CRIMPRO Case Digest

213 – Roberts Jr. v. CA

TOPIC: Remedies from Preliminary Investigation - Reinvestigation/Preliminary Investigation
Court EN BANC

Ponente DAVIDE, JR., J

Citation G.R. No. 113930.

Date March 5, 1996.

Petitioners PAUL G. ROBERTS, JR., et. al

Respondent THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. MAXIMIANO ASUNCION, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104, HON. APOLINARIO G. EXEVEA, HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON, and
HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, in their capacities as Members of the Department of Justice "349" Committee, and
the CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY

Case Doctrine Related to Topic

There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in
a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, "as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court."

FACTS
 Petitioners, who are corporate officers and members of the Board of Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. were prosecuted in connection with
the Pepsi “Number Fever” promotion by handlers of the supposedly winning “349” Pepsi crowns. Of the four cases filed against the
petitioners, probable cause was found by the investigating prosecutor only for the crime of estafa, but not for the other alleged offenses.
 April 12, 1993 – Information was filed with the RTC; a copy of the investigating prosecutor’s Joint Resolution was forwarded to the
RTC but no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the preliminary
investigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof were included
 April 15, 1993 – Roberts et. al filed a petition for review with the DOJ seeking the reversal of the finding of probable cause; they also
filed a motion to hold in abeyance issuance of warrant of arrest and to suspend proceedings until the DOJ has resolved the
petition for review
 Judge Asuncion issued an order (1) denying the petitioners' motion and (2) directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest "after 21 June
1993" and setting the arraignment on 28 June 1993.
 In part, respondent judge stated in his order that since the case is already pending in this Court for trial, following whatever opinion the
Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity his court. To justify his order, he quoted the
ruling of the Supreme Court in Crespo v. Mogul, which stated:
“In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the
fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for
review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left
entirely for the determination of the Court.”
 Upon appeal to the CA, the CA affirmed the finding of probable cause by Asuncion
 Subsequently, the DOJ also dismissed the petition for review finding that it would be an “exercise in futility to continue reviewing the
instant cases for any further action on the part of the Department would depend on the sound discretion of the Trial Court”
 The petitioner now assails before the SC both (1) the DOJ’s dismissal of the petition for review and (2) Asuncion’s April 15, 1993 order

ISSUE – HELD – RATIO

ISSUE # 1 HELD
W/N the DOJ’s dismissal of the petition of review was tainted with grave abuse of YES.
discretion
 There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an
accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, "as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court."
 The ruling in Crespo is in line with the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court 54 which recognizes the authority of
the Secretary of Justice to reverse the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor upon petition by a
proper party
 The DOJ improperly dismissed the petition simply because it thought that a review of the Joint Resolution would be an exercise
in futility in that any further action on the part of the Department would depend on the sound discretion of the trial court, and that the
latter's denial of the motion to defer arraignment filed at the instance of the DOJ was clearly an exercise of that discretion or was, in
effect, a signal to the Department that the determination of the case is within the court's exclusive jurisdiction and competence. This
infirmity becomes more pronounced because the reason adduced by the respondent judge for his denial of the motions to
suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment finds no support in Crespo.

ISSUE # 2 HELD
W/N Asuncion’s order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion YES.

 Anent the denial of the motion, it was premature for respondent Judge Asuncion to deny the motions to suspend proceedings and to defer
arraignment
 The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of this court is not the filing of the aforementioned motions at that stage of the
proceedings but the ling of a motion to dismiss or to withdraw the information on the basis of a resolution of the petition for review
reversing the Joint Resolution of the investigating prosecutor. However, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is
filed the trial judge may grant or deny it, not out of subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise of judicial
prerogative

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CRIMPRO Case Digest
213 – Roberts Jr. v. CA
TOPIC: Remedies from Preliminary Investigation - Reinvestigation/Preliminary Investigation
 Anent the finding of probable cause, this was incorrect since nothing accompanied the information upon its filing on 12 April 1993 with the
trial court
 And as revealed by the certification of Branch Clerk of Court Gibson Araula, Jr., no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic
notes of the proceedings during the preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof
 Clearly, when respondent Judge Asuncion issued the assailed order, he did not have the records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's
finding of probable cause. And strangely enough, he made no specific finding of probable cause; he merely directed the issuance of
warrants of arrest "after June 21, 1993."

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted and the following are hereby SET ASIDE:

(a) Decision of 28 September 1993 and Resolution of 9 February 1994 of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31226;

(b) The Resolution of the "349" Committee of the Department of Justice of 23 July 1993 dismissing the petitioners' petition for review and of 3
February 1994 denying the motion to reconsider the dismissal; and

(c) The Order of respondent Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion of 17 May 1993 in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198.

The Department of Justice is DIRECTED to resolve on the merits, within sixty (60) days from notice of this decision, the petitioners' petition for the
review of the Joint Resolution of Investigating Prosecutor Ramon Gerona and thereafter to file the appropriate motion or pleading in Criminal Case
No. Q-93-43198, which respondent Judge Asuncion shall then resolve in light of Crespo vs. Mogul, Soliven vs. Makasiar, People vs. Inting , Lim vs.
Felix, Allado vs. Diokno, and Webb vs. De Leon.

In the meantime, respondent Judge Asuncion is DIRECTED to cease and desist from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198 and to
defer the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners.

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