SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS – SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
ATTY. FRANCESCA LOURDES SENGA
RULE 67 – RULES OF COURT
BPI SAVINGS BANK, INC. V. SPS. YUJUICO
G.R. NO. 175796
FACTS: The City of Manila filed a complaint against
Respondents for the expropriation of 5 parcels of land registered
in the name of Teresita Yujuico. 2 of the 5 parcels of land were
previously mortgaged to CityTrust Banking Corporation, which
is the Petitioner herein’s predecessor-in-interest. The RTC later
on decided that the 5 parcels of land be expropriated for public
use. Petitioner then extrajudicially foreclosed on the 2 parcels
of land with the petitioner being declared the highest bidder.
Claiming there to be a deficiency, petitioner sued respondents
for the deficiency before the RTC-Makati but the Respondents
moved to dismiss the complaint claiming, among others, that the
remedy had been abandoned or extinguished. RTC denied the
MTD. Respondents then moved to reconsider and later on, in its
reply, raised for the first time the ground of improper venue
contending that an action for recovery of deficiency, being a
supplementary action to the extrajudicial foreclosure, was a real
action and should have been brought with the RTC-Manila
where the property was located. RTC-Makati denied the MR.
Upon appeal to the CA, the CA granted the petition and ruled in
favor of respondents that the case had been filed in the wrong
venue.
ISSUE: IS AN ACTION TO RECOVER DEFICIENCY AFTER
EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE A REAL OR PERSONAL
ACTION?
HELD: IT IS A PERSONAL ACTION, hence, the venue was
properly laid.
A real action is one that affects title to or possession of real
property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is
a real action. The real action is to be commenced and tried in
the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which
explains why the action is also referred to as a local action. All
other types of action are personal actions and are considered as
transitory as the venue is the place where the plaintiff or any of
the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of
the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an
action to recover the deficiency after the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal action,
for it does not affect title to or possession of real property, or any
interest therein.
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BARRIDO V. NONATO
G.R. NO. 176492 (2014)
(Take note that in this case, condemnation is considered to be
under the jurisdiction of the MTCC (basing the property on its
assessed value) as compared to the earlier case of Bardillon v.
Brgy Masili (2003) where expropriation/condemnation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation hence, the RTC has
jurisdiction)
FACTS: During the course of their marriage, petitioner and
respondents acquired a house and lot. However, their marriage
was later declared void due to psychological incapacity. Nonato
then asked Barrido for partition but Barrido refused. Nonato then
filed a complaint for partition before the MTCC. Barrido moved
to dismiss the complaint on the ground of, among others, lack of
jurisdiction as an action for partition is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. MTCC then adjudicated that the house be given to
Barrido.
Nonato appealed to the RTC which set aside the MTCC’s
judgement which was affirmed by the CA saying that MTCC had
jurisdiction as the assessed value of the property was only Php
8,080 pesos.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT MTCC HAS JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE FOR PARTITION
HELD: YES, it has jurisdiction over the case for partition.
Contrary to Barrido’s contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to
take cognizance of real actions or those affecting title to real
property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage
on real property. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129
provides:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.– Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions which involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein where
the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (₱20,000.00)or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs: Provided, That value of such property
shall be determined by the assessed value of
the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No.
7691)
 SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS – SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
ATTY. FRANCESCA LOURDES SENGA
RULE 67 – RULES OF COURT
Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely
₱8,080.00, an amount which certainly does not exceed the
required limit of ₱20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila
to fall within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the lower
court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.
BARDILLON V. BARANGAY MASILI OF CALAMBA,
LAGUNA
G.R. NO. 146886 (2003)
(Compare this case with the latter case of Barrido v. Nonato)
FACTS: 2 complaints were filed by Brgy. Masili for eminent
domain involving a parcel of land owned by Petitioner. The first
complaint was filed for the failure of Brgy. Masili to reach an
agreement with Petitioner on the purchase offer of Php
200,000.00. The expropriation was pursuant to Brgy. Masili’s
multi-purpose hall for the use and benefit of the constituents.
The MTC dismissed the same and denied their MR. The second
complaint was for the same reason but filed before the RTC. The
Petitioner moved to dismiss the same as it is barred by prior
judgement pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. The RTC
dismissed the MTD and declared that the MTC had no
jurisdiction over the expropriation proceedings. Upon appeal to
the CA, it ruled in favor of the Brgy. Masili and declared that
there is no res judicata as MTC had no jurisdiction over the
expropriation proceedings.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION
OVER AN EXPROPRIATION CASE
HELD: YES. Petitioner claims that, since the value of the land is
only P11,448, the MTC had jurisdiction over the case.
On the other hand, the appellate court held that the assessed
value of the property was P28,960. Thus, the MTC did not have
jurisdiction over the expropriation proceedings, because the
amount involved was beyond the P20,000 jurisdictional amount
cognizable by MTCs.
An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of
money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of
its authority and right to take property for public use. As such, it
is incapable of pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the
regional trial courts.
This was explained by the Court in Barangay San Roque v. Heirs
of Francisco Pastor:
"It should be stressed that the primary
consideration in an expropriation suit is
whether the government or any of its
instrumentalities has complied with the
requisites for the taking of private property.
Hence, the courts determine the authority of the
government entity, the necessity of the
expropriation, and the observance of due
process. In the main, the subject of an
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expropriation suit is the government's exercise of
eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
"True, the value of the property to be
expropriated is estimated in monetary terms,
for the court is duty-bound to determine the
just compensation for it. This, however, is
merely incidental to the expropriation suit.
Indeed, that amount is determined only after
the court is satisfied with the propriety of the
expropriation."
"Verily, the Court held in Republic of the
Philippines v. Zurbano that 'condemnation
proceedings are within the jurisdiction of Courts
of First Instance,' the forerunners of the regional
trial courts. The said case was decided during
the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which,
like BP 129 in respect to RTCs, provided that
courts of first instance had original jurisdiction
over 'all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation.'
The 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court
were not intended to change these
jurisprudential precedents.
To reiterate, an expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of
the RTC regardless of the value of the land, because the
subject of the action is the government's exercise of
eminent domain a matter that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
BARANGAY SAN ROQUE V. HEIRS OF FRANCISCO
PASTOR
GR NO. 138896, JUN 20, 2000
Doctrine: An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the jurisdiction of the
regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject
property.
Facts: Petitioner filed before the MTC of Talisay, Cebu a
Complaint to expropriate a property of the respondents. It
appears from the current Tax Declaration of the land involved
that its assessed value is only One Thousand Seven Hundred
Forty Pesos (P1,740.00). MTC dismissed the Complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "eminent domain
is an exercise of the power to take private property for public
use after payment of just compensation. In an action for eminent
domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise
of such power or right. The fact that the action also involves real
property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is
therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court and not with this Court."
 SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS – SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
ATTY. FRANCESCA LOURDES SENGA
RULE 67 – RULES OF COURT
RTC Ruling: RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed
before it, holding that an action for eminent domain affected title
to real property; hence, the value of the property to be
expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed
before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should
have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject
property was less than P20,000.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to SC, raising a pure
question of law.
Issue: Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for
eminent domain or expropriation where the assessed value of
the subject property is below Twenty Thousand (20,000.00)
Pesos?
Ruling: RTC. The test to determine whether it is so was laid
down by the Court in this wise:
"A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in
determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which
is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted
the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action
or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum
of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts
or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of
the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not
be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule
is plainly that the second class cases, besides the determination
of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the law
has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first
instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that
the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating
jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine Commission of June 11,
1901)."
In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the
recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise
by the government of its authority and right to take private
property for public use.
In National Power Corporation v. Jocson, the Court ruled that
expropriation proceedings have two phases:
first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in
the suit.
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second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with
the determination by the court of `the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken.
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an
expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its
instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking
of private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of
the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and
the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an
expropriation suit is the government's exercise of eminent
domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated
in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the
just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to
the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only
after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.
NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORP. V. BERMUDA
DEVELOPMENT CORP.
G.R. NO. 214782
FACTS: Respondent Bermuda Development Corporation (BDC)
filed a case for Unlawful Detainer against Petitioner National
Transmission Corporation (TransCo) with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Cabuyao. The MTC rendered a decision
ordering TransCo to vacate the subject lot locsted at Brgy.
Banlic, Cabuyao, Laguna as well as to pay the amount of
P10,350,000.00 as monthly rentals.
TransCo inteposed an appeal while BDC filed an Urgent Motion
for Execution. Such motion was then granted by the MTC. In the
meantime, Petitioner TransCo filed a Complaint for
Expropriation of the parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 258244, (the same property subject of the
Unlawful Detainer Case) before the RTC of Biñan, Laguna.
Subsequently, on 25 February 2010, TransCo filed with RTC an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession.
TransCo then deposited the amount of P10,704,000.00 with the
Landbank of the Philippines, purportedly representing the
provisional value of the property sought to be expropriated. The
RTC then issued an order granting the motion for issuance of
writ of possession.
APPEAL IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER: The RTC dismissed the
appeal of TransCo for being moot and academic. In filing said
expropriation proceeding, defendant-appellant TransCo may
also be considered to have abandoned its appeal. An MR was
filed which was subsequently denied. Thus, a petition for review
was filed before the CA.
The CA dismissed the petiton. It reasoned out that it would be
circuitous for the CA to require TransCo to first vacate the
subject property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
 SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS – SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
ATTY. FRANCESCA LOURDES SENGA
RULE 67 – RULES OF COURT
258244 in view of the adverse judgment in the unlawful detainer
case of the Municipal Trial Court of Cabuyao (MTC), and then
soon thereafter, restore it again in possession of the property on
account of the writ of possession issued by the RTC, Branch 25,
the court where the expropriation case is pending. The CA
added that this sort of pernicious and unreasonable delay of
government infrastructure/development projects will not be
countenanced by it.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in dismissing TransCo's appeal
allegedly because it has become moot and academic with the
filing of the expropriation complaint involving the same property
subject of the unlawful detainer case
HELD: Yes. The recovery of possession of the property by
the landowner can no longer be allowed on the grounds of
estoppel and, more importantly, of public policy which
imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue its
services to the public. The non-filing of the case for
expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the
property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is
the right of compensation.
It is well-settled that a case filed by a landowner for recovery of
possession or ejectment against a public utility corporation,
endowed with the power of eminent domain, which has
occupied the land belonging to the former in the interest of
public service without prior acquisition of title thereto by
negotiated purchase or expropriation proceedings, will not
prosper. Any action to compel the public utility corporation to
vacate such property is unavailing since the landowner is denied
the remedies of ejectment and injunction for reasons of public
policy and public necessity as well as equitable estoppel. The
proper recourse is for the ejectment court: (1) to dismiss the
case without prejudice to the landowner filing the proper action
for recovery of just compensation and consequential damages;
or (2) to dismiss the case and direct the public utility corporation
to institute the proper expropriation or condemnation
proceedings and to pay the just compensation and
consequential damages assessed therein; or (3) to continue with
the case as if it were an expropriation case and determine the
just compensation and consequential damages pursuant to Rule
67 (Expropriation) of the Rules of Court, if the ejectment court
has jurisdiction over the value of the subject land.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001, the National Transmission Corporation
(TransCo or TRANSCO), a government agency, was created to
assume the electrical transmission functions of the National
Power Corporation and is vested with the power of eminent
domain subject to the requirements of the Constitution and
existing laws.
Given that BDC filed before the MTC a complaint for unlawful
4
detainer against TransCo, which erected and then energized a
230 KV transmission traversing the whole extent of the subject
property, the MTC should have found or taken judicial notice
that TransCo is a public service corporation with the power to
expropriate. Upon such finding, the MTC, pursuant to the
aforecited prevailing jurisprudence, should have then ordered
the dismissal of the unlawful detainer case without prejudice to
BDC's right to recover the value of the land actually taken, or
ordered TransCo to institute the proper expropriation or
condemnation proceedings and to pay the just compensation
and damages assessed therein. The MTC could not have
proceeded to determine just compensation given that the value
of the subject property is clearly beyond its jurisdiction.
Further, the award of rental in arrears by the MTC is improper
because BDC is only entitled to the just compensation of the
subject land and consequential damages as determined
pursuant to Sections 5 and 6, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
While the award of rental in arrears is proper in an unlawful
detainer action, its award in the present case cannot be upheld
since an unlawful detainer action is not a sanctioned remedy in
case a public service or utility corporation, endowed with the
power of eminent domain, like TransCo in this case, has
occupied privately-owned property without first acquiring title
thereto by negotiated purchase or expropriation proceedings.
The MTC being bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the unlawful
detainer case, its Decision mandating TransCo to vacate the
subject property and remove all structures thereon and to pay
BDC P10,350,000.00 as reasonable rental computed from
December 13, 2008 is without legal basis.
The subsequent filing by TransCo of the expropriation
proceedings could not have rendered the unlawful detainer case
moot and academic inasmuch as the MTC erred in proceeding
with the unlawful detainer case and not dismissing it following
the prevailing jurisprudence.
EUSEBIO V. LUIS
G.R. NO. 162474
FACTS: Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 53591 and
53589 with an area of 1,586 sq.m. Said parcel of land was taken
by the City of Pasig in 1980 and used as a municipal road now
known as A. Sandoval Avenue, Barangay Palatiw, Pasig City.
On February 1, 1993, the Sanggunian of Pasig City passed
Resolution No. 15 authorizing payments to respondents for said
parcel of land. However, the Appraisal Committee of the City of
Pasig, in Resolution No. 93-13 dated October 19, 1993,
assessed the value of the land only at P150.00/sq.m.. In a letter
dated June 26, 1995, respondents requested the Appraisal
Committee to consider P2,000.00/sq.m. as the value of their
land. One of the respondents also wrote a letter dated November
 SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS – SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
ATTY. FRANCESCA LOURDES SENGA
RULE 67 – RULES OF COURT
25, 1994 to Mayor Vicente P. Eusebio calling the latter's attention
to the fact that a property in the same area, as the land subject
of this case, had been paid for by petitioners at the price of
P2,000.00/sq.m. when said property was expropriated in the
year 1994 also for conversion into a public road.
Subsequently, respondents' counsel sent a demand letter dated
August 26, 1996 to Mayor Eusebio. Respondents filed a
Complaint for Reconveyance and/or Damages (Civil Case No.
65937) against herein petitioners before the RTC of Pasig City
(Branch 155). They prayed that the property be returned to them
with payment of reasonable rentals for 16 years of use at
P500.00/sq.m., or P793,000.00, with legal interest of 12% per
annum from date of filing of the complaint until full payment, or
in the event that said property can no longer be returned, that
petitioners be ordered to pay just compensation in the amount
of P7,930,000.00 and rental for sixteen years of use at
P500.00/sq.m., or P793,000.00, both with legal interest of 12%
per annum from the date of filing of the complaint until full
payment. In addition, respondents prayed for payment of moral
and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs.
Petitioners then appealed the case to the CA, but the CA
affirmed the RTC judgment in its Decision dated November 28,
2003.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether respondents are entitled to regain possession
of their property taken by the city government in the
1980's and,
(2) In the event that said property can no longer be
returned, how should just
compensation to respondents be determined.
HELD: No. Because the landowner did not act to question the
lack of expropriation proceedings for a very long period of time
and even negotiated with the PNR as to how much it should be
paid as just compensation, said landowner is deemed to have
waived its right and is estopped from questioning the power of
the PNR to expropriate or the public use for which the power
was exercised.
Just like in the Forfom case, herein respondents also failed to
question the taking of their property for a long period of time
(from 1980 until the early 1990's) and, when asked during trial
what action they took after their property was taken, witness
Jovito Luis, one of the respondents, testified that "when we have
an occasion to talk to Mayor Caruncho we always asked for
compensation." It is likewise undisputed that what was
constructed by the city government on respondents' property
was a road for public use, namely, A. Sandoval Avenue in Pasig
City. Clearly, as in Forfom, herein respondents are also
estopped from recovering possession of their land, but are
entitled to just compensation.
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Now, with regard to the trial court's determination of the amount
of just compensation to which respondents are entitled, the
Court must strike down the same for being contrary to
established rules and jurisprudence.
Still following Forfom, the Court ruled that even if there are no
expropriation proceedings instituted to determine just
compensation, the trial court is still mandated to act in
accordance with the procedure provided for in Section 5, Rule
67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the
appointment of not more than three competent and
disinterested commissioners to ascertain and report to the court
the just compensation for the subject property.
The Court reiterated its ruling in National Power Corporation v.
Dela Cruz that "trial with the aid of commissioners is a substantial
right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no
reason at all." It was also emphasized therein that although
ascertainment of just compensation is a judicial prerogative, the
commissioners' findings may only be disregarded or substituted
with the trial court's own estimation of the property's value only
if the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the
evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded a
clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed
is either grossly inadequate or excessive.
It is quite clear that the Court, in formulating and promulgating
the procedure provided for in Sections 5 and 6, Rule 67, found
this to be the fairest way of arriving at the just compensation to
be paid for private property taken for public use.
With regard to the time as to when just compensation should be
fixed, it is settled jurisprudence that where property was taken
without the benefit of expropriation proceedings, and its owner
files an action for recovery of possession thereof before the
commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of
the property at the time of taking that is controlling.
MANILA RAILROAD V. PAREDES
32 PHIL 534 (1915)
FACTS: Plaintiff is a railroad corporation organized under the
laws of the Philippine Islands and has the power of eminent
domain. In conformity with its charter, it constructed and is now
operating a branch line from Manila to Gumaca, Province of
Tayabas. It claims that it took possession of this strip of land with
the consent of the various owners and occupants claiming title
thereto, and with the understanding that it would pay the owners
of all the lands thus taken a price to be agreed upon thereafter,
or to be fixed in condemnation proceedings; and that, not having
been able to agree upon a price with the owners of the land, it
was later compelled to institute proceedings for the
condemnation of the land thus taken.
 SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS – SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
ATTY. FRANCESCA LOURDES SENGA
RULE 67 – RULES OF COURT
On April 1, 1913, the Railway Companyinstituted expropriation
proceedings looking to the condemnation of all these lands
under and by virtue of the authority conferred upon it by is
charter and under the laws applicable to such proceedings.
On April 4, 1913, Herbert Gale, the judge then presiding in the
court wherein these proceedings were pending, entered an
order granting to the Railroad Company the right of possession
of all these lands, upon the filing of a deposit in an amount
certified by the provincial treasurer to be equal to the average
assessed value of all these lands, which, in the language of the
order itself was the value of the lands, "hereby provisionally
ascertained and fixed."
On April 11, 1913, the Railroad Company deposited the sum of
P8,971.72, the assessed value of the lands in question as shown
by the certificate of the provincial treasurer. Thereafter, Judge
Cui, then presiding in the court wherein the proceedings were
pending, issued a formal writ, directing the sheriff of the court to
put the Railroad Company in possession of all the lands
described in the applications in expropriation proceedings filed
by the Railroad Company.
Thereafter, the land companies to be the owners and
successors in interest of the original owners of most of the lands
in question, entered their appearance as defendants in the
expropriation proceedings, and acting jointly with the various
claimants whose lands had not been acquired by them,
procured the appointment of commissioners for the valuation of
these lands.
On January 9, 1915, the land companies and the other claimants
to these lands moved the court to increase the amount of the
deposit from P8,971.72, the amount originally fixed, to
P1,000,000.
On February 18, 1915, the respondent judge, then presiding in
the court wherein the proceedings were pending, after hearing
the parties and considering the evidence submitted at the
hearing, and notwithstanding objection duly interposed on the
ground of his lack of jurisdiction to entertain the motion, issued
an order directing the Railroad Company to increase its deposit
to P1,000,000.
It is this order which the applicants now seek to have this court
declare null and void in original certiorari proceedings in this
court.
ISSUE: Whether the state may prescribed a procedure by virtue
of which a railway corporation may secure the possession of the
lands it seeks to condemn, pending the condemnation
proceedings, without first paying the owners just compensation
therefor, on condition that it deposit with the Treasurer of the
Philippine Islands the value of the land, in money, provisionally
ascertained by the court without giving the owners of the land
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an opportunity to be heard as to the amount of the prescribed
deposit.
HELD: The Court said that “according to the weight of authority,
if the constitution or statutes do not expressly require it, actual
payment or tender before taking is unnecessary, and it will be
sufficient if a certain and adequate remedy is provided by which
the owner can obtain compensation without any unreasonable
delay.”
The right to enter into immediate possession of the property
even before the final ascertainment and payment of just
compensation is given to any plaintiff. The pertinent Rules of
Court provision (Section 2, Rule 67) reads:
“Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter the
plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession
of the real or personal property involved if he deposits with the
National or Provincial Treasurer its value, as provisionally and
promptly ascertained and fixed by the court having jurisdiction
of the proceedings, to be held by such treasurer subject to the
orders and final disposition of the court.”
DE YNCHAUSTI V. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD & LIGHT,
CO.
36 PHIL 908 (1917)
FACTS: In 1912, respondent was duly authorized by the Director
of Public Works, acting on behalf of the Philippines and the
province of Rizal, to construct an electric railroad track upon the
provincial highway running from the city of Manila to the
municipality of Parañaque. The precise location of the tract was
designated by that official, who authorized and required the
company to construct its track along the side of the road. When
it was completed in 1912, question appears to have arisen as to
the width of the highway, as it is now occupying 200 meters long
and 3 meters wide. Petitioner is now praying for the recovery of
possession of a strip of his land and damages for the alleged
unlawful taking and dereliction in the sum of PHP 1,000.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to his claim
HELD: No. If the railroad corporation were not clothed with any
special or exceptional rights under its charter, touching the
condemnation of lands necessary for its use, it is clear that under
the general provisions of law, the plaintiff would be entitled to
elect, either to recover the value of the lands thus taken, or to
recover possession of these lands, upon condition that he first
reimburse the corporation for the expenditures made upon the
land while in its possession.
Article 361 of the Civil Code provides that: "The owner of the
land on which building, sowing, or planting is done in good faith
shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing,
or planting after the indemnity mentioned in articles 453 and
 SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS – SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
ATTY. FRANCESCA LOURDES SENGA
RULE 67 – RULES OF COURT
454, or, to oblige the person who has built or planted, to pay to
him the value of the land and to force the person who sowed to
pay the proper rent."
But the railroad corporation being clothed with the right to take
the land in question in condemnation proceedings, it would be a
manifestly vain and useless formality to render judgment for the
restoration of possession upon payment of an indemnity to
reimburse the railroad corporation for its expenditures on the
land — with the full knowledge that before such judgment could
be executed the railroad corporation could and would take
possession of the land in condemnation proceedings upon
payment of compensation for the value of the land and the
improvements made upon it. It is clear, therefore, that with
relation to lands which a railroad corporation is authorized under
its charter to have condemned for its sue, and which have been
entered upon and occupied by the railroad corporation, under a
claim of right and in good faith, but without first instituting the
appropriate condemnation proceedings, the right of election
secured to the landowner in articles 361 and 453 of the Civil
Code has, in substance and effect, been destroyed by the
enactment of the legislation conferring the power upon the
railroad corporation to take possession in condemnation
proceedings.
The only right secured to the landowner in such cases is the
right to compensation for the lands taken, and resultant
damages to his lands not taken, which right he may enforce in
an ordinary action to compel the corporation to pay the value of
the land under the terms of article 361 of the Code, or, if he so
desires, by the institution of appropriate proceedings to compel
the corporation and damages assessed in the course of the
condemnation proceedings.
In Goodin v. Cin. and Whitewater Canal Co, it was said that: "The
owner of land, who stands by, without objection, and sees a
public railroad constructed over it, can not, after the road is
completed, or large expenditures have been made thereon upon
the faith of his apparent acquiescence, reclaim the land, or
enjoin its use by the railroad company. In such case there can
only remain to the owner a right of compensation."
Similarly in St. Julien vs. Morgan etc., Railroad Co., "One who
permits a railroad company to occupy and use his land and
construct its road thereon without remonstrance or complaint,
cannot afterwards reclaim it free from the servitude he has
permitted to be imposed upon it. His acquiescence in the
company's taking possession and constructing its works under
circumstances which made imperative his resistance, if he ever
intended to set up illegality, will be considered a waiver. But
while this presumed waiver is a bar to his action to dispossess
the company, he is not deprived of his action for damages for
the value of the land, or for injuries done him by the construction
or operations of the road."
7
Petitioner’s claim for possession shall fail, but he is entitled to
recover the value of the land, gave judgment for an amount
equal to its assessed value.
However, the amount is erroneous. No such relief was sought or
prayed for by the plaintiff, and no evidence was introduced into
the record in support thereof. The trial judge appears to have
assumed, without proof, that the assessed value of the land
might be taken as its true market value; and however this may
be, it is a fact that there is no evidence in the record upon which
to base a finding as to the true value of the land, even if a
judgment could properly be entered in favor of the plaintiff for
damages the amount of which he did not allege or make any
attempt to prove at the trial.
Judgment should be reversed without costs in this instance. But
the dismissal of the complaint in this action should be without
prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to institute the appropriate
proceedings to recover the value of the lands actually taken, or
to compel the railroad corporation to take the necessary steps
to secure the condemnation of the land and to pay the amount
of the compensation and damages assessed in the
condemnation proceedings.
DE KNECHT V. CA
G.R. NO. 108015 & 109324
FACTS: In 1979, the Republic of the Philippines initiated a case
for expropriation against the Knechts' property. The government
sought to utilize the land for the completion of the Manila Flood
Control and Drainage Project and the extension of the EDSA
towards Roxas Boulevard.
The CFI issued a writ of possession. This SC, however, held that
the choice of area for the extension of EDSA was arbitrary. The
SC annulled the writ.
In 1982, the City Treasurer of Pasay discovered that the Knechts
failed to pay real estate taxes on the property from 1980 to 1982.
As a consequence of this deficiency, the City Treasurer sold the
property at public auction on May 27, 1982 for the sum of
P63,000.00, the amount of the deficiency taxes. The highest
bidders were respondents Babiera and Sangalang couples.
The petitioners failed to redeem the property. Babiera then filed
for registration of the land to his name. The trial court granted
the petition. The Knechts, who were in possession of the
property, allegedly learned of the auction sale only by the time
they received the orders of the land registration courts.
The De Knechts also filed Civil Case No. 2961-P to prevent the
titles from being given to the contending spouses. They put up
lack of notice to the sale as defense. This was dismissed for lack
of counsel to appear on the last hearing.
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ATTY. FRANCESCA LOURDES SENGA
RULE 67 – RULES OF COURT
On March 12, 1985, Sangalang and Babiera sold the land to
respondent Salem Investment Corporation (Salem) for
P400,000.00. Meanwhile, on February 17, 1983, the Batasang
Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 authorizing the national
government to expropriate certain properties in Pasay City for
the EDSA Extension. The just compensation for this purpose
was docketed by the OSG under civil case 7327. The De Knecht
property was covered by the expropriation. On August 30, seven
of the eight houses of the Knechts were demolished and the
government took possession of the portion of land on which the
houses stood. Salem instituted against them Civil Case No. 85-
263 for unlawful detainer.
The SC allowed for the expropriation this time. Meanwhile,
Salem conveyed 5,611.92 square meters of the subject property
to respondent spouses Mariano and Anacoreta Nocom. Part was
left to Salem.
As prayed for by Salem, the trial court issued an order on
September 13, 1990 for the release of P5,763,650.00 to Salem
by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as partial payment of just
compensation. The De Knechts filed a motion to intervene. On
April 23, 1992, as prayed for by Mariano Nocom, the trial court
ordered the release of P11,526,000.00 as third installment for
his 5,611.92 square meters of the subject land. The De Knechts
questioned this in the CA.
The CA quashed their motion to intervene due to the lack of legal
interest. They filed an original action for the annulment of
TC judgments. Therein, the Knechts challenged the validity of
the orders of the land registration courts in the two petitions of
the Sangalangs and Babieras for registration of their names, the
reconveyance case and the just compensation proceedings.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit on
November 24, 1992. Hence the filing of G.R. No. 108015. In a
Resolution dated February 1, 1993, the SC denied the petition
finding "no reversible error" committed by the Court of Appeals.
The De Knechts alleged:
1. CA committed a reversible error when it claimed 7327 was
not an eminent domain proceeding;
2. CA upheld res judicata to bar the MFR; and
3. When CA refused for respondent judge to rule for the motion
for inhibition.
ISSUE: Is Civil Case No. 7327 an expropriation case?
HELD: Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in declaring that Civil
Case No. 7327 was not an expropriation case.
It was precisely in the exercise of the state's power
of eminent domain under B.P. Blg. 340 that expropriation
proceedings were instituted against the owners of the lots
sought to be expropriated.
8
B.P. Blg. 340 did not, by itself, lay down the procedure for
expropriation. The law merely described the specific properties
expropriated and declared that just compensation was to be
determined by the court. It designated the then Ministry of Public
Works and Highways as the administrator in the "prosecution of
the project." Thus, in the absence of a procedure in the law for
expropriation, reference must be made to the provisions
on eminent domain in Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court.
“The complaint must join as defendants all persons owning or
claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest
therein.”
The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to
the owners of the property condemned. They include all
other persons owning, occupying or claiming to own the
property including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in
possession under an executory contract. Every person
having an estate or interest at law or in equity in the land
taken is entitled to share in the award.
The Knechts insist that although they were no longer the
registered owners of the property at the time Civil Case No. 7327
was filed, they still occupied the property and therefore should
have been joined as defendants in the expropriation
proceedings. They claim that they still occupied the land when it
was expropriated and therefore had a share.
Four months earlier, in January 1990, Civil Case No. 2961-P for
reconveyance was dismissed with finality by this Court and
judgment was entered in February 1990. The Knechts lost
whatever right or colorable title they had to the property after we
affirmed the order of the trial court dismissing the reconveyance
case.
The Knechts' possession of the land and buildings was based on
their claim of ownership not on any juridical title such as a lessee,
mortgagee, or vendee.
Indeed, the Knechts had no legal interest in the property by the
time the expropriation proceedings were instituted. They had no
right to intervene and the trial court did not err in denying their
"Motion for Intervention and to Implead Additional Parties." Their
intervention having been denied, the Knechts had no personality
to move for the inhibition of respondent Judge Sayo from the
case.
ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORP. V. QUITAIN
G.R. NO. 135042
FACTS: Robern is the registered owner of a parcel of land with
an area of about 17,746.50 square meters, which the National
Power Corporation ("NPC" for brevity) is seeking to expropriate.
 SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS – SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
ATTY. FRANCESCA LOURDES SENGA
RULE 67 – RULES OF COURT
The property forms part of a proposed low-cost housing project
in Inawayan, Binugao, Toril, Davao City.
On June 6, 1997, NPC filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain
against Robern. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner countered
with a Motion to Dismiss, alleging (a) that the Complaint suffered
a jurisdictional defect for not showing that the action bore the
approval of the NPC board of directors; (b) that Nemesio S.
Cañete, who signed the verification and certification in the
Complaint, was not the president, the general manager or an
officer specifically authorized under the NPC charter (RA 6395);
(c) that the choice of property to be expropriated was improper,
as it had already been intended for use in a low-cost housing
project, a public purpose within the contemplation of law; and
the choice was also arbitrary, as there were similar properties
available within the area.
Before this Motion could be resolved, NPC filed a Motion for the
Issuance of Writ of Possession based on Presidential Decree No.
42. On July 9, 1997, NPC deposited P6,121.20 at the Philippine
National Bank, Davao Branch, as evidenced by PNB Savings
Account No. 385-560728-9.
In its Order of August 13, 1997, the trial court denied the
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss in this wise: "This refers to the
motion to dismiss. The issues raised are matters that should be
dealt with during the trial proper. Suffice it to say that [NPC] has
the privilege as a utility to use the power of eminent domain.
On September 2, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, pointing out that (a) the issues raised in the
Motion to Dismiss could be resolved without trial, as they could
be readily appreciated on the face of the Complaint itself vis-à-
vis the applicable provisions of law on the matter; and (b) the
grounds relied upon for dismissing the Complaint did not require
evidence aliunde.
On September 11, 1997, the trial court denied the motion. On
September 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of September 11, 1997, arguing
among others that Section 15-A of RA 6395 was virtually
"amended" when Cañete was allowed to verify and sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping in regard to the Complaint for
expropriation filed by NPC. Without awaiting the outcome of the
Motion for Reconsideration, NPC filed a Motion to Implement the
Writ of Possession. On September 19, 1997, in spite of
petitioner's opposition, the trial court issued a Writ of
Possession.
ISSUES:
1. WON NPC has legal standing to file the expropriation
case because the Complaint did not allege that its board
of directors had authorized its filing
9
2. WON petitioner’s contention is correct that: (a) the
complaint should be dismissed because the subject
property was already committed to be used in a low-cost
housing project; and (b) the Complaint allegedly sought
only an easement of a right-of-way, not essentially an
expropriation
HELD:
1. Yes. Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, provides:
SECTION 1. The complaint.The right of eminent domain
shall be exercised by the filing of a verified complaint
which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of
expropriation, describe the real or personal property
sought to be expropriated, and join as defendants all
persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any
part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as
practicable, the separate interest of each defendant.
The foregoing Rule does not require that the Complaint
be expressly approved by the board of directors of a
corporation. In any event, such authorization is a factual
issue that can be threshed out during the trial. As held by
the appellate court, the issue of whether or not the
expropriation proceedings [were] authorized by the
Board of Directors or that those who signed the
complaint [were] authorized representatives are
evidentiary in character determinable only in [the] trial
proper.
2. No. Petitioner's argument in this case is premised on the
old rule. Before the 1997 amendment, Section 3 of Rule
67 allowed a defendant in lieu of an answer, [to] present
in a single motion to dismiss or for other appropriate
relief, all of his objections and defenses to the right of the
plaintiff to take his property xxx. A motion to dismiss was
not governed by Rule 15 which covered ordinary
motions. Such motion was the required responsive
pleading that took the place of an answer and put in issue
the plaintiff's right to expropriate the defendant's
property. Any relevant and material fact could be raised
as a defense in a condemnation proceeding, such as that
which tended to show that (1) the exercise of the power
to condemn was unauthorized, or (2) there was cause for
not taking defendants property for the purpose alleged in
the petition, or (3) the purpose for the taking was not
public in character.
This old rule found basis in the constitutional provisions on the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, which were deemed
to be for the protection of the individual property owner against
the aggressions of the government.21 Under the old rule, the
hearing of the motion and the presentation of evidence followed.
 SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS – SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
ATTY. FRANCESCA LOURDES SENGA
RULE 67 – RULES OF COURT
However, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure no longer
requires such extraordinary motion to dismiss. Instead, it
provides:
SEC. 3. Defenses and objections. If a defendant has any
objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or
any objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall
serve his answer within the time stated in the summons. The
answer shall specifically designate or identify the property in
which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and extent
of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and
defenses to the taking of his property.
In his book on remedial law, Justice Florenz D. Regalado writes
that the old Rule was a bit confusing as the previous holdings
under that former provision also allowed the filing of another
motion to dismiss, as that is understood in Rule 16, to raise
additionally the preliminary objections authorized by that Rule.
Further, an answer, which is now required, gives more
leeway. First, even if it still applies the omnibus motion rule, it
allows amendments to be made within ten days from its
filing. Second, the failure to file an answer does not produce all
the disastrous consequences of default in ordinary civil actions,
because the defendant may still present evidence as to just
compensation.
When petitioner filed its Motion to Dismiss, the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure had already taken effect. Statutes regulating
procedure in the courts are applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time those statutes were passed. New court
rules apply to proceedings that take place after the date of their
effectivity.25 On April 8, 1997, the Court en banc issued a
Resolution in Bar Matter No. 803, declaring that the revisions in
the Rules of Court were to become effective on July 1, 1997.
Accordingly, Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, does not
consider as grounds for a motion to dismiss the allotment of the
disputed land for another public purpose or the petition for a
mere easement of right-of-way in the complaint for
expropriation. The grounds for dismissal are exclusive to those
specifically mentioned in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court, and an action can be dismissed only on a ground
authorized by this provision.
To be exact, the issues raised by the petitioner are affirmative
defenses that should be alleged in an answer, since they require
presentation of evidence aliunde. Section 3 of Rule 67 provides
that if a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the
allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense to the
taking of his property, he should include them in his answer.
Naturally, these issues will have to be fully ventilated in a full-
blown trial and hearing. It would be precipitate to dismiss the
Complaint on such grounds as claimed by the petitioner.
Dismissal of an action upon a motion to dismiss constitutes a
denial of due process if, from a consideration of the pleadings, it
appears that there are issues that cannot be decided without a
trial of the case on the merits.
Inasmuch as the 1997 Rules had just taken effect when this case
arose, we believe that in the interest of substantial justice, the
petitioner should be given an opportunity to file its answer to the
10
Complaint for expropriation in accordance with Section 3, Rule
67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT V. DE LOS ANGELES
55 PHIL 776 (1931)
FACTS: A complaint was filed by the plaintiff to secure the
expropriation of the land of the defendants situated in
municipality of Montalban, Rizal. The plaintiff alleged that the
land was necessary in the construction of the Angat Waterworks
System and its watershed passed over and through the land of
the defendant. The CFI then authorized the plaintiff to enter and
take possession of the land. Defendant moved to dismiss the
complaint. The court then appointed 3 commissioners for the
land’s assessment. Upon consideration of the 3 commissioners’
assessment, the court fixed the value of the land at Php
58,750.60 and improvements at Php 15,510.00. Both parties
appealed. The plaintiff averred that the value is exorbitant and
unjust while the defendant contended that the value fixed by the
court is less than the actual assessed value and that they are
likewise entitled to damages.
During the pendency of the proceedings, the Metropolitan Water
District Board passed a resolution requesting the Attorney-
General to quash the condemnation proceedings as the land is
no longer indispensably necessary for the operation of the
watershed. The defendants then opposed the resolution stating
that it would be unjust to quash the proceedings after incurring
all the expenses for litigation over 5 years and that the plaintiff
had been in possession of the land over the said period. And at
this point, since both parties have perfected their appeal, it
would be too late for the plaintiff to withdraw.
ISSUE: Whether or not the condemnation proceedings should
be dismissed
HELD: YES, the proceedings should be dismissed.
There is no question raised concerning the right of the plaintiff
here to acquire the land under the power of eminent domain.
That power was expressly granted it by its charter. The power of
eminent domain is a right reserved to the people or Government
to take property for public use. It is the right of the state, through
its regular organization, to reassert either temporarily or
permanently its dominion over any portion of the soil of the state
on account of public necessity and for the public good. The right
of eminent domain is the right which the Government or the
people retains over the estates of individuals to resume them for
public use. It is the right of the people, or the sovereign, to
dispose, in case of public necessity and for the public safety, of
all the wealth contained in the state.
It is not denied that the purpose of the plaintiff was to acquire
the land in question for a public use. The fundamental basis then
of all actions brought for the expropriation of lands, under the
power of eminent domain, is public use. That being true, the
 SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS – SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
ATTY. FRANCESCA LOURDES SENGA
RULE 67 – RULES OF COURT
very moment that it appears at any stage of the proceedings
that the expropriation is not for a public use, the action must
necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the reason that
the action cannot be maintained at all except when the
expropriation is for some public use. That must be true even
during the pendency of the appeal or at any other stage of
the proceedings. If, for example, during the trial in the lower
court, it should be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court
that the expropriation is not for some public use, it would be the
duty and the obligation of the trial court to dismiss the action.
And even during the pendency of the appeal, if it should be
made to appear to the satisfaction of the appellate court that the
expropriation is not for public use, then it would become the duty
and the obligation of the appellate court to dismiss it.
In the present case the petitioner admits that the expropriation
of the land in question is no longer necessary for public use. Had
that admission been made in the trial court the case should have
been dismissed there. It now appearing positively, by
resolution of the plaintiff, that the expropriation is not
necessary for public use, the action should be dismissed
even without a motion on the part of the plaintiff. The
moment it appears in whatever stage of the proceedings
that the expropriation is not for a public use the complaint
should be dismissed and all the parties thereto should be
relieved from further annoyance or litigation. It must follow,
therefore, inasmuch as it appears by express admission of the
plaintiff itself that the expropriation is not for a public use, that
the complaint should be dismissed.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY V. HEIRS OF
GUIVELONDO
G.R. NO. 154411
FACTS: Petitioner National Housing Authority filed with RTC of
Cebu an Amended Complaint for eminent domain against
respondents alleging that the lands in Carreta, Mabolo, Cebu
City are within a blighted urban center which petitioner intends
to develop as a socialized housing project.
Respondents filed a manifestation waiving their objections to the
petitioner’s power to expropriate. Thereafter, the trial court
appointed three Commissioners to ascertain the correct and just
compensation of the properties of respondents. On August 7,
2000, the trial court rendered Partial Judgment adopting the
recommendation of the Commissioners and fixing the just
compensation of the lands of respondent Heirs of Isidro
Guivelondo at P11,200.00 per square meter.
Petitioner, on July 16, 2001, filed with the trial court a Motion to
Dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-23386, complaint for eminent
domain, alleging that the implementation of its socialized
housing project was rendered impossible by the unconscionable
value of the land sought to be expropriated, which the intended
beneficiaries cannot afford. The Motion was denied, on the
ground that the Partial Judgment had already become final and
11
executory and there was no just and equitable reason to warrant
the dismissal of the case.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE CAN BE COMPELLED
AND COERCED BY THE COURTS TO EXERCISE OR
CONTINUE WITH THE EXERCISE OF ITS INHERENT POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN
HELD: YES. The fundamental basis then of all actions brought
for the expropriation of lands, under the power of eminent
domain, is public use. The moment that it appears at any stage
of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use,
the action must necessarily fail and should be dismissed,
because the action cannot be maintained at all except when the
expropriation is for some public use. That must be true even
during the pendency of the appeal of at any other stage of the
proceedings. The rule is different where the case had been
decided and the judgment had already become final and
executory.
There are two (2) stages in every action for expropriation. The
first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the
suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take
the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or
purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a
final one. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one,
for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings
before the Trial Court, no objection to the exercise of the right
of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned
with the determination by the Court of the just compensation for
the property sought to be taken.
An order of condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the
question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally
exercised its power of eminent domain.31 Once the first order
becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to
expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.
In the case at bar, petitioner did not appeal the Order of the trial
court dated December 10, 1999, which declared that it has a
lawful right to expropriate the properties of respondent Heirs of
Isidro Guivelondo. Hence, the Order became final and may no
longer be subject to review or reversal in any court.
 SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS – SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
ATTY. FRANCESCA LOURDES SENGA
RULE 67 – RULES OF COURT
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V. CA
G.R. NO. 106804
FACTS: Petitioner is authorized by law to acquire property and
exercise the right of eminent domain. Private respondent
Antonino Pobre is the owner of a property located in Barangay
Bano, Municipality of Tiwi, Albay. In 1963, Pobre began
developing the Property as a resort-subdivision, which he
named as "Tiwi Hot Springs Resort Subdivision.
On 4 August 1965, the Commission on Volcanology certified that
thermal mineral water and steam were present beneath Pobre’s
property. The Commission on Volcanology found the thermal
mineral water and steam suitable for domestic use and
potentially for commercial or industrial use. NPC then became
involved with Pobre's Property.
On 1 September 1979, NPC filed its second expropriation case
against Pobre to acquire an additional 5,554 square meters of
the Property. This is the subject of this petition. On 6 September
1979, NPC entered the 5,554 square-meter lot upon the trial
court's issuance of a writ of possession to NPC. On 10
December 1984, Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second
complaint for expropriation claiming that NPC damaged his
Property and praying for just compensation of all the lots
affected by NPC's actions and for the payment of damages.
On 2 January 1985, NPC filed a motion to dismiss the second
expropriation case on the ground that NPC had found an
alternative site and that NPC had already abandoned in 1981 the
project within the Property due to Pobre's opposition. The trial
court granted NPC's motion to dismiss but the trial court allowed
Pobre to adduce evidence on his claim for damages.
ISSUE: Whether the court erred in not allowing NPC’s motion to
dismiss and in granting damages for Pobre
HELD: NO. NPC's belated attack on Pobre's claim for damages
must fail. The 8 January 1985 Order of the trial court attained
finality when NPC failed to move for its reconsideration within
the 15-day reglementary period. NPC opposed the order only on
27 May 1985 or more than four months from the issuance of the
order.
Even a timely opposition against Pobre's claim for damages
would not yield a favorable ruling for NPC. It is not Section 1,
Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court that is applicable to this case
but Rule 67 of the same Rules, as well as jurisprudence on
expropriation cases. Rule 17 referred to dismissal of civil actions
in general while Rule 67 specifically governed eminent domain
cases.
While Section 1, Rule 17 spoke of the "service of answer or
summary judgment," the Rules then did not require the filing of
an answer or summary judgment in eminent domain cases. In
lieu of an answer, Section 3 of Rule 67 required the defendant
12
to file a single motion to dismiss where he should present all of
his objections and defenses to the taking of his property for the
purpose specified in the complaint. In short, in expropriation
cases under Section 3 of Rule 67, the motion to dismiss took the
place of the answer.
In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff's
matter of right to dismiss the complaint precisely because the
landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of
the taking. The plaintiff's right in expropriation cases to dismiss
the complaint has always been subject to court approval and to
certain conditions
The power of eminent domain is subject to limitations. A
landowner cannot be deprived of his right over his land until
expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court must
then see to it that the taking is for public use, there is payment
of just compensation and there is due process of law.
If the propriety of the taking of private property through eminent
domain is subject to judicial scrutiny, the dismissal of the
complaint must also pass judicial inquiry because private rights
may have suffered in the meantime. The dismissal, withdrawal
or abandonment of the expropriation case cannot be made
arbitrarily. If it appears to the court that the expropriation is not
for some public use, then it becomes the duty of the court to
dismiss the action. However, when the defendant claims that his
land suffered damage because of the expropriation, the
dismissal of the action should not foreclose the defendant's right
to have his damages ascertained either in the same case or in a
separate action.
PROVINCE OF DAVAO DEL NORTE V. BUENAVENTURA-
NAVARRO
G.R. NO. 208771 (NOTICE)
FACTS: Lina Buenaventura-Navarro (respondent) is the
registered owner of a parcel of land. Allegedly, the Municipal
Government of Carmen, Davao del Norte, constructed a
barangay road at Barrio La Paz, Carmen, appropriating a 3,587
square-meter portion of the said property (subject road) without
just compensation being paid to respondent. This road is now a
provincial road and is maintained by the Province of Davao Del
Norte.
Respondent sent formal demand letters to the local government
of Carmen, Davao del Norte, as well as to petitioner, for back
rentals and payment of just compensation. The two local
governments ignored her demands. RTC decided in favor of
Respondent and ordered petitioners to pay the former.
Petitioner did not appeal the decision; hence, on July 31, 2004,
respondent moved for its execution. Consequently, the RTC
issued a writ of execution on August 12, 2004.
On September 1, 2004, petitioner filed the instant petition for
relief from judgment with prayer for temporary restraining order
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and preliminary injunction. The same was denied by the trial
court and the appellate court. The CA also held that the issue of
whether the RTC erred in rendering the June 30, 2004 decision
is no longer within the realm of the petition for certiorari. It stated
that the non-appointment of a commissioner to determine the
just compensation for the subject road is not an error reviewable
under certiorari.
Petitioner insists that respondent is not entitled to just
compensation for the subject road which had allegedly been
used as a public road prior to its award to its original owner,
Porferio Jain (Jain). It alleges that the road was the only ingress
and egress of Barangay La Paz, Municipality of Carmen, Davao
del Norte. Since Jain acquired the land by virtue of Act No. 496
or the Land Registration Act, Section 39 thereof applies. It
provides that every person receiving a certificate of title
pursuant to a decree of registration shall hold the same free from
all encumbrances except those which may be subsisting,
including any servitude or legal encumbrance.
ISSUE: Whether CA erred in not allowing the petitioner the relief
from entry of judgment
HELD: NO. Petitioner failed to prove that excusable negligence,
as a ground for the grant of relief from judgment, is present in
this case.
Court notes that the present petition assails not only the
dismissal of the petition for relief from judgment but the very
merits of the June 30, 2004 decision of the RTC granting
respondent's prayer for just compensation, damages, and
attorney's fees. Petitioner did not limit itself to the issue of
excusable negligence; it challenged the merits of the June 30,
2004 decision in this appeal by certiorari.
In any case, the Court cannot entertain petitioner's argument
concerning the public character of the subject road prior to its
grant to Jain because it is a question of fact. Petitioner's
argument concerning the RTC's alleged error in its failure to
appoint a commissioner for the determination of just
compensation, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court,
is without merit. The Court notes that the initial proceedings
before the RTC were not for expropriation, but for payment of
just compensation, back rentals, and attorney's fees.
The Court has previously held that Rule 67 presupposes a prior
filing with the appropriate court of a complaint for eminent
domain by the expropriator. If no such complaint is filed, the
expropriator is considered to have violated procedural
requirements and, hence, has waived the usual procedure
prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of
commissioners to ascertain just compensation.
Since the initial proceedings before the lower court was not for
expropriation but for payment of just compensation, petitioner is
considered to have violated procedural requirements and has
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waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67. The
provisions on ascertainment of just compensation are no longer
applicable and a trial before commissioners is dispensable.
GARCIA V. CA
G.R. NO. L-47553
FACTS: In 1969, the National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a
complaint for eminent domain for acquisition of right of way
easement over defendants' (herein petitioner Jane Garcia, et.al.)
two parcels of land known as Blocks 10 and 19 which it needed
for the construction of the 69 KV Mexico-Balibago power line.
Block 19 had already been occupied by NPC since 1957 with
the permission of defendants' predecessor although no
agreement as to compensation had ever been completed, while
Block 10 was placed in its possession in 1970 upon deposit of a
provisional amount.
The trial court rendered judgment expropriating Blocks 10 and
19 and ordering plaintiff NPC to pay defendants P15.00 per
square meter for the area expropriated, shown to be the
prevailing market value of the property at the time plaintiff took
possession. On appeal, the CA held that the market value at the
time of the taking determined the just compensation, and
inasmuch as plaintiff had been occupying Block 19 since 1957
and defendants did not present evidence as to the market value
of said property as of 1957, the just compensation should be that
appearing in the 1957 tax declaration which in this case is P.07
per square meter.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in fixing the amount of just
compensation to P 0.07 per square meter
HELD: Yes. Since NPC did not take possession of Block 19 for
the purpose of eminent domain in 1957, nor did it subsequently
file an action for expropriation in court over the said property but
only sought a right of way easement over the same, the market
value should not be fixed as of the time of the taking but as
of the time the trial court made its order of expropriation.
The doctrine enunciated in Republic vs. PNB, et al. does not
apply in this case, as erroneously argued by NPC. In that case,
the Court ruled that, "where the taking of the property in eminent
domain precedes the institution of the condemnation
proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the
taking." This doctrine however has been applied only in cases
where: (1) the properties in question became the subject of
expropriation proceedings initiated by the plaintiff Government,
and (2) the possession or "Taking" of the Government of the
properties in question, whether it was made before or after the
filing of the complaint for expropriation was made for purpose of
eminent domain or with the intent to expropriate.
Exhibit "M", in clear and unmistakable terms, states the nature of
the possession that private respondent, the NPC, was granted at
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the time by defendants' predecessor. The title of this document
is "PERMISSION TO OCCUPY LAND" which undoubtedly grants
to the NNPC a privilege and the same is subject to the terms and
conditions embodied in the document. As the NPC’s entry was
gained through permission, it did not have the intention to
acquire ownership either by voluntary purchase or by the
exercise of eminent domain. And the fact remains that the
private respondent never completed the negotiation as to
compensation. Not only this, private respondent went on to
construct another line without defendants' permission nor a
court authorization. All these prove the private respondent's
intention not to expropriate Block 19, as it did seek so in the
action it instituted on August 8, 1969. Neither did it have the
intention to do so in 1953 as shown by the terms in Exhibit "M".
EVERGREEN MANUFACTURING CORP V. REPUBLIC
G.R. NOS. 218628 & 218631
FACTS: Evergreen is the registered owner of a parcel of land
situated in Barangay Santolan, Pasig City, which covers an area
of 1,428.68 sq.m. (subject property) Republic-DPWH seeks to
expropriate a portion of the Subject Property covering 173.08
sq.m. (subject premises) which will be used for the construction
of Package 3, Marikina Bridge and Access Road, Metro Manila
Urban Transport Integration Project. Evergreen, in opposing the
complaint for expropriation, alleged that the conditions for filing
a complaint for expropriation have not been met, and that there
is no necessity for expropriation. It argued that an expropriation
of the subject premises would impair the rights of leaseholders
in gross violation of the constitutional proscription against
impairment of the obligation of contracts. It prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
After depositing ₱1,038,480.00 - which is equivalent to 100% of
the value of the Subject Premises based on the BIR zonal
valuation of P6,000.00 per square meter - Republic-DPWH filed
a Motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession, which was
granted by the RTC. Republic-DPWH filed a Motion for Issuance
of a New Writ of Possession as the first writ of possession was
not implemented. Subsequently, Evergreen filed a Motion to
Withdraw the Initial Deposit. This was opposed by Republic-
DPWH as it was not yet allowed entry into the Subject Premises.
The parties entered into an agreement allowing Republic-DPWH
to enter into and/or possess the Subject Premises. RTC granted
the Motion to Withdraw Initial Deposit.
Three real estate brokers/appraisers were appointed as
commissioners to determine the current fair market value of the
Subject Premises. Bonifacio Maceda, Jr. of the City Assessor's
office recommended the payment of ₱15,000.00 per square
meter, Atty. Jade Ferrer Wy recommended ₱37,500.00 per
square meter and Atty. Pablita Migrifio of the Office of the RTC
Clerk of Court of Pasig City recommended the amount of
₱30,000.00 per square meter.
14
RTC ruled that the just compensation should be ₱25,000.00 per
square meter. CA modified the amount to ₱35,000.00 per square
meter.
Republic-DPWH argues that the recommendations of Atty. Wy
and Atty. Migrifio are incorrect as the value given by said
commissioners was computed at the time the inspection was
undertaken in 2008, and not at the time of taking, which was in
2004. It argues that the basis of just compensation should be the
value of the expropriated property at the time of taking because
the value of the property had already been greatly enhanced
since then.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the time of the taking shall be
determinative of the just compensation
2. Whether or not Evergreen is entitled to legal
interest
HELD: Yes. Just compensation must be the value of the
property at the time of taking.
In 2000, this Court found that the just compensation for similar
properties situated in the vicinity was ₱26,100.00. In 2008, the
commissioners found the selling price of the properties in the
surrounding area to be from ₱35,000.00 to ₱40,000.00 per
square meter. The time of taking was in 2004, or right in the
middle of 2000 and 2008. Thus, we may consider the mean of
the prices of the properties for the years 2000 and 2008 to arrive
at the amount of just compensation in 2004. Taking the higher
value of the range of price in 2008 and the amount of just
compensation as affirmed by this Court in 2000, we find that the
amount of just compensation in 2004 is ₱33,050.00 per square
meter or a total of ₱5,720,294.00.
Yes. The just compensation due to the landowners for their
expropriated property amounted to an effective
forbearance on the part of the State. Applying the Eastern
Shipping Lines ruling, the Court fixed the applicable interest rate
at 12% per annum, computed from the time the property was
taken until the full amount of just compensation was paid, in
order to eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and
inflation of the value of the currency over time.
Republic-DPWH was able to take possession of the Subject
Premises even before making a full and fair payment of just
compensation because RA 8974 allowed for the possession of
the property merely upon the initial payment which forms part of
the just compensation. Thus, it is clear that the government has
not yet made the full and fair payment of just compensation to
Evergreen.
Thus, a legal interest of 12% per annum on the difference
between the final amount adjudged by the Court and the initial
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ATTY. FRANCESCA LOURDES SENGA
RULE 67 – RULES OF COURT
payment made shall accrue from 21 April 2006 until 30 June
2013. From 1 July 2013 until the finality of the Decision of the
Court, the difference between the initial payment and the final
amount adjudged by the Court shall earn interest at the rate of
6% per annum.
REPUBLIC V. MUPAS
G.R. NO. 181892, 209917, 209696, 209731
FACTS: Note: Guys ang daming computation ng case na to,
pero yung iba naman di na masyadong relevant sa expropriation.
Please see full text for the computation.
On October 5, 1994, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC)
submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government - through
the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
and the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) - for the
construction and development of the NAIA-IPT III under a build-
operate-and-transfer (BOT) arrangement. The DOTC and the
MIAA invited the public to submit competitive and comparative
proposals to AEDC's unsolicited proposal in accordance with the
BOT Law and its implementing rules.
Both AEDC and Paircargo Consortium offered to build the NAIA-
IPT III for at least $350 million at no cost to the Government and
to pay the Government: 5% share in gross revenues for the first
five years of operation, 7.5% share in gross revenues for the next
ten years of operation, and 10% share in gross revenues for the
last ten years of operation. However, Paircargo Consortium
offered to pay the Government a total of P17.75 billion as
guaranteed payment for 27 years while AEDC offered to pay the
Government a total of P135 million for the same period. After the
AEDC’s failure to match the competitive bid, the DOTC awarded,
the project to the Paircargo Consortium (that later organized
itself as PIATCO).
On July 12, 1997, the Government executed a Concession
Agreement with PIATCO. On March 31, 2000, PIATCO engaged
the services of Takenaka, a local branch of a foreign corporation
duly organized under the laws of Japan and doing business in
the Philippines, for the construction of the NAIA-IPT III. On the
same date, PIATCO, likewise contracted the services of
Asahikosan, a foreign corporation duly organized under the laws
of Japan, for the design, manufacture, purchase, test and
delivery of the Plant in the NAIA-IPT III. On November 29, 2002,
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo declared in her speech that
the Government would not honor the PIATCO contracts. On the
same day, Takenaka and Asahikosan notified PIATCO that they
were suspending the construction of the NAIA-IPT III for
PIATCO’s failure to provide adequate security.
On May 5, 2003, in the Agan v. PIATCO Case, the Court nullified
the PIATCO contracts after finding that Paircargo Consortium
(that later incorporated into PIATCO) was not a duly pre-
qualified bidder for failure to meet the minimum equity
15
requirements for the NAIA-IPT III project, as required under the
BOT Law and the Bid Documents. On December 21, 2004 (The
Expropriation Case, Civil Case No. 04-0876), the Government
filed a complaint for expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III and
informed the RTC that it had deposited with the Land Bank the
amount of P3,002,125,000.00, representing the NAIA-IPT III’s
assessed value. On the same day, the RTC issued a writ of
possession in favor of the Government.
On May 5, 2006, the RTC ordered the engagement of the
services of an internationally accepted independent appraiser
who shall conduct the valuation of the NAIA-IPT III. On May 3,
2007, the RTC appointed DG Jones and Partners as
independent appraiser. The Government directly challenged the
order in a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction , which, the Court thereafter issued. Subsequently, the
parties and the BOC conducted a preliminary conference on
April 22, 2010, to adopt an alternative course of action to avoid
further delay in the determination of just compensation. On
August 5, 2010, the RTC ordered the parties to submit their
appraisal reports of NAIA-IPT III with supporting documents and
affidavits. The Government appraised the NAIA-IPT III at
$149,448,037.00 while PIATCO concluded that its replacement
cost was $905,867,549.47. On the other hand, Takenaka and
Asahikosan claimed that the NAIA-IPT III’s construction cost
amounted to $360,969,790.82.
RTC adopted the Government’s computed just compensation of
$149,448,037.00.
CA modified the RTC rulings and arrived at its own formula of
the NAIA-IPT III’s cost.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in awarding the just
compensation
HELD: No. We maintain our ruling that the depreciated
replacement cost applies in computing just compensation in
the present case. In applying this method, the owner is
compensated for his actual loss at the date of taking of the
expropriated property. Consequently, the deduction from
the construction cost of the deterioration and depreciation
items is permissible under RA 8974 (Right of Way for
Infrastructure Projects).
The determination of just compensation is primarily a judicial
function that may not be usurped by any other branch or official
of the Republic. In National Power Corporation v. Bagui, this
Court ruled that any valuation for just compensation laid down in
the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the
factors in determining just compensation but it may not
substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should
be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. In fact, in National
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RULE 67 – RULES OF COURT

Power Corporation v. Purefoods Corporation, we held that just other things, in the valuation of the NAIA-IPT III. The Government
compensation standards derived from statutes such as RA 8974 should not compensate PIATCO based on the value of a modern
(, are not binding on this Court. equivalent asset that has the full functional utility of a brand new
asset.
The nature of the provisions in RA 8974 as mere guidelines to
this Court, as opposed to being mandatory rules, cannot be
denied. First, while Section 10, RA 8974 IRR uses the word
"shall" in referring to the use of the replacement cost method in
determining valuation of the improvements and/or structures on
the land to be expropriated, connoting that such use is
mandatory, the directive/mandate is addressed, not to this
Court, but to the Implementing Agency or the department,
bureau, office, commission, authority, or agency of the national
government, including any government-owned and -controlled
corporation or state college or university, concerned and
authorized by law or its respective charter to undertake national
government projects. Second, Section 13, RA 8974 IRR
explicitly states that the court shall determine the just
compensation to be paid to the owner of the property,
considering the standards set out in Sections 8, 9, and 10
thereof. Clearly, the Court may consider the guidelines set, but
it cannot be bound by these guidelines.

At best, any finding on just compensation using the methods set

forth in the statute is merely a preliminary determination by the
Implementing Agency, subject to the final review and
determination by the Court. While we may be guided by the
replacement cost of the property, just compensation will be
ultimately based on the payment due to the private property
owner for his actual loss — the fundamental measure of just
compensation compliant with the Constitution.

The amount of just compensation as of the filing of the complaint

for expropriation on December 21, 2004, is $326,932,221.26.
From this sum shall be deducted the proffered value of
$59,438,604.00. The resulting difference of $267,493,617.26
shall earn a straight interest of 12% per annum from September
11, 2006 until June 30, 2013, and a straight interest of 6% per
annum from July 1, 2013, until full payment.

PIATCO, as the owner of the NAIA-IPT III, shall solely receive the
just compensation. Based on the last paragraph, Section 4 of RA
8974 and the prevailing jurisprudence, it is the owner of the
expropriated property who is constitutionally entitled to just
compensation. Other claimants should be impleaded or may
intervene in the eminent domain case if the ownership of the
property is uncertain or there are conflicting claims on the
property pursuant to Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

The use of depreciated replacement cost method is consistent

with the principle that the property owner shall be compensated
for his actual loss. It is consistent as well with Section 10 of RA
8974 IRR which provides that the courts shall consider the kinds
and quantities of materials/equipment used and the
configuration and other physical features of the property, among

16