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Apportionment and Voting

Delia Rose A. Miana


Department of Mathematics and Physics
Central Luzon State University

November 17, 2019


Outline
1 introduction to apportionment
The Hamilton Plan
The Jefferson Plan
The Adam’s Plan
The Webster’s Plan
The Huntington-Hill Plan
The Fair Plan
Apportionment Paradoxes

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Outline
1 introduction to apportionment
The Hamilton Plan
The Jefferson Plan
The Adam’s Plan
The Webster’s Plan
The Huntington-Hill Plan
The Fair Plan
Apportionment Paradoxes
2 introduction to voting
Plurality Method
Plurality with Elimination (without rank)
Plurality with Elimination (with rank)
Borda Count Method
Pairwise Comparison Method
Fairness of Voting Methods

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Outline
1 introduction to apportionment
The Hamilton Plan
The Jefferson Plan
The Adam’s Plan
The Webster’s Plan
The Huntington-Hill Plan
The Fair Plan
Apportionment Paradoxes
2 introduction to voting
Plurality Method
Plurality with Elimination (without rank)
Plurality with Elimination (with rank)
Borda Count Method
Pairwise Comparison Method
Fairness of Voting Methods
3 weighted voting system
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Introduction
According to the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
Article VI Section 5:

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Introduction
According to the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
Article VI Section 5:

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INTRODUCTION TO APPORTIONMENT

Apportionment is the process in which a whole is divided


into several parts. The portion alloted to its part is not
necessarily equal.

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INTRODUCTION TO APPORTIONMENT

Apportionment is the process in which a whole is divided


into several parts. The portion alloted to its part is not
necessarily equal.

For example, the family income is apportioned according


to the needs of the family. The amount alloted for food
may take the biggest share, followed by other needs such
as house rent, education, medicine and so on.

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(1) The Hamilton Plan
Under the Hamilton Plan, the standard divisor, SD, is first
computed.

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(1) The Hamilton Plan
Under the Hamilton Plan, the standard divisor, SD, is first
computed.
total population
Standard Divisor, SD=
number of people/seats to apportion

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(1) The Hamilton Plan
Under the Hamilton Plan, the standard divisor, SD, is first
computed.
total population
Standard Divisor, SD=
number of people/seats to apportion
The standard divisor determines the number of
individuals in the total population to be represented by
each representative.

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(1) The Hamilton Plan
Under the Hamilton Plan, the standard divisor, SD, is first
computed.
total population
Standard Divisor, SD=
number of people/seats to apportion
The standard divisor determines the number of
individuals in the total population to be represented by
each representative.

The Standard Quota, SQ, for each subgroup is computed


next.
population of subgroup
Standard Quotient, SQ=
SD
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(1) The Hamilton Plan

Example 1
A total of 25 practice teachers are to be apportioned
among seven classes at a certain elementary school. The
number of students in each of the seven classes is shown
in the table below.

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(1) The Hamilton Plan

Example 1
A total of 25 practice teachers are to be apportioned
among seven classes at a certain elementary school. The
number of students in each of the seven classes is shown
in the table below.

GRADE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 TOTAL
Number of Students 38 39 35 27 21 31 33 224

Determine the number of practice teachers that should be assigned in


each class.

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(2) The Jefferson Plan

Another method of apportionment is using the Jefferson


Plan. This method is similar to the Hamilton Plan except
that the standard divisor SD is modified by trial and error.

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(2) The Jefferson Plan

Another method of apportionment is using the Jefferson


Plan. This method is similar to the Hamilton Plan except
that the standard divisor SD is modified by trial and error.
Example 2
Use the Jefferson Plan to solve Example 1.

GRADE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 TOTAL
Number of Students 38 39 35 27 21 31 33 224

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(3) The Adam’s Plan

The Adam’s Plan of apportionment is similar to the


Jefferson’s Plan but instead of using the lower quota LQ,
the upper quota UQ, is used. That is, round up the SQ
of each subgroup to the nearest whole number.

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(3) The Adam’s Plan

The Adam’s Plan of apportionment is similar to the


Jefferson’s Plan but instead of using the lower quota LQ,
the upper quota UQ, is used. That is, round up the SQ
of each subgroup to the nearest whole number.
Example 3
Use the Adam’s Plan to solve Example 1.

GRADE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 TOTAL
Number of Students 38 39 35 27 21 31 33 224

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(4) The Webster’s Plan

The Webster’s Plan of apportionment is similar to the


Jefferson’s Plan but instead of using the lower quota LQ,
regular rounding off is done. If the sum is less than the
required seats, modify the standard divisor.

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(4) The Webster’s Plan

The Webster’s Plan of apportionment is similar to the


Jefferson’s Plan but instead of using the lower quota LQ,
regular rounding off is done. If the sum is less than the
required seats, modify the standard divisor.
Example 4
Use the Webster’s Plan to solve Example 1.

GRADE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 TOTAL
Number of Students 38 39 35 27 21 31 33 224

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(5) The Huntington-Hill Plan
The Huntington-Hill Method is also called the method of
equal proportions.
The Huntington-Hill Apportionment Principle states that
if one representative is to be added to one of several
subgroups, it should be added to the one with the
greatest Huntington-Hill Number (HHN)

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(5) The Huntington-Hill Plan
The Huntington-Hill Method is also called the method of
equal proportions.
The Huntington-Hill Apportionment Principle states that
if one representative is to be added to one of several
subgroups, it should be added to the one with the
greatest Huntington-Hill Number (HHN)
Example 5
Use the Huntington-Hill Method to solve Example 1.

GRADE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 TOTAL
Number of Students 38 39 35 27 21 31 33 224
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Apportionment Paradoxes

1.Alabama Paradox
Adding one representative causes one of the subgroups to
lose one representative even when the population of this
subggroup has not changed.

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Apportionment Paradoxes

1.Alabama Paradox
Adding one representative causes one of the subgroups to
lose one representative even when the population of this
subggroup has not changed.

The Alabama paradox was first noticed after the 1870 census. At the
time, the House of Representatives had 270 seats. However, when the
number of representatives in the House was increased to 280 seats,
Rhode Island lost a representative.

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Apportionment Paradoxes
2.Population Paradox
A subgroup loses a representative even when its
population is increasing faster than that of other
subgroups.

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Apportionment Paradoxes
2.Population Paradox
A subgroup loses a representative even when its
population is increasing faster than that of other
subgroups.
3.New States Paradox
Adding a new subgroup, and the corresponding number of
representatives based on its population, alters the
apportionment for some of the other subgroups.

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Apportionment Paradoxes
2.Population Paradox
A subgroup loses a representative even when its
population is increasing faster than that of other
subgroups.
3.New States Paradox
Adding a new subgroup, and the corresponding number of
representatives based on its population, alters the
apportionment for some of the other subgroups.
In 1907, when Oklahoma was added to the Union, the size of the
House was increased by five representatives to accomodate
Oklahoma’s population. However, when the complete apportionment
of the Congress was recalculated, New York lost a seat and Maine
gained a seat.
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The table below shows the comparison of the flaws of the
different methods of apportionment:
FLAW Hamilton Plan Jefferson Plan Adam’s Plan Webster’s Plan Huntington-Hill Plan
1. May violate the quota rule No Yes Yes Yes Yes
2. May produce the Alabama Paradox Yes No No No No
3. May produce the Population paradox Yes No No No No
4. May produce the New State Paradox Yes No No No No

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INTRODUCTION TO VOTING

It has been said that the only civil right for which the rich
and the poor are equal is that of voting. The right of
suffrage is a privilege granted to all eligible citizens
especially in the Philippines

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INTRODUCTION TO VOTING

It has been said that the only civil right for which the rich
and the poor are equal is that of voting. The right of
suffrage is a privilege granted to all eligible citizens
especially in the Philippines
Several methods of Voting:
1 Plurality Method
2 Plurality with Elimination (without rank)
3 Plurality with Elimination (with rank)
4 Borda Count Method
5 Pairwise Comparison Method
6 Fairness of Voting Methods

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(1) Plurality Method

This is the method of voting for the President and


Vice-President in the Philippines. Each Filipino voter
votes for one Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate.
The candidate with the most number of votes wins. The
number of votes need not necessarily be a majority vote.
A majority vote means 50% or one-half of the voting
people.

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(1) Plurality Method
EXAMPLE:
Sixty-five members of a youth club are asked to rank their
choices in order of preference for the place where they will
conduct their team building activity. The places are
Baguo (BG), Baler (BR) and Los Banos (LB). The results
are given in the table below.

Number of Ballot Cast


19 12 10 11 13
1st choice BG BG BR LB LB
2nd choice BR LB BG BR BG
3rd choice LB BR LB BG BR

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(2) Plurality with Elimination (without rank)

This Method works as follows:


a. Each voter votes for a candidate.
b. If a candidate receives a majority vote, that candidate
is declared the winner.
c. If no candidate receives a majority vote, then the
candidate with the fewest votes is eliminate and a
new election is held.
d. This process continues until a candidate receives a
majority vote.

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(2) Plurality with Elimination (without rank)

This Method works as follows:


a. Each voter votes for a candidate.
b. If a candidate receives a majority vote, that candidate
is declared the winner.
c. If no candidate receives a majority vote, then the
candidate with the fewest votes is eliminate and a
new election is held.
d. This process continues until a candidate receives a
majority vote.
The disadvantage of this method, however, is that holding several
elections is expensive and time-consuming.
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(3) Plurality with Elimination (with rank)

It is also known as Instant-Runoff Method of Voting.


a. Each voter votes for a candidate.
b. Eliminate the candidate with the fewest number of votes. If two
or more of the remaining candidates have the same number of
first-place votes, then all are eliminated unless that would
eliminate all alternatives. In that case, a different method of
voting must be used.
c. Adjust the voter’s rankings of the remaining candidates.
d. Repeat the process of elimination until 2 candidates are left.
d. The candidate with the majority vote wins the election.

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(3) Plurality with Elimination (with rank)

EXAMPLE:
Use the previous example.

Number of Ballot Cast


19 12 10 11 13
1st choice BG BG BR LB LB
2nd choice BR LB BG BR BG
3rd choice LB BR LB BG BR

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(4) Borda Count Method

Jean C. Borda (1733-1799), a member of the French


Academy of Sciences, introduced this method in order to
ensure the fairness of voting. He wanted to make sure
that the people being elected into their Academy were the
best candidates. This method became the first attempt
to quantify the voting system.

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(4) Borda Count Method

Jean C. Borda (1733-1799), a member of the French


Academy of Sciences, introduced this method in order to
ensure the fairness of voting. He wanted to make sure
that the people being elected into their Academy were the
best candidates. This method became the first attempt
to quantify the voting system.
In the Borda Count method of voting, each voter ranks the
choice by giving n points, n being the number of choices
to the first choice, n-1 points to the second choice, n-2 to
the third choice and so on. The choice that receives the
highest number of points wins.

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(4) Borda Count Method

EXAMPLE:
Consider again the previous example.

Number of Ballot Cast


19 12 10 11 13
1st choice BG BG BR LB LB
2nd choice BR LB BG BR BG
3rd choice LB BR LB BG BR

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(5) Pairwise Comparison Method

Maria Nicholas Caritat (1743-1794) was also a member


of the French Academy of Sciences. Being a colleague of
Borda, he showed that the Borda Count Method of voting
had flaws.

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(5) Pairwise Comparison Method

Maria Nicholas Caritat (1743-1794) was also a member


of the French Academy of Sciences. Being a colleague of
Borda, he showed that the Borda Count Method of voting
had flaws.
He proposed instead, that each choice should be compared
one-to-one with each of the other choices. In comparing,
the winning choice over another gets 1 point, 0.5 if the
two choices are tied and 0 points if it is a loss. The choice
with the most number of points is the winner. He called
this criterion the Condorcet Criterion.

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(5) Pairwise Comparison Method

Maria Nicholas Caritat (1743-1794) was also a member


of the French Academy of Sciences. Being a colleague of
Borda, he showed that the Borda Count Method of voting
had flaws.
He proposed instead, that each choice should be compared
one-to-one with each of the other choices. In comparing,
the winning choice over another gets 1 point, 0.5 if the
two choices are tied and 0 points if it is a loss. The choice
with the most number of points is the winner. He called
this criterion the Condorcet Criterion.
The pairwise comparison voting method is also called
head-to head method.
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(5) Pairwise Comparison Method

EXAMPLE:
Consider again the previous example.

Number of Ballot Cast


19 12 10 11 13
1st choice BG BG BR LB LB
2nd choice BR LB BG BR BG
3rd choice LB BR LB BG BR

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Fairness of Voting Methods

Among the different voting methods presented, which of


these methods is the fairest?

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Fairness of Voting Methods

Among the different voting methods presented, which of


these methods is the fairest?
Kenneth J. Arrow tried to answer this in 1948 while he was
doing his doctoral dissertation. In his studies, he presented
four criteria for a fair voting system.

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Fairness of Voting Methods

Among the different voting methods presented, which of


these methods is the fairest?
Kenneth J. Arrow tried to answer this in 1948 while he was
doing his doctoral dissertation. In his studies, he presented
four criteria for a fair voting system.
Criteria for Fairness of Voting Method
1 Majority criterion
2 Monotonicity criterion
3 Condorcet criterion
4 Independence of irrelevant alternatives

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Criteria for Fairness of Voting Method

1. Majority Criterion
The choice/option which gets a majority of the first-place
votes wins.

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Criteria for Fairness of Voting Method

1. Majority Criterion
The choice/option which gets a majority of the first-place
votes wins.

2. Monotonicity Criterion
If a choice/option wins the election, then it will also win
the election if the supporters of other choices/options
change their votes to support it in case there is a change
of preferences.

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Criteria for Fairness of Voting Method

3. Condorcet Criterion
If a choice/option is favored when compared head-to-head
individually with each of the other choice/options, then
this choice/option wins.

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Criteria for Fairness of Voting Method

3. Condorcet Criterion
If a choice/option is favored when compared head-to-head
individually with each of the other choice/options, then
this choice/option wins.

4. Independence of irrelevant alternatives


The winning choice/option would still be the winner in
any recount.

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Criteria for Fairness of Voting Method

Based from Arrow’s study, he was able to conclude that if


there are three or more choices, there is no voting method
that will satisfy all the four criteria for fairness. This is now
referred to as Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

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Criteria for Fairness of Voting Method

Based from Arrow’s study, he was able to conclude that if


there are three or more choices, there is no voting method
that will satisfy all the four criteria for fairness. This is now
referred to as Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem


It is mathematically impossible to create any system of
voting (involving three or more candidates) that satisfies
all four fairness criteria.

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WEIGHTED VOTING SYSTEM

A weighted voting system is a biased voting system. It is a


voting system wherein some voters are given more weight
on the election result.

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WEIGHTED VOTING SYSTEM

A weighted voting system is a biased voting system. It is a


voting system wherein some voters are given more weight
on the election result.

A weighted voting system of n voters is written

{q : w1 , w2 , w3 , . . . wn }
where q represents the quota and wi represents the weight
of each voter. The quota is the number of votes required
to pass a given measure or resolution.

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WEIGHTED VOTING SYSTEM

The weight of a voter is the number of votes controlled by


the voter.

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WEIGHTED VOTING SYSTEM

The weight of a voter is the number of votes controlled by


the voter.
For example, {60 : 24, 27, 26, 22} means 60 votes are
required to pass a proposed measure or resolution. The
four numbers after the colon means there are four votes
whose weights are respectively, 24, 27, 26 and 22.

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Types of Weighted Voting System
One Person, One Vote
{6 : 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}

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Types of Weighted Voting System
One Person, One Vote
{6 : 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}
In this voting system, each of the ten voters has one vote
and 6 votes are needed to pass the resolution. This is also
a majority vote.

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Types of Weighted Voting System
One Person, One Vote
{6 : 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}
In this voting system, each of the ten voters has one vote
and 6 votes are needed to pass the resolution. This is also
a majority vote.

Dictatorship
{15 : 16, 5, 3, 2, 4}

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Types of Weighted Voting System
One Person, One Vote
{6 : 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}
In this voting system, each of the ten voters has one vote
and 6 votes are needed to pass the resolution. This is also
a majority vote.

Dictatorship
{15 : 16, 5, 3, 2, 4}
In this voting system, the person with 16 votes can pass
any resolution. Even if the four other members merge,
their total votes will not meet the quota.
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Types of Weighted Voting System

Null System
{35 : 16, 5, 3, 2, 4}

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Types of Weighted Voting System

Null System
{35 : 16, 5, 3, 2, 4}
No resolution or proposal will pass in this voting system.
Even if all the voters cast their votes, the sum of the votes
will never be equal to the quota.

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Types of Weighted Voting System
Veto Power System
{35 : 16, 4, 8, 6, 1}

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Types of Weighted Voting System
Veto Power System
{35 : 16, 4, 8, 6, 1}

In this voting system, the sum of all votes is equal to the


quota. if any voter will not vote for the resolution or
proposal, it will fail. Each voter is said to have a veto
power

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Types of Weighted Voting System
Veto Power System
{35 : 16, 4, 8, 6, 1}

In this voting system, the sum of all votes is equal to the


quota. if any voter will not vote for the resolution or
proposal, it will fail. Each voter is said to have a veto
power

A voter is said to have a veto power if a measure or proposal


cannot be passed without him voting for it.

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Types of Weighted Voting System
Veto Power System
{35 : 16, 4, 8, 6, 1}

In this voting system, the sum of all votes is equal to the


quota. if any voter will not vote for the resolution or
proposal, it will fail. Each voter is said to have a veto
power

A voter is said to have a veto power if a measure or proposal


cannot be passed without him voting for it.
In this weighted voting system, {20 : 15, 5, 6}, who has
the veto power?
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Coalition

A set of voters each voting for or against a measure,


collectively, is a coalition.

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Coalition

A set of voters each voting for or against a measure,


collectively, is a coalition.

If the sum of the votes of the voters in a coalition is greater


than or equal to the quota, the coalition is a winning
coalition; otherwise it is called a losing coalition.

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Coalition

A set of voters each voting for or against a measure,


collectively, is a coalition.

If the sum of the votes of the voters in a coalition is greater


than or equal to the quota, the coalition is a winning
coalition; otherwise it is called a losing coalition.
Any voter in a winning coalition who leaves it, turning it
into a losing coalition is called a critical voter .

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Coalition
Example
A weighted voting system is given by

{10 : 5, 6, 4, 3}

where the numbers after the colon are the respective


weights of voters A, B, C and D.

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Coalition
Example
A weighted voting system is given by

{10 : 5, 6, 4, 3}

where the numbers after the colon are the respective


weights of voters A, B, C and D.
The coalition {A, B} is a winning coalition, while the
coalition {C , D} is a losing coalition.

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Coalition
Example
A weighted voting system is given by

{10 : 5, 6, 4, 3}

where the numbers after the colon are the respective


weights of voters A, B, C and D.
The coalition {A, B} is a winning coalition, while the
coalition {C , D} is a losing coalition.

How many coalitions can be formed in this system?

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Coalition
Example
A weighted voting system is given by

{10 : 5, 6, 4, 3}

where the numbers after the colon are the respective


weights of voters A, B, C and D.
The coalition {A, B} is a winning coalition, while the
coalition {C , D} is a losing coalition.

How many coalitions can be formed in this system?


The number of possible coalition of n voters is 2n − 1.
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Banzhaf Power Index

In 1965, John F. Banzhaf III, a professor of law at George


Washington University Law Scholl, derived the Banzhaf
power index which is now used to determine the power
of a voter in a weighted voting system.

Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 35 / 36
Banzhaf Power Index

In 1965, John F. Banzhaf III, a professor of law at George


Washington University Law Scholl, derived the Banzhaf
power index which is now used to determine the power
of a voter in a weighted voting system.

The Banzhaf power index of a voter v, BPI(v), is computed


as:
number of times voter v is a critical voter
BPI(v ) =
number of times any voter is a critical voter

Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 35 / 36
Banzhaf Power Index
The Banzhaf power index is between 0 and 1. If
BPI(A)=0.25 and BPI(B)=0.5, then B is a critical voter
twice of A. This means voter B can enter into more
winning coalitions.
Example
Consider four people A, B, C and D and the one person,
one vote system given by {3 : 1, 1, 1, 1}.
Winning Coalitions Number of Votes Critical Voters
{A, B, C } 3 A, B, C
{A, B, D} 3 A, B, D
{A, C , D} 3 A, C, D
{B, C , D} 3 B, C, D
{A, B, C , D} 4 none
Delia Rose A. Miana|DMP Math 1100: Apportionment and Voting November 17, 2019 36 / 36

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