Proliferation Good (and Bad)

Created by: Sechan Tak (Grady), Carlos Smith (Loyola)

Thanks to Griffin Descant (Newman) and Sathvik Rajagopalan (Groves) for the help
Prolif Good
 Prolif good---1NC
Prolif deters and is key to cooperation with adversaries
Koch Foundation 17 (Charles Koch foundation, December 4, 2017, an American conservative and
libertarian public policy think tank based in Chicago.) https://bigthink.com/charles-koch-foundation/a-
safer-world-is-one-where-americas-enemies-hold-onto-their-nuclear-weapons
The United States tries hard to keep nuclear weapons away from countries it considers foes. Given how close the
world came to nuclear armageddon during the Cold War, and recent threats from so-called “rogue states" like North Korea, it may seem like an
essential goal. But
America's strategy for thwarting nuclear proliferation may be reaching a point where the
costs outweigh the benefits.
The first nuclear bomb was exploded the same year as the invention of the microwave. Nuclear
technology is no longer new, and
therefore more difficult to keep from spreading. (Imagine trying to keep microwave technology under wraps all these years.)
Developing a nuclear bomb from scratch, however, is much more costly than reverse engineering a microwave.

But snuffing out a country's nuclear capabilities is perhaps even more costly. It requires crippling a
country's economy so its government can't invest in nuclear research (of course, its innocent citizens bear the brunt of
that burden). It requires destroying factories and laboratories with aggressive bombing or cyber-sabotage
campaigns. And it can even require kidnapping or killing scientists and engineers who conduct nuclear
research.
Iran, for example, is seeking nuclear technology while coldly aware of the U nited States' military superiority.
Likewise, the rest of the world is aware of America's massive nuclear arsenal —and of the fact that it's capable
of annihilating any country on Earth at a moment's notice
This kind of behavior toward other countries, needless to say, won't engender kindness and cooperation. North
Korea knows that developing a small nuclear arsenal has made the U.S. much more hesitant to invade its borders. It's a lesson Pyongyang learned
recently from countries without nuclear weapons—Iraq, Libya, Syria—that were subsequently invaded by the U.S. So it
makes perfect
sense that America's enemies would be scrambling to develop nuclear weapons—not so they can fire
them, but so they can also enjoy the benefits of deterrence.
So thequestion becomes: How often is the U.S. willing to wage preventive wars, and with how many
countries does it really want this kind of relationship?

No impact to proliferation- threat is exaggerated

Cato Institute, (a public policy research organization — a think tank — dedicated to the principles of
individual liberty, limited government, free markets, and peace. Its scholars and analysts conduct
independent, nonpartisan research on a wide range of policy issues. It is a receives no government
funding), 2017,"Cato Handbook for Policymakers: 76. Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Terrorism,"
from the CATO HANDBOOK FOR POLICYMAKERS, 8TH EDITION, https://www.cato.org/cato-
handbook-policymakers/cato-handbook-policy-makers-8th-edition-2017/nuclear-weapons (VIK)
Except for their effects on agonies, obsessions, rhetoric, posturing, and spending, the consequences of
nuclear proliferation have been largely benign: those who have acquired the weapons have “used” them
simply to stoke their egos or to deter real or imagined threats . For the most part, nuclear powers have
found the weapons to be a notable waste of time, money, effort, and scientific talent. They have quietly
kept the weapons in storage and haven’t even found much benefit in rattling them from time to time. If
the recent efforts to keep Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons have been successful, those efforts have
done Iran a favor.
There has never been a militarily compelling reason to use nuclear weapons, particularly because it has
not been possible to identify suitable targets — or targets that couldn’t be attacked as effectively by
conventional munitions. Conceivably, conditions exist under which nuclear weapons could serve a
deterrent function, but there is little reason to suspect that they have been necessary to deter war thus far,
even during the Cold War. The main Cold War contestants have never believed that a repetition of World
War II, whether embellished by nuclear weapons or not, is remotely in their interests.
Moreover, the weapons have not proved to be crucial status symbols. How much more status would Japan
have if it possessed nuclear weapons? Would anybody pay a great deal more attention to Britain or France
if their arsenals held 5,000 nuclear weapons, or much less if they had none? Did China need nuclear
weapons to impress the world with its economic growth or its Olympics?
Those considerations help explain why alarmists have been wrong for decades about the pace of nuclear
proliferation. Most famously, in the 1960s, President John Kennedy anticipated that in another decade
“fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons.” Yet, of the dozens of technologically
capable countries that have considered obtaining nuclear arsenals, very few have done so. Insofar as most
leaders of most countries (even rogue ones) have considered acquiring the weapons, they have come to
appreciate several drawbacks of doing so: nuclear weapons are dangerous, costly, and likely to rile the
neighbors. Moreover, as the University of Southern California’s Jacques Hymans has demonstrated, the
weapons have also been exceedingly difficult for administratively dysfunctional countries to obtain — it
took decades for North Korea and Pakistan to do so. In consequence, alarmist predictions about
proliferation chains, cascades, dominoes, waves, avalanches, epidemics, and points of no return
have proved faulty.

Although proliferation has so far had little consequence, that is not because the only countries to get
nuclear weapons have had rational leaders. Large, important countries that acquired the bomb were run at
the time by unchallenged — perhaps certifiably deranged — monsters. Consider Joseph Stalin, who, in
1949, was planning to change the climate of the Soviet Union by planting a lot of trees, and Mao Zedong,
who, in 1964, had just carried out a bizarre social experiment that resulted in an artificial famine in which
tens of millions of Chinese perished.
Some also fear that a country might use its nuclear weapons to “dominate” its area. That argument was
used with dramatic urgency before 2003 when Saddam Hussein supposedly posed great danger, and it has
been frequently applied to Iran. Exactly how that domination is to be carried out is never made clear. The
notion, apparently, is this: should an atomic rogue state rattle the occasional rocket, other countries in the
area, suitably intimidated, would bow to its demands. Far more likely, threatened states would make
common cause with each other and with other concerned countries (including nuclear ones) against the
threatening neighbor. That is how countries coalesced into an alliance of convenience to oppose Iraq’s
region-threatening invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
Yet another concern has been that the weapons will go off, by accident or miscalculation, devastating the
planet in the process: the weapons exist in the thousands, sooner or later one or more of them will
inevitably go off . But those prognostications have now failed to deliver for 70 years. That time
period suggests something more than luck is operating. Moreover, the notion that if one nuclear
weapon goes off in one place, the world will necessarily be plunged into thermonuclear cataclysm
should remain in the domain of Hollywood scriptwriters.

Also keep in mind that anti-proliferation efforts can be counterproductive in their own terms. Thus, “one
of the unintended ‘demonstration’ effects of the American anti-proliferation war against Iraq,” notes
Mitchell Reiss, an expert on nuclear proliferation, “was that chemical and biological weapons proved
insufficient to deter America: only nuclear weapons, it appeared, could do this job.” North Korea has
apparently learned this lesson. Insofar as nuclear proliferation is a response to perceived threat, one way
to reduce the nuclear pace is simple: stop threatening countries that might consider acquiring them.
The impulse to prevent nuclear proliferation through any means available should be weighed against the
potentially very high costs of counter-proliferation wars. The war in Iraq, with well over a hundred
thousand deaths, is a key case in point. The war against Saddam Hussein was a militarized counter-
proliferation effort substantially sold as necessary to keep his pathetic regime from developing nuclear
and other presumably threatening weapons, and to prevent him from transferring some of them to eager
and congenial terrorists. Karl Rove, President George W. Bush’s top political adviser, reflected in 2008
that, absent this belief, “I suspect that the administration’s course of action would have been to work to
find more creative ways to constrain him like in the ’90s.”
 Polif Good---2NC---Deterence
Nuclear deterrence is effective
Serena Carassale, 01-26-2019, "Has nuclear deterrence changed after the end of Cold War? (part 2),"
Serena Carassale is the former vice president at the Venice Diplomatic Society and studied philosophy,
international studies and economics at the University of Venice.
https://www.venicediplomaticsociety.com/blog/has-nuclear-deterrence-changed-after-the-end-of-cold-
war-part-2
Therefore, starting from the assumption of a loss of rationality, how can deterrence be still a valid strategy in the Second Nuclear Age? The
answer lays in the shifting from capability to credibility, as stressed by Lowther: in order to
allow nuclear powers to effectively
respond to irrational actors with a strategy of deterrence, it is necessary for the latter to believe that
traditional rational actors will also be willing to employ nuclear weapons as well.
On the contrary, in the intra-states relationships, no much difference can be appreciated since the Cold War and both the traditional Super Powers
keep pursuing a highly costly policy of expenditures for nuclear weapons: China, differently, does not employ a similar capital, enabling the
Country to simply keep a minimal level of deterrence, strategy which many lobbies are actually working to obtain in the US as well. What
remains as common in the First and the Second World Nuclear Areas is that the US and Russia both base their strategic nuclear weapons on the
other and consequently their expenditures and investments in such area - to make a realistic prevision - are not going to be reduced in recent
times.

Concerning the role of nuclear deterrence in non-nuclear attacks, that is usually applicable to those
countries not being part of the traditional circle of nuclear powers, thus representing a change since the Cold War.
Those countries have mostly violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but never faced a direct military
attack, as we have significant reason in believing that the root cause behind that lays in their nuclear
capability: their nuclear deterrence strategy is therefore perfectly in function. North Korea, in contrast with Iraq, is
the perfect evidence for the aforementioned. Differently from the latter, North Korea has a more bothersome and developed
policy, for what concerns the proliferation of WMDs, but it might be that thanks to its very deterrence
strategy the Country has never faced a NATO attack. The role of nuclear deterrence is although relevant
even at a regional level when considering conventional attacks, as displayed in the case of the conflict
between India and Pakistan: it is only for their nuclear arsenals that the two enemies, like the US and the
Soviet Union before them, did not enter into a direct conflict.

Prolif benefits all states beyond deterrence

Mark Bell, 10-2-2017, Mark S. Bell is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of
Minnesota. "North Korea Benefits From Nuclear Weapons. Get Used to It.," War on the Rocks,
https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/north-korea-benefits-from-nuclear-weapons-get-used-to-it/
It is often said that nuclear weapons offer little beyond the ability to deter. But if
nuclear weapons deter, they also necessarily
offer benefits to states that go well beyond simply deterring attack. North Korea today is in the process of reaping those
benefits, and this will constrain American foreign policy in the region. As much as American policymakers might want to wish this away, it is
better to adjust the sails than to hope the wind disappears. War
with North Korea should now be off the table and the
denuclearization of North Korea is similarly unrealistic. If the United States wants to tamp down the current
crisis, it needs to get used to North Korean nuclear weapons and the constraints they impose on U.S.
foreign policy.
It is true that nuclear
weapons deter. But because they deter attack, they also act as a shield that reduces the risks and costs
of pursuing a host of other foreign policy behaviors. My research shows that nuclear weapons can facilitate a range of
objectives that states of all stripes may find attractive. Possessing
nuclear weapons can allow states to act more
independently of allies, engage in aggression, expand their position and influence, reinforce and
strengthen alliances, or stand more firmly in defense of the status quo. States with nuclear weapons are
aware of these benefits and use nuclear weapons to pursue them. This applies as much to democratic
states committed to the status quo as it does to authoritarian or revisionist states.
Consider the case of Britain. A
declining, status quo state when it acquired nuclear weapons in the 1950s, Britain was
increasingly dependent on the United States for its security, facing growing challenges to its role as the
preeminent power in the Middle East, while its commitments to allies were becoming increasingly
uncredible. What did it do when it acquired nuclear weapons? As I show in a 2015 International Security article, Britain
used nuclear commitments instead of conventional military commitments (which it could no longer afford) to
reassure allies that were increasingly skeptical of Britain’s ability to come to their aid. Similarly, Britain’s
nuclear weapons reduced the risks of acting more independently of the United States and of using military
force to resist challenges to its position in the Middle East.

Nuclear weapons bring peace, empirics

Michael Shellenberger, 08-06-2018, "Who Are We To Deny Weak Nations The Nuclear Weapons
They Need For Self-Defense?," Forbes,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2018/08/06/who-are-we-to-deny-weak-nations-the-
nuclear-weapons-they-need-for-self-defense/#7ce9e38d522f
No nation with a nuclear weapon has ever been invaded by another nation. The number of deaths in battle
worldwide has declined 95 percent in the 70 years since the invention and spread of nuclear weapons; The
number of Indian and Pakistani civilian and security forces’ deaths in two disputed territories declined 90
percent after Pakistan’s first nuclear weapons test in 1998. In 1981, the late political scientist Kenneth Waltz published an essay
titled, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better.” In it he argued that nuclear weapons are revolutionary in allowing
weaker nations to protect themselves from more powerful ones . International relations is “a realm of anarchy as opposed to
hierarchy… of self-help… you’re on your own,” Waltz explained. How do nuclear weapons work? Not “through the ability to defend but
through the ability to punish...The message of a deterrent strategy is this,” explained Waltz. “‘Although we are
defenceless, if you attack we will punish you to an extent that more than cancels your gains .’” Does anybody
believe France should give up its nuclear weapons? Certainly not the French. After President Barack Obama in 2009 called for eliminating nuclear weapons, not a
single other nuclear nation endorsed the idea. All of this raises the question: if nuclear weapons protect weak nations from foreign invasion, why shouldn’t North
Korea and Iran get them? Why Nuclear Weapons Make Us Peaceful On January 29, 2002, President George W. Bush denounced Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an
“axis of evil.” North Korea was “arming with missiles,” he said. Iran “aggressively pursues these weapons” and the “Iraqi regime has plotted to develop...nuclear
weapons for over a decade.” One year later, the U.S. invaded and occupied Iraq. The ensuing conflict resulted in the deaths of over 450,000 people — about four
times as many as were killed at Hiroshima — and a five-fold increase in terrorist killings in the Middle East and Africa. It all came at a cost of $2.4 trillion dollars.
Now, 16 years later, U.S. officials insist that North Korea and Iran need not fear a U.S. invasion. But why would any nation — particularly North Korea and Iran —
believe them? Not only did the U.S. overthrow Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein after he gave up his nuclear weapons program, it also helped overthrow Libyan President
Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 after he too had given up the pursuit of a nuclear weapon. North Korean President Kim Jong-un may, quite understandably, see his own
life at stake: Hussein was hanged and Gaddafi was tortured and killed. Both hawks and doves say North Korea and Iran must not be allowed to have a weapon because
both regimes are brutal, but nuclear
weapons make nations more peaceful over time. There were three full-scale
wars before India and Pakistan acquired the bomb and only far more limited conflicts since. And China
became dramatically less bellicose after acquiring the bomb. Why? “History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel
increasingly vulnerable,” notes Waltz, “and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers. This
awareness discourages nuclear states from bold and aggressive action.” Is it really so difficult to imagine that a nuclear-armed North Korea and Iran might follow the
same path toward moderation as China, India, and Pakistan? Nuclear
weapons are revolutionary in that they require the ruling class to have
skin in the game. When facing off against nuclear-armed nations, elites can no longer sacrifice the poor
and weak in their own country without risking their lives. Had Iraq in 2002 been in possession of a
nuclear weapon, the U.S. would never have invaded. As such, we should be glad that North Korea
acquired the bomb since it guarantees the U.S. will never invade.
 AT: NPT stops prolif
The NPT has historically failed, widespread prolif can’t be stopped
Sofi et al., 2018, American International Journal of Research in Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences,
http://iasir.net/AIJRHASSpapers/AIJRHASS18-103.pdf
There is a lack of provision since non-signatory states are not required to comply with the treaty,
therefore the movement or theft of nuclear weapons could be achieved through any of the nine NWS. In recent
developments, the IAEA reported that Iran has assembled and delivered a nuclear reactor close to the western city of Iraq and is continuing with
its nuclear advancements. This indicates there is a loophole in Article IV of the NPT since NNWS have the right to pursue nuclear energy for the
purpose of generating power. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the five legally recognized NWS (China, France,
Russia, the UK, and US) appear determined to retain their nuclear weapons indefinitely. It is difficult to move towards nuclear disarmament if
none of the five states are prepared to implement Article II of the second pillar of the NPT. The countries like North Korea, India and Pakistan
were the few evident countries where there is sign of failure of NPT which are as given below:

North Korea• Questionably, inability

to forbid North Korea to produce nuclear arms was one of the greatest failures
of NPT because it is the only country to resign NPT later on and started indigenous nuclear program
(culminating in an attempted test detonation) in total disobedience of the international community.
Additionally there has been a lack of international reaction to this program during the administration of
Clinton and bush. Thus the principal actors in this situation are international actors like the United States, North Korea, Russia, China, the UN, the IAEA,
South Korea, and Japan. These actors played different roles in the evolution of North Korean nuclear issue with South Korea and Japan in the most threatened position
by a confrontational, nuclear armed North Korea. United States, Russia and china played act as a peacekeepers although having different views on the crisis.
Nevertheless, this is shifting. In mid-2009, in the period of nuclear test, Russia and china co-operate American criticism for the program and China (historically the
strongest supporter of the DPRK on the UN Security Council) abducted the North Korean funds in Macao.25 Furthermore in 2008 it became more complicated to treat
the North Korea as monolithic state due to the succession struggle in North Korea due to declining health of Jim Jong-II.26 This complication arises as more actors
become appropriate in an impoverished, out-of-the-way, nuclear armed country with a history of aggression.27 In 1994, the North Korea planned to resign from NPT
so as to begin the construction of nuclear reactors at Yongbyon. The chief source of nuclear material for Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is the
reprocessed spent nuclear fuel which is converted into plutonium. The technical assistance was provided from Pakistan through the A.Q. Khan’s network in the late
1990s.28 The ballistic missile inventory in North Korea was of major concern that can be fitted with nuclear warheads. These include Soviet designed Scud-Bs and –
Cs, as well as indigenously designed Nodong and Taepodong missiles.29 On the other hand, the kind of nuclear warheads in their arsenal as well as the degree of its
weaponization is not well informed till date. More over much greater concern than the nuclear assault by the DPRK (which would likely result in a devastating nuclear
response from the United States) is the trading of its nuclear weapons and materials to overcomes financial crisis.30 All the sources indicate the security and
economics as the prime drivers for the nuclear program in North Korea where the security reason dominates. North Korea initially described its “nuclear deterrent
force” as a policy bargaining chip in 2003, and has over and over again claimed that it was developing nuclear arms for self defense and to defy U.S. sanctions and
nuclear threats.31 Obstinately, the intention behind Kim Jong Il regarding the use of nuclear program seems to lapse the non aggression policy signed earlier with
united states and as a result of growing Russian and Chinese exasperation with the short of predictability of the DPRK and its continued defiance of the international
community, the situation gets worse.32To enhance the economics, North Korea has paying more attention in using the program as a bargaining chip to have U.N.
sanctions as well as to build cooperation with Japan and South Korea.33 North Korea marks a greater risk not only to its regional neighbors but also to the NPT
regime. It also indicates a disturbing model of withdrawing NPT with no recourse but to accept the sanctions. It also encourages countries like Iran to establish its own
nuclear arsenals and also become the platform for supplying disastrous material to Sofi et al., American International Journal of Research in Humanities, Arts and
Social Sciences, 21(1), December 2017- February 2018, pp. 10-15 AIJRHASS 18-103; © 2018, AIJRHASS All Rights Reserved Page 14 other countries and even to
the terrorists groups. Keeping this is mind; North Korea set a terrific example of great obstacle in the future of non proliferation depending on how this rising nuclear
power is administered over the coming years.

India and Pakistan• The

cold war between India with Pakistan has been the topic of nuclear clash on the Indian
subcontinent as both have declared their nuclear done in the late 1990s which is regarded as an example
of nonproliferation disaster as of North Korea. Both India and Pakistan have not signed the NPT as India
asserted it as biased and Pakistan would not sign if it is not signed first by India . Furthermore it also
describes the lacuna in the commitment of existing nuclear states towards disarmament and the dismissal
of the issue in the face of other political issues (such as the War on Terror). The in-house problems exist in Pakistan
embodied an opportunity for terrorists and non state actors to steal nuclear arms which ultimately make the analysts to consider the Pakistan as a
barrel of prime nuclear power. As the nuclear programs of both the countries are almost same, therefore both will be reviewed together. Clearly,
the two primary actors are India and Pakistan in this particular case and both are not monolithic countries as in India there exists many actors with
different positions to put their views on nuclear issues.34 However in Pakistan the drive of nuclear power was more or less relies on the people of
Pakistan. Still there are some actors in the country who were responsible for the development of nuclear arms. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan is one of
the most notable of these, as he spearheaded the Pakistani nuclear weapons program from the scientific side.35 Given the lack of the involvement
of IAEA, the major international actors in the particular case of failure of non proliferation regime were the United States and United Nations.
The united states were more responsible as they were lagging in the effective response to the growing nuclear issue during Clintons and bush
administrations. Sanctions on both sides were light which were not able to accelerate the development of nuclear arms on both side.36 The
development of nuclear weapons on both sides dated back to the signing of NPT in 1968, with India as the catalyst. India begs to be excused to
sign the NPT for the reason that it felt the treaty was biased and allowed the existing nuclear weapon states a monopoly.37 1974 was the year
when India tested its first peaceful nuclear explosives but even after this, India was not skilled enough to deliver nuclear arms until 1986-198838
as from May 11th 1998 to May 13th 1988, India practiced 5 nuclear test detonations. Then India became a fully nurtured state of nuclear weapon
after developing ballistic missile types capable of delivering nuclear warheads.39 On
the other hand, in reaction to India’s
denial to sign the NPT in 1970s, Pakistan had been developing its own nuclear program . Pakistan, in the
beginning, has planned a nuclear test in 1977 in answer to the Indian 1974 test but later on it was cancelled. Then in 1983 and in 1988, Pakistan
again conducted its first “cold test” and moreover Pakistan had a number of nuclear weapons constructed, but left disassembled.40 In 1998,
Pakistan got ready to take the challenge and tested at least two (possibly as many of six) nuclear weapons between May 28th and 30th which
prevent Indian talks of military action in Kashmir.41 The factors that propelled conflict on both the sides are different. In case of India, the
factors are arguable. As it seems that security issues are the major feature that results in conflict but in many cases, it is supposed that India does
not have any major security pressure that would merit a nuclear arsenal, including China.42 Additionally, the terrorism and rebel continuous to
bloom in both the countries as there is always a risk of theft of nuclear weapon and black market sale. Awaiting both countries can connect each
other peacefully and agree to dismantle their nuclear arms; both countries will remain grave liabilities to global nonproliferation

NPT fails now, loopholes prove

Suresh, 10-6-2018, "WHY NUCLEAR NON PROLIFERATION TREATY NEED CHANGES?”, The
author has compiled the following article from various sources to give a brief synoptic view on the status
of the NPT. Medium, https://medium.com/@Susapien/why-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-need-
changes-b46f80ca1d5
The Non-Proliferation Treaty is uniquely unequal, as it obliges non-nuclear states to forgo development of nuclear weapons while allowing the
established nuclear states to keep theirs. (2005 conference)

In addition, it was understood in 1968 that, in return for their special status, the nuclear states would help the non-nuclear states in the
development of civilian nuclear power (although in the event the distinction between civilian and military nuclear technology was not so
straightforward) and also that
the nuclear states would make their best efforts to agree on measures of
disarmament, but even after almost 50 years the world faces the danger of 15000 Nuclear warheads.
The lack of mention of nuclear terrorism is a loophole, during its negotiations state parties didn’t consider
about non-state actors which makes this arrangement vulnerable to nuclear terrorism.
One of the other real difficulties with the treaty is that there is a tradition, although it’s not a legal
obligation adherence to the NPT is not universal. And a few countries that are parties to the NPT have
violated their treaty obligations. One weak point from the beginning is that the treaty acts by consensus.
And any change is highly unlikely due to Consensus rule. The formal amendment process of treaty is
highly cumbersome which makes amendment to treaty virtually impossible.
Enforcement is a major issue. That being said there are states that also maintain that the nuclear weapon states have not met all their NPT
obligations. What
is a major difficulty is the question of compliance. There’s no provision for enforcement,
there is no date of nuclear disarmament which entirely jeopardizes one of main objectives of the treaty.
Article 10 provides provisions for states to come out of treaty after 3 months of providing notice if treaty
jeopardizes the nations supreme interest, this articles in itself weakens the objective of the treaty. NATO
States argues that this treaty does not prevent them from using Nuclear weapons during the period of the War.

Over the years the NPT has come to be seen by many Third World states as “a conspiracy of the nuclear ‘haves’ to keep the nuclear ‘have-nots’
in their place “This
argument has roots in Article VI of the treaty which “obligates the nuclear weapons states
to liquidate their nuclear stockpiles and pursue complete disarmament. The non-nuclear states see no
signs of this happening”.
Countries like India justify their nuclear arsenal as a deterrent against attack by its neighbours namely
China and Pakistan. However, India and China both has adopted No First Use Policy.
 AT: Nuclear Terrorism
Nuclear terror is impossible
Cato Institute, 2017, "Cato Handbook for Policymakers: 76. Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and
Terrorism," The Cato Institute is a think tank of scholars and analysts that conduct independent,
nonpartisan research on a wide range of policy issues. https://www.cato.org/cato-handbook-
policymakers/cato-handbook-policy-makers-8th-edition-2017/nuclear-weapons
The possibility that small groups could set off nuclear weapons is an alarm that has been raised repeatedly over the
decades. However, terrorist groups thus far seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in
going atomic. Perhaps, after a brief exploration of the possible routes, they have discovered that the tremendous effort
required is scarcely likely to succeed.

One route a would-be atomic terrorist might take would be to receive or buy a bomb from a generous, like-minded
nuclear state for delivery abroad. That route, however, is highly improbable. The risk would be too great — even for a
country led by extremists — that the source of the weapon would ultimately be discovered. Here, the rapidly
developing science (and art) of “nuclear forensics” — connecting nuclear materials to their sources even after a
bomb has been detonated — provides an important deterrent. Moreover, the weapon could explode in a manner or on a
target the donor would not approve — including, potentially, the donor itself. Almost no one, for example, is likely to trust al Qaeda: its explicit
enemies list includes all Middle Eastern regimes, as well as the governments of Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Russia. And the Islamic State,
or ISIS, which burst onto the international scene in 2014, has alienated just about every state on the planet.

Nuclear-armed states are unlikely to give or sell their precious weapons to nonstate actors. Some observers,
though, worry about “loose nukes,” especially in post-Communist Russia — meaning weapons, “suitcase bombs” in particular, that can
be stolen or bought illicitly. However, as a former director at the Los Alamos National Laboratory notes, “Regardless of what is
reported in the news, all nuclear nations take the security of their weapons very seriously.” Careful
assessments have concluded that it is unlikely that any nuclear devices have been lost and that, regardless,
their effectiveness would be very low or even nonexistent because nuclear weapons require continual
maintenance.

Moreover, finished
bombs are outfitted with devices designed to trigger a nonnuclear explosion that will
destroy the bomb if it is tampered with. Bombs can also be kept disassembled with the component parts
stored in separate high-security vaults (a common practice in Pakistan). Two or more people and multiple codes
may be required not only to use the bomb, but also to store, maintain, and deploy it.

No risk of nuclear terror

Antonia Ward July 26, 2018 She is an analyst in the Defence, Security and Infrastructure team at
RAND Europe (“Is the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Distracting Attention from More Realistic Threats?”;
https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/07/is-the-threat-of-nuclear-terrorism-distracting-attention.html; Date
Accessed: 7/28/19)
Despite Obama's remarks in 2016 and these two incidents, expertsand officials contest the viability of the nuclear
terrorism threat. Dr Beyza Unal, a research fellow in nuclear policy at think tank Chatham House, argued there is currently no
evidence that terrorist groups could build a nuclear weapon . Similarly, a report by the Council on Foreign Relations in 2006
emphasized how building
a nuclear bomb is a difficult task for states, let alone terrorists . This is because of the
issues involved in accessing uranium and creating and maintaining it at the correct grade (enriched uranium).
While nuclear terrorism is a concern, the majority of terrorist attacks are conducted with conventional explosives .
The 2017 Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend Report states that 40 percent of terrorist attacks used explosives. These explosives originate
from a wide variety of countries across the world. According to a study by Conflict Armament Research, large quantities of explosive precursor
chemicals used to make bombs as seen in the 7/7 attack in London in 2005 and the 2017 Manchester Arena attack, have been linked to supply
chains in the United States, Europe, and Asia via Turkey. The threat from the spread of chemical precursors prompted the EU to begin looking at
ways to tighten the regulations of these chemicals (PDF).

A nuclear terrorist attack would have grave consequences, but it is currently not a realistic or viable threat
given that it would require a level of sophistication from terrorists that has not yet been witnessed. The
recent focus of terrorist groups has been on simplistic strikes , such as knife and vehicular attacks . If countries
are concerned about nuclear terrorism, the best way to mitigate this risk could be to tighten security at civilian and government nuclear sites. But
governments would be better off focusing their efforts on combatting the spread and use of conventional weapons.
 Non-Prolif Bad
Non-prolif assures coercive diplomacy, justifies constant military intervention, and
leads to more violence
Jan Ruzicka, 10-18-2017, "Behind the veil of good intentions: power analysis of the nuclear non-
proliferation regime," SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-017-0086-0
The structural distribution of power could not, however, by itself create and sustain the regime. Compulsory
power as the use of
force, threatened or actual, has been the regime’s indispensable feature, because it has transmitted the
latent potential of structural power (along with the norms and preferences accompanying it) into actual
policy choices and behaviour. Compulsory power has taken three main forms, ranging from the relatively stable and non-violent
(though certainly not benign in its potential results) deterrence, over the pressures of coercive diplomacy, to the outright military combat. Each of
these forms of compulsory power has at one point or another, and sometimes simultaneously, ensured that the regime’s dominant norm against
the spread of nuclear weapons would be upheld.

Realization that deterrence will play a crucial role in the nuclear age came early as both observers and practitioners quickly concluded that no
defence against a nuclear attack was possible (Brodie 1946). An enemy could only be deterred from launching such an attack by the threat of an
equivalent retaliation (Herz 1959; Freedman 1981, pp. 40–44). The practice of deterrence has had a direct impact upon the formation and
operation of the non-proliferation regime. It led to the build-up of the superpowers’ nuclear arsenals and the ensuing series of stand-offs, which
culminated in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Taking the world to the brink of nuclear annihilation made plain the instability that the spread of
nuclear weapons could produce. In the words of William Walker, the crises ‘fostered the view in Washington, Moscow and other capitals that
security and survival could henceforth only be achieved through greater practice and institutionalization of restraint’ (Walker 2012, p. 64). The
non-proliferation regime, broadly conceived, provided elements of such restraint.

Much as the superpowers came to recognize that they had to manage their encounters more carefully, the crises in their mutual relationship also
alerted them particularly strongly to the dangers of the spread of nuclear weapons. If, as a result of deterrence-based policies, things could have
gone horribly wrong in interactions involving merely two states which constantly kept an eye on each other, the growing number of nuclear
actors would have vastly expanded the scope for miscalculation (Jervis 1989). Even more importantly, with China’s ascent among the nuclear-
armed states, it became obvious that the logic of deterrence could be used against the superpowers themselves. In other words, the superpowers
concluded that the stability of international order, no matter how confrontational their bilateral dealings may have been, required that the actual
number of relationships based on nuclear deterrence be limited. This would both reduce the scope for nuclear crises and, crucially, preserve the
structural distribution of power favouring the superpowers.

Exercising compulsory power in the form of a constant threat to use nuclear weapons was a crucial
element in the effort to stop nuclear proliferation. If the individual member states of the respective alliance blocs, with the
exception of the United Kingdom and France in the NATO alliance, were not allowed to possess their own nuclear capacity, how was their
security to be ensured in the nuclear world? The promise to defend one’s allies by the nuclear means, the so-called nuclear umbrella, provided
reassurance they asked for in the face of a nuclear threat posed by the other side. This system of extended deterrence was the flip side of the
superpowers’ enforcement of nuclear non-proliferation within their respective alliance blocs. Whether the promise would have been fulfilled or
not, whether the superpowers would have risked their own territory or not, was beside the point. The deployment of superpowers’ nuclear
arsenals created the need for extended deterrence and simultaneously delivered it, thus helping to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It gave
the superpower collusion yet another dimension. The existence of Russian nuclear weapons after the collapse of the Soviet Union changed very
little in this regard. NATO has continued to bill itself as a nuclear alliance.

Compulsory power in the non-proliferation regime goes well beyond the use of extended nuclear
deterrence, the extent of which ultimately rests on the reach of alliance commitments. What about those
states which have no nuclear protector to rely upon? During the Cold War they were exposed to strong
diplomatic pressure, such as when the USA tried to prevent Brazil from going ahead with its 1975 civil nuclear deal with West Germany
that was perceived to have a hidden military dimension (Lowrance 1976; Gray 2012). But the superpower competition did limit such pressures
because of concerns about the overall balance of power. This was evident from the number of countries in the non-aligned movement actively
pursuing nuclear weapons programmes, with some of them (India, Pakistan) eventually doing so successfully.

The use of coercive diplomacy grew rapidly with the onset of the American primacy in the 1990s.
Increasingly, direct military action accompanied it. The first Gulf War concluded with the imposition of a
robust inspection regime, forged within the United Nations Security Council, designed to dismantle Iraq’s
nuclear infrastructure. Occasional use of air strikes backed the sanctions regime throughout the rest of the
decade. When this regime of coercion appeared unsatisfactory, proliferation concerns provided a
convenient rationale for the second Gulf War. Coercive diplomacy and the example of military
intervention in Iraq also nudged Libya to negotiate the dismantlement of its rudimentary nuclear
programme in 2003.
Direct use of force was on full display when the 2007 Israeli air strike destroyed a clandestine nuclear facility in Syria, which was under
construction probably with North Korean technical and Iranian financial assistance. The USA was well aware of the Israeli mission and may have
given tacit approval to it. Leonard Spector and Avner Cohen highlighted as notable ‘the near total lack of international comment or criticism of
Israel’s action’ (Spector and Cohen 2008, p. 15). But
truly remarkable was the fact that a state which remains outside
of the NPT, and is often criticized for abstaining from this linchpin of the non-proliferation regime, used
violence to enforce the non-proliferation norm and thus helped to prop up the wider regime . In doing so, it
obviously disregarded various institutional channels, such as the IAEA or the UN Security Council, that were open to it and the use of which it
supported in relation to the Iranian nuclear programme.

In the Iranian case, the full repertoire of coercive diplomacy came into play. The IAEA’s initial findings about Iran’s failure to report some of its
nuclear activities were revealed in 2003. Subsequently, when the IAEA reported Iran to the UN Security Council, these discoveries led to several
rounds of sanctions imposed by the Security Council. The
USA and its allies further augmented the sanctions regime
against Iran. These tools of coercive diplomacy were accompanied by repeated threats of the use of force,
especially by the USA and Israel. While the dispute was eventually resolved through negotiations culminating in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (better known as the Iran nuclear deal), compulsory
power, which put Iran under a considerable amount
of pressure, was undoubtedly a crucial part of the diplomatic settlement.

Nonnuclear states are subject to militarism by nuclear states, extended deterrence

fails
Michael Shellenberger, 08-06-2018, "Who Are We To Deny Weak Nations The Nuclear Weapons
They Need For Self-Defense?," Forbes,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2018/08/06/who-are-we-to-deny-weak-nations-the-
nuclear-weapons-they-need-for-self-defense/#7ce9e38d522f
In a 2012 cover story for Foreign Affairs, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” Waltz notes that “nuclear balancing would mean stability.” Why?
Because, “It is Israel’s nuclear arsenal, not Iran’s desire for one, that has contributed most to the current crisis.”

Israeli air strikes destroyed an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, and destroyed a Syrian reactor in 2007. Wrote Waltz: Israel's
proven ability
to strike potential nuclear rivals with impunity has inevitably made its enemies anxious to develop the
means to prevent Israel from doing so again.
In this way, the current tensions are best viewed not as the early stages of a relatively recent Iranian nuclear crisis but rather as the final stages of
a decades-long Middle East nuclear crisis that will end only when a balance of military power is restored."

Little surprise that Israeli hardliners responded with outrage to Waltz’s essay. “Some have even said that Iran with nuclear weapons would
stabilize the Middle East,” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said after Foreign Affairs published Waltz’s article. “I think people who
say this have set a new standard for human stupidity.” But was Israel stupid for acquiring the bomb in 1968 to protect itself from its neighbors?
No doubt Netanyahu would say no.

How do nuclear-armed nations justify their double-standard on nuclear weapons ? Mostly through fear-
mongering. “Those who dread a world with more nuclear states do little more than assert that more is worse,” noted Waltz,
“and claim without substantiation that new nuclear states will be less responsible and less capable of self-
control than the old ones have been.”
Nuclear-armed nations perpetuate two fictions, the first of which is that they will give up their weapons.
They point to the weak language in the 1968 nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which says treaty members will
“pursue negotiations” to achieve the goal of “complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”
And yet no nuclear-armed nation in the world is pursuing negotiations with the goal of “complete disarmament.”
Indeed, most nuclear-armed nations are upgrading, not downgrading their arsenals. The second fiction is
that nuclear-armed nations will protect their unarmed allies with nuclear weapons. But ask yourself: would
President Donald Trump risk New York for Montenegro (population 643,000) — the newest member of
NATO? In July, Trump suggested he was would not, even though the US is obligated to under NATO rules.
And why should Americans risk New York for Berlin when Germans won’t risk Berlin for New York ? Just
40 percent of Germans believe they “should use military force to defend a NATO ally if it got into a
serious military conflict with Russia,” while 65 percent believe “the U.S. would use military force to
defend a NATO ally.” And they are correct. Sixty-two percent of Americans agree that the U.S. should use
military force to defend a NATO ally in a conflict with Russia. But that commitment to NATO will likely
weaken given the lack of European solidarity, Middle East war fatigue, and President Trump’s
questioning of America’s role in the Alliance. Already, a growing number of vulnerable U.S. allies are asking
whether they should acquire weapons of their own. In Germany, a prominent political scientist has called for his nation to get the
bomb. “Trump-bashing will only further undermine the U.S. commitment to ‘extended deterrence,’” warned Dr. Christian Hacke, Professor of
Political Science at the University of Bonn, in a major essay in Welt am Sonntag, the country’s largest Sunday newspaper (an English version can
be read here).

Germany is, for the first time since 1949, without nuclear protection provided by the United States, and thus
defenseless in an extreme crisis. As such, Germany has no alternative but to rely on itself. A nuclear Germany
would stabilize NATO and the security of the Western World. But if we cannot persuade our allies, then Germany should go it alone. It may be
that just six to eight submarines would insure the security of the German people." A similar dynamic is underway in Asia. In the wake of tensions
with North Korea, 60
percent of South Koreans today say they want their own nuclear weapons, and 68 percent
want to redeploy U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. And now, politicians with South Korea’s leading
opposition party are urging their nation’s nuclear armament. Disarmament and Imperialism The end of extended deterrence
provided by the U.S. to Europe should not come as a surprise. Its temporary nature was foreseen as early as 1962, when André Fontaine wrote in
Le Monde: “It is inconceivable, unless we are resigned to an interminable cold war, that Europe forever relies on America for its security and for
the orientation of its diplomacy.” As to be expected, the usual fears are being drummed up against why a militarily-weak nation like Germany
shouldn’t get the bomb. “If Germany was to relinquish its status as a non-nuclear power, what would prevent Turkey or Poland, for example,
from following suit?” a former German ambassador to the U.S., wrote in response to Hacke’s essay. “Germany as the gravedigger of the
international nonproliferation regime? Who can want that?” In truth, it’s remarkable the nonproliferation regime has lasted as long as it has. It
made sense for nuclear-armed nations in the 1950s and 60s to try to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. After all, nations weren’t accustomed
to the revolutionary new technology, and the likelihood was far higher back then that a weapon could get used accidentally or fall into the wrong
hands. But 60 years later, in a multipolar world where the dominant power, the U.S., has grown tired of its role as global
hegemon, the non-proliferation regime is falling apart under the weight of its own contradictions. The
division of the world into nuclear-armed and unarmed nations has long been arbitrary and unfair. Nuclear-armed nations, except for
France, hypocritically punished India for decades with trade sanctions for acquiring a weapon. People
rightly worry about accidental or unauthorized use of weapons, such as by terrorists, but nations today
safeguard their weapons and materials far better than they did in the past. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the
United States spent $10 billion to help Russia maintain control of and destroy many of its nuclear weapons, and intelligence agencies around the
world work together to prevent nuclear materials from falling into the hands of non-state actors.

As for terrorism, why would a nation like Iran go to all the trouble of getting a bomb only to give it to a non-state actor like Hamas or Hezbollah?
Not only would doing so risk retaliation from Israel, but the bomb could be used by those groups to gain leverage over Iran itself. Today, the
greatest opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons to weak nations like North Korea and Iran comes from
militaristic figures like U.S. national security advisor John Bolton, who advocated the disastrous invasion
of Iraq, and who now advocates “the Libya model” for North Korea. It’s easy to see why. “In a world without
nuclear weapons,” a U.S. nuclear weapons designer explained, “the U.S. would have uncontested military
dominance.” In other words, a world without nuclear weapons would be a world where relatively weak
nations — like France and Britain before World War II and North Korea and Iran today — are deprived
the only power on Earth capable of preventing a military invasion by a more powerful adversary.
Who are we to deny weak nations the nuclear weapons they need for self-defense? The answer should by now be clear: hypocritical, short-
sighted, and imperialistic.
Prolif Bad
 Prolif Bad
Prolif kills heg and sparks conflict
Gene Gerzhoy and Nicholas Miller, 4-6-2016, "Donald Trump thinks more countries should have
nuclear weapons. Here’s what the research says.," Washington Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/should-more-countries-have-
nuclear-weapons-donald-trump-thinks-so/?utm_term=.90726a277c68
Would nuclear proliferation be good for U.S. interests?

What about Trump’s second proposition: that proliferation by our allies would be good for U.S. interests? This argument is based on the idea that
nuclear-armed allies could help contain U.S. adversaries and enable the United States to save money. As Trump told Cooper, “I would rather see
Japan having some form of defense, and maybe even offense, against North Korea.” And as he suggested, the United States can’t afford to protect
Japan and South Korea — and therefore, “they have to pay us or we have to let them protect themselves.”

Reducing military commitments and letting allies build their own nuclear weapons might save money for the
United States. But international relations scholarship suggests that allied proliferation would have broader negative
repercussions. Among these would be declining U.S. influence. When nations gain their own military
capabilities, they rely less on their allies and become less subject to their sway. And that can undermine a
senior partner’s ability to hold its junior allies back from risky military actions.
In other words, allowing or encouraging proliferation would worsen the “American weakness” that Trump decries.

Recent nonproliferation research underscores this proposition. Mark Bell shows that nuclear
allies are likely to become more
independent of their patrons and in some cases can develop more assertive foreign policies. And Francis Gavin
and Matthew Kroenig show that the fear of declining influence was one reason why most American administrations vigorously opposed the
spread of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear allies can also become security risks. Vipin Narang demonstrates that when weaker states gain nuclear
weapons, they often seek to coerce their senior partners into intervening on their behalf by threatening to
use nuclear weapons. That’s what Israel did at the height of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. That’s what South
Africa did during its 1988 confrontation with Cuban forces in Angola. And that’s what Pakistan did in the
midst of its 1990 military crisis with India.
Instead of relieving the United States of a military burden, as Donald Trump suggests, having
more nuclear allies could increase
the risk that the United States would get involved in conflicts that might turn nuclear.
Furthermore, were South Korea or Japan to begin developing nuclear weapons, their rivals might be
tempted to launch preventive military strikes, which research suggests has been frequently considered in
the past. The road to nuclear acquisition is often rocky and increases the likelihood of militarized conflict.
For example, Soviet worries that West Germany would acquire nuclear weapons helped trigger the Berlin
Crisis.
And if Japan or South Korea actually acquired nuclear weapons, we could possibly see a nuclear arms
race in Asia. Japan’s neighbors, including South Korea, would fear resurgent Japanese militarism. North
Korea would expand its nuclear capabilities. China would continue to expand its own nuclear arsenal.
Why haven’t we seen nuclear arms races before?

Nuclear “domino effects” have not been common historically. But that’s largely because of determined U.S. efforts to stop them.

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States has pursued nonproliferation as a top policy priority. That includes sponsoring and enforcing
the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Research suggests the NPT has been instrumental in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, in part by
coordinating states’ beliefs about one another’s nonproliferation commitments. To develop nuclear weapons, Japan and South Korea would need
to violate or withdraw from the NPT. That could prompt U.S. allies and adversaries in other regions — including Saudi Arabia, Germany and
Iran — to question the treaty’s viability and consider seeking their own nuclear arsenals.
Would this be so bad? After all, no two nuclear armed states have fought a major war with each other, and nuclear weapons have not been used in
conflict since the United States bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

But the conclusion that nuclear weapons produce peace is subject to debate. It’s
true that there has been no war between major
powers since 1945. But that may be due to other factors. The quantitative evidence linking nuclear
weapons to a reduced risk of conflict is limited at best.
Further, theoretical and historical evidence suggests that nuclear accidents and miscalculations are likely.
More countries with nuclear weapons would mean more opportunities for catastrophic nuclear mistakes.
So what’s the takeaway?

A look at history shows us that nuclear proliferation is anything but inevitable. U.S. nonproliferation efforts have been surprisingly successful,
even when the United States was weaker than it is today.

Without firm U.S. opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons — a policy implemented through “carrots” like alliances and “sticks” like
sanctions — the world would probably have far more than nine countries with nuclear weapons. What’s more, research
suggests that
nuclear proliferation would reduce U.S. world influence, undermine global stability and increase the risk
of nuclear war.

Prolif doesn’t improve the squo, rogue states are emboldened

John Mueller, 10-15-2018, "Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter," John Mueller is an adjunct professor of
political science, Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist at Ohio State University, and a Senior Fellow
at the Cato Institute. Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-10-15/nuclear-
weapons-dont-matter
Great powers are one thing, some might say, but rogue states or terrorist groups are another. If they go
nuclear, it’s game over — which is why any further proliferation must be prevented by all possible
measures, up to and including war.

That logic might seem plausible at first, but it breaks down on close examination. Not only has the world already survived the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by some of the craziest mass murderers in history (Stalin and Mao), but proliferation has slowed down rather than sped up over
time. Dozens of technologically sophisticated countries have considered obtaining nuclear arsenals, but very few have done so. This is because
nuclear weapons turn out to be difficult and expensive to acquire and strategically provocative to possess.

They have not even proved to enhance status much, as many expected they would. Pakistan and Russia
may garner more attention today than they would without nukes, but would Japan’s prestige be increased
if it became nuclear? Did China’s status improve when it went nuclear — or when its economy grew?
And would anybody really care (or even notice) if the current British or French nuclear arsenal was
doubled or halved?

Alarmists have misjudged not only the pace of proliferation but also its effects. Proliferation
is incredibly dangerous and
necessary to prevent, we are told, because going nuclear would supposedly empower rogue states and
lead them to dominate their region. The details of how this domination would happen are rarely discussed, but the general idea
seems to be that once a country has nuclear weapons, it can use them to threaten others and get its way, with
nonnuclear countries deferring or paying ransom to the local bully out of fear.
Under Trump, prolif raises the risk of miscalc
ACA, 2-15-2018, "The New U.S. Nuclear Strategy is Flawed and Dangerous. Here’s Why.," The Arms
Control Association is a national nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to promoting public
understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Arms Control Association,
https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2018-02/new-us-nuclear-strategy-flawed-dangerous-heres-why.
The 2018 NPR says that the first use of nuclear weapons will only be considered under “extreme
circumstances” to defend the “vital interests” of the United States and its allies (p. 21). The 2010 NPR
used identical language. Unlike the previous administration, however, the Trump administration defines
extreme circumstances more broadly to include “significant non-nuclear strategic attacks” against “U.S.,
allied or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their
command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities.”
The document does not explicitly define “significant non-nuclear strategic attacks” but at various points says it could include chemical and
biological attacks, large-scale conventional aggression, and cyberattacks. The review references the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-
nuclear attacks over 30 times.

The 2010 NPR, on the other hand, described “a narrow range of contingencies” in which nuclear weapons may play a role in deterring "a
conventional or CBW attack.” There was no reference to cyberattacks or attacks on nuclear command, control, and communications capabilities
anywhere in the 2010 document.

“This opens questions,” writes former Pentagon official Rebecca Hersman, “about whether the United
States would consider using” nuclear “weapons more readily than it might have in the past or in response
to attacks that are less than fully catastrophic.”
In addition, the 2010 NPR stated that the United States “will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear
weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and partners
the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons.”

Indeed, by the end of his second term of office President Obama believed that goal had effectively been achieved. As then Vice President Joe
Biden put it in remarks delivered in January 2017: “given our non-nuclear capabilities and the nature of today’s threats, it’s hard to envision a
plausible scenario in which the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States would be necessary. Or make sense. President Obama and I are
confident we can deter and defend ourselves and our allies against non-nuclear threats through other means.”

In contrast, the new NPR explicitly rejects the idea of “sole purpose” (p. 20). The review extols ambiguity and proposes two new low-yield
nuclear capabilities to “expand the range of credible U.S. options for responding to nuclear or non-nuclear strategic attack” (p. 55).

The Trump NPR diverges from the Obama NPR on declaratory policy in still other ways.

The 2010 review updated and strengthened the U.S. pledge of nonuse against non-nuclear-weapon states that are in good standing with their
nuclear nonproliferation obligations, even in the unlikely event that one of those states attacks the United States or its allies with chemical or
biological weapons. This revised negative security assurance expanded the security benefits for non-nuclear-weapon states of good faith
membership in the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime.

The 2018 NPR reiterates this pledge but undermines the value of this assurance by retaining “the right to make any adjustment in the assurance
that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of non-nuclear strategic attack technologies and U.S. capabilities to counter that threat”
(p. 21).

It is notable that President

Trump argued in his 2018 State of the Union address that “we must modernize and rebuild our
nuclear arsenal, hopefully never having to use it, but making it so strong and powerful that it will deter
any acts of aggression by any other nation or anyone else .”
This approach represents a clear shift away from past U.S. strategy and practice that aims to reduce the
role of nuclear weapons in U.S. military and foreign policy. The 2010 NPR stated that the “fundamental role” of nuclear
weapons is to deter nuclear attack against the United States or its allies, not “any act of aggression.”

The proposed changes in the 2018 NPR on the role of nuclear weapons are real. And they are dangerous.
Threatening nuclear retaliation to counter new kinds of “asymmetric” attacks would lower the threshold
for nuclear use, increase the risks of miscalculation, and make it easier for other countries to justify
excessive roles for nuclear weapons in their policies. Such threats are also unlikely to be proportional and
therefore would be difficult to make credible. For example, though a kinetic or nonkinetic attack on U.S. nuclear command and
control capabilities, which support both nuclear and non-nuclear missions, could have major repercussions, such an attack is unlikely to result in
any human casualties.

Given the overall conventional superiority of the U.S.-led alliance system, it is in the U.S. interest to raise, not lower, the bar for nuclear use. A
more prudent approach to countering potential non-nuclear attacks on U.S. infrastructure and command and control capabilities would include
strengthening the resilience of these systems against cyberattack and ensuring the availability of credible symmetric and asymmetric conventional
response options.
 NPT stops prolif
Nonproliferation Treaty is tightening restrictions, ensures non-prolif
Durkalec 18 (JACK June 29, 2018 Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Center for Global Security
Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Doctorate in Political science master’s
degree in International relations https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2018/Also-in-2018/the-nuclear-non-
proliferation-treaty-at-fifty-a-midlife-crisis/EN/index.htm)
The non-proliferation score of the NPT is not perfect, as a number of countries have decided to cheat and pursue nuclear
options while remaining NPT parties. Yet, because of the NPT, they have had to pursue nuclear weapons covertly,
constraining their efforts. In some cases, it has bought time for them to reconsider their nuclear options, or for outside intervention that
has prevented further progress.

For example, Libya’s

pursuit of nuclear weapons for almost 30 years was terminated in 2003, thanks to the
diplomatic efforts of the United Kingdom and the United States, and a change of mind by the country’s leader, Colonel Muammar
Qaddafi. Iraq’s nuclear pursuit of almost 20 years was ended by the 1991 Gulf War, and Syria’s decade-long efforts were disrupted by Israel’s
2007 attack on the covert Al Kibar nuclear reactor.

Those NPT countries that have been caught cheating and have refused to abandon their clandestine
programmes have paid a significant price for noncompliance . North Korea, which in 2003 announced its withdrawal from
the Treaty and soon acquired nuclear weapons capability, did it despite extensive international sanctions and political isolation. Sanctions
imposed on Iran for its covert nuclear activities were eased after the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and Iran’s renewed
commitment to abide by its obligations under the Treaty. Without
the NPT, the concerted global efforts to prevent, slow
down, curb, punish and reverse the actions of Iran and North Korea would be much more difficult. The Treaty
gives legitimacy to the non-proliferation norm and to actions to enforce it.
While the Treaty has significant loopholes, detection of illegal proliferation by its safeguards system has mobilised efforts to strengthen
verification and enforcement. The exposure of Saddam Hussein’s clandestine programme in 1991 led to improvements of the IAEA’s inspection
authority with the 1997 Additional Protocol. The Protocol has been ratified by over 130 countries.

The non-proliferation impact of the NPT Treaty has been multiplied by a dense network of international initiatives and agreements created to
support the NPT goals, including the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Zangger
Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Nuclear
Security Summits. Together, these multilateral efforts reinforce the non-proliferation regime and the NPT.

NPT has bound many major countries to an agreement already, they can’t back
down
Durkalec 18 (JACK June 29, 2018 Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Center for Global Security
Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Doctorate in Political science master’s
degree in International relations https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2018/Also-in-2018/the-nuclear-non-
proliferation-treaty-at-fifty-a-midlife-crisis/EN/index.htm)
Scholars disagree on the extent to which theNPT has helped to stop nuclear proliferation, as its direct or indirect impact is difficult to prove.
Yet it can be, at least partially, credited with embedding the non-proliferation norm that is responsible for
keeping the number of countries armed with nuclear weapons lower than ten . As Lewis Dunn – an astute observer of
the NPT – notes, the Treaty has curbed proliferation pessimism, which was widespread in the 1960s. The increasing number of
states adhering to the Treaty has helped to reverse the perception that ‘runaway’ or ‘cascading’ proliferation is unavoidable.

Even though there are many reasons why all but a few countries have refrained from acquiring nuclear weapons, the NPT might have
helped some of them to crystallize their decisions by compelling them to make a choice. After prolonged
political and bureaucratic debates and taking into account various considerations, countries like Australia,
Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and West Germany decided that joining the Treaty would be in their best
interest. In the case of countries allied with the United States, the diplomatic efforts of the United States to convince them to join the Treaty,
backed up by nuclear guarantees, significantly contributed to their final choices. For many states that never contemplated obtaining nuclear
weapons, technical and financial help with the peaceful use of nuclear technology was the main incentive for acceding to the Treaty.

Only three countries decided to not adhere to the NPT from the outset: India, which carried out a “peaceful” nuclear test in 1974; Pakistan, which
conducted nuclear tests back to back with India in 1998; and Israel, which has neither confirmed nor denied that it has nuclear weapons.

There are positive examples of countries that joined the NPT even though they initially acquired nuclear
weapon capability or were close to obtaining it. South Africa joined the NPT in 1991 after it had unilaterally
dismantled its small arsenal. Argentina and Brazil acceded to the Treaty in the 1990s after they had
mutually agreed to cease their weapons-related activities . Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine became NPT members after they
gave up nuclear weapons they had inherited in 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Even though the decisions of these
countries were prompted by factors other than the NPT, their accession to the Treaty cemented these
decisions and made them far more difficult to reverse .
 Nuclear Terrorism
Nuclear terrorism is a real possibility- terrorists are making efforts now
Carnegie Corporation, 03-29-2016, "Nuclear Terrorism," Carnegie Corporation Of New York,
https://www.carnegie.org/interactives/nuclear-terrorism/#!/
The recent terrorist attack in Brussels should remind the world that nuclear security has never been more
important. Even with the disarmament of many Cold War era weapons, poorly secured stockpiles of weapons-usable
uranium and plutonium remain across the globe, several of which have experienced security breaches in recent years. Without action
to keep these materials from terrorist groups and other nonstate actors an act of nuclear terrorism becomes all the more likely.

In 2010, the Obama administration convened the first Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in an attempt to draw high-level political attention to this
issue. These Summits reconvened in 2012 and 2014 in Seoul and The Hague, respectively. Each summit, attended by nations across the globe,
has been driven by the goal of securing all civilian nuclear materials and creating a global culture of accountability. The NSS process, supported
by international experts including many Carnegie Corporation of New York grantees, has raised awareness around nuclear security, reduced the
number of worldwide sites containing fissile material, and built support for higher security standards. It has driven home the message that
vulnerable nuclear materials anywhere are a threat to citizens everywhere.
We are safer today for this effort, but more must be done. As Matthew Bunn, a Corporation grantee at Harvard University’s Project on Managing
security has improved, but so have the capabilities of the terrorist groups
the Atom, noted in a recent Q&A,
seeking these nuclear material s. “If IS [Islamic State] did turn toward nuclear weapons, they have more
money, more people, more territory under their control, and more ability to recruit globally than al-Qaeda
ever had.”

This is not idle speculation. In November, authorities recovered video footage from an IS associate in Brussels
who had been monitoring a nuclear scientist, potentially in search of radioactive or nuclear
materials . Facilities in Belgium house highly-enriched uranium—the most easily weaponized nuclear material—as well as radiological
materials that could be used in a radiological dispersal device (or “dirty bomb”). Just this month, eleven workers at Belgium's
Tihange nuclear facility had their security access revoked, an action that called to mind an incident in
2014 in which a Belgian nuclear power plant was sabotaged by an insider, causing an estimated $100-200
million in damage.

Prolif reverses counter-terrorism efforts

James Wirtz, 9-8-2017, "War on Terrorism," Taylor & Francis, James J. Wirtz is a professor in the
Department of National Security Affairs, https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781315234403
Theory, policy and organization have blinded us to the way that US counter-proliferation efforts help to deter or
prevent chemical, biological and nuclear terrorism. Common cognitive biases also have slowed widespread recognition of the
negative interaction between counterproliferation and counter-terrorism policies and of the tradeoffs that might have to be made between these
two policies. Individuals often find it difficult to recognize the opportunity costs and unintended consequences produced by the policies they
advocate and adopt. They also find it difficult to see how well-intentioned policies can produce negative consequences.7

Counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism are related in at least four ways.8 First, counter-
proliferation policy has bounded the terrorist threat by cutting supplies to black markets and by reducing
the incentives for state sponsorship of WMD terrorism. Second, superior US conventional military
capabilities, which are bolstered in several ways by counter-proliferation policies, force determined US
adversaries to seek asymmetric responses, including terrorism. To the extent that counter-proliferation policies harden US military
units and installations to terrorist attack, counter-proliferation also might channel terrorists toward civilian targets.

Third, US counter-proliferation efforts address key allied vulnerabilities to terrorism involving

weapons of mass destruction, further bounding the terrorist threat. Fourth, potential policy and budgetary
tradeoffs are looming between counter-proliferation and a major component of counter-terrorism policy,
consequence management (the protection of civilian populations from weapons effects following a
successful terrorist attack).
 AT: Deterrence
Nuclear proliferation deterrence fails
Craig et al., 2-1-2019, "Have nuclear weapons helped to maintain global peace?," Malcolm Craig is
senior lecturer in American history at Liverpool John Moores University, specializing in post-1945 US
and UK foreign policy. Michael Goodman is professor of intelligence and international affairs in the
department of war studies at King’s College London. Simon J Moody is lecturer in defense studies at
King’s College London, specializing in the history of strategic thought. Benoît Pelopidas is professor,
junior chair of excellence in security studies, and scientific director of the master’s program in
international security at Sciences Po (Paris). https://www.historyextra.com/period/20th-century/have-
nuclear-weapons-helped-to-maintain-global-peace/
Do you think that nuclear weapons will ensure world peace in the future?

MG: In a word: no. The

deterrent effect of possession of a nuclear weapon is obvious and with historical
precedent, but that does not mean that irrational leaders won’t consider using them either pre-emptively
or for a specific purpose.
While warfare increasingly moves towards the cyber domain and non-kinetic electronic or other remote technological] means, nuclear
weapons remain the diametric opposite. They are the red line that no state has crossed since August 1945, but this
lack of use is not enough of an argument to say that they have ensured world peace. They are a tactic of
last resort, but peace will be pursued separate to nuclear weapons . That said, they are an important and valuable
commodity to any defensive arsenal, so will remain a significant factor in world politics for the foreseeable future.

SJM: As a historian, I would naturally be reluctant to peer too deep into the future.

What the historical record tells us, however, is that the security framework within which nuclear weapons have become so ingrained is
remarkably stable, and that total war (as our grandfathers’ and great-grandfathers’ generations twice knew it), really does seem to be a relic of the
industrial age. Yet nuclear
weapons are not a panacea for ensuring world peace, as demonstrated by the
proliferation of conventional conflicts since 1945. Real world peace rests on the ability of humans to
solve their political differences through understanding, compassion and co-operation.

BP: Since the beginning of the nuclear age, nuclear

weapons were not designed to prevent all forms of violence and
have not done so. The extent to which they have been central to the prevention of war between major
powers since 1945 is also contested. They primarily generated a vulnerability, from the moment when
undetectable submarine-launched ballistic missiles made it impossible to defend against a nuclear attack.
Nuclear-weapon states have been attacked and lost wars against non-nuclear-weapon states, and actors
willing to give their life for a cause may not fear nuclear retaliation. This is as true as it ever was.
As scholars and citizens, we have a responsibility in building the future. Perpetuating
overconfidence in the controllability
and safety of nuclear weapons allows for complacency. It neglects the role of luck and failures in
avoiding nuclear weapons use in the past. Beyond the security dimension, the question of the future of nuclear weapons raises
ethical and political issues about what kind of political communities we want to be in the eyes of future generations – and what we want to leave
them.
Nuclear weapons won’t deter, history proves
David Barash, 1-14-2018, David P Barash is a psychology professor at the University of Washington.
"Nuclear deterrence is a myth. And a lethal one at that," Guardian,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/14/nuclear-deterrence-myth-lethal-david-barash
Even in war-prone Europe, decades of peace have not been so rare. Each time, when peace ended and the next war began, the war involved
weapons available at the time – which, for the next big one, would likely include nuclear weapons. The
only way to make sure that
nuclear weapons are not used is to make sure that there are no such weapons. There is certainly no reason
to think that the presence of nuclear weapons will prevent their use. The first step to ensuring that humans do not
unleash nuclear holocaust might be to show that the Emperor Deterrence has no clothes – which would then open the possibility of replacing the
illusion with something more suitable.

It is possible that the post-1945 US-Soviet peace came ‘through strength’, but that need not imply nuclear deterrence. It is also undeniable that the
presence of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert capable of reaching each other’s homeland in minutes has made both sides edgy.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 – when, by all accounts, the world came closer to nuclear war than at
any other time – is not testimony to the effectiveness of deterrence: the crisis occurred because of nuclear
weapons. It is more likely that we have been spared nuclear war not because of deterrence but in spite of
it.
Even when possessed by just one side, nuclear weapons have not deterred other forms of war. The
Chinese, Cuban, Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions all took place even though a nuclear-armed US
backed the overthrown governments. Similarly, the US lost the Vietnam War, just as the Soviet Union
lost in Afghanistan, despite both countries not only possessing nuclear weapons, but also more and better
conventional arms than their adversaries. Nor did nuclear weapons aid Russia in its unsuccessful war
against Chechen rebels in 1994-96, or in 1999-2000, when Russia’s conventional weapons devastated the
suffering Chechen Republic.
Nuclear weapons did not help the US achieve its goals in Iraq or Afghanistan, which have become expensive catastrophic failures for the country
with the world’s most advanced nuclear weapons. Moreover, despite its nuclear arsenal, the US remains fearful of domestic terrorist attacks,
which are more likely to be made with nuclear weapons than be deterred by them.

In short, it
is not legitimate to argue that nuclear weapons have deterred any sort of war, or that they will do
so in the future. During the Cold War, each side engaged in conventional warfare: the Soviets, for example, in
Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979-89); the Russians in Chechnya (1994-96;
1999-2009), Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014-present), as well as Syria (2015-present); and the US in
Korea (1950-53), Vietnam (1955-75), Lebanon (1982), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989-90), the Persian
Gulf (1990-91), the former Yugoslavia (1991-99), Afghanistan (2001-present), and Iraq (2003-present ), to
mention just a few cases.

Nor have their weapons deterred attacks upon nuclear armed states by non-nuclear opponents. In 1950, China
stood 14 years from developing and deploying its own nuclear weapons, whereas the US had a well-developed atomic arsenal. Nonetheless, as
the Korean War’s tide was shifting dramatically against the North, that US
nuclear arsenal did not inhibit China from sending
more than 300,000 soldiers across the Yalu River, resulting in the stalemate on the Korean peninsula that
divides it to this day, and has resulted in one of the world’s most dangerous unresolved stand-offs.
In 1956, the nuclear-armed United Kingdom warned non-nuclear Egypt to refrain from nationalising the Suez Canal. To no avail: the UK, France
and Israel ended up invading Sinai with conventional forces. In 1982, Argentina
attacked the British-held Falkland Islands,
even though the UK had nuclear weapons and Argentina did not.
Following the US-led invasion in 1991, conventionally armed Iraq was not deterred from lobbing Scud
missiles at nuclear-armed Israel , which did not retaliate, although it could have used its nuclear weapons
to vaporise Baghdad. It is hard to imagine how doing so would have benefitted anyone. Obviously, US
nuclear weapons did not deter the terrorist attacks on the US of 11 September 2001, just as the nuclear
arsenals of the UK and France have not prevented repeated terrorist attacks on those countries.
Deterrence, in short, does not deter.

The pattern is deep and geographically widespread. Nuclear-armed France couldn’t prevail over the non-nuclear Algerian National Liberation
Front. The US nuclear arsenal didn’t inhibit North Korea from seizing a US intelligence-gathering vessel, the USS Pueblo, in 1968. Even today,
this boat remains in North Korean hands.

US nukes didn’t enable China to get Vietnam to end its invasion of Cambodia in 1979. Nor did US nuclear weapons stop Iranian Revolutionary
Guards from capturing US diplomats and holding them hostage (1979-81), just as fear of US nuclear weapons didn’t empower the US and its
allies to force Iraq to retreat from Kuwait without a fight in 1990.

In Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (2017), the political

scientists Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann examined 348
territorial disputes occurring between 1919 and 1995. They used statistical analysis to see whether nuclear-armed
states were more successful than conventional countries in coercing their adversaries during territorial
disputes. They weren’t.

Deterrence fails, countries will first-strike

David Barash, 1-14-2018, David P Barash is a psychology professor at the University of Washington.
"Nuclear deterrence is a myth. And a lethal one at that," Guardian,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/14/nuclear-deterrence-myth-lethal-david-barash
First, deterrence via nuclear weapons lacks credibility . A police officer armed with a backpack nuclear weapon would be
unlikely to deter a robber: ‘Stop in the name of the law, or I’ll blow us all up!’ Similarly, during the Cold War, NATO
generals
lamented that towns in West Germany were less than two kilotons apart – which meant that defending
Europe with nuclear weapons would destroy it, and so the claim that the Red Army would be deterred by
nuclear means was literally incredible. The result was the elaboration of smaller, more accurate tactical weapons that would be
more usable and, thus, whose employment in a crisis would be more credible. But deployed weapons that are more usable, and
thus more credible as deterrents, are more liable to be used.
Second, deterrence requires that each side’s arsenal remains invulnerable to attack , or at least that such an
attack would be prevented insofar as a potential victim retained a ‘second-strike’ retaliatory capability,
sufficient to prevent such an attack in the first place. Over time, however, nuclear missiles have become
increasingly accurate, raising concerns about the vulnerability of these weapons to a ‘counterforce’ strike .
In brief, nuclear states are increasingly able to target their adversary’s nuclear weapons for destruction. In
the perverse argot of deterrence theory, this is called counterforce vulnerability, with ‘vulnerability’ referring to the target’s nuclear weapons, not
its population. The
clearest outcome of increasingly accurate nuclear weapons and the ‘counterforce
vulnerability’ component of deterrence theory is to increase the likelihood of a first strike, while also
increasing the danger that a potential victim, fearing such an event, might be tempted to pre-empt with its
own first strike. The resulting situation – in which each side perceives a possible advantage in striking
first – is dangerously unstable.

Third, deterrence theory assumes optimal rationality on the part of decision-makers . It presumes that those
with their fingers on the nuclear triggers are rational actors who will also remain calm and cognitively
unimpaired under extremely stressful conditions. It also presumes that leaders will always retain control
over their forces and that, moreover, they will always retain control over their emotions as well, making
decisions based solely on a cool calculation of strategic costs and benefits. Deterrence theory maintains,
in short, that each side will scare the pants off the other with the prospect of the most hideous,
unimaginable consequences, and will then conduct itself with the utmost deliberate and precise
rationality. Virtually everything known about human psychology suggests that this is absurd.

In Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey Through Yugoslavia (1941), Rebecca West noted that: ‘Only part of us is sane: only part of us loves
pleasure and the longer day of happiness, wants to live to our 90s and die in peace …’ It requires no arcane wisdom to know that people often act
out of misperceptions, anger, despair, insanity, stubbornness, revenge, pride and/or dogmatic conviction. Moreover,
in certain
situations – as when either side is convinced that war is inevitable, or when the pressures to avoid losing
face are especially intense – an irrational act, including a lethal one, can appear appropriate, even
unavoidable.

When he ordered the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese defence minister observed that: ‘Sometimes it is necessary to close one’s eyes and
jump off the platform of the Kiyomizu Temple [a renowned suicide spot].’ During the First World War, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany wrote in
the margin of a government document that: ‘Even if we are destroyed, England at least will lose India.’

While in his bunker, during the final days of the Second World War, Adolf Hitler ordered what he hoped would be the total destruction of
Germany, because he felt that Germans had ‘failed’ him.

Consider, as well, a US president who shows signs of mental illness, and whose statements and tweets are
frighteningly consistent with dementia or genuine psychosis. National leaders – nuclear-armed or not –
aren’t immune to mental illness. Yet, deterrence theory presumes otherwise.

Finally, there
is just no way for civilian or military leaders to know when their country has accumulated
enough nuclear firepower to satisfy the requirement of having an ‘effective deterrent’ . For example, if one
side is willing to be annihilated in a counterattack, it simply cannot be deterred, no matter the threatened
retaliation. Alternatively, if one side is convinced of the other’s implacable hostility, or of its presumed
indifference to loss of life, no amount of weaponry can suffice. Not only that, but so long as accumulating
weapons makes money for defence contractors, and so long as designing, producing and deploying new
‘generations’ of nuclear stuff advances careers, the truth about deterrence theory will remain obscured.
Even the sky is not the limit; militarists want to put weapons in outer space.

Insofar as nuclear weapons also serve symbolic, psychological needs, by demonstrating the technological accomplishments of a nation and thus
conveying legitimacy to otherwise insecure leaders and countries, then, once again, there is no rational way to establish the minimum (or cap the
maximum) size of one’s arsenal. At some point, additional detonations nonetheless come up against the law of diminishing returns, or as Winston
Churchill pointed out, they simply ‘make the rubble bounce’.

In addition, ethical deterrence is an oxymoron. Theologians know that a nuclear war could never meet so-called ‘just war’ criteria. In 1966, the
Second Vatican Council concluded: ‘Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with
their populations is a crime against God and man itself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation.’ And in a pastoral letter in 1983,
the US Catholic bishops added: ‘This condemnation, in our judgment, applies even to the retaliatory use of weapons striking enemy cities after
our own have already been struck.’ They continued that, if something is immoral to do, then it is also immoral to threaten. In a message to the
2014 Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Pope Francis declared that: ‘Nuclear deterrence and the threat of
mutually assured destruction cannot be the basis of an ethics of fraternity and peaceful coexistence among peoples and states.’
The United Methodist Council of Bishops go further than their Catholic counterparts, concluding in 1986 that: ‘Deterrence must no longer
receive the churches’ blessing, even as a temporary warrant for the maintenance of nuclear weapons.’ In The Just War (1968), the Protestant
ethicist Paul Ramsey asked his readers to imagine that traffic accidents in a particular city had suddenly been reduced to zero, after which it was
found that everyone had been required to strap a newborn infant to the bumper of every car.

Perhaps the most frightening thing about nuclear deterrence is its many paths to failure. Contrary to what is widely assumed, the least likely is a
‘bolt out of the blue’ (BOOB) attack. Meanwhile, thereare substantial risks associated with escalated conventional war,
accidental or unauthorised use, irrational use (although it can be argued that any use of nuclear weapons
would be irrational) or false alarms, which have happened with frightening regularity, and could lead to
‘retaliation’ against an attack that hadn’t happened . There have also been numerous ‘broken arrow’ accidents – accidental
launching, firing, theft or loss of a nuclear weapon – as well as circumstances in which such events as a flock of geese, a
ruptured gas pipeline or faulty computer codes have been interpreted as a hostile missile launch.

Prolif multiplies the risk of miscalc

Rakesh Sood, 1-5-2019, "Nuclear order in the twenty-first century," ORF, Ambassador Rakesh Sood is
a Distinguished Fellow at ORF. He has over 38 years of experience in the field of foreign affairs,
economic diplomacy and international security issues. https://www.orfonline.org/research/nuclear-order-
in-the-twenty-first-century-47105/
For nuclear peace to hold, deterrence and fail-safe mechanisms must work every single time. For nuclear
Armageddon to break out, deterrence or fail safe mechanisms need to break down only once. This is not a
comforting equation.

Deterrence stability depends on rational decision-makers being always in office on all sides: a dubious and not
reassuring precondition. How reassured would the world feel —including Americans—if the world’s nuclear peace
depended on, say, Donald Trump’s or Kim Jong-un’s fingers on nuclear buttons? Deterrence stability
depends equally critically on there being no rogue launch, human error or system malfunction. As more
states acquire nuclear weapons, the risks multiply exponentially with the requirements for rationality in
all decision-makers, robust command and control systems in all states, 100 percent reliable fail-safe
mechanisms and procedures against accidental and unauthorised launch of nuclear weapons, and
unbreachable security measures against terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons . This is an impossibly high bar.