WHICH 'ATHENODORUS' COMMENTED ON ARISTOTLE'S "CATEGORIES"?

Author(s): MICHAEL J. GRIFFIN

Source: The Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 63, No. 1 (MAY 2013), pp. 199-208
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association
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Accessed: 20-02-2020 16:32 UTC

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Classical Quarterly A 199-208 (2013) Printed in Great Britain 199
doi: 10.1017/S0009838812000651

WHICH 'ATHENODORUS' COMMENTED ON ARISTOTLE'S

CATEGORIES?*

The principate of Augustus coincided with a surge of interest in the short Aristotelian
treatise which we now entitle Categories, contributing to its later installation at the out
set of the philosophical curriculum and its traditional function as an introduction to
logic.1 Thanks in part to remarks made by Plutarch (Sulla 26.1-2) and Porphyry
(Vita Plotini 24.7), the origin of this interest has often been traced to Andronicus of
Rhodes: his catalogue (jtivaKeç) and publication of the Aristotelian corpus began
with the Categories and may have drawn fresh attention to a previously obscure trea
tise.2 But the later Neoplatonic sources name several other philosophers who also dis
cussed the Categories and played an important role in crafting its interpretation
during the first centuries of our era.3 For example, the Neoplatonist Simplicius discusses
the views of Stoics and Platonists who questioned the Categories' value as a treatment
of grammar or ontology, while others defended its usefulness as an introduction to logic.
These early debates, as these later sources suggest, exercised a lasting influence on the

* This article has benefited from very helpful discussions with Ben Morison and George Boys
Stones, who were generous enough to comment on multiple earlier drafts of this paper, and whose
remarks saved me from many slips and sharpened the argument. This note develops an idea initially
articulated in my doctoral thesis, 'The reception of Aristotle's Categories c. 80 bce-ad 220' (Diss.,
Oxford University, 2009). I am grateful to my doctoral supervisor Tobias Reinhardt and to my exam
iners Richard Sorabji and Peter Adamson for their patient and invaluable guidance, suggestions and
corrections. I am, of course, entirely responsible for any remaining errors.
1 On the rapid rise of the Categories as an introduction to Aristotelian philosophy, see recently R.
W. Sharpies, 'Habent sua fata libelli: Aristotle's Categories in the first century bc', AAntHung 48
(2008), 273-87; H.B. Gottschalk, 'Aristotelian philosophy in the Roman world from the time of
Cicero to the end of the second century ad', ANRW 2.36.2 (1987), 1079-174; and P. Moraux, Der
Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias, vol. 1 (Berlin and
New York, 1973), in particular pp. 97-112 on the paraphrase of the Categories by Andronicus of
Rhodes, 147-63 on Boethus of Sidon's commentary, and pp. 182-5 on Aristón of Alexandria.
Moraux's second volume (1984) will also be referenced below. On the origins and organization of
the treatise itself, and more specific questions surrounding its current title, coherence and origins,
see M. Frede, 'Title, unity, authenticity', in id., Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Oxford, 1987) and
the introduction to R. Bodéüs, Catégories (Paris, 2001).
2 On Andronicus see J. Barnes, 'Roman Aristotle', in id. and M. Griffin (edd.), Philosophia Togata
II (Oxford, 1997), 1-70, who persuasively criticizes the story of a formative Roman 'edition' of the
Aristotelian corpus, and O. Primavesi, 'Ein Blick in den Stollen von Skepsis: Vier Kapitel zur frühen
Überlieferung des Corpus Aristotelicum', Philologus 151 (2007), 51-77, who offers some reasons to
defend the narrative of a Roman edition. I discuss some of the issues surrounding Andronicus at
greater length in M.J. Griffin, 'What does Aristotle categorize?', in M. Edwards and P. Adamson
(edd.), The Peripatetic School Through Alexander of Aphrodisias = BICS 52.2 (2011).
3 e.g. Simplicius at in Cat. 159.32 relates the following list of early (ttaAxwoi) interpreters of the
Categories: Boethus [of Sidon], Aristón [of Alexandria], Andronicus [of Rhodes], Eudorus [of
Alexandria] and Athenodorus, with whose identity this note is principally concerned.

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 200 MICHAEL J. GRIFFIN

shape of subsequent philosophy and phi

Aristotelian tradition.4
In this note I would like to revisit the i
critics, a Stoic identified only as 'Athen
and Simplicius. There is a strong conse
Athenodorus Calvus, a tutor of Octavian a
porary with Andronicus of Rhodes.5 I want
this identification. In particular, I want to a
Diogenes Laertius (7.68) is on philosophica
fication with the critic of the Categories,
unlikely to be Calvus. As an alternative to
that our Athenodorus may belong to a ge
work on the Categories in the Hellenistic
the first century, and under the title Bef
observes that Andronicus of Rhodes was a
Such a story runs counter to the older con
Andronicus was the first philosopher to dr
had languished for centuries out of circul
relocation of the text to the outset of the Aristotelian curriculum under the new title

Categories as a relatively late chapter in an ongoing tradition of commentary and

polemic. In what follows, I suggest some possible motives for Andronicus' relocation
of the Categories, if it can be viewed as a response to earlier criticism.

SOURCES FOR ATHENODORUS

From the Neoplatonic commentators on the Categories, we know that Athenodoru

a 'Stoic' (Porph. in Cat. 86.22; cf. Dexipp. [but only in chapter heading] 1.9) who
preted the Categories as an attempt to classify and describe 'verbal expressions q
bal expressions' (AéÇeiç m0ó XéÇeiç). He criticized the treatise as insufficie
comprehensive about this subject, since it has nothing to say about parts of s
such as conjunctions and articles (Porph. in Cat. 59.5-14; cf. 88.22), or about s
sentences (such as 'Dion walks'), or about various other kinds of words (retail

4 As Sharpies (n. 1), 274 remarks, 'The attention given to Aristotle's Categories in antiqui
major consequences for the future direction of philosophy. The prominence in subsequent disc
of the problem of universals, and more generally of questions concerning the relation between
knowledge and language, is due in large part to the Categories coming in antiquity to occupy th
it did at the start of the philosophical curriculum. This has also affected approaches to Aristot
self. Trends in Aristotelianism associated with the rise of Categories commentary have recent
treated by M. Rashed in his innovative book Essentialisme: Alexandre d'Aphrodise entre log
physique et cosmologie (Berlin, 2007). For the Neoplatonist debate on the subject-matter or
(oKotiôç) of the work, see P. Hoffmann, 'Catégories et langage selon Simplicius. La question
pos du traité aristotélicien des Catégories', in I. Hadot (ed.) Simplicius, Sa vie, son œuvre, sa
(Berlin, 1987), 61-90.
5 I rely chiefly upon the review in R. Goulet, Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques (Paris, 20
entries 496-8; Moraux (n. 1), 2.592-601 ; B.L. Hijmans, 'Athenodorus on the Categories and a
Athenodorus', in J. Mansfeld and L.M. de Rijk (edd.), Kephalaion: Studies in Greek Philosop
its Continuation Offered to Professor C.J. de Vogel (Assen, 1975), 105-14. For further bibliogr
see DPhA entries 496-8, and especially entry 497 on Calvus.
6 See for example Barnes, Primavesi and Frede (n. 2).

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 WHICH -ATHENODORUS' COMMENTED ON ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES? 201

Dexipp. in Cat. 12.3-11 ; cf. 32.18-29). His criticisms were embodied in a book
ing to Simplicius (who at in Cat. 62.26 references ÀOtivôôcopoç év xrâ TI
ApiaTOxéA.ooç pèv Ka-rnyopiaç èTciyeYpappévcp |3iP>,iqi). Athenodoms m
expressed these views before another Stoic, L. Annaeus Comutus, composed a
or expansion entitled tlpôç AGqvóócopov mi ApiatoxéAriv (Simpl. in Cat. 6
Comutus' identity is reasonably well established and his lifetime is firmly att
the reign of Nero,7 we can date his book around the second half of the first
ce, and date Athenodorus' critical activity on the Categories sometime before
The tradition offers several historical candidates for identification with the
Athenodoms described by Porphyry and Simplicius (who name him) and Dexippus
(who does not name him, but reports views similar to the Athenodoran positions in
Porphyry and Simplicius). We know about multiple Athenodori of the Stoic school,
all of whom appear to have lived prior to L. Annaeus Comutus, and at least two of
whom hailed from the city of Tarsus. One of the two best-documented candidates is
the Athenodoms called 'Cordylion', a contemporary of Marcus Cato who became librar
ian at Pergamon and was accused of bowdlerizing Zeno's Republic (Diog. Laert. 7.34);
and the other is Athenodoms 'Calvus', identified as the son of 'Sandon' and a tutor of
Augustus and correspondent of Cicero. Strabo (14.5.14) informs us that these two
Athenodori are best distinguished by their connections with Cato and Augustus, respect
ively; thus Cordylion lived before the suicide of Cato in 46 bce, while the son of Sandon
died in Tarsus at the age of eighty-two, after advising Augustus well into his reign as
emperor (cf. [Lucían], Macr. 21).
Of the son of Sandon, we know a good deal historically because of his association
with the young Octavian and the mature Augustus.8 In addition to his candidacy as the
author of a book criticizing the Categories, Athenodoms Calvus is credited with a 'his
tory of his fatherland'; with a work dedicated to Octavia Minor; with a work Jtepi
O7tou8f)ç tear jiaiSsiaç; and with a treatment of at least eight books on 'Peripatetics'
(e.g. Diog. Laert. 9.42.4, although it is also plausible that this is Cordylion's). As the
later sources were primarily interested in Calvus' association with Augustus, many anec
dotes about his mentorship have come down to us, several of which may carry hints
about his ethical doctrine.9
Of the Athenodoms called Cordylion we know markedly less. Strabo mentions him
as a Tarsian Stoic alongside Antipater, Archedemus, Nestor and Athenodoms Calvus

7 In the case of Cornutus, there is only one candidate whose identification is broadly
accepted. L. Annaeus Cornutus, whose praenomen is noted in Charisius (Gramm. 162.9), is the
tutor of Persius (Satire 5) and instructor of Nero (see Cass. Dio 62.29.2 ff.) On Cornutus' life and
work, see the entry of Pedro Pablo Fuentes González in Goulet (n. 5), entry 190.
8 A full and descriptive analysis of the assignment of the biographical 'Athenodorus' fragments
may be found in Goulet (n. 5), entries 496-8.
9 There is a famous anecdote that he instructed Augustus to recite the alphabet whenever he became
angry, before he took any action. Whoever introduced this anecdote may have intended to reflect, and
retroactively explain, certain traditions about the historical Augustus' dementia. But the anecdote may
also reflect some specific interest on the part of Athenodorus in the Stoic doctrine of 'first motions'.
For discussions of the Stoic 'pre-emotions' and 'first movements', for example in Seneca, an impor
tant source for the theory, see R.R.K. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to
Christian Temptation (Oxford, 1998), e.g. ch. 4; B. Inwood, 'Seneca and psychological dualism', in J.
Brunschwig and M. Nussbaum, Passions and Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind
(Cambridge, 1993), 164-8; J. Rist, 'Seneca and Stoic orthodoxy', ANRW2.36.3 (1989), 1999-2003;
and on the sources of the theory, M. Graver, 'Philo of Alexandria and the origin of the Stoic
Propatheiai', Phronesis 44 (1999), 300-25.

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202 MICHAEL J. GRIFFIN

(Strabo 14.5.14, a list which bears compar

Laert. 7.68).10 During his tenure as librari
'Isidoras of Pergamon', Cordylion attemp
Zeno: Isidoras presents the consequences i
toó A0r|vo8copoo Kai Kivôuveùaavtoç, D
had won renown as a Stoic and had also de
age of kings and politicians (Plut. Cat. Mi
succeeded in winning him over, and subsequ
Rome (ibid. 16.1; Strabo 14.5.14).
Richard Goulet in his Dictionnaire exer
ments to any one Athenodorus, noting th
didates. But there is some consensus amon
and Hijmans, that the Athenodorus who
Sandon - chiefly because of Calvus' late d
ditionally assigned to the publication of A
(see e.g. Moraux [n. 1], 1.150). Hijmans pre
identification, and is followed in the main
to the two Tarsians: the alternative cand
mentioned by Quintilian (Inst. 2.17.15), ar
dent of Zeno and brother of Aratus, 'Ath
literature.12 Second, the Athenodorus ci
interested in propositions could well be
[n. 5], 105, citing Zeller's History, 607). T
Cordylion died before Andronicus' edition
But the strength of these arguments in f
able. The dating of Andronicus' edition m
Given valid doubts regarding the true ext
waters surrounding that edition's date o
event as a definite terminus post quer
Certainly the candidacy of the earlier Sto
candidates should not be rejected solely o

10 The logician 'Athenodorus' mentioned by D

Antipater and Archedemus.
11 On this episode and Cordylion's possible mo
(Cambridge, 1991), 4-21.
12 Goulet plainly states that he is unlikely to be
even mentioned by Hijmans.
13 Also, whatever facts underlie the (perhaps hosti
of Zeno's Republic (on which see also Schofield
exercised some kind of criticism upon Athenian
Pergamon. Indeed, it is interesting to compa
Aristotle, including the text of the Categories
Scepsis precisely in order to prevent the Per
Pergamon (Strabo 13.1.54). Perhaps sources host
were responsible for promoting the story that Pe
inal texts of Aristotle. Perhaps it was also hostile
the librarian Cordylion in a bad light. But the
Isidorus, is also himself associated with Pergam

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 WHICH 'ATHENODORUS' COMMENTED ON ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES? 203

DIOGENES LAERTIUS AND DEXIPPUS

I believe it would be more fruitful to focus attention upon the 'Athenodorus' mentioned
by Diogenes Laertius as a pioneering Stoic logician at 7.68, and to seek reasons intern
to the text to identify this Athenodorus either with Calvus or with any of the othe
Athenodori in our record. At 7.68, Diogenes' 'Athenodorus' is said to have concerned
himself with the distinction of simple propositions from complex ones, and to hav
included 'assertoric' or categorical propositions within the rubric of 'simple' pro
ositions (7.68-70, ed. Long):

[7.68] Tojv àçwi)(j.àxo)v xà pév éaxiv imkà, xà 8' ov% àaikà, âç cpaaiv oi ropi Xpúairatov K
ÀpxéSîipov Kai A0r\vôôcûpov Kai Avxmaxpov Kai Kpîviv. ànkâ pèv ouv éaxi xà aovEaxcôx
èt, àÇuôgaxoç pf| Siaipopougévou [fj éç. àijuopâxiov], oîov xà 'ppépa éaxiv'- ox>% àaikà 8' èa
xà cruvfaxâix' èc, àçioipaxoç Siacpopoupévoti f| èç àÇiiogàxwv. èç àÇiœ|jaxoç pè
Siaipopougévoi), oîov 'ei npépa èaxiv, <f|pépa éaxiv > '■ èç, àÇuogàxcov 8é, oîov 'ei fipé
éaxi, cpcôç èaxi'.

[7.70] KaxriyopiKÔv 8é èaxi xô auvEaxàç èk 7ixiûatax; ôpGfjç Kai Kaxriyopfipaxoç, oîov 'Aicov
TOpuiaxEÎ'- KaxayoptuxiKÔv 8é éaxi xà ouveoxôç èK nxcôaECûç ópOry; Seikxiktîç Kai
KaxT|Yopf||j.axoç, oîov 'ouxoç 7t£puiaxEÎ'

[7.68] According to the likes of Chrysippus, Archedemus, Athenodorus, Antipater and Crinis,1
propositions may be simple or non-simple. Simples are those constituted of a proposition tha
cannot be [further] differentiated, such as 'it is day'; but non-simples are those constituted o
one or several propositions that can be [further] differentiated - one, such as 'if it is day, <i
is day>', or several, such as 'if it is day, it is light'.

[7.70] [.sc. Among simple propositions], an assertoric (katêgorikon)15 proposition is one const
tuted of a noun in the nominative case and a predicate (katêgorêma), such as 'Dion walks'.
demonstrative (katêgoreutikon) proposition is one constituted of a deictic word in the nomin
tive case and a predicate, such as 'this man walks'.

Diogenes Laertius' Athenodorus, then, was a particularly memorable or influenti

exponent of the distinction between simple and non-simple propositions, a basic div
ision articulated and defended by Stoic logicians. Athenodorus maintains that a cate
orical or 'assertoric' (katêgorikon) sentence such as 'Dion walks' represents a simp
proposition, whereas a sentence composed from several such propositions - such
the protasis and apodosis of a conditional joined by 'if - represents a complex
proposition.
This discussion of propositions falls within Diogenes' general exposition of Stoic
dialectic, beginning at 7.63. Dialectic is a branch of knowledge dealing with sayables
(lekta), those items which we 'mean' or 'point out' (sêmainein) by our verbal
expressions, and specifically with those sayables that may be true or false. One subdivi
sion of the subject matter of dialectic is propositions (axiômata). Propositions are com
plete (autotelê) in the sense that they contain both a subject and a predicate, forming a

14 I am indebted to Dirk Obbink and Ben Morison for helpful guidance on the interpretation of the
oi rtcpi 'X' locution in late antiquity. On the locution's force, see S.L. Radt, 'OI (AI etc) nEPI + acc.
nominis proprii bei Strabon', ZPE 71 (1988), 35—40.
15 I follow A.A. Long and D. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1987), 2.34K in
rendering katêgorikon as 'assertoric', katêgoreutikon as 'demonstrative' and katêgorêma as 'predi
cate'. See Long and Sedley's commentary in §§ 34-5 for discussion of simple and non-simple
propositions and the wider context of this passage.

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204 MICHAEL J. GRIFFIN

complete sentence: 'writes' (graphei) signi

question 'Who?' (7.63.8), whereas the sen
lekton that begs no questions. Thus a lo
which could be 'said of something (kata
is 'incomplete' or 'defective' (ellipes, 7.6
by Diogenes, then, an example of the simp
ing and is complete is the sentence 'Dion
ositions are the elementary building blocks
incomplete {ellipes).
Aristotelian logicians after the first centu
elementary building blocks of logic are t
briefly sketched below.) In adopting thi
Categories and perhaps by Andronicus' orde
of increasing complexity from terms {Ca
(An. pr.) to demonstration (An. post.).
Peripatetic orthodoxy, the Categories was
ful, simple verbal expressions' (it is ttepi <p
58.5), where these are understood as terms
as things 'said without combination' (tr. A

Trâv Xeyopévcov xà gèv Kaxà aupjx/.OKijv kéy

crupjiXoKf|v, olov àv6pawtoç xpéyc i, àv
âvOpawtoç, poûç, xpéyci, vucâ.

Of things that are said, some involve combina

Examples of those involving combination are:
bination: man, ox, runs, wins.

Suppose a Stoic reader, who read this pass

maintained by Stoic logicians such as Ath
might object that, if the Categories is reall
bal expressions' (as the Peripatetics mainta
only accounts for a fraction of such expre
or defective (ellipes) verbal expressions
runs' or 'Dion walks', the simplest comp
of complex propositions, such as conjunct
That is, in fact, roughly the line adopted
'Stoics' in the chapter headings of Dexipp
line taken by 'Athenodorus' in Porphyry
complained that the Categories omitted s
ious parts of speech such as conjunction
Peripatetics (as reflected in the later Neop
such as 'Dion walks' is in fact a complex ex
deals only with simple, meaningful expre
tences that the Stoics wrongly regard a
as various parts of speech that are not 'm

[Chapter heading, 1.8-9] 8. nrâç ypij xàç Kax

Xxcoïkcûv àjtopiaiç;

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 WHICH 'ATHENODORUS' COMMENTED ON ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES? 205

[12.3-11] Kai to àitkoûv Kai áaóv0exov, éáv té tu; év xoîç xrâv ôvxœv yévEoxv aùxô éiticnco
àv x' éiti xwv -/EviKcoxáxcov aiipavxiKœv Àéqeœv, éáv te Kai <ruva|icpoxépco<;, itavxaxfi o
xôv xapaKxijpa àcpopiÇei xœv Kaxnyopirôv oiíxe ow xà crúv0£xa olov Aîûjv rcepuiaxEÎ oût
íwtO(TÚv0£xa oîov t ÇuaxpÔJKûv oïixe xà Kaxà cruyKoixnv f| à7C0K07tfiv /xyópEva otite
it£itoiT|géva óvópaxa oûte xà TtapEcr/ripaxiapÉva crike xà èiti0£xa oà0' ôca 7toir|xiKf
prixopiKfiç 'i5ia 0Ecop£Îv, oùSagoû 7tpocrr|KEi xi xaîç Kaxrvyopiau;- â.Â/Lr|ç yàp 0E(opiaç
7t£pi xr|v Xé^iv Kai SEuxépaç xà xoiaàxa yivokxkeiv.

[Chapter heading, 1.8-9] How is one to identify the Categories and not be led astray b
difficulties raised by the Stoics?

[12.3-11] Again, it is the qualify of simplicity and non-compositeness, whether one sees
inhering in the genera of being, or in the most generic significant utterances, or in both,
everywhere constitutes the most proper defining characteristic of the categories. Ther
neither composite expressions, such as 'Dion walks', nor quasi-composite ones, such as
scraper-manufactures',16 nor expressions involving syncope or apocope, nor invented w
nor derivatives, nor adjectives, nor words proper to poetry or rhetoric [a list of items overl
by the book Categories according to the Stoic critics] are in any way relevant to the catego
for it is the business of another secondary discipline to study such phenomena, na
philology.

As Dillon points out, the Neoplatonists' 'Athenodorus' must be one of the critics meant
here, to whom Dexippus is replying; likewise he is named at Poiphyry, in Cat. 59.5-14
and in Simplicius as levelling similar criticisms, albeit more briefly.17
This passage, which embodies a tradition of Stoic and Peripatetic debate about
whether the Categories is complete or deficient in classifying its proper subject matter,
also reflects the well-known controversy concerning whether propositions or terms are
the basic building blocks of logic. As discussed above, the basic units of the Categories
and later Peripatetic logic are simple terms, whereas the basic units of Stoic logic are
simple propositions. That distinction appears to have been played upon for polemical
ends by both critics and defenders of the Categories, as Dexippus testifies. It may be
extremely suggestive of the motives that led Stoic logicians such as Athenodorus and
Cornutus to focus a series of works on the problems raised by the Categories.
J. Barnes points out, for example, that the later Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias'
essay on negation (in A. Pr. 402.1^105.16) focusses on the simplicity or composite sta
tus of sentences such as Kakkiaç imputará.18 For Alexander, a negation sign will mod
ify the verb 7t£putaxeî alone; but for his opponents (apparently Stoic logicians), a
negation sign modifies the entire propositional sentence, which should itself be viewed
as simple. It is generally assumed that Alexander's opponents here are 'old Stoics', but
Barnes makes a case that 'they may ... have been later Stoics - Athenodorus and
Cornutus, say - who determined to defend the old Stoic doctrine against its resuscitated
Peripatetic rival'.19 I think we may support and develop this identification of

16 Reading, with Dillon, xustropoiei for the meaningless xustropôn of the MSS. See J. Dillon,
Dexippus: On Aristotle Categories (London, 1990), 30 n. 20.
17 Following Porph. in Cat. 59.10 and Simpl. in Cat. 18.26. See Dillon (n. 16), ibid. I suspect that
L. Annaeus Comutus should not be included in the ambit of Dexippus' report, as Comutus himself
may have rebutted Athenodorus' claims (see Simpl. in Cat. 62.27-8).
18 J. Barnes, 'Aristotle and Stoic logic', in K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), Topics in Stoic Philosophy
(Oxford, 1999), 23-53, at 41-2; see also J. Barnes, 'Peripatetic negations', in Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy 4 (1986), 201-14.
19 Barnes (n. 18), 43.

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 206 MICHAEL J. GRIFFIN

Alexander's opponents as plausible, at l

texts considered above.
For our purposes here, the connection to Alexander's opponents is relevant because
it again links the professional interests of 'Athenodorus' at Diogenes Laertius 7.68 with
the criticism broadly ascribed to 'Athenodorus' by Porphyry, Simplicius and (implicitly)
by Dexippus: namely, that the division or classification scheme of the Categories is
incomplete (e.g. EÙpiaKovteç eTAutfj cpaatv elvai Tryv Siaípeatv, Porph. in Cat.
59.13-14) because the text does not deal with many kinds of expression which it
ought to include under the heading of simple, meaningful verbal expressions. There
are two key samples of its failure: (a) sentences such as 'Dion walks', and (b) a raft
of other kinds of words such as conjunctions (mentioned by Porphyry) and adjectives,
coined vocabulary and so on (mentioned by Dexippus). In reply, the Peripatetics grant
that (a) sentences are meaningful, but not simple; (b) conjunctions and other parts of
speech listed by Athenodorus may be simple, but they are not (in and of themselves)
meaningful. Thus the Peripatetics respond that only the items classified by the
Categories are both simple and meaningful, and that the Categories succeeds in classi
fying these completely. This debate provides at least a textually and philosophically
grounded association between the Athenodorus who commented on the Categories
and the logician of Diogenes Laertius 7.68.
Drawing the connection between Diogenes' Athenodorus and the Neoplatonists'
critic of the Categories may suggest another perspective on Athenodorus' motives in
criticizing the Categories. The word used by the Stoics to characterize incomplete
lekta such as a predicate (katêgorêma) is 'deficient' or 'incomplete' (ellipes, e.g.
Diog. Laert. 7.64). The Neoplatonists also suggest that Athenodorus and other Stoic
critics used the word ellipes to denote the 'deficiency' or 'incompleteness' of the classi
fication scheme in the Categories. It seems possible that Athenodorus regarded the
Xeyopeva Kara crupnAoicnv of the Categories as vocalizations that signified incomplete,
ellipê lekta, and that it had nothing to say about vocalizations which signified complete
or autotelê lekta.

If Athenodorus encountered the Categories prepended to the Topics - that is, as a

propaedeutic to the study of 'dialectic' - and not yet in its Andronican position at the
head of the curriculum, he might have regarded the treatise as a poor introduction to
dialectic, that branch of knowledge which, on the Stoic view, deals with complete
lekta that admit of truth and falsehood. In response to such a complaint, a Peripatetic
defender of the text's usefulness as an introduction to logic, such as Andronicus of
Rhodes, could have replied that logic should begin with terms, that only terms are prop
erly 'simple' as well as 'meaningful', and that the Categories is a natural starting point
for the progression from terms to propositions and syllogisms. Detaching the Categories
from the Topics, entitling it Categories, and pulling it forward to the outset of the logical
curriculum in a significant publication of the Aristotelian corpus, would serve to emphasize
that point.

IDENTIFICATION AND IMPORTANCE

So far, I hope to have suggested some motives for linking our Athenodorus to the fig
described in Diogenes Laertius 7.68. Does that passage offer any useful implicat
about his historical identity? Notably Diogenes Laertius' logician is primarily associ

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 WHICH 'ATHENODORUS' COMMENTED ON ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES? 207

with Chrysippus at 7.68, and secondly with a number of second-century bce phil
phers of the Stoic school. In itself, this grouping might cast doubt on the la
first-century date required by Athenodorus Calvus, who does not fit the temporal as
ations of the group at 7.68. Indeed, the philosophers mentioned by Diogenes Laerti
7.68 are presented as doing important early work in Stoic logical doctrine. They ar
order, Chrysippus himself (third century bce), Archedemus (second century b
Athenodorus (unknown), Antipater (second century bce) and Crinis (probably sec
century bce, and later than Archedemus: cf. Epictetus, Disc. 3.2.15); compare
the list of notable Tarsian Stoics at Strabo 14.5.14. As far as we can tell, this grou
lows a rough chronological order. If our 'Athenodorus' is the son of Sandon, then
would appear in this list out of order, that is, much earlier than we should expec
he lived in the first century bce. While again not decisive, this might weigh aga
the traditional identification. Indeed, Athenodorus Cordylion (cf. 7.34) would be a bet
fit for Diogenes Laertius 7.68 in terms of chronology.
There may be an incentive to entertain an even earlier date for the Athenodor
named at Diogenes Laertius 7.68. At 7.190 Diogenes provides a detailed list of
works of Chrysippus, where one book is in fact entitled Tlepi xwv KaxayopeuxiK
Jipùç A0t|vó5opov. (Katagoreutika, as we know from Diog. Laert. 7.70, are senten
which consist of a demonstrative in the nominative case and a predicate.) T
Athenodorus to whom Chrysippus dedicated this book could plausibly be ident
with the Athenodorus of 7.68, who also worked on categorical propositions, and is
tioned in association with Chrysippus in this context. Such an association could dat
logician to the fourth or third century bce. In fact, there is a recorded match for
chronology: Athenodorus of Soli (mentioned earlier at Diog. Laert. 7.38 = SVF 1
who lived slightly earlier than Chrysippus and joined his brother Aratus as a pup
Zeno (as recounted in the Anonymous Life of Aratus). An interesting argument c
be made, if not for Athenodorus of Soli in particular, then at least for a contempo
of Zeno and Chrysippus. It is tempting to speculate that the Athenodorus of 7.68,
self associated with Chrysippus, was both the Athenodorus to whom Chrysippus
cated a work Ilepi xá>v KaxoryopeuxiKtov (7.190) and the Athenodorus depicte
Porphyry, Dexippus and Simplicius as criticizing the Categories for failing to
into account certain 'simple' categorical propositions. Such an identification migh
challenged on the grounds that Simplicius mentions 'Athenodorus and Cornutu
the same breath as if they were near contemporaries; but Simplicius elsewhere menti
'Xenocrates and Andronicus' in the same way (63.22), although they, like Athenodo
of Soli and L. Annaeus Cornutus, are separated by some three centuries.
It might be reasonable to situate the earliest Stoic criticism of the Categories,
within the context of the first century bce as a response to Andronicus' publicat
but rather in a prior environment of Stoic studies of logic and dialectic in the ci
of Chrysippus. The Categories itself was dismissed as a somewhat crude treatm
as Dexippus explains, because it omitted many parts of grammar, including the sim
categorical proposition (such as 'Dion walks'). The Peripatetic reply that it is terms
are simple, but propositions that are complex, may have motivated the first-century
catalogue or curricular order traceable to Andronicus,20 which locates the Categori

20 Andronicus notoriously doubted the authorship of the De interpretatione (Alexander, in An.

161.1, Ammonius, in Int. 5.28), but it does not necessarily follow from his athetization that the
was omitted from his catalogue, or that he did not endorse the curricular progression from term
propositions to syllogisms to demonstration.

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208 MICHAEL J. GRIFFIN

dealing with simple terms) before the De

the De interpretatione before the Prior An
progressing from the simpler to the mor
might regard Andronicus as replying to suc
plicity of terms, anticipating the response
Again, we might even speculate that And
set of the logical curriculum to emphasize t
opening sentence of Andronicus' paraphr
tute as tow Xeyopevtov to gèv aveu crug7
highlight just this subject matter from the
above, there is no evidence that the Categ
Aristotle's work that we know about (in f
catalogues reported at Diog. Laert. 5.22-7
Andronicus seems to have found this tex
in Cat. 379.9), perhaps located immediately
he worked from, and presented as a kind of
have been in this context that early Stoics
title they knew it under. If Andronicus, l
basic treatment of simple, meaningful term
OTipav-rucaí eiai xrâv npay^átcov, accord
(Porph. in Cat. 58.5-6) - then his framin
and catalogue and his relocation of this t
may have formed part of his response to
of simple sentences and of non-signifi
Andronicus' relocation of the Categories
dations of a truly distinct Peripatetic
Chrysippus' 'dialectic of the gods'.
I hope to have expressed some reasons to
Diogenes Laertius 7.68 as a proponent of v
to the criticisms of the Categories asc
Simplicius. The concerns of Diogenes' At
motivate the recorded Stoic criticism of t
for the Andronican ordering of the Arist

MICHAEL J. GRIFFIN
University of British Columbia
michael.griffin@ubc.ca

21 Moraux (n. 1) 1.102-3 pieces together the full preamble of Andronicus' paraphrase
in Cat. 21.22-4, 26.18-19, 30.3-5 and Dexipp. in Cat. 21.18-19. See also Sharpies (

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