Estafa and Blg. 22; Complaint w/ laws and jurisprudence.

I wish to share a criminal complaint for Estafa and BP 22 that I prepared recently, with focus on
the legal research aspect thereof, for the information of my regular readers, to wit:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR
X x x CITY

X x x,
Complainant, I.S. No. _______

- versus - For: ESTAFA and

B.P. Blg. 22.

Xxx
(Alias: x x x),
Respondent.
x---------------------------------x

COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT

THE UNDERSIGNED COMPLAINANT respectfully alleges:

1. COMPLAINANT. – The complainant is x x x, of legal age, married, Filipino and, for

purposes of this criminal complaint, with postal address at:

Xxx

2. RESPPONDENT. – The respondent is x x x, aka, of legal age, married, xxx national, and
with the following three (3) addresses, where summons and notices may be served, to wit:

X x x.

3. NATURE OF THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. - This is a criminal complaint for ESTAFA

and for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involving the sum of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) arising
from various checks issued by the respondent to the complainant.

4. ULTIMATE FACTS.
X x x.

4.11. For the record, and to form part hereof, by incorporation and reference, attached
hereto are copies of the following supporting documents, to wit:

X x x.

5. DISCUSSION.

APPLICABLE LAWS
5.1. Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code on deceit/swindling (estfa) provides any
person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned therein shall be punished by
the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if
such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years; provided that the fraud be committed by
any of the following means:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
X x x.
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property.
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar
deceits.
X x x.
(a) By pretending to have bribed any Government employee, without prejudice to the
action for calumny which the offended
party may deem proper to bring against the offender. In this case, the offender shall be
punished by the maximum period of the penalty.
(b) By post-dating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the
offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover
the amount of check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to
cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or
holder that said check has been dishonored for lack of insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie
evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. (As amended by Republic Act
No. 4885, approved June 17, 1967.)
5.2. Article 316 (other forms of swindling) of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than the
value of the damage caused and not more than three times such value, shall be imposed upon
“any person who, to the prejudice of another, shall execute any fictitious contract.”
5.3. Article 318 (other deceits) of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of
arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the damage caused and not more than
twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by
“any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter.”

5.4. Further, B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) provides:

5.4.1. Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or
for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have
been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not
more than one (1) year or by fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the
check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

5.4.2. The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep
sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within
a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored
by the drawee bank.

5.4.3. Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or
persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

5.4.4. The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the
drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety
(90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount
due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within
five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

5.4.5. It shall be the duty of the drawee of any check, when refusing to pay the same to
the holder thereof upon presentment, to cause to be written, printed or stamped in plain
language thereon, or attached thereto, the reason for drawee's dishonor or refusal to pay the
same: Provided, That where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank,
such fact shall always be

explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal. In all prosecutions under this Act, the
introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check, having the drawee's refusal to
pay stamped or written thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid, shall
be prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the
drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for
the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check.
5.4.6. Notwithstanding receipt of an order to stop payment, the drawee shall state in
the notice that there were no sufficient funds in or credit with such bank for the payment in full
of such check, if such be the fact."

5.5. BP Blg. 22 enumerates the elements of the crime to be

(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank
to stop payment.

There is deemed to be a prima facie evidence of knowledge on the part of the maker, drawer or
issuer of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank of the check issued if the
dishonored check is presented within 90 days from the date of the check and the maker or
drawer fails to pay thereon or to make arrangement with the drawee bank for that purpose.

5.5.1. The statute has created the prima facie presumption evidently because
"knowledge" which involves a state of mind would be difficult to establish. The presumption
does not hold, however, when the maker, drawer or issuer of the check pays the holder thereof
the amount due thereon or makes arrangement for payment in full by the drawee bank of such
check within 5 banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee bank. Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 clearly provides that this presumption arises not from the
mere fact of drawing, making and issuing a bum check; there must also be a showing that,
within five banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, such maker or drawer failed to
pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment in
full by the drawee of such check.

LATEST APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE: ESTAFA

5.6. In PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIRGINIA BABY P. MONTANER, G.R. No.
184053, August 31, 2011, the accused was convicted for the crime of Estafa as defined and
penalized under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information alleged
that on or about May 17, 1996 in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused Virginia (Baby) P. Montaner did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one Reynaldo Solis in the following manner: said
accused by means of false pretenses and fraudulent acts that her checks are fully funded draw,
make and issue in favor of one Reynaldo Solis ten (10) Prudential Bank Checks, all having a
total value of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) and all aforesaid checks were postdated
June 17, 1996 in exchange for cash knowing fully well that she has no funds in the drawee bank
and when the said checks were presented for payment the same were dishonored by the drawee
bank on reason of “ACCOUNT CLOSED” and despite demand accused failed and refused to
pay the value thereof to the damage and prejudice of Reynaldo Solis in the aforementioned total
amount of P50,000.00.

To exculpate herself from criminal liability, accused Virginia Baby P. Montaner denied the
allegations that she issued ten (10) checks in private complainant’s favor claiming that the ten
(10) checks were borrowed from her by one Marlyn Galope because the latter needed money.
She gave the ten checks to Galope, signed the same albeit the space for the date, amount and
payee were left blank so that the checks cannot be used for any negotiation. She further told
Galope that the checks were not funded. When she learned that a case was filed against her for
estafa, she confronted Marlyn Galope and the latter told her that money will not be given to her
if she will not issue the said checks. She has no knowledge of the notice of dishonor sent to her
by private complainant and claimed that her husband, who supposedly received the notice of
dishonor left for abroad in July 1996 and returned only after a year, that is, in 1997.

In a Decision dated April 8, 2003, the trial court convicted appellant for the crime of estafa as
defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentenced her to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from twelve (12) years of
prision mayor as minimum to twenty-two (22) years of reclusion perpetua as maximum and to
indemnify complainant Reynaldo Solis in the amount of P50,000.00.

Appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but the adverse ruling was merely affirmed
by the appellate court in its Decision dated February 12, 2008.

Hence, appellant interposed an appeal before the Supreme Court and put forth a single
assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED–
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER
ARTICLE 315, PAR. 2 (D) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

Appellant maintains that she entrusted the subject checks, purportedly signed in blank, to
Marilyn Galope (Galope) out of pity in order for the latter to secure a loan. Thus, there is
purportedly no certainty beyond reasonable doubt that she issued the checks purposely to
defraud Reynaldo Solis (Solis) into lending her money. She further claims that no transaction
had ever transpired between her and Solis. Admitting that she may have been imprudent, she
nonetheless insists that her simple imprudence does not translate to criminal liability.

The Supreme Court was not persuaded.

The Court cited Paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow x x x:

xxxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

xxxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had
no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of
the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his
check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that
said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence
of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.

According to the Court, the elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code are: (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted
at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3)
damage to the payee.[1]

In the said case, the prosecution sufficiently established appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt for estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. According to
Solis’s clear and categorical testimony, appellant issued to him the 10 postdated Prudential
Bank checks, each in the amount of P5,000.00 or a total of P50,000.00, in his house in exchange
for their cash equivalent.

From the circumstances, the Court held that it was evident that Solis would not have given
P50,000.00 cash to appellant had it not been for her issuance of the 10 Prudential Bank checks.
These postdated checks were undoubtedly issued by appellant to induce Solis to part with his
cash. However, when Solis attempted to encash them, they were all dishonored by the bank
because the account was already closed.

Solis wrote appellant a demand letter dated October 13, 1996 which was received by appellant’s
husband to inform appellant that her postdated checks had bounced and that she must settle
her obligation or else face legal action from Solis. Appellant did not comply with the demand
nor did she deposit the amount necessary to cover the checks within three days from receipt of
notice. This gave rise to a prima facie evidence of deceit, which is an element of the crime of
estafa, constituting false pretense or fraudulent act as stated in the second sentence of
paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

As for appellant’s claims that she merely entrusted to Galope the blank but signed checks
imprudently, without knowing that Galope would give them as a guarantee for a loan, the
Court viewed such statements with the same incredulity as the lower courts.

Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it
must be credible in itself – such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances. The Court has no test of the truth of human
testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is
repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside judicial cognizance.[2]

Appellant wished to impress upon the Court that she voluntarily parted with her blank but
signed checks not knowing or even having any hint of suspicion that the same may be used to
defraud anyone who may rely on them. Verily, appellant’s assertion defies ordinary common
sense and human experience, the Court stated.
Moreover, the Court added, it is elementary that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence which has far less evidentiary value
than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[3] It agreed with
the lower courts that appellant’s bare denial cannot be accorded credence for lack of evidentiary
support. As aptly noted by the trial court, appellant’s failure to produce Galope as a witness to
corroborate her story is fatal to her cause. In all, the Court of Appeals committed no error in
upholding the conviction of appellant for estafa. Hence, the Supreme Court AFFIRMED the two
decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court.

LATEST APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE: B.P. BLG. 22

5.7. In EUMELIA R. MITRA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and FELICISIMO S.

TARCELO, G.R. NO. 191404, July 5, 2010, the petitioner Eumelia R. Mitra (Mitra) was the
Treasurer, and Florencio L. Cabrera (deceased), Jr. was the President, of Lucky Nine Credit
Corporation (LNCC), a corporation engaged in money lending activities. Between 1996 and
1999, private respondent Felicisimo S. Tarcelo (Tarcelo) invested money in LNCC. As the usual
practice in money placement transactions, Tarcelo was issued checks equivalent to the amounts
he invested plus the interest on his investments by Mitra and Cabrera, were issued by LNCC to
Tarcelo.

When Tarcelo presented these checks for payment, they were dishonored for the reason
“account closed.” Tarcelo made several oral demands on LNCC for the payment of these
checks but he was frustrated. Constrained, in 2002, he caused the filing of seven informations
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) in the total amount of P925,000.00 with the
MTCC in Batangas City.

After trial on the merits, the MTCC found Mitra and Cabrera guilty of the charges and ordered
them to respectively pay the mandated fines for each violation and with subsidiary
imprisonment in all cases, in case of insolvency and it further adjudged them civilly liable and
ordered them to pay, in solidum, private complainant Felicisimo S. Tarcelo the amount of NINE
HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P925,000.000).

Mitra and Cabrera appealed to the Batangas RTC contending that: they signed the seven checks
in blank with no name of the payee, no amount stated and no date of maturity; they did not
know when and to whom those checks would be issued; the seven checks were only among
those in one or two booklets of checks they were made to sign at that time; and that they signed
the checks so as not to delay the transactions of LNCC because they did not regularly hold
office there. The RTC affirmed the MTCC decision.

Meanwhile, Cabrera died. Mitra alone filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
claiming, among others, that there was no proper service of the notice of dishonor on her. The
Court of Appeals dismissed her petition for lack of merit.

Mitra went up to the Supreme Court on a petition for review and submitted the issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ELEMENTS OF VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22
MUST BE PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS AGAINST THE CORPORATION
WHO OWNS THE CURRENT ACCOUNT WHERE THE SUBJECT CHECKS WERE DRAWN
BEFORE LIABILITY ATTACHES TO THE SIGNATORIES; and WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS
PROPER SERVICE OF NOTICE OF DISHONOR AND DEMAND TO PAY TO THE
PETITIONER AND THE LATE FLORENCIO CABRERA, JR.

The Supreme Court denied the petition.

The Court held that a check is a negotiable instrument that serves as a substitute for money and
as a convenient form of payment in financial transactions and obligations. The use of checks as
payment allows commercial and banking transactions to proceed without the actual handling of
money, thus, doing away with the need to physically count bills and coins whenever payment
is made. It permits commercial and banking transactions to be carried out quickly and
efficiently. But the convenience afforded by checks is damaged by unfunded checks that
adversely affect confidence in our commercial and banking activities, and ultimately injure
public interest.

BP 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law was enacted for the specific purpose of addressing the
problem of the continued issuance and circulation of unfunded checks by irresponsible persons.
To stem the harm caused by these bouncing checks to the community, BP 22 considers the mere
act of issuing an unfunded check as an offense not only against property but also against public
order.[4] The purpose of BP 22 in declaring the mere issuance of a bouncing check as malum
prohibitum is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the
offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and rehabilitate him, and to maintain social order.
[5] The penalty is stiff. BP 22 imposes the penalty of imprisonment for at least 30 days or a fine
of up to double the amount of the check or both imprisonment and fine.

Specifically, BP 22 provides:

SECTION 1. Checks Without Sufficient Funds. — Any person who makes or draws and issues
any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not
less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more
than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient
funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period
of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the
drawee bank.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who
actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

SECTION 2. Evidence of Knowledge of Insufficient Funds. — The making, drawing and

issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in
or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check,
shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such
maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for
payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice
that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

Mitra posited in the petition that before the signatory to a bouncing corporate check can be held
liable, all the elements of the crime of violation of BP 22 must first be proven against the
corporation. The corporation must first be declared to have committed the violation before the
liability attaches to the signatories of the checks.

The Court stated that it found itself unable to agree with Mitra’s posture. The third paragraph
of Section 1 of BP 22 reads: "Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the
person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under
this Act." This provision recognizes the reality that a corporation can only act through its
officers. Hence, its wording is unequivocal and mandatory – that the person who actually
signed the corporate check shall be held liable for a violation of BP 22. This provision does not
contain any condition, qualification or limitation.

The Court cited the case of Llamado v. Court of Appeals,[6] where it ruled that the accused was
liable on the unfunded corporate check which he signed as treasurer of the corporation. He
could not invoke his lack of involvement in the negotiation for the transaction as a defense
because BP 22 punishes the mere issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which the
check was issued or in consideration of the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. In this
case, Mitra signed the LNCC checks as treasurer. Following Llamado, she must then be held
liable for violating BP 22.

Another essential element of a violation of BP 22 is the drawer’s knowledge that he has

insufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank to cover his check. Because this involves a
state of mind that is difficult to establish, BP 22 creates the prima facie presumption that once
the check is dishonored, the drawer of the check gains knowledge of the insufficiency, unless
within five banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the drawer pays the holder of
the check or makes arrangements with the drawee bank for the payment of the check. The
service of the notice of dishonor gives the drawer the opportunity to make good the check
within those five days to avert his prosecution for violating BP 22.

Mitra alleged that there was no proper service on her of the notice of dishonor and, so, an
essential element of the offense is missing. This contention, the Court said, raised a factual issue
that was not proper for review. It is not the function of the Court to re-examine the finding of
facts of the Court of Appeals. Our review is limited to errors of law and cannot touch errors of
facts unless the petitioner shows that the trial court overlooked facts or circumstances that
warrant a different disposition of the case[7] or that the findings of fact have no basis on record.
Hence, with respect to the issue of the propriety of service on Mitra of the notice of dishonor,
the Court gives full faith and credit to the consistent findings of the MTCC, the RTC and the
CA.

The defense postulated that there was no demand served upon the accused, said denial
deserves scant consideration. Positive allegation of the prosecution that a demand letter was
served upon the accused prevails over the denial made by the accused. Though, having denied
that there was no demand letter served on April 10, 2000, however, the prosecution positively
alleged and proved that the questioned demand letter was served upon the accused on April 10,
2000, that was at the time they were attending Court hearing before Branch I of this Court. In
fact, the prosecution had submitted a Certification issued by the other Branch of this Court
certifying the fact that the accused were present during the April 10, 2010 hearing. With such
straightforward and categorical testimony of the witness, the Court believes that the
prosecution has achieved what was dismally lacking in the three (3) cases of Betty King, Victor
Ting and Caras – evidence of the receipt by the accused of the demand letter sent to her. The
Court accepts the prosecution’s narrative that the accused refused to sign the same to evidence
their receipt thereof. To require the prosecution to produce the signature of the accused on said
demand letter would be imposing an undue hardship on it. As well, actual receipt
acknowledgment is not and has never been required of the prosecution either by law or
jurisprudence. [emphasis supplied]

With the notice of dishonor duly served and disregarded, there arose the presumption that
Mitra and Cabrera knew that there were insufficient funds to cover the checks upon their
presentment for payment. In fact, the account was already closed.

To reiterate the elements of a violation of BP 22 as contained in the above-quoted provision, the

Court said, a violation exists where:

1. a person makes or draws and issues a check to apply on account or for value;

2. the person who makes or draws and issues the check knows at the time of issue that he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the full payment of the check
upon its presentment; and

3. the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit,
or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. [8]

The Court added that there was no dispute that Mitra signed the checks and that the bank
dishonored the checks because the account had been closed. Notice of dishonor was properly
given, but Mitra failed to pay the checks or make arrangements for their payment within five
days from notice. With all the above elements duly proven, Mitra cannot escape the civil and
criminal liabilities that BP 22 imposes for its breach.[9]

6. PRAYER.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that after notice and hearing the
respondent be indicted for ESTAFA and VIOLATION OF B.P. BLG. 22 to protect/preserve the
right/interest of the complainant to recover his claim of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), plus
exemplary damages of P100,000.00, moral damages of P100,000.00, attorney’s fees of P125,000.00
plus 5% of the recoverable amounts, and costs of suit.
 X x x City, October 18, 2011.

Xxx
Complainant
LTO Driver’s License No.
__________________
Expiring on _________

Assisted By:

LASERNA CUEVA-MERCADER LAW OFFICES

Counsel for the Complainant
Unit 15, Star Arcade. C.V. Starr Ave.
Philamlife Village, Las Pinas City 1740
Tel. No. 8725443; Fax No. 8462539.

MANUEL J. LASERNA JR.

Roll No. 33640, 4/27/85
IBP Lifetime Member No. 1907
IBP Leyte Chapter
PTR 1016909, 1/7/11, Las Pinas City
MCLE Compliance No. IV-1326, 2/3/11

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before in Muntinlupa City me this ___ day of October 2011,
affiant/complainant showing his official identification document as stated above.

Administering Assistant City Prosecutor

Annexes: “A” to “L“, supra.

[1] Cajigas v. People, G.R. No. 156541, February 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 54, 63.
[2] People v. Garin, 476 Phil. 455, 474 (2004); People v. Samus, 437 Phil. 645, 659 (2002).
[3] Gomba v. People, G.R. No. 150536, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 396, 400, citing
People v. Magbanua, G.R. No. 133004, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 617, 630.
[4] Lozano v. Martinez, 230 Phil. 406, 428 (1986).
[5] Rosario v. Co, G.R. No. 133608, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 239, 253.
[6] 337 Phil. 153, 160 (1997).
[7] American Home Assurance Company v. Chua, 368 Phil. 555, 569 (1999).
[8] Rigor v. People, 485 Phil. 125, 139 (2004).
[9] In Gosiaco v. Ching, G.R. No. 173807, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 471, 483, we held an accused
corporate officer free from civil liability for the corporate debt after the lower court acquitted
the accused of criminal liability under BP 22. Note that this is a totally different case from the
present case as the issue here is both criminal and civil liability.