrote to the
company expressing his intent to render the contract void ab initio.

Several correspondences ensued, all of which were signed by Alauya as ATTY. ASHARY M. ALAUYA. Alauya is a
member of the Sharia Bar and for that matter he is a counselor-at-law. Alauya claims that he does not use the
title of counselor-at-law for fear of being mistaken as a local legislator, i.e. councilor. Hence, he affixed the title
of attorney before his name.

Alawi filed a verified complaint against Alauya, alleging, among others, that Alawi usurped the title of an
attorney which is reserved only for the members of the Philippine Bar.

Issue:
Whether or not Alauya's membership in the Sharia Bar endows him the title of an attorney

Held:
No. Alauya is hereby reprimanded for usurping the title of an attorney reserved for those who, having
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and had successfully passed the bar examinations, have
been admitted ti the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing.
Persons who passed the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Bar and may only practice law before a
Sharia Court, Alauya's disinclination to use the title of counselor-at-law does not warrant his use of the title of
an attorney.

5. A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979

SANTA PANGAN, complainant vs. ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent,

R E S O L U T I O N. ANTONIO, J.:

Facts:
Dionisio Ramos filed a motion for postponement of an administrative case involving Santa Pangan. Pangan
then filed this motion to cite Ramos for contempt for allegedly deceiving the court in signing his name as "Atty.
Pedro D.D. Ramos" even if what was registered in the Roll of Attorneys is "Dionisio D. Ramos."
For his part, Ramos claims that he uses the name Pedro D.D. Ramos because his registered name in his birth
certificate is "Pedro Dionisio Dayaw Ramos."
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should eb cited for contempt for using a name other than that registered in the
roll of attorneys
Held:
Yes. The Roll of Attorneys is the official record containing the names and signatures of those who are
authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than that registered in the Roll of
Attorneys. In using the name "Pedro D.D. Ramos," respondent violated his oath stating that he will do no
falsehood.

As an officer of the court, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of truthfulness, candor, and frankness which
should characterize his or her conduct at all times. In resorting to falsehood, he demonstrated lack of candor

6. B.M. No. 1222 April 24, 2009

RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN, Petitioner,
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts:

This treats the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated November 10, 2008 filed by petitioner
Danilo de Guzman. He prays that this Honorable Court "in the exercise of equity and compassion, grant
petitioner’s plea for judicial clemency, and thereupon, order his reinstatement as a member in good standing
of the Philippine Bar."1

To recall, on February 4, 2004, the Court promulgated a Resolution, in B.M. No. 1222, the dispositive portion of
which reads in part:

WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating Committee, hereby resolves to —

(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon his receipt of this RESOLUTION;

xxxx

The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law during the 2003 Bar Examinations.
Petitioner at that time was employed as an assistant lawyer in the law firm of Balgos & Perez, one of whose
partners, Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for Mercantile Law during the said bar examinations. The Court
had adopted the findings of the Investigating Committee, which identified petitioner as the person who had
downloaded the test questions from the computer of Balgos and faxed them to other persons.

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended the reinstatement of petitioner in the
Philippine Bar. In a Report dated January 6, 2009, the OBC rendered its assessment of the petition, the
relevant portions of which we quote hereunder:

Petitioner narrated that he had labored to become a lawyer to fulfill his father’s childhood dream to become
one. This task was not particularly easy for him and his family but he willed to endure the same in order to pay
tribute to his parents.

Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he already imposed upon himself the duty of rendering service
to his fellowmen. At 19 years, he started his exposure to public service when he was elected Chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig City. During this time, he initiated several projects
benefiting the youth in their barangay.

Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and eventually
pursuing Bachelor of Laws. In his second year in law school, he was elected as the President of the Student
Council of the Institute of Law of the Far Eastern University (FEU). Here, he spearheaded various activities
including the conduct of seminars for law students as well as the holding of bar operations for bar examinees.
Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and student leader, petitioner still managed to excel in
his studies. Thus, he was conferred an Academic Excellence Award upon his graduation in Bachelor of Laws.

Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner immediately entered government service as a Legal Officer
assigned at the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig. Simultaneously, he also rendered free legal services to less
fortunate residents of Taguig City who were then in need of legal assistance.

In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the Associate Lawyers at the Balgos and Perez Law Offices. It
was during his stay with this firm when his craft as a lawyer was polished and developed. Despite having
entered private practice, he continued to render free legal services to his fellow Taguigeños.

Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate, petitioner’s flourishing career was cut short as he was
stripped of his license to practice law for his alleged involvement in the leakage in the 2003 Bar Examinations.

Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself inside his house to avoid the rather unavoidable
consequences of his disbarment.

On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new lease in life when he was taken as a consultant by the
City Government of Taguig. Later, he was designated as a member of the Secretariat of the People’s Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB). For the next five (5) years, petitioner concentrated mainly on rendering public
service.

Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of his act which unfortunately, compromised the
integrity of the bar examinations. As could be borne from the records of the investigation, he cooperated fully
in the investigation conducted and took personal responsibility for his actions. Also, he has offered his
sincerest apologies to Atty. Balgos, to the Court as well as to all the 2003 bar examinees for the unforeseen
and unintended effects of his actions.

Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his mistakes and has taken the said humbling experience to
make him a better person.

As part of his Petition, petitioner submitted to the Court various testimonials and endorsements of various
individuals and entities all attesting to his good moral character, e.g. parish priests of Taguig, Rizal, local
voluntary bar associations in Taguig, law offices in Taguig, local government executives and the city council of
Taguig, homeowners associations in Taguig, civic organizations and other non-governmental organizations in
Taguig, and many others.
Petitioner pleaded that he be afforded judicial kindness and compassion in order that his promising future may
not be perpetually foreclosed.

In the case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyer’s Oath (Bar Matter 712), the Court said in allowing
Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath, the Court recognized that Mr. Argosino was not inherently of bad
moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he was a devout Catholic with a genuine
concern for civic duties and public service. The Court was persuaded that Mr. Argosino had exerted all efforts,
to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial
notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

In the case of Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia (Administrative Case No. 2984), the Court, in
deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia to the practice of law, took into consideration the applicant’s
character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was
disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment
and the application for reinstatement. Petitioner was barely thirty (30) years old and had only been in the
practice of law for five (5) years when he was disbarred from the practice of law.

In the said case, the Court stated that it was of no doubt that petitioner had a promising future ahead of him
where it not for the decision of the Court stripping off his license. Petitioner was also of good moral repute,
not only before but likewise, after his disbarment, as attested to overwhelmingly by his constituents,
colleagues as well as people of known probity in the community and society. Way before the petitioner was
even admitted to the bar, he had already manifested his intense desire to render public service as evidenced
by his active involvement and participation in several social and civic projects and activities. Likewise, even
during and after his disbarment, which could be perceived by some as a debilitating circumstance, petitioner
still managed to continue extending his assistance to others in whatever means possible. This only proves
petitioner’s strength of character and positive moral fiber.

In the case at bar, the report of the Bar Confidant stated that it was of no question that petitioner’s act in
copying the examination questions from Atty. Balgos’ computer without the latter’s knowledge and consent,
and which questions later turned out to be the bar examinations questions in Mercantile Law in the 2003 Bar
Examinations, is not at all commendable. While we do believe that petitioner sincerely did not intend to cause
the damage that his action ensued, still, he must be sanctioned for unduly compromising the integrity of the
bar examinations as well as of this Court. However, the Court convinced that petitioner had since reformed
and had sincerely reflected on his transgressions. Thus, in view of the circumstances and likewise for
humanitarian considerations, the penalty of disbarment may now be commuted to suspension. Considering
the fact, however, that petitioner had already been disbarred for more than five (5) years, the same may be
considered as proper service of said commuted penalty and thus, may now be allowed to resume practice of
law.

In fine, the Court stated that the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant was well-taken in part. It
deemed petitioner worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty to seven (7) years suspension
from the practice of law, inclusive of the five (5) years he had already served his disbarment. According to the
Court, penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. While the Court was
ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knew how to show compassion when the penalty
imposed had already served its purpose. In cases where the Court had deigned to lift or commute the supreme
penalty of disbarment imposed on the lawyer, it had taken into account the remorse of the disbarred lawyer
and the conduct of his public life during his years outside of the bar.

For example, in Valencia v. Antiniw, the Court held that the long period of respondent's disbarment gave him
the chance to purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his
willingness and capacity to live up once again to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of every
member of the bar and officer of the court. During respondent's disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to
date for his professional infraction, he had been persistent in reiterating his apologies and pleas for
reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show that he had regained his worthiness
to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and unblemished record as an elected public servant, as
attested to by numerous civic and professional organizations, government institutions, public officials and
members of the judiciary.

In the case at bar, the Court held that petitioner had sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him
considering the gravity of his transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner had redirected focus since his
disbarment towards public service, particularly with the People’s Law Enforcement Board. The attestations
submitted by his peers in the community and other esteemed members of the legal profession, such as retired
Court of Appeals Associate Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval and Atty.
Loreto Ata, and the ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas testified to his positive impact on
society at large since the unfortunate events of 2003.
The Court added that petitioner’s subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope that if
he were to reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a lawyer would redound to the
general good and more than mitigate the stain on his record. Compassion to the petitioner was warranted, the
Court concluded.

W HEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion is hereby GRANTED
IN PART. The disbarment of DANILO G. DE GUZMAN from the practice of law is hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN
(7) YEARS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW, reckoned from February 4, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
7. In re: Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys Michael A. Medado, BM No. 2540, September 24,
2013
TOPIC: Admission to the Bar, Unauthorized Practice of Law, Canon 9, Signing of the Roll of Attorneys
FACTS: Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979. On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s
Oath at the PICC. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but failed to do so
allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, while
rummaging through his things, he found said Notice. He then realized that he had not signed in the roll, and
that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.

He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as important. The
matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys was subsequently forgotten.

In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to provide his roll number for his MCLE
compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll
number.

About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the
Roll of Attorneys. Medado justifies this lapse by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor intentional but
based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross
negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit, saying that petitioner could offer no valid justification for
his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

RULING: Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a
penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty
of disbarment, a penalty reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions. In this case, said action is not
warranted.

The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith in filing the petition himself, albeit after the
passage of more than 30 years; that he has shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of
the Philippine Bar; and that he appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held
various positions at different firms and companies.

However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of inaction.

A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law
and its consequences.

Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed
at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he
realized that what he had signed was just an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of
fact as a valid justification. At that point, he should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the
Philippine Bar, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so. When, in spite of this
knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. At the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This
duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to
conduct themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.

Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer. However, the Court imposed upon him a
penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of the
Resolution. He was also made to pay a fine of P32,000. Also, during the one-year period, petitioner was not
allowed to engage in the practice of law.

8 A.M. No. 35 September 30, 1949

In re Attorney FELIX P. DAVID, petitioner.

REYES, J.:

Facts:

The respondent, Felix P. David, a member of a Philippine Bar, is charged with the malpractice for
misappropriating funds entrusted to him by his client, the complainant Briccio S. Henson. Respondent having
answered denying the charge, the complaint was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation. After the
investigation the Solicitor General rendered his report finding the respondent guilty of professional
misconduct and recommending disciplinary action. The Solicitor General reports the following facts to have
been conclusively established:

. . . that on February 15, 1947, respondent obtained P840 from his client Briccio Henson to be applied to the
payment of inheritance and real estate taxes due from the estate of Esteban Henson for 1945, 1946 and 1947
,for which he signed a receipt .On several occasions, complainant asked the respondent to show him the
official tax receipt evidencing the payment of said taxes, to which the latter answered that he had already paid
them, but the receipts were left with his friend in San Fernando. Respondent promised to give the receipt
later. Complainant waited patiently for it but it was never delivered. After the respondent had failed to deliver
the receipt, complainant became suspicious and inquired from the provincial treasurer of Pampanga about the
matter. Said official gave the information that the taxes were never paid. Consequently, complainant
requested the respondent to refund the money given him for the payment of said taxes (p. 7, t. s. n., OSG), but
he failed to do so. Respondent made several promises to return the money which he never complied. Neither
had he done anything to transfer the titles of the land in the name of the heirs of Esteban Henson up to the
present. In view of this failure of the respondent, the complainant was ultimately forced to pay the taxes out
of his own pocket.

Required to answer the complaint formulated by the Solicitor General based on his report, respondent failed
to do so. And despite due notice he likewise failed to appear at the hearing before this Court. Indeed, we note
from the Solicitor General's report that respondent, instead of welcoming every opportunity for hearing,
seems to have wanted to avoid it. On this point the report says:

At the hearing held on May 26, 1948, both parties appeared and the complainant had testified, the hearing
was set for continuance the following day. Both parties agreed in the presence of the investigator to postpone
said hearing for June 5, 1948. On June 5, 1948, complainant appeared, but respondent did not show up, so to
give the respondent a chance, the investigator postponed the continuation of the hearing to June 17. Both
parties were duly subpoenaed (attached to the records). On June 15th, respondent sent a letter (attached to
the records) to Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, asking that the hearing be postponed to June 25,
1948. According to the request, both parties were again duly subpoenaed for June 25, 1948 (attached to the
record). In the subpoena sent to respondent, his attention was invited to Rule 127, section 28, of the Rules of
Court, which provides that if he fails to appear and answer the charge, the Solicitor in charge will proceed to
hear the case ex parte. In spite of this, on the morning of June 25, he again sent another letter (attached to the
records) to Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, asking that the hearing be transferred to July 7, or 8, 1948. In
order that the respondent be given all the chances to defend himself, his request was granted. In the
subpoena sent him setting the hearing for July 8, 1948, as requested, the following remark was stated:

Failure on your part to appear will cause the investigator to proceed with the investigation and to file the
corresponding recommendation to the Supreme Court. No further postponement will be entertained.
It is worthwhile mentioning that every time the case was set for hearing the complainant made his
appearance.

On the morning of July 8, 1948, both parties appeared; respondent made a formal request in person to the
investigator asking that the hearing be postponed to 2 o'clock p.m. of the same day. Out of consideration to
him, even to the discomfiture of complainant, respondent's request was again granted. But contrary to his
assurance, the respondent again failed to appear.

There is no question that respondent received from complainant the sum of P840 for the specific purpose of
applying the same to the payment of taxes due from the estate which he was engaged to settle. The receipt
which he issued for said amount as well as for the sum of P110 and a sack of rice paid to him for his expenses
and fee reads as follows: . . .

February 15, 1947.

Received from Mr. Briccio S. Henson the sum of eight hundred and forty (P840) pesos to be paid as follows:

P210 -Inheritance tax of the heirs of the late Don Esteban Henson.

P630 -Land taxes for 1945-1947.

Failure on my part to deliver to him the official receipts corresponding to the above mentioned amount, I
promise to return to him the whole amount of P840 not later than April 16, 1947 without any obligation on his
part.

A separate amount of one hundred and ten (P110) pesos and a sack of rice was paid to me for my expenses
and fee.

(Sgd.) Atty. FELIX DAVID.

Respondent did not care to testify. But through his unverified answer, he would make it appear that he was
entitled to and had been promised a legal fee for his services and that, as this promise was not complied with,
he "saw it fit to withhold said amount (the P840 for taxes) until he is paid." This explanation is obviously an
afterthought and clearly unfounded. For the established fact is that respondent at first made complainant
believe that the sum in question had already been applied by him to the payment of taxes, and, as testified to
by complainant, for the little that respondent was able to do in connection with the case entrusted to him, he
has already received his fee as shown by the above-copied receipt. The conclusion is therefore irresistible that
respondent misappropriated the money of his client. This makes him guilty of unprofessional conduct.

In view of the gravity of the misconduct committed, the respondent Felix P. David is hereby ordered
suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years from the date this decision become final, without
prejudice to a more severe action if the sum misappropriated is not refunded within one month from the same
date.

9. G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs.

CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
PARAS, J.:

Facts:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC. TheCommission on Appointments confirmed the said nomination. Petitioner
Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination becauseallegedly Monsod does not possess the Constitutional
qualification requirement. The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C:(1) There shall be a
Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-borncitizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
collegedegree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections. However, amajority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be Members of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practiceof law for at least ten years

.(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
three Members shall hold officefor seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for
three years, without reappointment. Appointmentto any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed ordesignated in a temporary or acting capacity.

It was known to us that Monsod, after graduating from the College of Law and having hurdled the bar, worked
in his father’s lawoffice. After then, he worked as operations officer in the World Bank Group for about two
years (1963-1970). Upon returning to thePhilippines, he worked with the Meralco Group as a Chief Executive
Officer, and subsequently rendered services to
variouscompanies either as legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. He also served as former
Secretary-General(1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL, as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987) and DavideCommission (1990), and as Chairman of Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers

ISSUE; WHETHER OR NOT Monsod possess the required qualification for the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC

Ruling: YES. In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,

(105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases orlitigation in court

; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incidentto actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judgesand courts, and in addition,
conveying.

Atty. Monsod ’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of

industry, alawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor— verily more
than satisfy theconstitutional requirement— that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an
individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice
alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a
partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional
corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled
"associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous,
unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. The practice of law is defined as the
performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. Because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the
law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the
philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be
improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for
handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business
administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in
similar types of complex decision-making.

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla."
He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His
areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out
as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies
(including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal
with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the
corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management.

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of
Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good
lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them."

10. A.C. No. 6792 January 25, 2006

ROBERTO SORIANO, Complainant, vs. Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

FACTS:

Atty. Manuel Dizon was driving his car under the influence of liquor when along Abanao Street, Baguio City, a
taxi driver overtook him. Incensed, Dizon tailed the taxi, pulled it over, and berated Roberto Soriano, the taxi
driver, and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, Soriano forced open his door, causing Dizon to fall to
the ground. Soriano tried to help Dizon get up, but the latter was about to punch him so Soriano punched
Dizon first to fend off an impending attack. Soriano prevented another attempt by Dizon to hit him. Dizon
went back to his car and got his revolver with the handle wrapped in a handkerchief. As Soriano was handing
Dizon’s eyeglasses, which he just picked up from the pavement, Dizon fired and shot him. Soriano fell on the
thigh of the accused, and the latter merely pushed him out and sped off. The bullet hit Soriano’s neck and
lacerated his carotid artery. According to the doctors who treated him, he would have died if not for the timely
medical assistance. Soriano sustained spinal cord injury causing the left side of his body to be paralyzed,
disabling him for his job as a taxi driver.
Dizon was eventually convicted for frustrated homicide but was allowed probation, conditioned on payment of
civil liabilities. However, four years after judgment was rendered, Dizon has not yet fulfilled his civil obligation.

Soriano filed complaint before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP for Dizon’s disbarment. The
Commissioner of the CBD recommended that respondent be disbarred for having been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude and for violating Rule. 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
IBP adopted the recommendation of the CBD and sent their resolution to the Supreme Court for review.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the crime of frustrated homicide committed by Atty. Dizon involved moral turpitude.

2. Whether or not Atty. Dizon’s guilt warrants his disbarment.

HELD:

1. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the CBD that the crime of frustrated homicide
committed by Atty. Dizon involved moral turpitude. The court defined moral turpitude as “everything
which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity
in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” Moral turpitude was shown when Atty. Dizon shot a taxi
driver for no justifiable reason. His act definitely did not constitute self-defense. It was he who was
the aggressor because he first tried to punch Soriano. The latter was merely defending himself when
he counterpunched Dizon. Moreover, Dizon’s act was aggravated with treachery when he shot
Soriano when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. Soriano was handing Dizon’s
eyeglasses, which he just picked up, when he was shot. Furthermore, Dizon tried to escape
punishment by wrapping the handle of his gun in handkerchief in order not to leave fingerprints on
the gun used. Dizon’s violent reaction to a simple traffic incident indicated his skewed morals.

2. The Supreme Court held that Dizon also violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides that “A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.” Dizon failed to obey the laws of the land through his illegal
possession of an unlicensed firearm. He failed to respect legal processes through his unjust refusal to
satisfy his civil liabilities, the condition for his probation.

Dizon also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that “A lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” Dizon’s violation was exhibited when he
tried to reach an out-of-court settlement with the family of Soriano but when the negotiations failed, he made
it appear as if it was the family who approached him to get a referral to a neurosurgeon. In addition, Dizon
fabricated a story that it was Soriano and two other persons who mauled him. According to the three doctors
who examined Dizon, his injuries were so minor that his allegation was so improbable.

The court ruled that the appalling treachery and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly showed his unfitness
to continue as a member of the bar. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree
of good moral character, which is not only a condition precedent to admission, but also a continuing
requirement for the practice of law. While the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that
disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired, the court
held that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with the lofty aspiration that every lawyer be a
shining exemplar of truth and justice. Atty. Dizon was disbarred.
11) A.M. No. 1048 July 14, 1995

WELLINGTON REYES, complainant, vs. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent.

Facts: Wellington Reyes, complainant, reported to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had
been the victim of extortion by respondent Atty. Salvador Gaa, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was
investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainant’s business rival. The NBI agents then apprehended
respondent in an entrapment operation set up by them.

This administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent, a former Assistant City Fiscal of
manila, with malpractice and willful violation of his oath as an attorney.

I On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M. complainant reported to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim of extortion by respondent, an Assistant City Fiscal
of Manila, who was investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainant's business rival.
According to complainant, he had given respondent P500.00 on March 1, 1971 and a total of
P500.00 on three other occasions. He said that another "payoff" was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. that
day in respondent's office at the City Hall.
An entrapment was set up by the NBI.

Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totalling P150.00 for marking. The paper
bills were sent to the Forensic and Chemistry Division of the NBI and subsequently returned to
complainant for the use in the entrapment.
ISSUE:

WON respondent should be disbarred on the grounds of malpractice and willful violation of lawyer’s oath.

RULING:

Yes. The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also constitutes
as a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer’s oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a
ground for his suspension, disbarment, or other disciplinary action
On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that respondent be disbarred. Said recommendation was approved by
the IBP Board of Governors in its resolution dated March 26, 1994.
II
We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
In the case at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of receiving the marked money from
complainant during the entrapment conducted by the NBI agents, which resulted in his arrest and the
subsequent filing of administrative and criminal cases against him. In his defense, respondent merely denied
the charge of extortion and retorted that the marked money was planted by complainant.

It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony. When the integrity of a
member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the
issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of
morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.
12) A.C. No. 5161 April 14, 2004

ISIDRA TING-DUMALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES, respondent.

Facts:

In a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed on 22 October 1999 with this Court, complainant Isidra Ting-Dumali
charges respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres with presentation of false testimony; participation in, consent to,
and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainant’s signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from such forgery, thereby
violating his oath as a lawyer and the canons of legal and judicial ethics.

The complainant is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting. Her siblings are
Marcelina T. Rivera; Miriam T. Saria; Felicisima T. Torres, who is married to herein respondent; Vicente Ting,
Jr.; and Eliseo Ting. Their parents died intestate and left several parcels of land

According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his relationship with her and her brothers
and used his profession to deprive them of what was lawfully due them even if it involved the commission of
an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act. She attributes to the respondent the following acts or omissions:

1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the perjury committed by his
wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when they executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
dated 11 November 1986, wherein the two made it appear that they were the sole heirs of the late spouses
Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting, knowing fully well that the same was false. He presented that document to
the Register of Deeds of Cavite for the transfer of the title over Lot No. 1586 in the names of his wife and
Miriam.

The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the forgery of complainant’s
signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 when he
knew that she was in Italy at that time working as an overseas contract worker. He even presented the falsified
document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title over the property in favor of his wife
Felicisima and sister-in-law Marcelina. The forgery or falsification was made to enable them to sell Lot 1603 to
Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment was received and misappropriated by Felicisima and Marcelina.

Finally, the respondent believes that complainant intended to harass him in bombarding him with
numerous lawsuits, i.e., this administrative case; Civil Case No. TM-855 for "Annulment of
Documents, Titles, and Reconveyance plus Damages"; and a criminal case for Estafa and
Falsification of Public Documents.

On 14 June 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation or decision.3

On 9 January 2003, after due hearing and consideration of the issues presented by both parties, Investigating
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP found the actuations of the
respondent to be violative of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Thus she recommended that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of
law.4

In its Resolution No. XV-2003-3335 of 21 June 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved and adopted
Commissioner San Juan’s report, but reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for six years.

We fully agree with the Investigating Commissioner in her findings of facts and conclusion of culpability. The
respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and
honorable fraternity of the legal profession. In his long years as a lawyer, he must have forgotten his sworn
pledge as a lawyer. It is time once again that the Court inculcate in the hearts of all lawyers that pledge; thus:
(insert Lawyer’s oath)
This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the
pursuit of justice is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards; nor
is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all
times. By swearing the lawyer’s oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law, as well as
instruments in the fair and impartial dispensation of justice.6 This oath is firmly echoed and reflected in
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.

CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall
he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. When the respondent
took the oath as a member of the legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by his pledge.
In this covenant, respondent miserably failed.

Marcelina admitted that she signed complainant’s name in that document.11 Such act of counterfeiting the
complainant’s signature to make it appear that the complainant had participated in the execution of that
document is tantamount to falsification of a public document.12

Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power of attorney and against committing
falsification, he presented13 such document to the Registry of Deeds to secure a new title for the lot in favor
of Marcelina and his wife.14 He himself, therefore, may also be held liable for knowingly using a falsified
document to the damage of the complainant and her other co-heirs.15 Notably, he also admitted in an
affidavit dated 22 May 1995 that he prepared the legal documents for the transfer of Lot 1603.16

Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing acts which are contrary to law. He must
have kept in mind the first and foremost duty of a lawyer, which is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, uphold the Constitution, and obey the laws of the land. The Code of Professional Responsibility
underscores the primacy of such duty by providing as its canon that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes.17 For a lawyer is the servant of
the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the
dispensation of justice.18 As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate.19 He
should not, therefore, engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.20 He makes himself unfit
to remain in the profession who commits any such unbecoming act or conduct.21

The respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony24 in court, and he never
corrected the same despite full knowledge of the true facts and circumstances of the case.25 Moreover, in
knowingly offering in evidence such false testimony, he himself may be punished as guilty of false
testimony.26
Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer owes candor, fairness, and
good faith to the court. He shall "not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice."27 This Rule was clearly and openly violated by the
respondent when he permitted Marcelina to falsely testify that she had no siblings aside from Felicisima and
when he offered such testimony in the petition for reconstitution of the title involving Lot 1605.

The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an officer of the court called upon to assist in
the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause. For this reason, any
act on his part that obstructs and impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies
disciplinary action against him.28

It may not be amiss to mention that to further support the reconstitution, he offered in evidence an Affidavit
of Loss, which was executed by Marcelina and notarized by him. During the hearing of this administrative case,
Marcelina admitted that her statement in that affidavit that the title was in her possession was false, as she
was never in possession of the title29 and would not, therefore, know that the same was lost.

Moreover, in a letter dated 20 November 1996 addressed to a certain Mrs. Ong, the respondent requested the
release of 50% of the remaining balance for the sale of Lot 1605, relaying to Antel Holdings, Inc., through Mrs.
Ong that he was assured by the Clerk of Court that the order directing the reconstitution of title for Lot 1605
would be released within the month.30 Respondent’s information was misleading because he presented
evidence only on 12 August 1997, or almost a year after he sent the letter.31 Such act, therefore, shows lack of
candor and honesty on the part of the respondent.

Respondent’s acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring intolerable dishonor to the legal
profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be disbarred or suspended pursuant to Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. -- A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer, we take into account the
primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts
and clients may repose confidence.32 While the assessment of what sanction may be imposed is primarily
addressed to our sound discretion, the sanction should neither be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by
personal animosity or prejudice. Rather, it should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously
guard the purity and independence of the bar.33

Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect
the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. We will not hesitate
to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it.34
Verily, given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, we find that respondent’s gross
misconduct calls for the severance of his privilege to practice law for life, and we therefore adopt the penalty
recommended by the Investigating Commissioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be Disbarred

Held: Yes, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross
misconduct and violation of the lawyer’s oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus
ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys,
effective immediately.
13) A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant vs. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

Facts:

In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of
the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a
decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988.

n 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of
jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that
the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or
before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold
pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check
dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the
amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon
presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were
dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding
receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the
honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.

Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due
time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which:

(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and

(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and sentenced respondent
to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the
complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359;

to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the
complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and

to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to indemnify the
complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs in all
three (3) cases.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law.
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar, and the offense for (sic)
which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law
and shall not practice her profession until further action from the Supreme Court, in accordance with Sections
27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court
as required by Section 29 of the same Rule.

Issue: Whether or not suspension of respondent should be lifted

Held: NO,

Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted
of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court

We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of
her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey
the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case,
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly
relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. the nature of the office
of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only
a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law. 5

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain
suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court.

14) A. M. No. 139 March 28, 1983

RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee.

ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR., President of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., complainant,

vs. ELMO S. ABAD, respondent.

Facts:

Charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association,
Inc., of practicing law without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar, Mr. Elmo S. Abad
could not deny and had to admit the practice. In exculpation he gives the following lame explanation:
1. On July 23, 1979, respondent conformably with the Resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court En Banc
dated July 10, 1979, ... prior to his taking the Oath of Office as a member of the bar, paid his Bar Admission Fee
in the amount of P175.00... paid his Certification Fee in the amount of P5.00... and also paid his Membership
Dues for the year 1979-80 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

2. On July 26, 1979, Atty. Romeo Mendoza, the then Clerk of Court of the Honorable Supreme Court,
included the respondent as among those taking the Oath of Office as Member of the Bar...
3. At around Eleven o' clock in the morning of July 26, 1979, while waiting for my turn to take my Oath
as a member of the Bar, I was made to sign my Lawyer's Oath by one of the Clerk in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and while waiting there, Atty. Romeo Mendoza told me that Chief Justice, the Honorable Enrique M.
Fernando wants to talk to me about the Reply of Mr. Jorge Uy (Deceased) to my Answer to his Complaint. The
Honorable Chief Justice told me that I have to answer the Reply and for which reason the taking of my
Lawyer's Oath was further suspended. *
4. On July 31, 1979, I filed my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's Answer with a Prayer that the Honorable
Supreme Court determines my fitness to be a member of the Bar;
5. While waiting for the appropriate action which the Honorable Supreme Court may take upon my
Prayer to determine my fitness to be a member of the Bar, I received a letter from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Quezon City Chapter dated May 10, 1980 informing the respondent of an Annual General Meeting
together with my Statement of Account for the year 1980-1981, ... .
6. Believing that with my signing of the Lawyer's Oath on July 26, 1979 and my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's
(Deceased) Answer, the Honorable Supreme Court did not ordered for the striking of my name in the Roll of
Attorneys with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and therefore a Member in Good Standing, I paid my
membership due and other assessments to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter
8. Respondent's belief and good faith was further enhanced by the fact that on January 8, 1981,
Complainant Jorge Uy in SBC607 died and herein respondent submitted a verified Notice and Motion with the
Honorable Supreme Court on April 27, 1981; notifying the Court of this fact with a prayer that herein
respondent be allowed to take his Oath as Member of the Bar;
9. Thereafter, respondent was again assessed by the Integrated Bar for his 1981-1982 membership
due and other assessment for which the undersigned paid.
11. Respondent likewise has a Certificate of Membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as
well as a Certificate of Membership in Good Standing with the Quezon City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines
Issue: Whether or not Respondent was admitted to the bar?

Held:

Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute
his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practise law thereafter. He should know that two
essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. The proven charge against
respondent Abad constitutes contempt of court. WHEREFORE, Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five
Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this Court within ten (10) days from notice failing which he shall
serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.

15) B. M. No. 1036 June 10, 2003

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in
the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot
practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.

The Facts:

Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of
the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre ("complainant") filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22
May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could
not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the
lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges
that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before
the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that
respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in
the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent
represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the
pleading as counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan").

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee,
being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law
to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as
counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan ("Bunan") without the latter engaging respondent’s
services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the
winning vice mayoralty candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyer’s oath but disallowed
him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution,
the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to represent him before
the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a
person who knows the law." Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the
inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as
a lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in the pleading.

OBC’s Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001
elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took
the lawyer’s oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondent’s misconduct casts a serious doubt on his
moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondent’s unauthorized practice of law
is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be
denied admission to the Philippine Bar.

Issue: Whether or not respondent has engaged in unauthorized practice of law.

The Court’s Ruling: YES

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as
counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. In the pleading entitled
Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor
dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as "counsel for George Bunan." In the first paragraph of the same
pleading respondent stated that he was the "(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty
Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN." Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had "authorized Atty.
Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him" before the MBEC and similar bodies.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the
practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.

n Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice
to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment
and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263).
(Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that "practice of law" means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice
of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to
practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC
and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized
practice of law. Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar.
Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown
moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.3

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good
moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust4 since a
lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing
the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the
bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.5

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,6 a candidate passed the
bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of
court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.7

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath.1âwphi1 However, it is
the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent
passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-
at-law.8 Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.9

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as
counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as
constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice-
mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning "effective
upon your acceptance."10 Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondent’s resignation effective 11 May 2001.11
Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized
respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no
misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

16) A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative
Case No. MDD-1)

CASTRO, C.J.:
Facts:
The respondent is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended to the Supreme Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rules of Court 139-A and the
provisions of Paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of the IBP,
payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edilion contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense
that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues and that as a consequence of this, compelled financial
support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the
rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the
above provisions of the Rules of Court and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may compel the respondent to pay his membership fee to the IBP.

Held:
The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of a distinguished from
bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with
the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment of reasonable annual fees as one of the
requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his
constitutional free to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is
free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.

The Supreme Court concluded that the provisions of Rules of Court (Article 139-A) and of the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A.
Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys
of the Court. Respondent disbarred.

17) A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.

FACTS:

This is an administrative proceeding against Victorio Lanueva who was the Bar Confidant during the
1971 Bar Examination emanating from the revelation of one Oscar Landicho, a bar examinee of the same bar
exam, in his confidential letter that the result of the bar exam of one of the bar examinee later identified as
Ramon Galang was raised before the result was released to make him pass the bar. Acting upon said letter, the
court called the 5 bar examiners and the Bar Confident Lanuevo to submit their sworn statements on the
matter. It appears that each of the 5 bar examiners were approached by Lanuevo with the examination
booklet asking them to re-evaluate the grades of the bar examiner explaining that it is a practice policy in bar
exams that he will review the grades obtained in all subjects by an examinee and when he finds a candidate to
have extraordinary high grades in other subjects and low grade in one subject he can bring it to the examiner
for reconsideration to help the candidate pass. In good faith of trust and confidence to the authority of
Lanuevo, the examiners re-evaluated the exam of the candidate and reconsider the grade they give for each
subject matter. Further investigation also revealed that Ramon Galang was charged with crime of slight
physical injuries in the Mla. MTC but did not revealed the information in his application to take the bar
examination.

ISSUE:

WON Lanuevo has the authority to ask bar examiners to re-evaluate and re-correct the examination
result of a bar candidate.

HELD:

No.His duty as a Bar Confident is limited only as a custodian of the examination notebooks after they
are corrected by the examiners where he is tasked to tally the general average of the bar candidate. The court
ruled that it is evident that Lanuevo has deceptively staged a plot to convince each examiner individually to re-
evaluate the grades of Galang in order to help him pass the bar without prior authorization of the Court. All
requests for re-evaluation of grades from the bar exam shall be made by the candidate themselves. With the
facts fully established that Lanuevo initiated the re-evaluation of the exam answers of Galang without the
authority of the Court, he has breached the trust and confidence given to him by the court and was disbarred
with his name stricken out from the rolls of attorneys. Galang was likewise disbarred for fraudulently
concealing the criminal charges against him in his application for the bar exam while under oath constituting
perjury. The court believed that the 5 bar examiners acted in good faith and thereby absolved from the case
but reminded to perform their duties with due care.

18.In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
Albino Cunanan, Et Al, March 18, 1954

Facts: The Congress passed RA No. 972 known as “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953” the law was entitled “An
Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”

Provided in the article 1 of the law are the passing grades: 70% for years 1946-1951, 71% for year
1952, 72% for year 1953, 73% for year 1954 and 74% in year 1955. Provided however, that the examinee shall
have no grade below 50%.

After the enactment of the law and invoking of its provisions, many unsuccessful post-war candidates
filed petition for admission to the bar. The court then subject the motions for reconsiderations for review.

Issue: WON RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

Ruling: No. RA No. 972 is unconstitutional.

RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.In the judicial system from which
ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension,
disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.On this
matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments
of the government.It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or
as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

19) G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.

PAREDES, J.: DISBARMENT

Facts:

On Sept. 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged SImplicio Villanueva with crime of
Malicious Mischiedf, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said Municipality. Said accused was represented
by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was
representry by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private-
prosecutor, having secuting the permission of the the Secretary of Justice.

Counsel for the accused presented a “Motion in inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private prosecutor in this
case, “this time invoking sec. 32, Rule 127, now sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules, which bars certain attorneys
from practicing.

ISSUE: Whether of not Atty. Fule violate sec. 32 of Rule 127 now Sec. 35, Rule 138, revised Rules of Court,
which bars certain attorneys from practicing.

RULING:The Court holds that the appearance of Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within the
meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent
or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. The word private practiceof law implies that one
must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services. It has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission
by his immediate supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a
relative.

20) A. M. No. 139 March 28, 1983

RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee. ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR., President of the
Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., complainant,

vs. ELMO S. ABAD, respondent.

FACTS:

Mr. Elmo S. Abad was a successful examinee of the 1978 bar examinations. His subsequent practice of law was
questioned and complained by the President of Philippine Trial Lawyers’ Association, Inc. Respondent
explained that:

– He had already paid for the Bar Admission Fee;

– He was notified of the oath-taking by the Supreme Court and signed the Lawyer’s Oath by one clerk in the
Office of the Bar Confidante;
– He participated Annual General Meeting of IBP Quezon City, and paid his statement dues and was
included as a voting member for officers and directors – also conferred to him a certificate of Membership in
Good Standing from IBP QC Chapter;
– The Supreme Court never issued any order in the striking of his name in the roll of attorneys, and paid his
dues and PTR;
ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is guilty of contempt of court.

HELD:

YES. Respondent was sentenced fine and imprisonment for twenty five (25) days.

RATIO:

Respondent should know that the circumstances which he narrated do not constitute his admission to the
Philippine Bar and the right (or privilege) to practice law thereafter. He should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by
this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

He was found in violation of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing – x x x: (e) Assuming to be an attorney or an
officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

21. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL
C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.

Facts: Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993 but was denied of taking the lawyer’s
oath and signing on the roll of attorneys due to his previous conviction for “Reckless Imprudence resulting in
Homicide” due to hazing resulting to the death of a neophyte. Later in his sentence, the trial court granted him
probation. The trial court issued discharge from probation. He filed a petition to the court praying that he may
be allowed to take the Oath and sign on the rolls of attorneys. As proof of his good moral character, he
submitted fifteen (15) certifications from two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of
religious orders. In addition, he provides community service.

Issue: WON he shall be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath, sign on the Rolls of Attorneys, and practice law.

Ruling: Yes. The petition was granted. Given the fact that the petitioner has shown proof of his good moral
character as required before taking the Lawyer’s Oath, sign the rolls of Attorneys and practice law, the
Supreme court recognized him not inherently of a bad moral fiber. Giving the petitioner the benefit of the
doubt, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Oath is not merely a ceremony or formality to practice law and
that he shall continue providing community service for the less fortunate.