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Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 2 / 36
Outline
1 introduction to apportionment
The Hamilton Plan
The Jefferson Plan
The Adam’s Plan
The Webster’s Plan
The Huntington-Hill Plan
The Fair Plan
Apportionment Paradoxes
2 introduction to voting
Plurality Method
Plurality with Elimination (without rank)
Plurality with Elimination (with rank)
Borda Count Method
Pairwise Comparison Method
Fairness of Voting Methods
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 2 / 36
Outline
1 introduction to apportionment
The Hamilton Plan
The Jefferson Plan
The Adam’s Plan
The Webster’s Plan
The Huntington-Hill Plan
The Fair Plan
Apportionment Paradoxes
2 introduction to voting
Plurality Method
Plurality with Elimination (without rank)
Plurality with Elimination (with rank)
Borda Count Method
Pairwise Comparison Method
Fairness of Voting Methods
3 weighted voting system
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 2 / 36
Introduction
According to the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
Article VI Section 5:
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Introduction
According to the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
Article VI Section 5:
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 3 / 36
INTRODUCTION TO APPORTIONMENT
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INTRODUCTION TO APPORTIONMENT
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 4 / 36
(1) The Hamilton Plan
Under the Hamilton Plan, the standard divisor, SD, is first
computed.
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 5 / 36
(1) The Hamilton Plan
Under the Hamilton Plan, the standard divisor, SD, is first
computed.
total population
Standard Divisor, SD=
number of people/seats to apportion
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 5 / 36
(1) The Hamilton Plan
Under the Hamilton Plan, the standard divisor, SD, is first
computed.
total population
Standard Divisor, SD=
number of people/seats to apportion
The standard divisor determines the number of
individuals in the total population to be represented by
each representative.
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 5 / 36
(1) The Hamilton Plan
Under the Hamilton Plan, the standard divisor, SD, is first
computed.
total population
Standard Divisor, SD=
number of people/seats to apportion
The standard divisor determines the number of
individuals in the total population to be represented by
each representative.
Example 1
A total of 25 practice teachers are to be apportioned
among seven classes at a certain elementary school. The
number of students in each of the seven classes is shown
in the table below.
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 6 / 36
(1) The Hamilton Plan
Example 1
A total of 25 practice teachers are to be apportioned
among seven classes at a certain elementary school. The
number of students in each of the seven classes is shown
in the table below.
GRADE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 TOTAL
Number of Students 38 39 35 27 21 31 33 224
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 6 / 36
(2) The Jefferson Plan
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 7 / 36
(2) The Jefferson Plan
GRADE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 TOTAL
Number of Students 38 39 35 27 21 31 33 224
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(3) The Adam’s Plan
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 8 / 36
(3) The Adam’s Plan
GRADE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 TOTAL
Number of Students 38 39 35 27 21 31 33 224
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 8 / 36
(4) The Webster’s Plan
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 9 / 36
(4) The Webster’s Plan
GRADE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 TOTAL
Number of Students 38 39 35 27 21 31 33 224
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 9 / 36
(5) The Huntington-Hill Plan
The Huntington-Hill Method is also called the method of
equal proportions.
The Huntington-Hill Apportionment Principle states that
if one representative is to be added to one of several
subgroups, it should be added to the one with the
greatest Huntington-Hill Number (HHN)
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 10 / 36
(5) The Huntington-Hill Plan
The Huntington-Hill Method is also called the method of
equal proportions.
The Huntington-Hill Apportionment Principle states that
if one representative is to be added to one of several
subgroups, it should be added to the one with the
greatest Huntington-Hill Number (HHN)
Example 5
Use the Huntington-Hill Method to solve Example 1.
GRADE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 TOTAL
Number of Students 38 39 35 27 21 31 33 224
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 10 / 36
Apportionment Paradoxes
1.Alabama Paradox
Adding one representative causes one of the subgroups to
lose one representative even when the population of this
subggroup has not changed.
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 11 / 36
Apportionment Paradoxes
1.Alabama Paradox
Adding one representative causes one of the subgroups to
lose one representative even when the population of this
subggroup has not changed.
The Alabama paradox was first noticed after the 1870 census. At the
time, the House of Representatives had 270 seats. However, when the
number of representatives in the House was increased to 280 seats,
Rhode Island lost a representative.
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 11 / 36
Apportionment Paradoxes
2.Population Paradox
A subgroup loses a representative even when its
population is increasing faster than that of other
subgroups.
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 12 / 36
Apportionment Paradoxes
2.Population Paradox
A subgroup loses a representative even when its
population is increasing faster than that of other
subgroups.
3.New States Paradox
Adding a new subgroup, and the corresponding number of
representatives based on its population, alters the
apportionment for some of the other subgroups.
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 12 / 36
Apportionment Paradoxes
2.Population Paradox
A subgroup loses a representative even when its
population is increasing faster than that of other
subgroups.
3.New States Paradox
Adding a new subgroup, and the corresponding number of
representatives based on its population, alters the
apportionment for some of the other subgroups.
In 1907, when Oklahoma was added to the Union, the size of the
House was increased by five representatives to accomodate
Oklahoma’s population. However, when the complete apportionment
of the Congress was recalculated, New York lost a seat and Maine
gained a seat.
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 12 / 36
The table below shows the comparison of the flaws of the
different methods of apportionment:
FLAW Hamilton Plan Jefferson Plan Adam’s Plan Webster’s Plan Huntington-Hill Plan
1. May violate the quota rule No Yes Yes Yes Yes
2. May produce the Alabama Paradox Yes No No No No
3. May produce the Population paradox Yes No No No No
4. May produce the New State Paradox Yes No No No No
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 13 / 36
INTRODUCTION TO VOTING
It has been said that the only civil right for which the rich
and the poor are equal is that of voting. The right of
suffrage is a privilege granted to all eligible citizens
especially in the Philippines
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 14 / 36
INTRODUCTION TO VOTING
It has been said that the only civil right for which the rich
and the poor are equal is that of voting. The right of
suffrage is a privilege granted to all eligible citizens
especially in the Philippines
Several methods of Voting:
1 Plurality Method
2 Plurality with Elimination (without rank)
3 Plurality with Elimination (with rank)
4 Borda Count Method
5 Pairwise Comparison Method
6 Fairness of Voting Methods
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(1) Plurality Method
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(1) Plurality Method
EXAMPLE:
Sixty-five members of a youth club are asked to rank their
choices in order of preference for the place where they will
conduct their team building activity. The places are
Baguo (BG), Baler (BR) and Los Banos (LB). The results
are given in the table below.
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 16 / 36
(2) Plurality with Elimination (without rank)
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(2) Plurality with Elimination (without rank)
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(3) Plurality with Elimination (with rank)
EXAMPLE:
Use the previous example.
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(4) Borda Count Method
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(4) Borda Count Method
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 20 / 36
(4) Borda Count Method
EXAMPLE:
Consider again the previous example.
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(5) Pairwise Comparison Method
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(5) Pairwise Comparison Method
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(5) Pairwise Comparison Method
EXAMPLE:
Consider again the previous example.
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Fairness of Voting Methods
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Fairness of Voting Methods
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 24 / 36
Fairness of Voting Methods
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Criteria for Fairness of Voting Method
1. Majority Criterion
The choice/option which gets a majority of the first-place
votes wins.
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 25 / 36
Criteria for Fairness of Voting Method
1. Majority Criterion
The choice/option which gets a majority of the first-place
votes wins.
2. Monotonicity Criterion
If a choice/option wins the election, then it will also win
the election if the supporters of other choices/options
change their votes to support it in case there is a change
of preferences.
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 25 / 36
Criteria for Fairness of Voting Method
3. Condorcet Criterion
If a choice/option is favored when compared head-to-head
individually with each of the other choice/options, then
this choice/option wins.
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Criteria for Fairness of Voting Method
3. Condorcet Criterion
If a choice/option is favored when compared head-to-head
individually with each of the other choice/options, then
this choice/option wins.
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Criteria for Fairness of Voting Method
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Criteria for Fairness of Voting Method
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WEIGHTED VOTING SYSTEM
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WEIGHTED VOTING SYSTEM
{q : w1 , w2 , w3 , . . . wn }
where q represents the quota and wi represents the weight
of each voter. The quota is the number of votes required
to pass a given measure or resolution.
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WEIGHTED VOTING SYSTEM
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WEIGHTED VOTING SYSTEM
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Types of Weighted Voting System
One Person, One Vote
{6 : 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}
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Types of Weighted Voting System
One Person, One Vote
{6 : 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}
In this voting system, each of the ten voters has one vote
and 6 votes are needed to pass the resolution. This is also
a majority vote.
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Types of Weighted Voting System
One Person, One Vote
{6 : 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}
In this voting system, each of the ten voters has one vote
and 6 votes are needed to pass the resolution. This is also
a majority vote.
Dictatorship
{15 : 16, 5, 3, 2, 4}
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 30 / 36
Types of Weighted Voting System
One Person, One Vote
{6 : 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}
In this voting system, each of the ten voters has one vote
and 6 votes are needed to pass the resolution. This is also
a majority vote.
Dictatorship
{15 : 16, 5, 3, 2, 4}
In this voting system, the person with 16 votes can pass
any resolution. Even if the four other members merge,
their total votes will not meet the quota.
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 30 / 36
Types of Weighted Voting System
Null System
{35 : 16, 5, 3, 2, 4}
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Types of Weighted Voting System
Null System
{35 : 16, 5, 3, 2, 4}
No resolution or proposal will pass in this voting system.
Even if all the voters cast their votes, the sum of the votes
will never be equal to the quota.
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 31 / 36
Types of Weighted Voting System
Veto Power System
{35 : 16, 4, 8, 6, 1}
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Types of Weighted Voting System
Veto Power System
{35 : 16, 4, 8, 6, 1}
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Types of Weighted Voting System
Veto Power System
{35 : 16, 4, 8, 6, 1}
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Types of Weighted Voting System
Veto Power System
{35 : 16, 4, 8, 6, 1}
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Coalition
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Coalition
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Coalition
Example
A weighted voting system is given by
{10 : 5, 6, 4, 3}
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Coalition
Example
A weighted voting system is given by
{10 : 5, 6, 4, 3}
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Coalition
Example
A weighted voting system is given by
{10 : 5, 6, 4, 3}
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Coalition
Example
A weighted voting system is given by
{10 : 5, 6, 4, 3}
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Banzhaf Power Index
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Banzhaf Power Index
The Banzhaf power index is between 0 and 1. If
BPI(A)=0.25 and BPI(B)=0.5, then B is a critical voter
twice of A. This means voter B can enter into more
winning coalitions.
Example
Consider four people A, B, C and D and the one person,
one vote system given by {3 : 1, 1, 1, 1}.
Winning Coalitions Number of Votes Critical Voters
{A, B, C } 3 A, B, C
{A, B, D} 3 A, B, D
{A, C , D} 3 A, C, D
{B, C , D} 3 B, C, D
{A, B, C , D} 4 none
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