CANON 7-9 CASES
1. SPOUSES HENRY A. CONCEPCION AND BLESILDA S. CONCEPCION VS ATTY.
ELMER A. DELA ROSA, A.C. No. 10681, February 03, 2015
FACTS: This is an administrative case filed by complainants Spouses against Atty. Elmer,
charging him with gross misconduct for violating, among others, Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR)
ANTECEDENTS:
 Spouses alleged that from 1997 until August 2008, Atty. Elmer served as their
retained lawyer and counsel, who handled many of their cases and was consulted
on various legal matters, among others, the prospect of opening a pawnshop
business towards the end of 2005. Said business, however, failed to materialize.
 Upon knowing the fact that Spouses had money intact from their failed business, on
23 March 2006, Atty. Elmer called Henry to borrow the amount of 2.5 Million
which he promised to return, with interest, five (5) days thereafter. Henry
consulted his wife, Blesilda, who, believing that respondent would be soon returning
the money, agreed to lend the aforesaid sum to respondent. She thereby issued
three (3) EastWest Bank checks in respondent’s name.
 Upon receiving the checks, respondent signed a piece of paper containing: (a)
photocopies of the checks; and (b) an acknowledgment that he received the originals
of the checks and that he agreed to return the P2,500,000.00, plus monthly interest
of five percent (5%), within five (5) days. In the afternoon of March 23, 2006, the
foregoing checks were personally encashed by respondent.
 On March 28, 2006, or the day respondent promised to return the money, Atty.
Elmer failed to pay complainants. Thus, in April 2006, complainants began
demanding payment but respondent merely made repeated promises to pay soon.
 On July 7, 2008, Blesilda sent a demand letter to respondent, which the latter did
not heed. On August 4, 2008, complainants, through their new counsel, Atty. Kathryn
Jessica dela Serna, sent another demand letter to respondent.
 In his Reply, Atty. Elmer denied borrowing any money from the Spouses. Instead,
claimed that a certain Jean Charles Nault (Nault), one of his other clients, was the
real debtor.
 Consequently, Spouses brought the matter to the Office of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa in Barangay Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. The parties, however,
failed to reach a settlement.
 Hence, on January 11, 2010, the IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter received
complainants’ letter-complaint charging respondent with violation of Rule 16.04
of the CPR.
The rule prohibits lawyers from borrowing money from clients unless the
latter’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice.
RESPONDENT’S DEFENSES:
 Atty. Elmer denied borrowing P2.5 Million from Spouses, insisting that Nault was
the real debtor. He also claimed that complainants had been attempting to collect
from Nault and that he was engaged for that specific purpose.
COMPLAINANT’S CONTENTION:
 Spouses maintained that they extended the loan to respondent alone, as
evidenced by the checks issued in the latter’s name.
 They categorically denied knowing Nault and pointed out that it defies common
sense for them to extend an unsecured loan in the amount of P2,500,000.00 to a
person they do not even know.
o In said pleading, Nault explicitly denied knowing complainants and alleged
that it was respondent who incurred the subject loan from them.
IBP COMMISSIONER’S RECOMMENDATION:
On April 19, 2013, issued his Report finding respondent guilty of violating:
(a) Rule 16.04 of the CPR which provides that a lawyer shall not borrow
money from his clients unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice;
(b) Canon 7 which states that a lawyer shall uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and support the activities of the IBP; and
(c) Canon 16 which provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all monies and
properties of his client that may come into his possession.
The Investigating Commissioner observed that the checks were issued in respondent’s
name and that he personally received and encashed them. Also, the Verified Complaint
shows that respondent acknowledged receipt of the three (3) EastWest Bank checks
and agreed to return the P2,500,000.00, plus a pro-rated monthly interest of five percent
(5%), within five (5) days.
On the other hand, respondent’s claim that Nault was the real debtor was found to be
implausible. The Investigating Commissioner remarked that if it is true that respondent was
not the one who obtained the loan, he would have responded to complainants’ demand letter;
however, he did not.He also observed that the acknowledgment Nault allegedly signed
appeared to have been prepared by respondent himself. Finally, the Investigating
Commissioner cited Nault’s Answer to the Third Party Complaint which categorically states
that he does not even know the complainants and that it was respondent alone who obtained
the loan from them.
In fine, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent’s actions degraded
the integrity of the legal profession and clearly violated Rule 16.04 and Canons 7 and
16 of the CPR. Respondent’s failure to appear during the mandatory conferences further
showed his disrespect to the IBP-CBD. Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that respondent be DISBARRED and that he be ordered to return the
P2,500,000.00 to complainants, with stipulated interest.
Page 1 of 15

IBP GOVERNOR’S RECOMMENDATION:
Finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and by the
applicable laws and rule, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioner’s Report in Resolution No. XX-2013-617 dated May 11, 2013,38 but reduced
the penalty against the respondent to indefinite suspension from the practice of law and
ordered the return of the P2,500,000.00 to the complainants with legal interest, instead of
stipulated interest.
ISSUE:
The central issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable for violating the CPR.
RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative and held Atty. Elmer guilty of violating
Canon 16, Rule 16.04 and Canon 7. Hence, ordered his suspension in the practice of
law for 3 years.
The court ruled that base on the records, it was sufficiently established that Atty. Elmer is
the one who one borrowed 2.5 Million Pesos to the Spouses, which amount he had failed to
return. This was supported by the ff:
a) As the records bear out, Blesilda, on March 23, 2006, issued three (3) EastWest
Bank Checks, in amounts totalling to P2,500,000.00, with respondent as the
payee.
b) Verified Complaint shows that respondent acknowledged receipt of the checks and
agreed to pay the complainants the loan plus the pro-rated interest of five percent
(5%) per month within five (5) days.
c) The dorsal sides of the checks likewise show that respondent personally encashed
the checks on the day they were issued. With respondent’s direct transactional
involvement and the actual benefit he derived therefrom, absent too any credible
indication to the contrary, the Court is thus convinced that respondent was indeed
the one who borrowed the amount of P2,500,000.00 from complainants, which
amount he had failed to return, despite their insistent pleas
d) Nault, in his Answer to Third Party Complaint, categorically denied knowing the
complainants and incurring the same obligation.
e) Moreover, as correctly pointed out by Spouses, it would be illogical for them to
extend a P2,500,000.00 loan without any collateral or security to a person they do
not even know.
VIOLATION OF CPR:
Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from borrowing money
from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his clients that may
come into his possession.
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer
lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.”
The Court ruled that Atty. Elmer violated this canon by taking advantage of his
influence over his client. As a matter of fact, it was established by records that Atty. Elmer
borrowed money to the Spouses while in the existence of “Attorney-client-Relationship”.
It is also worth noting that, Spouses agreed to lend the money in consideration of
his profession as a lawyer, the Spouses trusted his word that he will returned the said amount
within 5 days thereafter.
Hence, the Court finds the act of Atty. Elmer in borrowing money from his client as
unethical and violation of the CPR particularly Rule 16.04 since Atty. Elmer borrowed money
from complainants who were his clients and whose interests, by the lack of any security on
the loan, were not fully protected. Owing to their trust and confidence in Atty. Elmer,
Spouses relied solely on the former’s word that he will return the money plus interest within
five (5) days. However, respondent abused the same and reneged on his obligation, giving
his previous clients the runaround up to this day.
In Frias v. Atty. Lozada, (Frias) the Court categorically declared that a lawyer’s act of
asking a client for a loan, as what herein respondent did, is unethical, to wit:
Likewise, her act of borrowing money from a client was a violation of [Rule] 16.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case and by independent advice.
A lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very
unethical. It comes within those acts considered as abuse of client’s
confidence. The canon presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s
ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on her obligation.
Under Canon 7, a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the integrated bar.
The Court ruled that in unduly borrowing money from the Spouses and by blatantly
refusing to pay the same, Atty. Elmer abused the trust and confidence reposed
in him by his clients, and, in so doing, failed to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession. Thus, he should be equally held administratively
liable on this score.
PENALTY IMPOSED: SUSPENSION from practice of Law for three (3) years.
SO ORDERED.
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2. FRANCISCO L. ROSARIO, JR., VS. LELLANI DE GUZMAN, ARLEEN DE GUZMAN,
PHILIP RYAN DE GUZMAN, AND ROSELLA DE GUZMAN BAUTISTA, G.R. No. 191247,
July 10, 2013
FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set
aside the Orders of the RTC, Manila in Civil Case No. 89-50138, entitled "Loreta A. Chong v.
Sps. Pedro and Rosita de Guzman," denying the Motion to Determine Attorney's Fees filed
by the petitioner.
ANTECEDENTS:
 Sometime in August 1990, Spouses de Guzman engaged the legal services of Atty.
Rosario, Jr. as defense counsel in the complaint filed against them by one CHONG for
annulment of contract and recovery of possession with damages involving a parcel of
land in Parañaque City.
 Petitioner’s legal services commenced from the RTC and ended up in this Court.
Spouses de Guzman, represented by petitioner, won their case at all levels.
 While the case was pending before this Court, Spouses de Guzman died in a vehicular
accident. Thereafter, they were substituted by their children, namely: Rosella de
Guzman-Bautista, Lellani de Guzman, Arleen de Guzman, and Philip Ryan de Guzman.
 On September 8, 2009, petitioner filed the Motion to Determine Attorney’s Fees 5 before
the RTC.
He alleged, among others, that he had a verbal agreement with the
deceased Spouses de Guzman that he would get 25% of the market value
of the subject land if the complaint filed against them by Chong would be
dismissed. Despite the fact that he had successfully represented them,
respondents refused his written demand for payment of the contracted
attorney’s fees. Petitioner insisted that he was entitled to an amount
equivalent to 25% percent of the value of the subject land on the basis
of quantum meruit
RTC RULING: On November 23, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed order denying
petitioner’s motion on the ground that it was filed out of time.
 The RTC stated that the said motion was filed after the judgment rendered
in the subject case, as affirmed by this Court, had long become final and
executory on October 31, 2007.
 The RTC wrote that considering that the motion was filed too late, it had
already lost jurisdiction over the case because a final decision could not be
amended or corrected except for clerical errors or mistakes. There would
be a variance of the judgment rendered if his claim for attorney’s fees would
still be included
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition.
COMPLAINANT’S CONTENTION
 Atty. Rosario claims that Spouses de Guzman engaged his legal services and orally
agreed to pay him 25% of the market value of the subject land. He argues that a
motion to recover attorney’s fees can be filed and entertained by the court before and
after the judgment becomes final.
 Moreover, his oral contract with the deceased spouses can be considered a quasi-
contract upon which an action can be commenced within six (6) years, pursuant to
Article 1145 of the Civil Code. Because his motion was filed on September 8, 2009, he
insists that it was not yet barred by prescription.
RESPONDENT’S DEFENSES
 Respondents counter that the motion was belatedly filed and, as such, it could no
longer be granted.
 In addition, the RTC had already resolved the issue when it awarded the amount of P
10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
 Respondents further assert that the law, specifically Article 2208 of the Civil Code,
allows the recovery of attorney’s fees under a written agreement. The alleged
understanding between their deceased parents and petitioner, however, was never put
in writing.
 They also aver that they did not have any knowledge or information about the
existence of an oral contract, contrary to petitioner’s claims. At any rate, the
respondents believe that the amount of 25% of the market value of the lot is excessive
and unconscionable.
ISSUE: WHETHER ATTY. ROSARIO IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEE.
RULING: The Court rule in the affirmative that Atty. Rosario is indeed entitled to recover
attorney’s fee from the respondent. The Court considered that Atty. Rosario filed the case
within the period allowable by the law.
In determining the amount of attorney’s fee, the court considered the quantum meruit and
considered the period that Atty. Rosario rendered in providing legal service to the late de
Guzman prior to his accident. The efforts, skill, energy rendered by Atty. Rosario is
appreciated by the Court which warrant the award of attorney’s fee.
Also, the court give emphasize to the fact that a layer is as much entitled to judicial protection
against injustice, imposition or fraud on the part of his client as the client against abuse on
the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to see that a lawyer acts in a proper
and lawful manner; it is also its duty to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees
Page 3 of 15
FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION: (SEE BELOW) HAHA
PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
The Court observed that Rosario sought the wrong remedy in filing the petition for review
under Rule 45 instead of Rule 65 because this case involves an error of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Also, Atty. Rosario violated the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts which prohibits direct resort to this Court unless the appropriate remedy
cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals.
However, despite of utilization of improper remedy, this Court has allowed a petition to
prosper with the reasoning that the inflexibility or rigidity of the application of the rules of
procedure must give way to serve the higher ends of justice. The strict application of
procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of the case on the merits.
Thus, this Court deems it expedient to consider this petition as having been filed under Rule
65.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
Two concepts of Attorney’s Fees
1. Ordinary – In its ordinary sense, it is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by
his client for legal services rendered.
2. Extraordinary – In its extraordinary concept, it is awarded by the court to the successful
litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages.
DIFFERENCE OF THE TWO CONCEPTS:
 Although both concepts are similar in some respects, they differ from each other, as
further explained below:
 The attorney’s fee which a court may, in proper cases, award to a winning litigant is,
strictly speaking, an item of damages. It differs from that which a client pays his
counsel for the latter’s professional services. However, the two concepts have many
things in common that a treatment of the subject is necessary.
 The award that the court may grant to a successful party by way of attorney’s
fee is an indemnity for damages sustained by him in prosecuting or defending,
through counsel, his cause in court. It may be decreed in favor of the party, not
his lawyer, in any of the instances authorized by law.
 On the other hand, the attorney’s fee which a client pays his counsel refers to
the compensation for the latter’s services. The losing party against whom damages
by way of attorney’s fees may be assessed is not bound by, nor is his liability
dependent upon, the fee arrangement of the prevailing party with his lawyer. The
amount stipulated in such fee arrangement may, however, be taken into account by
the court in fixing the amount of counsel fees as an element of damages.
The fee as an item of damages belongs to the party litigant and not to his lawyer.
It forms part of his judgment recoveries against the losing party. The client and his
lawyer may, however, agree that whatever attorney’s fee as an element of damages
the court may award shall pertain to the lawyer as his compensation or as part thereof.
In such a case, the court upon proper motion may require the losing party to pay such
fee directly to the lawyer of the prevailing party.
SIMILARITY OF THE TWO CONCEPTS
 They both require, as a prerequisite to their grant, the intervention of or the rendition
of professional services by a lawyer.
 As a client may not be held liable for counsel fees in favor of his lawyer who never
rendered services, so too may a party be not held liable for attorney’s fees as damages
in favor of the winning party who enforced his rights without the assistance of counsel.
 Moreover, both fees are subject to judicial control and modification. And the rules
governing the determination of their reasonable amount are applicable in one as in the
other.
APPLICATION TO THE CASE AT BAR,
 In the case at bench, the attorney’s fees being claimed by the petitioner refers to the
compensation for professional services rendered, and not as indemnity for damages.
Atty. Rosario is demanding payment from heirs of de Guzman for
having successfully handled the civil case filed by Chong against
Spouses de Guzman.
 The award of attorney’s fees by the RTC in the amount of P10,000.00 in favor of
Spouses de Guzman, which was subsequently affirmed by the CA and this Court, is
of no moment.
 The said award, made in its extraordinary concept as indemnity for damages, forms
part of the judgment recoverable against the losing party and is to be paid directly to
Spouses de Guzman (substituted by respondents) and not to petitioner.
 Thus, to grant petitioner’s motion to determine attorney’s fees would not result in a
double award of attorney’s fees. And, contrary to the RTC ruling, there would be no
amendment of a final and executory decision or variance in judgment.
The Court now addresses two (2) important questions:
(1) How can attorney’s fees for professional services be recovered?
(2) When can an action for attorney’s fees for professional services be filed?
The case of Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC15 is instructive
As an adjunctive episode of the action for the recovery of bonus differentials in NLRC-
NCR Certified Case No. 0466, private respondent’s present claim for attorney’s fees
may be filed before the NLRC even though or, better stated, especially after its earlier
decision had been reviewed and partially affirmed. It is well settled that a claim for
Page 4 of 15
 attorney’s fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services
of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action.
With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorney’s fees as an incident of
the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client. Attorney’s fees
cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject
of the recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney’s fees only arises
when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid.
While a claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the
determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be
held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer’s claim for attorney’s fees
may arise has become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will
be premature. Of course, a petition for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment
in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client.
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to when to file
his claim for professional fees. Hence, private respondent was well within his rights when
he made his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment for holiday pay differential,
instead of filing it ahead of the award’s complete resolution. To declare that a lawyer
may file a claim for fees in the same action only before the judgment is reviewed by a
higher tribunal would deprive him of his aforestated options and render ineffective the
foregoing pronouncements of this Court.
APPLICATION TO THE CASE AT BAR,
In this case, Atty. Rosario opted to file his claim as an incident in the main action, which is
permitted by the rules. As to the timeliness of the filing, this Court holds that the questioned
motion to determine attorney’s fees was seasonably filed.
The records show that the August 8, 1994 RTC decision became final and executory on
October 31, 2007. There is no dispute that Atty. Rosario filed his Motion to Determine
Attorney’s Fees on September 8, 2009, which was only about one (1) year and eleven (11)
months from the finality of the RTC decision.
Because Atty. Rosario claims to have had an oral contract of attorney’s fees with
the deceased spouses, Article 1145 of the Civil Code allows him a period of six
(6) years within which to file an action to recover professional fees for services
rendered.
Respondents never asserted or provided any evidence that Spouses de Guzman refused
petitioner’s legal representation. For this reason, petitioner’s cause of action began to run only
from the time the respondents refused to pay him his attorney’s fees, as similarly held in the
case of Anido v. Negado:
In the case at bar, private respondent’s allegation in the complaint that petitioners
refused to sign the contract for legal services in October 1978, and his filing of
the complaint only on November 23, 1987 or more than nine years after his cause
of action arising from the breach of the oral contract between him and petitioners
point to the conclusion that the six-year prescriptive period within which to file an
action based on such oral contract under Article 1145 of the Civil Code had
already lapsed.
As a lawyer, private respondent should have known that he only had six
years from the time petitioners refused to sign the contract for legal
services and to acknowledge that they had engaged his services for the
settlement of their parents’ estate within which to file his complaint for
collection of legal fees for the services which he rendered in their favor.
RULING:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the court, in this case ruled that having established that
Atty. Rosarion is entitled to attorney’s fees and that he filed his claim well within the prescribed
period, the proper remedy is to remand the case to the RTC for the determination of the
correct amount of attorney’s fees.
Such a procedural route, however, would only contribute to the delay of the final disposition
of the controversy as any ruling by the trial court on the matter would still be open for
questioning before the CA and this Court.
In the interest of justice, this Court deems it prudent to suspend the rules and simply
resolve the matter at this level.
The Court has previously exercised its discretion in the same way in National Power
Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay:
In the event of a dispute as to the amount of fees between the attorney and his
client, and the intervention of the courts is sought, the determination requires
that there be evidence to prove the amount of fees and the extent and value of
the services rendered, taking into account the facts determinative thereof.
Ordinarily, therefore, the determination of the attorney’s fees on quantum
meruit is remanded to the lower court for the purpose. However, it will be just
and equitable to now assess and fix the attorney’s fees of both attorneys
in order that the resolution of “a comparatively simple controversy,” as
Justice Regalado put it in Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-
Independent v. NLRC, would not be needlessly prolonged, by taking into
due consideration the accepted guidelines and so much of the pertinent data
as are extant in the records.
 With respect to petitioner’s entitlement to the claimed attorney’s fees, it is the Court’s
considered view that he is deserving of it and that the amount should be based on quantum
meruit.
Quantum meruit – literally meaning as much as he deserves – is used as basis for
determining an attorney’s professional fees in the absence of an express agreement.
The recovery of attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit is a device that prevents an
unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without
paying for it and also avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the attorney himself. An attorney
Page 5 of 15
must show that he is entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort in pursuing the client’s
cause, taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.
Rule 20.01 of the CPR lists the guidelines for determining the proper amount of attorney fees,
to wit:
Rule 20.1 – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees;
a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
c) The importance of the subject matter;
d) The skill demanded;
e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the
proffered case;
f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
chapter to which he belongs;
g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client
from the service;
h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Atty. Rosario unquestionably rendered legal services for respondents’ deceased parents in
the civil case for annulment of contract and recovery of possession with damages. He
successfully represented Spouses de Guzman from the trial court level in 1990 up to this
Court in 2007, for a lengthy period of 17 years. After their tragic death in 2003, petitioner filed
a notice of death and a motion for substitution of parties with entry of appearance and motion
to resolve the case before this Court. As a consequence of his efforts, the respondents were
substituted in the place of their parents and were benefited by the favorable outcome of the
case.
A layer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice, imposition or fraud on the
part of his client as the client against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court
is not alone to see that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner; it is also its duty to see
that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With his capital consisting of his brains and with his skill
acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of time and energy, he is
entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his
client to escape payment of his just compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth
the best in him to secure justice for his client he himself would not get his due.
The Court, however, is resistant in granting petitioner's prayer for an award of 25% attorney's
fees based on the value of the property subject of litigation because petitioner failed to clearly
substantiate the details of his oral agreement with Spouses de Guzman. A fair and
reasonable amount of attorney's fees should be 15% of the market value of the
property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court grants the Motion to
Determine Attorney's Fees filed by petitioner Atty. Francisco L. Rosario, Jr. Based
on quantum meruit, the amount of attorney's fees is at the rate of 15% of the market value of
the parcel of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1292, at the time of payment.
SO ORDERED.

As earlier mentioned, petitioner served as defense counsel for deceased Spouses de

Guzman and respondents for almost seventeen (17) years. The Court is certain that it was
not an easy task for petitioner to defend his clients’ cause for such a long period of time,
considering the heavy and demanding legal workload of petitioner which included the
research and preparation of pleadings, the gathering of documentary proof, the court
appearances, and the various legal work necessary to the defense of Spouses de Guzman.

It cannot be denied that Atty. Rosario devoted much time and energy in handling the
case for respondents. Given the considerable amount of time spent, the diligent effort
exerted by petitioner, and the quality of work shown by him in ensuring the successful defense
of his clients, Atty. Rosario clearly deserves to be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees
for services rendered. Justice and equity dictate that petitioner be paid his professional fee
based on quantum meruit.

The fact that the practice of law is not a business and the attorney plays a vital role in
the administration of justice underscores the need to secure him his honorarium
lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the legal
profession.

Page 6 of 15
3. JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA, MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY ANGELYN
OROLA-BELARGA, MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-CALIP, AND KAREN
OROLA, v. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS, A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013
FACTS: This is a disbarment case filed by Orolas agaist Atty. Ador Ramons for his violation
of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 (Rule 15.03) of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) and
Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court (Rules).
ANTECEDENTS:
 Orolas are the children of the late Trinidad married to Emilio. Meanwhile, complainant
Karen Orola (Karen) is the daughter of Maricar Alba-Orola (Maricar) and Antonio L.
Orola (Antonio), the deceased brother of the above-named complainants and the son of
Emilio.
 In the settlement of Trinidad’s estate, pending before the RTC, Roxas City and docketed
as Special Proceeding No. V-3639, the parties were represented by the following:
(a) Atty. Roy M. Villa (Atty. Villa) as counsel for and in behalf of Josephine, Myrna,
Manuel, Mary Angelyn, and Marjorie (Heirs of Trinidad);
(b) Atty. Ely F. Azarraga, Jr. (Atty. Azarraga) as counsel for and in behalf of Maricar,
Karen, and the other heirs of the late Antonio (Heirs of Antonio), with respondent
as collaborating counsel; and
(c) Atty. Aquiliana Brotarlo as counsel for and in behalf of Emilio, the initially
appointed administrator of Trinidad’s estate.
 In the course of the proceedings, the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio moved for
the removal of Emilio as administrator and, in his stead, sought the appointment of the
latter’s son, Manuel Orola, which the RTC granted in an Order 5 dated September 20,
2007 (RTC Order).
 Subsequently, or on October 10, 2007, Atty. Ramos filed an Entry of Appearance as
collaborating counsel for Emilio in the same case and moved for the reconsideration of
the RTC Order.
 Due to the respondent’s new engagement, complainants filed the instant disbarment
complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), claiming that he violated:
(a) Rule 15.03 of the Code, as he undertook to represent conflicting interests in the
subject case;7 and
(b) Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules, as he breached the trust and confidence
reposed upon him by his clients, the Heirs of Antonio.
RESPONDENT’S DEFENSES
 Atty. Ramos refuted the abovementioned charges, contending that he never appeared as
counsel for the Heirs of Trinidad or for the Heirs of Antonio.
 He pointed out that the records of the case readily show that the Heirs of Trinidad were
represented by Atty. Villa, while the Heirs of Antonio were exclusively represented by Atty.
Azarraga.
 He averred that he only accommodated Maricar's request to temporarily appear on her
behalf as their counsel of record could not attend the scheduled June 16 and July 14,
2006 hearings and that his appearances thereat were free of charge.
 In fact, he obtained Maricar’s permission for him to withdraw from the case as no further
communications transpired after these two hearings. Likewise, he consulted Maricar
before he undertook to represent Emilio in the same case.13 He added that he had no
knowledge of the fact that the late Antonio had other heirs and, in this vein, asserted that
no information was disclosed to him by Maricar or their counsel of record at any instance.
Finally, he clarified that his representation for Emilio in the subject case was more of a
mediator, rather than a litigator, and that since no settlement was forged between the
parties, he formally withdrew his appearance on December 6, 2007.
IBP COMMISSIONER’S RECOMMENDATIONI
Atty. Ramos was found guilty of representing conflicting interests only with respect to Karen
as the records of the case show that he never acted as counsel for the other complainants.
The Investigating Commissioner observed that while respondent's withdrawal of appearance
was with the express conformity of Maricar, respondent nonetheless failed to obtain the
consent of Karen, who was already of age and one of the Heirs of Antonio, as mandated
under Rule 15.03 of the Code.
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner held that there was no violation of Section
20, Rule 138 of the Rules as complainants themselves admitted that respondent “did not
acquire confidential information from his former client nor did he use against the latter any
knowledge obtained in the course of his previous employment.” Considering that it was
respondent's first offense, the Investigating Commissioner found the imposition of disbarment
too harsh a penalty and, instead, recommended that he be severely reprimanded for his act
with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
IBP GOVERNOR’S RECOMMENDATION
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the aforementioned
report in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-64123 dated December 11, 2008 (Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-641), finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules but imposed against respondent the penalty of six (6) months
suspension from the practice of law
ISSUE: The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent is guilty of representing
conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code.
Page 7 of 15
RULING:
The Court concurs with the IBP’s finding that respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code, but
reduced the recommended period of suspension to three (3) months
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL
HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients
whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties
in the same action or on totally unrelated cases.
The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. It behooves
lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets
to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
In Hornilla v. Salunat the Court explained the concept of conflict of interest, to wit:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests
of two or more opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose
it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be
opposed by him when he argues for the other client.”
This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided,
but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict
of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act
which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also
whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
It must, however, be noted that a lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover
transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the
law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on
matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose
after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.
VIOLATION OF CPR:
 Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not only for Maricar as
claimed by him, but for all the Heirs of Antonio in Special Proceeding No. V-3639. In
the course thereof, the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio succeeded in
removing Emilio as administrator for having committed acts prejudicial to their
interests.
Hence, when respondent proceeded to represent Emilio for the purpose of seeking his
reinstatement as administrator in the same case, he clearly worked against the very
interest of the Heirs of Antonio – particularly, Karen – in violation of the above-
stated rule.
 Respondent's justification that no confidential information was relayed to him cannot
fully exculpate him for the charges against him since the rule on conflict of interests,
as enunciated in Hornilla, provides an absolute prohibition from representation with
respect to opposing parties in the same case.
In other words, a lawyer cannot change his representation from one party to the
latter’s opponent in the same case. That respondent’s previous appearances for
and in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was only a friendly accommodation cannot equally
be given any credence since the aforesaid rule holds even if the inconsistency is
remote or merely probable or even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no
intention to represent conflicting interests.
 Neither can respondent's asseveration that his engagement by Emilio was more of a
mediator than a litigator and for the purpose of forging a settlement among the family
members render the rule inoperative.
In fact, even on that assertion, his conduct is likewise improper since Rule 15.04,
Canon 15 of the Code similarly requires the lawyer to obtain the written consent of all
concerned before he may act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes.
Irrefragably, respondent failed in this respect as the records show that respondent was
remiss in his duty to make a full disclosure of his impending engagement as Emilio’s
counsel to all the Heirs of Antonio – particularly, Karen – and equally secure their
express written consent before consummating the same.
Besides, it must be pointed out that a lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute
cannot represent any of the parties to it.33 Accordingly, for respondent’s violation of
the aforestated rules, disciplinary sanction is warranted
PENALTY IMPOSED:
In the foregoing light, the Court finds the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) months to be more appropriate taking into consideration the following
factors:
1. Atty. Ramosis a first time offender;
2. It is undisputed that respondent merely accommodated Maricar’s request out of
gratis to temporarily represent her only during the June 16 and July 14, 2006
hearings due to her lawyer’s unavailability;
3. It is likewise undisputed that respondent had no knowledge that the late Antonio had
any other heirs aside from Maricar whose consent he actually acquired (albeit shortly
after his first appearance as counsel for and in behalf of Emilio), hence, it can be
said that he acted in good faith; and
Page 8 of 15
4. Orolas admit that respondent did not acquire confidential information from the Heirs
of Antonio nor did he use against them any knowledge obtained in the course of his
previous employment, hence, the said heirs were not in any manner prejudiced by
his subsequent engagement with Emilio.

Notably, in Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lokin, Jr.,the Court similarly imposed the penalty of

suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months to the counsel
therein who represented parties whose interests are hostile to his other clients in
another case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos is hereby held GUILTY of

representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months, with WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more

Page 9 of 15
4. REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY, . A.C. No.
9115, September 17, 2014
FACTS: This is an administrative case filed by Rebecca Marie against Atty. Uy unprofessional
and unethical conduct.
ANTECEDENTS:
 Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the late Dra. Pacita Uy y Lim
(Pacita). She was adjudged as the sole and exclusive legal heir of Paci ta by virtue of
an Order by RTC.
 At the time of her death, Pacita was a stockholder in several corporations primarily
engaged in acquiring, developing, and leasing real properties.
COMPLAINANT’S CONTENTION
 Rebecca alleged that Atty. Uy, his allegedly half cousin, continuously failed and
refused to comply with the court order in SP 95-75201 declaring her as the successor-
in-interest to all of Pacita’s properties, as well as her requests for the accounting and
delivery of the dividends and other proceeds or benefits coming from Pacita’s
stockholdings in the aforementioned corporations.
 That Atty. Uy mortgaged a commercial property in favor of PSB in the total amount of
54 Million despite an existing Trust Agreement executed on October 15, 1993 wherein
Atty. Uy, in his capacity as President of URCI, already recognized Rebecca to be the
true and beneficial owner of the same.
 That Rebecca demanded to Atty. Uy to return the said property by executing the
corresponding deed of conveyance in her favor together with an inventory and
accounting of all the proceeds therefrom, but to no avail.
 In this relation, Rebecca claimed that it was only on September 2, 2005 or after she
had already instituted various legal actions and remedies that Atty. Uy and URCI
agreed to transfer the subject property to her pursuant to a compromise agreement.
RESPONDENT’S DEFENSES
 Atty. Uy denied Rebecca’s allegations and raised the affirmative defenses of forum
shopping and prescription.
 Atty. Uy pointed out that Rebecca had filed several cases raising the single issue on
the correct interpretation of the subject trust agreement.
 He also contended that the parties’ transactions in this case were made way back in
1993 and 1995 without a complaint having been filed until Bella came into the picture
and instituted various suits covering the same issue. As such, he sought the dismissal
of the complaint, and further prayed for the payment of moral damages and attorney’s
fees by way of counterclaim.
 On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint in CBD Case No.
05-1484 for the reason that "the facts surrounding the same arose out of a
misunderstanding and misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute."
 However, on October 6, 2005, Bella filed a Manifestation with Leave of Court to File
Motion for Intervention, praying that the investigation of the charges against respondent
continue in order to weed out erring members of the legal profession.
IBP COMMISSIONER’S RECOMMENDATION
On October 8, 2007, IBP found Atty. Uy guilty of serious misconduct in violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 CPR, and, thus, recommended the penalty of SUSPENSION for a period of
six (6) months.
On the merits of the charge, the Investigating Commissioner observed that Atty. Uy lacked
the good moral character required from members of the Bar when the latter failed to
comply with the demands of Rebecca under the subject trust agreement, not to
mention his unworthy and deceitful acts of mortgaging the subject property without
the former’s consent.
 On matters of procedure, the Investigating Commissioner opined that Rebecca’s motion
to withdraw did not serve as a bar for the further consideration and investigation of the
administrative case against respondent.
o As basis, he cites Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which
provides that "[n]o investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason
of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the
charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same."
 Separately, the Investigating Commissioner denied the claim of forum shopping, noting
that disciplinary cases are sui generis and may, therefore, proceed independently.
IBP GOVERNOR’S RECOMMENDATION
On November 10, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation.
ISSUE: Whether the act of Atty. Uy in mortgaging the subject property and refusing to return
warrants a disciplinary action
RULING: YES. The court ruled that Atty. Uy is guilty of misconduct violating Rule 1.01, Canon
1 of CPR and imposes a penalty of fine of P 15,000.
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as it is applied to the members of the legal profession,
engraves an overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct, viz.:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The gravity of the misconduct – determinative as it is of the errant lawyer’s penalty – depends
on the factual circumstances of each case.
Page 10 of 15
The Court finds that Atty. Uy committed some form of misconduct by, as admitted, mortgaging
the subject property, notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the same. Regardless of the
merits of his own claim, respondent should have exhibited prudent restraint becoming
of a legal exemplar. He should not have exposed himself even to the slightest risk of
committing a property violation nor any action which would endanger the Bar's
reputation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a FINE of
₱15,000.00 within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution. Further, he is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.

By no insignificant measure, respondent blemished not only his integrity as a member of the
Bar, but also that of the legal profession.

In other words, his conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian
of law and justice. Although to a lesser extent as compared to what has been ascribed by the
IBP, the Court still holds respondent guilty of violating Rule 1. 01, Canon 1 of the Code which
warrants a disciplinary action.

AS CONTRARY TO THE IBP’S RECOMMENDATION

 The court find it hard to support the finding of IBP that Atty. Uy is guilty of “serious
misconduct” considering the surrounding facts of the case.
 Here, the Court observes that the squabble which gave rise to the present administrative
case largely constitutes an internal affair, which had already been laid to rest by the
parties.

In connection with the Motion to withdraw by Rebecca, the Court sees it, Atty. Uy’s
failure to comply with the demands of Rebecca – which she takes as an invocation
of her rights under the subject trust agreement – as well as Atty. Uy’s acts of
mortgaging the subject property without the former’s consent, sprung from his own
assertion of the rights Atty. Uy’s believed he had over the subject property.

Also, Rebecca even states in her motion to withdraw that the allegations she had
previously made arose out of a "misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their
dispute" and even adds that respondent "had fully explained to [her] the real nature
and extent of her inheritance x x x to her entire satisfaction," leading her to state
that she is "now fully convinced that [her] complaint has no basis in fact and in law."
 Accordingly, with the admitted misstatement of facts, the observations of the
Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP, hardly hold water so as to support
the finding of "serious misconduct" which would warrant its recommended penalty

PENALTY IMPOSED:

Considering that this is his first offense as well as the peculiar circumstances of this case, the
Court believes that a fine of ₱15,000.00 would suffice.

Page 11 of 15
5. ATTY. POLICARIO I. CATALAN, JR., vs. ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA, A.C. No.
7360, July 24,2012
FACTS: This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty.
Joselito M. Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three causes of action against Atty.
Silvosa;
(1) Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for which he
previously appeared as prosecutor;
(2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros.Toribio) for
P30,000; and
(3) the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No. 27776 for direct
bribery.
ANTECEDENTS:
 Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in
RTC. Atty. Silvosa appeared as public prosecutor in Criminal Case re: (Esperon case),
for the complex crime of double frustrated murder, in which case Atty. Catalan was one
of the private complainants.
 Atty. Catalan took issue with Atty. Silvosa’s manner of prosecuting the case, and
requested the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Atty. Silvosa.
COMPLAINANT’S CONTENTION
 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private
counsel in a case where he previously appeared as public prosecutor, hence violating
Rule 6.03 of the CPR.
Atty. Catalan also alleged that, apart from the fact that Atty. Silvosa and the accused are
relatives and have the same middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest bias in the
accused’s favor.
Atty. Silvosa caused numerous delays in the trial of the Esperon case by arguing
against the position of the private prosecutor.
In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor Guillermo Ching granted Atty. Catalan’s request to relieve
Atty. Silvosa from handling the Esperon case. The RTC rendered judgment convicting
the accused on 16 November 2005.
On 23 November 2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for the accused,
filed a motion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgment of the Esperon case.
 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In
a case for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalan’s brother was a respondent, Pros.
Toribio reviewed the findings of the investigating judge and downgraded the offense
from frustrated murder to less serious physical injuries.
During the hearing before Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio testified that, while still a public
prosecutor at the time, Atty. Silvosa offered her P30,000 to reconsider her findings
and uphold the charge of frustrated murder.
 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: Atty Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayan’s decision
in Criminal Case No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on 18 May 2006.
Nilo Lanticse (Lanticse) filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa before the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Despite the execution of an affidavit of desistance by the
complainant in a homicide case in favor of Lanticse’s father-in-law, Arsenio Cadinas
(Cadinas), Cadinas still remained in detention for more than two years.
Atty. Silvosa demanded P15,000 from Lanticse for the dismissal of the case and for the
release of Cadinas. The NBI set up an entrapment operation for Atty. Silvosa. GMA 7’s
television program Imbestigador videotaped and aired the actual entrapment operation.
The footage was offered and admitted as evidence, and viewed by the Sandiganbayan.
Despite Atty. Silvosa’s defense of instigation, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty.
Silvosa.
RESPONDENT’S DEFENSES
 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned as prosecutor from
the Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The trial court released its decision in the
Esperon case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the accused’s bail.
Atty. Silvosa claims that his appearance was only for the purpose of the reinstatement
of bail. Atty. Silvosa also denies any relationship between himself and the accused.
 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribio’s allegations as
"self-serving" and "purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan] and his puppeteer to pursue
persecution."
 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: Atty. Silvosa admits his conviction by the Sandiganbayan
and is under probation, he asserts that "conviction under the 2nd paragraph of
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral turpitude since
the act involved ‘do [sic] not amount to a crime.’"
He further claims that "it is not the lawyer in respondent that was convicted, but his
capacity as a public officer, the charge against respondent for which he was convicted
falling under the category of crimes against public officers x x x."
IBP COMMISSIONER’S RECOMMENDATION
On 15 September 2008, Commissioner Funa found that:
 First Cause Action – the wordings and prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility [are] quite clear. [Atty. Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal
Case No. 10246-00. [Atty. Silvosa’s] attempt to minimize his role in said case would
be unavailing.
The fact is that he is presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of said case
and has made himself familiar with the parties of the case. Such would constitute
sufficient intervention in the case.
Page 12 of 15
 The fact that, subsequently, [Atty. Silvosa] entered his appearance in said case only
to file a Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still constitute a violation of
Rule 6.03 as such act is sufficient to establish a lawyer-client relation.
 Second Cause Action – there is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that
occurred more than seven (7) years ago. In this instance, the conflicting allegations are
merely based on the word of one person against the word of another.
With [Atty. Silvosa’s] vehement denial, the accusation of witness [Pros.] Toribio stands
alone unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take note that the alleged incident occurred more
than seven (7) years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before this disbarment case was filed on
November 2006.
Such a long period of time would undoubtedly cast doubt on the veracity of the
allegation. Even the existence of the bribe money could not be ascertained and verified
with certainty anymore.
 Third Cause Action – Atty. Silvosa correctly points out that herein complainant has no
personal knowledge about the charge of extortion for which Atty. Silvosa was convicted
by the Sandiganbayan. Thus, Atty. Catalan was not a party in said case nor was he ever
involved in said case.
The findings of the Sandiganbayan are not binding upon this Commission. The findings
in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a disbarment proceeding. No evidence has
been presented relating to the alleged extortion case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the First
Charge in violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be given
the penalty of REPRIMAND.
IBP GOVERNORS’ RECOMMENDATION
On 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the
Report and Recommendation of Comm. Funa and suspended Atty. Silvosa from the practice
of law for six months.
On 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors increased the penalty of Atty. Silvosa’s
suspension from the practice of law to two years.
ISSUE: Whether the acts of Atty. Silvosa constitutes violation of CPR which warrants
disciplinary action
RULING: The Court found Atty. Silvosa guilty of serious misconduct violationg Rule 6.03 and
Sec 27, Rule 138 which warrants his disbarment.
Attorney Silvosa was found to be engage in a conflicting interest and his act of bribing the
prosecutor tainted the legal profession and lastly his conviction for the crime of direct bribery
which is a crime involving moral turpitude. Therefore, the court finds Attorney Silvosa to be
unfit to exercise the privilege to practice of law.
EXPLANATION OF THE RULING:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that "A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in said service."
Atty. Silvosa, on the hand, relies on Rule 2.01 which provides that "A lawyer shall not
reject, except for valid reasons the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed"
Canon 14 which provides that "A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy."
We agree with Comm. Funa’s finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he
entered his appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal
Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of facts."
Atty. Silvosa’s attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two occasions
can only be described as desperate. He claims his participation as public prosecutor was
only to appear in the arraignment and in the pre-trial conference. He likewise claims his
subsequent participation as collaborating counsel was limited only to the reinstatement of
the original bail. Atty. Silvosa will do well to take heed of our ruling in Hilado v. David:
An attorney is employed — that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity
as a lawyer or counselor — when he is listening to his client’s preliminary
statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as
when he is drawing his client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s pleadings,
or advocating his client’s cause in open court.
xxx
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of
attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests.
This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from
fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded
suspicion of unprofessional practice.
It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said in
another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties,
but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard.
With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar’s wife, not
only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance
of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in
the administration of justice.
Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies
although the attorney’s intentions were honest and he acted in good faith. 5
Page 13 of 15
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribio’s accusation of bribery and casts doubt on its veracity by
emphasizing the delay in presenting a complaint before the IBP. Comm. Funa, by stating that
there is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the facts with certainty, in effect agreed with
Atty. Silvosa.
Contrary to Comm. Funa’s ruling, however, the records show that Atty. Silvosa made an
attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio and failed. Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14 June 1999,
a day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then
President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter.
There was no reason for Pros. Toribio to make false testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty.
Silvosa, on the other hand, merely denied the accusation and dismissed it as persecution.
The court emphasized that, when the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it
is not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree
of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect.
Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative complaint against
a member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a respondent. Administrative
offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the
commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring
members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. The Court disagree with Comm. Funa’s ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding are
not binding in a disbarment proceeding.
First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There can be no
doubt of the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and
doings of public officers which a citizen feels are incompatible with the duties of the office
and from which conduct the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences.
Section 1, Rule 139-B reads:
Section 1. How Instituted. – Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person.
The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall
be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts
therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or
by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute
proper charges against erring attorneys including those in government service.
xxxx
With that, THE COURT RULED THAT;
 It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the complainant in Criminal Case No.
27776, and that Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not presented as a witness
in the present case.
There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayan’s judgment in Criminal Case No.
27776 is a matter of public record and is already final. Atty. Catalan
supported his allegation by submitting documentary evidence of the
Sandiganbayan’s decision in Criminal Case No. 27776. Atty. Silvosa
himself admitted, against his interest, that he is under probation.
2. The court ruled that the conviction of Atty. Silvosa for the crime of bribery constitute a
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude which in accordance with Section 27, Rule 138
is a ground for disbarment.
Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.
Section 27, Rule 138 provides:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction.
THE COURT EXPLAINED THAT the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral
turpitude.
In Magno v. COMELEC,
By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime
of direct bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by
himself or through another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public
officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the
execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust,
or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and
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 4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is
connected with the performance of his official duties.

Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees
to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing
an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the
offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also,
the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust
reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and
duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral
turpitude.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, Atty. Silvosa’s representation of conflicting interests

and his failed attempt at bribing Pros. Toribio merit at least the penalty of suspension.

However, Atty. Silvosa’s final conviction of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under
one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138.

Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa’s conviction of the crime. We are

constrained to impose a penalty more severe than suspension because we find that Atty.
Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting standards of morality and decency required of
a member of the Bar.

His excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer,
is unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The
practice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise
this privilege.

PENALTY IMPOSED:

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his

name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal record
as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
to the Office of the Court Administration for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

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