G.R. No.

L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM,
INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant
to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity
as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine
Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360,
361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800,
802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810,
1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209,
211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315,
325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587,
594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595,
1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-
1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847,
1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044,
2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553,
560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or
standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute
this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately
or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a
public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule
is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be
subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers
exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one
of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and
the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to
show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to
compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this
Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character
when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for
the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the
particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this
case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we
have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition.
Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners
were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor
General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to
the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of
the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that
publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the
date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light
of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the
Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such
documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of
the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would
be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the
people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of
the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have
actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court
of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales
ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein
imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our
mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that
provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within
this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need
not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a
rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee
said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule
of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and
instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some
members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of
invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past
this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was
inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S.
425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights
claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have
engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had
accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have
consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the
Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the
subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is
undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court,
through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the
manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have
been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur
insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding
force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even
aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be
confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It
does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other
executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a
pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in
the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies
only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for
any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional
doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike
some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be
bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in
agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no
person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by
publication in the Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be
enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and
unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To
be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the
question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their
existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the
Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters
deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree
or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though,
retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged
presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully
invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional
terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or
executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in
its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette
is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does
not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally
provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously
published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted,
with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms
and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain
set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed
must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due
process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first
be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis
nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the
public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be
published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is
provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due
process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after
such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in
the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential
requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in
connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after
its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself.
There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be
said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official
Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless
it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will
take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode
of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The
said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the
publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability."
It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover,
the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal
and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the
operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can
assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without
notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due
publication thereof.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur
insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding
force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even
aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be
confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It
does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other
executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a
pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in
the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies
only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for
any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional
doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike
some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be
bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in
agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no
person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by
publication in the Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be
enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and
unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To
be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the
question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their
existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the
Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters
deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree
or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though,
retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged
presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully
invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional
terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or
executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in
its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette
is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does
not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally
provide for a different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously
published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted,
with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms
and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain
set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed
must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due
process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first
be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis
nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the
public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be
published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is
provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due
process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after
such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in
the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential
requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in
connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after
its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself.
There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be
said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official
Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless
it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will
take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode
of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The
said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the
publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability."
It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover,
the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal
and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the
operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can
assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without
notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due
publication thereof.
 [G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986.]
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM,
INC. (MABINI), Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA. in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity
as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., Respondents.

FERNAN, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CIVIL LAW; EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS; ARTICLE 2, CIVIL CODE; PUBLICATION OF LAWS MADE TO ENSURE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND TO INFORMATION. — The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law be made
effective seeks to prevent abuses on the part if the lawmakers and, at the time, ensure to the people their constitutional right to due process and to
information on matter of public concern.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure or a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published
as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the
Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect."cralaw virtua1aw library

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1 Specifically, they ask the following
questions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability" ?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by "publication" ?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that
publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2

In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be
dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein
was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision
was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February
Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules
of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the interval administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not
have to be published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration
was not binding because it was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This
Code shall take effect one year after such publication."cralaw virtua1aw library

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the
conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any
other date, without its previous publication.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not
become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply
because it was "otherwise provided."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due
process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law
shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is
not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply
because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal
measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.cralawnad
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the
presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the
government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit
there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos
who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply
directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums
or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as
class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the
same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need
not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only
the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or
exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to
interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for
adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms.
Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly
pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary
Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even
substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of
general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information
on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that
publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and another merely acknowledged
the need for due publication without indicating where it should be made, 11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at
a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership.
Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more
easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or
authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to
such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That
function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the
government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the
publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication
or after a different period provided by the legislature.chanrobles law library

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is
that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for
whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves
no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to
public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the
people and all government authority emanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to
their lights, through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended
to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published
in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Separate Opinions
FERNAN, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

While concurring in the Court’s opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even
as a Member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by which the previous dispensation had
promulgated and made effective thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power which traditionally
belongs to the legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus,
in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different
subject matters. In point is the case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to
Michael M. Keon, the then President’s nephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with air-conditioner. This was further
exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis
George Still.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made effective seeks to prevent abuses on the part of the
lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to
reflect my understanding of what the Court is saying.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect
immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be
regarded as purporting literally to come into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so to interpret such
statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown
to and unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and
enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government and its people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a
newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the
Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A
specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating
a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the country. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected
in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
 G.R. No. 187587, June 5, 2013
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 187654

WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Board of Directors, Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97925.

THE FACTS

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig,
Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation. The military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later on
renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).

On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a
certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the
administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).

Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangaysLower
Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the provisions of
Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.

At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which reads:

"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan

(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2

The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette3 on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted
addendum.

Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated
Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared
the said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.

Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the same day.

Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus,
Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further unauthorized
occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.

On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement
of Land Problems (COSLAP), where it was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the following: (1) the reclassification of the
areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation
No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and (3) the Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution and sale of
the subject lot to its bona fide occupants.4

On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed a Petition-in-Intervention substantially praying for the
same reliefs as those prayed for by NMSMI with regard to the area the former then occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in Western Bicutan.5

Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution6 granting the Petition and declaring the portions of land in question alienable and disposable,
with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General dissenting.7

The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling.
The intention of the President could not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Further, considering that Proclamation

No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers, it could not be amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive
enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172 could not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was issued on October
16, 1987 when President Aquino’s legislative power had ceased.

In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral stressed that pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is indispensable
in every case. Likewise, she held that when the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the court to look into
legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.8 Finally, she maintained that the Commission had no authority
to supply the addendum originally omitted in the published version of Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so would be tantamount to encroaching on the
field of the legislature.

Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which was denied by the COSLAP in a Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10

MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January 2007.

Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed Decision granting MSS-PVAO’s Petition, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated September 1, 2006 and January 24, 2007 issued
by the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the
petitions of respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as discussed herein. Further, pending urgent motions filed by
respondents are likewise

DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)

Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their respective Petitions for Review with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

THE ISSUES

Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT
INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS ON THE SAID PROCLAMATION
WAS NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 172 LIKEWISE
EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF LAND OCCUPIED BY MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS BROAD POWERS
TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT >INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS LAND CASES.14

On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT
FERDINAND E. MARCOS INCLUDING WESTERN BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION.15

Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the subject lots were not alienable and disposable by
virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included in the publication of the said law.

THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.

Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots), their claims were anchored on the handwritten addendum of
President Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that the former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the reclassification of
portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a notation just below the printed version of Proclamation No. 2476.

However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette.

The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the determination of whether the handwritten addendum of
President Marcos has the force and effect of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This
Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The
phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s publication in the
Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with. The issue of the requirement of publication was already
settled in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera,16 in which we had the occasion to rule thus:

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not
become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply
because it was "otherwise provided."
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due
process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law
shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is
not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply
because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal
measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

xxxx

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit
there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos
who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply
directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums
or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as
class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the
same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

xxxx

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only
the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or
exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to
interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

xxxx

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly
pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary
Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement.1âwphi1 This is
not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree
undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose
information on this vital law.

xxxx

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended
to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn. (Emphases supplied)

Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published.
Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect.

Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the
Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only
irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words appearing in the
law.17 This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano,18 we ruled that
"under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.' This does not mean, however, that courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise
would be violative of the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws, particularly where
gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The remedy sought in these
Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another legislation that would amend the law ‘to include petitioners' lots in the reclassification.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is hereby LIFTED.
Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in contempt is DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:
 G.R. No. 173976, February 27, 2009
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
EUGENIO PEÑAFIEL, for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact of ERLINDA PEÑAFIEL, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 29, 2005 and Resolution dated July 31, 2006. The
assailed decision nullified the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of respondents’ properties because the notice of sale was published in a newspaper not of
general circulation in the place where the properties were located.

Respondent Erlinda Peñafiel and the late Romeo Peñafiel are the registered owners of two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. (350937) 6195 and TCT No. 0085, both issued by the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City. On August 1, 1991, the Peñafiel spouses mortgaged
their properties in favor of petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc. The mortgage deed was amended on various dates as the amount of
the loan covered by said deed was increased.

The spouses defaulted in the payment of their loan obligation. On July 14, 1999, petitioner instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding under Act
No. 3135 through Diego A. Alleña, Jr., a notary public. Respondent Erlinda Peñafiel received the Notice of Sale, stating that the public auction was to be
held on September 7, 1999 at ten o’clock in the morning, at the main entrance of the City Hall of Mandaluyong City. The Notice of Sale was published in
Maharlika Pilipinas on August 5, 12 and 19, 1999, as attested to by its publisher in his Affidavit of Publication.2Copies of the said notice were also
posted in three conspicuous places in Mandaluyong City.3

At the auction sale, petitioner emerged as the sole and highest bidder. The subject lots were sold to petitioner for ₱6,144,000.00. A certificate of
sale4 was subsequently issued in its favor.

On August 8, 2000, respondent Erlinda Peñafiel, through her attorney-in-fact, Eugenio Peñafiel, filed a Complaint5praying that the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the properties be declared null and void. They likewise sought (a) to enjoin petitioner and the Register of Deeds from consolidating
ownership, (b) to enjoin petitioner from taking possession of the properties, and (c) to be paid attorney’s fees.

On June 30, 2003, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment in favor of petitioner:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. The extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage instituted by defendants Metrobank and Notary Public Diego A. Alleña, Jr. over the two parcels of
land covered by TCT Nos. (350937) 6195 and TCT No. 0085 is hereby declared VALID; and

2. The counterclaim of herein defendants are hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.

SO ORDERED.6

Respondents appealed to the CA, raising, among others, the issue of whether petitioner complied with the publication requirement for an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale under Act No. 3135.

On this issue, the CA agreed with respondents. The CA noted that the law requires that publication be made in a newspaper of general circulation in the
municipality or city where the property is situated. Based on the testimony of the publisher of Maharlika Pilipinas, it concluded that petitioner did not
comply with this requirement, since the newspaper was not circulated in Mandaluyong City where the subject properties were located. Thus, in its
Decision dated July 29, 2005, the CA reversed the RTC Decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby entered declaring the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the
properties covered by TCT Nos. (350937) 6195 and 0085 NULL and VOID.

SO ORDERED.7

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration8 of the decision which the CA denied on July 31, 2006.

Petitioner now brings before us this petition for review on certiorari, raising the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED TO APPLY THE PROVISIONS ON THE
PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL NOTICES UNDER SECTION 1 OF P.D. NO. 1079 TO THE EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE OF THE MORTGAGE BY
NOTARY PUBLIC OVER THE PROPERTIES COVERED BY TCT NO. (350927) 6195 AND TCT NO. 0085.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT "MAHARLIKA PILIPINAS" IS NOT A
NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN MANDALUYONG CITY.

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE DECISION
DATED JUNE 30, 2003 ISSUED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANDALUYONG CITY, BRANCH 208 AND DECLARED THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE SALE OF THE PROPERTIES COVERED BY TCT NO. (350937) 6195 AND TCT NO. 0085 NULL AND VOID.9

This controversy boils down to one simple issue: whether or not petitioner complied with the publication requirement under Section 3, Act No. 3135,
which provides:
SECTION 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city
where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at least
three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city.10

We hold in the negative.

Petitioner insists that Maharlika Pilipinas is a newspaper of general circulation since it is published for the dissemination of local news and general
information, it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers, and it is published at regular intervals. It asserts that the publisher’s Affidavit of
Publication attesting that Maharlika Pilipinas is a newspaper of general circulation is sufficient evidence of such fact.11 Further, the absence of
subscribers in Mandaluyong City does not necessarily mean that Maharlika Pilipinas is not circulated therein; on the contrary, as testified to by its
publisher, the said newspaper is in fact offered to persons other than its subscribers. Petitioner stresses that the publisher’s statement that Maharlika
Pilipinas is also circulated in Rizal and Cavite was in response to the question as to where else the newspaper was circulated; hence, such testimony
does not conclusively show that it is not circulated in Mandaluyong City.12

Petitioner entreats the Court to consider the fact that, in an Order13 dated April 27, 1998, the Executive Judge of the RTC of Mandaluyong City
approved the application for accreditation of Maharlika Pilipinas as one of the newspapers authorized to participate in the raffle of judicial notices/orders
effective March 2, 1998. Nonetheless, petitioner admits that this was raised for the first time only in its Motion for Reconsideration with the CA.14

The accreditation of Maharlika Pilipinas by the Presiding Judge of the RTC is not decisive of whether it is a newspaper of general circulation in
Mandaluyong City. This Court is not bound to adopt the Presiding Judge’s determination, in connection with the said accreditation, that Maharlika
Pilipinas is a newspaper of general circulation. The court before which a case is pending is bound to make a resolution of the issues based on the
evidence on record.1avvphi1

To prove that Maharlika Pilipinas was not a newspaper of general circulation in Mandaluyong City, respondents presented the following documents: (a)
Certification15 dated December 7, 2001 of Catherine de Leon Arce, Chief of the Business Permit and Licensing Office of Mandaluyong City, attesting
that Maharlika Pilipinas did not have a business permit in Mandaluyong City; and (b) List of Subscribers16 of Maharlika Pilipinas showing that there were
no subscribers from Mandaluyong City.

In addition, respondents also presented Mr. Raymundo Alvarez, publisher of Maharlika Pilipinas, as a witness. During direct examination, Mr. Alvarez
testified as follows:

Atty. Mendoza: And where is your principal place of business? Where you actually publish.

Witness: At No. 80-A St. Mary Avenue, Provident Village, Marikina City.

Atty. Mendoza: Do you have any other place where you actually publish Maharlika Pilipinas?

Witness: At No. 37 Ermin Garcia Street, Cubao, Quezon City.

Atty. Mendoza: And you have a mayor’s permit to operate?

Witness: Yes.

Atty. Mendoza: From what city?

Witness: Originally, it was from Quezon City, but we did not change anymore our permit.

Atty. Mendoza: And for the year 1996, what city issued you a permit?

Witness: Quezon City.

Atty. Mendoza: What about this current year?

Witness: Still from Quezon City.

Atty. Mendoza: So, you have no mayor’s permit from Marikina City?

Witness: None, it’s only our residence there.

Atty. Mendoza: What about for Mandaluyong City?

Witness: We have no office in Mandaluyong City.

Atty. Mendoza: Now, you said that you print and publish Maharlika Pilipinas in Marikina and Quezon City?

Witness: Yes.

Atty. Mendoza: Where else do you circulate your newspaper?

Witness: In Rizal and in Cavite.

Atty. Mendoza: In the subpoena[,] you were ordered to bring the list of subscribers.

Witness: Yes.

xxxx

Atty. Mendoza: How do these subscribers listed here in this document became (sic) regular subscribers?
Witness: They are friends of our friends and I offered them to become subscribers.

Atty. Mendoza: Other than this list of subscribers, you have no other subscribers?

Witness: No more.

Atty. Mendoza: Do you offer your newspaper to other persons other than the subscribers listed here?

Witness: Yes, but we do not just offer it to anybody.17 (Emphasis supplied.)

It bears emphasis that, for the purpose of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, the party alleging non-compliance with the requisite publication has the
burden of proving the same.18 Petitioner correctly points out that neither the publisher’s statement that Maharlika Pilipinas is being circulated in Rizal
and Cavite, nor his admission that there are no subscribers in Mandaluyong City proves that said newspaper is not circulated in Mandaluyong City.

Nonetheless, the publisher’s testimony that they "do not just offer [Maharlika Pilipinas] to anybody" implies that the newspaper is not available to the
public in general. This statement, taken in conjunction with the fact that there are no subscribers in Mandaluyong City, convinces us that Maharlika
Pilipinas is, in fact, not a newspaper of general circulation in Mandaluyong City.

The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place and terms of the sale.
Notices are given for the purpose of securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property.19 The goal of the notice requirement is to achieve a
"reasonably wide publicity" of the auction sale. This is why publication in a newspaper of general circulation is required. The Court has previously taken
judicial notice of the "far-reaching effects" of publishing the notice of sale in a newspaper of general circulation.20

True, to be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information, that it has
a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers, and that it is published at regular intervals.21 Over and above all these, the newspaper must be
available to the public in general, and not just to a select few chosen by the publisher. Otherwise, the precise objective of publishing the notice of sale in
the newspaper will not be realized.

In fact, to ensure a wide readership of the newspaper, jurisprudence suggests that the newspaper must also be appealing to the public in general. The
Court has, therefore, held in several cases that the newspaper must not be devoted solely to the interests, or published for the entertainment, of a
particular class, profession, trade, calling, race, or religious denomination. The newspaper need not have the largest circulation so long as it is of general
circulation.22

Thus, the Court doubts that the publication of the notice of sale in Maharlika Pilipinas effectively caused widespread publicity of the foreclosure sale.

Noticeably, in the Affidavit of Publication, Mr. Alvarez attested that he was the "Publisher of Maharlika Pilipinas, a newspaper of general circulation,
published every Thursday." Nowhere is it stated in the affidavit that Maharlika Pilipinas is in circulation in Mandaluyong City. To recall, Sec. 3 of Act No.
3135 does not only require that the newspaper must be of general circulation; it also requires that the newspaper be circulated in the municipality or city
where the property is located. Indeed, in the cases23 wherein the Court held that the affidavit of the publisher was sufficient proof of the required
publication, the affidavit of the publisher therein distinctly stated that the newspaper was generally circulated in the place where the property was
located.

Finally, petitioner argues that the CA, in effect, applied P.D. No. 107924 when it cited Fortune Motors (Phils.) Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company,25 which involved an extrajudicial foreclosure sale by a sheriff. Petitioner avers that the general reference to "judicial notices" in P.D. No.
1079, particularly Section 226 thereof, clearly shows that the law applies only to extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings conducted by a sheriff, and not by
a notary public.27 P.D. No. 1079 allegedly applies only to notices and announcements that arise from court litigation.28

The Court does not agree with petitioner that the CA applied P.D. 1079 to the present case. The appellate court cited Fortune Motors merely to
emphasize that what is important is that the newspaper is actually in general circulation in the place where the properties to be foreclosed are located.

In any case, petitioner’s concern that the CA may have applied P.D. 1079 to the present case is trifling. While P.D. No. 1079 requires the newspaper to
be "published, edited and circulated in the same city and/or province where the requirement of general circulation applies," the Court, in Fortune Motors,
did not make a literal interpretation of the provision. Hence, it brushed aside the argument that New Record, the newspaper where the notice of sale was
published, was not a newspaper of general circulation in Makati since it was not published and edited therein, thus:

The application given by the trial court to the provisions of P.D. No. 1079 is, to our mind, too narrow and restricted and could not have been the intention
of the said law. Were the interpretation of the trial court (sic) to be followed, even the leading dailies in the country like the "Manila Bulletin," the
"Philippine Daily Inquirer," or "The Philippine Star" which all enjoy a wide circulation throughout the country, cannot publish legal notices that would be
honored outside the place of their publication. But this is not the interpretation given by the courts. For what is important is that a paper should be in
general circulation in the place where the properties to be foreclosed are located in order that publication may serve the purpose for which it was
intended.29

Therefore, as it stands, there is no distinction as to the publication requirement in extrajudicial foreclosure sales conducted by a sheriff or a notary public.
The key element in both cases is still general circulation of the newspaper in the place where the property is located.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated July 29, 2005 and Resolution dated July 31, 2006 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 79862 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 G.R. No. 188056, January 8, 2013
SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R. DACUDAO, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Petitioners - residents of Bacaca Road, Davao City - were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the Legacy
Group of Companies (Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's "buy back agreement" that earned them check payments that
were dishonored. After their written demands for the return of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of charges for syndicated estafa
against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City on February 6, 2009. Three of the cases were docketed as NPS
Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-A-00356, Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-C-00752, and Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-C-00753.1

On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors,
Provincial Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special
Panel in Manila for appropriate action.

DO No. 182 reads:2

All cases against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr., et al. under Legacy Group of Companies, may be filed with the docket section of the National Prosecution
Service, Department of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila and shall be forwarded to the Secretariat of the Special Panel for assignment and distribution to
panel members, per Department Order No. 84 dated February 13, 2009.

However, cases already filed against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr. et al. of Legacy group of Companies in your respective offices with the exemption of
the cases filed in Cagayan de Oro City which is covered by Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, should be forwarded to the Secretariat of the Special
Panel at Room 149, Department of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila, for proper disposition.

For information and guidance.

Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City to the Secretariat of the Special
Panel of the DOJ.3

Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come to the Court via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to
respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182. They claim that DO No. 182 violated their right to due process, their
right to the equal protection of the laws, and their right to the speedy disposition of cases. They insist that DO No. 182 was an obstruction of justice and
a violation of the rule against enactment of laws with retroactive effect.

Petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the issuance of DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 exempting from the coverage of DO No. No. 182
all the cases for syndicated estafa already filed and pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City. They aver that DOJ
Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violated their right to equal protection under the Constitution.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent Secretary of Justice, maintains the validity of DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum
dated March 2, 2009, and prays that the petition be dismissed for its utter lack of merit.

Issues

The following issues are now to be resolved, to wit:

1. Did petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus directly to the Court?

2. Did respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182?

3. Did DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violate petitioners’ constitutionally guaranteed rights?

Ruling

The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, being bereft of substance and merit, is dismissed.

Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the Court with their petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus without tendering therein any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the petition.

We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum.4 An undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will cause the dismissal of the recourse. In Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion,5 we
explained why, to wit:

The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious
consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of
the lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it.
The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and
important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy. This was why the Court stressed in Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto:
x x x. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental
charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to
issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor.
Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other
tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for
the writ’s procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe. (Emphasis supplied)

In People v. Cuaresma, the Court has also amplified the need for strict adherence to the policy of hierarchy of courts. There, noting "a growing tendency
on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and
adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land," the Court has cautioned lawyers and litigants against taking a direct resort to
the highest tribunal, viz:

x x x. This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts x x x, which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is
also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals x x x, although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129
on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence
of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should
also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy
that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in
this regard, supra— resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" — was evidently intended precisely to relieve
this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for the extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court
corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it.1âwphi1

xxxx

The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration for the information and evidence of all concerned, that it will not only continue to enforce the
policy, but will require a more strict observance thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial forum from which to seek and obtain effective redress of their grievances.
As a rule, the Court is a court of last resort, not a court of the first instance. Hence, every litigant who brings the petitions for the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is explicitly defined and
enjoined in Section 4 of Rule 65, Rules of Court, viz:

Section 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In
case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from
notice of the denial of the said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether
or not the same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or
omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of
Appeals.

In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on
Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.6

Secondly, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ direct resort to the Court was permissible, the petition must still be dismissed.

The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.7"The sole office of the writ of certiorari," according to Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company:8

x x x is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard,
mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or
quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or
board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following requisites must concur, namely: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.9 The burden of proof lies on petitioners to demonstrate that the assailed order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites. To start with, they merely alleged that the Secretary of Justice had acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction. Also, the petition did not show that the Secretary of Justice was an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Instead,
the Secretary of Justice would appear to be not exercising any judicial or quasi-judicial functions because his questioned issuances were ostensibly
intended to ensure his subordinates’ efficiency and economy in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of all the cases involving the Legacy Group.
The function involved was purely executive or administrative.

The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of
cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the
finding of probable cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of Appeals,10 the Supreme Court has held that a preliminary investigation is not a
quasi-judicial proceeding, stating:

x x x the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-
making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably
charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except
that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the
fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not
the fiscal.11

There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public prosecutor’s power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial
in nature. Still, this characterization is true only to the extent that the public prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the executive
department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law.

But the limited similarity between the public prosecutor and a quasi-judicial body quickly endsthere. For sure, a quasi-judicial body is an organ of
government other than a court of law or a legislative office that affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making; it performs
adjudicatory functions, and its awards and adjudications determine the rights of the parties coming before it; its decisions have the same effect as the
judgments of a court of law. In contrast, that is not the effect whenever a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable
cause in order to file a criminal information against a person properly charged with the offense, or whenever the Secretary of Justice reviews the public
prosecutor’s orders or resolutions.

Petitioners have self-styled their petition to be also for prohibition. However, we do not see how that can be. They have not shown in their petition in
what manner and at what point the Secretary of Justice, in handing out the assailed issuances, acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On the other hand, we already indicated why the issuances were not infirmed by
any defect of jurisdiction. Hence, the blatant omissions of the petition transgressed Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from
further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (2a)
Similarly, the petition could not be one for mandamus, which is a remedy available only when "any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court."12 The main objective of mandamus is to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty on the part of the respondent. Plainly enough, the writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of
discretion or to compel a course of conduct,13 which, it quickly seems to us, was what petitioners would have the Secretary of Justice do in their favor.
Consequently, their petition has not indicated how and where the Secretary of Justice’s assailed issuances excluded them from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which they were unquestionably entitled.

Thirdly, there is no question that DO No. 182 enjoyed a strong presumption of its validity. In ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima,14 the Court has
extended the presumption of validity to legislative issuances as well as to rules and regulations issued by administrative agencies, saying:

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of
law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the
statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality
in an appropriate case by a competent court.15

DO No. 182 was issued pursuant to Department Order No. 84 that the Secretary of Justice had promulgated to govern the performance of the mandate
of the DOJ to "administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof"16 as expressed in Republic Act No. 10071
(Prosecution Service Act of 2010) and Section 3, Chapter I, Title III and Section 1, Chapter I, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order 292 (Administrative
Code of 1987).

To overcome this strong presumption of validity of the questioned issuances, it became incumbent upon petitioners to prove their unconstitutionality and
invalidity, either by showing that the Administrative Code of 1987 did not authorize the Secretary of Justice to issue DO No. 182, or by demonstrating
that DO No. 182 exceeded the bounds of the Administrative Code of 1987 and other pertinent laws. They did not do so. They must further show that the
performance of the DOJ’s functions under the Administrative Code of 1987 and other pertinent laws did not call for the impositions laid down by the
assailed issuances. That was not true here, for DO No 182 did not deprive petitioners in any degree of their right to seek redress for the alleged wrong
done against them by the Legacy Group. Instead, the issuances were designed to assist petitioners and others like them expedite the prosecution, if
warranted under the law, of all those responsible for the wrong through the creation of the special panel of state prosecutors and prosecution attorneys
in order to conduct a nationwide and comprehensive preliminary investigation and prosecution of the cases. Thereby, the Secretary of Justice did not act
arbitrarily or oppressively against petitioners.

Fourthly, petitioners attack the exemption from the consolidation decreed in DO No. 182 of the cases filed or pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Cagayan de Oro City, claiming that the exemption traversed the constitutional guaranty in their favor of the equal protection of law.17

The exemption is covered by the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, to wit:
It has come to the attention of the undersigned that cases for syndicated estafa were filed with your office against officers of the Legacy Group of
Companies. Considering the distance of the place of complainants therein to Manila, your Office is hereby exempted from the directive previously issued
by the undersigned requiring prosecution offices to forward the records of all cases involving Legacy Group of Companies to the Task Force.

Anent the foregoing, you are hereby directed to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases involving the Legacy Group of Companies filed in your
office with dispatch and to file the corresponding informations if evidence warrants and to prosecute the same in court.

Petitioners’ attack deserves no consideration. The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.18 Hence, the
Court has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification stands as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end.19

That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, the Secretary of Justice took into account the relative
distance between Cagayan de Oro, where many complainants against the Legacy Group resided, and Manila, where the preliminary investigations
would be conducted by the special panel. He also took into account that the cases had already been filed in the City Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan de
Oro at the time he issued DO No. 182. Given the considerable number of complainants residing in Cagayan de Oro City, the Secretary of Justice was
fully justified in excluding the cases commenced in Cagayan de Oro from the ambit of DO No. 182. The classification taken into consideration by the
Secretary of Justice was really valid. Resultantly, petitioners could not inquire into the wisdom behind the exemption upon the ground that the non-
application of the exemption to them would cause them some inconvenience.

Fifthly, petitioners contend that DO No. 182 violated their right to the speedy disposition of cases guaranteed by the Constitution. They posit that there
would be considerable delay in the resolution of their cases that would definitely be "a flagrant transgression of petitioners’ constitutional rights to speedy
disposition of their cases."20

We cannot favor their contention.

In The Ombudsman v. Jurado,21 the Court has clarified that although the Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy disposition of cases, such
speedy disposition is a flexible concept. To properly define that concept, the facts and circumstances surrounding each case must be evaluated and
taken into account. There occurs a violation of the right to a speedy disposition of a case only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are sought and secured, or when, without cause or justifiable motive, a
long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.22 It is cogent to mention that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not determinant of the concept.23

The consolidation of the cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. was ordered obviously to obtain expeditious justice for the parties with the least cost and
vexation to them. Inasmuch as the cases filed involved similar or related questions to be dealt with during the preliminary investigation, the Secretary of
Justice rightly found the consolidation of the cases to be the most feasible means of promoting the efficient use of public resources and of having a
comprehensive investigation of the cases.

On the other hand, we do not ignore the possibility that there would be more cases reaching the DOJ in addition to those already brought by petitioners
and other parties. Yet, any delays in petitioners’ cases occasioned by such other and subsequent cases should not warrant the invalidation of DO No.
182. The Constitution prohibits only the delays that are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive, and tend to render rights nugatory.24 In fine, we see
neither undue delays, nor any violation of the right of petitioners to the speedy disposition of their cases.

Sixthly, petitioners assert that the assailed issuances should cover only future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al., not those already being
investigated. They maintain that DO No. 182 was issued in violation of the prohibition against passing laws with retroactive effect.

Petitioners’ assertion is baseless.

As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature.
The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights but
only operates in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of already existing rights.25 A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. All procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent. The retroactive application is not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right generally attaches
to or arises from procedural laws.

Finally, petitioners have averred but failed to establish that DO No. 182 constituted obstruction of justice. This ground of the petition, being
unsubstantiated, was unfounded.

Nonetheless, it is not amiss to reiterate that the authority of the Secretary of Justice to assume jurisdiction over matters involving the investigation of
crimes and the prosecution of offenders is fully sanctioned by law. Towards that end, the Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision over all
the regional, provincial, and city prosecutors of the country; has broad discretion in the discharge of the DOJ’s functions; and administers the DOJ and
its adjunct offices and agencies by promulgating rules and regulations to carry out their objectives, policies and functions.

Consequently, unless and until the Secretary of Justice acts beyond the bounds of his authority, or arbitrarily, or whimsically, or oppressively, any person
or entity who may feel to be thereby aggrieved or adversely affected should have no right to call for the invalidation or nullification of the rules and
regulations issued by, as well as other actions taken by the Secretary of Justice.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the omnibus petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus for lack of merit.

Petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.

G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:p

The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon -

(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to
be disqualified to hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;

(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the
electorate should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid votes; or

(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the position of governor, but who according to prevailing
jurisprudence should take over the said post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred"?

In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections,
and upholds the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.

G.R. No. 123755

This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the
respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division,1 promulgated on December 19, 19952 and another Resolution of the Comelec en
banc promulgated February 23, 19963 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995
elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that
Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his
Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution5 granting the petition with the
following disposition6:

WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of
Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is canceled.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was
voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second
Division.

The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of Votes8 dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing
the following votes obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:

Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060

Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440

Raul R. Lee 53,304

Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925

On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition9 praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.

In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en banc directed "the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the
province of Sorsogon on June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,11 docketed as SPC No. 95-317, praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995
proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen
of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had
been granted". As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at
5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the alternative, he averred that
pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,12 the Vice-Governor - not Lee - should occupy said position of governor.

On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest
number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes,
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified
to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition.

Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being
contrary to law, he not having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.

Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on
the basis of the completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the highest number
of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and,
thus, qualified to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon.

Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the
President of the Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution immediately upon the
due implementation thereof.

On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec en banc in its Resolution 14 promulgated on February
23, 1996. On February 26, 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this Court issued on February 27,
1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."

The Issues in G.R. No. 123755

Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand may briefly be capsulized in the following propositions"15:

First -- The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the
result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said petition;

Second -- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to
hold the Office of Governor;

Third -- The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the
Office of Governor; and

Fourth -- Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of petitioner's proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon.

G.R. No. 120295

This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:

1. Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995
elections "on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines";

2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and

3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.

The Facts and the Issue

The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different
ground: that under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)

the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered "within the period allowed by law" i.e., "not later than fifteen
days before the election."

Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the
election as provided by law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.

By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since they are intimately related in their factual environment
and are identical in the ultimate question raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.

On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them thereafter to file simultaneously their respective memoranda.

The Consolidated Issues

From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:

1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the
Office of Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?

2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the
governorship of Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation
case, an election protest or a quo warranto case"?

4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence?

5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from
assuming the governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within the period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?

The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation

The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to
this.

The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial
governor, thus:

Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to
be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the
sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

xxx xxx xxx

Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship;
in fine, that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).

Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No.
10465422 and during the oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do
so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to the
"maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and
procedural defects.

Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in
the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus
twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon
and a favorable decision from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully passed through the third and last
mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel
in the previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he
insists that he -- not Lee -- should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30
p.m. on the said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes in the elections and since at that time, he already
reacquired his citizenship.

En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with serious defects, which we shall now discuss in seriatim.

First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed", asserting that "then President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under
the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses a
serious and contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the
judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution", adding that in her memorandum dated March 27, 1987 to the members of the Special
Committee on Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist from
undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11,
1975, as amended."23

This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of
P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made
because then President Aquino in her memorandum -- based on the copy furnished us by Lee -- did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725
was being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other
hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly
and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist".26

The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive
even under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could be
treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending
whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to
the first Congress -- once created -- to deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of
referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said
Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory construction but
on common sense as well.
Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was
"filed on June 29, 1995 . . . (and) was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 . . .", which "prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the
merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for repatriation with the Office of the President in Malacañang Palace on August 17, 1994.
This is confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee
started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required. Under these circumstances,
it could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in the processing of his application.

Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on Naturalization was intended solely for the personal interest of
respondent,"27 the Solicitor General explained during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply baseless as there were many
others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him to this Court, through a Manifestation28 filed on April 3,
1996.

On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the presumption of
legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a
ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to
comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D.
72529 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to
promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in repatriation the
applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a
natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his naturalization in the United States -- a naturalization he
insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience embrace -- and who, after the fall
of the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services
to his people.

So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were granted repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the
existence of favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should have been pursued
before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Third, Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995
whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his election, if not when the certificate of
candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R. 10465430 which held that "both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only
Philippine citizens can run and be elected to public office." Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in said case was whether
Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not -- and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of
when an aspirant for public office should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question we shall now directly rule on.

Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:

* a citizen of the Philippines;

* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected;

* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;

* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for
residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on
election day).

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office,31 and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other
than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.
Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin.
Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very day32 the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began -- he was
therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at
that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on
qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it
should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then
should such qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such
qualifications -- unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence -- should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected]
official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling
in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, 33 if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up
being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing
the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.

But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument34 to the effect that the citizenship qualification should be
possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to
be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a "registered voter". And, under the law35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the
Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter -- much less a validly registered one -- if he was not a citizen at the time of such
registration.

The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior
to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law
abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a
voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"),
not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the
law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local
Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration -- not the actual voting
-- is the core of this "qualification". In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually
registered in the area he seeks to govern -- and not anywhere else.

Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized -- and Lee has not disputed -- that he "was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his
registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by judicial declaration . . . In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995."36

So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in
1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and
he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on May 8, 1995."3 7

It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be elected.

There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or
date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code 38 gives any voter, presumably including the defeated candidate,
the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to
contest before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government
Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that
the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30,
1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he
should have been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding elections and
such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible.

But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on
August 17, 1994.

It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled
exceptions40 to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.

According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative
proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some
statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in
operation. Agpalo,42 on the other hand, says that curative statutes are
"healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations . . . (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities
in existing laws, and curb certain evils. . . . By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or
irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."

On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away
vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a
retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes.43

A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus,
in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and
who could not, under the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their
marital status" and who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain
her Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said
constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women -- the right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital
coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other
"natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of
P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they
could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.

The Solicitor General44 argues:

By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in
existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).

In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law, specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are
allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes faced
the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization.

Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and
curative.

In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute
retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly appears from a
consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof."45 It is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons,
events and transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a political and
civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees
enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has
been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the
statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so direct, unless to
do so would impair some vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty."46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any
restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.

At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5,
1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?

While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725)
which is to be given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted
to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority
that the law should apply to past events -- i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into being -- in order to benefit the greatest
number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative
intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner
to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and
should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary
intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result
from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any
vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.

Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there
were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.

Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect,
and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos
who may be stateless, as Frivaldo -- having already renounced his American citizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This
should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to
prevail.4 7

And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and grant applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of
time after the same were filed.48 The fact that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the government as a
result of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the government is possible only where a person's
repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and accruing only
during the interregnum between application and approval, a situation that is not present in the instant case.

And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should now prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust
or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being so, all
questions about his possession of the nationality qualification -- whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8,
1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot.

Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as
having been repatriated -- i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated
as of said date.

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual
citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?"49 We answer this
question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even
before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenship -- long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before
he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."50

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:51

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when
he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government."

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee.
Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse.52

The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship

a Continuing Disqualification?

Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its
Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final and executory after five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no restraining order having been issued by this
Honorable Court.54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected governor on June 30, 1995, there was already a final and executory judgment
disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also
become final and executory way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial pronouncements of his political status as an American citizen absolutely
and for all time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public office in the Philippines."

We do not agree.

It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No.
104654 was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed. In the words of the
respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed Resolution:55
The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the
1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no record of any "final judgment" of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8, 1995
elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that
Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen "having been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the Philippines." This
declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in connection with the 1992 elections.

Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may
subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee
vs. Commissioner of Immigration,56 we held:

Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion
demands.

The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction

Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317

Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No. 95-317 because the only "possible types of proceedings
that may be entertained by the Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case". Again, Lee reminds us that he was
proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 -- "beyond the 5-day
reglementary period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest or a quo warranto action."

This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57 has given the Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective . . . provincial . . . officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the various petitions that
Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's
authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations -- of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one.58 Thus, in Mentang
vs. COMELEC,59 we ruled:

The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of
cases holding that pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidate has been proclaimed.
(citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however,
is premised on an assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the
COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)

The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done within ten (10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as
Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the
same.

The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?

Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons:

First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,60 "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will," and
in Aquino vs. COMELEC,61 Lee is "a second placer, . . . just that, a second placer."

In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this Court in the aforesaid Labo62 case, as follows:

The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within
the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the
validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining
the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.

But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:

But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as
an ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the
Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city Payor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course to
petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final outcome of this case.

The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this case because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as
Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election day as there was in both cases a pending
motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an (omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others can
still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.

Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's
alleged disqualification as to "bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety;" in other words, that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots
knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor -- and not Lee -- should be pro-
claimed, since in losing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic
teaching of Labo:

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably reacquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes
in the 1995 elections, he -- not Lee -- should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the
Election Code Mandatory?

In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en
banc Resolution of May 11, 1995 disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day
period prescribed by Section 78, of the Omnibus Election Code which reads as follows:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided
after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)

This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First
Division) on December 19, 1995, affirmed en banc63 on February 23, 1996; which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is
merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (emphasis supplied)

Refutation of
Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent

In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that President Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be
viewed as a suspension (not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely academic distinction
because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or abrogate an existing law.
The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo case;64 viz., "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473
and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by . . . repatriation". He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to remain as a
registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see
such abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects there may have been in his
registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were the
subjects of such previous rulings.

Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's authority
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false material representation therein
as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel.
Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995
were invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen days before the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No.
120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R.A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide
disqualifications even after the elections." In spite of his disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory", we note that just
like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295". One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition to
deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present case however deals with the period during
which the Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after the fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we
rule that a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of
time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.

Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive
effect. He argues that such retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second Frivaldo) decision did not
directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of
determining his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening repatriation has changed his political status -- not in
1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.

Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is
not a ground to lose American citizenship". Since our courts are charged only with the duty of determining who are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule
on the legal question of who are or who are not Americans. It is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its own citizens --
not who are the citizens of other countries.65 The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not
been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such finding is binding and final.

The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all three previous elections, should be declared winner because
"Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an American was publicly known". First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public" knowledge. Second,
even if there is, such knowledge can be truepost facto only of the last two previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still
deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How then can there be such "public" knowledge?

Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the qualifications of electivelocal officials, i.e., candidates, and
not elected officials, and that the citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by candidates, not merely at the
commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it differently. Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par.
(b) to (f) refer to "candidates". If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to "candidates" and not elected officials, the legislature would
have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should
be possessed at election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) far other qualifications of
candidates for governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the ground, among others, that the law specifically provides
that it is only after taking the oath of allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not question what the
provision states. We hold however that the provision should be understood thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to have retroacted to the date of his
application therefor.

In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective" in reference to Section 39 of the Local Authority Code, as well as
regarding Mr. Justice Davide's thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather extensively earlier in this
Decision.

Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law." We agree -- we must all follow the rule of
law. But that is NOT the issue here. The issue is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed, so it can rule!

At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or
liberal; the letter or the spirit, the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social
conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular
sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon
would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon this Court's conscience.

EPILOGUE

In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the
present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly
granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political
status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his
means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency
of which he was stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino
citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of
citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The
foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to
run for and hold public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and
decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.

This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our
people,66 for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:

. . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by mere technical objections (citations omitted).67

The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has
repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the
possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the
will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully
challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic68 to constitutional
and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice
to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has
miserably failed.

In Frivaldo's case. it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his
repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could
have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a
disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal
technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus,
the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial
justice in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought
American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and
dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon
overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and during his
failed naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite
several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-
embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost
on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of
the most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his struggling but beloved land
of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo
himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:

(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.

(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any event, it has no merit.No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring:

I concur with the path-breaking ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban which is pro-people and pierces the myopia of legalism. Upholding the sovereign will
of the people which is the be-all and the end-all of republicanism, it rests on a foundation that will endure time and its tempest.

The sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution. For this reason, it appears as thefirst in our declaration of principles and
state policies. Thus, section 1 of Article II of our fundamental law proclaims that "[t]he Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The same principle served as the bedrock of our 1973 and 1935
Constitutions.1 It is one of the few principles whose truth has been cherished by the Americans as self-evident. Section 4, Article IV of the U.S.
Constitution makes it a duty of the Federal government to guarantee to every state a "republican form of government." With understandable fervor, the
American authorities imposed republicanism as the cornerstone of our 1935 Constitution then being crafted by its Filipino framers.2

Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution, our 1987 Constitution is more people-oriented. Thus, section 4 of Article II provides as a state
policy that the prime duty of the Government is "to serve and protect the people." Section 1, Article XI also provides that ". . . public officers . . . must at
all times be accountable to the people . . ." Sections 15 and 1 of Article XIII define the role and rights of people's organizations. Section 5(2) of Article
XVI mandates that "[t]he state shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in the
performance of their duty." And section 2 of Article XVII provides that "amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative . . ." All these provisions and more are intended to breathe more life to
the sovereignty of our people.

To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose dimensions are buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the
framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to
govern.3 Former Dean Vicente Sinco4 states that an essential quality of sovereignty is legal omnipotence, viz.: "Legal theory establishes certain
essential qualities inherent in the nature of sovereignty. The first is legal omnipotence. This means that the sovereign is legally omnipotent and absolute
in relation to other legal institutions. It has the power to determine exclusively its legal competence. Its powers are original, not derivative. It is the sole
judge of what it should do at any given time."5Citing Barker,6 he adds that a more amplified definition of sovereignty is that of "a final power of final legal
adjustment of all legal issues." The U.S. Supreme Court expressed the same thought in the landmark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,7 where it held that ". .
. sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the
agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts."

In our Constitution, the people established a representative democracy as distinguished from a pure democracy. Justice Isagani Cruz explains:8

xxx xxx xxx

A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern themselves
directly. The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who derive their
mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the option of their
principal. Obviously, a republican government is a responsible government whose officials hold and discharge their position as a public trust and shall,
according to the Constitution, "at all times be accountable to the people" they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican government it is almost
needless to state, is the promotion of the common welfare according to the will of the people themselves.

I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Davide. I agree that sovereignty is indivisible but it need not always be exercised by the people together,
all the time.9 For this reason, the Constitution and our laws provide when the entire electorate or only some of them can elect those who make our laws
and those who execute our laws. Thus, the entire electorate votes for our senators but only our district electorates vote for our congressmen, only our
provincial electorates vote for the members of our provincial boards, only our city electorates vote for our city councilors, and only our municipal
electorates vote for our councilors. Also, the entire electorate votes for our President and Vice-President but only our provincial electorates vote for our
governors, only our city electorates vote for our mayors, and only our municipal electorates vote for our mayors. By defining and delimiting the classes of
voters who can exercise the sovereignty of the people in a given election, it cannot be claimed that said sovereignty has been fragmented.

It is my respectful submission that the issue in the case at bar is not whether the people of Sorsogon should be given the right to defy the law by allowing
Frivaldo to sit as their governor. Rather, the issue is: whether the will of the voters of Sorsogon clearly choosing Frivaldo as governor ought to be given
a decisive value considering the uncertainty of the law on when a candidate ought to satisfy the qualification of citizenship. The uncertainty of law and
jurisprudence, both here and abroad, on this legal issue cannot be denied. In the United States, 10 there are two (2) principal schools of thought on the
matter. One espouses the view that a candidate must possess the qualifications for office at the time of his election. The other ventures the view that the
candidate should satisfy the qualifications at the time he assumes the powers of the office. I am unaware of any Philippine decision that has squarely
resolved this difficult question of law. The ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban adhered to the second school of thought while Mr. Justice Davide
dissents.

I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in interpreting our law on the matter for this is vital to dispel the fear of Mr. Justice Davide that my
opinion can bring about ill effects to the State. Mr. Justice Davide's fear is based on the assumption that Frivaldo continues to be disqualified and we
cannot allow him to sit as governor without transgressing the law. I do not concede this assumption for as stressed above, courts have been sharply
divided by this mind boggling issue. Given this schism, I do not see how we can derogate on the sovereignty of the people by according more weight to
the votes of the people of Sorsogon.

Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of Batanes stage a rebellion, we cannot prosecute them "because of the doctrine of people's
sovereignty." With due respect, the analogy is not appropriate. In his hypothetical case, rebellion is concededly a crime, a violation of Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code, an offense against the sovereignty of our people. In the case at bar, it cannot be held with certitude that the people of Sorsogon
violated the law by voting for Frivaldo as governor. Frivaldo's name was in the list of candidates allowed by COMELEC to run for governor. At that time
too, Frivaldo was taking all steps to establish his Filipino citizenship. And even our jurisprudence has not settled the issue when a candidate should
possess the qualification of citizenship. Since the meaning of the law is arguable then and now, I cannot imagine how it will be disastrous for the State if
we tilt the balance in the case at bar in favor of the people of Sorsogon.
In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of our people should be resolutory of the case at bar which is one of its kind, unprecedented in our
political history. For three (3) times, Frivaldo ran as governor of the province of Sorsogon. For two (2) times, he was disqualified on the ground of
citizenship. The people of Sorsogon voted for him as their governor despite his disqualification. The people never waffled in their support for Frivaldo. In
1988, they gave him a winning margin of 27,000; in 1992, they gave him a winning spread of 57,000; in 1995, he posted a margin of 20,000. Clearly
then, Frivaldo is the overwhelming choice of the people of Sorsogon. In election cases, we should strive to align the will of the legislature as expressed
in its law with the will of the sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign, it must respect the will of the people. For in the eloquent
prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". . . an enfranchised citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty and is the ultimate source of established authority."11 The
choice of the governed on who shall be their governor merits the highest consideration by all agencies of government. In cases where the sovereignty of
the people is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct. We cannot fail by making the people succeed.

DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:

After deliberating on the re-formulated issues and the conclusions reached by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, I find
myself unable to join him.

I agree with petitioner Lee that Frivaldo's repatriation was void, but not on the ground that President Corazon C. Aquino's 27 March 1987 memorandum
"effectively repealed" P.D. No. 725. In my view, the said memorandum only suspended the implementation of the latter decree by divesting the Special
Committee on Naturalization of its authority to further act on grants of citizenship under LOI No. 270, as amended, P.D. No. 836, as amended; P.D. No.
1379; and "any other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations." A reading of the last paragraph of the memorandum can lead to no
other conclusion, thus:

In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special Committee on Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and desist from
undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter of Instruction No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as
amended, Presidential Decree No. 836 dated December 3, 1975, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May 17, 1978, relative to the
grant of citizenship under the said laws, and any other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations. (emphasis supplied)

It is self-evident that the underscored clause can only refer to those related to LOI No. 270, P.D. No. 836, and P.D. No. 1379. There is no doubt in my
mind that P.D. No. 725 is one such "related law" as it involves the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by repatriation and designates the Special
Committee on Naturalization created under LOI No. 270 to receive and act on (i.e., approve or disapprove) applications under the said decree. The
power of President Aquino to suspend these issuances by virtue of the 27 March 1987 memorandum is beyond question considering that under Section
6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, she exercised legislative power until the Congress established therein convened on the fourth Monday of July
1987.

I disagree with the view expressed in the ponencia that the memorandum of 27 March 1987 was merely a declaration of "executive policy," and not an
exercise of legislative power. LOI No. 270, P.D. No. 836, P.D. No. 1379 and "any other related laws," such as P.D. No. 725, were issued by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers -- not executive power. These laws relate to the acquisition (by naturalization) and
reacquisition (by repatriation) of Philippine citizenship, and in light of Sections 1(4) and 3, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution (naturalization and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship shall be in accordance with law), it is indubitable that these subjects are a matter of legislative prerogative. In the
same vein, the creation of the Special Committee on Naturalization by LOI No. 270 and the conferment of the power to accept and act on applications
under P.D. No. 725 are clearly legislative acts.

Accordingly, the revocation of the cease and desist order and the reactivation or revival of the Committee can be done only by legislative fiat, i.e., by
Congress, since the President had long lost his authority to exercise "legislative power." Considering that Congress has not seen it fit to do so, the
President cannot, in the exercise of executive power, lift the cease and desist order nor reactivate/reconstitute/revive the Committee. A multo fortiori, the
Committee cannot validly accept Frivaldo's application for repatriation and approve it.

II

Even assuming arguendo that Frivaldo's repatriation is valid, it did not "cure his lack of citizenship." I depart from the view in the ponencia that Section
39 of the Local Government Code of 1991 does not specify the time when the citizenship requirement must be met, and that being the case, then it
suffices that citizenship be possessed upon commencement of the term of the office involved; therefore, since Frivaldo "re-assumed" his Philippine
citizenship at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995 and the term of office of Governor commenced at 12:00 noon of that day, he had, therefore, complied with the
citizenship requirement.

In the first place, Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications of elective local officials and not those of an elected local official. These adjectives are
not synonymous, as the ponencia seems to suggest. The first refers to the nature of the office, which requires the process of voting by the electorate
involved; while the second refers to a victorious candidate for an elective office. The section unquestionably refers to elective -- not elected -- local
officials. It falls under Title Two entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; under Chapter 1 entitled Qualifications and Election; and paragraph (a) thereof begins
with the phrase "An elective local official," while paragraphs (b) to (f) thereof speak of candidates. It reads as follows:

Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to
be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the
sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one
(21) years of age on election day.

(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election
day.
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.

(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day
(emphasis supplied)

It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications of candidates for elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way may
the section be construed to mean that possession of qualifications should be reckoned from the commencement of the term of office of the elected
candidate.

For another, it is not at all true that Section 39 does not specify the time when the citizenship requirement must be possessed. I submit that the
requirement must be satisfied, or that Philippine citizenship must be possessed, not merely at the commencement of the term, but at an earlier time, the
latest being election day itself. Section 39 is not at all ambiguous nor uncertain that it meant this to be, as one basic qualification of an elective local
official is that he be "A REGISTERED VOTER IN THE BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR PROVINCE . . . WHERE HE INTENDS TO VOTE." This
simply means that he possesses all the qualifications to exercise the right of suffrage. The fundamental qualification for the exercise of this sovereign
right is the possession of Philippine citizenship. No less than the Constitution makes it the first qualification, as Section 1, Article V thereof provides:

Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the
election. . . . (emphasis supplied)

And Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) expressly provides for the qualifications of a voter. Thus:

Sec. 117 Qualifications of a voter. -- Every citizen of the Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law, eighteen years of age or over, who shall have
resided in the Philippines for one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the
election, may be a registered voter. (emphasis supplied)

It is undisputed that this Court twice voided Frivaldo's election as Governor in the 1988 and 1992 elections on the ground that for lack of Philippine
citizenship -- he being a naturalized citizen of the United States of America -- he was DISQUALIFIED to be elected as such and to serve the position
(Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 [1989]; Republic of the Philippines vs. De la Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994]). This disqualification
inexorably nullified Frivaldo's registration as a voter and declared it void ab initio. Our judgments therein were self-executory and no further act, e.g., a
COMELEC order to cancel his registration as a voter or the physical destruction of his voter's certificate, was necessary for the ineffectivity. Thus, he
was never considered a registered voter for the elections of May 1992, and May 1995, as there is no showing that Frivaldo registered anew as a voter
for the latter elections. Even if he did -- in obvious defiance of his decreed disqualification -- this did not make him a Filipino citizen, hence it was equally
void ab initio. That he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections and was even allowed to vote therein were of no moment. Neither act made
him a Filipino citizen nor nullified the judgments of this Court. On the contrary, said acts made a mockery of our judgments. For the Court now to validate
Frivaldo's registration as a voter despite the judgments of disqualification is to modify the said judgments by making their effectivity and enforceability
dependent on a COMELEC order cancelling his registration as a voter, or on the physical destruction of his certificate of registration as a voter which, of
course, was never our intention. Moreover, to sanction Frivaldo's registration as a voter would be to sacrifice substance in favor of form (the piece of
paper that is the book of voters or list of voters or voter's ID), and abet the COMELEC's incompetence in failing to cancel Frivaldo's registration and
allowing him to vote.

The second reason in the ponencia as to why the citizenship disqualification should be reckoned not from the date of the election nor the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, but from the date of proclamation, is that the only available remedy to question the ineligibility (or disloyalty) of a candidate is a
petition for quo warranto which, under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, may be filed only within ten days from proclamation and not earlier.

I beg to differ.

Clearly, quo warranto is not the sole remedy available to question a candidate's ineligibility for public office. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
allows the filing of a petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation contained
therein, as required by Section 74, is false. Section 74, in turn, requires that the person filing the certificate of candidacy must state, inter alia, that he is
eligible for the office, which means that he has all the qualifications (including, of course, fulfilling the citizenship requirement) and none of the
disqualifications as provided by law. The petition under Section 78 may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The section reads in full as follows:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

This remedy was recognized in Loong vs. Commission on Elections (216 SCRA 760, 768 [1992]), where this Court held:

Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition within the 25-day period Section 78 of the Code for
whatever reasons, the election laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing
a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code. Section
1, Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure similarly provides that any voter contesting the election of any regional, provincial or city official on the
ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with the Electoral Contest Adjudication
Department. The petition may be filed within ten (10) days from the date the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).

Likewise, Rule 25 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows the filing of a petition for disqualification on the ground of failure to possess all
the qualifications of a candidate as provided by the Constitution or by existing laws, "any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but
not later than the date of proclamation." Sections 1 and 3 thereof provide:

Rule 25 -- Disqualification of Candidates

Sec. 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by
existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. The petition shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation.

While the validity of this rule insofar as it concerns petitions for disqualification on the ground of lack of all qualifications may be doubtful, its invalidity is
not in issue here.

In this connection, it would seem appropriate to take up the last issue grappled within the ponencia, viz., is Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
mandatory? The answer is provided in Loong.

We also do not find merit in the contention of respondent Commission that in the light of the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646, a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed even beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, as
long as it is filed within a reasonable time from the discovery of the ineligibility.

Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 are here re-quoted:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modifies or alters the 25- day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for filing the appropriate action
to cancel a certificate of candidacy on account of any false representation made therein. On the contrary, said Section 7 affirms and reiterates Section
78 of the Code.

We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification case which may be based on grounds other than that provided under Section 78 of
the Code. But Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 also makes the effects referred to in Section 6 applicable to disqualification cases filed under Section 78 of
the Code. Nowhere in Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 is mention made of the period within which these disqualification cases may be filed. This
is because there are provisions in the Code which supply the periods within which a petition relating to disqualification of candidates must be filed, such
as Section 78, already discussed, and Section 253 on petitions for quo warranto.

I then disagree with the asseveration in the ponencia that Section 78 is merely directory because Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the COMELEC
to try and decide petitions for disqualification even after elections. I submit that Section 6 refers to disqualifications under Sections 12 and 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code and consequently modifies Section 72 thereof. As such, the proper court or the COMELEC are granted the authority to continue
hearing the case after the election, and during the pendency of the case, suspend the proclamation of the victorious candidate, if the evidence against
him is strong. Sections 12, 68, and 72 of the Code provide:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment
for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon declaration by competent authority that said insanity or
incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again
becomes disqualified.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or
found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections
80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected,
from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971 EC)

Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation
of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.
Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to
office.

III

Still assuming that the repatriation is valid, I am not persuaded by the arguments in support of the thesis that Frivaldo's repatriation may be given
retroactive effect, as such goes against the spirit and letter of P.D. No. 725. The spirit adheres to the principle that acquisition or re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship is not a right, but a mere privilege. Before the advent of P.D. No. 725, only the following could apply for repatriation: (a) Army,
Navy, or Air Corps deserters; and (b) a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien after the death of her spouse (Section 2[2],
C.A. No. 63). P.D. NO. 725 expanded this to include Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens even before the death of
their alien husbands, or the termination of their marital status and to natural-born Filipino citizens who lost their Philippine citizenship but subsequently
desired to reacquire the latter.

Turning now to the letter of the law, P.D. No. 725 expressly provides that repatriation takes effect only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, thus:

. . . may reacquire Philippine citizenship . . . by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if
their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, AFTER WHICH THEY SHALL BE DEEMED
TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. (emphasis and capitalization supplied)

Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation under the decree are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and
(3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is
deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the
application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise.

This theory in the ponencia likewise dilutes this Court's pronouncement in the first Frivaldo case that what reacquisition of Filipino citizenship requires is
an act "formally rejecting [the] adopted state and reaffirming . . . allegiance to the Philippines." That act meant nothing less than taking of the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. If we now take this revision of doctrine to its logical end, then it would also mean that if Frivaldo had chosen
and reacquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization or through Congressional action, such would retroact to the filing of the petition for naturalization
or the bill granting him Philippine citizenship. This is a proposition which both the first and second Frivaldo cases soundly rejected.

The other reason adduced in the ponencia in support of the proposition that P.D. No. 725 can be given retroactive effect is its alleged curative or
remedial nature.

Again, I disagree. In the first place, by no stretch of legal hermeneutics may P.D. No. 725 be characterized as a curative or remedial statute:

Curative or remedial statutes are healing acts. They are remedial by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations. The rule in
regard to curative statutes is that if the thing omitted or failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect sought to be removed or made harmless, is
something the legislature might have dispensed with by a previous statute, it may do so by a subsequent one.

Curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable a person to
carry into effect that which they have designed and intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory disability or
irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute, was invalid. (RUBEN E. AGPALO, Statutory
Construction, Second ed. [1990], 270-271, citations omitted).

P.D. No. 725 provides for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship lost through the marriage of a Filipina to an alien and through naturalization in a
foreign country of natural-born Filipino citizens. It involves then the substantive, nay primordial, right of citizenship. To those for whom it is intended, it
means, in reality, the acquisition of "a new right," as the ponencia cannot but concede. Therefore, it may not be said to merely remedy or cure a defect
considering that one who has lost Philippine citizenship does not have the right to reacquire it. As earlier stated, the Constitution provides that
citizenship, once lost, may only be reacquired in the manner provided by law. Moreover, it has also been observed that:

The idea is implicit from many of the cases that remedial statutes are statutes relating to procedure and not substantive rights. (Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, Vol. 3, Third ed. [1943], §5704 at 74, citations omitted).

If we grant for the sake of argument, however, that P.D. No. 725 is curative or remedial statute, it would be an inexcusable error to give it a retroactive
effect since it explicitly provides the date of its effectivity. Thus:

This Decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the city of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy five.

Nevertheless, if the retroactivity is to relate only to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, then nothing therein supports such theory, for as the decree
itself unequivocally provides, it is only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines that the applicant is DEEMED TO HAVE
REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.

IV

Assuming yet again, for the sake of argument, that taking the oath of allegiance retroacted to the date of Frivaldo's application for repatriation, the same
could not be said insofar as it concerned the United States of America, of which he was a citizen. For under the laws of the United States of America,
Frivaldo remained an American national until he renounced his citizenship and allegiance thereto at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995, when he took his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Section 401 of the Nationality Act of 1940 of the United States of America provides that a person who is a
national of the United States of America, whether by birth or naturalization, loses his nationality by, inter alia, "(b) Taking an oath or making an
affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state" (SIDNEY KANSAS, U.S. Immigration Exclusion and Deportation and Citizenship of
the United States of America, Third ed., [1948] 341-342). It follows then that on election day and until the hour of the commencement of the term for
which he was elected - noon of 30 June 1995 as per Section 43 of the Local Government Code - Frivaldo possessed dual citizenship, viz., (a) as an
American citizen; and (b) as a Filipino citizen through the adoption of the theory that the effects of his taking the oath of allegiance were retrospective.
Hence, he was disqualified to run for Governor for yet another reason: possession of dual citizenship, in accordance with Section 40 (d) of the Local
Government Code.

The assertion in the ponencia that Frivaldo may be considered STATELESS on the basis of his claim that he "had long renounced and had long
abandoned his American citizenship - long before May 8, 1985" - is untenable, for the following reasons: first, it is based on Frivaldo's unproven, self-
serving allegation; second, informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship; and third, simply put, never did the status
of a STATELESS person attach to Frivaldo.

Statelessness may be either de jure, which is the status of individuals stripped of their nationality by their former government without having an
opportunity to acquire another; or de facto, which is the status of individuals possessed of a nationality whose country does not give them protection
outside their own country, and who are commonly, albeit imprecisely, referred to as refugees (JORGE R. COQUIA, et al., Conflict of Laws Cases,
Materials and Comments, 1995 ed., 290).

Specifically, under Chapter 1, Article 1 of the United Nations Convention Regarding the Status of Stateless Persons (Philippine Treaty Series, Compiled
and Annotated by Haydee B. Yorac, vol. III, 363), a stateless person is defined as "a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the
operation of its law." However, it has not been shown that the United States of America ever ceased to consider Frivaldo its national at any time before
he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 30 June 1995.

VI

Finally, I find it in order to also express my view on the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I am absolutely happy to join him in his
statement that "[t]he sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution" and that the said Constitution is "more people-oriented,"
"borne [as it is] out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution." I would even go further by saying that this Constitution is pro-God (Preamble), pro-
people (Article II, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 15, 16; Article XI, Section 1, Article XII, Sections 1, 6; Article XIII, Sections 1, 11, 15, 16, 18; Article XVI, Sections
5(2), 6), pro-Filipino (Article XII, Sections 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 14; Article XIV, Sections 1, 4(2), 13; Article XVI, Section 11), pro-poor (Article II, Sections 9,
10, 18, 21; Article XII, Sections 1, 2(3); Article XIII, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13), pro-life (Article II, Section 12), and pro-family (Article II,
Section 12; Article XV).

Nevertheless, I cannot be with him in carrying out the principle of sovereignty beyond what I perceive to be the reasonable constitutional parameters.
The doctrine of people's sovereignty is founded on the principles of democracy and republicanism and refers exclusively to the sovereignty of the people
of the Philippines. Section 1 of Article II is quite clear on this, thus:

Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

And the Preamble makes it clear when it solemnly opens it with a clause "We, the sovereign Filipino people . . ." Thus, this sovereignty is an attribute of
the Filipino people as one people, one body.

That sovereign power of the Filipino people cannot be fragmentized by looking at it as the supreme authority of the people of any of the political
subdivisions to determine their own destiny; neither can we convert and treat every fragment as the whole. In such a case, this Court would provide the
formula for the division and destruction of the State and render the Government ineffective and inutile. To illustrate the evil, we may consider the
enforcement of laws or the pursuit of a national policy by the executive branch of the government, or the execution of a judgment by the courts. If these
are opposed by the overwhelming majority of the people of a certain province, or even a municipality, it would necessarily follow that the law, national
policy, or judgment must not be enforced, implemented, or executed in the said province or municipality. More concretely, if, for instance, the vast
majority of the people of Batanes rise publicly and take up arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to the said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces, or depriving
the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives, then those who did so -- and which are composed of the
vast majority of the people of Batanes -- a political subdivision -- cannot be prosecuted for or be held guilty of rebellion in violation of Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code because of the doctrine of peoples' sovereignty. Indeed, the expansion of the doctrine of sovereignty by investing upon the people
of a mere political subdivision that which the Constitution places in the entire Filipino people, may be disastrous to the Nation.

So it is in this case if we follow the thesis in the concurring opinion. Thus, simply because Frivaldo had obtained a margin of 20,000 votes over his
closest rival, Lee, i.e., a vast majority of the voters of Sorsogon had expressed their sovereign will for the former, then this Court must yield to that will
and must, therefore, allow to be set aside, for Frivaldo, not just the laws on qualifications of candidates and elective officials and naturalization and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, but even the final and binding decisions of this Court affecting him.

This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law. I vote then to DISMISS G.R. No. 120295 and GRANT G.R. No. 123755.

Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring:

I concur with the path-breaking ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban which is pro-people and pierces the myopia of legalism. Upholding the sovereign will
of the people which is the be-all and the end-all of republicanism, it rests on a foundation that will endure time and its tempest.

The sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution. For this reason, it appears as thefirst in our declaration of principles and
state policies. Thus, section 1 of Article II of our fundamental law proclaims that "[t]he Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The same principle served as the bedrock of our 1973 and 1935
Constitutions.1 It is one of the few principles whose truth has been cherished by the Americans as self-evident. Section 4, Article IV of the U.S.
Constitution makes it a duty of the Federal government to guarantee to every state a "republican form of government." With understandable fervor, the
American authorities imposed republicanism as the cornerstone of our 1935 Constitution then being crafted by its Filipino framers.2

Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution, our 1987 Constitution is more people-oriented. Thus, section 4 of Article II provides as a state
policy that the prime duty of the Government is "to serve and protect the people." Section 1, Article XI also provides that ". . . public officers . . . must at
all times be accountable to the people . . ." Sections 15 and 1 of Article XIII define the role and rights of people's organizations. Section 5(2) of Article
XVI mandates that "[t]he state shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in the
performance of their duty." And section 2 of Article XVII provides that "amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative . . ." All these provisions and more are intended to breathe more life to
the sovereignty of our people.
To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose dimensions are buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the
framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to
govern.3 Former Dean Vicente Sinco4 states that an essential quality of sovereignty is legal omnipotence, viz.: "Legal theory establishes certain
essential qualities inherent in the nature of sovereignty. The first is legal omnipotence. This means that the sovereign is legally omnipotent and absolute
in relation to other legal institutions. It has the power to determine exclusively its legal competence. Its powers are original, not derivative. It is the sole
judge of what it should do at any given time."5Citing Barker,6 he adds that a more amplified definition of sovereignty is that of "a final power of final legal
adjustment of all legal issues." The U.S. Supreme Court expressed the same thought in the landmark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,7 where it held that ". .
. sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the
agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts."

In our Constitution, the people established a representative democracy as distinguished from a pure democracy. Justice Isagani Cruz explains:8

xxx xxx xxx

A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern themselves
directly. The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who derive their
mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the option of their
principal. Obviously, a republican government is a responsible government whose officials hold and discharge their position as a public trust and shall,
according to the Constitution, "at all times be accountable to the people" they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican government it is almost
needless to state, is the promotion of the common welfare according to the will of the people themselves.

I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Davide. I agree that sovereignty is indivisible but it need not always be exercised by the people together,
all the time.9 For this reason, the Constitution and our laws provide when the entire electorate or only some of them can elect those who make our laws
and those who execute our laws. Thus, the entire electorate votes for our senators but only our district electorates vote for our congressmen, only our
provincial electorates vote for the members of our provincial boards, only our city electorates vote for our city councilors, and only our municipal
electorates vote for our councilors. Also, the entire electorate votes for our President and Vice-President but only our provincial electorates vote for our
governors, only our city electorates vote for our mayors, and only our municipal electorates vote for our mayors. By defining and delimiting the classes of
voters who can exercise the sovereignty of the people in a given election, it cannot be claimed that said sovereignty has been fragmented.

It is my respectful submission that the issue in the case at bar is not whether the people of Sorsogon should be given the right to defy the law by allowing
Frivaldo to sit as their governor. Rather, the issue is: whether the will of the voters of Sorsogon clearly choosing Frivaldo as governor ought to be given
a decisive value considering the uncertainty of the law on when a candidate ought to satisfy the qualification of citizenship. The uncertainty of law and
jurisprudence, both here and abroad, on this legal issue cannot be denied. In the United States, 10 there are two (2) principal schools of thought on the
matter. One espouses the view that a candidate must possess the qualifications for office at the time of his election. The other ventures the view that the
candidate should satisfy the qualifications at the time he assumes the powers of the office. I am unaware of any Philippine decision that has squarely
resolved this difficult question of law. The ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban adhered to the second school of thought while Mr. Justice Davide
dissents.

I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in interpreting our law on the matter for this is vital to dispel the fear of Mr. Justice Davide that my
opinion can bring about ill effects to the State. Mr. Justice Davide's fear is based on the assumption that Frivaldo continues to be disqualified and we
cannot allow him to sit as governor without transgressing the law. I do not concede this assumption for as stressed above, courts have been sharply
divided by this mind boggling issue. Given this schism, I do not see how we can derogate on the sovereignty of the people by according more weight to
the votes of the people of Sorsogon.

Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of Batanes stage a rebellion, we cannot prosecute them "because of the doctrine of people's
sovereignty." With due respect, the analogy is not appropriate. In his hypothetical case, rebellion is concededly a crime, a violation of Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code, an offense against the sovereignty of our people. In the case at bar, it cannot be held with certitude that the people of Sorsogon
violated the law by voting for Frivaldo as governor. Frivaldo's name was in the list of candidates allowed by COMELEC to run for governor. At that time
too, Frivaldo was taking all steps to establish his Filipino citizenship. And even our jurisprudence has not settled the issue when a candidate should
possess the qualification of citizenship. Since the meaning of the law is arguable then and now, I cannot imagine how it will be disastrous for the State if
we tilt the balance in the case at bar in favor of the people of Sorsogon.

In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of our people should be resolutory of the case at bar which is one of its kind, unprecedented in our
political history. For three (3) times, Frivaldo ran as governor of the province of Sorsogon. For two (2) times, he was disqualified on the ground of
citizenship. The people of Sorsogon voted for him as their governor despite his disqualification. The people never waffled in their support for Frivaldo. In
1988, they gave him a winning margin of 27,000; in 1992, they gave him a winning spread of 57,000; in 1995, he posted a margin of 20,000. Clearly
then, Frivaldo is the overwhelming choice of the people of Sorsogon. In election cases, we should strive to align the will of the legislature as expressed
in its law with the will of the sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign, it must respect the will of the people. For in the eloquent
prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". . . an enfranchised citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty and is the ultimate source of established authority."11 The
choice of the governed on who shall be their governor merits the highest consideration by all agencies of government. In cases where the sovereignty of
the people is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct. We cannot fail by making the people succeed.

DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:

After deliberating on the re-formulated issues and the conclusions reached by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, I find
myself unable to join him.

I agree with petitioner Lee that Frivaldo's repatriation was void, but not on the ground that President Corazon C. Aquino's 27 March 1987 memorandum
"effectively repealed" P.D. No. 725. In my view, the said memorandum only suspended the implementation of the latter decree by divesting the Special
Committee on Naturalization of its authority to further act on grants of citizenship under LOI No. 270, as amended, P.D. No. 836, as amended; P.D. No.
1379; and "any other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations." A reading of the last paragraph of the memorandum can lead to no
other conclusion, thus:
In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special Committee on Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and desist from
undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter of Instruction No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as
amended, Presidential Decree No. 836 dated December 3, 1975, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May 17, 1978, relative to the
grant of citizenship under the said laws, and any other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations. (emphasis supplied)

It is self-evident that the underscored clause can only refer to those related to LOI No. 270, P.D. No. 836, and P.D. No. 1379. There is no doubt in my
mind that P.D. No. 725 is one such "related law" as it involves the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by repatriation and designates the Special
Committee on Naturalization created under LOI No. 270 to receive and act on (i.e., approve or disapprove) applications under the said decree. The
power of President Aquino to suspend these issuances by virtue of the 27 March 1987 memorandum is beyond question considering that under Section
6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, she exercised legislative power until the Congress established therein convened on the fourth Monday of July
1987.

I disagree with the view expressed in the ponencia that the memorandum of 27 March 1987 was merely a declaration of "executive policy," and not an
exercise of legislative power. LOI No. 270, P.D. No. 836, P.D. No. 1379 and "any other related laws," such as P.D. No. 725, were issued by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers -- not executive power. These laws relate to the acquisition (by naturalization) and
reacquisition (by repatriation) of Philippine citizenship, and in light of Sections 1(4) and 3, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution (naturalization and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship shall be in accordance with law), it is indubitable that these subjects are a matter of legislative prerogative. In the
same vein, the creation of the Special Committee on Naturalization by LOI No. 270 and the conferment of the power to accept and act on applications
under P.D. No. 725 are clearly legislative acts.

Accordingly, the revocation of the cease and desist order and the reactivation or revival of the Committee can be done only by legislative fiat, i.e., by
Congress, since the President had long lost his authority to exercise "legislative power." Considering that Congress has not seen it fit to do so, the
President cannot, in the exercise of executive power, lift the cease and desist order nor reactivate/reconstitute/revive the Committee. A multo fortiori, the
Committee cannot validly accept Frivaldo's application for repatriation and approve it.

II

Even assuming arguendo that Frivaldo's repatriation is valid, it did not "cure his lack of citizenship." I depart from the view in the ponencia that Section
39 of the Local Government Code of 1991 does not specify the time when the citizenship requirement must be met, and that being the case, then it
suffices that citizenship be possessed upon commencement of the term of the office involved; therefore, since Frivaldo "re-assumed" his Philippine
citizenship at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995 and the term of office of Governor commenced at 12:00 noon of that day, he had, therefore, complied with the
citizenship requirement.

In the first place, Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications of elective local officials and not those of an elected local official. These adjectives are
not synonymous, as the ponencia seems to suggest. The first refers to the nature of the office, which requires the process of voting by the electorate
involved; while the second refers to a victorious candidate for an elective office. The section unquestionably refers to elective -- not elected -- local
officials. It falls under Title Two entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; under Chapter 1 entitled Qualifications and Election; and paragraph (a) thereof begins
with the phrase "An elective local official," while paragraphs (b) to (f) thereof speak of candidates. It reads as follows:

Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to
be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the
sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one
(21) years of age on election day.

(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election
day.

(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.

(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day
(emphasis supplied)

It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications of candidates for elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way may
the section be construed to mean that possession of qualifications should be reckoned from the commencement of the term of office of the elected
candidate.

For another, it is not at all true that Section 39 does not specify the time when the citizenship requirement must be possessed. I submit that the
requirement must be satisfied, or that Philippine citizenship must be possessed, not merely at the commencement of the term, but at an earlier time, the
latest being election day itself. Section 39 is not at all ambiguous nor uncertain that it meant this to be, as one basic qualification of an elective local
official is that he be "A REGISTERED VOTER IN THE BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR PROVINCE . . . WHERE HE INTENDS TO VOTE." This
simply means that he possesses all the qualifications to exercise the right of suffrage. The fundamental qualification for the exercise of this sovereign
right is the possession of Philippine citizenship. No less than the Constitution makes it the first qualification, as Section 1, Article V thereof provides:

Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the
election. . . . (emphasis supplied)

And Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) expressly provides for the qualifications of a voter. Thus:
Sec. 117 Qualifications of a voter. -- Every citizen of the Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law, eighteen years of age or over, who shall have
resided in the Philippines for one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the
election, may be a registered voter. (emphasis supplied)

It is undisputed that this Court twice voided Frivaldo's election as Governor in the 1988 and 1992 elections on the ground that for lack of Philippine
citizenship -- he being a naturalized citizen of the United States of America -- he was DISQUALIFIED to be elected as such and to serve the position
(Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 [1989]; Republic of the Philippines vs. De la Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994]). This disqualification
inexorably nullified Frivaldo's registration as a voter and declared it void ab initio. Our judgments therein were self-executory and no further act, e.g., a
COMELEC order to cancel his registration as a voter or the physical destruction of his voter's certificate, was necessary for the ineffectivity. Thus, he
was never considered a registered voter for the elections of May 1992, and May 1995, as there is no showing that Frivaldo registered anew as a voter
for the latter elections. Even if he did -- in obvious defiance of his decreed disqualification -- this did not make him a Filipino citizen, hence it was equally
void ab initio. That he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections and was even allowed to vote therein were of no moment. Neither act made
him a Filipino citizen nor nullified the judgments of this Court. On the contrary, said acts made a mockery of our judgments. For the Court now to validate
Frivaldo's registration as a voter despite the judgments of disqualification is to modify the said judgments by making their effectivity and enforceability
dependent on a COMELEC order cancelling his registration as a voter, or on the physical destruction of his certificate of registration as a voter which, of
course, was never our intention. Moreover, to sanction Frivaldo's registration as a voter would be to sacrifice substance in favor of form (the piece of
paper that is the book of voters or list of voters or voter's ID), and abet the COMELEC's incompetence in failing to cancel Frivaldo's registration and
allowing him to vote.

The second reason in the ponencia as to why the citizenship disqualification should be reckoned not from the date of the election nor the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, but from the date of proclamation, is that the only available remedy to question the ineligibility (or disloyalty) of a candidate is a
petition for quo warranto which, under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, may be filed only within ten days from proclamation and not earlier.

I beg to differ.

Clearly, quo warranto is not the sole remedy available to question a candidate's ineligibility for public office. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
allows the filing of a petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation contained
therein, as required by Section 74, is false. Section 74, in turn, requires that the person filing the certificate of candidacy must state, inter alia, that he is
eligible for the office, which means that he has all the qualifications (including, of course, fulfilling the citizenship requirement) and none of the
disqualifications as provided by law. The petition under Section 78 may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The section reads in full as follows:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

This remedy was recognized in Loong vs. Commission on Elections (216 SCRA 760, 768 [1992]), where this Court held:

Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition within the 25-day period Section 78 of the Code for
whatever reasons, the election laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing
a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code. Section
1, Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure similarly provides that any voter contesting the election of any regional, provincial or city official on the
ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with the Electoral Contest Adjudication
Department. The petition may be filed within ten (10) days from the date the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).

Likewise, Rule 25 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows the filing of a petition for disqualification on the ground of failure to possess all
the qualifications of a candidate as provided by the Constitution or by existing laws, "any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but
not later than the date of proclamation." Sections 1 and 3 thereof provide:

Rule 25 -- Disqualification of Candidates

Sec. 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by
existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. The petition shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation.

While the validity of this rule insofar as it concerns petitions for disqualification on the ground of lack of all qualifications may be doubtful, its invalidity is
not in issue here.

In this connection, it would seem appropriate to take up the last issue grappled within the ponencia, viz., is Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
mandatory? The answer is provided in Loong.

We also do not find merit in the contention of respondent Commission that in the light of the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646, a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed even beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, as
long as it is filed within a reasonable time from the discovery of the ineligibility.

Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 are here re-quoted:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modifies or alters the 25- day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for filing the appropriate action
to cancel a certificate of candidacy on account of any false representation made therein. On the contrary, said Section 7 affirms and reiterates Section
78 of the Code.

We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification case which may be based on grounds other than that provided under Section 78 of
the Code. But Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 also makes the effects referred to in Section 6 applicable to disqualification cases filed under Section 78 of
the Code. Nowhere in Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 is mention made of the period within which these disqualification cases may be filed. This
is because there are provisions in the Code which supply the periods within which a petition relating to disqualification of candidates must be filed, such
as Section 78, already discussed, and Section 253 on petitions for quo warranto.

I then disagree with the asseveration in the ponencia that Section 78 is merely directory because Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the COMELEC
to try and decide petitions for disqualification even after elections. I submit that Section 6 refers to disqualifications under Sections 12 and 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code and consequently modifies Section 72 thereof. As such, the proper court or the COMELEC are granted the authority to continue
hearing the case after the election, and during the pendency of the case, suspend the proclamation of the victorious candidate, if the evidence against
him is strong. Sections 12, 68, and 72 of the Code provide:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment
for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon declaration by competent authority that said insanity or
incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again
becomes disqualified.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or
found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections
80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected,
from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971 EC)

Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation
of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.
Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to
office.

III

Still assuming that the repatriation is valid, I am not persuaded by the arguments in support of the thesis that Frivaldo's repatriation may be given
retroactive effect, as such goes against the spirit and letter of P.D. No. 725. The spirit adheres to the principle that acquisition or re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship is not a right, but a mere privilege. Before the advent of P.D. No. 725, only the following could apply for repatriation: (a) Army,
Navy, or Air Corps deserters; and (b) a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien after the death of her spouse (Section 2[2],
C.A. No. 63). P.D. NO. 725 expanded this to include Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens even before the death of
their alien husbands, or the termination of their marital status and to natural-born Filipino citizens who lost their Philippine citizenship but subsequently
desired to reacquire the latter.

Turning now to the letter of the law, P.D. No. 725 expressly provides that repatriation takes effect only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, thus:

. . . may reacquire Philippine citizenship . . . by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if
their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, AFTER WHICH THEY SHALL BE DEEMED
TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. (emphasis and capitalization supplied)

Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation under the decree are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and
(3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is
deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the
application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise.

This theory in the ponencia likewise dilutes this Court's pronouncement in the first Frivaldo case that what reacquisition of Filipino citizenship requires is
an act "formally rejecting [the] adopted state and reaffirming . . . allegiance to the Philippines." That act meant nothing less than taking of the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. If we now take this revision of doctrine to its logical end, then it would also mean that if Frivaldo had chosen
and reacquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization or through Congressional action, such would retroact to the filing of the petition for naturalization
or the bill granting him Philippine citizenship. This is a proposition which both the first and second Frivaldo cases soundly rejected.

The other reason adduced in the ponencia in support of the proposition that P.D. No. 725 can be given retroactive effect is its alleged curative or
remedial nature.

Again, I disagree. In the first place, by no stretch of legal hermeneutics may P.D. No. 725 be characterized as a curative or remedial statute:

Curative or remedial statutes are healing acts. They are remedial by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations. The rule in
regard to curative statutes is that if the thing omitted or failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect sought to be removed or made harmless, is
something the legislature might have dispensed with by a previous statute, it may do so by a subsequent one.

Curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable a person to
carry into effect that which they have designed and intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory disability or
irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute, was invalid. (RUBEN E. AGPALO, Statutory
Construction, Second ed. [1990], 270-271, citations omitted).

P.D. No. 725 provides for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship lost through the marriage of a Filipina to an alien and through naturalization in a
foreign country of natural-born Filipino citizens. It involves then the substantive, nay primordial, right of citizenship. To those for whom it is intended, it
means, in reality, the acquisition of "a new right," as the ponencia cannot but concede. Therefore, it may not be said to merely remedy or cure a defect
considering that one who has lost Philippine citizenship does not have the right to reacquire it. As earlier stated, the Constitution provides that
citizenship, once lost, may only be reacquired in the manner provided by law. Moreover, it has also been observed that:

The idea is implicit from many of the cases that remedial statutes are statutes relating to procedure and not substantive rights. (Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, Vol. 3, Third ed. [1943], §5704 at 74, citations omitted).

If we grant for the sake of argument, however, that P.D. No. 725 is curative or remedial statute, it would be an inexcusable error to give it a retroactive
effect since it explicitly provides the date of its effectivity. Thus:

This Decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the city of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy five.

Nevertheless, if the retroactivity is to relate only to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, then nothing therein supports such theory, for as the decree
itself unequivocally provides, it is only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines that the applicant is DEEMED TO HAVE
REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.

IV

Assuming yet again, for the sake of argument, that taking the oath of allegiance retroacted to the date of Frivaldo's application for repatriation, the same
could not be said insofar as it concerned the United States of America, of which he was a citizen. For under the laws of the United States of America,
Frivaldo remained an American national until he renounced his citizenship and allegiance thereto at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995, when he took his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Section 401 of the Nationality Act of 1940 of the United States of America provides that a person who is a
national of the United States of America, whether by birth or naturalization, loses his nationality by, inter alia, "(b) Taking an oath or making an
affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state" (SIDNEY KANSAS, U.S. Immigration Exclusion and Deportation and Citizenship of
the United States of America, Third ed., [1948] 341-342). It follows then that on election day and until the hour of the commencement of the term for
which he was elected - noon of 30 June 1995 as per Section 43 of the Local Government Code - Frivaldo possessed dual citizenship, viz., (a) as an
American citizen; and (b) as a Filipino citizen through the adoption of the theory that the effects of his taking the oath of allegiance were retrospective.
Hence, he was disqualified to run for Governor for yet another reason: possession of dual citizenship, in accordance with Section 40 (d) of the Local
Government Code.

The assertion in the ponencia that Frivaldo may be considered STATELESS on the basis of his claim that he "had long renounced and had long
abandoned his American citizenship - long before May 8, 1985" - is untenable, for the following reasons: first, it is based on Frivaldo's unproven, self-
serving allegation; second, informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship; and third, simply put, never did the status
of a STATELESS person attach to Frivaldo.

Statelessness may be either de jure, which is the status of individuals stripped of their nationality by their former government without having an
opportunity to acquire another; or de facto, which is the status of individuals possessed of a nationality whose country does not give them protection
outside their own country, and who are commonly, albeit imprecisely, referred to as refugees (JORGE R. COQUIA, et al., Conflict of Laws Cases,
Materials and Comments, 1995 ed., 290).

Specifically, under Chapter 1, Article 1 of the United Nations Convention Regarding the Status of Stateless Persons (Philippine Treaty Series, Compiled
and Annotated by Haydee B. Yorac, vol. III, 363), a stateless person is defined as "a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the
operation of its law." However, it has not been shown that the United States of America ever ceased to consider Frivaldo its national at any time before
he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 30 June 1995.

VI

Finally, I find it in order to also express my view on the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I am absolutely happy to join him in his
statement that "[t]he sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution" and that the said Constitution is "more people-oriented,"
"borne [as it is] out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution." I would even go further by saying that this Constitution is pro-God (Preamble), pro-
people (Article II, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 15, 16; Article XI, Section 1, Article XII, Sections 1, 6; Article XIII, Sections 1, 11, 15, 16, 18; Article XVI, Sections
5(2), 6), pro-Filipino (Article XII, Sections 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 14; Article XIV, Sections 1, 4(2), 13; Article XVI, Section 11), pro-poor (Article II, Sections 9,
10, 18, 21; Article XII, Sections 1, 2(3); Article XIII, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13), pro-life (Article II, Section 12), and pro-family (Article II,
Section 12; Article XV).

Nevertheless, I cannot be with him in carrying out the principle of sovereignty beyond what I perceive to be the reasonable constitutional parameters.
The doctrine of people's sovereignty is founded on the principles of democracy and republicanism and refers exclusively to the sovereignty of the people
of the Philippines. Section 1 of Article II is quite clear on this, thus:

Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

And the Preamble makes it clear when it solemnly opens it with a clause "We, the sovereign Filipino people . . ." Thus, this sovereignty is an attribute of
the Filipino people as one people, one body.

That sovereign power of the Filipino people cannot be fragmentized by looking at it as the supreme authority of the people of any of the political
subdivisions to determine their own destiny; neither can we convert and treat every fragment as the whole. In such a case, this Court would provide the
formula for the division and destruction of the State and render the Government ineffective and inutile. To illustrate the evil, we may consider the
enforcement of laws or the pursuit of a national policy by the executive branch of the government, or the execution of a judgment by the courts. If these
are opposed by the overwhelming majority of the people of a certain province, or even a municipality, it would necessarily follow that the law, national
policy, or judgment must not be enforced, implemented, or executed in the said province or municipality. More concretely, if, for instance, the vast
majority of the people of Batanes rise publicly and take up arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to the said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces, or depriving
the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives, then those who did so -- and which are composed of the
vast majority of the people of Batanes -- a political subdivision -- cannot be prosecuted for or be held guilty of rebellion in violation of Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code because of the doctrine of peoples' sovereignty. Indeed, the expansion of the doctrine of sovereignty by investing upon the people
of a mere political subdivision that which the Constitution places in the entire Filipino people, may be disastrous to the Nation.

So it is in this case if we follow the thesis in the concurring opinion. Thus, simply because Frivaldo had obtained a margin of 20,000 votes over his
closest rival, Lee, i.e., a vast majority of the voters of Sorsogon had expressed their sovereign will for the former, then this Court must yield to that will
and must, therefore, allow to be set aside, for Frivaldo, not just the laws on qualifications of candidates and elective officials and naturalization and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, but even the final and binding decisions of this Court affecting him.

This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law. I vote then to DISMISS G.R. No. 120295 and GRANT G.R. No. 123755.

1 Composed of Pres. CoFootnotesmm. Regalado E. Maambong, ponente; Comm. Graduacion A.R. Claravall, concurring, and Comm. Julio F. Desamito,
dissenting.

2 In SPC No. 95-317, entitled Juan G. Frivaldo, petitioner, vs. Raul R. Lee, respondent; rollo, pp. 110-129.

3 Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo, Comms. Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, Manolo B. Gorospe and Teresita Dy-
Liaco Flores. Chairman Pardo certified that "Commissioner Julio F. Desamito was on official travel at the time of the deliberation and resolution of this
case. However, the Commission has reserved to Comm. Desamito the right to submit a dissenting opinion." Rollo, pp. 159-171.

4 Rollo, pp. 46-49.

5 Rollo, pp. 50-55. The Second Division was composed of Pres. Comm. Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, ponente; Comm. Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores,
concurring, and Comm. Manolo B. Gorospe ("on official business").

6 Frivaldo was naturalized as an American citizen on January 20, 1983. In G.R. No. 87193, Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (June
23, 1989), the Supreme Court, by reason of such naturalization, declared Frivaldo "not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from
serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon." On February 28, 1992, the Regional Trial Court of Manila granted the petition for naturalization of
Frivaldo. However, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 104654, Republic of the Philippines vs. De la Rosa, et al., 232 SCRA 785 (June 6, 1994), overturned
this grant, and Frivaldo was "declared not a citizen of the Philippines" and ordered to vacate his office. On the basis of this latter Supreme Court ruling,
the Comelec disqualified Frivaldo in SPA No. 95-028.

7 Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo and the six incumbent commissioners, namely, Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando,
Manolo B. Gorospe, Graduacion A. Reyes-Claravall, Julio F. Desamito and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores; rollo, pp. 56-57.

8 Rollo, p. 60.

9 Rollo, pp. 61-67.

10 Rollo, pp. 86-87. The Comelec considered the votes cast for Frivaldo as "stray votes", and thus Lee was held as having garnered the "highest
number of votes."

11 Rollo, pp. 88-97. This is the forerunner of the present case.

12 211 SCRA 297 (July 3, 1992) and 176 SCRA 1 (August 1, 1989).

13 Rollo, pp. 110-128.

14 Rollo, pp. 159-170.

15 Rollo, pp. 16-17; petition, pp. 14-15.

16 Rollo, pp. 10-15. This is the same resolution referred to in footnote no. 5.

17 Rollo, pp. 16-17. This is the same resolution referred to in footnote no. 7.
18 Rollo, pp. 18-21. This is signed also by the Chairman and the six other Comelec Commissioners.

19 Republic Act No. 7160.

20 See footnote no. 6, supra.

21 In debunking Frivaldo's claim of citizenship, this Court in G.R. No. 87193, supra, p. 254, observed that "(i)f he (Frivaldo) really wanted to disavow his
American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under C.A. No. 63
as amended by C.A. No. 473 and P.D. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation."

22 Supra, p. 794.

23 Petition, p. 27; rollo, p. 29.

24 The full text of said memorandum reads as follows:

MEMORANDUM

TO : The Solicitor General

The Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs

The Director-General

National Intelligence Coordinating Agency

The previous administration's practice of granting citizenship by Presidential Decree or any other executive issuance, and the derivative administrative
authority thereof, poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion,
should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution.

In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special Committee on Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and desist from
undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter of Instructions No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as
amended, Presidential Decree No. 836 dated December 3, 1975, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May 17, 1978, relative to the
grant of citizenship under the said laws, and any other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations.

(Sgd.) Corazon C. Aquino

Manila, March 27, 1987.

25 Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines.

26 Cf. Ty, et al. vs. Trampe, et al., G.R. No. 117577 (December 1, 1995).

27 Petition, p. 28; rollo, p. 30.

28 The aforesaid Manifestation reads as follows:

MANIFESTATION

The Solicitor General, as Chairman of the Special Committee on Naturalization, hereby manifests that the following persons have been repatriated by
virtue of Presidential Decree No. 725, since June 8, 1995:

1. Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo R-000900

2. Manuel Reyes Sanchez 901

3. Ma. Nelly Dessalla Ty 902

4. Terry Herrera and

Antonio Ching 903

5. Roberto Salas Benedicto 904

6. Winthrop Santos Liwag 905

7. Samuel M. Buyco 906

8. Joselito Holganza Ruiz 907

9. Samuel Villanueva 908

10. Juan Leonardo Collas, Jr. 909

11. Felicilda Otilla Sacnanas-Chua 910

29 The text of P.D. 725 is reproduced below:

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 725

PROVIDING FOR REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAD LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF
NATURAL BORN FILIPINOS.

WHEREAS, there are many Filipino women who had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens;

WHEREAS, while the new Constitution allows a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship unless by her act or omission,
she is deemed under the law to have renounced her Philippine citizenship, such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who
had married aliens before said constitution took effect;

WHEREAS, the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) allows the repatriation of Filipino women who lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to
aliens only after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status; and

WHEREAS, there are natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship;

Now, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby
decree and order that: (1) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and (3) natural born Filipinos who have lost their
Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by
Letter of Instructions No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after
which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their
certificate of registration.

The aforesaid Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required fees for
the effective implementation of this Decree.

This Decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-five.

30 See footnote no. 6, supra.

31 Cf. Labo, Jr. vs. Comelec, 211 SCRA 297 (July 3, 1992).

32 The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or
such date as may be provided for by law, . . ." Sec. 43, Local Government Code.

33 96 Phil. 447, 453 (1955).

34 The following are excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the oral argument held on March 19, 1996:

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Mr. Counsel, it is your position then that the candidate should be a citizen at the time of proclamation?

ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, it is required that he must be a citizen at the time of proclamation and not only that, at the time that he assumes
the office he must have the continuing qualification as a citizen.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Should that not be reckoned from the time of filing of certificate of candidacy or at least the day of the election?

ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, there are positions taken that it should be reckoned from the date of certificate of candidacy as in the case of
qualification for Batasang Pambansa before under B.P. 53 - it says that for purposes of residence it must be reckoned . . . from the time of the filing of
the certificate, for purposes of age, from the time of the date of the election. But when we go over all the provisions of law under current laws, Your
Honor, there is no qualification requirement insofar as citizenship is concern(ed) as to when, as to when you should be a citizen of the Philippines and
we say that if there is no provision under any existing law which requires that you have to be a citizen of the Philippines on the date of the filing or on the
date of election then it has to be equitably interpreted to mean that if you are already qualified at the time that the office is supposed to be assumed then
you should be allowed to assume the office.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Is it not also true that under the Local Autonomy Code the candidate should also be a registered voter and to be a registered
voter one must be a citizen?

ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, in fact, Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he
voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned but the Court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as
in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on May 8, 1995.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: But the fact that he voted does not make him a citizen. The fact is, he was declared not a citizen by this Court twice.

ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is true, Your Honor, we admit that he has been twice declared not citizen and we admit the ruling of the Supreme Court is
correct but the fact is, Your Honor, the matter of his eligibility to vote as being a registered voter was likewise questioned before the judiciary. There was
a ruling by the Municipal Court, there was a ruling by the Regional Trial Court and he was sustained as a valid voter, so he voted.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I raised this question in connection with your contention that citizenship should be determined as of the time of proclamation
and not as of the time of the election or at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.

ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is true, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: And is it your contention that under the law, particularly the Local Autonomy Code, the law does not specify when citizenship
should be possessed by the candidate, is that not correct?

ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is right, Your Honor, there is no express provision.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am also asking you that under the Local Autonomy Code the candidate for governor or for other local positions should be a
voter and to be a voter one must be a citizen?

ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is right, Your Honor, but the fact of voting is not an issue here because he was allowed to vote and he did in fact vote and in
fact, he was a registered voter. (TSN, March 19, 1996.)

35 Section 117, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as "The Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines", as amended, provides for the various
qualifications of voters, one of which is Filipino citizenship.

36 Comment, p. 11; rollo, p. 259.

37 See footnote no. 33.

38 Section 253 reads as follows:

Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. -- Any voter contesting the election of any member of the Congress, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground
of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election. (Art. XIV, Sec. 60, BP 697; Art. XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2, 1978 EC).

Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or barangay officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall
file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the regional trial court or metropolitan or municipal trial court, respectively, within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2, 1978 EC).

39 Art. 4, New Civil Code. See also Gallardo vs. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500 (May 25, 1988), and Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519 (April 2,
1984).

40 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 23 states:

Exceptions to Rule. -- Statutes can be given retroactive effect in the following cases: (1) when the law itself so expressly provides, (2) in case of remedial
statutes, (3) in case of curative statutes, (4) in case of laws interpreting others, and (5) in case of laws creating new rights.

41 Id., p. 25.

42 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., pp. 270-271.

43 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 354, p. 489, cited in Castro vs. Sagales, 94 Phil. 208, 210 (1953).

44 Memorandum, p. 9.

45 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 351, p. 488.

46 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 354, p. 490; emphasis supplied.

47 Art. 10, Civil Code of the Philippines.

48 Based on the "Corrected Compliance" dated May 16, 1996 filed by the Solicitor General, it appears that, excluding the case of Frivaldo, the longest
interval between date of filing of an application for repatriation and its approval was three months and ten days; the swiftest action was a same-day
approval.

49 Sec. 40. Disqualifications. -- The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) Those with dual citizenship;"

50 p. 11; rollo, p. 259.

51 Resolution, p. 12; rollo, p. 121.

52 Cf. Navarro vs. Commission on Elections, 228 SCRA 596 (December 17, 1993); Arao vs. Commission on Elections, 210 SCRA 290 (June 23, 1992).

53 The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the office of Provincial Governor
of Sorsogon on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly respondent's certificate of candidacy is cancelled.

54 Petition, p. 19; rollo, p. 21.

55 Resolution promulgated on December 19, 1995, p. 7; rollo, p. 116.

56 42 SCRA 561, 565 (December 20, 1971), citing Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-21289, October 4, 1971.

57 Art. IX, Sec. 2.

58 SPC No. 95-317 is entitled "Annulment of Proclamation" and contains the following prayer:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Commission that after due notice and hearing an Oder (sic) /Resolution/Decision be
issued as follows:
a) Annulling/setting aside the 30 June 1995 proclamation of respondent as the duly election (sic), Governor of Sorsogon for being contrary to law;

b) Ordering the proclamation of the petitioner as duly elected governor of Sorsogon;

xxx xxx xxx

59 229 SCRA 666, 674 (February 4, 1994).

60 211 SCRA 297, 309 (July 3, 1992).

61 G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995.

62 Supra, at p. 312.

63 See footnotes 2 and 3.

64 174 SCRA 245, 254 (June 23, 1959).

65 Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, 1966 ed., p. 239.

66 In Espinosa vs. Aquino, (Electoral Case No. 9, Senate Electoral Tribunal [SET]), the election of the late Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was upheld,
despite his not being of the required age on the day of the election, although he celebrated his thirty-fifth birthday before his proclamation. Much later, in
1990, this Court held in Aznar vs. Comelec (185 SCRA 703, May 25, 1990) that even if Emilio "Lito" Osmeña held an Alien Certificate of Registration as
an American citizen, he was still not disqualified from occupying the local elective post of governor, since such certificate did not preclude his being
"still a Filipino." The holding in Aquino was subsequently nullified by the adoption of the 1987 Constitution (Art. VI, Sec. 3), which specified that the age
qualification must be possessed on the day of the elections, and not on the day of the proclamation of the winners by the board of canvassers. On the
other hand, Sec. 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) which took effect on January 1, 1992, provides that those with dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position, and effectively overturns the ruling in Aznar. But the point is that to the extent
possible, and unless there exist provisions to the contrary, the laws have always been interpreted to give fullest effect to the political will.

67 Benito vs. Commission on Elections, 235 SCRA 436, 442 (August 17, 1994).

68 This antagonism was clearly present in the two earlier cases involving Frivaldo. See footnote no. 6.

PUNO, J., concurring:

1 The 1987 Constitution added the word "democratic" in the statement of the principle.

2 Section 24(a) of the Tydings-McDuffie Law which authorized the Filipino people to draft a Constitution in 1934 required that the "constitution
formulated and drafted shall be republican in form."

This Court has observed that even before the Tydings-McDuffie Law, the Philippine Bill and the Jones Law have ". . . extended the powers of a
republican form of government modeled after that of the United States to the Philippines." Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315, 340 [1912],
Severino v. Gov. General, 16 Phil. 366, 383 [1910], US v. Bull, 15 Phil. 7, 27 [1910].

3 Words and Phrases, Vol. 39 A., p. 68 citing Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. R. Co., 33 F. 900, 906.

4 Dean of the UP College of Law; later President of U.P., and Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.

5 Since, Philippine Political Law, Principles and Concepts, 1954, ed., p. 22.

6 Barker, Principles of Social and Political Theory, p. 59 (1952 ed.).

7 118 US 356.

8 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, p. 49, [1991 ed.].

9 Sinco, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

10 3 AM JUR 2d 889-890; 63 AM JUR 2d 653; 67 CSJ 926.

11 Moya v. del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199.

 G.R. No. 178306, December 18, 2008
FRANCISCO R. NUNGA, JR. and VICTOR D. NUNGA, petitioners,
vs.
FRANCISCO N. NUNGA III, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1dated 31 January 2007 and
Resolution2 dated 4 June 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78424. The appellate court, in its assailed decision, reversed the
Decision3 dated 25 October 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 42, in Commercial Case No. 018,
which ordered the registration of the transfer of ownership of the disputed shares of stock in the Rural Bank of Apalit, Inc. (RBA) in favor of petitioners;
and in its resolution, denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned decision.

Presented hereunder are the factual antecedents of the case.

On 30 January 1996, the RBA conducted its Annual Stockholders’ Meeting at its principal office in San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga. Attending the said
meeting were stockholders representing 28,150 out of the 35,956 total outstanding shares of stock of RBA.4 Petitioner Francisco R. Nunga, Jr.
(Francisco Jr.), his son petitioner Victor D. Nunga (Victor), and his nephew respondent Francisco N. Nunga III (Francisco III) were among the
stockholders of RBA. However, petitioner Francisco Jr. was not present at the meeting, as he was then in the United States of America where he is a
naturalized citizen.

Quorum having been established at the meeting, the stockholders proceeded with the election of the RBA Board of Directors to serve for the fiscal year
1996. Francisco III was voted the Chairman of the Board; with Ma. Elena Rueda, Ma. Rosario Elena Nacario, Cecilia Viray and Dwight Nunga, the
Members. In the same meeting, stockholder Jesus Gonzalez (Gonzalez) made known his intention to sell his shareholdings.

Victor, thereafter, informed his father, Francisco Jr., of Gonzalez’s intention to sell his shares. Francisco Jr. then instructed Victor to inquire from
Gonzalez the terms of the sale. After a series of negotiations, Gonzalez ultimately agreed to sell his shares of stock to Francisco Jr.

On 19 February 1996, Gonzalez executed a Contract to Sell5 in favor of Francisco Jr., which pertinently provided:

CONTRACT TO SELL

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This CONTRACT TO SELL, executed this 19th day of February, 1996, at Quezon City, by:

JESUS J. GONZALE[Z], of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Cristina D. Gonzale[z], residing at No. 10 2nd Ave., Crame, Quezon City, hereinafter
referred to as the VENDOR;

in favor of

FRANCISCO D. (sic) NUNGA, JR., of legal age, single, residing at Poblacion, Masantol, Pampanga[,] hereinafter referred to as the "PURCHASER";

WITNESSETH:

That the VENDOR is the absolute registered owner of several shares of stocks of the RURAL BANK OF APALIT, INC. located at Apalit, Pampanga,
more particularly described as follows:

No. of Shares
Stock Cert. No. Date of Issue Journal Folio No.
Represented

5 250 May, 1978 1

36 122 Jan., 1991 1

105 264 Feb., 1991 5

152 487 Nov., 1993 7

166 8 Feb., 1994 7

181 525 July, 1994 8

213 336

That the VENDOR has offered to sell the abovestated (sic) shares of stocks and the PURCHASER has agreed to purchase the same for a total
consideration of P200,000;

That it is hereby agreed that out of the total consideration or contract price, the purchaser will pay the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00), receipt of which is herein acknowledged by the purchaser, at the date and place below stated and the remaining balance of P150,000 will
be paid in full on February, (sic) 28, 1996;

That it is further agreed that the VENDOR will execute an authorization in favor of the herein purchaser or his representative, Victor D. Nunga[,] to
retrieve all the corresponding Stocks (sic) Certificates as above indicated from the Apalit Rural Bank, Inc.
WHEREFORE, for and in consideration of the total amount of P200,000 (sic) receipt in part of which is herein acknowledged in the amount
of P50,000.00, the vendor hereby agrees to sell, cede and transfer all the above stated shares of stocks to the PURCHASER, his heirs[,] successors,
and assigns, absolutely free from any encumbrance and lien whatsoever.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my signature this 19th day of FEBRUARY, (sic) 1996, at Quezon City, Philippines.

(signed)

JESUS J. GONZALES
Vendor

On even date, Victor gave the initial payment of P50,000.00 to Gonzalez, who duly acknowledged the same.6 In exchange, Gonzalez handed Victor
RBA Stock Certificates No. 105, No. 152 and No. 166. As to the four other certificates that were in the possession of the RBA, Gonzalez issued a
letter7 addressed to Isabel Firme (Firme), the RBA Corporate Secretary, which instructed the latter to turn over to Victor the remaining stock certificates
in Gonzalez’s name. Upon being presented with Gonzalez’s letter, Firme gave Victor Stock Certificate No. 181, but alleged that Stock Certificates No. 5
and No. 36 could no longer be located in the files of RBA. Firme advised Victor to merely reconstitute the missing stock certificates.8 A reading of the
said Contract to Sell would reveal, however, that the same was only notarized on 28 February 1996.

Before Francisco Jr. and Victor could pay the balance of the contract price for Gonzalez’s RBA shares of stock, Gonzalez entered into another contract
involving the very same shares. It would appear that on 27 February 1996, Gonzalez executed a Deed of Assignment9 of his RBA shares of stock in
favor of Francisco III, the relevant terms of which recite:

DEED OF ASSIGNMENT

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

For value (sic) consideration received, the undersigned ASSIGNOR JESUS GONZALE[Z], of legal age, Filipino and resident of #10 2ND AVENUE,
CUBAO, QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA hereby sells, assigns and transfers unto FRANCISCO N. NUNGA III (AS ASSIGNEE), Filipino, of legal age
and with postal address at 1122 Alhambra St., Ermita 1000 Metro Manila, his assigns and successors, all their rights, titles and interests to the following
shares of stocks owned by the ASSIGNOR in Apalit Rural Bank, Inc., with par value of one hundred pesos only (P100.00) per share, free from all liens
and encumbrances.

Date SC. No. No. of Shares Amount

May 24, 1969 4 (sic) 250 P 25,000.00

January 02, 1975 36 122 12,200.00

February 19, 1991 105 264 26,400.00

November 10, 1993 152 487 48,700.00

February 22, 1994 166 8 800.00

July 25, 1994 181 525 52,500.00

February 2, 1996 213 336 33,600.00

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the ASSIGNOR have (sic) cause (sic) these presents to be signed at Quezon City, this 27 day of February, 1996.

(signed)

JESUS J. GONZALE[Z]
Assignor

At the same time the afore-quoted Deed was executed, Francisco III paid in full the agreed purchase price of P300,000.00 using a BPI (Bank of the
Philippine Islands) Family Bank Check No. 0347505 issued in favor of Gonzalez. An acknowledgment receipt signed by Gonzalez and witnessed by his
wife Cristina D. Gonzalez evidenced the payment.10 Since the stock certificates covering the shares were already in Victor’s possession, Gonzalez
immediately wrote Victor a letter,11 demanding that Victor hand over the said stock certificates to Francisco III, the supposed new owner of the shares.

The next day, on 28 February 1996, Francisco Jr. arrived from the United States of America. He and Victor then promptly proceeded to the residence of
Gonzalez in order to pay the balance of P150,000.00 of the purchase price stated in their Contract to Sell with Gonzalez. Gonzalez, however, informed
them that he already sold his shares of stock to Francisco III.12 After discussing the matter, Gonzalez was somehow convinced to accept the balance of
the purchase price and sign his name at the dorsal portion of the stock certificates to endorse the same to Francisco Jr. Gonzalez also executed a Deed
of Absolute Sale13 in favor of Francisco Jr., which states:

DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE, executed this 28th day of February, 1996, at SAN JUAN, M.M. by:

JESUS J. GONZALE[Z], of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Cristina D. Gonzale[z], residing at No. 10 2nd Ave., Crame, Quezon City, hereinafter
referred to as the VENDOR;

in favor of
FRANCISCO R. NUNGA, JR., of legal age, married, residing at Poblacion, Masantol, Pampanga[,] hereinafter referred to as the "PURCHASER"[;]

WITNESSETH:

That the VENDOR is the absolute registered owner of several shares of stocks of the RURAL BANK OF APALIT, INC. located at Apalit, Pampanga,
more particularly described as follows:

No. of Shares
Stock Cert. No. Date of Issue Journal Folio No.
Represented

5 250 May, 1978 1

36 122 Jan., 1991 1

105 264 Feb., 1991 5

152 487 Nov., 1993 7

166 8 Feb., 1994 7

181 525 July, 1994 8

213 336

That Stock Certificate Nos. 5 and 36 respectively representing 250 and 122 shares of the Rural Bank of Apalit[,] Inc. were lost and is (sic) currently in the
process of reconstitution;

That the VENDOR has offered to sell the abovestated (sic) shares of stocks and the PURCHASER has agreed to purchase the same.

WHEREFORE, for and in consideration of the total amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00), receipt of which in full is herein
acknowledged, the VENDOR hereby sells, cedes and transfers all the above stated shares of stocks to the PURCHASER, his heirs, successors, and
assigns, absolutely free from any encumbrance and lien whatsoever.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my signature this 28 day of FEB (sic), 1996, at SAN JUAN, MM, Philippines.

(signed)

JESUS J. GONZALE[Z]
Vendor

Incidentally, on that same day, Francisco III delivered to Firme the Deed of Assignment which Gonzalez executed in his favor, and a copy of Gonzalez’s
letter to Victor dated 27 February 1996 demanding the latter to surrender the stock certificates in his possession to Francisco III. Accordingly, on 1
March 1996, Firme wrote Victor a letter14requesting that the latter immediately comply with the enclosed 27 February 1996 letter of Gonzalez.

Victor refused to comply with Firme’s request and instead demanded that the sale of shares of stock by Gonzalez in favor of Francisco Jr. on 28
February 1996 be entered into the Corporate Book of Transfer of RBA. Firme, in turn, rejected Victor’s demand, alleging that Francisco III already
bought Gonzalez’s shares.15

Consequently, on 14 March 1996, Victor filed a Petition16 with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Francisco III and Firme, which
was docketed as SEC Case No. 03-96-5288. Victor prayed that the SEC declare null and void the Stockholders’ Meeting held on 30 January 1996 for
lack of the required majority quorum; as well as the votes cast for the shares of the deceased stockholders, namely, Teodorico R. Nunga, Carmencita N.
Nunga and Jesus Enrico N. Nunga. Victor additionally requested that the transfer of Gonzalez’s RBA shareholdings to Francisco Jr. be annotated on the
RBA Corporate Transfer Book and new stock certificates be issued in favor of Francisco Jr. Victor finally pleaded that Francisco III and Firme be ordered
to jointly pay him P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, damages and litigation expenses.

On the same date, Francisco III likewise filed a Complaint17 against Gonzalez, Francisco Jr., and Victor before the SEC, which was docketed as SEC
Case No. 03-96-5292. Francisco III sought the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against Francisco Jr. and Victor, who were allegedly
conspiring to oust him and the other members of the RBA Board of Directors. Francisco III also prayed, inter alia, for judgment ordering (a) Victor to
surrender Gonzalez’s stock certificates in order that the same may be transferred to Francisco III’s name; and (b) Francisco Jr. and Victor to desist from
attempting to register the purported sale by Gonzales of his RBA shares of stock to Francisco Jr., who had already become a naturalized American
citizen and was, thus, disqualified from owning shares in RBA.

Francisco III and Firme filed their joint Answer18 in SEC Case No. 03-96-5288, while Francisco Jr. and Victor filed their Answer19 in SEC Case No. 03-
96-5292. Gonzalez, however, was considered in default in both SEC cases for failure to file his answers despite notice.

Eventually, Francisco Jr.20 and Victor filed a Motion for Consolidation21 of the two cases pending before the SEC, alleging that they involved common
questions of fact and law, which required the presentation of similar evidence. Said Motion was granted in an Order22 dated 30 September 1996.
Thereafter, SEC Cases No. 03-96-5288 and No. 03-96-5292 were jointly heard.

After the parties submitted their respective Offers of Evidence, but before the SEC could rule on the same, the cases were eventually turned over to the
RTC pursuant to Administrative Circular AM No. 00-11-0323 of the Supreme Court dated 21 November 2000.24

In the RTC, SEC Cases No. 03-96-5288 and No. 03-96-5292 were docketed as Commercial Cases No. 001 and No. 018, respectively.

Francisco Jr. and Victor subsequently filed a Motion to Resolve their Formal Offer of Exhibits, which the SEC was not able to act upon. In an
Order25 dated 30 April 2002, the RTC admitted the formal offers of evidence in both cases.
On 25 October 2002,26 the RTC promulgated its Decision. With respect to Commercial Case No. 001, Victor’s Petition, the RTC ruled:

The Court, after a careful study on the evidences on record finds that [herein petitioner Victor] failed to substantiate the allegation in the petition. [Victor]
failed to controvert the documentary evidences presented by [herein respondent Francisco III] to wit: Minutes of the Stockholders Meeting, showing the
number of shares present in person or in proxy[;] written Proxy in favor of Dwight N. Nunga in (sic) behalf of deceased Teodorico R. Nunga by virtue of
the Extrajudicial Settlement of estate in (sic) behalf of Carmencita Noel Nunga proxy executed by Ma. Del Carmen N. Leveriza in her capacity as the
Judicial Administratrix duly appointed by the RTC Branch 60, Makati[,] Metro Manila in Special Proceedings No. M-146127; Affidavit of respondent
Isabel C. Firme stating thereat the fact that the certificate of stock delivered for registration in the Corporate Transfer Book were mere xerox copies thus,
the refusal. Thus further, proved [Victor’s] lack of cause of action against [Francisco III] and as a result of which damages on the part of [Francisco III]
and Isabel C. Firme who were constrained to hire the services of their counsel to protect their right (sic). (Emphasis ours.)

As regards Commercial Case No. 018,28 Francisco III’s Complaint, the RTC decreed:

The Court[,] after a careful study on the aforementioned evidences (sic) on record[,] finds and holds that [herein petitioner Francisco Jr.] has a better
right over the subject shares considering that the Contract to Sell was executed prior to the Deed of Assignment presented by the [herein respondent
Francisco III]. The Court gleaned also from the evidences (sic) that the Deed of Assignment was executed in bad faith as [Francisco III] is aware of the
transaction between [herein petitioner Victor] in (sic) behalf of his father and [Gonzalez], thus, the conclusion that the Deed of Assignment was executed
with malice. The Contract to Sell may not be a public instrument29 but being a consensual contract it is, therefore, valid there being a meeting of the
mind (sic) between the parties. Further, there being no contention on (sic) the contrary, on the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale interposed by
[Gonzalez] coupled with the proof of full payment and the endorsement of the Stock Certificate at the back by the owner[,] which is the only operative act
of valid transfer of shares of stock certificate provided for by law and jurisprudence, clearly convinced the Court that the latter honored the transaction
between him and [Victor] in (sic) behalf of his father [Francisco Jr.] and[,] to bind third parties, the fact of transfer should be registered with the transfer
book of the corporation.

xxxx

Further, with respect to the issue on the citizenship of [Francisco Jr.], not being qualified to own such share (sic), the Court is inclined to give credence
on (sic) the contention of the latter[,] it being supported by R.A. 8179[,] known as "An Act to Further Liberalize Foreign Investment,["] to wit:

"SEC. 9. Investment Rights of Former Natural-born Filipinos. – For purposes of this Act, former natural born citizens of the Philippines shall have the
same investment rights of a Filipino citizen in Cooperatives under Republic Act No. 6938, Rural Banks under Republic Act No. 7353, Thrift Banks and
Private Development Banks under Republic Act No. 7906, and Financing Companies under Republic Act No. 5980."

Furthermore, insofar as (sic) [Gonzalez], the same was (sic) considered as in default for failure to appear and participate despite notice. (Emphasis
ours.)

In the end, the RTC disposed of the two cases in this wise:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in Commercial Case No. 001 ordering the dismissal of the Petition filed by [herein
petitioner Victor] against [herein respondent Francisco III] and Isabel C. Firme.

Insofar as Commercial Case No. 018[,] judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [herein petitioners Victor and Francisco Jr.] and against [Francisco
III] ordering the following:

1) Ordering the Corporate Secretary of the Rural Bank of Apalit, Inc, (sic) to register the fact of the transfer of ownership in favor of [Francisco Jr.] and to
cancel Stock certificate (sic) in the name of Jesus [Gonzalez] and to issue a new one (sic) in the name of [Francisco Jr.] upon presentation of Stock
Certificate Nos. 105, 152, 166, 181, 213, 5 and 36 duly endorsed by Jesus [Gonzalez];

2) The [respondent Francisco III] to pay the [petitioners Victor and Francisco Jr.] the amount of P100,000.00 [for] moral damages[;]

3) The amount of P100,000.00 [for] exemplary damages[;]

4) The amount of P50,000.00 [for] attorneys (sic) fees and the cost of suit.30

Francisco III filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration31 of the afore-quoted Decision, but it was denied by the RTC in an Order32 dated 31 January
2003. Thus, Francisco III filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal.33 His appeal before the Court of Appeals was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 78424.

Before the Court of Appeals, Francisco III argued that the RTC erred in: (1) ruling that Francisco Jr. had a better right over the disputed shares of stock,
considering that the prior contract which he had entered into with Gonzalez was a mere contract to sell; (2) finding that the Deed of Assignment in
Francisco III’s favor was executed in bad faith, inasmuch as it was not supported by any of the evidence presented by all the parties; and (3) giving
retroactive effect to Republic Act No. 8179,34 which grants former natural born citizens (such as Francisco Jr.) equal investment rights in rural banks of
the Philippines as Philippine citizens. In relation to his third assignment of error, Francisco III pointed out that Republic Act No. 8179 took effect only on
16 April 1996, after Francisco Jr. entered into the questionable contracts with Gonzalez; hence, the said statute cannot benefit Francisco Jr.

On 31 January 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision favoring Francisco III. It held that Francisco Jr. cannot invoke the provisions of
Republic Act No. 8179 based on the following ratiocination:

In the instant case, there is nothing in Republic Act No. 8179 [An Act to Further Liberalize Foreign Investment] which provides that it should retroact to
the date of effectivity of Republic Act No. 7353 [The Rural Banks Act of 1992]. Neither is it necessarily implied from Republic Act No. 8179 that it or any
of its provisions should be given a retroactive effect. On the contrary, there is an express provision in Republic Act No. 8179 that it "shall take effect
fifteen (15) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines." Being crystal clear on its prospective application, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without further interpretation (BPI Leasing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 416 SCRA 4, 13 [2003]).
Republic Act No. 8179 was published on March 31, 1996 at the Manila Times and Malaya; hence, it took effect on April 15, 1996. x x x.

Republic Act No. 7353 specifically states that "the capital stock of any rural bank shall be fully owned and held directly or indirectly by citizens of the
Philippines xxx." It bears stressing that the use of the word "shall" alone, applying the rule on statutory construction, already underscores the mandatory
nature of the law, and hence; (sic) requires adherence thereto. xxx Therefore, it is Our considered view that the sale and the subsequent transfer on
February 28, 1996 of the shares of stock of JESUS [Gonzalez] to FRANCISCO, JR., a naturalized American citizen, were made in patent violation of
Republic Act No. 7353. Considering that Republic Act No. 7353 did not contain any provision authorizing the validity of the sale and transfer of the
shares of stock to a foreigner, specifically to a former natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the same should be deemed null and void pursuant to Article
5 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which reads:

"ART. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity."

x x x The fact that Republic Act No. 8179 expressly granted to former natural-born citizens of the Philippines investment rights similar to those of citizens
of the Philippines bolsters the view that Republic Act No. 7353 indeed prohibited foreign nationals from owning shares of stock in rural banks. Had it
been necessarily implied from the provisions of Republic Act No. 7353 that foreign nationals could own shares of stock in rural banks, the legislature
would not have wasted time and effort in inserting a new provision granting to former natural-born citizens of the Philippines equal investment rights in
Republic Act No. 8179.

Furthermore, there is no merit in the assertion of FRANCISCO JR. and VICTOR that Republic Act No. 8179 should be given a retroactive effect in
accordance with the following rule:

"The principle that a new law shall not have retroactive effect only governs rights arising from acts done under the rule of the former law; but if a right be
declared for the first time by a new law it shall take effect from the time of such declaration, even though it has arisen from acts subject to the former
laws, provided that it does not prejudice another acquired right of the same origin." x x x.

Republic Act No. 8179 cannot be applied retroactively insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application would prejudice the (sic) FRANCISCO
III who had acquired vested right over the shares of stock prior to the effectivity of the said law. Such right was vested to him when the Deed of
Assignment was executed by Jesus in his favor on February 27, 1996. Undoubtedly, FRANCISCO III had a better right over the shares of stock of
JESUS inasmuch as the validity of the Deed of Assignment was not affected despite the prior execution of the Contract to Sell in favor of FRANCISCO
JR. on February 19, 1996. As previously adverted to, the said Contract, as well as the Deed of Absolute Sale and the subsequent transfer of the shares
of stock to FRANCISCO JR., was null and void for violating a mandatory provision of Republic Act No. 7353. x x x.35

The Court of Appeals, however, decided to award Francisco III only attorney’s fees and cost of suit, but not moral and exemplary damages:

We hold that FRANCISCO III is not entitled to moral damages. FRANCISCO III made no mention in his Complaint and during the hearing that he
sustained mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and other emotional and mental sufferings by reason of the double sale. x x x.

Likewise, FRANCISCO III is not entitled to exemplary damages. x x x In the instant case, FRANCISCO III failed to sufficiently prove his entitlement to
moral, temperate or compensatory damages. Hence, his claim for exemplary damages must similarly fail.

However, as to his claim for attorney’s fees and cost of suit, We find it to be tenable as the records of the case clearly reveal that FRANCISCO III was
compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect his interest because of the double sale. x x x. Under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case,
We deem that the award of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees is reasonable.36

The fallo of the Court of Appeals Decision thus reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated October 25, 2002 of Branch 42 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga with respect to Commercial Case No. 018 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby rendered ORDERING the following:

1) Victor Nunga to surrender the stock certificates of Jesus Gonzalez to the Corporate Secretary of Rural Bank of Apalit, Inc.;

2) [T]he Corporate Secretary of Rural Bank of Apalit, Inc. to register the assignment of shares of stock in favor of Francisco Nunga III, to cancel the stock
certificates of Jesus Gonzale[z], and to issue new ones in the name of Francisco Nunga III; and,

3) Jesus Gonzale[z], Francisco Nunga, Jr., and Victor Nunga to pay, jointly and severally, the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the cost of
suit.37

Francisco Jr. and Victor, together with Gonzalez, filed a Motion for Reconsideration38 of the foregoing Decision. Their Motion, however, was denied by
the Court of Appeals in its assailed Resolution dated 4 June 2007.

Refusing to concede, Francisco Jr. and Victor filed the instant Petition,39 which they anchor on the following assignment of errors:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE SALE OF THE SHARES OF STOCK OF GONZALE[Z] TO
FRANCISCO JR., NULL AND VOID AB INITIO ON THE BASIS OF THE ALLEGED DISQUALIFICATION OF FRANCISCO JR. UNDER REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 7353?

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT FRANCISCO III HAS A VESTED RIGHT TO THE SHARES
OF STOCK OF GONZALE[Z], WHICH WOULD BE IMPAIRED BY THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8179?

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED [IN] AWARDING DAMAGES TO FRANCISCO III AND WITHDRAWING THE
AWARD OF NOMINAL DAMAGES TO PETITIONERS BY THE TRIAL COURT?

Essentially, the fundamental issue that this Court is called upon to resolve is who among the parties to this case has a better right to the disputed RBA
shares of stock.
Francisco Jr. and Victor contend that the consummated sale of the RBA shares of stock by Gonzalez to Francisco Jr. gives the latter a superior right
over the same, since the transaction complied with all the elements of a valid sale. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Francisco Jr. and
Victor claim that there was no provision in Republic Act No. 7353, prior to its amendment, which explicitly prohibited any transfer of shares to individuals
who were not Philippine citizens, or which declared such a transfer void. Hence, there was an implied recognition by the legislature that to declare the
nullity of such acts would be more disadvantageous and harmful to the purposes of the law. Moreover, Francisco Jr. and Victor contend that the passage
of Republic Act No. 8179, An Act to Further Liberalize Foreign Investment, cured whatever legal infirmity there may have been in the purchase by
Francisco Jr. of the RBA shares of stock from Gonzalez. As Republic Act No. 8179 expressly creates and declares for the first time a substantive right,
then it may be given retroactive effect. The Deed of Assignment between Francisco III and Gonzalez did not confer upon Francisco III a vested interest
that could be impaired by the retroactive application of Republic Act No. 8179. The Deed was not only executed later in time, but the check issued for its
payment was also never encashed. There was, therefore, a total absence of consideration, making the said contract between Francisco III and Gonzalez
inexistent.

The Court finds the Petition devoid of merit.

As the Court of Appeals declared, Francisco Jr. was disqualified from acquiring Gonzalez’s shares of stock in RBA. The argument of Francisco Jr. and
Victor that there was no specific provision in Republic Act No. 7353 which prohibited the transfer of rural bank shares to individuals who were not
Philippine citizens or declared such transfer void, is both erroneous and unfounded.

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7353 explicitly provides:

Section 4. x x x With exception of shareholdings of corporations organized primarily to hold equities in rural banks as provided for under Section 12-C of
Republic Act 337, as amended, and of Filipino-controlled domestic banks, the capital stock of any rural bank shall be fully owned and held directly or
indirectly by citizens of the Philippines or corporations, associations or cooperatives qualified under Philippine laws to own and hold such capital stock: x
x x. (Emphasis ours.)

Otherwise stated, the afore-quoted provision categorically provides that only citizens of the Philippines can own and hold, directly or indirectly, the capital
stock of a rural bank, subject only to the exception also clearly stated in the same provision. This was the very interpretation of Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 7353 made by this Court in Bulos, Jr. v. Yasuma,40 on the basis of which the Court disqualified therein respondent Yasuma, a foreigner, from
owning capital stock in the Rural Bank of Parañaque. In the instant case, it is undisputed that when Gonzalez executed the Contract to Sell and the
Deed of Absolute Sale covering his RBA shares of stock in favor of Francisco Jr., the latter was already a naturalized citizen of the United States of
America. Consequently, the acquisition by Francisco Jr. of the disputed RBA shares by virtue of the foregoing contracts is a violation of the clear and
mandatory dictum of Republic Act No. 7353, which the Court cannot countenance.

Even the subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 8179 cannot benefit Francisco Jr. It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, laws shall
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.41 But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is
CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature, or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.42 Francisco Jr. and Victor assert that, as an exception to the cardinal rule of
prospective application of laws, Republic Act No. 8179 may be retroactively applied, since it creates for the first time a substantive right in favor of
natural-born citizens of the Philippines. Francisco Jr. and Victor, however, overlooked the vital exception to the exception. While it is true that a law
creating new rights may be given retroactive effect, the same can only be made possible if the new right does not prejudice or impair any vested right.43

The Court upholds the finding of the Court of Appeals that Republic Act No. 8179 cannot be applied retroactively to the present case, as to do so would
prejudice the vested rights of Francisco III to the disputed RBA shares of stock. Francisco III, who is undeniably a citizen of the Philippines, and who is
fully qualified to own shares of stock in a Philippine rural bank, had acquired vested rights to the disputed RBA shares of stock by virtue of the Deed of
Assignment executed in his favor by Gonzalez.

It would not matter that Gonzalez executed the Contract to Sell in favor of Francisco Jr. prior to the Deed of Assignment in favor of Francisco III. As
established in the previous discussion, the Contract to Sell between Gonzalez and Francisco Jr. was void and without force and effect for being contrary
to law. It intended to effect a transfer, which was prohibited by Republic Act No. 7353. It is even irrelevant that the terms of said Contract to Sell had
been fully complied with and performed by the parties thereto, and that a Deed of Absolute Sale was already executed by Gonzalez in favor of Francisco
Jr. A void agreement will not be rendered operative by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations. A contract that
violates the law is null and void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all.44

With respect to the award of damages, the Court agrees in the findings of the Court of Appeals that Francisco III failed to establish his entitlement to
moral damages in view of the absence of proof that he endured physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or any similar injury.45 As regards the grant of exemplary damages, we likewise uphold the ruling of
the appellate court that the same was not warranted under the circumstances, as FRANCISCO III was not able to prove that he was entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.46In contracts and quasi-contracts, exemplary damages may be awarded if the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.47 It cannot, however, be considered as a matter of right; the court has to decide
whether or not such damages should be adjudicated.48 Before the court may consider an award for exemplary damages, the plaintiff must first show
that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages; but it is not necessary that he prove the monetary value thereof.49

As to the contention that the Court of Appeals erred in withdrawing the award of nominal damages to the petitioners by the RTC, the Court finds the
same to be utterly misleading. The appellate court did not decree any such withdrawal, as the RTC had not awarded any nominal damages in favor of
the petitioners in the first place.

However, as Francisco III was indeed compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect his interests,50 the Court sustains the award by the Court of
Appeals of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus costs of suit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 31
January 2007 and Resolution dated 4 June 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78424 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 106560, August 23, 1996
FLOREZIL AGUJETAS, and SALVADOR BIJIS, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE; FAILURE TO PROCLAIM WINNING CANDIDATE; ERRONEOUS PROCLAMATION, EMBRACED
WITHIN THE OFFENSE; CASE AT BAR. — According to petitioners, the Omnibus Election Code does not punish the preparation of an incorrect
certificate of canvass, not an erroneous proclamation made by the Board; what it does punish is that, having thus prepared the corresponding certificate,
the board for some reason fails to make the corresponding proclamation on the basis thereof. On the other hand, the People’s counsel maintains that
petitioners’ challenges on this particular issue is a question of semantics, a mere play of words; for while the prosecution maintains that there was a
failure to proclaim the winning candidate, petitioners on the other hand, counter that there was merely an erroneous proclamation of the losing
candidate; that petitioners forget that in proclaiming an erroneous winner they actually failed to proclaim the winning candidate, in this case, Erlinda Irigo.
Respondents further argue that the situation presented by petitioners would not exculpate them from criminal responsibility for, whichever way the matter
may be looked into, whether as erroneous proclamation of a losing candidate or failure to proclaim the winning candidate, the result is the same — the
winning candidate was not proclaimed, and hence, injustice is the end result. We agree with the respondents. To go by the explanation as proposed by
the petitioner would be tantamount to tolerating and licensing boards of canvassers to "make an erroneous proclamation" and still be exculpated by Just
putting up the inexcusable defense that the "foul-up resulted from the erroneous arrangement of the names of candidates" in one municipality or that
"the basis of their proclamation was the erroneous ranking made by the tabulation committee." That would be a neat apology for allowing the board to be
careless in their important task by simply claiming that they cannot be held liable because they did their "duty" of proclaiming the winning candidates on
the basis of the certificate of canvass — even "erroneous" certificates — which they made. It appears from the resolution of Director Borra in relation to
the preliminary investigation conducted that it was difficult to make a mistake in selecting the 8 candidates with the highest votes for purposes of making
the certificate of canvass because there was no error in the tabulation of votes as CE Form No. 26-A (which is the statement of votes) shows that Erlinda
V. Irigo got 31,129, votes and Pedro T. Pena only 30,679 votes. The mistake could only be made through utter carelessness, if not made deliberately.
This situation only illustrates that the questioned provision cannot be construed in the manner as argued by petitioners for it would defeat the purpose
and spirit for which the law was enacted, i.e., to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TIMELY VERBAL PROTEST, A "PROTEST" UNDER THE CODE. — Petitioners contend that assuming ex gratia argumenti that the
protest made by candidate Irigo’s daughter Maribeth Irigo Batitang was the verbal protest contemplated under Sec. 245 of the Omnibus Election Code,
such fact could not be deemed to be a protest made to the Board of Canvassers itself; and that the failure of the member of the verification/tabulation
committee concerned to apprise the Board prior to the proclamation cannot be taken against the members of the Board. We find the above contentions
untenable. As aptly Stated by Director Borra in his aforementioned resolution: "The timely verbal protest of the daughter-watcher of Mrs. Erlinda Irigo did
not trigger on the part of the PBC (Provincial Board of Canvassers) the responsible action of verifying the basis of the protest. The 3 Members of the
PBC could not attribute to the Committee on Tabulation the blame for their errors as the PBC members themselves were the ones who certified under
oath the said Certificate of Proclamation and the Tabulation Committee members were totally under their direct supervision and control."cralaw
virtua1aw library

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CRIMINAL LIABILITY NOT AFFECTED BY FACT THAT THE BOARD HAS BECOME "FUNCTUS OFICIO." — Petitioner also raised the
issue that it was only after the proclamation had been made that the Board was informed of the fact than an error may have been committed in the
tabulation; and that however, having discharged its function of making canvass and proclamation of the winning candidates, the Board of Canvassers
became functus oficio and could no longer correct the erroneous proclamation. As to this issue, suffice it to state that whether or not "the Board of
Canvassers became functus oficio" after it proclaimed the winning candidates, is beside the point. What matters is whether or not petitioners committed
an election offense. Beside, as stated earlier, Mrs. Irigo’s watcher made a timely verbal protest to the Tabulation Committee.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CONVICTION IN CASE AT BAR. — Petitioners further contend that Maribeth Irigo Batitang, the
daughter of candidate Irigo and her designated representative during the canvassing proceedings, was never presented as a witness; Erlinda Irigo, upon
whose testimony the trial court relied heavily to establish the fact of protest, was not present during the canvassing proceedings; that Mrs. Irigo’s
testimony on this point is inadmissible as being hearsay and should not have been considered by the trial court; that no other evidence having been
adduced with respect to the protest allegedly made by Irigo’s representative, such fact should be deemed as not having been established; and that there
was thus no basis, therefore, for the respondent Court of Appeals to hold that the Board was deemed to have been constructively informed of the verbal
protest and that the members thereof were liable for having failed to act on the basis thereof. We are not persuaded. Even if we tentatively grant that
Mrs. Irigo’s testimony is hearsay evidence, there is still ample evidence which proves that the Board was deemed to have been informed of the verbal
protest and that the members thereof were liable for having failed to act on the basis thereof.

5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSION MADE BY A PARTY IN THE COURSE OF PROCEEDING DOES NOT REQUIRE PROOF; CASE AT
BAR. — The resolution of Director Borra quoted the questions and answers during the preliminary investigation. The import of those deliberations show
that petitioner Agujetas, as Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, admitted that the tabulation committee was under the supervision of the
Board. As regards petitioner Bijis, Vice Chairman of the Board, he admitted that he signed the minutes of the Board to the effect that on January 22,1988
in the after the proclamation, the Board’s business was "reconciliation of entries in the tally sheet," thus showing that the proclamation in question had
been made even before the votes were reconciled on the tally sheets. And as to accused Miano, Secretary of the Board, he admitted having stated in
the minutes that an oral complaint was made by Mrs. Batitang, representative of Erlinda Irigo, but that the complaint was lodged with the tabulation
committee and not with the Board; and that he did not care to examine the partial results for each provincial candidate, including Erlinda Irigo and Pedro
Pena. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof.

6. POLITICAL LAW; OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE; COMPLAINTS MAY BE FILED BY ANY COMPETENT PERSON; OFFENDED PARTY NOT
MENTIONED IN THE INFORMATION MAY CLAIM CIVIL LIABILITY. — On the last error assigned by petitioners, they maintain that the present case
was filed by Francisco Rabat, the losing gubernatorial candidate in the Province of Davao Oriental; that Mrs. Irigo never joined the Complaint as a party-
plaintiff at any stage of the proceedings; that she was merely presented as a witness; and thus, for the court to have awarded damages to Mrs. Irigo was
a patent error. We find petitioners’ allegations untenable. Except where the law specifically provides the contrary, a complaint that a public crime has
been committed may be laid by any competent person. The Omnibus Election Code does not specifically provide that a particular person must file the
complaint and hence, the complaint filed by Francisco Rabat, losing gubernatorial candidate, is valid. The counsel for the people points out and we
agree "Even an offended party not mentioned in the Information may claim the civil liability during the trial if he has not waived it. In the case at bar,
Erlinda Irigo clearly, was party offended or the person whose rights were trample upon, by the indecent haste with which petitioners proclaimed Teodoro
Pena (sic) as the winner of the 8th seat of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The persistence of Erlinda Irigo’s lawyers to participate, as in fact they
participated, the proceedings a quo as private prosecutors over the vehement objections of petitioners counsel clearly indicates that Erlinda Irigo
intended to claim damages from petitioners."cralaw virtua1aw library

7. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; INJURED PARTY WHO HAS NOT EXPRESSLY WAIVED CIVIL LIABILITY OR RESERVED RIGHT TO FILE
SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION MAY SUBMIT EVIDENCE OF HIS DAMAGES. — In U.S. v. Heery, this court held that "If the injured party has not expressly
waived the civil liability of the accused nor reserved his right to file a separate civil action, it is error for the court to refuse a request of the injured party
during the course of the criminal prosecution to submit evidence of his damages." Thus, the arguments of the petitioners notwithstanding, respondent
court did not err in awarding damages to Mrs. Irigo.

8. ID.; ID.; APPEALS; ISSUES CAN NOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. — Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not
adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal. However, since RA 7166 was enacted after the trial court had rendered its decision, and while the case was already pending
appeal in the Court of Appeals, and in order to settle the issue once and for all, this court will make a clear-cut ruling on the issue.

9. POLITICAL LAW; OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE; NOT EXPRESSLY REPEALED BY R.A. 7166. — See. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881) was not expressly repealed by R.A. 7166 because said Sec. 231 is not among the provisions repealed by Sec. 39 of the R.A. 7166.

10. CIVIL LAW; REPEAL OF LAWS; STATEMENT THAT "ALL LAWS OR PARTS THEREOF WHICH ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THIS ACT ARE
HEREBY REPEALED OR MODIFIED ACCORDINGLY", NOT AN EXPRESS REPEAL. — The statement "All laws or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." certainly is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or
designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. If repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper step is to so express it.

11. ID.; ID.; REPEAL BY IMPLICATION; HOW EFFECTED. — In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably
inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. The clearest case possible must be made
before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed. "It is necessary, says the court in a case, before such repeal
is deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the
former. There must be a showing of repugnance clear and convincing in character. The language used in the later statute must be such as to render it
irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice." For it is a well-settled ruled of
statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency or repugnance and, accordingly,
against implied repeal. For the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting
statutes.

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO IMPLIED REPEAL OF SEC. 231 BY R.A. 6646 AND R.A. 7166. — Neither is there an implied repeal of Sec. 231 by the subsequent
enactment of RA 6646 and RA 7166. While Sec. 28 of RA 7166, like Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) pertains to the Canvassing by the
Boards of Canvassers, this fact of itself is it not sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act. While the two provisions differ in terms, neither is
this fact sufficient to create repugnance. In the case at bar, the needed manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal is not present. Neither is there
any inconsistency between the two subject provisions.

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FAVORABLE PROVISIONS OF R.A. NOS. 6646 AND 7166, NOT APPLICABLE TO PETITIONERS. — While Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, this provision cannot be
applied to benefit the petitioners because Section 231 of BP 881 was not repealed by subsequent legislations, contrary to petitioners contention that
Section 231 was so repealed by R.A. nos. 6646 and 7166.

DECISION

TORRES, JR., J.:

Petitioners Florezil Agujetas and Salvador Bijis, former Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively of the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the
Province of Davao Oriental assail the decision of the public respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mati,
Davao Oriental finding them guilty as charged for failure to proclaim a winning elected candidate. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision
1 in GA-G.R. CR No. 09689 reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with a modification in that the actual damages of P50,000.00 are hereby reduced to
P40,000.000 and the moral damages of P100,000.00 awarded to Erlinda Irigo are deleted. Costs de oficio.

"SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library

The antecedents:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In the fateful evening of January 21, 1988, the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the Province of Davao Oriental, composed of 1.) the Provincial
Election Supervisor Florezil Agujetas, as Chairman, 2.) Provincial Prosecutor Salvador Bijis, as Vice Chairman, and 3.) Division Superintendent of Public
Schools in said province, Benjamin Miano, 2 as member, proclaimed the winners for the Governor, Vice-Governor, and Provincial Board Members for
Davao Oriental in the January 18, 1988 election. The candidates proclaimed were:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES

Name No. of Votes

For Governor:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Leopoldo Lopez 59,309 votes

Francisco Rabat 51,191 votes

For Vice-Governor:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Modesto Avellanosa 46,353 votes

Josefina Sibala 54,083 votes

For Provincial Board Members

1. Cirilo R. Valles 42,394 votes

2. Ma. Elena Palma Gil 41,557 votes

3. Antonio Alcantara 39,104 votes

4. Dr. Capistrano Roflo 37,301 votes

5. Orlando Rodriguez 34,914 votes

6. Alfredo Abayon 34,191 votes

7. Justina Yu 32,360 votes

8. Pedro Pena 30,679 votes

The eighth board member proclaimed, Pedro Pena, garnered 30,679 votes when another candidate for the Board, Erlinda Irigo, got 31,129 or 450 more
votes than Pena.

Before the proclamation was made, when the certificate of canvass and proclamation statements of winning candidates were finished, a verbal protest
was lodged by Mrs. Maribeth Irigo Batitang, daughter of candidate Irigo and her designated representative during the canvassing proceedings,
addressed to the Tabulation Committee.

At 8:00 o’clock in the morning of January 22, 1988, the Board resumed its session and undertook the following activities:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. Opening of Ballot Box No. CA-301596 and sealed by Metal Seal No. 204767 at exactly 10:25 a.m.

"2. Continued preparing all reports called for submissions to COMELEC, Regional Office and Manila.

"3. Reconciliation of entries in the tally sheets. (Exhs. "E" and "E-1")

Considering, however, that the protest was verbal and not officially brought to the attention of the Provincial Board of Canvassers during official session,
the same was not given appropriate official recognition. (Exh. "7-B", p. 2, Minutes of Provincial Board of Canvassers, January 21, 1988)

The following day, January 23, 1988, Board Member Candidate Erlinda V. Irigo filed her written protest 3 with the Board of Canvassers. (Exh. "F")

Meanwhile, Francisco Rabat, a losing gubernatorial candidate in Davao Oriental filed with the COMELEC a complaint against the three board members
for violation of BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and RA 6646 (The Electoral Reform Law of 1987). After a preliminary investigation was conducted by
the COMELEC, criminal charges were filed against the Board Members. The pertinent portions of the information in Criminal Case No. 1886 for Violation
of 2nd Paragraph of Section 231 in Relation to section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about January 21, 1988, in the Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused as Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Third Member, respectively, of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Davao
Oriental in the January 18, 1988 elections, conspiring with, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, willfully and
unlawfully fail to proclaim Erlinda Irigo as elected Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member candidate who obtained 31,129 votes, the eighth highest number
of votes cast in said province but instead proclaimed candidate Pedro Pena who obtained only 30,699 votes."cralaw virtua1aw library

"CONTRARY TO LAW" 4

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, Criminal Cases Nos. 1885 and 1887 are hereby DISMISSED, with costs de oficio, and the
accused considered acquitted. Their bail bonds are ordered canceled and released.

"In Criminal Case No. 1886, the Court finds the accused Florezil Agujetas, Salvador Bijis and Benjamin Miano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
principals for violation of Section 231, second paragraph, of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code of
the Philippines", and hereby sentences each of them to ONE (1) YEAR IMPRISONMENT which shall not be subject to probation. In addition, they are
sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. Said accused are ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
Erlinda Irigo the amounts of P50,000.00 as actual damages, P15,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees, and P100,000.00 as moral damages, plus the costs
of the proceedings.
"Let copies hereof be furnished the Honorable Chairman, Commission on Elections, and the Honorable Secretaries of Justice and Education, Culture
and Sports.

"SO ORDERED." (pp. 43-44, Decision)

The three accused appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the decision assailed in this petition.

Petitioners impute to the respondent court the following errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of conviction because:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. It is the failure to make a proclamation on the basis of the Certificate of Canvass, and not mere erroneous proclamations, which is punishable under
Sec. 262 in relation to Sec. 231 (2) of the Omnibus Election Code.

b. A protest made to the verification/tabulation committee does not constitute a protest to the Board of Canvassers itself.

c. The functus oficio rule is applicable to the present case.

d. Credence should not have been given to hearsay testimony to establish the alleged protest to the Board of Canvassers.

II
The Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages to a person who is not a party to the case.

We find the petition without merit.

On the first assigned error, the issue hinges on the question of what is being penalized by the pertinent provision of the Omnibus Election Code.
Petitioners argue that they are not liable under the said law because they complied with all the requirements of Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code
— 1. a certificate of canvass was prepared, 2. the same was duly supported by a statement of votes of each of the candidates, and 3. it was on the basis
of the certificate of canvass that the winners were proclaimed. Only, the certificate was erroneous.

According to petitioners, the Omnibus Election Code does not punish the preparation of an incorrect certificate of canvass, nor an erroneous
proclamation made by the Board; what it does punish is that, having thus prepared the corresponding certificate, the board for some reason fails to make
the corresponding proclamation on the basis thereof.

On the other hand, the People’s counsel maintains that petitioners’ challenges on this particular issue is a question of semantics, a mere play of words;
for while the prosecution maintains that there was a failure to proclaim the winning candidate, petitioners on the other hand, counter that there was
merely an erroneous proclamation of the losing candidate; that petitioners forget that in proclaiming an erroneous winner they actually failed to proclaim
the winning candidate, in this case, Erlinda Irigo. Respondents further argue that the situation presented by petitioners would not exculpate them from
criminal responsibility for, whichever way the matter may be looked into, whether as erroneous proclamation of a losing candidate or failure to proclaim
the winning candidate, the result is the same — the winning candidate was not proclaimed, and hence, injustice is the end result.

We agree with the respondents.

The second paragraph of Section 231 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The respective board of canvassers shall prepare a certificate of canvass duly signed and affixed with the imprint of the thumb of the right hand of each
member, supported by a statement of the votes and received by each candidate in each polling place and, on the basis thereof, shall proclaim as elected
the candidates who obtained the highest number of votes cast in the province, city, municipality or barangay. Failure to comply with this requirement
shall constitute an election offense."cralaw virtua1aw library

To go by the explanation as proposed by the petitioner would be tantamount to tolerating and licensing boards of canvassers to "make an erroneous
proclamation" and still be exculpated by just putting up the inexcusable defense that the "foul-up resulted from the erroneous arrangement of the names
of candidates" 5 in one municipality or that "the basis of their proclamation was the erroneous ranking made by the tabulation committee." That would be
a neat apology for allowing the board to be careless in their important task by simply claiming that they cannot be held liable because they did their
"duty" of proclaiming the winning candidates on the basis of the certificate of canvass — even "erroneous" certificates — which they made.

At this point, it is appropriate to quote certain portions of the Resolution in IPD Case No. 88-100, disposing of the complaint filed with the COMELEC
issued by Regional Election Director Resurreccion Borra of Region XI, in relation to the preliminary investigation conducted by him on said case. Director
Borra testified on this resolution 6 (Exh. "Z") under cross-examination by the prosecution, certain portions of which are material to the
case:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"But there is one incontrovertible fact that the respondents miserably failed to dispute. This undeniable fact is conveniently ignored by Respondents’
Memorandum. In the exhibits of the complainant, the computerized tabulation of votes based from the statements of votes by precinct in each of the 121
Municipalities of Davao Oriental for all of the 600 precincts and even admitted by the Respondents that there was no error in the tabulation of votes in
CA 26-A. Erlinda V. Irigo got 31,129 votes and Pedro T. Pena only 30,679 votes or a margin of 450 votes by Irigo over Pena. From the ranking, Irigo
would have been ahead of Pena, and she should have been No. 8 in the winning list of 8 candidates instead of Pena. But in the Certificate of Canvass of
Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidates for Provincial Offices, Pedro T. Pena was included as No. 8 in the winning list and proclaimed as No. 8
Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.

x x x
"The Complainant, in presenting the computerized summary tabulation of votes for each precinct per municipality of the Province, admitted that the PBC
prepared the statements of votes. . . . The statements of votes (CE 26-A) should have been the basis for the proclamation of the winning candidates for
Provincial Offices. Complainant’s documentary and testimonial evidences showed that the PBC proclaimed Pedro Pena who was not among those
candidates who obtained the 8 highest number of votes cast in the province per municipality by precinct which violated the legal requirement of the 2nd
paragraph of Section 231 of BP No. 881 as amended.

"The respondents were not able to explain their failure to comply with the requirement that (sic) the basis for the proclamation of Pena when he was not
among the eight candidates who obtained the highest number of votes as evidenced by the statements of votes. In fact they admitted that the basis was
not the statement of votes but the erroneous ranking by the Tabulators. . . ." 7

It appears from the foregoing resolution of Director Borra that it was difficult to make a mistake in selecting the 8 candidates with the highest votes for
purposes of making the certificate of canvass because there was no error in the tabulation of votes as CE Form No. 26-A (which is the statement of
votes) shows that Erlinda V. Irigo got 31,129 votes and Pedro T. Pena only 30,679 votes. The mistake could only be made through utter carelessness, if
not made deliberately. This situation only illustrates that the questioned provision cannot be construed in the manner as argued by petitioners for it would
defeat the purpose and spirit for which the law was enacted, i.e., to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. In Lino
Luna v. Rodriguez, 8 the court observed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Experience and observations taught legislature and courts that, at the time of a hotly contested election, the partisan spirit of ingenious and
unscrupulous politicians will lead them beyond the limits of honesty and decency and by the use of bribery, fraud and intimidation, despoil the purity of
the ballot and defeat the will of the people at the polls. Such experience has led the legislature to adopt very stringent rules for the purpose of protecting
the voter in the manner of preparing and casting his ballot to guard the purity of elections." "The infinite ingenuity of violation spirit in evading the rules
and regulations of elections and the use of bribery, fraud and intimidation has made necessary the establishment of elaborate and rigid rules for the
conduct of elections. The very elaborateness of these rules has resulted in their frequent violation and the reports of the courts are replete with cases in
which the result of an election has been attacked on the ground that some provisions of the law have not been complied with. Presumably, all the
provisions of the election laws have a purpose and should be observed."cralaw virtua1aw library

On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that assuming ex gratia argumenti that the protest made by candidate Irigo’s daughter Maribeth Irigo
Batitang was the verbal protest contemplated under Sec. 245 of the Omnibus Election Code, such fact could not be deemed to be a protest made to the
Board of Canvassers itself; and that the failure of the member of the verification/tabulation committee concerned to apprise the Board prior to the
proclamation cannot be taken against the members of the Board.

We find the above contentions untenable. As aptly stated by Director Borra in his aforementioned resolution:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The timely verbal protest of the daughter-watcher of Mrs. Erlinda Irigo did not trigger on the part of the PBC (Provincial Board of Canvassers) the
responsible action of verifying the basis of the protest. The 3 Members of the PBC could not attribute to the Committee on Tabulation the blame for their
errors as the PBC members themselves were the ones who certified under oath the said Certificate of Proclamation and the Tabulation Committee
members were totally under their direct supervision and control."cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioners also raised the issue that it was only after the proclamation had been made that the Board was informed of the fact that an error may have
been committed in the tabulation; and that however, having discharged its function of making the canvass and proclamation of the winning candidates,
the Board of Canvassers became functus oficio and could no longer correct the erroneous proclamation.

As to this issue, suffice it to state that whether or not "the Board of Canvassers become functus oficio" after it proclaimed the winning candidates, is
beside the point. What matters is whether or not petitioners committed an election offense. Besides, as stated earlier, Mrs. Irigo’s watcher made a timely
verbal protest to the Tabulation Committee.

Petitioners further contend that Maribeth Irigo Batitang, the daughter of candidate Irigo and her designated representative during the canvassing
proceedings, was never presented as a witness; that Erlinda Irigo, upon whose testimony the trial court relied heavily to establish the fact of protest, was
not present during the canvassing proceedings; that Mrs. Irigo’s testimony on this point is inadmissible as being hearsay and should not have been
considered by the trial court; that no other evidence having been adduced with respect to the protest allegedly made by Irigo’s representative, such fact
should be deemed as not having been established; and that there was thus no basis, therefore, for the respondent Court of Appeals to hold that the
Board was deemed to have been constructively informed of the verbal protest and that the members thereof were liable for having failed to act on the
basis thereof.

We are not persuaded. Even if we tentatively grant that Mrs. Irigo’s testimony is hearsay evidence, there is still ample evidence which proves that the
Board was deemed to have been informed of the verbal protest and that the members thereof were liable for having failed to act on the basis thereof.

The resolution 9 of Director Borra quoted the questions and answers during the preliminary investigation. The import of those deliberations show that
petitioner Agujetas, as Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, admitted that the tabulation committee was under the supervision of the Board.
10 As regards petitioner Bijis, Vice Chairman of the Board, he admitted that he signed the minutes of the Board to the effect that on January 22, 1988 in
the morning after the proclamation, the Board’s business was "reconciliation of entries in the tally sheet," 11 thus showing that the proclamation in
question had been made even before the votes were reconciled on the tally sheets. And as to accused Miano, Secretary of the Board he admitted
having stated in the minutes 12 that an oral complaint was made by Mrs. Batitang, representative of Erlinda Irigo, but that the complaint was lodged with
the tabulation committee and not with the Board; and that he did not care to examine the partial results for each provincial candidate, including Erlinda
Irigo and Pedro Pena. 13

An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. 14

On the last error assigned by petitioners, they maintain that the present case was filed by Francisco Rabat, the losing gubernatorial candidate in the
Province of Davao Oriental; that Mrs. Irigo never joined the Complaint as a party-plaintiff at any stage of the proceedings; that she was merely presented
as a witness; and thus, for the court to have awarded damages to Mrs. Irigo was a patent error. We find petitioners’ allegations untenable. Except where
the law specifically provides the contrary, a complaint that a public crime has been committed may be laid by any competent person. 15 The Omnibus
Election Code does not specifically provide that a particular person must file the complaint and hence, the complaint filed by Francisco Rabat is valid.

The counsel for the people points out and we agree —

"Even an offended party not mentioned in the Information may claim the civil liability during the trial if he has not waived it. 16

"In the case at bar, Erlinda Irigo clearly, was the party offended or the person whose rights were trampled upon, by the indecent haste with which
petitioners proclaimed Teodoro Pena (sic) as the winner of the 8th seat of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

"The persistence of Erlinda Irigo’s lawyers to participate, as in fact they participated, in the proceedings a quo as private prosecutors over the vehement
objections of petitioners’ counsel clearly indicates that Erlinda Irigo intended to claim damages from petitioners." 17

In U.S. v. Heery, 18 this court held that "If the injured party has not expressly waived the civil liability of the accused nor reserved his right to file a
separate civil action, it is error for the court to refuse a request of the injured party during the course of the criminal prosecution to submit evidence of his
damages." Thus, the arguments of the petitioners notwithstanding, respondent court did not err in awarding damages to Mrs. Irigo.

After the People’s counsel has filed respondents’ comment, petitioners filed their Reply wherein they raised for the first time (not even in their Petition),
the issue that the crime under which petitioners were convicted no longer exists because Republic Act Nos. 6646 (the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987)
and 7166 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1991) were subsequently approved on January 5, 1988 and November 26, 1991, respectively; that these two laws
amended the Omnibus Election Code by deleting certain provisions thereof or adding new ones; and that among those amended was Section 231,
which was modified by Section 28 of RA No. 7166 by removing the specific manner by which the proclamation of winning candidates by the Board of
Canvassers should be made and thereby, in effect, repealing the second paragraph of Sec. 231 of the old Omnibus Election Code under which
Petitioners had been convicted.

Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need to be, and ordinarily will not be considered by
a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 19 However, since RA 7166 was enacted after the trial court had rendered its
decision, and while the case was already pending appeal in the Court of Appeals, and in order to settle the issue once and for all, this court will make a
clear-cut ruling on the issue.

Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) was not expressly repealed by R.A. 7166 because said Sec. 231 is not among the
provisions repealed by Sec. 39 of R.A. 7166 which we quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 39. Amending and Repealing Clause. — Sections 107, 108 and 245 of the Omnibus Election Code are hereby repealed. Likewise, the inclusion in
Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code of the violations of Sections 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111 and 112 as among election offenses is also
hereby repealed. This repeal shall have retroactive effect.

"Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, Republic Act No. 6646, Executive Order Nos. 144 and 157 and all other laws, orders, decrees, rules and regulations or other
issuances, or any part thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby amended or repealed accordingly."cralaw virtua1aw library

The statement "All laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." Certainly is not an express
repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. If repeal of particular or specific law or laws is
intended, the proper step is to so express it. 20

Neither is there an implied repeal of Sec. 231 by the subsequent enactment of RA 6646 and RA 7166.

While Sec. 28 of RA 7166, like Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) pertains to the Canvassing by the Boards of Canvassers, this fact of
itself is not sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act. 21 The provisions of the subject laws are quoted below for
comparison:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 231. Canvass by the board. — The board of canvassers shall meet not later than six o’clock in the afternoon of election day at the place
designated by the Commission to receive the election returns and to immediately canvass those that may have already been received. It shall meet
continuously from day to day until the canvass is completed, and may adjourn but only for the purpose of awaiting the other election returns from other
polling places within its jurisdiction. Each time the board adjourns, it shall make a total of all the votes canvassed so far for each candidate for each
office, furnishing the Commission in Manila by the fastest means of communication a certified copy thereof, and making available the data contained
therein to the mass media and other interested parties. As soon as the other election returns are delivered, the board shall immediately resume
canvassing until all the returns have been canvassed.

"The respective board of canvassers shall prepare a certificate of canvass duly signed and affixed with the imprint of the thumb of the right hand of each
member, supported by a statement of the votes and received by each candidate in each polling place and, on the basis thereof, shall proclaim as elected
the candidates who obtained the highest number of votes cast in the province, city, municipality or barangay. Failure to comply with this requirement
shall constitute an election offense.

"Subject to reasonable exceptions, the board of canvassers must complete their canvass within thirty-six hours in municipalities, forty-eight hours in
cities and seventy-two hours in provinces. Violation hereof shall be an election offense punishable under Section 264 hereof.

"With respect to the election for President and Vice-President, the provincial and city boards of canvassers shall prepare in quintuplicate a certificate of
canvass supported by a statement of votes received by each candidate in each polling place and transmit the first copy thereof to the Speaker of the
Batasang Pambansa. The second copy shall be transmitted to the Commission, the third copy shall be kept by the provincial election supervisor or city
election registrar; the fourth and the fifth copies to each of the two accredited political parties. (Sec. 169, 1978 EC)." 22

"Sec. 28. Canvassing by Provincial, City, District and Municipal Boards of Canvassers. — (a) The city or municipal board of canvassers shall canvass
the election returns for President, Vice-President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives and/or elective provincial and city or
municipal officials. Upon completion of the canvass, it shall prepare the certificate of canvass for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives and elective provincial officials and thereafter, proclaim the elected city or municipal officials, as the case may be.

"(b) The City board of canvassers of cities comprising one or more legislative districts shall canvass the election returns for President, Vice-President,
Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and elective city officials. Upon completion of the canvass, the board shall prepare the certificate of
canvass for President, Vice-President, and Senators and thereafter, proclaim the elected Members of House of Representatives and city officials.

"(c)(1) In the Metro Manila Area, each municipality comprising a legislative district shall have a district board of canvassers which shall canvass the
election returns for President, Vice-President, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and elective municipal officials. Upon completion of
the canvass, it shall prepare the certificate of canvass for President, Vice-President, and Senators and thereafter, proclaim the elected Members of the
House of Representatives and municipal officials.

"(2) Each component municipality in a legislative district in the Metro Manila Area shall have a municipal board of canvassers which shall canvass the
election returns for President, Vice-President, Senators, . . .

"(3) The district board of canvassers of each legislative district comprising two (2) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area shall canvass the certificates of
canvass for President, Vice-President, . . .

"(d) The provincial board of canvassers shall canvass the certificates of canvass for President, Vice-President, Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and elective provincial officials as well as plebiscite results, if any plebiscite is conducted simultaneously with the same election, as
submitted by the board of canvassers of municipalities and component cities. Upon completion of the canvass, it shall prepare the certificate of canvass
for President, Vice-President and Senators and thereafter, proclaim the elected Members of the House of Representatives and provincial officials as well
as the plebiscite results, if any." 23

While the two provisions differ in terms, neither is this fact sufficient to create repugnance. In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must
be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. The clearest case
possible must be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed. 24 "It is necessary, says the court in a
case, 25 before such repeal is deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the
latter be inconsistent with the former. There must be a showing or repugnance clear and convincing in character. The language used in the later statute
must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice." 26
For it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. 27 The presumption is against inconsistency or
repugnance and, accordingly, against implied repeal. 28 For the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. 29

In the case at bar, the needed manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal is not present. Neither is there any inconsistency between the two
subject provisions. The explanation of a legal scholar 30 subject, particularly on Section 1 of BP 881 is enlightening:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines in Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, which was enacted into law on December 3, 1985. It codified all previous
election laws. It has undergone some amendments, basically by the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as "The Electoral
Reform Law of 1987," and Republic Act No. 7166, providing for synchronized national and local elections on May 11, 1992.

"The Omnibus Election Code is the basic law on elections. While legislations have been enacted every time an election for elective officials is scheduled,
the Omnibus Election Code remains the fundamental law on the subject and such pieces of legislations are designed to improve the law and to achieve
the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections."cralaw virtua1aw library

Consistently, while Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a
felony . . ., this provision cannot be applied to benefit the petitioners because Section 231 of BP 881 31 was not repealed by subsequent legislations,
contrary to petitioners contention that Section 231 was so repealed by R.A. Nos. 6646 and 7166.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011
TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE Petitioner,
vs.
LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petition1 challenges the 1 October 2004 Judgment2 and 6 November
2004 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region 1, Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet, in Civil Case No. 03-CV-1878.

The Facts

Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative, registered with the Cooperative Development Authority, and organized to provide domestic
water services in Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet.

La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility created under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198, as amended. It is authorized to supply water
for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet.

On 9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to
operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPC’s application. LTWD claimed that, under Section 47 of PD No.
198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive. Section 47 states that:

Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency for domestic, industrial or commercial water service within the
district or any portion thereof unless and except to the extent that the board of directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such
resolution, however, shall be subject to review by the Administration.

In its Resolution No. 04-0702 dated 23 July 2002, the NWRB approved TMPC’s application for a CPC. In its 15 August 2002 Decision,4 the NWRB held
that LTWD’s franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional and found that TMPC is legally and financially qualified to
operate and maintain a waterworks system. NWRB stated that:

With respect to LTWD’s opposition, this Board observes that:

1. It is a substantial reproduction of its opposition to the application for water permits previously filed by this same CPC applicant, under WUC No. 98-17
and 98-62 which was decided upon by this Board on April 27, 2000. The issues being raised by Oppositor had been already resolved when this Board
said in pertinent portions of its decision:

"The authority granted to LTWD by virtue of P.D. 198 is not Exclusive. While Barangay Tawang is within their territorial jurisdiction, this does not mean
that all others are excluded in engaging in such service, especially, if the district is not capable of supplying water within the area. This Board has time
and again ruled that the "Exclusive Franchise" provision under P.D. 198 has misled most water districts to believe that it likewise extends to be [sic] the
waters within their territorial boundaries. Such ideological adherence collides head on with the constitutional provision that "ALL WATERS AND
NATURAL RESOURCES BELONG TO THE STATE". (Sec. 2, Art. XII) and that "No franchise, certificate or authorization for the operation of public [sic]
shall be exclusive in character".

xxxx

All the foregoing premises all considered, and finding that Applicant is legally and financially qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks system; that
the said operation shall redound to the benefit of the homeowners/residents of the subdivision, thereby, promoting public service in a proper and suitable
manner, the instant application for a Certificate of Public Convenience is, hereby, GRANTED.5

LTWD filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 18 November 2002 Resolution,6 the NWRB denied the motion.

LTWD appealed to the RTC.

The RTC’s Ruling

In its 1 October 2004 Judgment, the RTC set aside the NWRB’s 23 July 2002 Resolution and 15 August 2002 Decision and cancelled TMPC’s CPC. The
RTC held that Section 47 is valid. The RTC stated that:

The Constitution uses the term "exclusive in character". To give effect to this provision, a reasonable, practical and logical interpretation should be
adopted without disregard to the ultimate purpose of the Constitution. What is this ultimate purpose? It is for the state, through its authorized agencies or
instrumentalities, to be able to keep and maintain ultimate control and supervision over the operation of public utilities. Essential part of this control and
supervision is the authority to grant a franchise for the operation of a public utility to any person or entity, and to amend or repeal an existing franchise to
serve the requirements of public interest. Thus, what is repugnant to the Constitution is a grant of franchise "exclusive in character" so as to preclude the
State itself from granting a franchise to any other person or entity than the present grantee when public interest so requires. In other words, no franchise
of whatever nature can preclude the State, through its duly authorized agencies or instrumentalities, from granting franchise to any person or entity, or to
repeal or amend a franchise already granted. Consequently, the Constitution does not necessarily prohibit a franchise that is exclusive on its face,
meaning, that the grantee shall be allowed to exercise this present right or privilege to the exclusion of all others. Nonetheless, the grantee cannot set up
its exclusive franchise against the ultimate authority of the State.7

TMPC filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 6 November 2004 Order, the RTC denied the motion. Hence, the present petition.
Issue

TMPC raises as issue that the RTC erred in holding that Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, is valid.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. This rule is basic and, to a reasonable mind, does not need explanation. Indeed, if acts
that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.

In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.,8 the Court held that, "What one cannot do directly, he cannot do indirectly."9 In Akbayan Citizens Action Party v.
Aquino,10 quoting Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,11 the Court held that, "This Court has long and consistently adhered to
the legal maxim that those that cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly."12 In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas,13the Court held that, "No one is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly."14

The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. The 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 8, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution states that:

No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the
Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. (Empahsis supplied)

Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution states that:

No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, nor
shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:

No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall
such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. (Emphasis supplied)

Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions are clear — franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be
exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly state that, "nor shall such franchise x x x be exclusive in
character." There is no exception.

When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. The duty of the Court is to apply the law the way it is worded. In Security Bank
and Trust Company v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61,15 the Court held that:

Basic is the rule of statutory construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the court is left with no alternative but to apply the same
according to its clear language. As we have held in the case of Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines:

"x x x We cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambiguous language of the above-quoted provision of law. This
Court had steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation
being called for only when such literal application is impossible. No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of law
peremptorily calls for application. Where a requirement or condition is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It
must see to it that its mandate is obeyed."16(Emphasis supplied)

In Republic of the Philippines v. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc.,17 the Court held that, "The Constitution is quite emphatic that the operation of a
public utility shall not be exclusive."18 In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. National Telecommunications Commission,19 the Court held that, "Neither
Congress nor the NTC can grant an exclusive ‘franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization’ to operate a public utility."20 In National Power
Corp. v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court held that, "Exclusivity of any public franchise has not been favored by this Court such that in most, if not all,
grants by the government to private corporations, the interpretation of rights, privileges or franchises is taken against the grantee."22 In Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission,23 the Court held that, "The Constitution mandates that a
franchise cannot be exclusive in nature."24

Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises that are exclusive in character. What the President, Congress and the
Court cannot legally do directly they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly franchises that are
exclusive in character by allowing the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water district and the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) to create
franchises that are exclusive in character.

In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) created indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by
allowing the BOD of LTWD and the LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, allows
the BOD and the LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 states:

Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency for domestic, industrial or commercial water service within the
district or any portion thereof unless and except to the extent that the board of directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such
resolution, however, shall be subject to review by the Administration. (Emphasis supplied)

In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails because the Constitution is the basic law to which all other
laws must conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws that do not conform to it.
In Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board,25 the Court held that, "It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it
conflicts with the Constitution."26 In Sabio v. Gordon,27 the Court held that, "the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is the ‘basic and
paramount law to which all other laws must conform.’"28 In Atty. Macalintal v. Commission on Elections,29the Court held that, "The Constitution is the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined
and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional."30 In Manila Prince
Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System,31 the Court held that:

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.
Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and
contract."32 (Emphasis supplied)

To reiterate, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly prohibit the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character. They uniformly
command that "nor shall such franchise x x x be exclusive in character." This constitutional prohibition is absolute and accepts no exception. On the
other hand, PD No. 198, as amended, allows the BOD of LTWD and LWUA to create franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 states that,
"No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency x x x unless and except to the extent that the board of directors consents thereto x x
x subject to review by the Administration." Section 47 creates a glaring exception to the absolute prohibition in the Constitution. Clearly, it is patently
unconstitutional.

Section 47 gives the BOD and the LWUA the authority to make an exception to the absolute prohibition in the Constitution. In short, the BOD and the
LWUA are given the discretion to create franchises that are exclusive in character. The BOD and the LWUA are not even legislative bodies. The BOD is
not a regulatory body but simply a management board of a water district. Indeed, neither the BOD nor the LWUA can be granted the power to create any
exception to the absolute prohibition in the Constitution, a power that Congress itself cannot exercise.

In Metropolitan Cebu Water District v. Adala,33 the Court categorically declared Section 47 void. The Court held that:

Nonetheless, while the prohibition in Section 47 of P.D. 198 applies to the issuance of CPCs for the reasons discussed above, the same provision must
be deemed void ab initio for being irreconcilable with Article XIV, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which was ratified on January 17, 1973 — the
constitution in force when P.D. 198 was issued on May 25, 1973. Thus, Section 5 of Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution reads:

"SECTION 5. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such
franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Batasang Pambansa when the
public interest so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utiltities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in
the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in the capital thereof."

This provision has been substantially reproduced in Article XII Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution, including the prohibition against exclusive franchises.

xxxx

Since Section 47 of P.D. 198, which vests an "exclusive franchise" upon public utilities, is clearly repugnant to Article XIV, Section 5 of the 1973
Constitution, it is unconstitutional and may not, therefore, be relied upon by petitioner in support of its opposition against respondent’s application for
CPC and the subsequent grant thereof by the NWRB.

WHEREFORE, Section 47 of P.D. 198 is unconstitutional.34 (Emphasis supplied)

The dissenting opinion declares Section 47 valid and constitutional. In effect, the dissenting opinion holds that (1) President Marcos can create indirectly
franchises that are exclusive in character; (2) the BOD can create directly franchises that are exclusive in character; (3) the LWUA can create directly
franchises that are exclusive in character; and (4) the Court should allow the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character.

Stated differently, the dissenting opinion holds that (1) President Marcos can violate indirectly the Constitution; (2) the BOD can violate directly the
Constitution; (3) the LWUA can violate directly the Constitution; and (4) the Court should allow the violation of the Constitution.

The dissenting opinion states that the BOD and the LWUA can create franchises that are exclusive in character "based on reasonable and legitimate
grounds," and such creation "should not be construed as a violation of the constitutional mandate on the non-exclusivity of a franchise" because it
"merely refers to regulation" which is part of "the government’s inherent right to exercise police power in regulating public utilities" and that their violation
of the Constitution "would carry with it the legal presumption that public officers regularly perform their official functions." The dissenting opinion states
that:

To begin with, a government agency’s refusal to grant a franchise to another entity, based on reasonable and legitimate grounds, should not be
construed as a violation of the constitutional mandate on the non-exclusivity of a franchise; this merely refers to regulation, which the Constitution does
not prohibit. To say that a legal provision is unconstitutional simply because it enables a government instrumentality to determine the propriety of
granting a franchise is contrary to the government’s inherent right to exercise police power in regulating public utilities for the protection of the public and
the utilities themselves. The refusal of the local water district or the LWUA to consent to the grant of other franchises would carry with it the legal
presumption that public officers regularly perform their official functions.

The dissenting opinion states two "reasonable and legitimate grounds" for the creation of exclusive franchise: (1) protection of "the government’s
investment,"35 and (2) avoidance of "a situation where ruinous competition could compromise the supply of public utilities in poor and remote areas."36

There is no "reasonable and legitimate" ground to violate the Constitution. The Constitution should never be violated by anyone. Right or wrong, the
President, Congress, the Court, the BOD and the LWUA have no choice but to follow the Constitution. Any act, however noble its intentions, is void if it
violates the Constitution. This rule is basic.
In Social Justice Society,37 the Court held that, "In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to
yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed."38 In Sabio,39 the Court held that, "the Constitution
is the highest law of the land. It is ‘the basic and paramount law to which x x x all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act
shall be valid, however noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution.’"40 In Bengzon v. Drilon,41 the Court held that, "the three branches of
government must discharge their respective functions within the limits of authority conferred by the Constitution."42 In Mutuc v. Commission on
Elections,43 the Court held that, "The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no choice
but to yield obedience to [the Constitution’s] commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed."44

Police power does not include the power to violate the Constitution. Police power is the plenary power vested in Congress to make laws not repugnant to
the Constitution. This rule is basic.

In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc.,45 the Court held that, "Police power is the plenary power vested in the
legislature to make, ordain, and establish wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution."46 In Carlos
Superdrug Corp. v. Department of Social Welfare and Development,47 the Court held that, police power "is ‘the power vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances x x x not repugnant to the
constitution.’"48 In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin,49 the Court held that, "police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is
the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances x x x not repugnant to the Constitution."50

There is no question that the effect of Section 47 is the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 expressly allows the BOD and
the LWUA to create franchises that are exclusive in character.

The dissenting opinion explains why the BOD and the LWUA should be allowed to create franchises that are exclusive in character — to protect "the
government’s investment" and to avoid "a situation where ruinous competition could compromise the supply of public utilities in poor and remote areas."
The dissenting opinion declares that these are "reasonable and legitimate grounds." The dissenting opinion also states that, "The refusal of the local
water district or the LWUA to consent to the grant of other franchises would carry with it the legal presumption that public officers regularly perform their
official functions."

When the effect of a law is unconstitutional, it is void. In Sabio,51 the Court held that, "A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within
the legislative power to enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the
Constitution or its basic principles."52 The effect of Section 47 violates the Constitution, thus, it is void.

In Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock Securities Limited,53 the Court held that, "This Court must perform its duty to defend and
uphold the Constitution."54 In Bengzon,55 the Court held that, "The Constitution expressly confers on the judiciary the power to maintain inviolate what it
decrees."56 In Mutuc,57 the Court held that:

The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest
official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that
which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic]
entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes
must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws
cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain
inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the
course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to
live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law.58

Sustaining the RTC’s ruling would make a dangerous precedent. It will allow Congress to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. In order to circumvent
the constitutional prohibition on franchises that are exclusive in character, all Congress has to do is to create a law allowing the BOD and the LWUA to
create franchises that are exclusive in character, as in the present case.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We DECLARE Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 198 UNCONSTITUTIONAL. We SET ASIDE the 1
October 2004 Judgment and 6 November 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Judicial Region 1, Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet, in Civil Case No.
03-CV-1878 and REINSTATE the 23 July 2002 Resolution and 15 August 2002 Decision of the National Water Resources Board.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 G.R. No. 124893, April 18, 1997
LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner,
vs.
FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL
SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated May 2, 1996 of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en
banc suspending her proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos
Norte.

The facts are undisputed. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections nationwide was scheduled to be held on May 6, 1996. On March 16, 1996,
petitioner applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Board of
Election Tellers, however, denied her application on the ground that petitioner, who was then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old, exceeded the
age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.

On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter" with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bangui-
Pagudpud-Adams-Damalneg, Ilocos Norte. In a decision dated April 18, 1996, the said court found petitioner qualified and ordered her registration as
member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association with petitioner.

On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality
of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter dated April 23, 1996, respondent Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios, per advice of Provincial Election
Supervisor Noli Pipo, disapproved petitioner's certificate of candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC Regional
Director Filemon A. Asperin who set aside the order of respondents and allowed petitioner to run.

On May 2, 1996, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of her ineligibility and giving her 24 hours to explain why her
certificate of candidacy should not be disapproved. Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private respondent Florencio G. Sales,
Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of
Certificate of Candidacy" against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. The petition was sent by
facsimile and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the Commission on Elections National Office, Manila.

On May 2, 1996, the same day respondent Rios issued the memorandum to petitioner, the COMELEC en bancissued an order directing the Board of
Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the election. The
order reads as follows:

Acting on the Fax "Petition for Denial And/Or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" by petitioner Florencio G. Sales, Jr. against Lynette G. Garvida,
received on April 29, 1996, the pertinent allegations of which reads:

xxx xxx xxx

5. That the said respondent is disqualified to become a voter and a candidate for the SK for the reason that she will be more than twenty-one (21) years
of age on May 6, 1996; that she was born on June 11, 1974 as can be gleaned from her birth certificate, copy of which is hereto attached and marked as
Annex "A";

6. That in filing her certificate of candidacy as candidate for SK of Bgy. San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, she made material representation which is
false and as such, she is disqualified; that her certificate of candidacy should not be given due course and that said candidacy must be cancelled;

xxx xxx xxx

the Commission, it is appearing that the petition is meritorious, hereby DIRECTS the Board of Election Tellers/Board of Canvassers of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, to suspend the proclamation of Lynette G. Garvida in the event she garners the highest number of votes for the position
of Sangguniang Kabataan [sic].

Meantime, petitioner is hereby required to submit immediately ten (10) copies of his petition and to pay the filing and legal research fees in the amount of
P510.00.

SO ORDERED.

On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondent's votes of 76. In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the
COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27,
1996.

On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for the position of SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo,
Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The proclamation was "without prejudice to any further action by the Commission on Elections or any other interested party." On
July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as
Auditor and was proclaimed one of the elected officials of the Pederasyon.

Petitioner raises two (2) significant issues: the first concerns the jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to act on the petition to deny or cancel her
certificate of candidacy; the second, the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground that she has exceeded the age requirement to run as
an elective official of the SK.
I

Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the conduct of the SK elections is under the supervision of the COMELEC and shall
be governed by the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy, viz:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before election.

In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for an
elective office may be filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has made a false material representation in his
certificate. The petition may be heard, and evidence received by any official designated by the COMELEC after which the case shall be decided by the
COMELEC itself.

Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en
banc. Cases before a Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution,
order or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division
are resolved by the COMELEC en banc. It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election cases. This is clear from
Section 3 of the said Rules thus:

Sec. 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions. — The Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions to hear and decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions,
special actions, special cases, provisional remedies, contempt and special proceedings except in accreditation of citizens' arms of the Commission.

In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon receipt of the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996.

II

The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the petition itself did not comply with the formal requirements of pleadings under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. These requirements are:

Sec. 1. Filing of Pleadings. — Every pleading, motion and other papers must be filed in ten (10) legible copies. However, when there is more than one
respondent or protestee, the petitioner or protestant must file additional number of copies of the petition or protest as there are additional respondents or
protestees.

Sec. 2. How Filed. — The documents referred to in the immediately preceding section must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the
Commission personally, or, unless otherwise provided in these Rules, by registered mail. In the latter case, the date of mailing is the date of filing and
the requirement as to the number of copies must be complied with.

Sec. 3. Form of Pleadings, etc. — (a) All pleadings allowed by these Rules shall be printed, mimeographed or typewritten on legal size bond paper and
shall be in English or Filipino.

xxx xxx xxx

Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or typewritten in legal size bond paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies.
Pleadings must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail.

In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only two (2) copies of the petition were filed with the COMELEC. 19 Also, the
COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution on the basis of the petition transmitted by facsimile, not by registered mail.

A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. 20 The current is transmitted as a
signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position
and the correct shade. 21 The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile. 22

Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, much less by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a
genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. 23 Without the original, there is no way of
determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be
a sham pleading. The uncertainty of the authenticity of a facsimile pleading should have restrained the COMELEC en banc from acting on the petition
and issuing the questioned order. The COMELEC en banc should have waited until it received the petition filed by registered mail.

III

To write finis to the case at bar, we shall now resolve the issue of petitioner's age.

The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by Presidential Decree No. 684 in 1975 as the Kabataang Barangay, a barangay youth organization
composed of all residents of the barangay who were at least 15 years but less than 18 years of age. The Kabataang Barangay sought to provide its
members a medium to express their views and opinions and participate in issues of transcendental importance. Its affairs were administered by a
barangay youth chairman together with six barangay youth leaders who were actual residents of the barangay and were at least 15 years but less than
18 years of age. In 1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, then the Local Government Code, raised the maximum age of the Kabataang Barangay members
from "less than 18 years of age" to "not more than 21 years of age."

The Local Government Code of 1991 changed the Kabataang Barangay into the Katipunan ng Kabataan. It, however, retained the age limit of the
members laid down in B.P. 337 at 15 but not more than 21 years old. The affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan are administered by the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) composed of a chairman and seven (7) members who are elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The chairman automatically becomes
ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay. A member of the SK holds office for a term of three (3) years, unless sooner removed for cause, or
becomes permanently incapacitated, dies or resigns from office.

Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to specific qualifications laid down by the Local Government Code of 1991, viz:

Sec. 424. Katipunan ng Kabataan. — The katipunan ng kabataan shall be composed of all citizens of the Philippines actually residing in the barangay for
at least six (6) months, who are fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age, and who are duly registered in the list of the sangguniang
kabataan or in the official barangay list in the custody of the barangay secretary.

A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may become a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan if he possesses the following qualifications:

Sec. 428. Qualifications. — An elective official of the sangguniang kabataan must be a citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter of the katipunan ng
kabataan, a resident of the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to election, at least fifteen (15) years but not more than twenty-one (21)
years of age on the day of his election, able to read and write Filipino, English, or the local dialect, and must not have been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude.

Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the
barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the
official barangay list. Section 428 of the Code requires that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified
voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but not
more than 21 years of age on the day of his election; (e) able to read and write; and (f) must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude.

For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in Resolution No. 2824 and
defined how a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan becomes a qualified voter and an elective official. Thus:

Sec. 3. Qualifications of a voter. — To be qualified to register as a voter in the SK elections, a person must be:

a) a citizen of the Philippines;

b) fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day that is, he must have been born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981,
inclusive; and

c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and actually residing in the barangay wherein he proposes to vote for at least six (6) months
immediately preceding the elections.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. Qualifications of elective members. — An elective official of the SK must be:

a) a qualified voter;

b) a resident in the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to the elections; and

c) able to read and write Filipino or any Philippine language or dialect or English.

Cases involving the eligibility or qualification of candidates shall be decided by the city/municipal Election Officer (EO) whose decision shall be final.

A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may be a qualified voter in the May 6, 1996 SK elections if he is: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) 15 but not more than
21 years of age on election day, i.e., the voter must be born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a resident of the Philippines for at
least one (1) year and an actual resident of the barangay at least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections. A candidate for the SK must: (a)
possess the foregoing qualifications of a voter; (b) be a resident in the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the elections; and (c) able
to read and write.

Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications of a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and a candidate for the
Sangguniang Kabataan. Petitioner 's age is admittedly beyond the limit set in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Petitioner, however,
argues that Section 3 [b] of Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and beyond the scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of
1991. She contends that the Code itself does not provide that the voter must be exactly 21 years of age on election day. She urges that so long as she
did not turn twenty-two (22) years old, she was still twenty-one years of age on election day and therefore qualified as a member and voter in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan and as candidate for the SK elections.

A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal a distinction between the maximum age of a member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the
maximum age of an elective SK official. Section 424 of the Code sets a member's maximum age at 21 years only. There is no further provision as to
when the member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21
years old "on the day of his election." The addition of the phrase "or the day of his election" is an additional qualification. The member may be more than
21 years of age on election day or on the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be more
than 21 years old on the day of election. The distinction is understandable considering that the Code itself provides more qualifications for an elective SK
official than for a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. The courts may distinguish when there are facts and
circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification.

The qualification that a voter in the SK elections must not be more than 21 years of age on the day of the election is not provided in Section 424 of the
Local Government Code of 1991. In fact the term "qualified voter" appears only in COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Since a "qualified voter" is not
necessarily an elective official, then it may be assumed that a "qualified voter" is a "member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan." Section 424 of the Code
does not provide that the maximum age of a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan is determined on the day of the election. Section 3 [b] of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2824 is therefore ultra vires insofar as it sets the age limit of a voter for the SK elections at exactly 21 years on the day of the election.
The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election is very clear. The Local Government
Code speaks of years, not months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days each. One born on the first day of
the year is consequently deemed to be one year old on the 365th day after his birth — the last day of the year. In computing years, the first year is
reached after completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the first day of the second 365-day cycle begins. On the 365th day of the second
cycle, the person turns two years old. This cycle goes on and on in a lifetime. A person turns 21 years old on the 365th day of his 21st 365-day cycle.
This means on his 21st birthday, he has completed the entire span of 21 365-day cycles. After this birthday, the 365-day cycle for his 22nd year begins.
The day after the 365th day is the first day of the next 365-day cycle and he turns 22 years old on the 365th day.

The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and
one or some days or a fraction of a year because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. "Not more than 21 years old" is not equivalent to "less
than 22 years old," contrary to petitioner's claims. The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day.

In P.D. 684, the law that created the Kabataang Barangay, the age qualification of a barangay youth official was expressly stated as ". . . at least fifteen
years of age or over but less than eighteen . . ." This provision clearly states that the youth official must be at least 15 years old and may be 17 years
and a fraction of a year but should not reach the age of eighteen years. When the Local Government Code increased the age limit of members of the
youth organization to 21 years, it did not reenact the provision in such a way as to make the youth "at least 15 but less than 22 years old." If the intention
of the Code's framers was to include citizens less than 22 years old, they should have stated so expressly instead of leaving the matter open to
confusion and doubt.

Former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, the sponsor and principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991 declared that one of the reasons why the
Katipunan ng Kabataan was created and the Kabataang Barangay discontinued was because most, if not all, Kabataang Barangay leaders were already
over 21 years of age by the time President Aquino assumed power. They were not the "youth" anymore. The Local Government Code of 1991 fixed the
maximum age limit at not more than 21 years and the only exception is in the second paragraph of Section 423 which reads:

Sec. 423. Creation and Election. —

a) . . . ;

b) A sangguniang kabataan official who, during his term of office, shall have passed the age of twenty-one (21) years shall be allowed to serve the
remaining portion of the term for which he was elected.The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more than
21 years of age on the day of his election. The only exception is when the official reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency. Section 423 [b] of
the Code allows him to serve the remaining portion of the term for which he was elected. According to Senator Pimentel, the youth leader must have
"been elected prior to his 21st birthday." Conversely, the SK official must not have turned 21 years old before his election. Reading Section 423 [b]
together with Section 428 of the Code, the latest date at which an SK elective official turns 21 years old is on the day of his election. The maximum age
of a youth official must therefore be exactly 21 years on election day. Section 3 [b] in relation to Section 6 [a] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is
not ultra vires insofar as it fixes the maximum age of an elective SK official on the day of his election.

In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections,
petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months old. On the day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old. When she
assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old and was merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner
may have qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for elective SK officials set by Section 428
of the Local Government Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824. She was ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996
Sangguniang Kabataan elections.

The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be
declared ineligible. In the same vein, if the candidate is over the maximum age limit on the day of the election, he is ineligible. The fact that the candidate
was elected will not make the age requirement directory, nor will it validate his election.The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot
cure the vice of ineligibility.

The ineligibility of petitioner does not entitle private respondent, the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections, to
be declared elected. A defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.Moreover, despite his claims, private respondent has failed to prove
that the electorate themselves actually knew of petitioner's ineligibility and that they maliciously voted for her with the intention of misapplying their
franchises and throwing away their votes for the benefit of her rival candidate.

Neither can this Court order that pursuant to Section 435 of the Local Government Code petitioner should be succeeded by the Sangguniang Kabataan
member who obtained the next highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections. Section 435 applies when a Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman
"refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, is convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is removed from office, or has
been absent without leave for more than three (3) consecutive months."

The question of the age qualification is a question of eligibility.Being "eligible" means being "legally qualified; capable of being legally
chosen." Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public
office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK Chairman.

To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deems it necessary to order that the vacancy be filled by the SK member chosen by the
incumbent SK members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte by simple majority from among themselves. The member chosen shall assume
the office of SK Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term, and shall discharge the powers and duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges
appurtenant to said office.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for candidacy
in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan, an is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay
San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Sangguniang Kabataan member voted by simple majority by and from among the incumbent Sangguniang
Kabataan members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall assume the office of Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion of the term.

SO ORDERED.