People vs Policarpio 158 SCRA 85

FACTS:
Complainant Estelita Ronaya was only 14 years old when hired as a househelper by the mother of the accused. The accused
Policarpio Rafaran and his family lived with his mother in the same house. Policarpio was married and has children. One evening,
the mother of the accused called complainant to help him close the door. When the complainant went near him, he pulled her
inside the store and raped her despite her resistance. After that, he warned the complainant not to tell anyone about it or he will
kill her. The next day, the family of the accused knew what happened. Appellant claimed that he is suffering from schizophrenia
when he inflicted violent intentions to Estelita. Trial court suspended the tria; and ordered his confinement to National Mental
Hospital in Mandaluyong. After 2 years, he was reported to be behaved and in improved condition and in mental condition to stand
court in trial. Trial of case resumed.

ISSUE: W/N the reason of insanity is sufficient to relieve him from criminal liability

HELD:
No. The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant had
previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed
that he was in a normal condition.

ANIAG VS COMELEC 237 SCRA 424

Facts:
In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2323, “Gun Ban”,
promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security personnel
or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance of
reaction forces during the election period. COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of
candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot
checkpoints. Pursuant to the “Gun Ban”, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote petitioner
for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano, to
pick up the firearms from petitioner’s house and return them to Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by
Arellano approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms. Arellano was apprehended and detained.
He then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that Arellano was only complying with the firearms ban, and
that he was not a security officer or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information
against petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, and for petitioner to show cause why he should not be
disqualified from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues
that “gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons” and other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on the
disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the
elections.

Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return the firearms issued to him on the basis of
the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his car

Held:
A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority. However, a warrantless search is not
violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellano’s waist nor
placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these
circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the
constitutional injunction. Absent any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the
search could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any
purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the
checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. He was not
informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation. Such constituted a violation of his right
to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him
as he was not informed that he was himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is declared
illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner. Resolution
No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.

GONZALES VS KALAW KATIGBAK

Facts:
In a resolution of a sub-committee of respondent Board of October 23, 1984, a permit to exhibit the film Kapit sa Patalim
under the classification "For Adults Only," with certain changes and deletions enumerated was granted. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioners stating that the classification of the film "For Adults Only" was without basis. 4 Then on
November 12, 1984, respondent Board released its decision: "Acting on the applicant's Motion for Reconsideration dated 29
October 1984, the Board, after a review of the resolution of the sub-committee and an examination of the film, Resolves to affirm
in toto the ruling of the sub-committee. Considering, however, certain vital deficiencies in the application, the Board further
Resolves to direct the Chairman of the Board to Withheld the issuance of the Permit to exhibit until these deficiencies are supplied

Issue:
WON the rating made with grave abuse of discretion

Held:
Roth- Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to
prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the
constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press. Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life has indisputably
been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of human interest and public
concern. In the Philippine context, E.O. 876 applied contemporary Filipino cultural values as a standard. Moreover, as far as the
question of sex and obscenity are concerned, it cannot be stressed strongly that the arts and letters "shall be under the patronage
of the State. Given this constitutional mandate, It will be less than true to its function if any government office or agency would
invade the sphere of autonomy that an artist enjoys. There is no orthodoxy in what passes for beauty or for reality. It is for the artist
to determine what for him is a true representation. It is not to be forgotten that art and belleslettres deal primarily with imagination,
not so much with ideas in a strict sense. What is seen or perceived by an artist is entitled to respect, unless there is a showing that
the product of his talent rightfully may be considered obscene. On the question of obscenity, therefore, such standard set forth in
Executive Order No. 878 is to be construed in such a fashion to avoid any taint of unconstitutionality. To repeat, what was stated in
a recent decision in Trinidad- an elementary, a fundamental, and a universal role of construction, applied when considering
constitutional questions, that when a law is susceptible of two constructions' one of which will maintain and the other destroy it,
the courts will always adopt the former. There can be no valid objection to the controlling standard. There was really a grave abuse
of discretion when the Board and its perception of what obscenity is is very restrictive. But, sadly, THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH VOTES
TO MAINTAIN THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The supporting evidence was in the fact that some scenes were not
for young people. They might misunderstand the scenes. The respondents offered to make it GP if the petitioners would remove
the lesbian and sex scenes. But they refused. The ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It
is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because
unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set. It is hardly the
concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. It cannot be denied though that the State as parens
patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.

IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992 petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of
Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified
the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is
expressly prohibited by law. Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered the
respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the respondent Board, the CA
reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of
the three series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. The CA also
found the subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner
INC appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program

Held:
Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on speech, including religious speech. Hence, any
act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden
of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down.
It failed in the case at bar The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet
they were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public
viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to
free exercise of religion The respondents cannot also rely on the ground "attacks against another religion" in x-rating the religious
program of petitioner. Even a sideglance at section 3 of PD No. 1986 will reveal that it is not among the grounds to justify an order
prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner's television program. The ground "attack against another religion" was merely added by the
respondent Board in its Rules. This rule is void for it runs smack against the hoary doctrine that administrative rules and regulations
cannot expand the letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce. In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents
failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the
respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute
impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about
especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be
justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already
on ground the determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies
outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body
such as a Board of Censors." He submits that a "system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to
administrative agencies.

Mactan Cebu International Airport vs Lozada

Facts:
On April 16, 1952, the Republic, represented by the CAA, filed an expropriation proceeding to the CFI of Cebu on several
parcels of land in Lahug, Cebu City, which included Lot 941, for the expansion and improvement of Lahug Airport.
In 1953, appellee Chiongbian purchased Lot 941 from its original owner, the original defendant in the expropriation case.
Subsequently, a TCT was issued in her name. Then in 1961, judgment was rendered in the expropriation case in favor of the Republic
which was made to pay Chiongbian an amount for Lot 941. Chiongbian did not appeal therefrom.Thereafter, absolute title to Lot
941 was transferred to the Republic under a TCT.

Then, in 1990, Republic Act No. 6958 was passed by Congress creating the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA) to which the assets of the Lahug Airport was transferred. Lot 941 was then transferred in the name of MCIAA under a TCT.

In 1995, Chiongbian filed a complaint for reconveyance of Lot 941 with the RTC of Cebu, alleging, that sometime in 1949,
the National Airport Corporation (NAC) ventured to expand the Cebu Lahug Airport. As a consequence, it sought to acquire by
expropriation or negotiated sale several parcels of lands adjoining the Lahug Airport, one of which was Lot 941 owned by
Chiongbian. Since she and other landowners could not agree with the NAC’s offer for the compensation of their lands, a suit for
eminent domain was instituted, before the then CFI of Cebu against 45 landowners, including Chiongbian, entitled “Republic of the
Philippine vs. Damian Ouano, et al.” It was finally decided in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. Some of the defendants-
landowners appealed the decision to the CA which rendered a modified judgment allowing them to repurchase their expropriated
properties. Chiongbian, on the other hand, did not appeal and instead, accepted the compensation for Lot 941 upon the assurance
of the NAC that she or her heirs would be given the right of reconveyance for the same price once the land would no longer be used
as (sic) airport.[by an alleged written agreement]

Consequently, the TCT of Chiongbian was cancelled and a TCT was issued in the name of the Republic. Then, with the
creation of the MCIAA, it was cancelled and a TCT was issued in its name.

However, no expansion of the Lahug Airport was undertaken by MCIAA and its predecessors-in-interest. Thus, the purpose
for which Lot 941 was taken ceased to exist.
 The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent Chiongbian and MCIAA was ordered to restore to plaintiff the
possession and ownership of the property denominated as Lot No. 941 upon reimbursement of the expropriation price paid to
plaintiff. The RD is therefore ordered to effect the Transfer of the Certificate Title from the defendant to the plaintiff. MCIAA
appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision. MR was denied hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether the abandonment of the public use for which Lot No. 941 was expropriated entitles CHIONGBIAN to reacquire it.

Ruling:
The Decision of the CA is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of Chiongbian against the Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority for reconveyance of Lot No. 941 is DISMISSED.

“The answer to that question depends upon the character of the title acquired by the expropriator… which has the right to acquire
property under the power of eminent domain. If, for example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that
when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is
terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated

If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land
becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or municipality, and in that case the non-
user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings.

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by
purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a
different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.”

In the present case, evidence reveals that Lot No. 941 was appropriated by the Republic of the Philippines through
expropriation proceedings. The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal and grant title to Lot No. 941 in fee simple to the
Republic. There was no condition imposed to the effect that the lot would return to CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right
to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other
than as the Lahug airport.

People vs Malngan
Facts:
January 2, 2001 when the witness and his tanods saw the accused-appellant, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto Separa,
Sr., hurriedly leaving the house of her employer. She was seen to have boarded a pedicab which was driven by a person later
identified as Rolando Gruta. Thirty minutes later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay Chairman Bernardos group later discovered that a
fire gutted the house of the employer of the housemaid. When Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to the Barangay Hall, he
received a report from pedicab driver Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod, that shortly before the occurrence of the fire, he saw
accused-appellant coming out of the house. Barangay Chairman Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and the other tanods proceeded to
Balasan Street and found the accused-appellant. Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr. and whose house was also
burned, identified the woman as accused-appellant, a disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant’s bag. Thereafter,
accused-appellant EDNA confessed to Barangay Chairman Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of angry residents outside the
Barangay Hall that she set her employers house on fire because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and that she
wanted to go home to her province but her employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going home.Accused-appellant was then
turned over to arson investigators headed by S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan, who brought her to the San Lazaro Fire Station in Sta. Cruz,
Manila where she was further investigated and then detained. When Mercedita Mendoza went to the San Lazaro Fire Station to
give her sworn statement, she had the opportunity to ask accused-appellant at the latters detention cell why she did the burning of
her employers house and accused-appellant replied that she set the house on fire because when she asked permission to go home
to her province, the wife of her employer shouted at her and when Mercedita Mendoza asked accused-appellant how she burned
the house, accused-appellant EDNA told her that she crumpled newspapers, lighted them with a disposable lighter and threw them
on top of the table inside the house.

Issue:
 Whether the all confession without the assistance of competent and independent counsel of the appellant-accused is
inadmissible as evidence.

Held:
No, Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was
brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that
destroyed several houses as well as killed the whole family of Roberto Separa, Sr. She was, therefore, already under custodial
investigation and the rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1), of the Constitution should have already been observed or applied
to her. Accused-appellants confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo was made in response to the interrogation made by
the latter admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the
presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well
as the lighter found by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as such were obtained in violation of her
constitutional rights.
Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-appellants confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the
lighter as evidence do not automatically lead to her acquittal. It should well be recalled that the constitutional safeguards during
custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary
manner whereby the accused verbally admits to having committed the offense as what happened in the case at bar when accused-
appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of Roberto Separa, Sr., to having started the fire in the Separas
house. The testimony of Mercedita Mendoza recounting said admission is, unfortunately for accused-appellant, admissible in
evidence against her and is not covered by the aforesaid constitutional guarantee. Article III of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights,
solely governs the relationship between the individual on one hand and the State (and its agents) on the other; it does not concern
itself with the relation between a private individual and another private individual as both accused-appellant and prosecution
witness Mercedita Mendoza undoubtedly are. Here, there is no evidence on record to show that said witness was acting under
police authority, so appropriately, accused-appellants uncounseled extrajudicial confession to said witness was properly admitted
by the RTC.

Beltran vs. Samson

Facts:
Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the
respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a violation of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination because such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in
the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself.

Issue:
Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting
and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the
scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination.

Held:
The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling
the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something
more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application
of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine
whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the
present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the
constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to
furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be
contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime
would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter
for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens
without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the
constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental
and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.

Nicholas- Lewis vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioners, Nicolas Lewis, Gregorio Macabenta, Alejandro Esclamado, Armando Heredia, Reuben Seguritan, Eric Furbeyre,
Teresita Cruz, Josefina Disterhoft, Mercedez Opena, Cornelio Natividad, and Evelyn Natividad have retained or acquired their
Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
Petitioners are duals praying that they be allowed to exercise their right to suffrage under RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003.
Petitioners were successful applicants of RA 9225. They sought to register and certify themselves to vote for the May 2004
national and local elections. However, the Philippine Embassy in the United States, per a COMELEC letter to the DFA dated
September 23, 2003, advised that petitioners do not have the right to vote as they lack the one-year residency requisite under
Section 1, Article 5 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Petitioners, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, owing to the refusal
of COMELEC from allowing them to exercise their right to vote for the May 2004 elections. A week before the May 2004 elections,
COMELEC filed a comment for the denial of the petition. Petitioners were not able to register and vote for the May 2004 elections.
10 days after the election, OSG filed a manifestation stating that, “All qualified overseas Filipinos, including duals who care to
exercise their right to vote may do so.” However, the May 2004 elections have ended rendering the petition moot and academic.
However, for the petition to perpetuate, petitioners’ participation in a political exercise is the subject of the concern making it a
transcendental issue. The exercise of duals of their right to suffrage has still remained unsolved.

ISSUE:
Does RA 9225 require “duals” to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can
exercise their right to vote?

RULING:
No. There is no provision in the dual citizenship law requiring “duals” to actually establish residence and physically stay in
the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals”
are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under RA
9189. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the
Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified
Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed
to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.