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CopyTigbt © 20!! by the Pmsident and Feflows offlarvard Coilege
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4
Printed ia the United States ofAmerica
First Harvard Univcrsity Press paperback editon, 2014
Libmry cf Congress Catakging4n-Publicatjan Data
To SHA R 0w
Kateb. George.
Human dignity / George Kateb.
pan.
Indudes bibliograpbkal references and ndex.
ISBPi 978-0-674-04837-9 (clotb; a& paer)
ISUN 978-0-674-28417-3 (pbk.)
1. Human rights. 2. Dignity. 1. Titie.
tCS7IK343 2011
323—4c22 2010025821
 1
The Idea of Human Dignity
My aim isto defend the idea of human dignfty Does it need a defense?
After aU, the iden has becorne commonplace, cspeciaily since the end
of Werld War 11. In the name of human dignity, which now turns out
te mean in its most common use the equal dignity of every person,
charters of hurnan rights are premulgated, and appeals te it are made
when people ali over the world struggle te achieve their claimed rights.
Humaii dignity is thus perceived to be the basis for human riEhts. But
notmuch is said abnuz what human dignity is and wby it matters for
the claim te rights. It almost seems as if the idea of human digriity is
axiomatic and therefore requires no theoretica[ defense. Mi iÉ needs
is lo he translated into establlshed rights, whicb are Iben preserved
iEThe face of attempts to keep peDple down and deny them what they
are owed.
When people have te struggle tu estabIish or preserve or reestablish
their rights, they contend with various interets Lhat are threatened by
the demand for rights and that have many bnds sE power to repel such
asserüons, but ihese antagonisic interesis have little theory of any
weight tu sustain their cause—they have only tenacious privilege
backed up by alarms, and by lingerhg popular prejudice, superstition,
and mental inerWess, and the cry of security agahist the enerny a[ways
ready to hand. Tt (ao be thought that whatever “as the case some cen
turjesago. lhe defense of rights at prescnt reguires littletheoretical
arüculadon. Why make tmuble by defending ri hts ar length and make
werse trou e y c auntng that human dignitv is the basis, or partof
the basis, for human rights? Theoretical defense invites philosophiç
skeptïcism, which is someümes useful to stimulate thought, but therç.
is these days not ver>’ much theory, thouh there is some that corn..s
eut and says that human rights are, in Jeremy Benthamsphjil& flon
sense upon stilts’ and thathe idea aí human dignity adds yet mor
no n 5 ense.
tason togo on witb the ffieoretical defense of human rights is
chat opposiüon tu ffiem exists among thinkers who are on the side aí
thc great majority of people and who do not support (he established
privilege that a system of rights tbreatens. One principal source of op
position te rights comes from those who think human rights are
essentially bourgeois rights and therefore make too much of one par
ticular right, the right of preperty. From the nineteen± century on,
this opposition on the radical left has been pmminent and sometimes
revolutionary. The Marxist and other radical critics of ifie right of pri
vate ornership have gene so fár as te cal’ into question the value of ai
most afl other rights because in an oligarchic or capitUst society ibe
rich and their aTUes are se dominant as to make such rights as free
speeçh, press, and religion into weapons usehil te Cortil’y tEe oppres
sion of the subordinate classes. This analysis overshoots the mark, but
retains the power to cause unease among those who are commifted to
human rights. Human rights are in fact conceptually and actuou>’ un
settled by widespread poverry, despite lhe strength of the case that the
abelition of private property is not the way te reduce poverty in the
long run. There are aho other worries about rigbts that we will eventu
ally attend te, including the critiques made by utilitarlin and virtia
ethics thinkers. Like the oppositional kft, these critics also write ou
behalf of the people nor the elite, though unlilce the left, they rarely
have much powcr. Still, we have tu try lo see what these theorists, who
oppose rights because they either suppnrt the people or want te better
the character ef the people. say to deíend their vie’vs. and what role, iF
any, the idca of human dignky plays ir, their arguments.
In any case, tbcre is already a subsiantial theoretical literature ia de;
f2frihts.It begins iii the revolutions in Britain in the seventeenth
HUMÁN DIGNÍTV
centuq’ proceeds in revolutienary AmeHca and France in ±e Iatter
part aí the eighteenth century, continues in Kanüan phiosuphy, and
develops fiirther in John Rawks inifuential pohtical phiosophy and
Rona)d Dwerkins legal theory in the bventieth century. Add to aH this
work Western jurisprudence throughout. The truth is that the idea of
human dignity figures in ir only to a mmcc extent, if ar aU. The excep
fiou is Kant’5 uolrtical and moral philosophy and heis aí course a ma
jer theorist of dignity (Würde). For him, dignity is a foundaüonal idea,
and his work remains a cuntinueus source aí prefeund instruction. My
debt to him will be obvious. But why, it cculd be asked. make so much
aí Kant? Kant aside, wty go on thinking abour human dignfty, espe
cially when we see that, especiafly in the twentieth centuiy, actual prog
ress in realizing human righis (whether called by that name or called
natural rights) has often come about without much need or use of Lhe
oretical assistance? Feelings oï injury and insult have mattered mast.
especiallywhen they come together to impel a leap aí consdousness, in
which a quickened expectation of decent treatment is combined with a
more definite íeeling of what human dignky in some simple sense is
owed; and once emergent, these attitudes and passions disseminate
themselves by ordinary if belated insight, by imitatien, and by the ar
tractiveness aí gradually established example.
Can we ar Ieast say that there is no harm in thinldng mere about Lhe
idea ei human dignity and its place in Lhe theory of human rights? 1
hope thar there is some good. lt turns out, howcver, that the idca ofhu
mandignity encompasses more than a role in the dfrnflght;
there is place in ir for the dignfty nor onlv of individuais hut also aí tlie
human species as one species among aU thé others.
Dignity of the Individual; Dignity of the Human Species
The core idea of human dignity is that on tarth, humanin’ is the ren -
est type o eings—or what we cali specie; because wc have learned te
see humanity as crie species in the animal kingdom, which is made up
of many other species along with our own—apd that everyrnemhgr
deserves to be trcated in a manner consonant with the high worthof
rUE IDEA CE HUMAN orÇtflTY
3
the species. Since Pico deila Mirandelas speech O,, the Dignily ofMan
(1486), in which the core ideais found early, there have been a number
of revisions and elaborations Yet doubt is sometimes expressed when
human dignity is introduced into later discussions of rights, even when
homan rights are accepted as defensibte and conducive to human in
terests. Severa1 particular contentions stand out in supperting the
thought tbat ali tbeoreLical discussion about human dignity is irrele
vant to the cause of promoting ±e esiablishment of human rights, or
may even be a distraction. The first contention is dm1, despite the ef
íorts of Kant, the idea of human dignity adds nothing but a phrase to
dw itieory of human rights; II surely does not provide, or help te pru
vide, an indispensabk foundation. The second is that the histurical re
cord shows such human savagery toward human beings that to speak
ofhuman dignity isto mock human suffering by refusing to make par
amount the moral difference betweeci victims and victimizers; we must
grant dignity only to those persons who have acted morail The only
human beings who have human dignity are those who are morally
blameless ar ai least much less guiity; violators of dghts, ffie victimiz
cr5, have forfeited their chance to acquire dignity. The theory uf rights
must distinguish between those who bave dignity and those who have
Iost it. The third contention is that the affirmation of human dig
nity is dangereus because, when extended te the human species vis-
à-vis ether species it Ieads te monstrous human pride, which drives
peeple te exploit nature for human purposes and hence to ravage na
ture and ultimateiy make the earth uninhabitable for many species, in
cluding humani4 The fourth coutention is that human species-pride
is not only dangereus but false: there is no basis
for thinking that the
human species is anything spccial; or that it alone has dignity among
ali the specics; or that if the human species does have dignity, that its
dignity is greater than, ar even incomparahly greater than, the dignity
of any other species.
Despite elements of truth ar ai least plausibility in these four con
tentions, my counterconentiOfl is that we should not repudiate the
various attempts that have been made lo defend the idea ai human
dignity, and that addiiional conceptual work is not necessarfly wasted.
There is more to be said. 1 cannot dcny that any atlempt should face the
1uMAf orc.flry
1 5
idnds of antagonism 1 have just mentioned and other kinds as well. 1
must tryto show that the idea of human dignityadds something neces
sary te the theory o! human rights; drnt though human history is a
s!aughter-bench, lhe scene of uninterrupted crimes and atrocities, hu
man dignity must be affirmed, even the dignity of those who assault
the dignity of others through wrongdoing, and thereby injure their
own dignity also, implausible as that notion may sem.
As my discussion preceeds, 1 also wish tu show, as 1 have said, dm1
lhe idea of human dignity not only serves te help defend lhe theory o!
individual rights but alio gives a perspective on the dignity of lhe hu
man species. Stil it is possible tiiat We dignity o! the species may be in
tension with the theory of individual rights; lhe idea of human dignity
may be at odds with itseif, lhe daims to dignity o! the individual with
lhe claims lo dignity of the species. Hewever, to speak of lhe dignity of
lhe human species as distinct from individual dignity is Lo invite more
skepticism and even hosfflity. 1 nevenheless want lo defend species dig
nity while admitting that human beings are generically given to mad
presumption in their enterprises and exploits, whether at lhe expense
oí nature or of une anotber. 1 thinkthul such presumption has actually
beco integral to species dignity. But now humanity should direct its ener
gies, as no other species can, to the stewardship of nature and therefore
curtail its mad presumption against nature, 1 wish tu go lo the eflent o!
saying that lhe human species is indeed something special, that it pos
sesses valuable, commendable uniqueness or distinctiveness that is un
like the uniqueness of any other species. lt has higher dignity than ali
olher species, ora qualitativcly different dignky fruiu aH of them. The
higher dignily is theoretica]ly founded on humanity’s partial disconti
nuity with nature. Humanity is not oniy natural, whereas aU other spe
cies are only natural. The reasons for this assertien, however, have
nothing todo with theology or religion.
1 therefore work with lhe assumplion that we can dislinguish be
twccn the dignity of every buman individual and lhe dignity uf lhe
human species as a whole. %9th that assumption in place, 1 make an
other assumption, that the dignity oF evcry individual is equal te that
of evcry othcr; which is tu say that every human being has a status equal
lo ihat o! aH ethers. The idea o! individual dignity thus applies lo per
rim 2DA QF II UMAN rnGNITY
5onS in relation to one another, and moves ideaflyin apmgression frem
au individual’s self-concepdon to a claim ±at offier persons have no
iess than equal status. 1, Iike anyone else, can insist on my dignity as a
human being, ia lhe face of others situated above me in power and
prestige and who treat me in such a way as tu fali te recognize my Ml
humanity. 1 also se that what 1 insist on, which is universal in nature, 1
canno; daim just for myself or my group, but must claim for all human
beings. Each person must claim for ali, and ali for each.
Ml individuais are equal; no other spedes is equal tu humanity
These are the two basic proposifions tbat make up lhe concept of hu
man dignity. The idea that humanity is special comes into play when
species are compared te one another Eram an extemai and deindividu
alized (though of course only human) point aí view. When we refer Lo
the dignity of the human species, we could speak of the stature of the
human race as distinguished from Lhe status of individuais. In com
parison te other species, humanity tias a stature beyond comparison.
The reasons for spealdng of individual dignity are the sarne as those for
speaking of lhe dignity of the species; the sarne unique and nonnatural
lraits and attributes, characteristics, and capacities. 1 am therefore not
saying that lhe species has a real existence apart from lhe individuais
who rnake it up, or has a substance that is different from the substance
of any individual or ali of them, or has a coilective agency different
from the agency of individuais separateiy ar in groups. Neverlheiess, 1
tatk about the spedcs because the interdependeoce of hdividuals and
groups is se extensive and deep, and so entangled, se hard, even im
possibie, to describe or trace, that for certain purposes we might just as
well make the human species a unified entity or agem, even though we
biow it isn’t. Most important, Lhe human species also includes the
nameless, countless, and unindividuated unborn- Ido not see ho’ Lhe
idea of human dignity can omit reflecflon on the human species, apart
fiam named or nameaNe individuais or identiflable aroups.
The histoHcal record appears te indicate that thinldng about hu
manity in relaUon lo other categories of beings comes wefl before
thinldng about individuais as individuais. Mhrmation aí hurnan stat
ure, o one set of terrns or another—the word stature rarely occurs—
comes wefl before politicai and social conccrn for every person equa[Iy.
EIUMAW oram??
6 7
Conceptuall; human siature precedes individual status; the greatness
ofhumanity precedes the equality of individuaIs. Starting with Homer,
vestern literature dwells on individuais, but they are mostly of the up
per rank and they tend to matter, except lo Socrates, notas individuais
but as members of a ciass, or as deflned by role or ftinction. Wbat
counts is ffiat tbe few aI the top dernonstrate what humanity at its best
is capable of.
Mthough Odysseus is remarkably de]ineated as a person, the stan
dards are set even for him, and the gods bave Lheír own plans alse for
him. Priam and Achilies break out of their roles but into tears. Socrates,
however, discovers Lhe individual, lhe self-consciou5 and hence dissi
dent and conscientisus individual, wbo by thinking for himseif acts te
avoid being an instmment of injustice, not, like Sophocles’ Antigone,
to uphold mores or customary piety. To be sure, Socrates says that he
pursues wisdom out of piety toward lhe god, and is put to death be
:1 cause heis accused of corrupting the youth by teaching gods other than
those of the city. But he does not accept lhe accusation that he teaches
1 other gods. Both he and Antigone can say in her bitter words about
hersdfi”1 stand convicted of impiety/ Lhe evidence mypious duty done”
(Antigone, p. 190). What matters first is that Socrates would rather die
than give up his pursuit of wisdom, which he began before lhe medium
ofthe godApolio at Delphi had answered no when asked whether any
une was wiser than Socrates, and second, that he would rather die than
inflict injustice on another person. Condemned to deatli on Lhe charges
against Mm, he chooses Lo die for the safety of thelaws oí the city rather
than escaping with the help oíhis friends. Death stalks him or he stalks
it. Both his piety and his moral sense are therefore distinctively bis and
they dominate his bond to bis feflows and bis peculiar tie te his city. It
is not necessary ar even possiblc lo say in which of the two quaiitics
Socrates is more radical. ln his Cvnfacsions, Augustine discovered the
individual self, Lhe Iargest contiuent, while Iooking for God within;
what is amazing is that he not only beiieved that inside is where we
shouid Iook for God, but with profound originality proceedcd to map
out Lhe vastness aí inwardness. AGain, it is n°1 necessary ar even
possibie te say whether his theology grows out of lhe discaverics of his
introspection or these discoveries grow out of bis theology Socrates in
lHE IOEA O; HUMAN oxcrsIrY
Plato’s Apoiogy and Augustine in the Confessions are hvo principal land
marb en the way te finding that individuais can exist as individuais,
1 tion of equai status deepens Lhe idea of human dignity. lt carHes
and that as individuais they have equal status.
tn these works, Lhe individual as subject and the individuais subjec
tivity are presented in a way that stlll retains the pewer te inspire reflec
tion. But until recent centuries, human stature was preponderantiy
thought equivaient te the dignity of the human species, and siature was
owed tu tbe exertions of a few. lt would sem that, concepwally, human
dignity was for a long time just a matter of stzture, of humanitys supe
riority tu ali ether beings on eanh, ahhough it was a superiority that
orily the few high and great enes proved or at least made vivid. The
Socratic breakthrough, in a setting of Athenian democracy, which was
itself a breakthrough, provides the earliest movement toward the no
tion of the egnai status of every individual; but even so, in the back
ground is the distinaiveness of the human race as the particular object
of the gods’ interest. Is it possible that for some of us, too, the idea of
human dignity is equivalent tu the notion of stature: the superior being
of the few and the greatness ef their achievements? Can human stature
therefore do witheut individuai status te liii out the idea ef human
dignity? In a turnabout, if we are cDmmitted to equal status de we
need the stature of the human species in order lo defend it? As 1 will
indicate, the element cemmon tu status and stature is uniqueness, but
a uniqueness defined by ks partiai discontinuity wiffi nature, unlike the
uniqueness of ali other species and of ali thefr individual memhcrs. Bu;
perhaps, though 1 douht it, the purported common elemcnt is only a
loose analogy. relevant for some purposes but not conceptualiy essen
tia’ for worldng out an idea of human dignity.
Ivty rough determination is that equal individual status is shored up
by the great achieemcnts that testi Lo human staturc because, in a
remarkable, menerable, and graspable way, they rebut the contention
that human beings are mereiy another species in nature, and thus pre
pare the way for us to regard every person in his or her potentiality. At
the sarne time, the idea of human stature is helped by acknowiedging
the claims of equal status if only because the tbeoiy of equal individual
rights has set the old order 011 fire. But the better reason is that the no
MLfll%N U5.VITY
8 9
through on the attempt tu establish the value of humanity by insisting
on the value ol’ everv human individual. The theory of rights, however,
must be more than partly, pragmaticaliy, er grudgingly accommodated.
The notion of equal status prescribes the imperative tini role and ffinc
tion sheuld not define any person, essentially or exhaustiveiy, The po
tentialities of any person can become actualized unapectedly, and
jump over boundaries or, ata minimum, push the boundaries back by
converting role and fijnction into a vocation that is creativeiy pursued.
One implicadon of the equal status of every individual as a unique
being is that no single person can stand for lhe species, whether that
individual is average or is exceptional in varinus aspects. No one can
represent (in the sense of embody) the human species in some imagi
nary congress of inteilectual species in the universe. Equal status means
±at the question of which individuais in the human species are “best
ofbreed’ Iet alone “best in show’ is out of order. Of com-se peopie vary
in their tajents and innate abilities, and in the manner of their accul
turation, bul ihat undeniable fact is irrelevant te human status. Mosi
hnportant, no person of whatever exceflence could adequately incar
nate sucb an unfinished and indefinite species as hurnanity; the poten
tiality of lhe species wili aiways be incompleLeiy disclosed as long as it
iasts, and without ar.> substantial change in its bio!ogical endowrnent.
Status and stature belong together in one concept of human dignityç
But an importaut difference vi1l emerge in our an’Jysïs We knowwhen
individual status is respected when we determine that a state is not us
ing or misusing lhe peopie, wasting or infantilizing them—in short,
when the state honors their rights. The evidence is mosdy in what the
state does not do, in avoidance and noninterference. In contrast, we
impute stature te humanítv on lhe basis aí the recerd of ícs achieve
ments. The evidence is manifest. Status is a largeiy negative concept,
defined by what assaults or even effaces it; slature can be defined eniy
positively, by what is humanly achieved.
The concepi of equal individual status is only part of the idea of Fui
man dignity; the othcr part is the stature ei the human species. What is
more, as1 vill suggest, status is only part of the defense of the thcory of
TUE mEÃ O; I,L;MA .ç DIGNJ TE
human rights; the ather part is the pubiic morality of justice. As we go
aiong. ffiese points çill be developeil.
Human Dignity Is an Existential, Nota Moral, Value
Human dinity is an existential value; value or worthiness is imputed
tu the identity of tbe person or lhe species. 1 stipulate that when the
tru± ol’ identity is at stake, existence is at stake; lhe matter is existentia].
The idea of human digni4’ insists on recognizing the pruper idenliiy of
individual or species; recognizing what a person is in relatien lo ali
other persons and what the species is in relaflen (o ali other species.
The truth aí personai identity is at stake when any individual is
treated as if he or slw is not a human being Iike any other, and therefore
treated as more ar Iess than human. The truth aí identityis aba at stake
when a person is treated as íf 1w ar s1w is just one more human being in
a species, and not, instead, a unique individual who is frreplaceab]e and
not exchangeable for another. These flvo notions seem te go in oppo
site directions—cummonness and distinctiveness—but 1 think that
they cooperate in constituting the idea of equal individual status.
III one sense, personal identity is not an achievemenL 1 could not and
did nor choose (o be bom ai ali, ar bom a man instead aí a weman; te be
bom on this daie rather some carlier or Jater une and bom to Iliese par
ents rather than some others. 1 couid not have been some other person
and stffl been myseif, even though the society in which 1 grew up hclped
te shape me; lhe sarne me could ef ceurse have grown up in some other
society, which would have shaped my beginnings differently. 1 am not a
creature who has a destiny, bui once Iam in existence, certain featumes are
what they are, and are rrrnre ar less fixed. In another sense, identity is an
achievement. Becoming ar being onesclí has meaning. One tries te real
ize certain putentialities rather thnn azily leaving them dormani; one
can try te msist imitating othems ar coniamniing thoughüessly te the pre
vai]ing mores ar fasbions; one can werk hard tu avoid pretending tubo
what one isn’t; one can change oneself for lhe better; one can take hoid of
oneself; one can aspfre to be not the author bui thc editor ofoneselíand
one’s 11k; one can aspire Lo a measure or episode ofauthenticit
IIUMAN OIGNITr
lo
For Lhe time being, ali that 1 want lo say abeut the idenuty of the hu
man species is that it is the only animal species that is not oniy anima],
lhe onlv species that is partly not natural, and that is therefore unpre
dictable in lis conduct despite lis genetic sameness fmom one genera
tion to lhe nen. These are, 1 think, lhe most important considerations
in regard to lhe idenflty o! lhe human species.
Individual status is a major part af the idea aí human dignity be
cause it struggles against soch notions as the natural ar divinely ar
dained superiority or inferiority of some hwnan beings in comparison
to ethers ar in relation to Ihem; the idea of caste, or lhe natural slavery
o! some; lhe idea o! hereditary rank; the idea o! inherited curse; the
idea of eternal damnation in itself, and also when it is posited for some
but not others; and lhe belief that one may sacrifico the hves or condi
tions aí life of lhe smafler number of persons for the larger number
witheut seeing that acting from sincerely perceived necessity can 11ev-
erthe[ess be doing cvii. Actually, q’nically asserted necessity is Lhe norm.
False metaphysics spensors these and many ather notions that war on
equai individual status and thus fortifies the aimost inveterate tendency
that humanbeings have to divide the wurld up into pseudo-ontoiogicai
categoHes. The pathetic fact is that lhe only enemies of human dignity
ame human beings.
When 1 speak o! identity, 1 have in mmd only ndividuais and spe
cies. 1 am skepticai of efforts that theerists make lo give groups the
sarne existential weight ar dignity as individuais and the species. My
skepücism extends to the concept aí group rights, because under some
versions of this concept, a group has rights that are not translatable
inw each member’s individual right o! free association and ether rights,
but rather are a sumI o! corporate rights lhat may abridge members’
individual rights. The basis aí my skepticism is Lhe reason that if a per
son ±inks o! himself ar herself first as a member of a group, that per
son has defined identity as affillation, and not as first being oneseL To
be afflhiated wilh ones whole self is to weicome docility, te endone lhe
thought that anos possibiiWes are exhausted, pcrhaps from binh, and
that one cannoi change or be changed; ali that une can da is piay a part
and aL most mab the part anes own by smail differences o! aLtitude ar
conduct. lndeed, cultural identfty may be imagincd as one’s fated and
TflE lUFA ar MUMAN OIGNITY
li
irrevocable personal identity. Affihiation that is self-defining and life
defining wfth this intensity gives a person a hand-me-down identity, an
identity chat has completion and enclosure, whkh no personal identi4’
that is free of self-mystification can possibly have. Ones life becomes a
vicaricus experience, Iived through the fate of the group. Group rights
consign individuais to dependence sustained by their conformity. 1
know that a Iife-defining group affihiation can feel l&e an enlarement
of the sdf, but it is actually a dhninishment; it can feel like an intensifi
cation of the sensafion of being joyously ahve, but it is acwaliy existen
tial surrender.
1 want now to make a contrast between eústentia[ values and moral
values. The categery of existential values, values of identity, includes
such cherished aspirations and attainments as developed er distinctive
selfhood, autonomy, authenticity freedom, equaiit power for its own
sake, virtues for their own sake, perfectionism aí character or styie of
life, honor, glory, and fome. Ali these values may pertain to individua’
uniqueness and hence are allied to the idea of human dignity; but they
agure in uniqueness as a project, not as a given. They signiFy a desire
for an enbanced dentity or enhanced indivduality. As such, these vah
ues can matter to the discussion of human dignity; some, Iike freedom
and equahty. have a pIam at its center; aU can be and ofien are dis
cussed, howcver, apart from the idea of human dignity. But as 1 will
suggest when 1 discuss the value-ethics critique aí human rights, the
project of enhanced individuality ar cultivated individual uniqueness
is not essential te the defense of equal individual status. Every human
being is unique and individual without having te try tu be.
Ali existential values have a conceptual indepeodence [tom instru
mental practicality and most important from morality, despite the fact
that freedom and equality, the core of human rights, are often defended
as practically or morally necessary ar useM. When 1 say that human
dignity is an existentiai vatue, however, E do not deny its dose relation
te mora]ity, despïte ils conceptual independence. (Not to say that ali
existential values—say, honor, lofl and fame—must bear a dose tela
tion te morali9) 1 mean that for many people, and rightly, [noralitv
has to do solely ar principally with human suffering; but human dig
nity in its concern with status and stawre has te do with the proper
ÍIUMAW DIGNIT Y
12
recognition of the identity of every human being and the identity of
Lhe human spedies. 1 ako do net deny that Lhe motives tu inffict suffer
ing and tu assault dignity come from the sane repertory of vices: ibe
sarne appetites, emotions, and passions, whether they are inherent in
everyday life or are inflamed by the eager adoption aí Lhe doctrine of
necessity or by the appeal of ideology te Lhe imaginadon. Stlll, being
made te suifer, bodily and materially, is not conceptually the sarne
wrong as being treated as if one is not a human being. iasth E beJieve
Lhat tbough a human being can never forfeit his or her dignir>’ and thus
become legitimateiy open te any ldnd aí inhuman treaunent, one as
sauits one’s own dignity when une is a party te serions injustice, or
systemic oppressien ar tu cvii as a policy; one is acting as if ene were
more than human, or more human tban those whose victimizaüon
mie causes ar calmiy accepts as nothing untoward. The ties bepveen
morai values and cdstentjal values are o&en tight, but net always se;
they are concepiually distinct, even in the idea of human dignity, and
not oniy when tension between flwm appears.
Now, the desen’ed salience aí Kant’s moral phiosophy iii the theory
of rights may Icad us astray and make morality and dignity inler
changeable terms. He holds that human dignity or worth lies in the
uniqueiy human capacity on earth (te leave aside more-than-human
entities) tu act morally, which necessarily means to act from the correct
moral disposition. First, oniy Lhe geod wilI shows respect for Lhe moral
law; emoüons lAce leve ar pity do not beiong te Lhe correct moral dis
position; and intrinsic te the good will is the resolve tu be indifferent te
the effects of ones moral action en human purpo5es. Sccond, Kant also
thinb that we treat persens with the respcct they deserve when we treat
them as ends and net merely as means. They deserve respect as ends
because as morai agents they are capable ef respecting the moral law.
To put the uva thoughts together, we accord persons die respect they
deserve as ends, when we treat them in a way that shows our respect for
the morai iaw, not when we mirnic morality out of one ar another
emotion or interest, much less when we immorally ar disrespectfully
use them as mere means. Kant ties respect for the morai law in coes
actions and respect for persons as ends in our dealings with them into
au unbreakable knot.
ruE !DEA F £FUMÂN WCNITY
13

Eut suppose tbat we want to hold, instead, that there are addiúonal
bases for respecfing human beings and hence their rights than their ca
pacity tu act morally. Free agency is a broader concept than moral agency.
The moral and the existential are not interchangeable terms, and they
cannot be tied into mi unbreakab[c knot. We might also thüik that there
are other praiseworthy sources aí moral conduct, besides respect for the
moral law, 111w piry or compassion. Then, too, içe could believe, and as a
matter of course, that anticipaüon of the consequences of cur action is
properly part of our disposition to act, just as 0w actual consequences
are properly subject to moral judgment. Mi these objecüons tu Kant are
commonpiace. We iearn much from KanI, but not on moral motivation,
and not on the place of morahly in 0w larger scheme of human values,
even when we take Kant’s theory of the virtues into account.
The conceptual distinction betveen moral and axistential values is
interestingly made by Justice Wffliam Brennan in bis concurrence to
the per curiam decision that (temporarily) invalidated We practice of
capital punishment (Furnian i Georgia 1972). His discussion in this
case is perforce framed by the specific kinds of pain and suffering
(mental and physical) that punishment inflicts, rather than the many
ldnds of pain and suffering that a state that does not recognize and te
sp&t rights inflicts on lhe totality of a ptnon’s exitence. But Brennan
allows himself whcn heis discharging bis specific interpretative task, to
reach a general principie. He says that more than pain is invoived in
‘extreme]y severe punishment’ and in capiial punishment especially.
“The true siguificance Íof severe punishmen:s] is that they treat 01cm-
bers of the human race as nonhuman, as objects to be toyed with and
djscarded” and tbat they may “reflcct the attitude that the person pun
ished is not entit]ed tu recognition as a fellow human being” (pp. 272—
273). (The uM Nazi phrase was “life unworthy of life’) He alio safl that
severe pain like that oi capital punishment can be degrading (p. 281),
especially when it is inflicied arbitrarily on some but not ali who have
committcd capital crimes; when the severity of thc pain is unacceptabie
tu contemporary society; and when a lesser punishment than death
would be adequate for the deterrent or expressive function ofpunish
ment. The “paradigm violation” of human dignity is “torturous pun
ishment’ which capital punishment is, mentally more than physicaily.
HUMAN OIGWITY
14
1
lis condusion is that capital punishment is a cruel and unusual pan
ishment and is therefore prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the
US Constitution.
lt is excellent that somewhere on tbe highest levei of US jurispru
dence, the idea of human dignity appears to be doing irreptaceable
work in the defense of human rights. in the Furman case, the target is
torture or what is torture-lilce: living on death rcw for a long period
and then enduring execution that is rarely &ee of serious pain. The
• trouble is that apart fwm the metaphor of the human being as ao ob
ject that is toyed with and discarded, and the reference to tbe slate’s
failure lo recognize a prisoner as a fellow human being, the entire bar-
• den of Brennan’s reasoning against capital punishrnent is carried by the
view that the inifiction of such severe pain is immural, a great mmo
rality committed by the state. He does not quite say that capitai punish
ment mabs the state no different from and certainiy no better than a
murderer, but he could have. Human dignity is ftequcntly mentioned,
but it is not clear what work the ïdea does. Eisewhere, he expands the
notion of human dignity tu require state provision for individual selE’
development. This idea is rather too custodial for the gocd aí human
dignity; the real force of bis conceptualization lies iii bis principled aver
sion tu capital punishment and other cruel or unusuai punishments.
Brennan implies that deibemte infliction of severe needless pain is
ir, itscif degrading because it is the ukimate immorality; the infliction
ofsuch pain is the worst way that human beiugs treat olher human be
ings. No one, no matter what they ]iave done, ever deserves tu receive
0w worst at the hands of the state. The treatmcnt is inhuman. But
Brennan does not hold unto his poinl that the inf]iction of severe pain
can be au instrument of an intention that goes beyond pain for the sake
ofpain namely, the reduction of a human being tu thc nonhuman sta
tus of a thing or animal. He keeps returning to the crueliy endured by
the prisoner in capitai punishment—that is, tu the extraordinarily
painful experience of a prisoner facing death and then undergoing ex
ecution. The severity of expericnced pain is what holds Brennan’s at
tention. Fie says that the United States believes that “the dignity ofthe
individual is the supreme value”; but it is telling that he then calis this
foundation ‘moral grounds” (p. 296).
THE mEÃ OP KUMA O
I5
 1 do not wish tu press Brennan tua hard. 1 can see why it maltes sense
tu hold that inflicted pain can be se severe that one wants to say that ít
is in itself an effacement, apart irem intentions ar effects, aí the hu—
manky and hence the dignfry of the victim. What 1 would like, how
ever, is a more definite indicatien that the violadon of dignity has
existential weight that is independent ei the suffering in itself. Pan o!
the intention of inflicting suffering isto re-identify gmups ei people as
subhuman and do se through the kinds ei suffering that degrade. In
general, atrocities, crimes against humanig’, are not merely immoral
but evil. When evil in the form of the effacement o! human identity is
involved, the category of immorality seems inadequate, The moral
concept o! cmeltydoes not account sufficienüy forthe phenomenoa oí
cruel and miusual punishments such as slavery.
E also think ffiat what Brennan’s epinion reqoires is a sharper dis
dnction between pain (no malter how severe) and death. He bates the
tbought that a state would deliberately end the life o! a human being
and tries tu malte Lhe awftulness o! that act resembie as c]osely as
possible the most extreme pain. By making 50 much aí Lhe cnelty, heis
able te take reflige in the Eighth Amendment and thus see severe pain
as in itself degrading and hence as violating human dignity. He believes
that he cannot appeal Lo an absolute indefeasible right of life because
the due process clauses o! the US Constitution do not prohibit capital
punishment, but assume lis continued existence and only demand due
process protections for the capitally accused penou, Conceptually, heis
left with the profound immurality o! state-inflicted cruelty. Yet he sees
that retributive moral arguments (secular and religious) are used to
deíend capital punishment: “a life for a life” has ancient standing. Ele
consequenüy needs a ldnd o! argument that is not unly moral; so he
centinuously refers Lo human digni, as if it were more tru[y moral
than traditjonal morality, just because human dignitv seems incompat
ible with, above aH. the deliberate and punitive inilictien o! severe pain.
But why is death “an unusually severe punishment?’ His answer is
that ft is “unusual lo its pain, in às finality, and in às enormi ty” (p. 287).
But he does not spell out the specialness o! death as a punishment; he
does not saywhy death isso bad ibai no one can ever be saM tu desene
it, even if it wcre inflicted quicldy and painlessly. WC need an existential
NUMA D:Griirr
L6
argument for an absolute, indefeasible right of life, nota moral one, and
1 hope to give a sketch of it in a little while. In Erennan’s concurrence,
strildng and praiseworthy as ii is, morality actually does just about ali
±e conceptual wark; dignity hardly does any. The defense aí human
rights reqaifes a more defined existential or identity component.
When we look, as içe wili, at the connecüon between pain and deg
radation outside the framework of legal punishment (capital punish
mcm in particular), and with state-infficted crimes against humanity
ji mmd, the nature of tbe degradation that severe pain can cause be
comes dearer.
Uniqueness and Dignity
In the idea o! human dignity te recognize onesclf as sharing in a com-
meu humanity with every human being is the primordial component
o! individual identity, lis positive center, however, is belief in one’s
uniqueness together with the uniqueness o! every human being. Anal
ogously, the dignity of Lhe human species lies in its uniqueness mn a
world o! species. 1 am what no one else is, while not existentiafly supe
rior to anyone else; we human beings belong te a species that is what
no other species is; li is the highest species ou earth—so far. In a fiirther
step, we want to be aMe te say that the uniqueness in each case is com-
mendable, not because any uniqueness whatever is commendablc but
because human individual and species uniqueness derives from capaci
ties, from traits and attributcs that are unique and commendable. AH
other species are more alike than humanity is hke any ai them; a chim
panzee is more like an eardiworm than a human being, despite the
dose biological relatien aí chimpanzees te human beings. The sma[l
genetic difference betwren humaniiy and its d!osest relatives is actually
a difference in capacity and petentiality that is indefmitely large, which
actually means that li can never be fiilly measured. Only the human
species is, in the most importam existential respects, a break with na
Lute and significantly not natural. It is unique among species in not
being only natural. O! ceurse, if the species breaks with nature, se must
eveq’ individual member o! II.
TH!IOEA OF fl UMA V
17
 Does dignity reaily depend on uniqueness, 00 unique identity? In one
sense of dignity, the answer is no. 1 mean tbat any creature or person or
thing can strike an observer as having the dignity of being itself, werthy
of perception, and able te arouse vender at its mere existence. The coa
cept of unigueness does not bave to be in play for us te feel this wonder
ia te suddenly vivid appearance of a particular tbing, creature, or hu
man being that is seen or fuund by the way; we know that species exist,
but the particular is suddenty magnificent iii momentary isolafien and
sufficiency. The creature ar thing ar person may be se little known te
us that we de not have enough knowledge of it or him or her to make
any ciaim of uniqueness. Or the concept of uniqueness can be in play
as the mumcntary feeling that what is before us is Lhe only one oF às
klid, when of course à isn’t; its presence before us impeis Lhe feeling
thatnothing else is Iike it.Appearances and impressons count for every
thing. We observe as from a distance; the frame of mmd is aesthetic.
But when we speak of human dignity as the status of the individual
or the stature of the human species, we are reaching for anether sense
of dignit» the dignity of what is uniquely human in its identity. Hu
man ideniity rests on uníque traits and attributes, which make hurnan
beings capabie of commendable works and ways of being, but also of
wrongdeing of every kind and in every degree. If there were only or
mostiy wrongdoing, it weuid be nonsense te speak of human dignity.
The existential values wouid be worthless without realized moral ca
pacities. SuL there is more than wrongdoing. Mi (or almost ali) and
only (tru]y only) human beings have ±ese commendahle traits and at
tributes. (1 vi1I later discuss these traits and attributes at some length.)
lfwe want people to be treated with the proper recognition and respect
by means of a system ef human rights, Içe must work tu enceurage Lhe
perceptica that each person’s cemmon human (raits and anributes. in
their individualized presence, make that person uniquely precious; and
ifwe wanl 11w human species tu serve as steward of nature we are asking
for peopie tu direct, more taz they have ever done, their uniquely hu
man traits and attributes to activities that make up the great project of
stewardship, which no other species couid possibly conceive or perform.
We begin thinldng about the human dignity aí individuais, thcir
equal status, when we impute tu cvery person ibis thought: 1 have a life
HL’MAN OIGNIYY
18
to bve; it is my ilfe and no one elses; it is my only life, let me live it 1
&st and no one can take my place; 1 exist and though 1 do not owe my
istence to fate or other superhuman necessit 1 am not nothing. My
birth may have been planned, but 1 was not intended as the spedfic
person 1 evenftaliy became. In some moods, 1 firntasize that everything
tjiat has se far happened in Lhe worid was needed to bring about my
particular existence, and that my existence is therefore a necessary out
come of innurnerahle interlocldng causal chains, although 1 knew that
±e sarne could be said of ali other persons and creatures. Anpvay, Iam
not nothing, even ifor even though 1 go te nothing at the end. Iam not
nothing, even ifin my life 1 amount tu nothing out of Lhe ordinary.
Thcre are people who are so disabted that they cannoc íunction.
Does 11w idea of dignity appiy te them? Yes, they remam human bebgs
jn the most important respect. If they cannot actively exercise many or
any of ffieir rights ffiey nevertheless retain a right to life, whatever their
incapacities (short ef the most extreme failures of ftinctioning). They
must be treated as human beings, not as subhuman oras animais or
Iumps aí matten Clearly, however, Lhe idea 1 explore puts ftrnctioning
human beings at 11w center. Nor do 1 wish Lo deny that Lhe obvious dif
ferences betveen adults and children (potential adults) remam crucial.
Attacb on the Status of Individuais
Lodged in te idea of human dignity is Lhe belief that the individuais
status can sornetimes be attacked—injured and insulted—painiessly,
witheut suffering. People can be manipuiated, centrofled, er condi
tioned softly and subt4 ar creu invisibly, and not frei tha they have
been degraded er even wronged, that they have been existenüally
harmed. They may even find pleasure or numerous benefits in their
siluation, and feel grateflil to those who mie them paternaiistically ar
in such a narrewly regimented way as to withhold from them the con
trasts and range of experience needed te create awareness of their dig
nity. It weuld take an outsider or an alienated subject to find their
horizon arbitrarily clesed in. To use a discredited terrn, people mayhve
ia ftilse censciousness, and do se comfortabty One of Lhe advantages
rifE JDEA 07 NUMAN OJONiTT
19
of the idea of human dignity for the theoqr of human rights is te raise
the possibffity of painless oppression, whether in ostensibly rights
respecting societies or in successfülly disciplined societies where the
very idea of human dignity and the rights that flow from it are Iacking.
The problem of painless oppression and the attendant problem of
flilse consciousness, however, do not provide tbe most significant issue
where lhe idea of human dignity does indispensable work. The greater
the suffering that a society may inflict 011 people within or outside its
domestic jurisdiction, the more urgent the question of human dignity
becomes. But lhe suffering that a wstem may inffict on people in denial
of their rights is not the whole story. The damage done te morality is
crucial, but not an exhaustive account of the oppression. Beyond op
pression, there are systems of suffering that are so extreme as to efface
the personhood oF individuais and leave only biological entities that do
anything to survive, at whatever cost lo those around them and to their
own dignity. Degraded human beings therefore lose their identity as
human beings and as particular persons, at least for a significant stretch
of time. They have been forced lo lose almost aU uniquely human and
personal characteristics. Thus through no fault of their own, they no
longer manifest the reasons for which incomparabie dignity is ascribed
te human beings. Except in rare cases, they can no longer exercise free
agency or moral agency. The assault on dignity has achieved its aim
when the very possibility of the idea of human dignity is forced out of
the mmd of the victim by extreme suffering. One has beco made te
forget that one is a human being because those who do evil as a poliq’
have already denied that those to whom they do it are human. This
eflreme will lo deny lhe humanity of targeted groups grows out of ide
ologies and eiaborated fantasies that congeal in revulsion and bottom
less contempt for the affficted groups and resuks in their degradation.
The original denial of their humanity seems vindicated in a grotesque
parody of proof. The effects of lhe atrocious policies reinforce lhe ex
tremism of will. Crimes against humanity are lhe most serious crimes
against human dignity as well as the most serious crimes against lhe
moraiity embedded in human rights.
Deiiberateiy effacing thc person takes place in extreme situations like
war, many prisons and forms of captivity, torture, slavery, concentra
nUMA N oEan(ry
20
tion camps, induced or neglected famine, and death camps. But we
should not speak as if aI any time degraded human beings are no
longer human; te do se would justify lhe treatment inflicted co them.
TheY are human beings in ruins. Even if some capúves are freed, thejr
rccovery of status may be only nominal, but it is someduing lilce resur
rection te recover it more than nominally. Great suffering imposed by
human decision, not by natural calamity, can thus impose the aggra
vated harm of the attempted destruction of existential status.
Yes, natural calamity may be 50 dire as te make human beings forget
themselVes in their efforts to save diemselves at whatever cost to others,
and prior or subsequent human negiect may worsen lhe effects ofnatu
ral calamity, but naftre has nothing in mmd when it starts a catastrophic
process In contrast, the cvii treatment of people—say, a totalitarian sys
tem of exterminaüon—deliberately imposes on them lhe worst exis
tenúal loss. fle evil of inhuman suffering is a conceptually separate
consideration from the inevitable existential loss that is sustained by
most people when they are dehumanized, even if for only a while, by
their suffering. The human loss has more than one dimension.
1 am not saying that the idea of human dignity represents indiffer
ence to suffering. Rather it serves as a reminder that the harm sustained
by a human being subjected te inhuman treatment is more than the
experience of pain. In most cases (but n°1 ali, as we shall see), the exis
tential perspective is not in competition with moral judgment. My
complaint is that the existential loss, the loss of human dignity through
extreme suffering, is not always taken into account. It is heartless but
necessary te say that since lhe existential loss often ceases to register on
lhe victim after thc ordeal has gene on for a while, it is up lo the ob
server to insist 011 it, precisely te highlight the compound nature of the
experience of evil treatment, lhe total abrogation of human rights.
Moral and Existential Components in the
Theory of Rights Compared
1 propose lhe tentative thought that (tom a moral point of view human
rights are instrumental in their value, whiie their value from an exis
TflE IOEA OF UDMAN DIGNE 1Y
21
tenüal point of iew is not instrumental. The ftmdamental moral
advantage of rights is that they are supposed to reduce suffering by
giiarding against state oppression and wrongdoing. In contrast, the a
istenflal advantage is that the state’s respect for rights shows that the
authoritative source of Iaws and policies in society is constrahed by its
recognition of every person’s identity as a human being qual in status
to ali others and as a unique selE For ali lis good effects on the psychol
ogy of a person, such recogniüon is not hstrumentally valuaNe, be
cause one’s identity precedes any purpose une lias. To be sure, a penDo
finds that guarantecd rights create an atmosphcre oFfreedom in which
oppcrtunities for acdon mulfiply. But 1 think that it is somewhat mis
Ieading to regard an atmosphere aí freedom as oniy or primariiy in
strumental; it makes a new world. lo exercising a right, one shows that
one is aware of being free and also demonstrates what being free means.
One exemplifies one’s status as free and qual. 1 won’t insist, however,
on a sharp contrast between the instrumental and noninstrumental
value of human rights, as if to say that what is noninstrumental must
always rank higher.
The hope, perhaps flitile, is that the question shouid not arise as to
the comparative importance of moral and existential components in
the theory of individual human rights. At first sight, we can say that
both are necessary, and neither is sufficient. A second look indicates,
however, that since there can be painiess degradation where no right
but life is resptcted (discussed again later), Lhe existential component is
occasionally necessary and sufficient to condemn such an infantiiizing
wstem where rights are comfortably absent because they are LheughÉ
unnecessary The moral element has faiied to cooperate with the ais
tential element in upholding human rights.
There is one iast stumbiing block. Does morality actualIy require a
prior existemial element? 1 mean that a committed champion of ani
mais could ask why the prcvention ar reduction of human suffering
counts as an absolute morai purpose, while animal suffering is at best,
and rareh’ ±at, a minor consideration. One way oF dealing with this
question is te say that individual members of Lhe human species matter
existentially more than mcmhers of ali ather species; human beings
HUMAN OIGNITY
22
have an incomparably higher dignity. fley matter more because aí
what they are: members of the human spedes, with the unique and
incomparable traits and atiributes of the species. In being parüy and
commenllY nonnatural, a human being has an incomparabiy higher
status ffian any animal. lf human beings maner more, their suffering
matters more.
i lrnuw that what 1 have just said is not a snict entailmeni; it may
even be a mistake. But 1 just do not ser that animaIs are edstentiafly
equal m human beings when they are not existentially similar to hu
mar’ beings. The infliction aí needless suffering on any person is wrong
not only for the pain that it causes but also for the failure to recognize
a shared humanity that it demunstrates. What makes the precept that
no person should suifer needlessly into a moral precept of the hig[iest
arder is thus a prior existential consideration: persons are to be treated
iii some ways and not in athers. To cause them needless suffering isto
treat them in a way that demes them their digmty ft would therefore
seem that only the idea aí human digmty can be the startrng point for
the daim that human sufíenng matters more than animal suffering,
even though the needless suffering of any animal that is not immedi
ately threatening is always deplorable. (lt is also right but regrettable lo
have tu 1<111 a lion to save a human being.) The alternative way oí defend
ing the priority of human suffering is simply to plead species-solidarity;
us against them. This is a neat solution but a bad one because ii comes
down to te adage that might makes right, which is not a moral prin
cipie. lt is instead a debased existential ideai since buman beings are
usualiy able to overpower other species they are permitted Lo make
them suffer for any purpose human beings have.
Let me ask again: should we judge the comparative importance aí
moral and existential elemenis in the theory of rights? Is tis theory
only a branch of morai phdosophy and not of existential phiosophy as
well? Later, we wffl take up more ftuly üie subject aí existential values in
te theory of righis; sol ‘411 delay addressing this question (to the ex
teM that 1 am able to discuss it) until then. But 1 wil say that, in my
judgment, the highest value is mara[ity and always deserves aL east
prima fade precedence in our practice in the present and ftiture, what
rifE IDEÁ O; JIUKIAN DEGHITr
23
ever we may think about the more remote past, that assessment does not
establish, by iiself, that whenever there is a moral consideration liwolved
morality is a sufflcient guide for thinldng about the issue.
Secular Mfirmation of the Dignity of the Human Species
It has been said that the earth would be better off without human be
ings living 011 ii 1 think that after a set of steps, we can reject that con
tendon and afflrm the unique contribution that humanity can make to
nature. The stewardship of nature is a contribution that only humanity
can make, and would exemplify human stature most &oriously From
nature’s point of view, even though nature has no point of vie’ the
human specics is irreplaceable because its stewardship depends on
commendabiy unique traits and attributes that help tu make human
beings partly not natural. Before humanity perished we could not pass
on to any other species, not even our closest relalives, our lmowledge
and appreciation of nature. Only the partly not natural can serve na
ture in certain ways that it deserves and cannot provide for itself.
This essay will ±us concentrate on the place of the idea of human dig
nity, in the form of equai individual status, ir, Lhe theory of human
rights; and on the dignity of the human species, ir, the form ofhuman
stature, which is based on unique nonnatural capacities. But in the af
firrnation of the dignitv of the species, the record oF human atrocities
wU! notbe forgo;cen; nor witL the afflrmation be turned loto a counse[
of forgiveness. Furthermore, the standing of the human species vis-à
vis other species is not the only form of stature ihat counts; nor is the
stewardship of nature the only active expression of stature. Stature is
also tied te the repeated demonstration that humanity has made, at any
given time, if not the most of itself (who can say what the mosi is?)
then something astonishing and unexpected; luar its acMevcments are
great and have shown that at any given time there could be no foresee
able end to thc realization of unsuspected human potentialities. Hu
man stature is essentially aH exi5tential. not a mural, value.
My essay is a secular aueinpt te discuss human dignity Ido not rcly
on traditional answers that any religion gives lo lhe question of hu
IÉIMAN OIQNITY
24
manity’s rauL A common Cbristian answer is that humanity finds its
place in a scaie of entities with divinity at the tup, angels below the di
vjnity and humanity “a little lower than the angels” (Psalms 8:5), with
ali animaIs benearh humanity and intended to serve iL But we are not
in the eye of any divinity. 1 do not assume lhat there is a religious an
swer te the question of the worih of humanity. 1t would be flattering tu
think, for example, that only human beings are in the image or likeness
of the divini4’ and that therefore we have the dignity of khiship with
some entity immeasurably greater than us but nevertheless not utterly
removed from us in its nature, not “whoily uthee’ If we could first be
fleve lo the more-than-human entity of monutheism, there would then
be no problem about the nature of and reason for imputing dignity te
every individual and tu the species. Who could deny it? Then, too,
Greek myths include stories ir. which the geds feel lust for human be
ings (whom the gods did not create out of nothing) and sometimes
mate with them. There is literal if selective ldnship. Christianity teaches
that being human is a good enough (though temporary) condition for
God. But we should try to do without sucb props; they cari always give
way to enllghtenment. Furthermore, given the extent of suffering in
human history, much of it owing te human widcedness, Ged Lhe cre
ator has endured a perpetual legitimadon crisis all through the history
[ of theologica] reflection. Secularism relieves os ef bis burden.
Iam aware that a case can be made for perceiving much ofWestern
re[igion as existing not to make Éruth-daims about more-than-human
reality,but by artful means te promote human dignity in Lhe only ways
that could establish a foothold and that then perhaps could eventually
be discarded as a theolegical husk. 1 mean that Greek and Roman poly
theism, Jewish theism, and Christian theism invent deities to provide a
standard that is supposedly not humanly devised and yet pretends to
show that humaniq—in its god-Iike resemblances or creative achieve
ments or even in ts capadty for wickednes&—has a dignit» an impor-
tance, that humanity does not have lo chim for itself. Who could doubt
the centrality of humanity in the eyes of the deities when une reads
Homer and Sophocles, the Jewish scriptures, and the Christian Testa
ment? Wé must caro to manage without the liieralness of sucb assis
tance, ifwe can. But suppose human beings can respect one anotber
TII ZOEA OF HUMAN OIGWITY
25
oniy as creatures of a god oras mortal (theugh rather feeble) copies of fl things. But humanity must perforce be the measure: it intmoduces
the gods and grow to hate one another as shriveled worthless beings measure into the universe. Humanity must be the judge in lis own case,
against the assumed background of a godless world? Imagine having to with alI the strains and perpiexities such a condition engenders. li is
lie to peeple to persuade them of the truth of their dignity. also the orily audience or interlocutor for the discussion. There is no
It would also be comforting to posit tbe existence of tbe soul as an arbiter um sponsor. Humanity talks te ibelf about itself, it judges itself,
answer tolhe quesfion of the identity of every individual. In one ver it invents the questions and answers, it alone wonies about human dig
sion, the soul of any individual lias exisled immaLerially, without a nity. There is no appeal beyond itself. But the discussion must go on
body, from the beginning; ii lias a necessary existence because of God’s because there are certain questions that must be answered, and can
purpose; it bears an identity known Mly only lo lIs maker. Incarnation only 1w answered by reference to the idea of human dignity. Or we can
is the souls prison; lhe soul. ones identity. needs no body. In some ac sai’ more modestly that the idea of human dignity supplies ae least
counts, any soul cou]d conceivably have been given any human ar ani unbellevable answers.
mal corporeality (ar more than one) and retained lhe sarne identity, 1W wifl remm te these questions ater. But Iet os now develop some
the sarne essence; it is, if not eternal, iben imrnDrtal. However, as long as thoughts aboutthe place of the existential element in the theory ofhu
we have no continuity of consciousness between incarnations, no rec man rights and its relation to the moral element,
oflection of earlier embodments, the idea is a nonsiarter. 1 may as well
be only one self-aware person as be many persons and animais, ]iuked
who knows how—charming as dat thought perhaps is and fertile lo
suggesting human ldnship with ali nture because humanit like
everything else, carne from matter, ar suggesting the inclusion within
every individual aí traces aí many animal species. (Chromosoma[ sim
ilarities are irrelevant ia lhe doctrine of reincarnation, which is nat a
metaphorica[ anticipation oí molecular biology.) Some who believe in
the sou! think ihat one cou!d have been bom at some other time ar
place and somehow still be the person une is now; ones existence is nOt
merely the outcorne of a chance coming togethem aí progenitors at one
time in one place. Perhaps lhe oddest notion is Christian: lhe resurrec
üen oí the dead bedy into imrnortality and the reawakening of the im
mortal (not etemnal) soul on Judgrnent Day. The secular theory of
dignity does without such unwarrantable clairns about the soul and
should content itselíwith Éhe cancept of mmd, a uniquelyhuman pos
session, which is na dissociable fram lhe body, is not immortal, much
less eternal, but, rather, infinite, dospite lIs meager life-span.
Nor do 1 posil a nonhuman ar more-than-human audience for spec
ulation about the standing and worth of humanity. If we accept reli
gious teaching, these problems receive salutions, diverse as they must
be. One problem is sureLy solved: the pesited divinity is the measure of
HUMAN oKoNIry THS ROSA O? HUMAM OIQNírr
26 21