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Psychophysical
parallelism

In the philosophy of mind, psychophysical


parallelism (or simply parallelism) is the
theory that mental and bodily events are
perfectly coordinated, without any causal
interaction between them. As such, it
affirms the correlation of mental and
bodily events (since it accepts that when a
mental event occurs, a corresponding
physical effect occurs as well), but denies
a direct cause and effect relation between
mind and body.[1] This coordination of
mental and bodily events has been
postulated to occur either in advance by
means of God (as per Gottfried Leibniz's
idea of pre-established harmony) or at the
time of the event (as in the occasionalism
of Nicolas Malebranche) or, finally,
according to Baruch Spinoza's Ethics, mind
and matter are two of infinite attributes of
the only Substance-God, which go as one
without interacting with each other. On this
view, mental and bodily phenomena are
independent yet inseparable, like two sides
of a coin.

Overview
Psychophysical parallelism is a third
possible alternative regarding the relation
between mind and body, between
interaction (e.g., dualism) and one-sided
action (e.g., materialism,
epiphenomenalism).[2]

Parallelism is a theory which is related to


dualism which suggests that although
there is a correlation between mental and
physical events there is no causal
connection. The body and mind do not
interact with each other but simply run
alongside one another, in parallel, and
there happens to be a correspondence
between the two but neither causes the
other. That is to say that the physical event
of burning your finger and the mental
event of feeling pain just happen to occur
simultaneously — one does not cause the
other.

In his 1925 book The Mind and its Place in


Nature, C. D. Broad maintains that
parallelism is, "The assertion is that to
every particular change in the mind there
corresponds a certain change in the brain
which this mind animates, and that to
every change in the brain there
corresponds a certain change in the mind
which animates this brain."

History

Malebranche …

A prominent version of parallelism is


called occasionalism. Defended by
Nicolas Malebranche, occasionalism
agrees that the mind and body are
separated but does not agree with
Descartes's explanation of how the two
interact. For Malebranche, God intercedes
if there was a need for the mind and body
to interact. For example, if the body is
injured, God is aware of the injury and
makes the mind, or the person (subject of
experience), feel pain.[3] Likewise, if a
person wants to move their hand, i.e. to
grasp an object with their fingers, that
want is made aware to God and then God
makes the person's hand move. In reality,
the mind and body are not actually in
contact with each other, it just seems that
way because God is intervening.
Occasionalism can be viewed as
parallelism with divine intervention so to
speak, because if God did not mediate
between the mind and body, there would
be no interaction between the two.

Spinoza …

According to Baruch Spinoza, as


explicated in his Ethics, the two attributes
of God of which we have cognizance,
namely thought and extension, are not
causally related. Rather, they are two
different ways of comprehending one and
the same reality. Thus, the human body
has a corresponding idea, which is the
human mind or soul. Whatever happens in
the body always occurs in tandem with
contents of the mind. Since everything that
exists is a modus of God, Spinoza's
concept represents a monist account of
parallelism, contrary to Leibniz's pluralist
version.

Leibniz …

German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm


Leibniz concluded that the world was
made up of an infinite number of life units
called monads (from the Greek monas,
meaning “single”). Similar to living atoms,
monads are all active and functioning. As
there is naturally a hierarchy in nature,
monads vary in degrees of intelligence.[4]
Some are more specialized and are more
capable of having clearer and more
distinctive thoughts opposed to monads
that are simpler in structure. Next to God,
humans possess the monads that are able
to exhibit the highest level of
comprehensive thinking. However, humans
possess many types of monads, varying
from very simple to very complex forms,
which explains why the ideas we
experience at times differ in clarity.[5]
Monads according to Leibniz can never be
influenced by anything outside of
themselves. Therefore, the only way that
they can change is by internal
development, or more specifically, by
actualizing their potential. He believed
monads never influence each other; it just
seems like they do. Whenever we perceive
a monad to be the cause of something,
other monads are created in such a way as
to seem like they are affecting the other.
According to Leibniz, the entire universe
was created by God to be in a pre-
established harmony, so nothing in the
universe actually influences anything
else.[6] Looking at psychophysical
parallelism in that way, you could imagine
the mind and body as two identical clocks.
The clocks will always be in agreement
because of the pre-existing harmony
between them, but will never interact. And
like the two clocks, no interaction or
causation among the monads that make
up the mind and body is necessary
because they are already synchronized.

See also
Metaphysical naturalism
Mind–body dichotomy
Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza:
Parallelism
Spinozism: Parallelism

Notes
1.  Walker, Leslie Joseph (1911).
"Psycho-Physical Parallelism"  . In
Herbermann, Charles (ed.). Catholic
Encyclopedia. 11. New York: Robert
Appleton Company.
2. Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911).
"Parallelism, Psychophysical"  .
Encyclopædia Britannica. 20 (11th
ed.). Cambridge University Press.
p. 762.
3. Hergenhahn, B. R. An Introduction to
the History of Psychology. Australia:
Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009.
Print. p. 185.
4. Hergenhahn, B. R. An Introduction to
the History of Psychology. Australia:
Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009.
Print. p. 187.
5. Hergenhahn, B. R. An Introduction to
the History of Psychology. Australia:
Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009.
Print. p. 187.
6. Hergenhahn, B. R. An Introduction to
the History of Psychology. Australia:
Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009.
Print. p. 188.

References
Broad, Charlie (1925). The Mind and its
Place in Nature.
Heil, John (2004). Philosophy of Mind: A
Contemporary Introduction. Routledge.
pp. 27–29. ISBN 978-0-415-28355-7.

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