DA - Diplomatic Capital - DDI 2022

Diplomatic Capital DA---DDI22
Shout out to Conor Feldman, Adam Lin, Annie Zhao, Wyeth Renwick, Ria Sood, Nichole Garcia,
Maggie Stearns, Chris Rodriguez, Layla Hijawi, and Gio Rios for all their work in producing this
file.
---China War
---Taiwan War
---Tech Leadership
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1NC
1NC---Diplomatic Capital DA
Uniqueness---Biden diplomatic focus is on China --- diverting from current

initiatives risks failure
Weitz 6-14, 2022 (Richard Weitz, Richard Weitz is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center
for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute. “Biden and Blinken Pivot Toward Asia,” China
US Focus, 6/14/2022, https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/biden-and-blinken-pivot-
toward-asia) - LH
Last month, the Biden administration finally concentrated on realizing its Asian ambitions . Though
President Biden came to office determined to make Asia his highest foreign-policy priority, events at home, in Afghanistan, and in
Europe understandably dominated the initial White House agenda. But last month, the
administration hosted an
ASEAN summit in Washington, arranged a short but consequential presidential trip to the region, and
delivered a long-anticipated speech focused on China-U.S. relations. As a result of these developments, we
now better understand the Biden administration’s Asian strategy.
Though Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s speech came at the end of May, the text, originally scheduled to occur before Biden’s
first trip as president to Asia, helps place the month’s events in context. Biden’s
presentation was notable not for its
new initiatives, which were few, but for
its repackaging and justifying of the administration’s policies
towards Beijing. China, he observed, was “the only country with both the intent” and the capacities
required to comprehensively challenge the extant “system of laws, agreements, principles, and
institutions” that underpin the prevailing international order favored by the United States. Therefore,
managing the Sino-American relationship should be Washington’s highest priority.
According to Blinken, the administration’s strategy is to “invest, align, and compete ” with China. To
invest more in U.S. industrial and technological prowess, the administration wants Congress to enact proposed legislation to support
U.S. leadership in emerging scientific and technical sectors. Meanwhile, the
State Department has redoubled
efforts to align U.S. allies and partners on behalf of the existing U.S.-favored international order
under challenge by China, Russia, and other revisionist states. The Defense Department has also been fortifying
U.S. military partnerships in the region. The administration sees these economic and military initiatives, whether
focused internally or outwardly in Asia, as mutually reinforcing. Combined, they position the United States well to compete with
China.
The new “invest, align, and compete” framework is less elegant than the previous 3-C “competition, cooperation, and confrontation”
formulation. Blinken still denies a U.S. effort to reflexively “stand against China.” Rather, the United States will work with China on
areas of common interest, such as managing global climate change, while “stand[ing] up for peace, security and human dignity.” Yet,
in addition to repeating long-standing complaints regarding Chinese policies,
the administration regretted that
Beijing was pursuing “asymmetric decoupling, seeking to make China less dependent on the
world and the world more dependent on China.” Instead of “decoupling” from the PRC, the administration
would strive to redirect Chinese foreign policies in a more positive direction by shaping the
international environment in which Beijing operates.
Unsurprisingly given that the speech was scheduled for an earlier delivery, Biden’s Asia trip aligned with Blinken’s presentation. At
each event, the Biden team highlighted presidential interest in Asia to counter the narrative that a future PRC-led regional order was
inevitable due to U.S. decline—with the implication that other Asian states should therefore accommodate rather than resist
Beijing’s regional preeminence. Another goal was to profile the administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy ,
which was rolled out in February and quickly overshadowed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this regard, Biden’s trip also
aimed to counter regional concerns that Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine would embolden Beijing to use force in Asia.
For example, in Tokyo, Biden
stressed the “unwavering U.S. commitment to the region, and
underscored that his strategy will be matched with resources and steady implementation.” Biden
and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida emphasized the imperative of keeping the Indo-Pacific region free of major war, noting the
devastating impact of the Ukraine war on the world. Kishida insisted that such a “unilateral attempt to change the status quo by
force...should never be tolerated in the Indo-Pacific.” In their joint statement, Biden and Kishida declared “that the
rules-based
international order is indivisible; threats to international law and the free and fair economic
order anywhere constitute a challenge to our values and interests everywhere. ” Both leaders saw the
international coalition that the West had organized against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine as a model for how the democracies
might respond to military aggression against Taiwan or the Senkaku Islands, which Biden reaffirmed fell under the Japan-U.S. Treaty
of Mutual Cooperation and Security.
The administration, seeking to counter criticisms that it has been insufficiently attentive to Asian economic issues, exploited
Biden’s trip as an opportunity to relaunch the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity ( IPEF).
Though still somewhat long on vision and short on details, the IPEF has enormous potential due to its members’
comprising more than one-third of the world economy. That twelve countries initially joined reflects not only
the widespread regional interest in cooperating economically with the United States, but also the IPEF’s paucity of rigorous
requirements or means of enforcement. These were apparently discarded to maximize membership. That nonmembers can
selectively participate in only select IPEF activities and receive benefits from the public goods the IPEF generates is also a mixed
blessing, as it may encourage free riding.
These compromises naturally reminded people about the superior Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which the United States crafted
and then abandoned. In his joint news conference with Biden, Kishida twice expressed his hope the United States would rejoin the
TPP, now rebranded as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The IPEF also falls
short of the high standards embedded in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. U.S. officials will need to make
continuing progress in executing the Framework, with attention focused on a few critical
projects with adequate funding, rather than spreading too thinly or competing with
existing frameworks, in order to demonstrate that the IPEF is more than another Trade and Investment Framework
Agreements (TIFA).
During his stay in Tokyo, Biden participated in another leadership meeting of the Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue (“the Quad”), with newly elected Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of Australia and Prime Minister Narendra Modi of
India joining Kishida and Biden. In their joint communique, the leaders criticized various policies of China and Russia
without explicitly mentioning these countries. Of note, the text highlights the members’ “commitment to a free and
open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient” and their support for the “principles of freedom,
rule of law, democratic values, sovereignty and territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of
disputes ... and freedom of navigation and overflight.” The Quad announced some novel projects to develop
infrastructure, enhance Asia’s cybersecurity, and promote secure and diversified supply chains.
In particular, the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) holds promise to assist Asian countries to
monitor, and ideally deter, transnational and nation-state threats at sea. These challenges encompass illegal fishing, piracy, and
aggressive paramilitary maritime militia. According to the White House fact sheet, the “IPMDA will offer a near-real-time, integrated,
and cost-effective maritime domain awareness picture” to “partners in the Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean
region.” Expanding partners’ collective maritime domain awareness will require substantial attention to network and improve the
different assets and authorities of the participating members.
Biden attracted the most media attention for his comments in Tokyo regarding Taiwan. Though reaffirming
the “One China” policy, Biden insisted that the United States would assist Taiwan if Beijing tried to
seize the island by force. Biden explained that such aggression would, like the Russian invasion of Ukraine, “dislocate the
entire region.” In his George Washington University speech, though, Blinken asserted that the administration had not changed the
contours of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. It remains based on the three Joint Communiques, the Six Assurances, and the Taiwan
Relations Act. The United States still opposes either side’s unilaterally changing the status quo, maintains strong but unofficial ties
with Taiwan, and demands the peaceful resolution of Cross-Strait differences.
Still, the poor China-U.S. relationship makes both Washington and Beijing more comfortable pressing a harder line on Taiwan
despite the harm to Sino-American ties. In Washington’s view, Beijing has been challenging the status quo by
pushing more favorable interpretations of previous agreements, inducing other countries to isolate Taiwan, and excluding
Taiwanese participation from multinational efforts to manage global problems. U.S. officials have also complained about the
expanding PLA military activities in the island’s vicinity. In response, the United States, under both the Biden and Trump
administrations, has strived to deepen bilateral collaboration with Taiwan and widen its multilateral ties with U.S. allies and
partners. Though controversial, Biden seemed to acknowledge that the United States will do at least as much for Taiwan as it has for
Ukraine in the face of external aggression, leaving ambiguous whether U.S. forces would engage in actual combat operations .
Link---The plan drains diplomatic capital --- shifts time, resource AND focus
Powell ‘22 – Career member of the United States Foreign Service who served as Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Resources (2016-2017), U.S. Ambassador to
Mauritania (2010-2013), and Consul General in Frankfurt, Germany (2006-2009).(Jo Ellen Powell;
"Bringing America’s Multilateral Diplomacy into the 21st Century"; Academy of Diplomacy;
https://www.academyofdiplomacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Bringing-Americas-
Multilateral-Diplomacy-into-the-21st-Century-FINAL.pdf; 2-2022, Accessed 7-12-2022)//ILake-AZ
All of Secretary Blinken’s foreign policy priorities listed above have global impact and must be addressed in global fora. Is
it even
possible to consider a U.S. strategy for dealing with China that does not include a multilateral
diplomacy dimension? Establishing our priorities means putting resources to work on their
achievement – beginning with the time and focus of the Department’s senior leadership. And if, as
we believe, these urgent global issues can only be successfully addressed through multilateral
diplomacy, then we must devote more resources there as well.
To achieve priority U.S. foreign policy objectives in the coming decades, the Department will
need to strengthen its commitment to multilateral diplomacy at the policy and operational levels. This will
require sustained policy attention and guidance, trained and resourced staff, and clear
priorities. Yet, multilateral diplomacy cannot be executed in isolation. The U.S. conducts diplomacy with organizations, but also
with the member states of those organizations. Bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, therefore, must be
strategically coherent and complementary, even when advancing global priorities causes
occasional friction in bilateral relations.
The State Department’s policy orientation, training, and assignment incentives are heavily
weighted to bilateral, not multilateral, diplomacy. In contrast, many other countries prioritize multilateral
diplomacy, and their best diplomats often have extensive experience working in international organizations or serving in diplomatic
missions to them, particularly the UN and regional organizations such as the European Union or the African Union. U.S.
diplomats, on the other hand, may have highly successful careers without ever having served at a
mission to an international organization, much less in the governing body of an international
organization. Both career and non-career chiefs of missions to international organizations shared their concern that
members of their staffs did not receive recognition in terms of onward assignment, promotion, or performance awards for
the inherent difficulty and unique challenges of serving in a mission to an international
organization. This needs to change.
The Department of State should develop a cadre of staff that is adept and deeply experienced in negotiations at international fora;
understands how to work with and influence international organizations, their member states, and their staffs; and knows how to
reach out to other parts of the U.S. government or the American private and academic sectors for expertise on specific issues
relevant to dealing with multilateral challenges. Those serving in bilateral assignments are increasingly asked
to engage and seek support for multilateral projects and actions. Achieving success will require a
commitment to enhance training, encouragement and reward for assignments to international
organizations and multilateral missions, and the development of a core cadre of multilateral
expertise within the Foreign Service (FS) and the Department’s Civil Service (CS).
Biden containment of China through active diplomacy avoids a catastrophic

China war
Daniel Fazio 21, Ph. D, Lecturer in History and Politics at the University of South Australia,
“Containing China’s assertiveness with diplomacy,” Asia & The Pacific Policy Society,
06/21/2021, https://www.policyforum.net/containing-chinas-assertiveness-with-diplomacy/
Just as China was the crucial catalyst in the creation of this alliance system in 1951, the Biden Administration is
now responding to China’s assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific region, reaffirming this 70-year-old
regional alliance system.
For instance, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and South Korean President Moon Jae-In were the first two foreign heads of
government to meet with Biden in the White House, suggesting the administration regards this regional alliance as essential in
managing the China challenge.
Clearly, the Biden Administration also recognises

the limits of American power and is investing in
diplomacy and engagement to prevent conflict with China.
Active diplomacy between the United States and its regional allies may indeed be the best way to
constrain the belligerence of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s regime.
China is fully aware of the combined military power of the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, and the armed forces of
the Philippines, Australia, and possibly India and Indonesia could be added to this list. For all its assertive behaviour, Beijing
knows a military conflict would devastate the region.
Knowing it is unlikely to prevail in such a conflict could constrain China’s behaviour in the region
so, despite geostrategic tensions, reaffirming this American alliance system makes sense.
When this alliance system came into being, the United States and China were at war on the Korean Peninsula and engaged in a
standoff over Taiwan, and today, Taiwan and North Korea remain crucial factors in the geostrategic tensions between the two
states.
The United States has no option other than to push back in some way against Chinese posturing in
the region. Acquiescence to China could mean an irretrievable loss of American geostrategic
authority, international prestige, and trust among its allies.
This presents the middle powers of the region with a stark choice: support the United States and the democratic values it
represents, or gravitate into China’s authoritarian orbit.
Economic dependence on China weakens national sovereignty and could make countries like Australia increasingly vulnerable to
coercion, but it is hard to imagine America’s allies will acquiesce to pressure from China. Ultimately, America’s allies know
that if Beijing pushes too far, the United States will inevitably push back.
Engaging with its regional allies is the best way for the Biden Administration to avoid what Graham Allison calls
the ‘Thucydides trap’: the United States and China going to war because each fear the other
poses a real threat to their respective geostrategic interests.
Policymakers need to realise that the dangerof conflict between the United States and China is very real and, if
conflict does break out, it will involve America’s regional allies. Drums of war rhetoric – whatever its actual intent
– can have unintended consequences, and no one in the region wants conflict.
If war breaks out, it will be because of a miscalculation or faulty assumptions by one or both sides about the other’s intentions, and
regional allies should work with the Biden Administration to prevent this from happening.
As an authoritarian regime, China

is motivated by the acquisition, maintenance, and expansion of its
power, and the suppression of any alternative and contrary sources of power. As such, its posturing
must be challenged because it threatens the geostrategic interests of the United States and its regional
allies, including Australia.
Given the difficult situation, the Biden Administration’s reaffirmation of the country’s 70-year-old alliance system in
Asia through active diplomacy is a prudent response. In the face of the threat to regional stability posed by
Chinese assertiveness, this alliance system provides the United States and its allies with a strong
mechanism to contain China and avoid a disastrous conflict.
Link
1NC
1nc---Disunity
Differing threat perceptions fracture effective cohesion---political focus is key to
achieve collective action
NATO, '20 – (North Atlantic Treaty Organization; "NATO 2030: United for a New Era"; NATO;
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-
Final-Report-Uni.pdf; 11-25-2020, Accessed 7-14-2022)//ILake-AZ
It is against this backdrop of earlier, successful adaptations, as well as the long sustainment of a vibrant political dimension to its
work, that NATO
enters a new and very different strategic environment in the period from now to 2030. But
past adaptation is no guarantee of future success; to survive, and remain effective and relevant to the
needs of its members, NATO must again adapt to changing strategic circumstances.
In this new chapter of its existence, the foundational mission for NATO remains, as set out in the North Atlantic
Treaty, to ‘safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy,
individual liberty and the rule of law… to
promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area… [and]
to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.’ Nor
have the basic ingredients for this mission changed; they remain, as they were at the time of the Harmel Report, military strength
and political solidarity combined with pursuit of a long-term stable international environment.
Mustering the necessary cohesion to support these purposes is, however, likely to be both more important
and harder in the coming decade than it was in previous eras, not least because of the way different Allies
prioritise multiple threats. Where NATO faced one big threat in the Cold War and no peer competitor in
the immediate post-Cold War period, today it faces two systemic rivals, the enduring threat of terrorism,
instability along NATO’s southern periphery, a dramatically changing technological landscape,
numerous, vexing non-state threats, and man-made as well as natural risks. While these threats
reaffirm NATO’s enduring purpose, their very plurality, and the differing weight that Allies attach to each,
also makes the process of reaching consensus on priorities harder. Alongside this, there have at times
been tensions and differences over underlying values which contribute to strained relations
between Allies. Political divergences within NATO are dangerous because they enable external
actors, and in particular Russia and China, to exploit intra-Alliance differences and take advantage
of individual Allies in ways that endanger their collective interests and security. This includes actions
that are directly relevant to NATO’s traditional geographic and functional mission but also extends to the cyber,
technological, and strategic-commercial realms—and indeed, the democratic way of life. Without cohesion,
NATO’s Allies would face these challenges alone. And neither Europe nor North America, for all their strength, are powerful enough
to manage these threats alone, while also dealing with the growing array of non-traditional threats and risks that affect our
societies.
A drift toward NATO disunity, should it occur, must be seen as a strategic rather than merely tactical or optical problem. Should such
a trend be left unaddressed, it will place all NATO Allies, big and small, on much less favourable terms in the coming decade than
would otherwise be the case if they acted together. This
brings into sharper focus the central political task for
NATO in our time: to consolidate the transatlantic Alliance for an era of strategic simultaneity, in
which numerous interconnected threats face the Alliance at the same time. Such an environment will require NATO to build on the
increased political consultations that have taken place in the Alliance in recent years to make the North Atlantic Council the unique
and essential forum for consultation on the most important strategic issues, including major national-security developments, the
status of the threat, common security, and national-operational or capability-related decisions which have an impact on the Alliance
and its members.
Achieving this outcome will not be easy. Divergences

in threat perception cannot simply be wished away,
since they are an expression of a state’s own unique interests, geography, and national-political
outlook. But arriving at a convergence of political and strategic priorities is possible, necessary, and
entirely in keeping with the traditions of the Alliance. The history of NATO is defined by the determined pursuit of such
convergence—itself an inherently political act—by using strategy and statecraft to forge
compromises and enable common action in a way that serves the good of all Allies. Arriving at such
convergence, by maintaining not only the structures but the culture of proactive consultation whereby
differentials in threat assessment can be mitigated, has been the most important way that NATO and its leaders
have achieved cohesion, and remains the path to a strong NATO today.
The question of how NATO should go about this task of enhancing political cohesion and convergence for the challenges of a new
era is the principal subject of this report. A central contention is that, however challenging it may be to attain , NATO critically
needs political convergence on first order questions because the sheer scale of threats, and in particular the
simultaneous geopolitical and ideological challenge from Russia and China, portend consequences for the security and prosperity of
us all. In such a setting, NATO’s political responsibility, and opportunity, is truly immense – to remain the platform around which the
Alliance organises itself for an era of truly global challenges. Such a NATO would continue to be not only a protector of its core
region but a source of stability for an unstable world. Viewed in this light, the hard work of achieving cohesion, which
can often seem cumbersome and frustrating, is a trifle in comparison to the benefits that accrue from it.
2NC-- Generic
2nc – link wall-- general
The plan requires expending significant diplomatic resources to guarantee allied
buy-in
Justin V. Anderson & Jeffrey A. Larsen 13, “Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance: Key
Concepts and Current Challenges for U.S. Policy,” INSS Occasional Paper, September 2013,
https://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/OCP69.pdf
First, the Healey Theorem demonstrates that the requirements of assurance and extended deterrence for a discrete set of allies and
their potential adversaries may differ markedly despite the fact the parties involved in both sets of strategies are the same. The
United States may find, as it did with NATO allies during the Cold War, that the resources allies request for the purposes of
assurance (whether measured in geopolitical capital, military force, or both) are greater – sometimes much greater – than the
resources U.S. policymakers and strategists believe are required to deter their potential adversaries. However, for allies
convinced they face an immediate, existential threat (such as a non- nuclear state bordering a belligerent
nuclear power), the apparent failure of the United States to recognize the magnitude of their situation can raise serious doubts
about the credibility of Washington as a security partner. As such, without necessarily adopting the allied position, it is
important for the United States to recognize these “gaps” and respond with diplomatic or military
means to address allied concerns, putting to rest any significant doubts held by their governments
that the United States is not prepared to offer a credible strategy for their defense.
The differing requirements of U.S. extended deterrence and allied assurance strategies represents a permanent challenge for U.S.
policymakers, strategists, and planners attempting to design and implement these strategies on a global scale. Balancing
competing allied demands with finite resources was often a difficult task during the Cold War, leading
directly to the types of inter-alliance debates observed by Healey in the late 1960s. During the Cold War and afterward,
the solution to this challenge generally required the United States to field a mix of military forces and engage in
diplomatic offensives designed to convince foreign parties that U.S. extended deterrence and
allied assurance strategies, however designed, were backed by a politically resolute military superpower
prepared to use immediately available resources and bring to bear additional forces located in
CONUS on behalf of its allies.
The Healy Theorem also points to a second challenge that stems directly from U.S.-allied consultations on deterrence issues. The United States recognizes it is critically important to work with its allies on extended
deterrence matters (and that these discussions are themselves critically important to allied assurance). Giving U.S. allies a “vote” on extended deterrence issues, however, also gives them an ability to exercise a
“veto” on associated plans and strategies. This can complicate or even abrogate these strategies, and can cause serious problems within a broader alliance that depends on all members providing political and
military support to implementing these strategies.
One key example of a breakdown in an alliance relationship over questions of extended deterrence was New Zealand’s decision to become “nuclear free” in 1984. New Zealand had long represented both a
staunch ally of the United States and a country that sought inclusion beneath the U.S. nuclear umbrella extended over close allies in the Asia- Pacific. Together with the United States and Australia, New Zealand
signed the ANZUS Treaty in 1951, confirming a common defense pact between the three countries. For most of the Cold War, Washington and Auckland cooperated closely on a range of regional defense and
national security matters. In 1984, however, New Zealand elected a Labour government whose campaign platform included a pledge to make the country “nuclear free,” a policy that would include denying port
access to any U.S. naval vessel capable of carrying nuclear weapons barring a guarantee from Washington that the vessel in question free of nuclear warheads. The United States, which for security reasons did not
“confirm or deny” the presence of nuclear weapons on any ship capable of carrying them, refused to accede to this request (which it did not receive from Australia or any other ally under its nuclear umbrella). In
subsequent bilateral discussions, New Zealand’s political leadership stated they hoped to retain defense ties with the United States, but not at the cost of its “no nuclear” policy. The United States insisted that
nuclear deterrence, and a willingness to support nuclear forces, was critical to the ANZUS relationship. The impasse led the Reagan administration to state in 1985 that New Zealand had failed to meet its alliance
obligations and U.S. defense and deterrence guarantees no longer applied to the country.174
The two countries would later mend fences and even resume some forms of defense cooperation, but it was twenty-six years before the United States officially allowed New Zealand naval vessels to visit U.S.
ports.175 The breaking of the ANZUS compact demonstrates how differences over extended deterrence can cause enough friction that the overall defense and diplomatic relationship between the two countries is
damaged. It illustrates that a principle that is central to the Healy Theorem – a certain level of tension will always exist between a nuclear- armed superpower and its allies. While the United States and other
members of NATO (France, as noted above, being an important exception) were able to iron over most of their differences, the suspension of the U.S.-New Zealand alliance demonstrates that decades of close
cooperation with an ally do not necessarily guarantee that U.S. bilateral or alliance relationships will survive disagreements related to extended deterrence or assurance strategies.176
From the end of the Second World War to the present day, many U.S. allies have generally (if sometimes reluctantly) accepted U.S. leadership in regard to alliance policymaking and strategizing. This reflects the
fact that the United States represents the strongest member within a defense pact. Furthermore, many U.S. allies believe their defense requirements exceed what they can independently develop or afford; they
depend on their alliance with the United States to meet their remaining needs. As a result, many U.S. allies rely on U.S. extended deterrence and assurance strategies to guarantee their national defense. Over
time, these U.S. strategies – and the forces associated with them, particularly if deployed on an ally’s home territory – often become part of an ally’s long-term foreign policy and defense planning.
As a result, once the general strategy for its assurance, and the extension of deterrence to its key adversaries, is established between the United States and a foreign ally, the latter often proves resistant to any
significant change to either. Allied objections stem from concerns that any changes imply an alteration in the U.S. political resolve or military capabilities that are critical for their defense against foreign
adversaries. Many allies are well aware, for example, that foreign deployments are frequently a target on Capitol Hill; both during the Cold War and afterward, Senators reviewing the U.S. defense budget have
perennially pressed for allies to shoulder a greater share of the burden for their defense. In addition, although conflicts and contingencies have occasionally raised the number of U.S. troops posted overseas, in
general over the past 20 years the United States has slowly but perceptibly reduced the numbers of forces permanently stationed abroad.
As a result, any
change to U.S. strategies, regardless of how these changes are depicted, may lead
allies to question whether their status has somehow changed within the eyes of U.S. leaders. Allies
may wonder if their defense concerns are still important to Washington; if they are surprised or unprepared
by a shift in U.S. policy or strategy, they may conclude their views on these changes were not considered or deemed important.
Changes in the U.S. military capabilities deployed in-country or in-theater may also raise issues for allies, as
many are unable to replace these forces using resources available to their own militaries.
In addition, allies resist change because many have an acute sense that U.S. extended deterrence and assurance strategies operate
within a complex network of political relationships at the domestic, regional, and international levels – and as a result, any
changes to these strategies can cascade throughout the entire system , often with negative
impacts for their own country (or political regime, in cases where these strategies touch on sensitive local issues). They prefer
maintenance of the status quo over changes that may give rise to some uncertainty – whether in their own country, in
the minds of adversaries, or both – regarding whether the United States remains a reliable and predictable security partner.
Perception---focusing on a particular issue saps diplomatic capital

Stephen Walt 01, Professor of International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, “Beyond Bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy.”
International Security, vol. 26, no. 3, 2001, pp. 56–78. JSTOR,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092089/adamL
Concerns about the U.S. role are not confined to the Arab or Islamic world, however .
Throughout the 1990s, Russia, China, and
India accused the United States of ignoring their interests and trying to impose its own
preferences on the rest of the world.9 Such worries led Russia and China to negotiate a friendship treaty in July 2001, which one
Russian commentator described as an "act of friendship against America."10 Even traditional U.S. allies have been
concerned about the concentration of power in U.S. hands and Washington's pen- chant for
unilateralism, and they have searched for ways to constrain U.S. freedom of action.1l Although many
of these countries appreciate the stabilizing effects of the global presence of the United States, they resent Washington's tendency to impose its will on
others and worry that it will use its power unwisely. 12 These concerns did not vanish when the twin towers fell. Although the United States has
enjoyed considerable international sympathy in the aftermath of the September attacks, international support has not been unconditional, and key
U.S. allies have made it clear that they wanted the U.S. response to be restrained. U.S. allies were
especially concerned that the United States would seize this opportunity to attack Iraq, and a group of heads of state from the European Union
emphasized that the U.S. response would have to be "proportional." Similarly, the NATO decision to invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty, thereby
identifying the September 11 events as an attack on all NATO members, was accompanied by European insistence that the United States consult with
its allies before taking action.13 This
lesson also warns us not to exaggerate the depth of international sup-
port that the United States presently enjoys. Other states have backed the United States because they agree that terrorism is
a threat and because Washington has made it clear that neutrality is not an option, but also because they see this crisis as an opportunity to advance
their own interests. Thus, Russia has sought to strike a deal over missile defense and gain U.S. acquiescence to its own campaign against Islamic
"terrorists" in Chechnya, Pakistan has gained important economic concessions, and Uzbekistan has bargained for a security guarantee. But support
for U.S. policy in Afghanistan does not mean that other states are comfortable with U.S. power
or that they agree with the United States on other issues.14 If U.S. leaders assume that the
current surge in international support will enable them to ignore the interests of other states
in the future, they will squander the diplomatic capital that the United States now enjoy.
Resolving NATO disunity on emerging tech requires political attention

GLOBSEC, '22 – GLOBSEC’s Security and Defence Council ("Adaptive Portfolio: Catalysing
NATO’s Performance Through Innovation"; GLOBSEC;
https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Adaptive-Portfolio-GLOBSEC-Report-
on-Catalyzing-NATO%E2%80%99s-Performance-Through-Innovation-report-ver8-spreads.pdf;
3-5-2022, Accessed 7-14-2022)//ILake-AZ
Finally, systemic
competition and the rise of geoeconomics dynamise the breakdown of inter-alliance
consensus over strategic priorities. Systemic competition aggravates existing divergences among alliance members.
While defending values, ensuring the integrity of borders, fending-off aggressors and handling international crises all remain
important NATO tasks, the rise of geoeconomics amid grand systemic competition gives these tasks a different geospatial twist.
Toxic connectivity in areas not traditionally associated with deterrence and defence – such as
diverging US and European approaches to developing and regulating emerging technologies4 –
adds new centrifugal disputes which degrade NATO’s ability to find consensus. This, in turn, suggests that the call for
collective defence, which is growing louder across NATO member states, must not lead to refocusing on “territorial frontiers,” but
should emphasize “domain frontiers” and investments in “forward resilience” to support its partners instead.5
Critical to NATO’s continued credibility as the bulwark of Euro- Atlantic security will be its ability to enhance its performance with
respect to this triple challenge vector. A key catalyst already identified by NATO policymakers is the Allied ability to innovate to
maintain an edge over strategic challengers and offer political and military decision-makers the capabilities to enhance decisive
action.6 Innovation is not new to the Alliance as the broad set of activities performed by NATO’s Allied Command Transformation
(ACT) since the early 2000s suggests. In 2021, however, NATO allies endorsed the Defence Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA)
and the NATO Innovation Fund (NIF) as two additional instruments that empower the Alliance to stand up to tomorrow’s
challenges.7 NATO’s ability to catalyse its performance through innovation will be critical for the
credibility of its political leadership, the effectiveness and interoperability of its military
organisation and its industrial ability to reliably deliver the Alliance a technological edge into the
foreseeable future:
Performance is key to political credibility. In a political environment that becomes increasingly fluid and is
characterised by shifting priorities, the ability to compete in the long game is essential. This requires a strategic culture
and core principles that embrace informed risk-taking to shape the global strategic environment and repel aggressive behavior and
concepts that enable NATO to seize opportunities and persist over long periods of complex uncertainty. It is on this ground that
Allies will be tested to devote the necessary political attention and leadership to outline what
they want, build the ecosystem needed to bring a heterogeneous community of public and private stakeholders together and
provide adequate funding to maintain collective innovation endeavours.
2nc link—cooperation
Plan saps diplomatic capital
Bergmann and Schmitt, Center for American Progress Senior Fellow and Senior
Policy Analyst, 2021, (Max and Alexandra, "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,"
Center for American Progress, 3-9, PAS) https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-
u-s-security-assistance/
The net effect is that U.S. foreign policy is less coherent, with Pentagon policy more likely to be out of sync with broader foreign
policy concerns. For example, the DOD’s U.S. Africa Command posture review is being conducted with little to no coordination with
the State Department, and the rumored outcome is to call for reduced U.S. presence and security investments in order to free up
DOD resources to focus on competition with Russia and China.64 Yet the United States still has serious security and geopolitical
interests in the continent that are likely not reflected in traditional military-only decision-making. Rachel Stohl, managing director at
the Stimson Center, warned that developing military-to-military security assistance programs is “an
important relationship, one that should be cultivated, but it is not separate from the diplomatic and
foreign policy relationships that have to be developed and take time. If you lose the foreign
policy piece and just focus on the security piece, you’re doing a disservice to the larger strategic
objectives.”65 The siloed security assistance system leads to disjointed U.S. foreign policy, divorces security
concerns from broader economic or diplomatic concerns, and can end up promoting militarized
solutions.
Security cooperation priorities trade off with other regional initiatives

Albert Zaccor 05, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, “Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats:
A Call for an Integrated Strategy,” The Atlantic Council, August 2005,
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46290/2005_08_Security_Cooperation_and_Non-
State_Threats.pdf
Moreover, executive branch departments and agencies lack a common set of regional and country-
specific Security Cooperation objectives and do not operate according to the same set of
priorities. For example, State and Defense are two of the most significant players in Security Cooperation. DOS controls Security
Assistance -- including Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, the
largest sources of funds DOD uses to execute its Security Cooperation activities. DOS requests funds from Congress and allocates
resources to DOD based on its own assessment of foreign policy requirements, which do not always agree with DOD’s. OSD carefully
lays out the strategic rationale for its Security Cooperation plans in its Security Cooperation guidance, but DOS officials are free to
ignore or accept the contents of this guidance as they like.119 Likewise, DOD
and its subordinate organizations
painstakingly prioritize countries and regions to guide allocation of Security Cooperation
resources, but the Department of State has its own priorities, which do not always coincide.120
The lack of baseline strategic guidance to govern the planning, programming, and execution of
Security Cooperation activities has resulted in the classic failures of an “administered policy.”
According to Barry Posen, administered policies prevail in democracies as political leaders trade off initiatives that
might be effective in one area against costs measured in terms of other agendas, values, and policies.121 The
result is bureaucratic politics and competition for resources and policy attention. To avoid the pitfalls of an
administered policy the USG must develop a combined approach that brings together all the stakeholders, assigns responsibilities,
and requires integrated planning.122 A document or set of documents, under the signature of the President or the National Security
Council will be required to provide sufficient authority to require and compel interagency cooperation in crafting and implementing
integrated Security Cooperation strategies.
Tech cooperation is burdensome and trades off with other forms of cooperation
Goodman and Roberts 21 (Matthew P. Goodman and Brooke Roberts, “Toward a T12
Putting Allied Technology Cooperation into Practice,” CSIS, October 2021,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/toward-t12-putting-allied-technology-cooperation-practice) - LH
Putting these cooperative efforts into practice will be more challenging than agreeing to them on paper. While
the members of these various groupings espouse democratic values and a commitment to multilateralism, each brings to
the table a distinct philosophy and approach to technology development and digital
governance. The European Union, for example, considers personal data privacy a fundamental human right, deserving of
thorough protection under law and regulation. The United States, by contrast, is in the midst of a roiling debate about the
appropriate balance between data privacy and the use of data for commercial, national security, and other purposes that may be at
odds with individual privacy. In the area of standard
setting for new technologies, most countries take a
top-down, government-led approach, while in the U.S. case, this work is led by the private
sector. More broadly, views on the appropriate balance between market mechanisms and state
intervention, or between free trade and protection of domestic producers, vary widely among potential members
of a technology alliance. These differences in philosophy and approach produce different forms of law,
regulation, and policy across a potential T12 that will be difficult to reconcile in practice.
Moreover, while the United States and its allies share many values and interests, they are also economic
competitors. U.S., European, and Asian companies compete globally for profits and market shares. Their willingness to
collaborate only goes as far as will benefit them commercially, or as far as government
incentives can sway them to collaborate through subsidies or other incentives. And for political, national security, and
other reasons, governments naturally prioritize the interests of their own companies over those in other
countries. In addition to impeding collaboration, national efforts to promote onshore production in critical technologies
could lead to redundancy and global overcapacity.
This leads to a final set of challenges: organization of allied efforts. Committing to cooperation in a
press release is one thing; follow-through is far more difficult. Working groups will need to have the right structure,
participants, and agenda. Leadership and accountability are critical, with clear points of contact and processes of decisionmaking
within and among governments. These organizational challenges will be especially difficult in a loose, fluid
technology alliance in which there may be differences over who should be at the table (not just countries but
government agencies, private-sector representatives, and others); which sectors and technologies should be prioritized; and what
kind of practical cooperation is appropriate. Moreover, it will be important to ensure that new allied efforts do not
duplicate or disrupt existing technology collaborations.
Setting Priorities
The effectiveness of any technology alliance will depend on prioritization. Allies cannot work
together on every new technology or address every issue that either enables or impedes
cooperation. They will have to make choices, particularly on two questions: Which technologies are most critical for
—and amenable to—allied cooperation? And where along the chain of technology development are the
greatest opportunities for—and obstacles to—allied cooperation?
2nc link—focus
Plan requires significant diplomatic resources---NATO’s transactional and
requires active focus to secure buy-in and satiate rising expectations
Tomáš Valášek 19, was director of Carnegie Europe and a senior fellow, “Conclusion,” in New
Perspectives on Shared Security: NATO’s Next 70 Years, Carnegie Europe, 11/28/2019,
https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/11/28/conclusion-pub-80445
The first is interrelation: by pursuing one of the paths of adaptation laid out in this collection, it might become
more difficult for NATO to address a different challenge. This is a problem not necessarily of resources
but of specialization. It may turn out, for example, that it is too much to expect NATO to signal
readiness for a high-tech, high-intensity war in order to deter a peer adversary in one part of the
world while also making friends elsewhere with a state that has a pacifist mindset—as desirable and important as that partnership
might be. In athletics, one can be either a sprinter or a long-distance runner, but not both.
Financial and diplomatic

resources may become an issue, too. That brings us to the second problem: will
member states muster the collective will and patience to execute the adaptations outlined here?
The most immediate risk is a rupture in U.S.-European relations. With the passage of time, it has become too easy
to forget that the U.S. commitment to the European security order in 1949 was an eminently realist, self-interested choice: it was a
move that not only immensely benefited Europe but also helped the United States as much as its allies. (The same can be said of U.S.
support for the multilateral order writ large.)
All U.S. leaders pursue American greatness first, but wise ones recognize that this need not be at the expense of others. For
evidence, reflect back on NATO’s first seventy years. Findings strongly suggest that the U.S. public is in favor of recommitting to the
alliance.3And the conditions that led the United States to agree to NATO’s creation in 1949 have, if anything, been reasserting
themselves. Law and order in international relations are in slow retreat, and in the words of American historian Robert Kagan, the
“jungle is growing back.”4
Another, less often discussed challenge to the alliance’s ability to adapt is its gradual relegation to
the margins of key capitals’ interest and attention. After all, most military alliances of the past did not go out with
a bang; they fizzled.
Whether NATO follows suit depends, in great part, on how it manages the diversity of interests among
its members. Since the demise of the unifying Soviet threat, allies have inevitably come to different conclusions
about their primary defense worries. Geography and history are central factors once again. The essays here offer a fairly
representative swath of the broad spectrum of concerns on member states’ minds.
This fragmentation has been partly obscured by the popular narrative of NATO as an institution committed to a changing yet single
mission. That mission is said to have ranged from deterring, and defending against, the Soviets until 1991 to reunifying Europe and
stabilizing the Western Balkans in the 1990s to fighting terrorism after 2001—and back to deterrence and defense since 2014, this
time vis-à-vis Russia. This narrative is only partly true, in the sense that since the end of the Cold War, these tasks have taken turns
in garnering more newspaper headlines than other activities that NATO was carrying out at the same time.
However, the most consequential change may have been not in the nature of the dominant task but in the way that each successive
focus has had to compete harder with other, multiplying jobs on NATO’s to-do list. And while Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine in
2014 refocused minds somewhat on collective defense, the near simultaneous emergence of the self-proclaimed Islamic State in
Syria and Iraq and the subsequent migration crisis have ensured that the Eastern and Southern flanks both occupy NATO. The
alliance has truly become different things to different people.
The allies
have responded by becoming more transactional in their relationships with each other. They all
remain interested in having recourse to outside help, at some point in time, from the rest of the alliance.
So they assist each other, still out of a sense of shared community but also—and increasingly—as part of an implied
bargain, in which they help each other to increase the probability of receiving aid in return in the
future.
This blend of idealism and pragmatism sounds crude, but it has worked well in practice. It may continue to serve NATO well for a
long time, assuming that three conditions are met. First, NATO needs the means to deal with the full spectrum of contingencies that
the allies expect it to address. The alliance’s ability to specialize in multiple areas at the same time, as discussed above, may yet
prove difficult.
The second, closely related condition is that the alliance pays roughly equal attention to the different worries that occupy national
capitals. All allies need to feel that the rest of NATO takes their concerns seriously.
Plan locks in US diplomatic focus with NATO

Moreover, countries that receive U.S. military systems are not just buying equipment off the shelf;
they are entering into a longer-term relationship with that country for training, maintenance,
and sustainment. This is similar to when a consumer buys a smart phone, as they are not simply buying a
piece of hardware; they are reliant on the company to access its broader ecosystem of apps and software
and trusting the company to safeguard important data. Over time, a consumer becomes locked in and dependent on a particular
provider. Similarly, when
a state commits to expanding military-to-military ties—often the most sensitive area
for a country—they are making a diplomatic bet on that country. As they base their military on U.S.
equipment and U.S. training and engagement, they similarly become locked in to the United States. This
sets the ground for more productive American partnerships to tackle a range of geopolitical challenges. For example, U.S. security
assistance has been key to building ties with Vietnam after the war between the two countries. American assistance provided to
clear unexploded ordnance has helped repair diplomatic relations between Hanoi and Washington, while the recent provision of a
retired Coast Guard ship to the Vietnam military can help strengthen military ties and potentially open the door to more U.S.
assistance and security cooperation, which will further strengthen bilateral relations.8
2nc link—Time Tradeoff
There isn’t enough time to fulfill all diplomatic goals
Elhai et al. 21 – Wren Elhai, foreign service officer since 2011. Marta Churella, civil servant
since 2007. Naima Green-Riley, political scientist, Atlantic Council nonresident fellow, and
former foreign service officer 2010–2015. Amirah Ismail, foreign service officer since 2011.
Graham Lampa, director of digital and data at Atlantic Council and former civil servant 2009–
2018. Molly Moran, faculty at Miami University of Ohio and former civil servant 2010–2019. Jeff
Ridenour, foreign service officer since 2011. Dan Spokojny, CEO, fp21 and former foreign service
officer 2009–2016. Megan Tetrick, foreign service officer since 2008. (“Upgrading US public
diplomacy: A new approach for the age of memes and disinformation,” Atlantic Council.
September 15th, 2021. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/
upgrading-us-public-diplomacy/) Edgemont PF
While those goals and activities remain in place, public

diplomacy tools have been deployed against an
additional range of complex threats. Some public diplomacy programs today seek to convince people to counter violent
extremism in their communities, reduce greenhouse-gas emissions in their businesses, and spread accurate public-health
information. Public diplomacy professionals design programs to build resilience to disinformation and spread media literacy and
intergroup tolerance, countering the hatred that can spread quickly on new digital platforms. We also increasingly design public
diplomacy programs to create spaces to engage in dialogue with foreign audiences, and to build networks of people who share US
values.
That is a lot to handle. And what we hear consistently from our colleagues in the field and in Washington is that
there isn’t enough time to do it all as it should be done. Existing training and tools aren’t
adequate to balance these competing missions while meeting increasing standards of rigor and evidence-driven
policy. Meanwhile, scarce staff time and resources in public diplomacy sections are often consumed by
ancillary functions that support other diplomatic activities. Thanks to their specialized training in grant management, public
diplomacy personnel are often pressed into service to administer embassy small grants and other assistance programs. Public
diplomacy events create opportunities for conversations with highly placed political and economic contacts. Exchanges reward some
of the mission’s best contacts. Public-facing platforms offer customer-service information to clients of consular and commercial
sections. Public diplomacy personnel take photos and videos that help illustrate the value of overseas diplomatic work to domestic
audiences. They sometimes assist in crafting speeches, even for non-public events.
Too often, these activitiesare done reactively, in response to demands from Washington offices, post leadership, or even
host-country requests, and not as a part of a clear vision of how to best utilize limited resources (and they
are always limited) to greatest effect in advancing US strategic goals and interests. Where will our efforts have the most impact, and
is that where they are directed? The answer, unfortunately, is often a vague argument based on anecdotes and perhaps a few sparse
numbers. This can be done better. Doing better means listening more to the practitioners out in the field, to those interacting
directly with the audiences we want to reach. The State Department can develop a more focused approach that allows it to really
utilize the best resource it has—its people—and helps make their work more efficient and effective.
2nc—dip cap k2 negotiations
Diplomatic capacity is the most important determining factor of negotiations
Stanzel and Voelsen 22 (Volker Stanzel and Daniel Voelsen, Stanzel is a retired German diplomat and
the former ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to Japan and China as well as former Political Director. Since 2015 he
works and publishes on political topics in Berlin, Germany. Dr. Daniel Voelsen works on issues at the intersection of technology and
foreign policy. In his capacity as head of the Global Issues Division, Daniel Voelsen also engages with the conceptual debates on
conflict and cooperation in the global order.
“Diplomacy and Artificial Intelligence,” SWP Research Paper,
January 2022,
https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2022RP01_Diplomacy_and
_AI.pdf) - LH
The fundamental considerations on the relationship between negotiations on the one hand and the use of
force on the other point to the most important criterion for the course and outcome of
negotiations: the power resources a state can bring to bear in the negotiations or directly. In their current
form, states are bound by the norms of international law. However, there is no global authority equipped with sufficient means of
coercion to punish violations of such norms, despite the general prohibition of the use of force codified in Article 2 of the UN
Charter. The assertiveness of a state is not synonymous with its military or economic strength.4
Rather, it is the function of material means, technical know-how, institutional diplomatic capacities and
capabilities, the international and national environment, and the possibility of sudden changes. Negotiation and the
possibility of using coercive measures in diplomatic dealings go hand in hand as a result of a cost-
benefit analysis that governments have to carry out continuously.5 Consequently, with regard to the negotiating
parties, an evaluation of the power resources at the other side’s disposal becomes the first
criterion for assessing the course of a negotiation process
Diplomacy needed to get countries on board

What worked for U.S. foreign policy in the post-war 20th century will not work nearly as well in the remaining decades of the 21st
century. The U.S. remains the most significant global actor, but other states, particularly China, have
enhanced their sources of national power and expanded their global influence. Meanwhile, technology
is driving the global economy and making new weapons of coercion and war available to more nations . The U.S. no longer
dominates technological innovation, although it remains first among equals. And the natural world is no longer part of
the background but is signaling through pandemics and climate change that it, not nations, may be the most disruptive force to the
international order in the 21st century, and beyond.
The changing geopolitical, technological, and natural world will present sustained challenges to
U.S. national security as well as to the wellbeing and prosperity of the American people. Some of these challenges
will be familiar ones, such as dealing with China as a competitive great power, but others will be
novel and perhaps truly existential threats, such as the cascading impacts of climate change. Few of these
challenges will be responsive to a military solution, but will require sustained, innovative, and skilled U.S.
diplomacy; diplomacy that anticipates challenges, marshals international support for U.S.
positions, and builds collaborative relationships and agreements to produce outcomes
consistent with U.S. interests and values.
2NC—Specific Links
2nc link---AI
European divergence from the US on AI means coop leads to conflict within the
alliance – estrangement, European autonomy, and diverging ethical ideals
Franke 21 (Ulrike Esther Franke, Dr. Ulrike Franke is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign
Relations (ECFR). She leads ECFR’s Technology and European Power initiative. Her areas of focus include German and European
security and defence, the future of warfare, and the impact of new technologies such as drones and artificial intelligence on
“ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI,”
geopolitics and warfare.
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2021,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep29123.pdf?refreqid=excelsior
%3A2482542bac8c719503d7a311e5056983&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1) - LH
Obstacles to cooperation Both sides of the Atlantic are already motivated to cooperate with each other on AI. But,
despite these shared interests, transatlantic cooperation on AI may not be straightforward . Four
trends, in particular, could pose problems: transatlantic estrangement; European digital autonomy efforts; differing views on China;
and, potentially, Brexit.
Transatlantic estrangement The transatlantic alliance has had a bad four years. The Trump
administration’s criticism of the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, the president’s threats to leave NATO, and his
active criticism of the EU all made Europeans wonder whether they had lost their most important partner. Moreover, in light of the
the minds of many Europeans, technology in particular has become an area
conflict over 5G, in
that creates conflict in the transatlantic relationship rather than fostering cooperation .
Although transatlantic relations are likely to improve under Biden, substantial damage has been done, and it will take some time to
mend these ties. But, even
if relations improve, it is becoming increasingly obvious that US has a
diminishing interest in Europe as a geopolitically important part of the world. This trend was already visible
under Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama. It is, therefore, unsurprising that, on technology cooperation, both sides emphasise the
importance of working with other actors as well as each other. The US National Security Commission on AI, for example,
recommends that the US Departments of State and Defense “should negotiate formal AI cooperation agreements with Australia,
India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam”. Its March 2020 report emphasises on several occasions the importance of
the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. Meanwhile, Europeans are pursuing the idea of an alliance for multilateralism. And, on technology
and AI more specifically, they have also begun to reach out to other democratic allies.
European digital autonomy The most important aspect of transatlantic estrangement, however, is not the loss of trust between the
US and Europe – which they will eventually reverse. Rather, during the four years of the Trump administration, and partly in
response to isolationist tendencies in the US, Europeans have become much more comfortable talking about
European strategic autonomy or sovereignty. Without encouraging the narrative that these efforts are directed
against the US, or were primarily an answer to Trump, Europeans aim to empower Europe as an actor in its
own right. In the technological realm, this led to the idea of European digital sovereignty , the aim
of which is to build up European technological capabilities. Although European digital sovereignty is not specifically targeted at the
US, it has led, among other things, to efforts such as the possible regulation of American technology
companies and concerns over American firms acquiring European start-ups. European campaigners and some policymakers believe
US tech giants such as Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon are forces to protect against .
European thinking on
technology partly developed in opposition to the US and US companies. Thus, European efforts to build
up digital sovereignty may impede transatlantic cooperation.
The EU’s effort

to strengthen ethical AI, and to make ‘trustworthy AI’ a unique selling point for Europe,
might also end up creating problems for transatlantic cooperation. Many EU policymakers believe that the
EU’s insistence on ethical AI will eventually become a location advantage for Europe (much like data privacy): as more people
become concerned about unethical AI and data security, they will prefer to use or buy AI ‘made in Europe’ rather than elsewhere. In
this respect, two European aims are at odds with each other: on the one hand , Europeans want to ensure that AI is
developed and used in an ethical way. Partnering with a powerful player such as the US on this matter should be an
obvious way to help them achieve this goal. However, if the EU considers ethical AI not just a goal for humanity but a
development that may also create commercial advantages for Europe, then transatlantic
cooperation on this issue is counterproductive, as it would undermine Europe’s uniqueness.
Finally, many Europeans have expressed scepticism about the extent to which Europe and the US
are indeed aligned on ethical AI principles. For example, the Danish national AI strategy argues for a common ethical
and human-centred basis for AI. It describes ethical AI as a particularly European approach: “Europe and Denmark should not copy
the US or China. Both countries are investing heavily in artificial intelligence, but with little regard for responsibility, ethical principles
and privacy.” Many Europeans feel that the US “has no idea how to regulate ” cyberspace and
continues to show little enthusiasm for doing so. The EU, however, likes to think of itself as a trailblazer when it comes to digital
rights, such as the 2014 “right to be forgotten” or the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation.
Differing approaches to AI within NATO guarantee norm-setting is burdensome

Heikkilä 21 (MELISSA HEIKKILÄ, Senior Reporter for AI at MIT Technology Review, “NATO
wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics: Big differences over how
to treat autonomous weapons could undermine NATO’s drive,” Politico, 3/29/2021,
https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/) - LH
On paper, NATO is the ideal organization to go about setting standards for military applications of
artificial intelligence. But the widely divergent priorities and budgets of its 30 members could get
in the way.
The Western military alliance has identified artificial intelligence as a key technology needed to maintain an edge over adversaries, and it wants to lead the way in establishing common ground rules for its use.
“We need each other more than ever. No country alone or no continent alone can compete in this era of great power competition,” NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană, the alliance’s second in command, said in an interview with POLITICO.
The standard-setting effort comes as China is pressing ahead with AI applications in the military largely free of democratic oversight.
David van Weel, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, said Beijing's lack of concern with the tech's ethical implications has sped along the integration of AI into the military apparatus.
"I'm ... not sure that they're having the same debates on principles of responsible use or they're definitely not applying our democratic values to these technologies,” he said.
Meanwhile, the EU — which has pledged to roll out the world's first binding rules on AI in coming weeks — is seeking closer collaboration with Washington to oversee emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. But those efforts have been slow in getting off the ground.
For Geoană, that collaboration will happen at NATO, which is working closely with the European Union as it prepares AI regulation focusing on “high risk” applications.
The pitch NATO does not regulate, but “once NATO sets a standard, it becomes in terms of defensive security the gold standard in that respective field,” Geoană said.
The alliance's own AI strategy, to be released before the summer, will identify ways to operate AI systems responsibly, identify military applications for the technology, and provide a “platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it's up to NATO standards,” van Weel said.
The strategy will also set ethical guidelines around how to govern AI systems, for example by ensuring systems can be shut down by a human at all times, and to maintain accountability by ensuring a human is responsible for the actions of AI systems.
“If an adversary would use autonomous AI powered systems in a way that is not compatible with our values and morals, it would still have defense implications because we would need to defend and deter against those systems,” van Weel said.
“We need to be aware of that and we need to flag legislators when we feel that our restrictions are coming into the realm of [being detrimental to] our defense and deterrence,” he continued.
Mission impossible?
The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking
about AI in the military context.
The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in
Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense
and military implications in their national AI strategies.
“It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy," but the Europeans
"did
it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations,
said:
That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over
defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly.
The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping
citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently.
There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop , including lethal
autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human
control.
Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and
oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have expressed serious
concerns about the technology.
These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human
rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 called for a ban .
AI hampers alliance decision making—strains diplomacy

Lin-Greenberg 20 (Erik Lin-Greenberg, Lin-Greenberd is a Leo Marx Career Development
Assistant Professor in the History and Culture of Science & Technology, “Allies and Artificial
Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making,” Texas National Security Review, vol
3, no 2, Spring 20, https://tnsr.org/2020/03/allies-and-artificial-intelligence-obstacles-to-
operations-and-decision-making/) - LH
Drawing from theories of alliance politics and analysis of emerging AI technologies, I map out two
areas where AI could
hamper multinational military operations. First, AI could pose challenges to operational coordination
by complicating burden-sharing and the interoperability of multinational forces. Not all alliance or
coalition members will possess AI capabilities, raising barriers to military cooperation as AI-enabled warfare becomes increasingly
common. States with AI technologies will also need to overcome political barriers to sharing the
sensitive data required to develop and operate AI-enabled systems. At the same time, rivals can stymie multinational coordination
by using AI to launch deception campaigns aimed at interfering with an alliance’s military command-and-control processes.
Second, AIcould hamper alliance and coalition decision-making by straining the processes and
relationships that undergird decisions on the use of force. By increasing the speed of warfare, AI could
decrease the time leaders, from the tactical to strategic levels, have to debate policies and make
decisions. These compressed timelines may not allow for the complex negotiations and
compromises that are defining characteristics of alliance politics.10 Decision-making may be
further hampered if the “black box” and unexplainable nature of AI causes leaders to lack confidence
in AI-enabled systems. And, just as adversaries could use AI to interfere with command and control, they could also use AI to
launch misinformation campaigns that sow discord among allies and heighten fears that allies will renege on their commitments.
Litany of issues with AI norm-setting guarantees long term diplomatic

challenges
Rainie and Anderson and Vogels 21 (LEE RAINIE, JANNA ANDERSON AND EMILY A.
VOGELS, Lee Rainie is the director of internet and technology research at Pew Research Center. He is a graduate of Harvard
University and has a master’s degree in political science from Long Island University. Janna Anderson is a professor of
communications and Director of the Imagining the Internet Center at Elon University. Emily A. Vogels is a research associate focusing
“Worries about developments in AI,” Pew Research
on internet and technology at Pew Research Center.
Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/06/16/1-worries-about-developments-in-
ai/) - LH
It would be quite difficult – some might say impossible – to design broadly adopted ethical AI
systems. A share of the experts responding noted that ethics are hard to define, implement and
enforce. They said context matters when it comes to ethical considerations. Any attempt to fashion ethical rules
generates countless varying scenarios in which applications of those rules can be messy. The nature and
relative power of the actors in any given scenario also matter. Social standards and norms evolve and can become
wholly different as cultures change. Few people have much education or training in ethics. Additionally,
good and bad actors exploit loopholes and gray areas where ethical rules aren’t crisp, so
workarounds, patches or other remedies are often created with varying levels of success.
The experts who expressed worries also

invoked governance concerns. They asked: Whose ethical systems
should be applied? Who gets to make that decision? Who has responsibility to care about
implementing ethical AI? Who might enforce ethical regimes once they are established? How?
A large number of respondents argued that geopolitical and economic competition are the main drivers for AI developers, while
moral concerns take a back seat. A share of these experts
said creators of AI tools work in groups that have little or
no incentive to design systems that address ethical concerns.
Some respondents noted that, even

if workable ethics requirements might be established, they could not
be applied or governed because most AI design is proprietary, hidden and complex. How can harmful
AI “outcomes” be diagnosed and addressed if the basis for AI “decisions” cannot be discerned? Some of these experts also note that
existing AI systems and databases are often used to build new AI applications. That means the biases and ethically troubling aspects
of current systems are being designed into teeehe new systems. They say diagnosing and unwinding the pre-
existing problems may be difficult if not impossible to achieve.
US-European disagreements hamper a united response to AI

Lawrence and Cordey, '20 – Christie Lawrence is the Director for Research and Analysis
working on international AI cooperation and intellectual property at ITIF. Prior, she worked at
Harvard Belfer Center’s Cyber Project, the State Department, and as a management consultant.
Sean Cordey holds a Masters of Arts in Law and Diplomacy & International Affairs (Christie
Lawrence and Sean Cordey; "The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial
Intelligence"; Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs;
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/case-increased-transatlantic-cooperation-artificial-
intelligence; 8-2020, Accessed 7-13-2022)//ILake-AZ
The world has changed a lot since September 2001, however these relationships are no less important. Global
terrorism is still a threat, but the rise of China and technological advancements have converged to create both new opportunities
and new challenges. Artificial
intelligence (AI) promises to help the world find a vaccine for Covid-19, add up to $15.7
trillion to the global economy, and improve
militaries’ ability to detect, defend, and deter against
cyberattacks.3 However, AI technologies could also provide adversaries and authoritarian
governments with tools to increase censorship, automate disinformation. and engage in
constant cyber or kinetic conflict.4
Despite all of these changes, the importance of a strong relationship between the United States
and the European Union has been a constant. The transatlantic disagreements that have
characterized the past few years—and have hampered a united front on emerging technologies
like 5G and AI5—are not the first time US-EU relations have suffered, but they should not further divide
allies that share common values.6 Deepened US-EU cooperation across the entire AI ecosystem7 is
necessary to advance a more secure, safe, and prosperous world, but to do this the current level of
AI-related coordination and partnership needs to be increased.
This report’s purpose is twofold: first, to inform policymakers and researchers about the current state of transatlantic AI efforts; and
second, to recommend specific areas where transatlantic AI collaboration should be strengthened. Based on a comprehensive study
of over 260 documents and reports covering the period from December 1997 to June 2020, we proposes more than 16
recommendations to increase US-EU AI collaboration across the entire AI ecosystem, as well as 9 recommendations for AI
cooperation in the healthcare, environmental sciences, and defense sectors. Greater
transatlantic efforts are needed
to prevent the advancement of an AI vision that is adversarial and harmful to the wellbeing of
the United States, the European Union, and allies.
US & Europe disagree

Lawrence and Cordey, '20 – Christie Lawrence is the Director for Research and Analysis
working on international AI cooperation and intellectual property at ITIF. Prior, she worked at
Harvard Belfer Center’s Cyber Project, the State Department, and as a management consultant.
Sean Cordey holds a Masters of Arts in Law and Diplomacy & International Affairs (Christie
Lawrence and Sean Cordey; "The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial
Intelligence"; Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs;
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/case-increased-transatlantic-cooperation-artificial-
intelligence; 8-2020, Accessed 7-13-2022)//ILake-AZ
Challenges to Collaboration & Recommendations
Full US-EU collaboration faces five distinct, but interconnected obstacles (see Figure 1 below). At the
highest level, the United States and European Union have some diverging geopolitical interests
(section A) illustrated by: America’s increasing isolationism, the European Union’s rebalancing to
become a third power, the European Union’s resistance to adversarial discourse about China , and
domestic political demands to focus resources on COVID-19 responses. Flowing out of the geopolitical landscape and
political interests are three overarching considerations that are bolstered by differing beliefs about the role
and size of government and can fuel US-EU disagreements around AI. These US national interests and
EU common priorities are (section B): AI’s impact on national security and economic interests, as well as
the ethics and values that guide AI’s development and use. Finally, aspects of the AI operating
environment (sections C, D, and E), such as regulation and governance (including standards and
operationalizing principles), funding, data spaces, hardware, and computing resources, provide
tactical areas for disagreement or misalignment.
NATO diverges on a unified approach to AI – US diplomacy is necessary to get

others on board.
HeikkilÄ, '22 – Melissa HeikkilÄ is a senior reporter at MIT Technology Review, where she
covers artificial intelligence and how it is changing our society (Melissa HeikkilÄ; "NATO wants to
set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics."; POLITICO;
https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/; 7-13-2022,
Accessed 7-13-2022)//ILake-AZ
On paper, NATO is the ideal organization to go about setting standards for military applications of artificial
intelligence. But the widely divergent priorities and budgets of its 30 members could get in the
way.
The Western military alliance has identified artificial intelligence as a key technology needed to maintain an edge over adversaries, and it wants to lead
the way in establishing common ground rules for its use.
“We need each other more than ever. No country alone or no continent alone can compete in
this era of great power competition,” NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană, the alliance’s second in command, said in
an interview with POLITICO.
The standard-setting effort comes as China is pressing ahead with AI applications in the military largely free of democratic oversight.
David van Weel, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, said Beijing's lack of concern with the tech's ethical implications
has sped along the integration of AI into the military apparatus.
"I'm ... not sure that they're having the same debates on principles of responsible use or they're definitely not applying our democratic values to these
technologies,” he said.
Meanwhile, the EU — which has pledged to roll out the world's first binding rules on AI in coming weeks — is seeking closer collaboration with
Washington to oversee emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. But those efforts have been slow in getting off the ground.
For Geoană, that collaboration will happen at NATO, which is working closely with the European Union as it prepares AI regulation focusing on “high
risk” applications.
The pitch
NATO does not regulate, but “once NATO sets a standard, it becomes in terms of defensive security the gold standard in that respective field,” Geoană
said.
The alliance's own AI strategy, to be released before the summer, will identify ways to operate AI systems responsibly, identify military applications for
the technology, and provide a “platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it's up to NATO standards,” van Weel said.
The strategy will also set ethical guidelines around how to govern AI systems, for example by ensuring systems can be shut down by a human at all
times, and to maintain accountability by ensuring a human is responsible for the actions of AI systems.
“If an adversary would use autonomous AI powered systems in a way that is not compatible with our values and morals, it would still have defense
implications because we would need to defend and deter against those systems,” van Weel said.
“We need to be aware of that and we need to flag legislators when we feel that our restrictions are coming into the realm of [being detrimental to] our
defense and deterrence,” he continued.
Mission impossible?
The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking
about AI in the military context.
The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But
in Europe, most countries —
France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in
their national AI strategies.
“It’sabsolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI
strategy," but the Europeans "did it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy
fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said:
That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over
defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly.
The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate
excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen
on defense, sees things differently.
There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including
lethal autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy
targets without human control.
Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and
oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have expressed serious
concerns about the technology.
These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human
rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 called for a ban.
Geoană said the alliance has “retained autonomous weapon systems as part of the interests of NATO.” The group hopes that its upcoming
recommendations will allow the ethical use of the technology without “stifling innovation.”
2nc link---Arms Control
Arms control specific diplomatic focus link
Christopher A. Ford 13 {Dr. Christopher Ford is a MITRE Fellow and founding Director of the
Center for Strategic Competition at the MITRE Corporation. He is also a Visiting Fellow at
Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. From January 2018 until January 2021, following his
unanimous confirmation by the U.S. Senate, Dr. Ford served as Assistant Secretary of State for
International Security and Nonproliferation, and also exercised the authorities of the Under
Secretary for Arms Control and International Security from October 2019 until his resignation
from the Department of State on January 8, 2021. Before his service at the State Department,
he served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Counterproliferation at the U.S. National Security Council, where he ran the
directorate of that name throughout 2017. A veteran of many years as a congressional staffer,
Dr. Ford has served at various points on the staffs of the U.S. Senate’s Foreign Relations
Committee, Banking Committee, Appropriations Committee, Select Committee on Intelligence,
Permanent Select Committee on Investigations, and Governmental Affairs Committee. He also
served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance in 2003-
06, and as U.S. Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation in 2006-08. A summa cum
laude graduate of Harvard who got his doctorate at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar and a law
degree from Yale, Dr. Ford has also worked as a Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute in
Washington, D.C., and served from 1994 until 2011 as an intelligence officer in the U.S. Navy
Reserve, which he left with an Honorable Discharge in 2011 at the rank of Lieutenant
Commander}, 13 - ("A Perspective upon Arms Control," No Publication, 8-28-2013,
https://www.newparadigmsforum.com/p1618)//marlborough-wr/
arms control has an opportunity cost. National leaders only have so much
Finally, one should remember that
time, energy, and political capital available that can be “invested” in the pursuit of policy
objectives. As a result, seeking an arms control agreement necessarily means – as a practical matter – that
one doesn’t work so hard on other initiatives. This is fine if there aren’t more important things that need attention, but if one’s strategic
circumstances are such that there isn’t much danger of a spiraling arms competition – or if one doesn’t face a dangerous adversary whose weapon acquisition or behavior one
it might be wiser to spend one’s finite reserves of

needs to constrain or at least better understand for one’s own strategic planning –
political and diplomatic capital on other things. Arms control should not be pursued out of mere inertia, or solely out of some
politically-correct conception of virtue ethics that prizes seeking arms control for its own sake even where achieving it would contribute little or nothing to peace and security.
Itshould be pursued where the advantages to be had outweigh what one could do with that
time, energy, and political capital on other policy fronts, but not otherwise.
2nc link---Article V
Article 5 disagreements are time-consuming to resolve – saps NATO focus
Glennon, ’22 – Professor of constitutional and international law at the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He is the former legal counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and the author of “Constitutional Diplomacy.” (Michael J. Glennon; "The NATO
Treaty Does Not Give Congress a Bye on World War III"; Lawfare;
https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-treaty-does-not-give-congress-bye-world-war-iii; 3-23-
2022, Accessed 7-14-2022)//ILake-AZ
What, then, does the NATO Treaty require in obliging each party to take such action “as it
deems necessary” in accordance with its “constitutional processes”? At the most obvious level, the notion
of “process” presupposes the possibility of different outcomes. If only one result were preordained, there would be no point in
working through a process to reach that result; the process would be only a sham. Process implies choice—a
deliberative procedure that can produce alternative outcomes. Thus the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
said in 1978 (referring to a requirement in the Panama Canal Treaty to enter into a prisoner exchange agreement) that “authority is
meaningless if it is required to be given; the authority to disapprove is implied if our ‘constitutional processes’ are to be upheld.”
The right of each party to decide what action to take under its own constitutional process hardly
makes its NATO commitment meaningless. Three elements are significant. First, the treaty obliges each
party to assess in good faith whether an armed attack on a NATO ally has occurred, as NATO
members did after the 9/11 attacks. Members may disagree. They may interpret “armed attack”
differently, or they may view the facts differently. Resolving those disagreements may take
time. When NATO ambassadors discussed the possibility of invoking Article 5 in Brussels on Sept.
11 and 12, 2001, for example, it was not yet clear whether the attacks on the United States had been externally directed or
were internal acts of terrorism, like the Oklahoma City bombing. NATO’s North Atlantic Council issued an initial statement on Sept.
11 condemning the “barbaric acts” committed against the United States, with no reference to attacks, while a statement issued the
next day indicated that Article 5 would cover the acts only “if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the
United States.” On Oct. 2, according
to NATO, after the council had been briefed on the results of investigations into the 9/11
attacks, itdetermined that the attacks were regarded as an action covered by Article 5 . Subsequently,
on Oct. 4, NATO took specific steps to “operationalise Article 5” of the treaty. This gradually
unfolding process has led to disagreement as to the date on which Article 5 was actually
“invoked.”
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-
Final-Report-Uni.pdf
2nc link---Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity-specific link – cybersecurity takes a whole lot of diplomatic focus
Cybersecurity Tech Accord 21 {a coalition of over 150 global technology firms committed
to advancing trust and security in cyberspace}, 21 - ("Effective Cyber Diplomacy White Paper: A
Guide to Countries’ Engagement in International Security Dialogues," 10-25-2021,
https://cybertechaccord.org/effective-cyber-diplomacy-white-paper-a-guide-to-countries-
engagement-in-international-security-dialogues/)//marlborough-wr/
states with an effective cyber diplomacy

Dedicating the required resources to operate effectively inside the government and abroad: To date,
operation have invested substantial time, money, and diplomatic expertise into the effort. They
have assigned cyber diplomacy leads with sufficient political capital to access senior government
leadership and call upon their attention and decision-making authority.32 Given the costs involved, however, states
may seek to leverage other actors or institutions to further their cyber diplomacy efforts. This may be done by consolidating different agencies or offices focused on cyber into
one bureau to streamline resources. Some states have sought more creative partnership opportunities with other governments, civil society, academia, and the private sector to
serve as a force multiplier for resources. For example, in support of its 2016 National Cyber Security Strategy, the UK’s Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)
launched an International Cyber Security Capacity Building Programme, which aims to improve cyber security capacity in Eastern Europe, ASEAN nations, the Middle East and
North Africa, India, Brazil, and Mexico.33 The FCDO also worked with the Cybersecurity Tech Accord to produce a comprehensive overview of cybersecurity awareness efforts
across the Commonwealth of Nations and to capture industry guidance for what makes such campaigns effective.34
Multilateral diplomacy in cybersecurity requires a whole-of-government

approach that saps finite diplomatic capital
In considering broadly the term multilateral diplomacy, this review examined four distinct functions or activities: the U.S. missions to
international organizations; the U.S. presence in international organizations themselves; U.S. representation to specialized
international conferences; and policy formulation and direction. We
interviewed current and former U.S.
government officials, and current and former foreign government and international organization
officials with relevant policy and operational experience in multilateral diplomacy. We sought to
identify best practices from others, as well as to examine what has worked well for us in the past.
The Department of State has 15 permanent missions to international organizations (See Annex 1).
Many, but not all, are overseen by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO). In most cases,
the U.S. is a member state of the organization; however, the U.S. also has permanent missions to organizations of which it is not a
member such as the European Union, the African Union, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Within the bodies
of the international organizations themselves, since 2007, the U.S. has filled the position of UN Under Secretary General for Political
and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA). Additionally, U.S. citizens serve as executive heads of three of the 30 funds and programs,
specialized agencies, and related organizations that comprise the Chief Executives Board of the United Nations: The World Bank
Group, UNICEF, and the World Food Programme. A U.S. citizen also serves as president of the International Court of Justice. By
comparison, Chinese citizens currently serve as Directors General or Secretaries General to the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Telecommunications Union, and the UN Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO),* as well holding the position of Under Secretary General for the Department of Economic and
Social Affairs (DESA).
At NATO, U.S. officials occupy four of the 16 principal positions in the organization: Assistant
Secretary General (ASG) for Operations, ASG for Intelligence and Security, Director of the NATO Office of Security, and Director of
the NATO Office of Resources. At the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a U.S. national currently
holds one of 23 senior positions in the body, director for Science, Technology, and Innovation. At the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), U.S. citizens currently hold two of 30 senior positions, head of the OSCE mission to Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and director for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings.**
In 2019, the U.S. government contributed slightly more than $11 billion to the UN. Approximately two-thirds of this total was
voluntary, and one-third was assessed. For reference, this figure represents roughly onefifth of the $50 billion that the U.S. spends
annually on foreign aid. The UN activities with the largest budgets, whether funded from voluntary or assessed contributions, are
peacekeeping operations ($6.5 billion total budget, with $1.9 billion from U.S. contributions), world food programs ($8 billion total
budget with $3.37 billion from U.S.), and the high commission on refugees ($4.1 billion total contributions, with $1.7 billion of those
from the U.S.).6 U.S. share of NATO’s operating budget (civil, military, and security investment programs) is 16.5 percent for 2021.
Germany’s share of the NATO operating budget is identical to that of the U.S., followed by the U.K., responsible for 11.29 percent,
and France for 10.49 percent.7
In the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO), the Office of International Conferences is
responsible for accrediting, instructing, and managing some 4,000 delegates to almost 400
multilateral conferences each year. Delegates to international conferences bring expertise from
throughout the U.S. government, and strong leadership is critical to success . State’s functional bureaus
provide subject matter expertise to lead U.S. delegations to these multilateral conferences, requiring a keen
understanding both of increasingly complex technical issues and the policy priorities of the
Administration. Successful multilateral diplomacy requires a whole-of-government approach , in
which State plays three key roles: it coordinates the interagency position, it leads delegations,
and it supports multilateral negotiations via IO and other specialized functional bureaus such as the Bureau of
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES), Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB), or Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN). Many
of the most challenging issues confronting the U.S.,
such as climate change, pandemics, and cyberspace, are not classic diplomatic issues, and the real
subject matter expertise often resides outside the Department. State must be conversant in these topics, but
its principal job is to coordinate the experts to advance our policy objectives and provide the essential
framework of understanding who our partners and adversaries are, and what motivates them to support our positions.
Clearly, both in terms of financial and human capital investment, the U.S. is a major player in
the multilateral arena. Yet the questions must be asked: Is the State Department investing its assets
strategically? Is it prepared to address the global challenges of the 21st century that demand its full
engagement in the practice of multilateral diplomacy?
The consensus among practitioners of multilateral diplomacy is that the

Department of State tends to treat
multilateral diplomacy as secondary to it traditional focus on bilateral diplomacy; in short, it lacks a
clear strategic vision for multilateral engagement. Even as multilateral issues such as climate change, pandemics,
and terrorism have become more urgent priorities, the Department’s orientation has remained largely
bilateral in terms of policy and fundamental processes, such as personnel assignments and promotions.
2nc link---Cyber Attribution
Agreements on cyber attribution require political consultations
Porter and Jordan, '19 – (Christopher Porter and Klara Jordan; "Don’t Let Cyber Attribution
Debates Tear Apart the NATO Alliance"; Lawfare; https://www.lawfareblog.com/dont-let-cyber-
attribution-debates-tear-apart-nato-alliance; 2-14-2019, Accessed 7-14-2022)//ILake-AZ
The United States still struggles to find effective policies for deterring cyberattacks. Suggestions run the gamut from more
widespread use of indictments and economic sanctions, despite their lackluster record of success, to less traditional but more risky
policies that emphasize the asymmetric advantage America has in conventional military power.
Most of the discussion of cyber deterrence focuses on preventing a single catastrophic or cascading cyberattack that would threaten
lives (like disruptions to electricity transmission or clean water)—or our way of life—altering election outcomes or grinding global
finance to a halt. Yet the reality is that in the event of such an attack, the response would likely not come from the
U.S. alone but from the NATO alliance in concert.
NATO’s cyber-defense mandate has evolved over time to update its collective defense
commitment under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty for the era of cyberattacks. In the latest effort to collectively
impose costs on adversaries, the 2018 NATO Summit saw a commitment from heads of state and government “to integrate
sovereign cyber effects, provided voluntarily by Allies, into Alliance operations and missions, in
the framework of strong
political oversight.” The newly updated White House National Cyber Strategy likewise envisions working together with a
“coalition of like-minded states” to “ensure adversaries understand the consequences of their malicious cyber behavior.”
Therein lies the rub. Both

formal alliances, such as NATO, and more ad hoc arrangements, such as
what the Cyber Deterrence Initiative imagines, will require members to share intelligence and
eventually, to the best of their ability and perhaps in different domains, contribute to joint action against a presumably well-armed
foreign aggressor. States including the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Estonia, and Denmark have publicly
declared their willingness to lend sovereign offensive cyber effects to deter, defend against and counter the full spectrum of threats.
Sharing intelligence and information is a key element of NATO’s core decision-making process enshrined in Article 4 of the
Washington Treaty. Political consultations are part of the preventive diplomacy between member
states, but they are also an avenue to discuss concerns related to the security threats member states face. These
consultations can be a catalyst for reaching a consensus on policies to be adopted or actions to
be taken—including those on the use of sovereign cyber effects to support a NATO operation.
The alliance has a track record of collective action and cooperative security measures . For example,
Operation Active Endeavour helped to deter, disrupt and protect against terrorist activity in the Mediterranean in the aftermath of
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, in solidarity with the United States. For the seventh time, the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative
will be among the organizations privileged to organize an event on the sidelines of the Feb. 15–17 Munich Security Conference. This
year in particular, the Atlantic Council’s event, “Defending Human Dignity: Limiting Malicious Cyber Activity Through Diplomacy,” will
complement the topics high on the agenda of the main conference, such as transatlantic collaboration, the consequences of a
resurgence of great power competition and the future of arms control.
In the United States, the greatest failures of response and deterrence to foreign aggression in cyberspace have not been caused by a
lack of intelligence, capability or imagination. Rather, U.S. policy has been serviceable in theory but impotent in practice because of
an inability to translate technical findings and intelligence into public support for sufficiently tough responses ordered by elected
political leaders. North Korea’s repeated operations targeting U.S. companies and critical infrastructure have been met with public
skepticism over their culpability, limiting the strength of retaliatory options needed to deter further events. Chinese
cyber
economic espionage continued for years despite widespread knowledge of China’s activities
because political leaders found it difficult to confront Beijing without undermining U.S.
companies in return. Russian information operations did not sow enough doubt to mislead experts, but they succeeded in
exacerbating the partisan polarization of an already-divided electorate and its leaders.
That inability to translate the findings of cyber experts into public sentiment and therefore
political action has sidelined America’s cyberwarriors, by far the most technologically advanced and well-
resourced in the world. Imagine the political response of an ally that is asked to burden-share in response to cyber aggression but is
probably much closer to any resulting kinetic fight than the United States.
Now imagine the response of that ally when it’s being asked to take causus belli on faith: The United States is presenting attribution
for a cyberattack elsewhere in the world, but perhaps is depending on the ally lacking critical details due to classification, and is
presenting that information alongside a request for help that might well put the ally in the crosshairs of its own cyberattack or lethal
action. How can allies with different capabilities to collect, analyze and understand intelligence be part of a consensus on using
sovereign cyber effects to support a NATO operation? How can a commander achieve a common operational picture to authorize
the use of sovereign effects in a NATO operation if all the allies are not on the same page with respect to critical attribution and
other technical information needed for a use of effect in an operation? We all know what a tank looks like on a shared satellite
image, but if you ask three cyber experts to interpret the attribution for a set of indicators, you are likely to get at least four answers.
For most U.S. allies in Europe and elsewhere, there is simply a dearth of technical know-how within the government
when it comes to cyber attribution and operations. This is already a challenge for the United States, with a massive defense budget,
Silicon Valley innovation and an educated workforce to pull into government service. But for many U.S. allies, tech-savvy public
servants will have long fled for the private sector, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and academia before reaching ministerial
positions.
To its credit, the

U.S. National Cyber Strategy does propose capacity-building measures to support
allies. This means building up law enforcement, intelligence, and military operational and
investigative capability. But even with successful capacity-building programs, many nations could, in a crisis, end up in the
same place the United States is—with good options stuck on the shelf while political leaders and their electorates lack a critical mass
of informed voters to trust, understand and act on expert findings.
For countries weighing whether to risk their own blood and treasure in support of an ally’s cyber
attribution findings, this hurdle could well prove insurmountable if not addressed well before a
crisis emerges. Many such countries will no doubt recall being burned when placing too much confidence in U.S. technical and
human sources without an ability to evaluate the evidence for themselves, as with the Iraq weapons of mass destruction findings.
2nc link---Deterrence/Assurances
US attention distribution is zero-sum
Kim and Simón 21 - Programme Director of the BA in International Affairs and Professor at
the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) of the Brussels School of Governance,
“Greater Security Cooperation: US Allies in Europe and East Asia.” The US Army War College
Quarterly: Parameters, vol. 51, no. 2, May 2021, https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.3068./AL
Connections between US Alliances in Europe and East Asia may not be apparent at first glance,
but they do exist and can have a meaningful impact on the strategic calculations of US Allies in
each region—and even on the United States itself. When new developments create uncertainty
about US policy, with potential implications for the United States’ reputation as an Ally or the allocation of US military
resources, the Allies pay close attention to situations in distant regions. Moreover, as the United States
prepares for global competition with China, Washington has been paving the road for interregional cooperation between US Allies.
For example, a recent expert group report to the NATO secretary general argues China is “best understood as a full-spectrum
systemic rival, rather than a purely economic player or an only Asia-focused security actor,” and asserts “NATO must devote much
more time, political resources and action to the security challenges posed by China.”31 Two somewhat contradictory interregional
connections are particularly important for US Alliances. First, US
Allies in both regions are affected by the
reputation of the United States as a military protector .32 Insofar as reputation is a global commodity, all US
Allies have reasons to support the reputation of the United States—the credibility of US
extended deterrence helps guarantee their own security. Yet US military resources, including
policymakers’ attention, are limited, resulting in an inevitable trade-off between what the
United States can commit to in East Asia and in Europe. Thus, just as the Obama administration’s rebalance to
Asia or the Trump administration’s emphasis on competition with China provoked uneasiness among European Allies about the
sustainability of Washington’s commitment to Europe, America’s reengagement with Europe after Russia’s annexation of Crimea led
to questions in Asia about the future of the alleged rebalance. In this regard, the complementary and competitive relations between
the two regions are an important background to any interregional collaboration among the Allies. Beyond these important but
abstract connections, what can the United States and its Allies gain from greater interregional cooperation? Arguably the most
important contributions America’s European and East Asian Allies can provide to each other’s
security are indirect. In a context defined by resource scarcity and a worsening threat environment in Europe and East Asia,
the United States would prefer its Allies concentrate their defense resources and efforts in their respective regions. In this vein , US
experts and policymakers often argue the most efficient way to use the resources and
capabilities of America’s European Allies is to deter Russia and provide security in their own
continent—and its immediate neighborhood—thus relieving Washington of its burden there as
it prioritizes Asia and the Indo-Pacific region.33 The same logic applies in relation to America’s East Asian Allies,
whom the United States would rather have focus on deterring China in the Western Pacific.34 America’s European Allies would also
derive important indirect benefits if East Asian Allies were to step up their defense and security efforts, and vice versa. From a
European perspective, perhaps the most useful contribution East Asian Allies can make is to increase their own military capabilities
while also reducing tensions with China. Likewise, East
Asian Allies would very much appreciate a greater
European defense effort, which could free up US resources badly needed in East Asia. 35 East Asian
Allies would also welcome a de-escalation between the West and Russia—perceived to be a relevant stakeholder in Asian security.36
From their viewpoint, the more conflictual the relationship between the United States and Russia is, the more of a spoiler attitude
Moscow may adopt in East Asia, for example, by closing ranks with China on North Korea and other issues.
Regional priorities are zero-sum

Kim and Simón 21, Programme Director of the BA in International Affairs and Professor at
the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) of the Brussels School of Governance, "A
Reputation versus Prioritization Trade-Off: Unpacking Allied Perceptions of US Extended
Deterrence in Distant Regions," 12-9-2021, Taylor & Francis,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2021.2010889/AL
Numerous scholars have convincingly shown how, when it comes to extended deterrence, the patron’s willingness to become involved in conflict
hinges on the protégé’s strategic value. According to Huth, a patron is more likely to attempt extended deterrence if the protégé is an ally,
geographically proximate, and similar to the defender in regime type.26 This points to the specific importance of the country in question. More
recently, Vesna Danilovic proposed to expand the notion of inherent credibility of extended threats to reflect the importance of the ties between a
major power and the entire region where the protégé is located.27 In her words, even
if “a particular state may not have
great significance for a major power, it may still be important if it is located in the region of
critical strategic importance for the major power’s interests.”28 This means a patron’s regional
prioritization is critical to its protégés, especially when the patron is a global power with
extensive security interests in multiple regions.
Although the notion that Europe and East Asia are the main priority regions appears to be well established in the scholarly literature on US grand
strategy,29 the
question of how the United States prioritizes resources between those regions has
not been addressed systematically.30 Some debates have focused on how crises in one region may affect US security commitments
in the other. Thus, some scholars pondered about how the Korean or Vietnam Wars affected America’s position in Europe.31 But the broader question
on how the United States prioritizes between Europe and Asia in peacetime, and how that might influence extended deterrence, has received
comparatively less attention.32 Yet, resource
scarcity compels the United States to establish priorities,
decide which region(s) matter(s) most, and distribute its national security resources accordingly .
When the United States allocates specific resources to one region, those resources are no
longer available elsewhere, and therefore may impact allied perceptions of extended
deterrence in the deprioritized region. How do these competitive concerns for US prioritization square with shared concerns for
US reputation?
Enter the Reputation versus Prioritization Trade-Off
The credibility of extended deterrence hinges on the patron’s resolve and capability. Indeed, a protégé’s abandonment concerns wax and wane in
relation to how closely its foreign policy interests are aligned with those of the patron and how militarily powerful the patron is vis-à-vis the threatening
state.33 The concept of prioritization is closely related to that of abandonment. According to Glenn H. Snyder, abandonment may take several specific
forms: the patron may realign with the opponent; de-align, thus abrogating the alliance contract; fail to make good on its explicit commitments; or fail
to provide support in contingencies where it is expected.34 Prioritization concerns the relative resourcing of the patron’s commitments or support to
the protégés. A patron’s
deprioritization of a given region thus signals a relative de-alignment of
interest with protégés therein, and it means that less of the patron’s capability will be available
for their protection. In other words, deprioritization of a given region increases protégés’ fear of
abandonment even if it does not necessarily constitute abandonment per se.
Because the patron’s resources are often divided between different regions, protégés pay close attention to the balance of military power between the
patron and the adversary within the theater of operations where the protégés are situated. A protégé that borders an adversary and is cut off
geographically from the patron is particularly prone to have abandonment fears. Hence, protégés often worry less about the global military balance
between patron and adversary than they do about whether the patron undertakes certain (re)assurance measures, which are often linked to its in-
theater capabilities.35
Although numerous scholars have discussed how a patron’s reputation underscores the interdependence of its extended deterrence commitments to
multiple allies, such interdependence also bears a material component. According to Montgomery, “Military personnel and platforms cannot be
present in multiple locations at the same time”; and hoping to use similar capabilities and operational concepts to deal with different adversaries “can
decrease military effectiveness because peacetime deployments to one theater will impose opportunity costs for other theaters, while wartime losses
anywhere will negatively affect the balance of military power everywhere else.”36
The interdependent commitment problem becomes increasingly acute when the number of adversaries grows and they each become stronger.37
Indeed, an overstretched patron that sees its power gap reduced vis-à-vis more than one adversary
simultaneously faces difficult choices: it can either fold on its extended deterrence
commitments in some regions or bet that its reputation for resolve and global capabilities will
suffice to convince multiple adversaries and allies alike about the strength of its guarantees. Yet,
just like it becomes difficult for a bank to use the same money as collateral against different obligations, different adversaries and
allies are unlikely to accept the notion that a patron’s reputation for resolve and global
capabilities are sufficient for all theaters simultaneously.
We argue that, when it comes to assurance, the in-theater balance between patron and adversary becomes the main concern. This has important
implications for both reputation and prioritization. For one thing, protégés recognize that reputation as a global commodity loses some value
depending on the (local) context. This is where prioritization comes in. A context in which the patron’s military advantage over one or more
competitors is eroding or the protégé is facing grave threats underscores the fact that different allies and regions compete for the patron’s attention.
Applied to the context of contemporary US alliances, allies

face a trade-off because the credibility of US extended
deterrence depends on both US reputation in general and US capabilities available to protect
specific allies. On the one hand, allies care about US reputation and its implications for deterrence. Because they all benefit from the extended
deterrence guarantees the United States provides, allies would like Washington to uphold its commitments to other allies, even those far afield. Thus,
in principle, all US allies are likely to welcome a decisive response on the part of the United States to changes in the balance of power or threat in
another region through verbal reassurance or even a strengthening of its military posture or alliances. On the other hand, allies are also fully aware that
US resources are limited, and they worry about a deprioritization of their own region. In other words, all US allies face a reputation versus prioritization
trade-off.
2nc—AT: aff
2nc AT: Not Finite
Dip cap is zero sum
Jennifer Cooke 10, Director of the Africa Program at CSIS, “African Conflicts and
U.S. Diplomacy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010, https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/
100115_Cooke_AfricanConflicts_Web.pdf
Faced with Limited Resources and Changing Priorities, Deciding When, If, and How to Intervene Is More Important than Ever
U.S. engagement can take on many forms, ranging from humanitarian assistance to diplomacy to military
action. Given finite resources and capacities, the United States must often make hard choices on
how much diplomatic capital to invest in crisis or conflict situations. It cannot invest equally in every
crisis or potential crisis. In intervening in these situations, decisionmakers must be careful and sensitive in setting ground rules
for engagement since intervention is never impartial—it can decide, for better or worse, who governs, who eats, and who survives.
At the same time, setting rules for where, when, and how to intervene has become more difficult as U.S. interests in Africa have
become harder to define following the end of the Cold War.
The reality is that decisions are made on a case-by-case basis or in response to events. A triage process is inevitable,
whereby possible types and places of intervention are ordered in terms of priority and their likelihood of success, based on the
availability of resources. For this reason, U.S. diplomatic activity has focused on the Horn of Africa and Sudan in particular, to the
detriment of other crises such as those in the Great Lakes region or Niger Delta. Decisionmakers
must make hard-
nosed decisions in setting criteria for intervention. Among the criteria that policymakers need to consider,
said Crocker, are cases where U.S. security interests are at stake; where a crisis risks having broad,
regional consequences; where the United States is expected to take the lead; where the United States can
usefully follow the lead of others such as the United Nations; and where grave humanitarian values are at stake and where domestic
public opinion demands that the United States provide policy leadership. The United States must also take into account the
willingness of African governments and regional bodies to accept such leadership.
Diplomatic capital is finite and dependent upon other goals.

Mcglinchey et al. '21 – (Stephen Mcglinchey; "11.3: Problems and Challenges"; Social Sci
LibreTexts; https://socialsci.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Sociology/International_Sociology/Book
%3A_International_Relations_(McGlinchey)/11%3A_Protecting_People/
11.03%3A_Problems_and_Challenges; 2-20-2021, Accessed
Another facet of the problem of ‘political will’ is that states are self-interested actors that
prioritise the wellbeing of their own citizens. As such, they are generally reluctant to commit extensive resources to
prevent atrocity crimes in other countries. The issue here is not whether governments support atrocity
prevention as a goal, but the depth of their support relative to their other goals – including
cherished domestic objectives such as healthcare and social welfare. Political and diplomatic capital is also
a finite resource. Sometimes, states may judge that trade-offs have to be made to achieve the
greatest good or least harm overall. For example, at the outset of the crisis in Darfur in 2003, several states decided not
to press the government of Sudan too hard, fearing that this might jeopardise negotiations to end the government’s war with rebels
in the south – who eventually seceded and founded their own state in 2011 with the creation of South Sudan.
Diplomatic capital is finite!!

Colby, '22 – Elbridge Colby is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force
Development (Elbridge Colby; Twitter;
https://twitter.com/ElbridgeColby/status/1494010443991556120; 2-16-22, Accessed 7-13-
2022)//ILake-AZ
Let me boil this down: Mr. Bolton is a dove on China.
Tradeoffs are completely real. Military forces can only be in one place at a time. Diplomatic
capital is finite.
Ignore the rhetoric. The upshot of 👇is to neglect the growing threat from China in Asia.
Dip Cap is finite

Cooke and Downie 10 – Jennifer Cooke is senior associate of Office of the President. Richard
Downie is a Director at GSIS and a Principal at Delphi Strategic Consulting. (“African Conflicts and
U.S. Diplomacy,” CSIS. January, 2010.
https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/
100115_Cooke_AfricanConflicts_Web.pdf) Edgemont PF
U.S. engagement can take on many forms, ranging from humanitarian assistance to diplomacy to military action.
Given finite resources and capacities, the United States must often make hard choices on how
much diplomatic capital to invest in crisis or conflict situations. It cannot invest equally in every
crisis or potential crisis. In intervening in these situations, decisionmakers must be careful and sensitive in
setting ground rules for engagement since intervention is never impartial —it can decide, for better or
worse, who governs, who eats, and who survives. At the same time, setting rules for where, when, and how to intervene has
become more difficult as U.S. interests in Africa have become harder to define following the end of the Cold War.
Dip cap is spread thin by new policies – its limited

Anderson and Grewell 01 - Terry A. Anderson is a journalist and J. Bishop Grewell, is a
former research associate for PERC. (“It Isn't Easy Being Green: Environmental Policy
Implications for Foreign Policy, International Law, and Sovereignty,” Chicago Journal of
International Law. September 9th, 2001.
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1422&context=cjil)
Edgemont PF
Foreign policy is a bag of goods that includes issues from free trade to arms trading to human rights. Each new
issue in the bag weighs it down, lessening the focus on other issues and even creating conflicts
between issues.
Increased environmental regulations could cause countries to lessen their focus on international threats of violence, such as the sale
of ballistic missiles or border conflicts between nations. As
countries must watch over more and more issues
arising in the international policy arena, they will stretch the resources necessary to deal with traditional
international issues. As Schaefer writes, "Because diplomatic currency is finite... it is critically important
that the United States focus its diplomatic efforts on issues of paramount importance to the
nation. Traditionally, these priorities have been opposing hostile domination of key geographic regions, supporting our allies,
securing vital resources, and ensuring access to foreign economies.
Dip cap is limited
Freilich 13 – Chuck Freilich was a deputy national security adviser in Israel and a long-time
senior fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. (“Proceed With Caution,” The
American Interest. March 13th, 2013.
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2013/03/13/proceed-with-caution/) Edgemont PF
Circumstances do not call for passivity, for doing nothing. They do call for sober consideration of diplomatic reality; the peace
process cannot afford another failure. Israelis and Palestinians have come to virtually despair of the prospects of ever reaching
agreement. Another failure will merely dash whatever residual hopes and good will exist, reinforce their deepest fears, and make
the prospects of a future breakthrough, if and when more propitious circumstances arise, that much harder to achieve. Moreover,
American diplomatic capital is a finite resource and should not be risked unless the prospects of
success are significant.
The Obama Administration made a number of egregious errors in its initial handling of the peace process that it can now redress.
The first was its naïve acceptance of the Palestinian narrative that the Israeli settlements and occupation are the heart of the
conflict. They are certainly major issues to be resolved, but the true problem remains the nearly century-long Palestinian
refusal to accept that a final settlement can only be based on a Palestinian state living alongside a Jewish Israel, not instead of it; that
is, to finally come to terms with the concept of two states for two peoples. Understanding of this reality requires that
U.S. diplomacy make a concerted effort to convince the Palestinians to finally recognize Israel for what it is, the
nation-state of the Jewish people. The demand that they do so is not an Israeli negotiating ploy, but would mark a fundamental
transformation of the conflict. Israel will only withdraw from territory and dismantle settlements when the Palestinians are ready for
true reconciliation.
Diplomatic capital is a finite resource

Alex J. Bellamy and Edward C. Luck, 2018, Director of the Asia Pacific Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect and Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at The University of
Queensland, Australia and senior vice president of the International Peace Institute, a New York
based policy research center, and as president and CEO of the United Nations Association of the
USA, “The Responsibility to Protect: From Promise to Practice”,
https://books.google.com/books?id=7md-DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT67&lpg=PT67&dq=
%22diplomatic+capital%22+finite&source=bl&ots=je-
ltKXVy0&sig=ACfU3U3BvnVARoJ3apcU6JRTJDn5EMN7ug&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi_jr789_X
4AhWZkYkEHUpdCuEQ6AF6BAgdEAM#v=onepage&q&f=false /RS
Another facet of the problem relates to the fact that states are self-interested actors that prioritize their own interests or those of
their governing elites. As such, they are generally reluctant to commit extensive resources to prevent atrocity crimes in other
countries. The issue here is not whether governments support atrocity prevention as a goal, but the depth of their support relative
to their other goals – including cherished domestic objectives such as healthcare and social welfare. Political
and diplomatic
capital is also a finite resource. Sometimes, states may judge that trade-offs have to be made to
achieve the greatest good or least harm overall. For example, at the outset of the crisis in
Darfur, several states decided not to press the government of Sudan too hard, fearing that this
might jeopardize negotiations to end the government’s war with the SPLM/A in the south.
Diplomatic capital is finite—focus tradeoff

J. Bishop Grewell 1 {Grewell, a Research Associate with PERC, is currently a visiting scholar
with the Competitive Enterprise Institute}, 1 - ("Foreign Policy goes Green," PERC, 3-1-2001,
https://www.perc.org/2001/03/01/foreign-policy-goes-green/)//marlborough-wr/
Foreign policy has always been a bag of goods bought with a finite amount of diplomatic
currency. Adding another item to that shopping list increases the cost of foreign policy and risks
losing focus. Because of these risks, only environmental issues truly international in scope should make it into the international policy arena.
Diplomatic capital is limited and can be gained or lost through material

contributions
Jason Ralph et al, 11-13-2019, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK, "The United Kingdom’s special
responsibilities at the United Nations: Diplomatic practice in normative context," SAGE Journals,
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177 /RS
UK diplomacy is therefore important to the UK’s claim to be a responsible great power. It has sufficient capital to sustain the
penholding role and to use that to reconcile the concert and governance functions of the Council. While this kind of soft power does
balance against concerns of declining hard power, however, there
are limitations to that; and, as the following
section illustrates, questions are currently being asked of the relationship between those states
exercising diplomatic leadership at the UK and those contributing peacekeeping personnel. Such
questions threaten to undermine the progress made in peacekeeping as an institution that addresses both the governance and
concert functions of the Council. Before moving on, however, it is worth illustrating the relationship between
diplomatic capital and material contributions with reference to an area where the UK has an undisputed reputation
for leadership: international development aid. UK diplomats have much capital in this area because the UK government is seen to be
leading in material contributions by committing 0.7% of gross national income in development aid. As one interviewee told us:
“You can look at individual countries… who have very high development spending and are held in high regard as a result and its
easier also for those countries to advocate for certain human rights policies in developing countries if they’re backing it up with
financial development support. If you don’t do that and you’re still trying to lecture you get less of a hearing” (Author interview #11).
This is an interesting illustration of the way material

contributions can multiply diplomatic capital because
they convey the impression that the state is leading by example. The state making the material
contribution is not asking followers to do something it is not prepared to do ; nor is it asking a
state to do something without support. As the next section illustrates, the converse holds true. When a
state asks another to do something it is not prepared to do, its diplomatic capital is devalued . In
this case, the UK’s ability to lead at the Council is threatened by a frustration among troop contribution countries, who experience a
sense of exclusion from Council deliberations while also being asked to do something (i.e., risk soldier’s lives) the P5, including the
UK, is unwilling to do. The
apparent hypocrisy threatens the development of peacekeeping and that
should lead the responsible great power to reflect on how to respond.
2nc AT: Issues Compartmentalized
Issues aren’t compartmentalized—the US must commit to diplomacy above all
else
Burke-White 21 – Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School,
Inaugural Director of the Perry World House, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution (William
Burke-White; "A Strategic Roadmap for Reentry 2021 and Beyond”; Brookings;
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/fp_20210218_engagement_report_v
3.pdf; 2-2021, Accessed 7-12-2022)//ILake-AZ
To operationalize this more flexible and varied approach to multilateral diplomacy, the United
States must become far more strategic and creative in how it maps particular multilateral policy
priorities with existing and potential institutional architectures. Within the U.S. government
bureaucratic restructuring must facilitate a holistic vision of the overall international
institutional architecture, whether such capacity is built within the Bureau of International Organizations at the State
Department or at the National Security Council (NSC).81 In U.S. diplomatic practice, multitasking is needed to
work numerous issues simultaneously in overlapping institutions. So too, the United States must
commit the political will and diplomatic capital to engage and steward a larger number of
international institutional structures. Finally, this approach demands strong bilateral diplomacy
that can lay the foundation for ad hoc partnerships and issue-specific cooperation.
Impacts
********China
***Uniqueness
1NC – UQ
Uniqueness---Biden diplomatic focus is on China --- diverting from current
initiatives risks failure
Weitz 6-14, 2022 (Richard Weitz, Richard Weitz is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center
for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute. “Biden and Blinken Pivot Toward Asia,” China
US Focus, 6/14/2022, https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/biden-and-blinken-pivot-
toward-asia) - LH
Last month, the Biden administration finally concentrated on realizing its Asian ambitions . Though
President Biden came to office determined to make Asia his highest foreign-policy priority, events at home, in Afghanistan, and in
Europe understandably dominated the initial White House agenda. But last month, the
administration hosted an
ASEAN summit in Washington, arranged a short but consequential presidential trip to the region, and
delivered a long-anticipated speech focused on China-U.S. relations. As a result of these developments, we
now better understand the Biden administration’s Asian strategy.
Though Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s speech came at the end of May, the text, originally scheduled to occur before Biden’s
first trip as president to Asia, helps place the month’s events in context. Biden’s
presentation was notable not for its
new initiatives, which were few, but for its repackaging and justifying of the administration’s policies
towards Beijing. China, he observed, was “the only country with both the intent” and the capacities
required to comprehensively challenge the extant “system of laws, agreements, principles, and
institutions” that underpin the prevailing international order favored by the United States. Therefore,
managing the Sino-American relationship should be Washington’s highest priority.
According to Blinken, the administration’s strategy is to “invest, align, and compete ” with China. To
invest more in U.S. industrial and technological prowess, the administration wants Congress to enact proposed legislation to support
U.S. leadership in emerging scientific and technical sectors. Meanwhile, the
State Department has redoubled
efforts to align U.S. allies and partners on behalf of the existing U.S.-favored international order
under challenge by China, Russia, and other revisionist states. The Defense Department has also been fortifying
U.S. military partnerships in the region. The administration sees these economic and military initiatives, whether
focused internally or outwardly in Asia, as mutually reinforcing. Combined, they position the United States well to compete with
China.
The new “invest, align, and compete” framework is less elegant than the previous 3-C “competition, cooperation, and confrontation”
formulation. Blinken still denies a U.S. effort to reflexively “stand against China.” Rather, the United States will work with China on
areas of common interest, such as managing global climate change, while “stand[ing] up for peace, security and human dignity.” Yet,
in addition to repeating long-standing complaints regarding Chinese policies,
the administration regretted that
Beijing was pursuing “asymmetric decoupling, seeking to make China less dependent on the
world and the world more dependent on China.” Instead of “decoupling” from the PRC, the administration
would strive to redirect Chinese foreign policies in a more positive direction by shaping the
international environment in which Beijing operates.
Unsurprisingly given that the speech was scheduled for an earlier delivery, Biden’s Asia trip aligned with Blinken’s presentation. At
each event, the Biden team highlighted presidential interest in Asia to counter the narrative that a future PRC-led regional order was
inevitable due to U.S. decline—with the implication that other Asian states should therefore accommodate rather than resist
Beijing’s regional preeminence. Another goal was to profile the administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy ,
which was rolled out in February and quickly overshadowed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this regard, Biden’s trip also
aimed to counter regional concerns that Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine would embolden Beijing to use force in Asia.
For example, in Tokyo, Biden

stressed the “unwavering U.S. commitment to the region, and
underscored that his strategy will be matched with resources and steady implementation.” Biden
and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida emphasized the imperative of keeping the Indo-Pacific region free of major war, noting the
devastating impact of the Ukraine war on the world. Kishida insisted that such a “unilateral attempt to change the status quo by
force...should never be tolerated in the Indo-Pacific.” In their joint statement, Biden and Kishida declared “that the
rules-based
international order is indivisible; threats to international law and the free and fair economic
order anywhere constitute a challenge to our values and interests everywhere. ” Both leaders saw the
international coalition that the West had organized against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine as a model for how the democracies
might respond to military aggression against Taiwan or the Senkaku Islands, which Biden reaffirmed fell under the Japan-U.S. Treaty
of Mutual Cooperation and Security.
The administration, seeking to counter criticisms that it has been insufficiently attentive to Asian economic issues, exploited
Biden’s trip as an opportunity to relaunch the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity ( IPEF).
Though still somewhat long on vision and short on details, the IPEF has enormous potential due to its members’
comprising more than one-third of the world economy. That twelve countries initially joined reflects not only
the widespread regional interest in cooperating economically with the United States, but also the IPEF’s paucity of rigorous
requirements or means of enforcement. These were apparently discarded to maximize membership. That nonmembers can
selectively participate in only select IPEF activities and receive benefits from the public goods the IPEF generates is also a mixed
blessing, as it may encourage free riding.
These compromises naturally reminded people about the superior Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which the United States crafted
and then abandoned. In his joint news conference with Biden, Kishida twice expressed his hope the United States would rejoin the
TPP, now rebranded as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The IPEF also falls
short of the high standards embedded in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. U.S. officials will need to make
continuing progress in executing the Framework, with attention focused on a few critical
projects with adequate funding, rather than spreading too thinly or competing with
existing frameworks, in order to demonstrate that the IPEF is more than another Trade and Investment Framework
Agreements (TIFA).
During his stay in Tokyo, Biden participated in another leadership meeting of the Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue (“the Quad”), with newly elected Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of Australia and Prime Minister Narendra Modi of
India joining Kishida and Biden. In their joint communique, the leaders criticized various policies of China and Russia
without explicitly mentioning these countries. Of note, the text highlights the members’ “commitment to a free and
open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient” and their support for the “principles of freedom,
rule of law, democratic values, sovereignty and territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of
disputes ... and freedom of navigation and overflight.” The Quad announced some novel projects to develop
infrastructure, enhance Asia’s cybersecurity, and promote secure and diversified supply chains.
In particular, the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) holds promise to assist Asian countries to
monitor, and ideally deter, transnational and nation-state threats at sea. These challenges encompass illegal fishing, piracy, and
aggressive paramilitary maritime militia. According to the White House fact sheet, the “IPMDA will offer a near-real-time, integrated,
and cost-effective maritime domain awareness picture” to “partners in the Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean
region.” Expanding partners’ collective maritime domain awareness will require substantial attention to network and improve the
different assets and authorities of the participating members.
Biden attracted the most media attention for his comments in Tokyo regarding Taiwan. Though reaffirming
the “One China” policy, Biden insisted that the United States would assist Taiwan if Beijing tried to
seize the island by force. Biden explained that such aggression would, like the Russian invasion of Ukraine, “dislocate the
entire region.” In his George Washington University speech, though, Blinken asserted that the administration had not changed the
contours of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. It remains based on the three Joint Communiques, the Six Assurances, and the Taiwan
Relations Act. The United States still opposes either side’s unilaterally changing the status quo, maintains strong but unofficial ties
with Taiwan, and demands the peaceful resolution of Cross-Strait differences.
Still, the poor China-U.S. relationship makes both Washington and Beijing more comfortable pressing a harder line on Taiwan
despite the harm to Sino-American ties. In Washington’s view, Beijing has been challenging the status quo by
pushing more favorable interpretations of previous agreements, inducing other countries to isolate Taiwan, and excluding
Taiwanese participation from multinational efforts to manage global problems. U.S. officials have also complained about the
expanding PLA military activities in the island’s vicinity. In response, the United States, under both the Biden and Trump
administrations, has strived to deepen bilateral collaboration with Taiwan and widen its multilateral ties with U.S. allies and
partners. Though controversial, Biden seemed to acknowledge that the United States will do at least as much for Taiwan as it has for
Ukraine in the face of external aggression, leaving ambiguous whether U.S. forces would engage in actual combat operations .
2NC – UQ – Wall
Biden is containing China through active diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific---avoids a

catastrophic China war
Daniel Fazio 21, Ph. D, Lecturer in History and Politics at the University of South Australia,
“Containing China’s assertiveness with diplomacy,” Asia & The Pacific Policy Society,
06/21/2021, https://www.policyforum.net/containing-chinas-assertiveness-with-diplomacy/
Just as China was the crucial catalyst in the creation of this alliance system in 1951, the Biden Administration is
now responding to China’s assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific region, reaffirming this 70-year-old
regional alliance system.
For instance, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and South Korean President Moon Jae-In were the first two foreign heads of
government to meet with Biden in the White House, suggesting the administration regards this regional alliance as essential in
managing the China challenge.
Clearly, the Biden Administration also recognises

the limits of American power and is investing in
diplomacy and engagement to prevent conflict with China.
Active diplomacy between the United States and its regional allies may indeed be the best way to
constrain the belligerence of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s regime.
China is fully aware of the combined military power of the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, and the armed forces of
the Philippines, Australia, and possibly India and Indonesia could be added to this list. For all its assertive behaviour, Beijing
knows a military conflict would devastate the region.
Knowing it is unlikely to prevail in such a conflict could constrain China’s behaviour in the region
so, despite geostrategic tensions, reaffirming this American alliance system makes sense.
When this alliance system came into being, the United States and China were at war on the Korean Peninsula and engaged in a
standoff over Taiwan, and today, Taiwan and North Korea remain crucial factors in the geostrategic tensions between the two
states.
The United States has no option other than to push back in some way against Chinese posturing in
the region. Acquiescence to China could mean an irretrievable loss of American geostrategic
authority, international prestige, and trust among its allies.
This presents the middle powers of the region with a stark choice: support the United States and the democratic values it
represents, or gravitate into China’s authoritarian orbit.
Economic dependence on China weakens national sovereignty and could make countries like Australia increasingly vulnerable to
coercion, but it is hard to imagine America’s allies will acquiesce to pressure from China. Ultimately, America’s allies know
that if Beijing pushes too far, the United States will inevitably push back.
Engaging with its regional allies is the best way for the Biden Administration to avoid what Graham Allison calls
the ‘Thucydides trap’: the United States and China going to war because each fear the other
poses a real threat to their respective geostrategic interests.
Policymakers need to realise that the dangerof conflict between the United States and China is very real and, if
conflict does break out, it will involve America’s regional allies. Drums of war rhetoric – whatever its actual intent
– can have unintended consequences, and no one in the region wants conflict.
If war breaks out, it will be because of a miscalculation or faulty assumptions by one or both sides about the other’s intentions, and
regional allies should work with the Biden Administration to prevent this from happening.
As an authoritarian regime, China

is motivated by the acquisition, maintenance, and expansion of its
power, and the suppression of any alternative and contrary sources of power. As such, its posturing
must be challenged because it threatens the geostrategic interests of the United States and its regional
allies, including Australia.
Given the difficult situation, the Biden Administration’s reaffirmation of the country’s 70-year-old alliance system in
Asia through active diplomacy is a prudent response. In the face of the threat to regional stability posed by
Chinese assertiveness, this alliance system provides the United States and its allies with a strong
mechanism to contain China and avoid a disastrous conflict.
Indo-Pacific diplomacy is the top US priority—essential in deterring aggressive

Chinese expansionism and regional stability
Miller 7/12 (Michael E. Miller, Michael E. Miller is The Washington Post's Sydney bureau chief. He was previously on
the local enterprise team. He joined The Washington Post in 2015 and has also reported for the newspaper from Afghanistan and
Mexico.“U.S. to open new embassies, boost aid in Pacific as China’s sway grows,” Washington
Post, 7/12/2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/07/12/kamala-harris-pacific-
islands-us-china/) -LH
The UnitedStates said Tuesday it would expand its diplomatic presence in the Pacific, as it seeks
to counter the growing influence of China in a region of intensifying great-power rivalry.
The new
efforts, which will be announced by Vice President Harris during a virtual address to leaders at the Pacific Islands
Forum (PIF) in Fiji, will
include two additional U.S. embassies and a tripling of some aid, among other
measures.
The diplomatic push comes amid concerns that China has supplanted the United States as the
friend of choice for some Pacific island nations. China struck a security agreement with the
Solomon Islands in April despite American objections. And the Chinese foreign minister recently signed
several other bilateral agreements during an eight-country tour of the region.
The Biden administration has sought to shift American focus from the Middle East to Asia. It has
withdrawn U.S. troops from Afghanistan, ramped up the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with Japan, Australia and
India, and launched the AUKUS pact with Britain and Australia , which, like the Quad, is seen as a
countermeasure to China’s growing military assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific.
Yet China’s security agreement with the Solomon Islands — the site of a key American military victory at Guadalcanal during World
War II — appeared to catch the United States and its close regional allies, Australia and New Zealand, by surprise.
The new diplomatic initiatives come as the United States tries to restore some of its influence in the
region.
“We are significantly stepping up our game in the Pacific islands,” said a senior administration
official who spoke to reporters on the condition of anonymity ahead of the vice president’s PIF appearance. The official said the
United States is not asking Pacific island nations to choose between it and China.
“We are focusing on our own engagement and our own interests and our own support,” the official said. “Of course contrasts [with
China] will be made, and we would like to think that contrast looks favorably on us, where we’ve
been a responsible
security actor in the region, in fact, in the entire Indo-Pacific, for many decades and have helped to preserve a
free and open Indo-Pacific.”
Among the measures Harris will announce to Pacific leaders will be new
U.S. embassies in Kiribati and Tonga. In 2019,
Kiribati and the Solomon Islands both switched their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to
China, underscoring the inroads Beijing has made in the region.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited both countries during his Pacific tour in late May and signed bilateral agreements with
each.
Kiribati announced this week that it was withdrawing from the PIF, purportedly over a leadership dispute, although an opposition
leader told the Guardian the withdrawal was the result of Chinese pressure. China has denied that.
The U.S.official said that the Biden administration was “concerned” by Kiribati’s withdrawal but that
discussions over the issue are ongoing.
Harris will also announce that the administration aims to triple funding for economic
development and ocean resilience in the region to $60 million a year for the next decade, although Congress will
have to approve the increase. Some of the funds would go toward combating the impact of climate
change on the Pacific island nations, which are among the world’s most vulnerable.
The United States will also appoint its first envoy to the Pacific Islands Forum , which, despite infighting,
has emerged as a key regional bloc. In a sign of the region’s growing geopolitical importance , the Biden administration
will also design and release its first national strategy specifically devoted to the Pacific islands.
Harris will announce the return of the Peace Corps to Fiji, Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu after volunteers were withdrawn during the
pandemic. The Biden administration is also exploring expanding the program to additional Pacific island countries.
“We are expanding our footprint and making sure we have the people and apparatus in place to deepen our
cooperation on a day-to-day basis and to deliver concrete results,” the senior administration official said.
But the Solomon Islands show the limitations of such outreach. In February, the Biden administration announced it would reopen its
long-shuttered embassy in the nation’s capital, Honiara, only for China to announce its security agreement two months later.
That agreement stirred fears of a Chinese military base about 1,000 miles from Australian shores, though China and the Solomon
Islands denied that would happen. China recently failed in an attempt to strike a similar but far broader security agreement with 10
Pacific island countries, but Beijing has suggested it will try again.
Australia’s recently elected center-left Labor government has also promised to boost diplomacy, aid and military ties to Pacific island
nations to counter Beijing’s growing influence.
Despite a slight easing of tensions between the two countries, highlighted by the first ministerial meetings in three years, China has
yet to lift punishing tariffs on Australia.
During a visit to Washington this week, Richard Marles, the Australian defense minister and deputy prime minister, said the
United States and Australia will need to increase their presence in the Indo-Pacific, warning that a
failure to maintain a balance of power could be “catastrophic.”
Biden is invested in cooperation focused on deterring China now—key to check

expansion
Hernik 7/11 (Jan Hernik, Jan Hernik is a journalist and publicist who gained experience in Polish independent Internet
media broadcasts. In his career, he participated in the creation of projects related to domestic policy and geopolitics. Hernik has an
experience in working as a TV presenter and editor of a news portal. At the Warsaw Institute, he is the editor-in-chief and expert in
the field of the United States. Hernik is a graduate of the American Studies Center at the University of Warsaw. He specializes in the
theory of religion, race and ethnicity for political choice in the U.S presidential elections. His research interests also include the
colonial era of the United States, the right to bear arms and the American liberal thought .
“The United States accepts
China’s challenge. Biden leads the establishment of “Partners in the Blue Pacific,” Warsaw
Institute, https://warsawinstitute.org/united-states-accepts-chinas-challenge-biden-leads-
establishment-partners-blue-pacific/) - LH
During his recent meetings at the international level, the

US President devoted a lot of time to building
relations with representatives of allied countries in the Indo-Pacific. Joe Biden visited Asia for the first
time as president in late May this year to strengthen ties with South Korea during his visit to Seoul and two
days later at the QUAD summit in Tokyo. It is also worth noting that on May 31, 2022, the Prime Minister of New
Zealand, Jacinda Ardern, visited the White House.
The president’s administration spends a lot of time building relations with allies in the Pacific and managing
relations with the People’s Republic of China. This is evidenced by the presence of US Secretary of Defense Lloyd
Austin at the Shangri-La Asia Security Summit in Singapore. On June 11, Austin not only met with his Australian and Japanese
counterparts there, but the day before he had his first meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wei Fenghe. The
diplomatic
turbulence of the statements by the Chinese representative confirmed the Americans in the
belief that the People’s Republic of China is not focused on maintaining the status quo in the
region, so the Joe Biden administration, in agreement with its allies, decided to launch another initiative
aimed at facing Chinese expansion.
A statement released on the White House website indicates that they plan to use their potential to
ensure “prosperity, resilience and security in the Pacific.” The means to achieve the set goal is
cooperation with countries that are directly exposed to the growing territorial, economic and military
aspirations of the People’s Republic of China. Mention is made here, inter alia, of about Fiji, Micronesia or Tonga.
In the official media information of the Joe Biden administration, we read about three areas of cooperation on which the
Partners in the Blue Pacific initiative will focus:
Efficiency and performance in the Indo-Pacific

The demands of the five countries are to be based on the upcoming 2050 Pacific Islands Forum strategy for the Blue Pacific.
Strengthening regionalism
The PBP will develop closer contacts with Pacific Island State Governments and the Pacific Islands Forum, facilitating stronger and
more regular engagement with countries launching a new initiative in the region.
Expanding opportunities for cooperation between the Pacific and the world
PBP will encourage and facilitate greater involvement in the Pacific through any other partner who shares the Pacific’s values and
aims to work constructively and transparently for the benefit of the people of the region.[1]
Building ever-wider alliances and collaborations to support the islands in the Indo-Pacific region is another
step for the United States to respond to a growing Chinese initiative. Joe Biden’s administration
and the countries of the Free World see the threat that goes along with the progressive aspirations of the PRC. Actions in the East
are not the only tool of the US in building resistance, also at the NATO summit in Madrid, which took place on June 28-
30, 2022, the topic of the Chinese threat was raised for the first time in history . Representatives of
partners from the Pacific region also attended the meeting of the leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance. We are talking about leading
politicians from Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea.
At a time when media headlines are dominated by topics related to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the administration of Joe
Biden, together with the leading leaders of the countries of the Pacific region and the world, is proving that it is not
losing sight of the greatest threat, which they see in the form of totalitarian actions, the
expansion of the Chinese People’s Army Liberation, economic and territorial expansion of China .
The partial neutralization of China also means an indirect weakening of the regime of Vladimir Putin, which remains in constant
agreement with Xi Jinping.
Diplomacy and allied engagement reflect US focus on China now—key to check

security risks posed by Chinese expansionism
7/8 Mousavizadeh (Philip Mousavizadeh, Philip Mousavizadeh is an undergraduate at Yale University studying
history and political science. He served as a staff reporter for the Yale Daily News for two years, covering University-wide policy and
its international dealings. Philip is from Denmark, Iran and the U.S. and is passionate about international relations, U.S. foreign policy
and the law. His studies have focused on American grand strategy, constitutional law and U.S. intelligence .
“The Biden
Administration’s China Policy: An Inventory of Actions to Address the Challenge,” Just Security,
7/8/2022, https://www.justsecurity.org/82252/the-biden-administrations-china-policy-an-
inventory-of-actions-to-address-the-challenge/) - LH
Rallying U.S. Allies Around the Security Threat Posed by China
In June 2021, NATO

leaders at their summit in Brussels declared China a global security risk. This
represented the first time that the organization, traditionally focused on Russia, shifted to prominently
emphasize its concern about China.
In the official communique released at the end of that summit, the

leaders declared that China’s “stated
ambitions and assertive behavior present systemic challenges to the rules-based international
order.”
At their latest summit last week in Madrid, NATO leaders adopted a new Strategic Concept that picks up much of
the language from the Brussels summit the year before and details actions that alliance members will take. In particular, the
strategic concept states
that NATO will “boost [its] shared awareness, enhance our resilience and
preparedness, and protect against the PRC’s coercive tactics and efforts to divide the Alliance.”
In May 2022, US
allies in the region collectively pushed back against coercive Chinese expansion in
the Indo-Pacific. According to a draft agreement obtained by the New York Times, China sought to expand its regional
influence in policing, maritime cooperation, and cybersecurity through a new agreement with Pacific nations. Documents obtained
by the Times outline how Beijing seeks to expand its alliances and access to the chains of islands in the Pacific that are of geopolitical
significance to China.
However, when China presented the proposal to Pacific Island nations, they faced pushback from U.S. allies in the
region. In a letter to other Pacific nations, David Panuelo, president of the Federated States of Micronesia, cautioned them against
signing on, saying that the agreement represents the “single-most game-changing proposed agreement in the Pacific in any of our
lifetimes.”
Expanding the U.S. Role in the Indo-Pacific
Perhaps the most significant U.S. policy development with respect to China came in September 2021,
when the administration announced an agreement with Australia and the U.K. to provide the Australian
government with nuclear-powered submarines and to cooperate on cybertechnology and
artificial intelligence. As a result of the agreement, according to the New York Times,
“Australia may begin conducting patrols that could move through areas of the South China Sea that Beijing claims as its exclusive
zone and that range as far north as Taiwan. The
deal enables Australia, a major U.S. ally in the region, to
become a far more significant actor in the American-led alliance in the Pacific . The vessels are
equipped with nuclear propulsion systems that offer limitless range and run so quietly that they are hard to detect.”
In May 2022, Biden announced during his trip to Tokyo that the U.S. would set up joint monitoring
of ships in the Indo-Pacific region with India, Japan, and Australia, the three other members of the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue, also known as the Quad. The Wall Street Journal reported the move was “designed to deter illegal
Chinese fishing and maritime militias.”
Other Diplomatic Measures
The administration has also sought to leverage symbolic diplomatic pressure on China. Most
significantly, in December, the United States announced that its diplomats and officials would be boycotting the Beijing winter
Olympics, citing human rights concerns.
Conclusion
Concern over China’s role in the world is one of the few bipartisan issues remaining on Capitol Hill. In just
the last few weeks, members of both parties have introduced legislation that would overhaul American policy towards Taiwan and
firmly commit the United States to standing by Taiwan. The
stakes involved in U.S. policy on China, coupled
with the inflamed rhetoric as tensions rise, is only further evidence that the relationship with
China requires delicate handling.
The measures detailed above illustrate the Biden administration’s attempt to walk that tightrope. It is impossible to anticipate the
turns this relationship will take in the coming years. The measures outlined above demonstrate that, successful or not, the
administration has a unified and consistent approach to China using allies where it can, but
acting alone where it must, in an effort to support American interests both regionally and globally.
Biden is focusing on China now—must invest in relationships in the Indo-Pacific

Gomez 5/19 (Justin Gomez, ABC News White House Producer/Reporter, “Biden embarks for
Asia with a heavy focus on China and North Korea,” ABC News, 5/19/2022,
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/biden-embarks-asia-heavy-focus-china-north-korea/story?
id=84811808) - LH
With much of the Biden administration's attention this year focused on Russia's invasion of Ukraine, President
Joe Biden
turns his attention to Asia Thursday as he embarks on a visit to South Korea and Japan -- a trip that
the White House says "comes at a pivotal moment" for his foreign policy agenda .
The trip will mark the president's first trip to the region since taking office and will feature a heavy focus on North
Korea and China. While the president campaigned heavily on making China a main focus of his foreign policy, the war in
Ukraine has occupied Biden's foreign agenda of late.
While the White House may hope that the trip shows that the president has not taken his eye off the challenge China poses, Ukraine
will still loom large over the trip.
"President Biden has rallied the free world in defense of Ukraine and in opposition to Russian aggression," White House national
security adviser Jake Sullivan said Wednesday. "He remains focused on ensuring that our efforts in those missions are successful, but
he also intends to seize this moment, this pivotal moment, to assert bold and confident American
leadership in another vital region of the world -- the Indo-Pacific."
Biden will begin his journey in Seoul and wrap the visit in Tokyo. Sullivan said this
will be an "opportunity to reaffirm
and reinforce two vital security alliances" and to "deepen two vibrant economic partnerships."
"The message we're trying to send on this trip is a message of an affirmative vision of what the
world can look like if the democracies and open societies of the world stand together to shape
the rules of the road, to define the security architecture of the region , to reinforce strong, powerful,
historic alliances, and we think putting that on display over four days bilaterally with the ROK and Japan, through
the Quad, through the Indo-Pacific economic framework, it will send a powerful message. We think that
message will be heard everywhere."
Asked to what extent is the message of this trip is a cautionary tale delivered to China and their aggression towards Taiwan,
Sullivan said the message "will be heard in Beijing, but it is not a negative message, and it's not targeted at any
one country."
While in South Korea, President Biden is expected to meet with President Yoon Seok-youl, "engage with technology and
manufacturing leaders" who are "mobilizing billions of dollars in investment here in the United States," and he will visit American
and South Korean troops who are "standing shoulder-to-shoulder in defense" of threats posed by North Korea.
White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said Biden will not be visiting the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) this trip. He
visited the area as vice president in 2013 and while serving in the Senate.
Sullivan, though, continued to repeat that U.S. intelligence continues to show that North Korean leader Kim Jon Un, who ramped up
missile launches in 2002, could launch a long-range missile test, nuclear test, or both in the days leading into, on, or after the
president's trip to the region.
"We are preparing for all contingencies, including the possibility that such a provocation would occur while we are in Korea or in
Japan," Sullivan told reporters.
He said that the U.S. is coordinating with allies in South Korea and Japan, as well as counterparts in China.
"We are prepared obviously to make both short and longer-term adjustments to our military posture as necessary to ensure that we
are providing both defense and deterrence to our allies in the region and then we're responding to any North Korean provocation."
In Japan, Biden will meet with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to discuss economic relations and global security issues,
including North Korea, and they launch a new economic initiative for the region.
"The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, IPEF, as we affectionately call it, is a 21st century economic arrangement, a
new model designed to tackle new economic challenges," Sullivan said. "From setting the rules of the digital
economy, to ensuring secure and resilient supply chains, to managing the energy transition, to
investing in clean modern high standards infrastructure."
And while in Tokyo, Biden will also participate in a second in-person Quad summit with his counterparts
from Australia, India and Japan. They last met in September at the White House
The US wants to invest more in the Indo-Pacific

Marson, Wall Street Journal European Security Correspondent, 6-11, 2022, (James, "Biden to
Press NATO Over China Threat," Wall Street Journal, PAS) https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-
to-press-nato-over-china-threat-11623419446
BRUSSELS—During his meetingwith NATO allies Monday, President Biden is expected to press the alliance
to do more to counter the rising threat from China, while still deterring the persistent menace from Russia. But he
will encounter skepticism from some allies who question what role the North Atlantic Treaty Organization can have on China—which
is seen as posing little direct military threat in the North Atlantic region—and whether such efforts could distract from the alliance’s
primary goal of deterring Russia. NATO began formally addressing the rise of China in 2019, noting in a declaration after a meeting of
alliance leaders the “opportunities and challenges that we need to address together.” The communiqué after next week’s
summit will include more details on the challenges and NATO’s responses, say diplomats familiar with its
preparation. China will also receive significant attention in the alliance’s planned new Strategic
Concept, its guiding policy document, which currently doesn’t mention the country at all. At a news conference Friday, NATO
Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg noted among the challenges facing the alliance, “Russia and China pushing back against the
rules-based international order.” Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman on Wednesday cited shared concerns about China’s
intellectual-property theft, cyber hacking and Beijing’s actions involving Taiwan, Hong Kong and Xinjiang. She told an event at the
German Marshall Fund of the United States, a think tank, that, “These are issues of concern for European allies, and obviously a
concern for NATO.” But there are differences within NATO over how to approach China. The U.S. wants to align allies to
broadly pressure Beijing. European governments don’t want to be drawn into a confrontation and are eager to protect
trade ties. Hungary is particularly close to China, and recently blocked a European Union statement criticizing Beijing over a new
security law in Hong Kong. “It’s clear that Europeans have no desire to be between the hammer and anvil,” said Bruno Lété, senior
fellow of security and defense at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Brussels. “China is a potential bone of
contention. It’s a splitter.” The U.S.
desire to direct resources to the Indo-Pacific could increase pressure
on European NATO members to do more for their own defenses, including increasing military spending to
the alliance’s target of 2% of gross domestic product. Only 10 of the 30 members, including the U.S., met the goal last year. “The U.S.
is fed up,” said Theresa Fallon, director of the Center for Russia Europe Asia Studies in Brussels. “Everyone’s been talking about this
for years, but now it really, really matters.”
Biden focus on China now—rhetoric, cooperation, and actions all reflect China
as the primary foreign policy priority
7/8 Mousavizadeh (Philip Mousavizadeh, Philip Mousavizadeh is an undergraduate at Yale University studying
history and political science. He served as a staff reporter for the Yale Daily News for two years, covering University-wide policy and
its international dealings. Philip is from Denmark, Iran and the U.S. and is passionate about international relations, U.S. foreign policy
and the law. His studies have focused on American grand strategy, constitutional law and U.S. intelligence .
“The Biden
Administration’s China Policy: An Inventory of Actions to Address the Challenge,” Just Security,
7/8/2022, https://www.justsecurity.org/82252/the-biden-administrations-china-policy-an-
inventory-of-actions-to-address-the-challenge/) - LH
President Joe Biden and his administration have made clear since taking office that its primary
foreign policy challenge is what it sees as China’s increasingly aggressive actions that threaten the
international order cultivated over decades by the United States and its allies. While Russia’s war in Ukraine has become the
immediate concern and has heightened awareness of Russia’s persistent threat, China
remains a strategic priority for
the United States, as demonstrated by Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s May speech outlining the
administration’s policy toward China. Just last week, Biden and other NATO leaders meeting in
Madrid for their annual summit cited China’s “challenge” to “our interests, security and values” in their
updated Strategic Concept 2022 for the alliance going forward.
In an attempt to understand the U.S. position and its aims in navigating the China challenge, it is useful to catalog the most
significant measures the
Biden administration has taken to date. The overarching approach, as outlined through
numerous statements and speeches, appears to be one of framing the relationship as a contest between
democracy and authoritarianism, in pursuit of a free, open, and secure Indo-Pacific region , and
alliances characterized by cooperation rather than coercion. The administration’s policy toward China represents the merging of a
hard-line approach partially inherited from its predecessor with a greater emphasis on taking action with allies and partners.
The concrete steps detailed below suggest that the administration has sought to cooperate with its allies
where it can; some of the most strategically and symbolically significant actions have been taken in lockstep with key allies,
from the agreement on nuclear submarines with Australia and the United Kingdom to the new
Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and the NATO strategy document referenced above . At the same
time, the Biden team has been prepared to act unilaterally to impose a wide array of sanctions on Chinese
individuals and firms and has maintained some key Trump-era trade restrictions. The administration
has expanded its commitment to halting China’s malign efforts to gain undue or harmful regional
influence through diplomatic and military means as well. This includes both actively expanding
America’s presence in the region through broad multilateral agreements and through a bolstered relationship with
Taiwan.
The following catalogs Biden administration actions that directly address the relationship with China: in his speech outlining U.S.
China policy, for example,
Blinken talked about the importance of investment at home in boosting
America’s global competitiveness; such broader aspects of the dynamic are not included here. This compilation also
does not attempt to be exhaustive: there are, of course, myriad decisions made on a daily basis that are part of the wider approach
to China that are not detailed here. Rather, this seeks to highlight the most significant steps, so as to create an overall understanding
of the administration’s approach.
2NC – UQ – Framing
Framing issue --- strategic concept sets the tone for US-NATO focus --- that’s on
shifting towards China
Guyer, Vox Senior Foreign Policy Writer, 6-27, 2022, (Jonathan, "What Biden wants to achieve
in Europe — and whether he’ll get it," Vox, PAS)
https://www.vox.com/2022/6/27/23181857/biden-eu-europe-nato-g7-summit-goals
Though Russia is the war of the moment, observers will be watching how NATO addresses China
in its new strategic concept — the document that is its “purpose in life,” as Rose Gottemoeller, the
alliance’s former deputy secretary general, put it. Since the US seems increasingly focused on
deterring China’s military power in the Indo-Pacific region, European countries will have to
refocus on how to defend Europe. “The alliance will be careful not to overreach with regard to
its competition with China, and I think it will be careful not to over-militarize that competition,” Lute told me. “It will
require careful drafting by NATO, because, of course, it’s a military alliance.” Securing critical infrastructure, commerce, and
investments in Europe from China’s influence will likely be a priority of NATO’s approach to China. The last NATO strategic concept
was from 2010 and described a different moment. “Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack
against NATO territory is low,” it read.
Strategic Concept provides focus on China

Scheunemann, Atlantic Council Transatlantic Security Initiative Deputy Director, 7-2, 2022,
(Leah, Interviewed by Josh Keating and Lili Pike, GRID Global Security and China Reporters, "Why
China is mad at NATO right now," GRID, 7-2, PAS)
https://www.grid.news/story/global/2022/07/02/natos-new-china-focus-smart-move-or-too-
provocative/
Leah Scheunemann: Itis not a surprise for those of us who have been watching NATO’s evolution toward
China for the last several years, especially under the Trump administration. There was a lot of focus
from Washington on getting them to focus more on the threat of China. But the language on
China is striking. It’s literally a list of all the ways the PRC [People’s Republic of China] is challenging the
interests and security and values of NATO. I think it’s stronger language, or at least more explicit language, than we
would have expected even two years ago. But the cyberattacks emanating from China, sponsored by the PRC, have been a persistent
problem in Europe for years. So has Chinese investment in critical infrastructure and the supply chain — issues that the pandemic
exacerbated. I think it’s really important that Europe
has woken up to this threat, even if it’s not putting it at
the same primacy that the United States is right now.
2NC – UQ – Economic Diplomacy
The US seeks to extend its diplomacy to shape an economic environment
around China.
Edward Wong and Ana Swanson 5-26-22 (Edward Wong, diplomatic correspondent for The
New York Times who reports on foreign policy from Washington, Ana Swanson, writes about
trade and international economics for The New York Times, “U.S. Aims to Constrain China by
Shaping Its Environment, Blinken Says”, The New York Times,
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/26/us/politics/china-policy-biden.html)
WASHINGTON — Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken

said Thursday that despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China
remains the greatest challenger to the United States and its allies, and that the Biden
administration aims to “shape the strategic environment” around the Asian superpower to limit
its increasingly aggressive actions.
“China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and,
increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to do it,” Mr. Blinken said in
a speech laying out the administration’s strategy on China. “Beijing’s vision would move us away from the
universal values that have sustained so much of the world’s progress over the past 75 years.”
The speech was the first public overview of President Biden’s approach to China, and it is based on a much longer classified strategy
that was largely completed last fall. U.S. officials say that decades of direct economic and diplomatic engagement to compel the
Chinese Communist Party to abide by American-led rules, agreements and institutions have largely failed, and Mr. Blinken
asserted that the goal now should be to form coalitions with other nations to limit the party’s
global power and curb its aggressions.
“We can’t rely on Beijing to change its trajectory,” he said. “So we will shape the strategic
environment around Beijing to advance our vision for an open and inclusive international
system.”
China’s open alignment with Russia before and during Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine have
further clarified for American and European officials the difficulties of engaging with Beijing . On
Feb. 4, almost three weeks before the invasion, President Vladimir V. Putin met with President
Xi Jinping in Beijing as their two governments issued a 5,000-word statement announcing a “no
limits” partnership that aims to oppose the international diplomatic and economic systems
overseen by the United States and its allies. Since the war began, the Chinese government has given Russia
diplomatic support by reiterating Mr. Putin’s criticisms of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and spreading disinformation and
conspiracy theories that undermine the United States and Ukraine.
“Beijing’s defense of President Putin’s war to erase Ukraine’s sovereignty and secure a sphere of
influence in Europe should raise alarm bells for all of us who call the Indo-Pacific region home,”
Mr. Blinken said to an audience at George Washington University.
Mr. Blinken emphasized that the United States does not seek to overthrow the Communist Party
or subvert China’s political system and that the two nations — nuclear powers with entwined
economies — could work together on some issues. However, Chinese officials will almost
certainly regard major parts of the speech as the outlines of an effort at containment of China,
similar to previous American policy toward the Soviet Union.
In private conversations, Chinese officials have expressed concern about the emphasis on
regional alliances under Mr. Biden and their potential to hem in China.
Mr. Blinken pointed to the creation last year of a security pact, called AUKUS, among Australia, Britain and the United States. The
work on coalition building is the opposite of the approach of President Donald J. Trump, who denounced U.S. partners and alliances
as part of his “America First” foreign policy.
Mr. Blinken’s speech revolved around the slogan for the Biden strategy: “Invest,
Align and Compete.” The partnerships
fall under the “align” part. “Invest” refers to pouring resources into the United States — administration
officials point to the $1 trillion bipartisan infrastructure law passed last year as an example. And
“compete” refers to the rivalry with China, a framing the Trump administration also promoted.
Both administrations emphasized the same core problems in U.S.-China relations: The
integration of China’s economy
with those of the United States and its allies gives Beijing enormous strategic leverage. And the
wealth that China has amassed from trade helps it chip away at American dominance of the
global economy and technology as well as military power in the Asia-Pacific region.
“Beijing wants to put itself at the center of global innovation and manufacturing, increase other countries’ technological
dependence, and then use that dependence to impose its foreign policy preferences,” Mr. Blinken said. “An d
Beijing is going
to great lengths to win this contest — for example, taking advantage of the openness of our
economies to spy, to hack, to steal technology and know-how to advance its military innovation
and entrench its surveillance state.”
Mr. Blinken also said that to meet the challenges Beijing posed, he was creating a “China House” team to coordinate policy across
the State Department and work with Congress.
Liu Pengyu, a spokesman at the Chinese Embassy in Washington, said after the speech that “competition does exist in some areas
such as trade, but it should not be used to define the overall picture of China-U.S. relations.”
“It is never China’s goal to surpass or replace the U.S. or engage in zero-sum competition with it,” he added.
Mr. Blinken also noted the human rights abuses, repression of ethnic minorities and quashing of
free speech and assembly by the Communist Party in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong. In recent
years, those issues have galvanized greater animus toward China among Democratic and
Republican politicians and policymakers. “We’ll continue to raise these issues and call for
change,” he said.
But Mr. Blinken sought to defuse any misunderstandings over Taiwan, the biggest single flashpoint in U.S.-China relations. He
reiterated longstanding U.S. policy on Taiwan, despite remarks by Mr. Biden in Tokyo on Monday that the United States has a
“commitment” to get involved militarily to defend Taiwan if China attacks the self-governing democratic island. The
U.S.
government for decades has maintained a policy of “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan — leaving
unsaid whether it would use force to protect the island from China — and has opposed Taiwan
independence.
Mr. Blinken said it was China’s recent actions toward Taiwan — trying to sever the island’s diplomatic and international ties and
sending fighter jets over the area — that are “deeply destabilizing.”
“While our policy has not changed, what has changed is Beijing’s growing coercion,” he said.
Yawei Liu, a political scientist at Emory University and director of the China Research Center in Atlanta, said Mr. Blinken’s words
would not reassure Beijing. “I don’t think this is going to satisfy the China side,” he said in a Twitter Spaces conversation after the
speech.
But Mr. Blinken stressed that despite the rising concerns, the United States was not seeking a new Cold War and would not try to
isolate China, the world’s second-largest economy.
Mr. Blinken credited China’s growth to the talent and hard work of the Chinese people, as well as the stability of the agreements on
global trade and diplomacy created and shaped by the United States in what Washington calls the rules-based international order.
“Arguably no country on earth has benefited more from that than China,” he said. “But rather than using its power to reinforce and
revitalize the laws, agreements, principles and institutions that enabled its success, so other countries can benefit from them too,
Beijing is undermining it.”
After China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, which the United States supported, leaders in Beijing carried out
far-reaching changes to the nation’s planned economy to open up further to outside trade and investment, helping to transform
China from one of the world’s poorest countries into its biggest factory hub, and lifting hundreds of millions of people into the global
middle class.
But China stopped far short of becoming the free-market democracy that many in the West had hoped, and over the past decade,
under Mr.Xi, the Communist Party and Chinese state have exerted an even heavier hand over the
private market and individual freedoms.
Both Democrats and Republicans now see Chinese trade practices, including the government’s creation of heavily subsidized
national champions and its acceptance of intellectual property theft, as one of the biggest factors undercutting American industry.
“For too long, Chinese companies have enjoyed far greater access to our markets than our companies have in China,” Mr. Blinken
said.” This lack of reciprocity is unacceptable and it’s unsustainable.”
The administration introduced a core initiative to shape the economic environment around
China — the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework — during Mr. Biden’s visit to Tokyo this week.
The United States and 13 Asia-Pacific nations will try to negotiate new industry standards.
But skeptics have said Washington’s ability to shape trade in the Asia-Pacific region may be limited because the framework is not a
traditional trade agreement that offers countries reductions in tariffs and more access to the lucrative American market — a move
that would be politically unpopular in the United States.
Mr. Blinken did not highlight Chinese government influence operations and espionage in the United States, which had been a focal
point of the Trump administration’s messaging about China. He said he welcomed Chinese exchange students, and that many of
them stay — “They help drive innovation here at home, and that benefits all of us.”
“We can stay vigilant about our national security without closing our doors,” he said. “Racism and hate have no place in a nation
built by generations of immigrants to fulfill the promise of opportunity for all.”
2NC – UQ – China Aggressive
US diplomatic power is ahead now, but only continued focus can prevent China
from filling in the power vacuum.
Jeffrey Feltman 20 {He is a John C. Whitehead Visiting Fellow in International Diplomacy. He is
also a senior fellow at the United Nations Foundation and a senior advisor to Kissinger
Associates. He serves on the board of governors of the Middle East Institute, on the advisory
board of the Amsterdam-based Dialogue Advisory Group, and as an advisor to the European
Institute of Peace. From 2012 until 2018, Feltman was U.N. under-secretary-general for political
affairs. Previously, he served a U.S. foreign service officer. From 2009 until 2012, Feltman was
the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs. Prior to his 2004-2008 tenure as U.S.
ambassador to Lebanon, he served in Erbil, Baghdad, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Tunis, Amman,
Budapest, and Port-au-Prince}, 20 – (“China’s Expanding Influence At the United Nations – And
How the United States Should React,” Brookings, September 2020,
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/FP_20200914_china_united_nations
_feltman.pdf//marlborough-wr/
China’s growing influence inside the United Nations is inevitable, stemming from President Xi
Jinping’s more assertive foreign policy and the fact that China’s assessed contributions to the
world body are now second only to those of the United States. Traditionally focused on the
U.N.’s development activities, China now flexes its muscles in the heart of the U.N., its peace
and security work. The Chinese-Russian tactical alignment in the U.N. Security Council
challenges protection of human rights and humanitarian access , demonstrated in July 2020
when China and Russia vetoed two resolutions regarding Syria and both blocked the
appointment of a French national as special envoy for Sudan.
Yet the fears that China is changing the United Nations from within seem if not overblown, at
least premature. Whatever its ambitions, China has not replaced the United States as the U.N.’s
most powerful member state. The U.N. can still be a force multiplier for the values and interests
of the United States, but only if Washington now competes for influence rather than assume
automatic U.N. deference. The U.N. can be characterized as “home turf” for the United States,
but walking off the field will facilitate China moving in to fill the vacuum.
2NC – UQ – QUAD And AKUS
Biden laser focused on ‘relentless diplomacy’ thru AUKUS and the QUAD---key
to containing China
Dr. Moonis Ahmar 21, Professor of International Relations at the University of Karachi,
Director, Program on Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, “America’s uphill road to relentless
diplomacy,” The Express Tribune, 10/03/2021, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2323010/americas-
uphill-road-to-relentless-diplomacy
In the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, many questions have arisen with specific regard to US foreign policy.
Biden’s administration appears to have shifted towards soft power. However, the growing Sino-US
wedge is alarming because of the impact it can have on the global order and the possibility of a rift in Sino-Russian relations.
Today’s emerging realities require readjustments, which negate what President Biden narrated in his speech. If
security arrangements under the framework of Australia, UK, US (AUKUS) is a new initiative to deal with growing Chinese
engagements in the Indo-Pacific region, the four-member understanding among Australia, India, Japan and the US known as QUAD is
another manifestation of what Beijing termed ‘cold war mentality’. The
first in-person summit of QUAD held in
Washington on 24th September is a mature effort to further consolidate the security alliance aimed at
containing China. The US signed yet another arrangement in the form of AUKUS targeting China. Both QUAD and AUKUS
can be termed as an eastern NATO that focuses on the Indo-Pacific region.
After spending more than 2 trillion dollars during its 20 years of futile war in Afghanistan, the US strategic and security mindset has
shifted its focus on two major threats to its age-old sphere of influence in Europe and the Asia-Pacific — Russia and China. The US
spent 12 trillion dollars in overseas wars — from the Korean war in the 1950s till the cessation of Afghan military engagement on
August 15, 2021. In economic and military power, China was far behind the US but now it is almost
on a par with the US
in the economic arena. It has also tried to bridge the gap in military and technological power. Even Russia
has recovered from the fall of the USSR and is now able to challenge the US’ so-called invincible power.
Biden’s diplomatic offensive against the two-pronged threat of Russia and China is based on three major
objectives.
First, to isolate and contain China in the Asia-Pacific region by utilising AUKUS and QUAD along with South
Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. Exploiting grey areas like unrest in Xinjiang, Tibet,
Hong Kong is America’s foremost strategic priority. Washington is mindful of Beijing’s growing
aggressive and offensive posture against Taiwan and terms it a major flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific
region. But, over the years, China has consolidated its soft power by diplomacy, aid, trade and investments
under its Belt and Road Initiative. The US may call China a ‘dragon’ and augment the sense of insecurity among countries in its
neighbourhood. However, Beijing has made full use of soft and smart power. We have yet to see how President Biden will transform
the claims he made in his speech into a reality. The US confidence amid its humiliation in Afghanistan must also be understood by
those who overestimated China’s power while undermining its fault lines. As a pioneer in the realm of science, technology and
research, the
US along with Australia, Britain and Japan is confident that it can contain China. It can also deprive China of
its growing power muscle in the Asia-Pacific region by exploiting its internal issues and tightening
containment in its neighbourhood.
AT: Ukraine Trade Off
Ukraine didn’t sap diplomacy – Biden knows it’s ineffective with Russia and left
it to Ukraine -
Atwood et al., '22 – Kylie Atwood is a National Security Correspondent at CNN, Jennifer
Hansler is the CNN State Department Producer, Jeremy Herb is a CNN Politics Reporter ("No
diplomatic off-ramp in sight for Russia's war in Ukraine"; CNN;
https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/11/politics/ukraine-russia-putin-diplomacy/index.html; 3-11-
2022, Accessed 7-16-2022)//ILake-AZ **edited for language
With Russia's war in Ukraine now in its third week, US and European officials have little
optimism that the diplomatic channels can deliver a way out of the conflict at this point.
Talks between Ukraine's and Russia's diplomats this week yielded no discernible progress.
Supposedly safe evacuation routes out of the country have repeatedly been contested. The civilian death toll continues to rise, and
by the end of the week both sides were trading accusations over the use of chemical weapons.
While Russian President Vladimir Putin said Friday there had been "certain positive advances" in negotiations with Ukraine, US
and European officials and diplomats who spoke to CNN all expressed deep skepticism about the state of
talks. None felt Putin's actions to date have suggested the Russian leader is ready to find a diplomatic off-
ramp to end the war.
The US and its allies have enacted crippling [destabilizing] sanctions on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine, and US
President Joe Biden
has kept in touch with European leaders as well as Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky. But US officials have privately acknowledged they don't believe any of these sanctions
are going to change Putin's thinking, and many don't believe Russia's losses in Ukraine will either.
The Biden administration is resisting putting its weight behind any single player involved in early
efforts to broker a solution to end the Ukraine crisis. US officials say they have yet to see any
tangible progress in any channel and continue to view Ukraine and Russia as the only essential
players in driving a solution.
"A variety of different countries can try to shape things as they would like, but at the end of the day,
this will likely boil down to what President Zelensky is willing to accept and what President Putin
is willing to accept," said a senior State Department official.
Some administration officials believe that efforts by Turkey and Israel could prove more effective than the French and German
attempts because they have relations with both countries, but warn that it is too soon tell. Other officials are resistant to offer early
judgment.
"There can be other parties that facilitate that or mediate, and there's obviously been a number of efforts
underway already. But at the end of the day, this is likely to be a conflict that lasts for a while longer
-- and ultimately it will be a negotiation," the official added.
Biden’s priority is China—that focus is uniquely vulnerable due to Ukraine
tradeoffs
Chalfant and Kelley 5/18 (MORGAN CHALFANT AND LAURA KELLY, Morgan Chalfant is the White
House reporter at The Hill. Additionally, Morgan Chalfant has had 2 past jobs including Collegiate Network fellow at USA Today.
Laura Kelly is a reporter for The Hill in Washington D.C. where she writes about the politics and policy surrounding U.S. foreign
“Biden’s Asia trip shifts focus to China,”
affairs, covering Capitol Hill, the White House, and the State Department.
The Hill, 5/18/2022, https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/3493549-bidens-asia-trip-
shifts-focus-to-china/) - LH
President Biden will embark on his first trip to Asia as chief executive this week, an opportunity to
focus more on the challenge posed by China since his administration has been consumed for
months by Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Biden entered office expecting to focus on China as his foremost foreign policy challenge. In speech
after speech, Biden has identified China as the chief economic competitor of the U.S. and built
policy and partnerships around countering Beijing’s influence in the Asia-Pacific.
But that focus has been challenged by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which experts say virtually
guarantees the U.S. will need to devote more resources in the short and medium term to bolster
European security in addition to strengthening its Asian allies while confronting China.
“I don’t see that shift as temporary, and that’s because Russia has demonstrated aggressive intent that will require vigilance in
Eastern Europe and will require more American troops on NATO’s eastern flank, more ships, more aircraft, more capability,” said
Charles Kupchan, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who served at the National Security Council under former
President Obama.
But the White House has made clear that it has the capacity to devote resources and attention to both the Indo-Pacific and Europe,
and officials see Biden entering the next several days of meetings on strong footing, having united allies behind a common approach
to addressing Russian aggression.
“For us, there is a certain level of integration and symbiosis in the strategy we’re pursuing in Europe and the strategy we’re pursuing
in the Indo-Pacific,” White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan told reporters at a Wednesday briefing. “President Biden’s
unique capacity to actually stitch those together is, I think, going to be a hallmark of his foreign policy presidency.”
Biden’s first trip to Asia starts on Friday in South Korea, where he will meet the country’s newly elected
president, Yoon Suk-yeol. Then he is on to Japan, where he will meet face-to-face with the leaders of Japan, India and
Australia, which along with the U.S. compose the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.
The meeting marks a major summit for the security group that was revived in 2017 to better
coordinate against China’s ambitions in the region but may face tension over New Delhi’s resistance to join the U.S.-
led campaign to isolate Moscow.
It is the second in-person leader meeting for the Quad, following a gathering in Washington in September. A virtual summit was held
in March.
Russia is likely on the agenda. Intelligence officials have said China is watching closely and calculating how the global response to the
invasion of Ukraine factors into its goal of conquering Taiwan, the democratically governed island that Beijing claims as its own.
Yuko Nakano, fellow of the Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said that Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine is being viewed in Asia as a “mirror image” for how China could look to invade Taiwan.
“I think [Japanese Prime Minister Fumio] Kishida will take this opportunity to reiterate the message of stressing that unilateral
change to the status quo by force is unacceptable not only in Europe but also in Asia,” Nakano said during a panel discussion on
Wednesday.
Asked if Biden would use the trip to send a cautionary message to China, Sullivan said the
goal of the White House is to
put forth an “affirmative vision of what the world can look like if the democracies and open
societies of the world stand together to shape the rules of the road, to define the security arch of the
region, to reinforce strong, powerful, historic alliances.”
“We think that message will be heard everywhere, we think it will be heard in Beijing,” said Sullivan, who spoke to his Chinese
counterpart Yang Jiechi on Wednesday ahead of the trip about a range of issues.
North Korea is also sure to be a topic of discussion amid heightened tensions in the region. The
White House said Wednesday it is preparing for the possibility that Pyongyang conducts a ballistic missile or nuclear test during
Biden’s trip.
While the Quad alliance is widely viewed as having the goal of countering China’s military and economic influence, the group is
careful about the way it talks about China. Sullivan said that the Quad summit would deal with issues including climate,
cybersecurity and emerging technology.
“I think, generally speaking, the Quad puts forward a positive agenda that tries to avoid mentioning China,” said Joshua Fitt, an
associate fellow at the Center for a New American Security. “China is always lurking in the background of the corners of large parts
of the Quad’s agenda, but not all of them.”
The trip
will also give Biden an opportunity to more fully articulate his administration’s strategy
on China, which has struggled to take off.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken had a speech prepared focused on just that, which he was set to give on May 5 but had to cancel
after testing positive for COVID-19. The State Department has not provided an alternate date.
“The U.S. has struggled to develop a China policy. We’ve developed parts of it in fits and starts,”
Scott Kennedy, senior adviser and trustee chair in Chinese business and economics at CSIS, said in a briefing.
Kennedy, who has traveled in Taipei, Seoul and Tokyo over the past month, said that despite the administration’s concentrated
focus on Russia, the U.S. is in a strong position to counter China, which has instituted intense lockdowns to try to stem the
transmission of COVID-19 but that has wreaked havoc on their economy.
Pro-U.S. governments in South Korea and Japan, and a historic U.S.-ASEAN summit in Washington last week, further strengthened
Biden’s hand in the Indo-Pacific, he argued.
“China’s reputation in the region has suffered dramatically while the U.S.’s has improved significantly,” Kennedy said.
In addition to meeting other leaders, Biden is expected to announce a new Indo-Pacific Economic
Framework (IPEF) while in Japan. It is expected to serve as a venue for closer cooperation on trade, standards for the
digital economy and technology, ensuring supply chains and combating climate change.
At least 50 Democratic and Republican senators are urging the president to commit to including Taiwan as a partner in the IPEF.
“Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shows the value of tangible economic support by the United States and like-minded allies and partners,
and the same is true for Taiwan. Including Taiwan in the IPEF would be an invaluable signal of our rock-solid commitment to Taiwan
and its prosperity and freedom,” the senators said in a letter to the president.
It was led by Sens. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) and James Risch (R-Idaho), the chair and ranking member, respectively, of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.
While it will be Biden’s first trip to the region as president, the administration has dispatched other prominent officials — including
Vice President Harris, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and, more recently, Blinken — to Asia.
“While President Biden himself hasn’t been out to the region yet, it has certainly been a major priority of his
administration,” Fitt said.
Ukraine proves the brink – diplomatic measures still exist but are spread thin
because of Ukraine
Lemire and Thompson 5/19 (JONATHAN LEMIRE and ALEX THOMPSON, Jonathan Lemire is
POLITICO's White House Bureau Chief. Alex Thompson is a White House correspondent and co-author of West Wing Playbook. He is
currently working on a book about the Biden administration to be published by Simon & Schuster in early 2024. He previously
covered the 2020 election for POLITICO and has written for The New York Times, Vice News, and Esquire . “Biden wanted to
prioritize China. 16 months later, he gets his shot,” POLITICO, 5/19/2022,
https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/19/biden-prioritize-china-00033653) - LH
The pivot to Asia lives.

Sixteen months after his inauguration, President Joe Biden will finally make his first trip to the region this Thursday with visits to
South Korea and Japan. And while the war in Ukraine dominates headlines and the attention of the West, the
White House
views the week ahead as a critical opportunity to tackle a wildly different but equally complex challenge:
China.
Biden will spend a whirlwind few days meeting with two of the United States’ staunchest allies in the
region, both of whom have pushed for more American involvement in Asia as a bulwark against
possible Chinese aggression. The president’s visit also comes at a time when North Korea has ramped up its weapons
testing and could, U.S. officials said, undertake additional provocations coinciding with Biden’s travel, from firing missiles to testing a
nuclear bomb.
And then, there’s the regional fallout of the war in Ukraine.
Russia’s invasion has prompted fears in the region that Beijing could seize upon the war to ratchet up pressure on Taiwan and
escalate its disruptive tactics against other neighbors. The White House is hopeful that Biden’s mere presence will reassure Tokyo
and Seoul and their recently elected leaders. The
president will also use the trip to meet with the Quad, which
includes Australia and India, to try to establish another barrier to Chinese expansion.
“The message we’re trying to send on this trip is what the world can look like if the democracies and open societies of the world can
stand together to shape the rules of the road,” said Jake Sullivan, the president’s national security adviser. “ It
will send a
powerful message, and we think that message will be heard everywhere. We think it will be
heard in Beijing.”
In all, the
trip constitutes the most difficult foreign test to date for Biden, one that combines a
myriad of thorny diplomatic issues that successive presidents have pledged and largely failed to solve.
Competition with China was long ago deemed by the White House as a top foreign policy objective, with Biden urging a tougher
stance on trade, security and human rights issues. The
administration believes that the relationship and
rivalry with China will still be the defining one of this century, and it has pushed back against the idea that
the war in Europe has come at the expense of focusing on Asia.
But it will certainly be hard for Biden to escape the shadow of the Ukraine war. Both Japan and Korea
have aided Ukraine’s effort to ward off Russia, which has its own Pacific presence. And the administration has explicitly and implicitly
argued that helping Ukraine win the war will bolster the position of democratic governments in the East.
“We don’t regard this as a tension, we regard this as mutually reinforcing,” Sullivan said Wednesday, noting that Europe is
increasingly involved in Indo-Pacific strategy.
When Biden first took office, the competition against China was among his preeminent foreign policy concerns.
But the planned pivot never fully took hold as various other priorities emerged, including restoring alliances in Europe, the chaotic
withdrawal from Afghanistan and Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. The
inability to actually devote sustained time
and attention to China policy was no small matter, foreign policy experts argued. And there is some
hope that as the war settles into a stalemate in Ukraine’s east, it could inadvertently help the White House broaden its focus
elsewhere.
“The most valuable commodity in Washington is the president’s time,” said Ryan Hass, who worked as the director for China, Taiwan
and Mongolia at the National Security Council during the Obama administration and wrote the 2021 book, “Stronger: Adapting
America’s China Strategy in an Age of Competitive Interdependence.” “ The
more the administration demonstrates
capacity to marshal tangible support for meeting the region’s key economic, health, and
climate priorities, the more influence the U.S. will gain in the region.”
There are new opportunities in the region as well with the recent inauguration of Yoon Suk Yeol as president of South Korea. Yoon
has signaled a closer relationship with the United States. At his inauguration earlier this month, administration officials noted that
second gentleman Doug Emhoff was seated in the front row, and at a dinner with foreign dignitaries, Emhoff also was seated at
Yoon’s table.
Biden’s relationship with Yoon could be critical as North Korea has stepped up its saber-rattling. Biden has no plans to visit the DMZ,
the heavily fortified border with the North, while in Korea, White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said Wednesday. But
North Korea, which only in recent days acknowledged it has begun to grapple with Covid-19, could be primed to conduct a seventh
nuclear test, officials warn.
“We are preparing for all contingencies, including the possibility that such a provocation would occur while we are in Korea or in
Japan,” Sullivan said.
AT: Middle East Trade Off (Need More)
Biden refocus on China now – Afghanistan proves his focus is out of the Middle
East
Mazzucco and Alexander, TREND Research & Advisory Visiting Researcher & Senior Fellow,
2022, (Leonard Jacopo Maria & Kristian, "Growing Pains: The Promise and Reality of Biden’s
Middle East Policy," FIKRA Forum, 1-24, PAS) https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/growing-pains-promise-and-reality-bidens-middle-east-policy
The Biden team spent a great deal of effort in 2021 working to differentiate itself from the administration of Donald Trump,
including a strong focus on re-establishing a cordial dialogue with U.S. allies around the globe. Yet domestic concerns such as the
COVID pandemic and the country’s battered economy have dominated the presidential agenda, leaving
residual diplomatic capital and resources for issues abroad. Within the foreign policy sphere, President Biden has
prioritized confronting a constantly expanding China and an increasingly revanchist Russia . In
consequence, apart from the chaotic American withdrawal from Afghanistan and the resumption of the Iranian nuclear dossier—
which entered its seventh round on December 27–many of the most urgent regional humanitarian and political crises from Yemen to
Syria have not really been addressed. The Biden administration hasmade no secret of its intention to downsize
the U.S. footprint in the Middle East and reorganize the American overseas military to better counter the
present threats to Washington’s national strategic interests, especially those originating from Russia and China. In the
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance statement that President Biden released in March 2021, America’s number-one enemy
is identified as “antagonistic authoritarian powers”—those nations eager to undermine the democratic values underpinning the
foundations of the liberal order as forged by the United States and its allies during the post-Cold War era.
AT: Decline Now
Threats to Chinese power now make escalation even more likely—the US must
focus on handling China now before it’s too late
Erickson and Collins 21 (Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, Andrew S. Erickson is a professor of
strategy and the research director in the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute and a visiting professor in full-
time residence in Harvard University’s Department of Government. Gabriel B. Collins is the Baker Botts fellow in energy and
environmental regulatory affairs at Rice University’s James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, whose funding sources are listed
“A Dangerous Decade of Chinese
here, and a senior visiting research fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
Power Is Here,” Foreign Policy, 10/10/2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/18/china-
danger-military-missile-taiwan/) - LH
U.S. and allied policymakers are facing the most important foreign-policy challenge of the 21st
century. China’s power is peaking; so is the political position of Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Chinese
Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic strength. In the long term, China’s likely decline after this peak is a good thing. But right now, it
creates a decade of danger from a system that increasingly realizes it only has a short time to fulfill
some of its most critical, long-held goals.
Within the next five years, China’s leaders are likely to conclude that its deteriorating demographic
profile, structural economic problems, and technological estrangement from global innovation centers are eroding its
leverage to annex Taiwan and achieve other major strategic objectives . As Xi internalizes these
challenges, his foreign policy is likely to become even more accepting of risk, feeding on his nearly
decadelong track record of successful revisionist action against the rules-based order. Notable examples include
China occupying and militarizing sub-tidal features in the South China Sea, ramping up air and maritime incursions against Japan and
Taiwan, pushing border challenges against India, occupying Bhutanese and Tibetan lands, perpetrating crimes against humanity in
Xinjiang, and coercively enveloping Hong Kong.
The relatively low-hanging fruit is plucked, but Beijing is emboldened to grasp the biggest single revisionist
prize: Taiwan.
Beijing’s actions over the last decade have triggered backlash, such as with the so-called AUKUS deal, but concrete constraints on
China’s strategic freedom of action may not fully manifest until after 2030. It’s remarkable and dangerous that China
has paid few costs for its actions over the last 10 years, even as its military capacities have rapidly grown.
Beijing will likely conclude that under current diplomatic, economic, and force postures for both “gray zone” and high-end scenarios,
the 2021 to late 2020s timeframe still favors China—and is attractive for its 68-year-old leader, who seeks a historical achievement
at the zenith of his career.
U.S. planners must mobilize resources, effort, and risk acceptance to maximize power and
thereby deter Chinese aggression in the coming decade—literally starting now—and innovatively employ assets
that currently exist or can be operationally assembled and scaled within the next several years. That will be the first step
to pushing back against China during the 2020s—a decade of danger—before what will likely be a waning of Chinese
power.
As Beijing aggressively seeks to undermine the international order and promotes a narrative of
inevitable Chinese strategic domination in Asia and beyond, it creates a dangerous contradiction between its goals
and its medium-term capacity to achieve them. China is, in fact, likely nearing the apogee of its relative power; and by 2030 to 2035,
it will cross a tipping point from which it may never recover strategically. Growing headwinds constraining Chinese growth, while not
publicly acknowledged by Beijing, help explain Xi’s high and apparently increasing risk tolerance. Beijing’s window of
strategic opportunity is sliding shut.
China’s skyrocketing household debt levels exemplify structural economic constraints that are emerging much earlier than they did for the United States when it had similar per capita GDP and income levels. Debt
is often a wet blanket on consumption growth. A 2017 analysis published by the Bank for International Settlements found that once the household debt-to-GDP ratio in a sample of 54 countries exceeded 60
percent, “the negative long-run effects on consumption tend to intensify.” China’s household debt-to-GDP ratio surpassed that empirical danger threshold in late 2020. Rising debt service burdens thus threaten
Chinese consumers’ capacity to sustain the domestic consumption-focused “dual circulation” economic model that Xi and his advisors seek to build. China’s growth record during the past 30 years has been
remarkable, but past exceptionalism does not confer future immunity from fundamental demographic and economic headwinds.
As debt levels continue to rise at an absolute level that has accelerated almost continuously for the past decade, China also faces a hollowing out of its working-age population. This critical segment peaked in 2010
and has since declined, with the rate from 2015 to 2020 nearing 0.6 percent annually—nearly twice the respective pace in the United States. While the United States faces demographic challenges of its own, the
disparity between the respective paces of decline highlights its relative advantage compared to its chief geopolitical competitor. Moreover, the United States can choose to access a global demographic and talent
dividend via immigration in a way China simply will not be able to do.
Atop surging debt and worsening demographics, China also faces resource insecurity. China’s dependence on imported food and energy has grown steadily over the past two decades. Projections from Tsinghua
University make a compelling case that China’s oil and gas imports will peak between 2030 and 2035. As China grapples with power shortages, Beijing has been reminded that supply shortfalls equal to even a few
percentage points of total demand can have outsized negative impacts.
Domestic resource insufficiency by itself does not hinder economic growth—as the Four Asian Tigers’ multi-decade boom attests. But China is in a different position. Japan and South Korea never had to worry
about the U.S. Navy interdicting inbound tankers or grain ships. In fact, the United States was avowedly willing to use military force to protect energy flows from the Persian Gulf region to its allies. Now, as an
increasingly energy-secure United States pivots away from the Middle East toward the Indo-Pacific, there is a substantial probability that energy shipping route protection could be viewed in much more
differentiated terms—with oil and liquefied natural gas cargoes sailing under the Chinese flag viewed very differently than cargoes headed to buyers in other regional countries.
Each of these dynamics—demographic downshifts, rising debts, resource supply insecurity —either
imminently threatens or is already actively interfering with the CCP’s long-cherished goal of achieving a “moderately prosperous
society.” Electricity blackouts, real estate sector travails (like those of Evergrande) that show just how many Chinese investors’
financial eggs now sit in an unstable $52 trillion basket, and a solidifying alignment of countries abroad concerned by aggressive
Chinese behavior all raise questions about Xi’s ability to deliver. With this confluence of adverse events only a year
before the next party congress, where personal ambition and survival imperatives will almost drive him to seek anointment as the
only Chinese “leader for life” aside from former leader Mao Zedong, the timing only fuels his sense of insecurity. Xi’s
anti-corruption campaigns and ruthless removal of potential rivals and their supporters solidified his power but likely also created a
quiet corps of opponents who may prove willing to move against him if events create the perception he’s lost the “mandate of
heaven.” Accordingly, the baseline assumption should be that Xi’s crown sits heavy and the insecurity induced is thereby intense
enough to drive high-stake, high-consequence posturing and action.
While Xi is under pressure to act, the external risks are magnified because so far, he has suffered
few consequences from taking actions on issues his predecessors would likely never have gambled on. Reactions to
party predations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong have been restricted to diplomatic-signaling pinpricks, such as sanctioning responsible
Chinese officials and entities, most of whom lack substantial economic ties to the United States. Whether U.S. restraint results from
a fear of losing market access or a belief that China’s goals are ultimately limited is not clear at this time.
While the CCP issues retaliatory sanctions against U.S. officials and proclaims a triumphant outcome to its hostage diplomacy, these
tactical public actions mask a growing private awareness that China’s latitude for irredentist action is poised to shrink. Not
knowing exactly when domestic and external constraints will come to bite —but knowing that when
Beijing sees the tipping point in its rearview mirror, major rivals will recognize it too— amplifies Xi and the party’s
anxiety to act on a shorter timeline. Hence the dramatic acceleration of the last few years.
Just as China is mustering its own strategic actions, so the United States must also intensify its focus and
deployment of resources. The United States has taken too long to warm up and confront the central challenge, but it
retains formidable advantages, agility, and the ability to prevail—provided it goes all-in now. Conversely, if Washington fails
to marshal its forces promptly, its achievements after 2030 or 2035 will matter little. Seizing the
2020s would enable Beijing to cripple the free and open rules-based order and entrench its
position by economically subjugating regional neighbors (including key U.S. treaty allies) to a degree that could offset the
strategic headwinds China now increasingly grapples with.
Deterrence is never certain. But it offers the highest probability of avoiding the certainty that an Indo-Pacific region dominated by a
CCP-led China would doom treaty allies, threaten the U.S. homeland, and likely set the stage for worse to come. Accordingly, U.S.
planners should immediately mobilize resources and effort as well as accept greater risks to deter Chinese action over the critical
next decade.
The greatest threat is armed conflict over Taiwan, where U.S. and allied success or failure will
be fundamental and reverberate for the remainder of the century. There is a high chance of a major move
against Taiwan by the late 2020s—following an extraordinary ramp-up in People’s Liberation
Army capabilities and before Xi or the party state’s power grasp has ebbed or Washington and its allies have fully regrouped
and rallied to the challenge.
So how should policymakers assess the potential risk of Chinese action against Taiwan reaching dangerous levels by 2027 or possibly even earlier—as emphasized in the testimonies of Adms. Philip Davidson and
John Aquilino? In June, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley testified to the House of Representatives that Xi had “challenged the People’s Liberation Army to accelerate their modernization programs to
develop capabilities to seize Taiwan and move it from 2035 to 2027,” although China does not currently have the capabilities or intentions to conduct an all-out invasion of mainland Taiwan.
U.S. military leaders’ assessments are informed by some of the world’s most extensive and sophisticated internal information. But what’s striking is open-source information available to everyone suggests similar
things. Moving forward, a number of open-source indicators offer valuable “early warning lights” that can help policymakers more accurately calibrate both potential timetables and risk readings as the riskiest
period of relations—from 2027 onward—approaches.
Semiconductors supply self-sufficiency. Taiwan is the “OPEC+” of semiconductors, accounting for approximately two-thirds of global chip foundry capacity. A kinetic crisis would almost certainly disrupt—and
potentially even completely curtail—semiconductor supplies. China presently spends even more each year on semiconductor imports (around $380 billion) than it does on oil, but much of the final products are
destined for markets abroad. Taiwan is producing cutting-edge 5-nanometer and 7-nanometer chips, but China produces around 80 percent of the rest of the chips in the world. The closer China comes to being
able to secure “good enough” chips for “inside China-only” needs, the less of a constraint this becomes.
Crude oil, grain, strategic metals stockpiles—the commercial community (Planet Labs, Ursa Space Systems, etc.) has developed substantial expertise in cost-effectively tracking inventory changes for key input
commodities needed to prepare for war.
Electric vehicle fleet size—the amount of oil demand displaced by electric vehicles varies depending on miles driven, but the more of China’s car fleet that can be connected to the grid (and thus powered by
blockade-resistant coal), the less political burden Beijing will face if it has to weather a maritime oil blockade imposed in response to actions it took against Taiwan or other major revisionist adventures. China’s
passenger vehicle fleet, now approximately 225 million units strong, counts nearly 6.5 million electric vehicles among its ranks, the lion’s share of which are full-battery electrics. China’s State Council seeks to have
20 percent of new vehicles sold in China be electric vehicles by 2025. This target has already basically been achieved over the last few months, meaning at least 3.5 to 4 million (and eventually many more) new
elective vehicles will enter China’s car fleet each year from now on.
Local concentration of maritime vessels —snap exercises with warships, circumnavigations, and midline tests with swarms of aircraft highlight the growing scale of China’s threat to Taiwan. But these assets alone
cannot invade the island. To capture and garrison, Beijing would need not only air, missile, naval, and special operations forces but also the ability to move lots of equipment and—at the very least—tens of
thousands of personnel across the Taiwan Strait. As such, Beijing would have to amass maritime transport assets. And given the scale required, this would alter ship patterns elsewhere along China’s coast in ways
detectable with artificial intelligence-facilitated imagery analysis from firms like Planet Labs (or national assets).
Only the most formidable, agile American and allied deterrence can kick the can down the road
long enough for China’s slowdown to shut the window of vulnerability. Holding the line is likely to require frequent and
sustained proactive enforcement actions to disincentivize full-frontal Chinese assaults on the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Chinese probing behavior and
provocations must be met with a range of symmetric and asymmetric responses that impose real costs, such as publishing assets owned by Chinese officials abroad, cyber interference with China’s technological
social control apparatus, “hands on” U.S. Navy and Coast Guard enforcement measures against Maritime Militia-affiliated vessels in the South China Sea, intensified air and maritime surveillance of Chinese naval
bases, and visas and resettlement options to Hong Kongers, Uyghurs, and other threatened Chinese citizens—including CCP officials (and their families) who seek to defect and/or leave China. U.S. policymakers
must make crystal clear to their Chinese counterparts that the engagement-above-all policies that dominated much of the past 25 years are over and the risks and costs of ongoing—and future—adventurism will
fall heaviest on China.
Bombastic Chinese reactions to emerging cohesive actions verify the approach’s effectiveness and potential for halting—and perhaps even reversing—the revisionist tide China has unleashed across the Asian
region. Consider the recent nuclear submarine deal among Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Beijing’s strong public reaction (including toleration of nuclear threats made by the state-affiliated
Global Times) highlights the gap between its global information war touting China’s irresistible power and deeply insecure internal self-perception. Eight nuclear submarines will ultimately represent formidable
military capacity, but for a bona fide superpower that believes in its own capabilities, they would not be a game-changer. Consider the U.S.-NATO reaction to the Soviet Union’s commissioning of eight Oscar I/II-
class cruise missile subs during the late Cold War. These formidable boats each carried 24 SS-N-19 Granit missiles specifically designed to kill U.S. carrier battle groups, yet NATO never stooped to public threats.
With diplomatic proofs of concepts like the so-called AUKUS deal, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and hard security actions like
the Pacific Deterrence Initiative now falling into place,
it is time to comprehensively peak the non-authoritarian
world’s protective action to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific. During this decade, U.S. policymakers
must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate Chinese
behavior. Xi’s recreation of a “one-man” system is a one-way, high-leverage bet that decisions he drives will succeed.
If Xi miscalculates, a significant risk given his suppression of dissenting voices while China raises the stakes in its
confrontation with the United States, the proverbial “leverage” that would have left him with outsized returns on a
successful bet would instead amplify the downside, all of which he personally and exclusively signed for. Resulting tensions
could very realistically undermine his status and authority, embolden internal challengers, and weaken the
party. They could also foreseeably drive him to double down on mistakes, especially if those led to
—or were made in the course of—a kinetic conflict. Personal survival measures could thus rapidly
transmute into regional or even global threats.
If Xi triggered a “margin call” on his personal political account through a failed high-stakes gamble, it would likely
be paid in blood. Washington must thus prepare the U.S. electorate and its institutional and physical infrastructure as well as
that of allies and partners abroad for the likelihood that tensions will periodically ratchet up to uncomfortable levels—and that
actual conflict is a concrete possibility. Si vis pacem, para bellum (“if you want peace, prepare for war”) must unfortunately serve as
a central organizing principle for a variety of U.S. and allied decisions during the next decade with China.
Given these unforgiving dynamics and stakes, implications for U.S. planners are stark: Do whatever remains possible to “peak” for
deterrent competition against China by the mid-to-late 2020s, and accept whatever trade-offs are available for doing so.
Nothing we might theoretically achieve in 2035 and beyond is worth pursuing at the expense
of China-credible capabilities we can realistically achieve no later than the mid-to-late 2020s.
***Impact
2NC---Top Level
Indo-Pacific diplomacy is the top US priority—essential in deterring aggressive
Chinese expansionism and regional stability
Miller 7/12 (Michael E. Miller, Michael E. Miller is The Washington Post's Sydney bureau chief. He was previously on
the local enterprise team. He joined The Washington Post in 2015 and has also reported for the newspaper from Afghanistan and
Mexico.“U.S. to open new embassies, boost aid in Pacific as China’s sway grows,” Washington
Post, 7/12/2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/07/12/kamala-harris-pacific-
islands-us-china/) -LH
The UnitedStates said Tuesday it would expand its diplomatic presence in the Pacific, as it seeks
to counter the growing influence of China in a region of intensifying great-power rivalry.
The new efforts, which will be announced by Vice President Harris during a virtual address to leaders at the Pacific Islands
Forum (PIF) in Fiji, will include two additional U.S. embassies and a tripling of some aid, among other
measures.
The diplomatic push comes amid concerns that China has supplanted the United States as the
friend of choice for some Pacific island nations. China struck a security agreement with the
Solomon Islands in April despite American objections. And the Chinese foreign minister recently signed
several other bilateral agreements during an eight-country tour of the region.
The Biden administration has sought to shift American focus from the Middle East to Asia. It has
withdrawn U.S. troops from Afghanistan, ramped up the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with Japan, Australia and
India, and launched the AUKUS pact with Britain and Australia , which, like the Quad, is seen as a
countermeasure to China’s growing military assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific.
Yet China’s security agreement with the Solomon Islands — the site of a key American military victory at Guadalcanal during World
War II — appeared to catch the United States and its close regional allies, Australia and New Zealand, by surprise.
The new diplomatic initiatives come as the United States tries to restore some of its influence in the
region.
“We are significantly stepping up our game in the Pacific islands,” said a senior administration
official who spoke to reporters on the condition of anonymity ahead of the vice president’s PIF appearance. The official said the
United States is not asking Pacific island nations to choose between it and China.
“We are focusing on our own engagement and our own interests and our own support,” the official said. “Of course contrasts [with
China] will be made, and we would like to think that contrast looks favorably on us, where we’ve
been a responsible
security actor in the region, in fact, in the entire Indo-Pacific, for many decades and have helped to preserve a
free and open Indo-Pacific.”
Among the measures Harris will announce to Pacific leaders will be new
U.S. embassies in Kiribati and Tonga. In 2019,
Kiribati and the Solomon Islands both switched their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to
China, underscoring the inroads Beijing has made in the region.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited both countries during his Pacific tour in late May and signed bilateral agreements with
each.
Kiribati announced this week that it was withdrawing from the PIF, purportedly over a leadership dispute, although an opposition
leader told the Guardian the withdrawal was the result of Chinese pressure. China has denied that.
The U.S.official said that the Biden administration was “concerned” by Kiribati’s withdrawal but that
discussions over the issue are ongoing.
Harris will also announce that the administration aims to triple funding for economic
development and ocean resilience in the region to $60 million a year for the next decade, although Congress will
have to approve the increase. Some of the funds would go toward combating the impact of climate
change on the Pacific island nations, which are among the world’s most vulnerable.
The United States will also appoint its first envoy to the Pacific Islands Forum , which, despite infighting,
has emerged as a key regional bloc. In a sign of the region’s growing geopolitical importance , the Biden administration
will also design and release its first national strategy specifically devoted to the Pacific islands.
Harris will announce the return of the Peace Corps to Fiji, Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu after volunteers were withdrawn during the
pandemic. The Biden administration is also exploring expanding the program to additional Pacific island countries.
“We are expanding our footprint and making sure we have the people and apparatus in place to deepen our
cooperation on a day-to-day basis and to deliver concrete results,” the senior administration official said.
But the Solomon Islands show the limitations of such outreach. In February, the Biden administration announced it would reopen its
long-shuttered embassy in the nation’s capital, Honiara, only for China to announce its security agreement two months later.
That agreement stirred fears of a Chinese military base about 1,000 miles from Australian shores, though China and the Solomon
Islands denied that would happen. China recently failed in an attempt to strike a similar but far broader security agreement with 10
Pacific island countries, but Beijing has suggested it will try again.
Australia’s recently elected center-left Labor government has also promised to boost diplomacy, aid and military ties to Pacific island
nations to counter Beijing’s growing influence.
Despite a slight easing of tensions between the two countries, highlighted by the first ministerial meetings in three years, China has
yet to lift punishing tariffs on Australia.
During a visit to Washington this week, Richard Marles, the Australian defense minister and deputy prime minister, said the
United States and Australia will need to increase their presence in the Indo-Pacific, warning that a
failure to maintain a balance of power could be “catastrophic.”
Biden is invested in cooperation focused on deterring China now—key to check

expansion
Hernik 7/11 (Jan Hernik, Jan Hernik is a journalist and publicist who gained experience in Polish independent Internet
media broadcasts. In his career, he participated in the creation of projects related to domestic policy and geopolitics. Hernik has an
experience in working as a TV presenter and editor of a news portal. At the Warsaw Institute, he is the editor-in-chief and expert in
the field of the United States. Hernik is a graduate of the American Studies Center at the University of Warsaw. He specializes in the
theory of religion, race and ethnicity for political choice in the U.S presidential elections. His research interests also include the
colonial era of the United States, the right to bear arms and the American liberal thought .
“The United States accepts
China’s challenge. Biden leads the establishment of “Partners in the Blue Pacific,” Warsaw
Institute, https://warsawinstitute.org/united-states-accepts-chinas-challenge-biden-leads-
establishment-partners-blue-pacific/) - LH
During his recent meetings at the international level, the

US President devoted a lot of time to building
relations with representatives of allied countries in the Indo-Pacific. Joe Biden visited Asia for the first
time as president in late May this year to strengthen ties with South Korea during his visit to Seoul and two
days later at the QUAD summit in Tokyo. It is also worth noting that on May 31, 2022, the Prime Minister of New
Zealand, Jacinda Ardern, visited the White House.
The president’s administration spends a lot of time building relations with allies in the Pacific and managing
relations with the People’s Republic of China. This is evidenced by the presence of US Secretary of Defense Lloyd
Austin at the Shangri-La Asia Security Summit in Singapore. On June 11, Austin not only met with his Australian and Japanese
counterparts there, but the day before he had his first meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wei Fenghe. The
diplomatic
turbulence of the statements by the Chinese representative confirmed the Americans in the
belief that the People’s Republic of China is not focused on maintaining the status quo in the
region, so the Joe Biden administration, in agreement with its allies, decided to launch another initiative
aimed at facing Chinese expansion.
A statement released on the White House website indicates that they plan to use their potential to
ensure “prosperity, resilience and security in the Pacific.” The means to achieve the set goal is
cooperation with countries that are directly exposed to the growing territorial, economic and military
aspirations of the People’s Republic of China. Mention is made here, inter alia, of about Fiji, Micronesia or Tonga.
In the official media information of the Joe Biden administration, we read about three areas of cooperation on which the
Partners in the Blue Pacific initiative will focus:
Efficiency and performance in the Indo-Pacific

The demands of the five countries are to be based on the upcoming 2050 Pacific Islands Forum strategy for the Blue Pacific.
Strengthening regionalism
The PBP will develop closer contacts with Pacific Island State Governments and the Pacific Islands Forum, facilitating stronger and
more regular engagement with countries launching a new initiative in the region.
Expanding opportunities for cooperation between the Pacific and the world
PBP will encourage and facilitate greater involvement in the Pacific through any other partner who shares the Pacific’s values and
aims to work constructively and transparently for the benefit of the people of the region.[1]
Building ever-wider alliances and collaborations to support the islands in the Indo-Pacific region is another
step for the United States to respond to a growing Chinese initiative. Joe Biden’s administration
and the countries of the Free World see the threat that goes along with the progressive aspirations of the PRC. Actions in the East
are not the only tool of the US in building resistance, also at the NATO summit in Madrid, which took place on June 28-
30, 2022, the topic of the Chinese threat was raised for the first time in history . Representatives of
partners from the Pacific region also attended the meeting of the leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance. We are talking about leading
politicians from Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea.
At a time when media headlines are dominated by topics related to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the administration of Joe
Biden, together with the leading leaders of the countries of the Pacific region and the world, is proving that it is not
losing sight of the greatest threat, which they see in the form of totalitarian actions, the
expansion of the Chinese People’s Army Liberation, economic and territorial expansion of China .
The partial neutralization of China also means an indirect weakening of the regime of Vladimir Putin, which remains in constant
agreement with Xi Jinping.
Turns Case---Cyber + Biotech
Chinese tech expansion is existential (cybersecurity + biotech)
Bridget Johnson {Managing Editor for Homeland Security Today, Senior Risk Analyst for Gate
15, and a private investigator}, 22 - ("Evanina: Combating China’s ‘Existential’ Cyber, Influence
Threats Requires Post-9/11 Intensity," Hstoday, 7-14-2022, https://www.hstoday.us/subject-
matter-areas/infrastructure-security/evanina-combating-existential-cyber-influence-threats-
from-china-requires-post-9-11-intensity/)//marlborough-wr/
Battling in “the new frontier” of malign foreign influence requires finding ways to fill “a vast
gaping hole” in helping Americans identify vulnerabilities and influence ops “every day living in
technology but also with elections in the future,” the former director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center said, adding that the Department of Homeland Security
could fill that domestic engagement role.
Bill Evanina told the Senate Intelligence Committee at an Aug. 4 hearing that “the holistic and
comprehensive threat to the United States posed by the Communist Party of China is an
existential threat, and it is the most complex, pernicious, aggressive, and strategic threat our
nation has ever faced.”
The private sector and academia “have become the geopolitical battle space for China” as
leader Xi Jinping “has one goal: to be the geopolitical, military, and economic leader in the
world, period.”
“He, along with China’s Ministry of State Security, People’s Liberation Army, and United Front
Work Department, drive a comprehensive and whole-of-country approach to their efforts to
invest, leverage, infiltrate, influence, and steal from every corner of the United States,” Evanina
said. “…Economic security is national security. Our economic global supremacy, stability, and
long-term vitality is at risk and squarely in the crosshairs of Xi Jinping and the communist
regime.”
Evanina noted that it is estimated 80 percent of American adults “have had all of their personal
data stolen” by China while “the other 20 percent, just some of the data.” The economic loss
last year from China’s activities in intellectual property and trade secrets is somewhere
between $300 billion and $600 billion.
“If we do not alter how we compete with awareness of China’s malign methodology and one-
sided practices, we will not sustain our global position as the world leaders from tomorrow’s
emerging technology down to our creative ideations,” he said. “We must create a robust public-
private partnership with real intelligence sharing while at the same time staying true to the
values, morals, and rule of law which made America the greatest country in the world.”
From a cybersecurity perspective, China “possesses persistent and unending resources to

penetrate our systems and exfiltrate our data, or sit dormant and wait, or plant malware on a
critical infrastructure for future hostilities.”
“At the same time, the insider threat epidemic originating from the Communist Party of China
has been nothing short of devastating to the United States corporate world,” Evanina continued.
“Additionally, the Communist Party of China strategically conducts malign influence campaigns
at the state and local level of the United States with precision. These efforts must be exposed
and mitigated. To effectively defend against China and compete effectively, we must put the
same effort into this threat as we did to combat terrorism the past 20 years.
Evanina, a member of HSToday’s editorial board, stressed that the threat to the United States
comes from the ruling Communist Party and not the Chinese people. “Chinese nationals or any
Chinese person or Chinese ethnicity here in the United States or around the world are not a
threat. They should not be racially targeted in any manner whatsoever,” he said. “This is a threat
pertaining to a draconian communist country with an autocratic dictator, who is committed to
human rights violations and stopping at nothing to achieve its geopolitical goals.”
Former Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger, a distinguished visiting fellow at the
Hoover Institution, told senators that “assembling dossiers on people has always been a feature
of Leninist regimes, but Beijing’s penetration of digital networks worldwide, including using 5G
networks … has really taken this to a new level.” He added that Evanina’s testimony “makes
plain that Beijing has stolen sensitive data sufficient to build a dossier on every single American
adult and on many of our children, too, who are fair game under Beijing’s rules of political
warfare.”
“Newer to the Communist Party’s arsenal,” he added, “is the exploitation of U.S. social media
platforms.”
“Over the past few years, Beijing has flooded U.S. platforms with overt and covert propaganda,
amplified by proxies and bots. And the propaganda is focused not only on promoting
whitewashed narratives of Beijing’s policies, but also increasingly on exacerbating social
tensions within the United States and other target nations,” Pottinger said. “The Chinese
government and its online proxies, for example, have for months promoted content that
questions the effectiveness and safety of our Western-made COVID-19 vaccines. There’s been
some recent research by the Soufan Center that also found indications that China-based
influence operations online are now outpacing Russian efforts to amplify some conspiracy
theories.”
Pottinger said that U.S. social media companies “have the technological know-how and
resources to take a leading role in exposing and tamping down shadowy influence operations
online, and the U.S. government should partner more closely with Silicon Valley companies in
this work.”
In February, NCSC stated that for years China “has collected large healthcare data sets from the
U.S. and nations around the globe, through both legal and illegal means, for purposes only it can
control.” Among the most notorious examples of the illegal means was the 2015 hack “in which
data on some 78.8 million persons was stolen from Anthem’s computer networks, including
health identification numbers, names, Social Security numbers, employment and income data
and other information.”
Asked why China is harvesting this data, Anna Puglisi, the former National Counterintelligence
Officer for East Asia and a senior fellow at Georgetown University’s Center for Security and
Emerging Technology, told senators that China “has amassed the largest genomic holdings of
anywhere in the world.”
“One of the most important questions in the next generation of both medicine and also
biological research is the genotype to phenotype — so, understanding what genes do. And so
access to that kind of data, both their own and from other places in the world, gives them an
advantage in figuring out some of those problems,” Puglisi said. “We know from their central
government policies and programs they have emphasized the importance of next-generation
medicine and that is a huge focus for them.”
“When we look at what they’ve accumulated in the last decade, I’ll point to Equifax, 150 million
Americans, all their financial data has been taken by China,” Evanina said. “I would say that it’s
unnecessary for China to procure or buy our data when they can come in and take it for free,
because of our lack of cybersecurity defenses here provide an open door for them to take
through spearfishing or other vectors to get into our systems and take our data.”
“With respect to DNA and genomics, they’ll use front companies like BGI, which is a company
around the world, to set up stations to collect COVID samples and do fertility clinics. And every
single time you do that, you’re giving away all your data to that node of their company, which as
we said before, is now beholden to the Communist Party,” he added. “So, as you provide
genetics, blood typing, or any kind of COVID test, it’s going to possibly go to the Chinese
Communist Party, which is why we must protect what we do here on our soil from companies
like Quest and other diagnostic companies, which are in every single town, from being procured
by the Chinese government.”
Puglisi stressed that “it’s important to remember the multifaceted ways that China targets our
technology and how different the systems are.”
“As we move forward, we need to think about what is the desired outcome of the efforts across
the board with technology acquisition and how do we mitigate some of these activities,” she
said. “And design policies and programs in addition to the ones that we already have that get at
how do you deal with a non-rules-based entity.”
Evanina called for looking at a change in “the construct for partnering with private-sector
industry and technology to be able to build coalitions” with government entities.
“China is going to be China and they’re going to double down,” he said. “We have to make a
decision in America: Do we want to change the way we operate?”
IL---Tech Leadership
Lack of clear prioritization of US response to China guarantees decoupling and
failure—spills over broadly
Bateman 4/25 (Jon Bateman, Jon Bateman is a senior fellow in the Technology and International Affairs Program at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His work focuses on large-scale policy challenges such as U.S.-China tech tensions,
“Choosing a Strategy,” US-China Technological
global influence operations, and systemic cyber risk.
Decoupling: A Strategy and Policy Framework, 4/25/2022
https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/25/choosing-strategy-pub-86899) - LH
The dozens of newU.S. government technology controls aimed at China in recent years did not all have a
single, unified objective. Some sought to counter national security threats, some were more economically motivated, and
some had ancillary purposes (like domestic or diplomatic gamesmanship) unrelated to technology itself. Yet in public discourse, and
even in policy circles, distinct
objectives are often left undifferentiated or undefined. Too frequently,
U.S. leaders and analysts speak of “countering” or “reining in” Chinese technology threats and risks—highly
general formulations that elide key goals and trade-offs.
Untangling this jumble of U.S. objectives is an important first step in developing a coherent
strategy. Table 5 describes nine apparent rationales for recent U.S. technology restrictions aimed at China.
The existence of so many distinct policy rationales is not surprising. The United States has many different
concerns with China, and technology plays a significant part in nearly all of them. Technology is rightly at the heart of America’s
China policies. (The corollary idea, that China should be at the heart of U.S. tech policy, is more debatable.) In many cases, these
policy rationales overlap and reinforce each other. For example, potential Chinese influence over U.S. telecommunications networks
raises multiple fears simultaneously: theft of commercial secrets, tracking of U.S. government officials, injection of disinformation, or
subversion of critical infrastructure in a crisis, among other possibilities. Hence the U.S. telecommunications sector was an early
target for American restrictive measures, and the global telecoms marketplace remains a central preoccupation of Washington’s
tech diplomacy.
THE NEED FOR BETTER STRATEGY
However, a long list of policy aims is not the same as a strategy. In fact, it can be anathema to one.
Many of these goals are vague and have no clear limiting principle. They can also come into conflict
with each other, or with other U.S. national priorities. A good strategy would clarify key objectives and
prioritize them. It would also proffer a theory of success—a realistic basis for determining which forms of technological
decoupling will actually achieve U.S. aims. So far, Washington has struggled to articulate such a strategy.
Without more strategic clarity, decoupling can become overaggressive or incoherent and
contrary to U.S. interests. For example, the U.S. military does not need (and cannot achieve) unlimited advantages over
China’s military in every place, time, and domain. The United States must define its desired “military edge”
over China in more specific terms. Likewise, if Washington seeks to rebalance the terms of bilateral economic
competition, it should have a desired model of the global economy in mind. Are U.S. policymakers aiming for two largely separate
international economic systems, or would China remain integrated within a modified global economy? And is the point to maximize
U.S. prosperity and technology leadership, or to minimize China’s (which are not the same thing)?
Without a sense of strategic priorities, decoupling can cause havoc as one objective smashes
into another. Barring Chinese graduate students helps to reduce illicit technology transfer, but it also hampers U.S.
technological competitiveness by spurning a key source of skilled labor.1 Which goal takes precedence? Technological
decoupling is fraught with these kinds of costs and risks—and unfortunately, their ripples can spread far beyond the
technological realm, affecting seemingly unrelated U.S. goals. For example, harsh U.S. measures against
Huawei and TikTok have helped convince many in Beijing that Washington seeks wholesale economic containment. In climate
change talks, China may now be even more liable to view proposed emissions reduction targets as a stealth means of stifling its
economic growth.
US diplomacy is necessary to spur a shift away from Chinese tech leadership

Cimmino and Rothschild, '22 – Jeffrey Cimmino is the Associate Director at the Scowcroft
Strategy Initiative Center for Strategy and Security, Amanda J. Rothschild is a Nonresident Senior
Fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security (Jeffrey Cimmino and Amanda J.
Rothschild; "Twenty-first-century diplomacy: Strengthening US diplomacy for the challenges of
today and tomorrow"; Atlantic Council; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-
reports/issue-brief/twenty-first-century-diplomacy-strengthening-us-diplomacy-for-the-
challenges-of-today-and-tomorrow/; 6-28-2022, Accessed 7-13-2022)//ILake-AZ
Whereas China and other adversaries have sought to use technology to export autocracy and repression, theUnited States
should seek to export digital information infrastructure that promotes freedom, privacy, and the
rule of law. As Ambassador Eileen Donahoe has written, AI has been a “game changer in favor of authoritarian states,”
particularly China.19 The CCP has exported its domestic-surveillance software around the world . As of
2019, eighteen countries are using Chinese-made intelligent monitoring systems .20 The spread of
these technology systems allows China to export repression, control, and coercion, undermining
freedom and shaping the international system to Beijing’s benefit.
Countering China’s efforts in this space will be challenging. In Africa, China provides more funds for
information and communication technologies than all multilateral development agencies and the world’s leading democracies
combined.21 The United States should build on efforts started at last year’s Summit for Democracy, including the United States
Agency for International Development’s (USAID) digital-democracy work and funding for “democracy affirming” technologies—
alongside the Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative, which aims to limit the flow of technology to authoritarian countries.22
The United States can also work through mechanisms such as the Blue Dot Network, which certifies infrastructure projects, to
promote secure, democratically-aligned digital infrastructure.
While these efforts are important, the United States will also need to work to convince countries outside of its traditional allies and
partners to turn away from authoritarian technologies. These efforts will be challenging, but the
United States must use
its substantial economic and diplomatic power to encourage nations to adopt US and partnered
technologies by offering them at a reduced price (e.g., through tax incentives to the private sector), guaranteeing
technical support for these systems, or providing them in return for other benefits that the United States or its allies can give
to recipient nations. The United States and its allies can also leverage the superior capability and quality of
their technology to make the case that partnership with them is a better option.
IL---China Expansionism
China undermines US heg in east Asia absent continued security cooperation
Mazarr et. al. 22, Michael Mazarr is a Senior Political Scientist and Associate Director of the
Strategy and Doctrine Program at the Arroyo Center at the RAND Corporation, which he joined
in October 2014 and Professor of National Security Strategy and Associate Dean at the U.S.
National War College in Washington, D.C., Security Cooperation in a Strategic Competition.
RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA, 7 Apr. 2022. apps.dtic.mil,
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1166035./AL
China’s first option is to simply continue its current transactional approach, leveraging relationships for peacetime access on a very much one-way
street of benefit for Beijing and as a zero-sum way to limit U.S. presence. However, this strategy runs the risk that the host nation would seek to deny
the PLA operational access in wartime, because, without a commitment from Beijing to the host nation’s defense, the trade-off of adversary retaliation
would likely be unappealing. The peacetime access will likely be sufficient if Beijing merely seeks to support a permanent military presence regionally
and execute extra-regional missions occasionally or to achieve limited global effects in wartime through deniable forces, such as private military
contractors. Alternatively, China
could shed its recent avoidance of foreign defense commitments and
agree to a more substantial relationship with some of its key security cooperation partners by
making a formal commitment. This approach would depend on creating deeper political and
military ties with partners in the hopes of receiving greater Chinese operational access in
wartime, potentially supporting longer-range, even global, military operations while also
possibly building a Chinese-led coalition. Perhaps a middle ground is most likely: substantial security ties
without a formal commitment, ensuring Beijing’s strategic flexibility while generating the most
political affinity and support possible for Chinese military actions in wartime. This would look much like U.S.
defense relationships with non-ally partners, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and Vietnam—although, in practice, China’s reliance as a security
partner would be uncertain until tested. For the foreseeable future, China’s best prospect for closer security cooperation clearly lies in Moscow,
although historical legacies and latent regional rivalries somewhat dampen ties. During a June 2019 visit to Moscow, Xi Jinping and Russian President
Vladimir Putin further elevated their countries’ overall relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era.”27 Chinese
Defense Minister Wei Fenghe echoed this idea in his comments during the visit, adding that “China and Russia will cooperate on an array of major
strategic projects and increase capabilities to jointly cope with security threats and challenges,” and that “cooperation between the two militaries is
growing deeper and more concrete.”28 Although, so
far, Chinese and Russian security cooperation does not
appear to be coordinated or even deconflicted to optimize its impact against U.S. interests, any
movement in this direction would likely create a scenario in which the whole effort is greater
than the sum of its parts. Moscow is also the only partner with which Beijing appears to be training for coalition, and perhaps fully joint,
operations for a regional contingency involving North Korea. Such partnership is likely based on a shared concern about U.S. military action and mutual
desire to limit the spillover from a war. Chinese military engagement abroad thus far does not appear to come
with any anti-U.S. conditions, but as U.S.-China relations worsen overall, the security domain is
likely to become increasingly zero-sum. This means that, ultimately, any gain in Chinese access and
influence with one country may diminish U.S. access and influence. Such a trade-off for a host country does not
have to include tangible Chinese access to benefit Beijing. Reducing the impact of U.S. security cooperation, without
improving Chinese security cooperation results, may be a satisfactory outcome for Beijing. China’s
growing economic power—specifically, its demonstrated willingness to leverage countries’ asymmetric economic dependence on Beijing to limit their
security cooperation with the United States—is perhaps an even bigger issue. Even the possibility of undetermined consequences across a variety of
Chinese tools—especially economic ones—may be sufficient to deter countries from allowing U.S. basing access or perhaps overflight rights in a U.S.-
China conflict. Although U.S. security cooperation partners will likely seek to avoid such spillover in great-power competition, countries’
economic dependence on China, combined with past examples (such as the U.S. deployment of the Terminal High-
Altitude Area Defense ballistic missile defense system to South Korea), is likely to have a chilling effect as countries
prioritize the immediate and tangible benefits of economic engagement with China against the
long-term and intangible benefits of security cooperation with the United States. This dilemma falls
outside the scope of this report, but is worth noting. Even short of true security partnerships, Beijing’s willingness to proliferate advanced military
capabilities provides one avenue of shaping the global security environment without increasing China’s foreign obligations. China has
become the preferred provider of unmanned combat aerial vehicles to much of the Middle
East,29 if only because the United States has limited its sale of these systems abroad. As China develops nextgeneration technology, it will be better
positioned to either sell this cutting-edge hardware to states seeking cheaper arms without Washington’s typical conditions or donate its older, but still
adequate, equipment to friendly nations. This proliferation could undermine U.S. security indirectly and even
unintentionally.
China is aiming to reshape the international order and expand their sphere of
influence in the Indo-Specific becoming the world’s leading power.
Containment on China now is key.
Christian Freel, 5-26-2022, 71st U.S. Secretary of State, "The Administration’s Approach to the
People’s Republic of China," United States Department of State, https://www.state.gov/the-
administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/
Even as President Putin’s war continues, we will remain focused on the most serious long-term
challenge to the international order – and that’s posed by the People’s Republic of China.
China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and,
increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Beijing’s
vision would move us away from the universal values that have sustained so much of the world’s progress over
the past 75 years.
China is also integral to the global economy and to our ability to solve challenges from climate to COVID. Put simply, the United
States and China have to deal with each other for the foreseeable future.
That’s why this is one of the most complex and consequential relationships of any that we have in the world today.
Over the last year, the Biden

administration has developed and implemented a comprehensive
strategy to harness our national strengths and our unmatched network of allies and partners to
realize the future that we seek.
We are not looking for conflict or a new Cold War. To the contrary, we’re determined to avoid both.
We don’t seek to block China from its role as a major power, nor to stop China – or any other country, for that matter – from
growing their economy or advancing the interests of their people.
But we will defend and strengthen the international law, agreements, principles, and institutions
that maintain peace and security, protect the rights of individuals and sovereign nations, and
make it possible for all countries – including the United States and China – to coexist and
cooperate.
Now, the China of today is very different from the China of 50 years ago, when President Nixon broke decades of strained relations
to become the first U.S. president to visit the country.
Then, China was isolated and struggling with widespread poverty and hunger.
Now, China is a global power with extraordinary reach, influence, and ambition. It’s the second largest
economy, with world-class cities and public transportation networks. It’s home to some of the world’s largest tech
companies and it seeks to dominate the technologies and industries of the future . It’s rapidly
modernized its military and intends to become a top tier fighting force with global reach . And
it has announced its ambition to create a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become
the world’s leading power.
China’s transformation is due to the talent, the ingenuity, the hard work of the Chinese people. It was also made possible by the
stability and opportunity that the international order provides. Arguably, no country on Earth has benefited more from that than
China.
But ratherthan using its power to reinforce and revitalize the laws, the agreements, the
principles, the institutions that enabled its success so that other countries can benefit from
them, too, Beijing is undermining them. Under President Xi, the ruling Chinese Communist Party has
become more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad.
We see that in how Beijing

has perfected mass surveillance within China and exported that
technology to more than 80 countries; how its advancing unlawful maritime claims in the South
China Sea, undermining peace and security, freedom of navigation, and commerce; how it’s
circumventing or breaking trade rules, harming workers and companies in the United States but
also around the world; and how it purports to champion sovereignty and territorial integrity
while standing with governments that brazenly violate them.
Even while Russia was clearly mobilizing to invade Ukraine, President Xi and President Putin declared that the friendship between
their countries was – and I quote – “without limits.” Just this week, as President Biden was visiting Japan, China and Russia
conducted a strategic bomber patrol together in the region.
Beijing’s defense of President Putin’s war to erase Ukraine’s sovereignty and secure a sphere of influence in Europe should raise
alarm bells for all of us who call the Indo-Pacific region home.
For these reasons and more, this is a charged moment for the world. And at times like these,
diplomacy is vital. It’s how we make clear our profound concerns, better understand each
other’s perspective, and have no doubt about each other’s intentions. We stand ready to increase our
direct communication with Beijing across a full range of issues. And we hope that that can happen.
But we cannot rely on Beijing to change its trajectory. So we will shape the strategic environment around Beijing to advance our
vision for an open, inclusive international system.
The actions that we take at home and with countries

President Biden believes this decade will be decisive.
worldwide will determine whether our shared vision of the future will be realized .
China power grabbing is directly entwined with escalatory nuclear arsenal

expansion—only US diplomacy solves
Schuman 22 (Michael Schuman, Michael Schuman is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Global
China Hub and an author and journalist with more than 25 years of experience in Asia. Currently a contributing writer to The
Atlantic, he was previously a foreign correspondent for the Wall Street Journal and Time magazine. His most recent book is
Superpower Interrupted: The Chinese History of the World. His two previous books are Confucius and the World He Created and The
Miracle: The Epic Story of Asia’s Quest for Wealth. His work has also appeared in the New York Times, Businessweek, and Bloomberg
“China Now Understands What a Nuclear Rivalry Looks Like,” The
Opinion. He is based in Beijing, China.
Atlantic, 2/16/2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/02/china-russia-
nuclear-weapons/622089/) - LH
Much clearer are the potential perils of China’s nuclear pivot. New nukes could add heft to Beijing’s foreign policy,
which is becoming more aggressive, and influence how Washington reacts. They could spark a regional nuclear-arms race as
countries that have rocky relationships with China, most notably India, enhance their own arsenal. The Chinese
expansion
also heightens the risk that a conventional war (say, over Taiwan) will escalate into a nuclear conflict.
And on a global scale, China’s buildup could accelerate a descent into disorderly superpower competition last seen before the
demise of the Soviet Union.
Half a century of American foreign policy was designed to avoid this very outcome. The primary
purpose of President Richard Nixon’s 1972 Beijing meeting with Mao Zedong, the founder of the People’s Republic, was to draw
Communist China into the U.S. orbit and reinforce its nasty schism with the Soviet Union. By the 1990s, the fall of the Soviets and
the capitalist ascent of China seemed to vindicate that approach—perhaps even heralding the ultimate triumph of American
democracy over authoritarian threats and ushering in a “flat,” prosperous world.
Unfortunately, 2022 is shaping up to be a Cold War rewrite, with an unhappy ending. The adversarial shift in
China’s overall posture, combined with President Xi Jinping’s apparent willingness to countenance Russia’s persistent
aggression in Europe, could place the U.S. in the very predicament it evaded decades ago: a standoff with a tag
team of nuclear-armed authoritarian states bent on rolling back American power. As Beijing’s
relations with Washington have soured, those with Moscow are arguably friendlier than they have
been since the 1950s. As if making up for a lost Cold War opportunity, the two dictatorships are supporting each other
in their assaults on the U.S.-led world order.
The U.S. may not be prepared to counter this double menace. “This is really an unprecedented challenge, the threat of two peer or
near-peer nuclear superpower competitors,” Matthew Kroenig, the deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and
Security at the Atlantic Council, told me. “We’ve always been able to build a nuclear force to deal with the Soviet Union and then
later Russia, and then China, North Korea, and Iran were lesser cases.” Thus China’s buildup “raises really fundamental questions for
U.S. nuclear strategy.”
Cold War comparisons to understand U.S.-China relations today are typically misplaced. But perhaps less so when it comes to nukes.
The two sides may be doing what the U.S. and Soviet Union did in the Cold War’s early stages:
hurtling toward a nuclear confrontation without a safety net. “In the old Cold War calendar, it’s like 1960,”
John Culver, a retired CIA analyst who once served as the U.S. intelligence community’s top East Asia expert, told me. “Both sides are
arraying themselves for strategic competition, but for the U.S. at least, a coherent strategy has yet to emerge.
At some point, there will be a bilateral crisis between us and China, and at that point, we both stare
into the abyss, like the Cuban missile crisis forced both sides to, and decide on the parameters for dialogue. Or fail
to achieve a dialogue and risk steep escalation and possible war between two nuclear powers.”
Beijing’s nuclear ambitions will prompt recriminations in Washington. Has American naivete helped enable the enemy the U.S. had
sought to deter? Yet Beijing’s
nuclear-strategy shift may be a product less of American decisions than of Xi’s
unprecedented drive to amplify China’s power and prepare the country for a new era of superpower competition.
The big question is: Why now? Xi is probably reacting to what he sees as a more dangerous United States. The buildup is “likely
because Beijing now assesses that there is a major risk that they could fight a war with the U.S.,” Culver said. “They’ve seen the
trajectory of the bilateral relationship, and they’ve decided that major nuclear deterrent capabilities are now required.”
Still, Beijing’s
nuclear expansion can’t be viewed separately from Xi’s wider agenda to project
Chinese power in his region and beyond—whether economic, technological, diplomatic, or
ideological. “Xi has decided The time to bide our time and hide our capabilities is over. It’s time for the coming-out party,”
Kroenig said. China’s People’s Liberation Army “is going to be a world-class military, and to do that you need to have a world-class
nuclear force.”
China’s nuclear buildup may not immediately change certain dynamics of the current strategic situation. The U.S. will still have far
more warheads. And China is already capable of striking the American heartland.
Gauging the threat depends in part on divining Xi’s purpose. He might be striving to achieve closer balance with
the U.S. in the hopes of attaining greater deterrence—in other words, the sort of nuclear stalemate that
prevailed during the Cold War. Xi might also be preparing China for a potential U.S. attack. In enhancing intercontinental capabilities,
Xi is “ensuring that China can withstand a first strike from the U.S. and penetrate U.S. missile defenses with whatever Chinese
nuclear weapons survive,” James Acton, a co-director of the nuclear-policy program at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, told me. He described that aspect of the buildup as a “defensive modernization’’ that won’t change the status quo.
Yet we can’t rule out that Xi has more sinister intentions. Unlike the United States, China declares as an official
policy that, in any conflict, it will not use nuclear weapons first. Perhaps Xi intends to uphold that commitment. But the
hundreds of missile silos that the Pentagon says China is constructing aren’t necessarily the best
investments for a purely defensive strategy. These fixed sites can easily be targeted and destroyed by U.S. missiles,
and thus are “not weapons you build if you were really worried about a U.S. first strike,” Kroenig said. These capabilities
make more sense, he said, if China intends to have a “superpower force.”
For now, though, the

biggest impact of Xi’s nuclear buildup may be on Asia, where Beijing’s foreign-
policy interests are most concentrated. Rather than in an intercontinental nuclear slugfest, Beijing might be
more willing to employ nuclear weapons in a local conflict—for instance, by dropping one on a U.S. military
base in Japan. “I think China’s development of its regional forces is much more concerning to me and potentially offensively
oriented,” Acton said. “I believe that China wants options to fight a limited nuclear war, which is a new element of its strategy.”
Short of that, simply

possessing a more muscular nuclear arsenal could help Beijing promote its
foreign-policy goals by constraining how the U.S. and its allies respond to Chinese actions toward Taiwan
or elsewhere in the region. “In the past, the U.S. has been able to do what it wanted out there and the Chinese really couldn’t do
anything about it,” Hans Kristensen, the director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, told
me. “Not anymore.”
In the longer term, China’s buildup could prompt its neighbors to respond in kind. U.S. allies protected by America’s nuclear
umbrella, such as Japan and South Korea, could press Washington to develop and deploy regional nuclear capabilities to counter
China. Or, worse yet, they could build their own. India, which also has a contentious relationship with China, might at some point
decide to expand its small nuclear arsenal.
Clearly, Washington needs a new strategy. Experts

say that simply building more nukes is not the answer—or
perhaps even necessary in response to China’s expansion alone. The Scowcroft Center’s
Kroenig, in a recent paper,
stressed that the U.S. “must maintain a favorable balance of power over China at each rung of
the escalation ladder” as a continued deterrent to Chinese military action. That, Kroenig suggested,
might require the U.S. to enhance its capabilities to fight a limited regional nuclear conflict in Asia—an area in which China now
holds an advantage.
Perhaps the most pressing need is to get the two sides talking. Unlike Washington, Beijing has no history of agreeing to
limitations on its nuclear arms and has been dodging negotiations. But the two countries do talk
about talking. U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said that Xi and President Joe Biden agreed in their November virtual
summit to “look to begin to carry forward discussion on strategic stability”—hardly a firm commitment.
Yet even if talks achieve little in the short term, they

may eventually evolve into arms-control negotiations
that could stabilize the nuclear threat, as happened during the Cold War. “We have to think about
managing a potentially disastrous situation and using not just military but all the tools of statecraft,
especially more diplomacy to rebuild a strategic dialogue and set some guardrails,” Culver, the
former CIA analyst, said. “In a crisis, we are going to have to rebuild all the dialogue we used to take as a
matter of course from scratch at the worst possible time.”
But the Cold War holds another lesson—that avoiding nuclear conflict requires not only steady diplomacy
but also a clear strategy. The U.S. is already a major nuclear power; the trick is convincing both its adversaries and allies
that it will continue to defend its interests, whatever it takes. “If China uses nuclear weapons, it will be because
it doubts U.S. resolve, not U.S. capability,” Acton said. Contending with a nuclear China is as much
a matter of will as of weapons.
IL---Focus Key
The US can’t afford to turn its diplomatic focus away from stopping Xi.
Politico 21 {A former senior government official with deep expertise and experience dealing
with China has published with the Atlantic Council a bold and ambitious new U.S. strategy
toward its next great global rival. It is similarly delivered anonymously, which the author
requested, and POLITICO granted}, 21 - ("To Counter China’S Rise, The U.S. Should Focus On Xi,"
POLITICO, 1-28-2021, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/01/28/china-foreign-
policy-long-telegram-anonymous-463120)//marlborough-wr/
The single most important challenge facing the United States in the twenty-first century is the
rise of an increasingly authoritarian China under President and General Secretary Xi Jinping. As
Joe Biden assumes the presidency, it might be easy to see China as an obsession of Donald
Trump that he’d do well to move past. If anything, the opposite is true: The American approach
to China needs more and more focused, attention, than any White House has yet given it.
This might seem like overstatement, given the scope of challenges this country faces, but it’s
not: Because of the scale of China’s economy and its military, the speed of its technological
advancement and its radically different worldview from that of the United States, China’s rise
now profoundly impacts every major U.S. national interest. This is a structural challenge that,
to some extent, has been gradually emerging over the last two decades. The rise to power of Xi
has greatly accentuated this challenge and accelerated its timetable.
At home, Xi has returned China to classical Marxism-Leninism and fostered a quasi-Maoist

personality cult, pursuing the systematic elimination of his political opponents. China’s market
reforms have stalled and its private sector is now under increasingly direct forms of party
control. Xi has also used ethnonationalism to unite his country against any challenges to his
authority, internal or external. His treatment of recalcitrant ethnic minorities within China
borders on genocide. Xi’s China increasingly resembles a new form of authoritarian police
state. And in a fundamental departure from his risk-averse post-Mao predecessors, Xi has
demonstrated that he intends to project China’s authoritarian system, coercive foreign policy
and military presence well beyond his country’s own borders to the world at large.
China under Xi, unlike under previous leaders Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, is no
longer a status quo power. It has become what the international-relations world calls a
revisionist power, a state bent on changing the world around it. For the United States, its allies
and the US-led liberal international order, this represents a fundamental shift. Xi is no longer
just a problem for U.S. primacy. He now presents a serious challenge to the whole of the
democratic world.
US commitment to the Indo-Pacific is of utmost importance for containing

Chinese power-grabbing—key to balance out China
Lyons 22 (Marco Lyons, Lieutenant Colonel Marco J. Lyons most recently served as Branch Chief, Globally Integrated Plans – West, War
Plans Division, Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate, Headquarters, Department of the Army in the Pentagon. Marco is a native of Seattle, Washington
and was commissioned into the United States Army in 2001 as an Infantry Second Lieutenant, from Officer Candidate School. Lieutenant Colonel Lyons
wrote the U.S. Army Transformation of Land Power in the Indo-Pacific strategy signed by the Secretary and Chief of Staff in May 2020. In 2019 he was
lead Defense planner and lead author of a national-level Department of Homeland Security interagency campaign plan and wrote the accompanying
strategic vision for the DHS Secretary. As a strategic planner with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Marco managed the 2017 Army
Science Board study of the Multi-Domain Battle concept and the 2018 Army Science Board study of the Multi-Domain Operations concept .
“China’s Rise and U.S. Defense Implications,” 1/14/2022, Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center,
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/chinas-rise-and-us-defense-implications) - LH
What are the international implications of China’s rise? What developments may be expected, and what should U.S. national
defense leaders do about the likely effects of these developments? China is a rising power but even if that cannot be said to
translate into a security threat to the United States directly, there
is little reason to believe that Beijing will not
take action to get out from under what it perceives as unfriendly U.S.-led global diplomatic, economic,
and security orders. In very broad terms, U.S. defense policy makers will need to address the change from
military capabilities for enforcing a liberal international order, to capabilities for both advancing and
protecting friendly regional or even sub-regional orders.
China’s potential power is sizable and increasing based on a large population and growing national wealth and this potential power
makes its neighbors fear that it will become the regional hegemon. Since other
states in the region cannot predict if
or when Beijing will make a bid for hegemony, relations are beset with uncertainty. Weaker
neighbors, like Vietnam and Laos in Southeast Asia, can be expected to accommodate Beijing more while trying to benefit from
Chinese economic growth when and where possible.1
The U.S. security allies can be expected to cooperate more
with each other while calling for more visible displays of U.S. commitment (including more military force
presence).2 India will become more important to U.S. strategy as a link between Australia and Thailand, and the Middle East and
Central Asia, and the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Beijing will likely respond to these increased U.S. defense commitments with accusations of hostile containment. But China has already used overt economic incentives to try and encourage U.S. regional allies to
deal with Beijing bilaterally, leading with economic engagement, and has used punishment when such states have organized against Chinese interests.3 By one account, China seeks three strategic aims: a secure
periphery; a favorable security environment; and successful resolution of the Taiwan issue—and Beijing sees the United States, and even more specifically, the U.S.-led security order in the region, as a threat to all
three.4 Avoiding armed conflict will become more difficult.
China faces strong incentives, especially economic, to try and assure neighboring states of its benign intentions, but as China becomes more powerful, this will be harder to accomplish—unless there is some
dramatic change in the regional security order.
China’s dramatic rise in power and international influence, especially since around 2000, has created a mounting ‘rise dilemma’—or the more it tries to accumulate comprehensive power, the more it must deal
with external pressure against its rise from other states—and as long as the United States relies on alliances and security partnerships in the region, the more Beijing will seek to cultivate state-by-state
relationships.5 According to Weifeng Zhou and Mario Esteban, of the Autonomous University of Madrid, Spain, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) represents a grand strategic move to begin remaking the
international diplomatic and economic orders, or in other words, to take Beijing from a rules-taking to a rules-making position.6 China’s preferences for bilateral relations and for promoting the BRI as a competing
global power order will probably cause leaders in Beijing to increase their confrontational stance vis-à-vis Washington.
From the early 2000s, China accepted that it must operate under American prominence in a unipolar system, but it hedged by trying to deepen ties to multiple countries around the world, to help if Washington is
uncooperative—while aiming for a future concert of powers style arrangement.7 Unipolarity matters little today in understanding what China’s continuing rise will do to the American position in the geopolitical
landscape, it is still unclear exactly what kind of polarity is emerging, and it seems that the ability of states to translate economic power into advanced military power is becoming more difficult.8 China was
engaging in hedging behavior, improving military capabilities while avoiding direct confrontation with the U.S. military, pursuing better ties with Southeast Asian states, as power was transferring away from the
policy
United States to multiple other players—this all up until about 2016.9 Although future Chinese foreign policy is hard to predict, especially as it relates to the United States , Chinese
makers and analysts have been increasingly arguing for America’s loss of power status, or at least
highlighting what they claim is Washington’s inability to handle the primary world power
position.10 Where Chinese hedging against the system leader is going now is less clear but Beijing behaves like it is
cultivating options that allow it to sidestep U.S. policy preferences.
It is becoming increasingly important for U.S. defense policy makers to come to grips with whether the
bilateral security relationships with important regional actors, like India, are durable enough to
balance against China. India should prove to be a key player for U.S. security interests, but there are also risks in the U.S.-
India alignment against China.11 Containing China through greater mobilization of partner states in the region figures prominently in
the security strategies of both the United States and India.12
Having some alignment in strategic approaches will help both countries see and interpret security
challenges in similar ways. In realist terms, India is pursuing a network of friendly security partners through Southeast Asia,
to parts of the Pacific Rim, and including the United States—to push back against Chinese involvement in countries around India and
to counterbalance Chinese assertiveness.13 At the same time that India is trying to balance China it is also trying to assure Beijing
that it is not containing China’s rise.14 This balancing act will be increasingly difficult as long as border violence continues between
the two major powers (such as recurrences of the vicious skirmish at Ladakh in June 2020).
Also key to how geopolitics unfolds over the next few decades will be the degree and manner in which the United States chooses to
either reconfigure global engagement or pull back substantially to the western hemisphere. The Indo-Pacific is emerging
as the pivot around which major powers are maneuvering, major powers will drive the most
important security aspects of the region, and the pivot is a geostrategic opportunity for the
United States.15 For some scholars, the divergent views between Washington and Beijing are too far apart and a more strategic approach would be to forgo cooperation and move to managing
rivalry.16 The rise of China has been portrayed as the geopolitical event of the post-1945 world, and that the U.S.-China rivalry is the dominant power relationship to shape all others.17 If the United States decides
to pull military forces from many parts of the world to focus more on defending only core interests, more narrowly defined, then U.S. defense policy makers should ensure that minimal outposts remain (or are
quickly acquired) in terrain key to the Indo-Pacific security construct as a whole, including north and south India, north and south Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, along with South Korea,
Japan, and Australia. The idea of “minimal outposts” here refers to what might be termed cold-start and warm-start military sites.18
drivers for conflict point to

There may be circumstances and options for major powers to control their ambitions and cooperate for stability and peaceful development, but the
even more intense competitive rivalry. Significant drivers for war include: diminishing arms control; weakening international institutions; persistent
competition between democracies and autocratic states; increasing nationalism; advancements in long-range
strike, and in nontraditional ways of warfare; and a possible explosion in mis- and disinformation.19 U.S. China scholars and
policy experts have been starting to refer to decisive turning points in Washington-Beijing
relations, such as the March 2021 meeting in Alaska between senior officials, and this may reflect a growing sense that the
stakes involved are significantly higher than in any recent period.20 China will continue working for a
dominant regional position, as a major power may be expected to do, but it is also maneuvering for global power, and these
advances to the global stage may surprise American strategists if Beijing does not follow expected paths.21 While power shifts alone
should not spell future armed conflict, theU.S.-China rivalry has multiple dimensions, including technological,
security-defense, and ideological, and that suggests that the drivers for conflict will be hard to manage for
both sides.
If security relations with China worsen in the region, then it can be assumed that there will be more requests for U.S. military
presence but of the more reversible kinds such as maritime patrols and air shows of force. But these will not communicate the same
level of U.S. commitment as land forces and may contribute to misunderstood deterrence signaling. At some point in the
conflict escalation, regional states will no longer weigh the benefits of economic activity with
China over their security and they will want more permanent demonstrations of U.S. commitment
to regional stability. It will be important for the U.S. Joint Force to be able to demonstrate capability to extend conventional
military force to the Chinese mainland, as well as conventional-nuclear integration, to counter People’s Liberation Army force
projection. The U.S. military end will be to prevent war, if possible, and advance U.S. interests by strengthening friendly coalition
deterrence of Chinese aggression.
Sustained US diplomacy is key to prevent the expansion of Chinese power

grabbing
Cimmino and Rothschild, '22 – Jeffrey Cimmino is the Associate Director at the Scowcroft
Strategy Initiative Center for Strategy and Security, Amanda J. Rothschild is a Nonresident Senior
Fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security (Jeffrey Cimmino and Amanda J.
Rothschild; "Twenty-first-century diplomacy: Strengthening US diplomacy for the challenges of
today and tomorrow"; Atlantic Council; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-
reports/issue-brief/twenty-first-century-diplomacy-strengthening-us-diplomacy-for-the-
challenges-of-today-and-tomorrow/; 6-28-2022, Accessed 7-13-2022)//ILake-AZ
Focus on personal diplomacy and relationship building
In an era of overwhelming power, US diplomacy tended to prioritize key regions and often
engaged in benign neglect in other regions. In this new era of great power rivalry, China has filled the
vacuum to the detriment of American interests. Diplomats must once again relearn the Cold War era skills of
viewing the entire world as the setting of a contest for influence and power.
China is actively combining its military, economic, political, and diplomatic power to cultivate
partnerships throughout the world, from traditionally nonaligned countries in Africa to NATO members in
Eastern Europe. China is especially good at personal engagement , approaching countries with a
robust on-the-ground presence to strengthen ties and leverage them to Beijing’s advantage. Through
debt diplomacy, a favored tool of the CCP, China has gained control of a port in Sri Lanka. It is also
reportedly constructing a naval base in Cambodia, and has concluded a pact with the Solomon Islands.
These are just a few examples of China’s reach.
US diplomacy needs to counter Chinese influence by recommitting to personal diplomacy and

frequent engagement with countries throughout the world, to draw them away from China’s
orbit. US diplomacy must be predicated on steady, sustained, and personal engagement to
nourish relationships and remind countries of the benefits of ties with the United States. The
United States needs to approach countries with a clear understanding of their interests and needs. It needs to compete
with China across all areas of engagement. In the technology realm, the United States must be tireless
in its efforts to persuade allies and partners to reject Huawei-built 5G digital infrastructure, which invites a
severe security threat into US alliances and partnerships, and exposes recipient nations to coercion, espionage, and
sabotage in the future. US diplomats must make this case to allies and partners around the world. Accepting money,
technology, or other resources from Beijing—no matter how attractive—makes a state vulnerable to
CCP coercion. Washington must also offer a positive alternative that plays to its strengths. While the US
government will not make large loans with no strings attached, it can offer higher quality, transparent, and environmentally
friendly development aid and other assistance that the CCP cannot match.
!---China---Top Level
China-Taiwan war goes nuclear---containment is key
Pettyjohn and Wasser 5-20-2022, *senior fellow and director of the defense program at the
Center for a New American Security, **fellow in the defense program and co-lead of The
Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security (Stacie and Becca, “A Fight Over Taiwan
Could Go Nuclear,” Foreign Affairs,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-20/fight-over-taiwan-could-go-
nuclear/)//BB
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has
placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would
result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such
saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and
drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States
came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation
in Europe. A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet
the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim
of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s
military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places
on unification with Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States
could very well go nuclear. Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese
Communist Party decides to invade the island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure
without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to
ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable. That would mean convincing the United States
and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways
to achieve that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective
means to keep the United States out of the conflict. China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to
Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able to project conventional
military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from effectively countering a
Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, a growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as
well as potentially new warfighting capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and
escalation. China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclear scholars at
the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo fields
under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders
as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the
continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around 1,000 deliverable warheads
—more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five
years from now the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with
Taiwan. Our recent war game—in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts
assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the United States—illustrated that a U.S.-
Chinese war could escalate quickly. For one thing, it showed that both countries would face operational
incentives to strike military forces on the other’s territory. In the game, such strikes were intended to be
calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed
red lines for both countries, and produced a tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that broadened the
scope and intensity of the conflict. For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S.
bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S.
military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team viewed striking it as less
escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and
surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as
attacks on their home territory, crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on
their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other
as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team responded to China’s moves by hitting targets
in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii. A NEW ERA One particularly
alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off
outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At
times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team
than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible. In real
life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear
threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of
experience making nuclear threats. This may push China to preemptively detonate a nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of
its warning. China
might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints
on its long-range conventional strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability
to launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to
strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the American people. Up until a
certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate
the seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S. homeland
could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear policy, the war game resulted in
Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the
electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The
war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would
have provoked a response. The most likely paths to nuclear escalation in a fight between the United States and China are different
from those that were most likely during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States feared a massive, bolt-from-the-blue
nuclear attack, which would precipitate a full-scale strategic exchange. In a confrontation over Taiwan, however, Beijing could
employ nuclear weapons in a more limited way to signal resolve or to improve its chances of winning on the battlefield. It is unclear
how a war would proceed after that kind of limited nuclear use and whether the United States could de-escalate the situation while
still achieving its objectives. AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION The
clear lesson from the war game is that the United
States needs to strengthen its conventional capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to ensure that China
never views an invasion of Taiwan as a prudent tactical move. To do so, the United States will need to
commit to maintaining its conventional military superiority by expanding its stockpiles of long-range munitions and investing in
undersea capabilities. Washington must also be able to conduct offensive operations inside the first and second island chains even
while under attack. This will require access to new bases to distribute U.S. forces, enhance their survivability, and ensure that they
can effectively defend Taiwan in the face of China’s attacks. Moreover, the United States needs to develop an integrated
network of partners willing to contribute
to Taiwan’s defense. Allies are an asymmetric advantage: the United States
has them, and China does not. The
United States should deepen strategic and operational planning with
key partners to send a strong signal of resolve to China. As part of these planning efforts, the United States and
its allies will need to develop war-winning military strategies that do not cross Chinese red-lines. The game highlighted just how
difficult this task may be; what it did not highlight is the complexity of developing military strategies that integrate the strategic
objectives and military capacities of multiple nations. Moving forward, military planners in the United States and in Washington’s
allies and partners must grapple with the fact that, in a conflict over Taiwan, China would consider all conventional and nuclear
options to be on the table. And the
United States is running out of time to strengthen deterrence and
keep China from believing an invasion of Taiwan could be successful. The biggest risk is that
Washington and its friends choose not to seize the moment and act: a year or two from now, it
might already be too late.
China poses a larger and more probable risk than Russia

Colby 20, co-founder and principal of The Marathon Initiative, a policy initiative focused on
developing strategies to prepare the United States for an era of sustained great power
competition. From 2018-2019, Colby was the Director of the Defense Program at the Center for
a New American Security, where he led the Center’s work on defense issues. Before that, he
served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development from
2017-2018. In that role, he served as the lead official in the development and rollout of the
Department’s 2018 National Defense Strategy. (Eldridge, “How NATO Manages the “Bear” and
the “Dragon”,” Elbridge A. Colby and Ian Brzezinski in Conversation with Nikolas Gvosdev,
Orbis)//BB
Nikolas Gvosdev: Which is the bigger challenge, China or Russia? Or are they equivalent?
Elbridge Colby is co-founder and principal of The Marathon Initiative, a policy initiative focused
on developing strategies to prepare the United States for an era of sustained great power
Department’s 2018 National Defense Strategy. Elbridge Colby: China is by a very considerable
margin the more significant challenge to U.S. interests. The fundamental U.S. interest abroad is
in denying another state the ability to dominate a key region like Asia or Europe. This could
allow such a state to prejudice or deny our trade, access to markets, and so forth. China is a
much greater threat on both of these scores: it is a far larger economy and thus can mount a
much more plausible challenge to establish hegemony over its region than Russia can over
Europe, and Asia is the world’s largest economy. So, the top priority must be to deny China
hegemony over Asia. That said, Russia remains a challenge in Europe, and, in particular, is a
concrete military threat in Eastern NATO; ensuring Russia does not see a plausible “theory of
victory” in this area needs to be the priority focus for the Atlantic Alliance.
Asia war outweighs, threatens extinction

Mead 10, senior fellow @ the Council on Foreign Relations (Walter, American Interest,
“Obama in Asia,” http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2010/11/09/obama-in-asia/)
East and South Asia

The decision to go to Asia is one that all thinking Americans can and should support regardless of either party or ideological affiliation.
are the places where the 21st century, for better or for worse, will most likely be shaped; economic growth,
environmental progress, the destiny of democracy and success against terror are all at stake
here. American objectives in this region are clear. While convincing China that its best interests
are not served by a rash, Kaiser Wilhelm-like dash for supremacy in the region, the US does not
want either to isolate or contain China. We want a strong, rich, open and free China in an Asia
that is also strong, rich, open and free. Our destiny is inextricably linked with Asia’s; Asian
success will make America stronger, richer and more secure. Asia’s failures will reverberate
over here, threatening our prosperity, our security and perhaps even our survival. The world’s
two most mutually hostile nuclear states, India and Pakistan, are in Asia. The two states most
likely to threaten others with nukes, North Korea and aspiring rogue nuclear power Iran, are
there. The two superpowers with a billion plus people are in Asia as well. This is where the
world’s fastest growing economies are. It is where the worst environmental problems exist. It is
the home of the world’s largest democracy, the world’s most populous Islamic country (Indonesia — which is
also among the most democratic and pluralistic of Islamic countries), and the world’s most rapidly rising non-democratic power as well. Asia holds more oil resources than any
other continent; the world’s most important and most threatened trade routes lie off its shores. East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia (where American and NATO forces are
fighting the Taliban) and West Asia (home among others to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey and Iraq) are the theaters in the world today that most directly engage America’s vital
interests and where our armed forces are most directly involved. The world’s most explosive territorial disputes are in Asia as
well, with islands (and the surrounding mineral and fishery resources) bitterly disputed between countries like Russia, the two Koreas, Japan, China (both from Beijing and
the world’s most intractable political problems are

Taipei), and Vietnam. From the streets of Jerusalem to the beaches of Taiwan
found on the Asian landmass and its surrounding seas. Whether you view the world in terms of
geopolitical security, environmental sustainability, economic growth or the march of democracy,
Asia is at the center of your concerns. That is the overwhelming reality of world politics today, and that reality is what President Obama’s trip is
intended to address.
!---Tech---Top Level
Tech leadership solves terrorism and rogue states, ceding causes nuclear war
Matthew Kroenig 21, Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh
School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Will Emerging Technology Cause Nuclear
War?” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Winter 2021, Vol. 15, No. 4 (WINTER 2021), pp. 59-73,
Accessed via JSTOR.
Novel Applications
The spread of new technology to the United States and its Allies and partners would likely serve, on
balance, to reinforce the existing sources of stability in the prevailing international system. At the end of the
Cold War, the United States and its Allies and partners achieved a technological- military advantage over its great power rivals, with
the US using its unipolar position to deepen and expand a rules-based system. They also employed their military dominance to
counter perceived threats from rogue states and terrorist networks. The United States, its Allies, and partners did not, however,
engage in military aggression against great power, nuclear-armed rivals or their allies.
In the future, these statusquo powers are apt to use military advantages to reinforce their position in
the international system and to deter attacks against Allies and partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. These states might also
employ military power to deal with threats posed by terrorist networks or by regional revisionist powers
such as Iran and North Korea. But it is extremely difficult to imagine scenarios in which Washington
or its Allies or partners would use newfound military advantages provided by emerging technology to conduct an
armed attack against Russia or China.
Similarly, Moscow and Beijing would likely use any newfound military strength to advance their preexisting
geopolitical aims. Given their very different positions in the international system, however, these states are likely to employ new
military technologies in ways that are destabilizing. These states have made clear their
dissatisfaction with the existing inter-national system and their desire to revise it. Both countries
have ongoing border disputes with multiple neighboring countries.
If Moscow developed new military technologies and operational con-cepts that shifted the balance of power in its favor, it would
likely use this advantage to pursue revisionist aims. If Moscow acquired a newfound ability to more easily invade and occupy
territory in Eastern Europe, for example (or if Putin believed Russia had such a capability), it is more likely Russia would be
tempted to engage in aggression.
Likewise, if
China acquired an enhanced ability through new technology to invade and occupy Taiwan or contested
islands in theEast or South China Seas, Beijing’s leaders might also find this opportunity tempting. If new
technology enhances either power’s anti-access, area-denial network, then its leaders may be more confident in their
ability to achieve a fait accompli attack against a neighbor and then block a US-led liberation.
These are precisely the types of shifts in the balance of power that can lead to war. As mentioned previously,
the predominant scholarly theory on the causes of war—the bargaining model—maintains that imperfect in-formation on the
balance of power and the balance of resolve and credible commitment problems result in international conflict.52 New
technology can exacerbate these causal mechanisms by increasing uncertainty about, or causing rapid
shifts in, the balance of power. Indeed as noted above, new military technology and the development of new
operational concepts have shifted the balance of power and resulted in military conflict
throughout history.
Some may argue emerging military technology is more likely to result in a new tech arms race than in conflict. This is possible. But
Moscow and Beijing may come to believe (correctly or not) that new technology pro-vides them a usable
military advantage over the United States and its Al- lies and partners. In so doing, they may underestimate Washington.
If Moscow or Beijing attacked a vulnerable US Ally or partner in their near abroad, therefore, there would be a risk of
major war with the potential for nuclear escalation. The United States has formal treaty
commitments with several frontline states as well as an ambiguous defense obligation to Taiwan. If
Russia or China were to attack these states, it is likely, or at least possible, that the United States would come to the
defense of the victims. While many question the wisdom or credibility of America’s global commitments, it would be
difficult for the United States to simply back down. Abandoning a treaty ally could cause fears that America’s global commit-
ments would unravel. Any US president, therefore, would feel great pressure to come to an Ally’s defense and expel Russian or
Chinese forces.
Once the United States and Russia or China are at war, there
would be a risk of nuclear escalation. As noted
previously, experts assess the greatest risk of nuclear war today does not come from a bolt-out-of-the-blue strike but from
nuclear escalation in a regional, conventional conflict.53 Russian leaders may believe it is in their interest to use nuclear
weapons early in a conflict with the United States and NATO.54 Russia possesses a large and
diverse arsenal, including thousands of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, to support this nuclear strategy.
In the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, Washington indicates it could re-taliate against any Russian nuclear “de-escalation”
strikes with limited nuclear strikes of its own using low-yield nuclear weapons.55 The purpose of US strategy is to deter
Russian strikes. If deterrence fails, however, there is a clear pathway to nuclear war between the United States and Russia.
As Henry Kissinger pointed out decades ago, there is no guarantee that, once begun, a limited nuclear war stays
limited.56
There are similar risks of nuclear escalation in the event of a US-China conflict. China has traditionally possessed
a relaxed nuclear posture with a small “lean and effective” deterrent and a formal “no first use” policy. But China is relying more
on its strategic forces. It is projected to double—if not triple or quadruple—the size of its nuclear arsenal in the
coming decade.57
Chinese experts have acknowledged there

is a narrow range of contin-gencies in which China might use
nuclear weapons first.58 As in the case of Russia, the US Nuclear Posture Review recognizes the possibility of limited Chinese
nuclear attacks and also holds out the potential of a lim-ited US reprisal with low-yield nuclear weapons as a deterrent.59 If the
nuclear threshold is breached in a conflict between the United States and China, the risk of nuclear exchange is real.
!---Turns Case
China poses a larger and more probable risk than Russia
Colby 20, co-founder and principal of The Marathon Initiative, a policy initiative focused on
developing strategies to prepare the United States for an era of sustained great power
Department’s 2018 National Defense Strategy. (Eldridge, “How NATO Manages the “Bear” and
the “Dragon”,” Elbridge A. Colby and Ian Brzezinski in Conversation with Nikolas Gvosdev,
Orbis)//BB
Nikolas Gvosdev: Which is the bigger challenge, China or Russia? Or are they equivalent?
Elbridge Colby is co-founder and principal of The Marathon Initiative, a policy initiative focused
on developing strategies to prepare the United States for an era of sustained great power
Department’s 2018 National Defense Strategy. Elbridge Colby: China is by a very considerable
margin the more significant challenge to U.S. interests. The fundamental U.S. interest abroad is
in denying another state the ability to dominate a key region like Asia or Europe. This could
allow such a state to prejudice or deny our trade, access to markets, and so forth. China is a
much greater threat on both of these scores: it is a far larger economy and thus can mount a
much more plausible challenge to establish hegemony over its region than Russia can over
Europe, and Asia is the world’s largest economy. So, the top priority must be to deny China
hegemony over Asia. That said, Russia remains a challenge in Europe, and, in particular, is a
concrete military threat in Eastern NATO; ensuring Russia does not see a plausible “theory of
victory” in this area needs to be the priority focus for the Atlantic Alliance.
Asia war outweighs, threatens extinction

Mead 10, senior fellow @ the Council on Foreign Relations (Walter, American Interest,
“Obama in Asia,” http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2010/11/09/obama-in-asia/)
East and South Asia

The decision to go to Asia is one that all thinking Americans can and should support regardless of either party or ideological affiliation.
are the places where the 21st century, for better or for worse, will most likely be shaped; economic growth,
environmental progress, the destiny of democracy and success against terror are all at stake
here. American objectives in this region are clear. While convincing China that its best interests
are not served by a rash, Kaiser Wilhelm-like dash for supremacy in the region, the US does not
want either to isolate or contain China. We want a strong, rich, open and free China in an Asia
that is also strong, rich, open and free. Our destiny is inextricably linked with Asia’s; Asian
success will make America stronger, richer and more secure. Asia’s failures will reverberate
over here, threatening our prosperity, our security and perhaps even our survival. The world’s
two most mutually hostile nuclear states, India and Pakistan, are in Asia. The two states most
likely to threaten others with nukes, North Korea and aspiring rogue nuclear power Iran, are
there. The two superpowers with a billion plus people are in Asia as well. This is where the
world’s fastest growing economies are. It is where the worst environmental problems exist. It is
the home of the world’s largest democracy, the world’s most populous Islamic country (Indonesia — which is
also among the most democratic and pluralistic of Islamic countries), and the world’s most rapidly rising non-democratic power as well. Asia holds more oil resources than any
other continent; the world’s most important and most threatened trade routes lie off its shores. East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia (where American and NATO forces are
fighting the Taliban) and West Asia (home among others to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey and Iraq) are the theaters in the world today that most directly engage America’s vital
interests and where our armed forces are most directly involved. The world’s most explosive territorial disputes are in Asia as
well, with islands (and the surrounding mineral and fishery resources) bitterly disputed between countries like Russia, the two Koreas, Japan, China (both from Beijing and
the world’s most intractable political problems are

Taipei), and Vietnam. From the streets of Jerusalem to the beaches of Taiwan
found on the Asian landmass and its surrounding seas. Whether you view the world in terms of
geopolitical security, environmental sustainability, economic growth or the march of democracy,
Asia is at the center of your concerns. That is the overwhelming reality of world politics today, and that reality is what President Obama’s trip is
intended to address.
!---Tech Leadership
Tech leadership is the centerpiece of US-China relations – effective political
focus is necessary
Saeed, '21 – Nonresident senior fellow with the New American Engagement Initiative in the
Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center (Ferial Ara Saeed; "The Sino-American Race for Technology
Leadership"; War on the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2021/04/the-sino-american-race-
for-technology-leadership/; 4-23-2021, Accessed 7-16-2022)//ILake-AZ
A Race of Existential Importance
America and China are vying to lead the world in emerging and foundational technologies, the
new crown jewels of geostrategic power. The Trump administration and Congress made blocking China’s
acquisition of these critical technologies their primary focus. A policy response was long overdue, but
Washington made two serious mistakes. First, policymakers relied on constraint-based measures as if they were silver bullets that
only impose costs on the other side. They applied constraints and expanded the government’s restrictive powers while leaving
unclear the scope of implementation, risking America’s innovation capacity and global competitiveness. Closing doors, erecting
barriers, and inflicting costs have a role to play — but a supporting role, not one as the lead act.
Second, Washington failed to mount a strategic response to the world’s second-largest economy
putting massive state resources behind policies and plans to win the most important race the
United States has run since the Cold War. The logic is hard to fathom. China is not on an immutable
trajectory. Market liberalization has not disappeared under Xi. It is a leadership priority in the financial sector consistent with the
International Monetary Fund’s recent alert of financial stability risk. Even more compelling is the warning in a 2019 World Bank
report, prepared in cooperation with China’s State Council, of serious structural obstacles to growth unless the government adopts
broad-based liberalizing reforms.
Americans were poorly served. Washington never bothered to test the proposition that,
confronted with bilateral and coordinated multilateral pushback, and given the need for
market reform to preempt serious economic challenges ahead, Beijing could be pressured to
change course. It is time to try.
Setting the right foundation is crucial. Sound analytical judgments about China’s policies, plans, and prospects, along
with a new framework for the relationship, are the starting point. Neither wholesale confrontation nor wholesale engagement are
adequate to address U.S. concerns, but the relationship should be stable for this approach to have any chance of success. The
view that economic competitiveness, innovation, and democratic norms are core components of
national security should drive the development of a comprehensive strategy into which discrete
policies of pressure, negotiation, multilateralism, high-level dialogue, and domestic measures fit. Industry
should work closely with the government to ensure this perspective underpins U.S. policy, and the government should recognize
that industry is central to the United States winning the technology race and therefore should get a vote on how to run it.
Out-competing and out-innovating China requires that America remain the world’s most
attractive innovation hub, enticing the best talent, drawing in the most venture capital, and
generating the largest revenues to support U.S. leadership of technology’s newest frontiers. It means continuing to “move fast and
break things.” The
ethos that made America a technology superpower can keep it so. It also means
injecting some strategic realism into U.S. policy. As former Secretary of Defense William Cohen put it, China’s
actions have caused the United States to say, “we can’t do business the way we’ve been doing business,” but, “we still have to do
business.”
Chinese tech leadership causes extinction
Kroenig and Gopalaswamy, '18 – Matthew Kroenig is an American political scientist,
author, national security strategist, and former CIA officer. He is professor in the Department of
Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.
Bharath Gopalaswamy is a Senior Fellow at ORF. He serves as the Vice- President of Strategic
Ventures at OCR Services Inc., a tech firm that specializes in Global Trade Management,
sanctions compliance and e-governance. (Matthew Kroenig and Bharath Gopalaswamy; "Will
disruptive technology cause nuclear war?"; The Bulletin; https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/will-
disruptive-technology-cause-nuclear-war/; 11-12-2018, Accessed 7-16-2022)//ILake-AZ
Recently, analysts
have argued that emerging technologies with military applications may
undermine nuclear stability (see here, here, and here), but the logic of these arguments is debatable and overlooks a
more straightforward reason why new technology might cause nuclear conflict: by upending the
existing balance of power among nuclear-armed states. This latter concern is more probable and
dangerous and demands an immediate policy response.
For more than 70 years, the world has avoided major power conflict, and many attribute this era of peace to nuclear weapons. In
situations of mutually assured destruction (MAD), neither side has an incentive to start a conflict because doing so will only result in
its own annihilation. The key to this model of deterrence is the maintenance of secure second-strike capabilities—the ability to
absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating counterattack.
Recently analysts have begun to worry, however, that new strategic military technologies may make it
possible for a state to conduct a successful first strike on an enemy. For example, Chinese colleagues
have complained to me in Track II dialogues that the United States may decide to launch a sophisticated
cyberattack against Chinese nuclear command and control, essentially turning off China’s
nuclear forces. Then, Washington will follow up with a massive strike with conventional cruise and hypersonic missiles to
destroy China’s nuclear weapons. Finally, if any Chinese forces happen to survive, the United States can
simply mop up China’s ragged retaliatory strike with advanced missile defenses. China will be disarmed
and US nuclear weapons will still be sitting on the shelf, untouched.
If the United States, or any other state acquires such a first-strike capability, then the logic of MAD
would be undermined. Washington may be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike. Or China may choose instead to use its
nuclear weapons early in a conflict before they can be wiped out—the so-called “use ‘em or lose ‘em” problem.
According to this logic, therefore, the appropriate policy response would be to ban outright or control any new weapon systems that
might threaten second-strike capabilities.
This way of thinking about new technology and stability, however, is open to question. Would any US president truly decide to
launch a massive, bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack because he or she thought s/he could get away with it? And why does it make
sense for the country in the inferior position, in this case China, to intentionally start a nuclear war that it will almost certainly lose?
More important, this conceptualization of how new technology affects stability is too narrow, focused exclusively on how new
military technologies might be used against nuclear forces directly.
Rather, we should think more broadly about how new technology might affect global politics , and,
for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The dominant theory of the causes of war in the academy is
the “bargaining model of war.” This theory identifies rapid shifts in the balance of power as a primary cause of conflict.
International politics often presents states with conflicts that they can settle through peaceful bargaining, but when bargaining
breaks down, war results. Shifts in the balance of power are problematic because they undermine effective bargaining. After all, why
agree to a deal today if your bargaining position will be stronger tomorrow? And, a clear understanding of the military balance of
power can contribute to peace. (Why start a war you are likely to lose?) But shifts in the balance of power muddy understandings of
which states have the advantage.
You may see where this is going. New technologies threaten to create potentially destabilizing shifts in
the balance of power.
For decades, stability in Europe and Asia has been supported by US military power. In recent years,
however, the balance of power in Asia has begun to shift, as China has increased its military
capabilities. Already, Beijing has become more assertive in the region, claiming contested territory in the
South China Sea. And the results of Russia’s military modernization have been on full display in its
ongoing intervention in Ukraine.
Moreover, Chinamay have the lead over the United States in emerging technologies that could be
decisive for the future of military acquisitions and warfare, including 3D printing, hypersonic
missiles, quantum computing, 5G wireless connectivity, and artificial intelligence (AI). And Russian
President Vladimir Putin is building new unmanned vehicles while ominously declaring, “Whoever leads in AI will rule the world.”
If China or Russia are able to incorporate new technologies into their militaries before the
United States, then this could lead to the kind of rapid shift in the balance of power that often
causes war.
If Beijing believes emerging technologies provide it with a newfound, local military advantage
over the United States, for example, it may be more willing than previously to initiate conflict over
Taiwan. And if Putin thinks new tech has strengthened his hand, he may be more tempted to
launch a Ukraine-style invasion of a NATO member.
Either scenario could bring these nuclear powers into direct conflict with the United States, and
once nuclear armed states are at war, there is an inherent risk of nuclear conflict through limited
nuclear war strategies, nuclear brinkmanship, or simple accident or inadvertent escalation.
This framing of the problem leads to a different set of policy implications. The
concern is not simply technologies that threaten
to undermine nuclear second-strike capabilities directly, but, rather, any technologies that can result in a
meaningful shift in the broader balance of power. And the solution is not to preserve second-strike
capabilities, but to preserve prevailing power balances more broadly.
When it comes to new technology, this means that the United States should seek to maintain an
innovation edge. Washington should also work with other states, including its nuclear-armed rivals, to
develop a new set of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and export controls to deny these newer and
potentially destabilizing technologies to potentially hostile states.
These are no easy tasks, but the

consequences of Washington losing the race for technological
superiority to its autocratic challengers just might mean nuclear Armageddon.
China tech norms cause extinction

Jain and Kroenig 19 – Ash Jain is director for democratic order with the Scowcroft Center for
Strategy and Security. Matthew Kroenig is a Professor in the Department of Government and
the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. (“Present at the Re-
Creation: A Global Strategy for Revitalizing, Adapting, and Defending a Rules-Based International
System,” Atlantic Council. October 30th, 2019. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-
research-reports/report/present-at-the-re-creation/) Edgemont PF
The system must also be adapted to deal with new issues that were not envisioned when the existing order was designed. Foremost
among these issues is emerging and disruptive technology, including AI, additive manufacturing (or 3D printing), quantum
computing, genetic engineering, robotics, directed energy, the Internet of things (IOT), 5G, space, cyber, and many others.
Like other disruptive technologies before them, these innovations promise great benefits, but also carry
serious downside risks. For example, AI is already resulting in massive efficiencies and cost savings in the private sector.
Routine tasks and other more complicated jobs, such as radiology, are already being automated. In the future, autonomous
weapons systems may go to war against each other as human soldiers remain out of harm’s
way.
Yet, AI is also transforming economies and societies, and generating new security challenges .
Automation will lead to widespread unemployment. The final realization of driverless cars, for example, will put out of work millions
of taxi, Uber, and long-haul truck drivers. Populist movements in the West have been driven by those disaffected by globalization
and technology, and mass unemployment caused by automation will further grow those ranks and provide new fuel to grievance
politics. Moreover, some fear that autonomous weapons systems will become “killer robots” that select and engage targets without
human input, and could eventually turn on their creators, resulting in human extinction.
The other technologies on this list similarly balance great potential upside with great downside risk .
3D printing, for example,
can be used to “make anything anywhere,” reducing costs for a wide range of manufactured
goods and encouraging a return of local manufacturing industries.61 At the same time,
advanced 3D printers can also be used by revisionist and rogue states to print component parts
for advanced weapons systems or even WMD programs, spurring arms races and weapons
proliferation.62 Genetic engineering can wipe out entire classes of disease through improved
medicine, or wipe out entire classes of people through genetically engineered superbugs.
Directed-energy missile defenses may defend against incoming missile attacks, while also
undermining global strategic stability.
Perhaps the greatest risk to global strategic stability from new technology, however, comes from the
risk that revisionist autocracies may win the new tech arms race. Throughout history, states that
have dominated the commanding heights of technological progress have also dominated
international relations. The United States has been the world’s innovation leader from Edison’s light
bulb to nuclear weapons and the Internet. Accordingly, stability has been maintained in Europe and Asia for
decades because the United States and its democratic allies possessed a favorable economic
and military balance of power in those key regions. Many believe, however, that China may now
have the lead in the new technologies of the twenty-first century, including AI, quantum, 5G, hypersonic missiles, and
others. If China succeeds in mastering the technologies of the future before the democratic core,
then this could lead to a drastic and rapid shift in the balance of power, upsetting global
strategic stability, and the call for a democratic-led, rules-based system outlined in these
pages.63
The United States and its democratic allies need to work with other major powers to develop a framework for
harnessing emerging technology in a way that maximizes its upside potential, while mitigating
against its downside risks, and also contributing to the maintenance of global stability . The existing
international order contains a wide range of agreements for harnessing the technologies of the twentieth century, but they need to
be updated for the twenty-first century. The world needs an entire new set of arms-control, nonproliferation, export-control, and
other agreements to exploit new technology while mitigating downside risk. These agreements should seek to maintain global
strategic stability among the major powers, and prevent the proliferation of dangerous weapons systems to hostile and revisionist
states.
Chinese tech bad (AI + cyber)
Lorand Laskai {research associate in the Asia Studies Program at the Council on Foreign
Relations}, 18 - ("Why Does Everyone Hate Made in China 2025?," Council on Foreign Relations,
3-28-2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-does-everyone-hate-made-china-2025)//
marlborough-wr/
Made in China 2025, originally approved by China's State Council in 2015, is mentioned or cited
an astounding hundred and sixteen times. In contrast, China's Cybersecurity Law, which has
caused a perennial headache for many U.S. multinationals, is only mentioned thirteen times.
And for good reason. Beijing's grand plan to upgrade its manufacturing base has
riled governments around the world, confirming their suspicion that China is not looking for a
'win-win' in trade relations as its overseas emissaries often insist. In the saga of the U.S.-China
economic rivalry, Made in China 2025 is shaping up to be the central villain, the real existential
threat to U.S. technological leadership.
What is Made in China 2025? Made in China 2025 is a blueprint for Beijing's plan to transform
the country into a hi-tech powerhouse that dominates advanced industries like robotics,
advanced information technology, aviation, and new energy vehicles. The ambition makes sense
within the context of China’s development trajectory: countries typically aim to transition away
from labor-intensive industries and climb the value-added chain as wages rise, lest they fall into
the so-called “middle-income trap.” Chinese policymakers have diligently studied the German
concept “Industry 4.0,” which shows how advanced technology like wireless sensors and
robotics, when combined with the internet, can yield significant gains in productivity, efficiency,
and precision.
However, China’s intention through Made in China 2025 is not so much to join the ranks of hi-
tech economies like Germany, the United States, South Korea, and Japan, as much as replace
them altogether. Made in China 2025 calls for achieving “self-sufficiency” through technology
substitution while becoming a “manufacturing superpower” that dominates the global market
in critical high-tech industries. That could be a problem for countries that rely on exporting high-
tech products or the global supply chain for high-tech components.
What’s wrong with China setting quotas for self-sufficiency? For one, such quotas violate WTO
rules against technology substitution. Made in China 2025 lays out targets for achieving 70%
“self-sufficiency” in core components and basic materials in industries like aerospace equipment
and telecommunication equipment by 2025. That could devastate countries like South Korea
and Germany, where hi-tech sectors constitute a large share of industrial output and exports.
The supply chains for hi-tech products usually span across many borders, with highly specialized
components often produced in one country and modified or assembled somewhere else. Rather
than abiding by the free market and rule-based trade, China is intent on subsuming the entire
global hi-tech supply chain through subsidizing domestic industry and mercantilist industrial
policies. Semi-official documents lay out even more specific quotas for Chinese manufacturers.
Officials at China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) insist these targets
are not official policy, though a report from the Mercator Institute for Chinese Studies argues
that officials are using internal or semi-official documents to communicate targets to Chinese
enterprises in order not to openly violate WTO rules.
How is Beijing acquiring advance technology for Made in China 2025? Equally problematic to
Beijing’s goal of “self-sufficiency” and becoming a “manufacturing superpower” is how it plans
to achieve it. Chinese officials know that China lags behind in critical hi-tech sectors and hence
are pushing a strategy of promoting foreign acquisitions, forced technology transfer
agreements, and, in many cases, commercial cyber espionage to gain cutting-edge technologies
and know-how.
While the Obama administration spent years pressuring Beijing to rein in commercial cyber
espionage, Washington and other capitals are only beginning to grapple with the repercussions
of Chinese investment and technology transfer agreements. Unlike cyber theft, neither is illegal
per se. Surging Chinese investment in the United States and Europe have been a recurring
story over the past few years. However, lawmakers are increasingly concerned that such
investments, especially in high-tech sectors, are not just a product of market forces, but guided
by Beijing as well.
Circumstantial evidence confirms this suspicion. Chinese investment in the United States and
elsewhere, especially in hi-tech sectors, has skyrocketed since 2015. Often these investments
evince a broader coordinated strategy. Take the example of Fujian Grand Chips, a purportedly
private Chinese company that attempted to acquire German machine maker Aixtron in 2016.
Shortly before it staged a public takeover of Aixtron, another Fujian-based company San’an
Optoelectronics canceled a critical order from Aixtron on dubious grounds, sending its stock
tumbling and presenting Fujian Grand Chips with an opportunity to swoop in. Both Fujian Grand
Chip and San’an Optoelectronics shared a common investor: an important national
semiconductor fund controlled by Beijing. The acquisition was stymied by an 11th-hour
intervention by government officials but demonstrated how Beijing can drive investing abroad,
often in a highly coordinated manner.
Technology transfer agreements and restrictive market practices in China present a similar
problem. Foreign companies often enter agreements to transfer valuable intellectual property
to Chinese partner in exchange for market access. These agreements can be exploitative and
highlight the asymmetries in market access between China and the rest of the world. Speaking
about Chinese takeovers of German firms, Germany's Economic Minister Sigmar Gabriel said
Germany should not sacrifice “its companies on the altar of free markets” while China denies
German firms equal access to invest in the Chinese market.
What can realistically be done? The keyword in Trump's recent tariffs against China is
"reciprocity." That's the right approach. An Asia Society task force concluded last year the
United States should urgently insist on reciprocity in the U.S.-China trade and investment
relations, even if it adds tension to the relationship. However, a trade war, as Scott Kennedy
points out, is no cakewalk, and it's unclear whether the administration has a clear idea of its
desired end-game. Moreover, Trump is using a wrecking-ball when a more precise tool would
have provided a better outcome. In addition to trade action against China, Trump has also
announced a blanket tariff on foreign steel, which affects U.S. allies as well as China. While many
allies have secured temporary exemptions to the tariff, Trump's pugilistic behavior is burning
valuable goodwill. As Matthew P. Goodman and Ely Ratner argued in Foreign Affairs, many
countries share Trump's desire to combat Chinese hi-tech mercantilism, but Trump is dividing
allies rather than unifying them to confront China.
Instead, the administration should focus on the long-game of building a political consensus at
home and abroad. That should include updating the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS) to better vet Chinese investment into hi-tech sectors; using existing
venues like the WTO to present a case against Chinese industrial policies; and rejoining the
Trans-Pacific Partnership, which set high bars for intellectual property protection, labor
standards, and safeguards against unfair competition from state-owned enterprises. Common
sense investments at home should also be a priority. Investing in education, infrastructure, and
basic science does not generate the same headlines as a trade war, but will do more to ensure
the United States maintains its edge.
!---China Containment
China expansion goes nuclear
Michael O’Hanlon & Gregory Poling 20, Senior fellow and director of research in Foreign
Policy at the Brookings Institution; Senior fellow for Southeast Asia and director of the Asia
Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS, “Rocks, Reefs, and Nuclear War,” Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative, 01/14/2020, https://amti.csis.org/rocks-reefs-and-nuclear-war/
It would be unwise, however, to assume that the status quo is stable. Deterrence has not failed—
yet. China is unlikely to do something as brazen as forcefully denying U.S. Navy or commercial ships access to the South China Sea,
attacking American or Japanese bases, or intentionally sinking Filipino sailors in disputed waters. But Beijing continues to
probe and test U.S. and allied resolve, provoking low-level crises which could easily escalate. Current
U.S. strategic thinking could trigger disproportionate responses that would cause such crises to
spiral out of control. That is the way World War I began a century ago—and it could happen
again.
War games seem to confirm these historic lessons. One of us has taken part in numerous simulations over the last
five years asking seasoned experts and officials to role-play how Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, and American leaders might respond to
crises in the South and East China Seas. The results are typically sobering. Some end
in a rapid Chinese fait accompli,
such as the seizure of a disputed island with minimal cost, while U.S. and allied leaders dither.
This type of scenario would lead to considerable damage to international norms, U.S. alliances, and American
national security.
Even more simulations rapidly escalate into full-scale conflict, bringing China and the United
States to the doorstep of nuclear war over stakes that no rational observer would consider
worth it. The U.S. national security community tends to view the ability to defeat China (or Russia) in combat wherever an ally
might be attacked as an essential goal. Direct defense or prompt reversal of any aggression, no matter how small, are the
foundational principles of current strategy. Article 5 of the NATO treaty and similar mutual defense commitments to Japan and the
Philippines treat all aggression as an equally existential threat. So in a scenario involving a Chinese landing on the Japanese-
administered Senkakus or a threat to the Sierra Madre—a derelict Philippine navy ship intentionally ran aground at Second Thomas
Shoal in the Spratlys and now housing a dozen soldiers—American
strategic culture most often leads to the
conclusion that kinetic action to retake a seized feature or outpost is justified to avoid abandoning an ally and
damaging U.S. credibility.
But such an escalation, while it should be kept as an option, would be fraught. It might end quickly, amounting to little more
than a skirmish, or large-scale
conflict between nuclear-armed superpowers could ensue. Both sides would
have powerful political incentives to escalate further. Military warning and communications
systems might be targeted through cyberattack or other means in a way that sowed confusion. Escalation
control could not be guaranteed—history and military scholarship strongly suggest as much, and
many war games corroborate it.
!---LIO
China expansionism collapses alliances and liberal-order norms
Xiangning Wu 20, Xiangning Wu is an Assistant Professor of Department of Government and
Public Policy, University of Macau. She held her Ph.D from the University of Birmingham, UK.
Her research focuses on Asia-Pacific regionalization, China-US relations, and International
Political Economy, "Technology, power, and uncontrolled great power strategic competition
between China and the United States," SpringerLink,
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s42533-020-00040-0/AL
Many observers conclude that the post-Cold War era of international relations, which is referred to as the “unipolar moment” (with the United States
as the unipolar power), began to fade from 2006–2008 (O’Rourke 2020). China's rise is often accompanied by corresponding predictions of inevitable
conflict and U.S. decline (Lewis 2018). The idea of a "Thucydides trap", an analogy that draws upon the Peloponnesian War in ancient Greece to suggest
that China and the U.S. may be headed for war, is still debatable, since the analogy fails considering the factors including international institutions,
economic interdependence and public resentment towards war. However, Washington
believes that China clearly "wants
to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other
nations' economic, diplomatic, and security decisions" (Mattis 2018, 2). The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy argues
that the U.S. is "facing increased global disorder, characterized by a decline in the long-standing
rules-based international order" and that "inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S.
national security" (Mattis 2018, 1). When the Cold War took place in the twentieth century, the post-war order and various international institutions
gradually came into being and aimed to keep peace through collective military might and shared prosperity. Despite enormous hardships and
intermittent disruption, the U.S. made utmost efforts to enforce security and sustain its global leadership, which the majority of its allies recognized.
However, the 2008–2009 financial crisis not only signalled that the post-war order that has dominated geopolitical affairs for more than 70 years is on
life support, but also indicated that the U.S. has fallen short of its wish to maintain the order as its relative power declines. The stability of the post-war
order has been challenged by a surge of nationalism, populism, and, not least, the United States. The primacy of national interests has been
readdressed by Trump, which weakens the language of multilateral cooperation and intentionally ignores the sophisticated institutions that hold the
world together. The backlash to liberal democracy is not exaggerated. The fact of Brexit concretely knocks down the seemingly firm faith of the West in
multilateral cooperation. Liberal internationalism is essentially threatened by developments within the West itself (Ikenberry 2018). The
increased global disorder is characterized by the decline and internal collapse of the rules-based
post-war international order, and the U.S. has fallen short, psychologically and economically, of
taking on the burdens of global leadership. The democratic system guarded by the U.S. and its allies is even more fragile when
it confronts threats from a single high-tech company that is believed to represent an entirely different value system (CGTN 2020). The
emergence of a powerful China is only a catalyst for the internal collapse. Critically, even though
the U.S. seeks to convince its allies to share more responsibilities and alleviate burdens from
American shoulders, the U.S. will not risk considering China for sharing such responsibilities if
China’s involvement would undermine American dominance. Therefore, the U.S and its allies have to
pick up the broken fragments and pieces of the post-war international order and struggle to
glue them back together while creating barricades to prevent threats from a non-Western, non-
democratic, and non-market-economy country, China. The United States and its Western allies might stand firmly to
protect the 75-year-old order while concealing their sinister motives on premises that have little to do with official post-war institutions, customs, and
traditions. The law of the jungle is returning in popularity in an anarchic world where we used to have an illusion of order. In the short term, China
might find some opportunities from the dynamics of great power competition, but the correlation of world forces has not changed fundamentally in
favour of socialism and to the detriment of Western capitalism (Aspaturian 1980). As the second-largest country in the world, China naturally seeks to
enhance its technological superiority, though it should not be overconfident in its inevitable and irresistible rise. There is a long road before China can
announce the triumph of its grand plans because of the inherent uncertainty of big plans and external unpredictability. However, the U.S. would rather
describe the potential for China’s triumph as an imminent threat to call for strength and defeat—but not compete with—China. Before
the
end of the fierce and vicious competition, which is for the rules, norms, and institutions that
will govern international relations in the decades to come, China and the U.S. will inevitably
confront the challenges of preventing competition from falling into conflict .
China establishing an Asian sphere of influence upends the LIO and creates pre-
WWII conditions for conflict
Kagun 17 - Robert Kagan is the Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow with the Project on
International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. (“The twilight of
the liberal world order,” Brookings. January 24th, 2017.
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-twilight-of-the-liberal-world-order/) Edgemont PF
The liberal world order established in the aftermath of World War II may be coming to an end, challenged by forces both without
and within. The external challenges come from the ambition of dissatisfied large and medium-size powers to overturn the existing
strategic order dominated by the United States and its allies and partners. Their aim is to gain hegemony in their respective regions.
China and Russia pose the greatest challenges to the world order because of their relative military,
economic, and political power and their evident willingness to use it, which makes them significant
players in world politics and, just as important, because the regions where they seek strategic
hegemony—Asia and Europe—historically have been critical to global peace and stability. At a lesser but
still significant level, Iran seeks regional hegemony in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, which if accomplished would have a
strategic, economic, and political impact on the international system. North Korea seeks control of the Korean peninsula, which if
accomplished would affect the stability and security of northeast Asia. Finally, at a much lower level of concern, there is the effort by
ISIS and other radical Islamist groups to establish a new Islamic caliphate in the Middle East. If accomplished, that, too, would have
effects on the global order.
However, it is the two great powers, China and Russia, that pose the greatest challenge to the relatively peaceful and prosperous
international order created and sustained by the United States. If
they were to accomplish their aims of
establishing hegemony in their desired spheres of influence, the world would return to the
condition it was in at the end of the 19th century, with competing great powers clashing over
inevitably intersecting and overlapping spheres of interest. These were the unsettled, disordered
conditions that produced the fertile ground for the two destructive world wars of the first half of the
20th century. The collapse of the British-dominated world order on the oceans, the disruption of the uneasy balance of power on
the European continent due to the rise of a powerful unified Germany, combined with the rise of Japanese power in East Asia all
contributed to a highly competitive international environment in which dissatisfied great powers took the opportunity to pursue
their ambitions in the absence of any power or group of powers to unite in checking them. The
result was an
unprecedented global calamity. It has been the great accomplishment of the U.S.-led world
order in the 70 years since the end of the Second World War that this kind of competition has been held in
check and great power conflicts have been avoided.
!---Taiwan War
China expansionism escalates to war with Taiwan
Josh Rogin 6-16-22 (columnist for the Global Opinions section of the Washington Post and a
political analyst with CNN, The Washington Post, “China’s military expansion is reaching a
dangerous tipping point”, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/06/16/china-
expansion-indopacific-asia-taiwan-xi-aquilino/)
Top military leaders from the United States and China met last weekend at a forum in Singapore, where they attempted to
manage mounting tensions between the superpowers. But
throughout Asia, there’s growing fear that China’s
drastic military expansion will soon result in Chinese regional military superiority, which could
embolden Beijing to start a war over Taiwan.
That sense of urgency was palpable at last week’s Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual conference of diplomats, officials and experts from
across Asia, organized by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. Over three days of discussions, a common
sentiment emerged: China
is racing to become the dominant military power in Asia in the next few
years — and if it succeeds, Beijing is likely to use force to attempt to subdue Taiwan’s
democracy. Russia’s attack on Ukraine has dispelled any notion that revisionist dictatorships can
be deterred by anything short of a superior opposing military force.
In recent years, Chinese President Xi Jinping has said that China plans to achieve military
parity with the United States in Asia by 2027. As the Chinese military advances in both
technology and territorial presence, leaders in the People’s Liberation Army are now openly
threatening to attack Taiwan and promising to fight anyone who attempts to intervene. Beijing
is speeding up its plans, and the United States risks falling behind.
In Singapore, I interviewed Adm. John C. Aquilino, the head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, who described what he’s seeing as “ the
largest military buildup in history” — with growing Chinese arsenals of both conventional and
nuclear weapons. Aquilino said Beijing is attempting to establish regional hegemony and change
the international order in Asia. China wants to be in a position to dictate the rules and use its
military without fearing any constraints.
“I only see their efforts accelerating,” he said. “I see advanced capabilities that are being
delivered more quickly than we would have expected. … Their goal is to have parity with the
United States to ensure that they can’t be deterred.”
China is building the capability to use nuclear blackmail to deter a U.S. intervention if it invades
Taiwan, following Russia’s model. China’s regional military presence is expanding, including
a secret naval base in Cambodia and a secret military cooperation agreement with the Solomon
Islands. China has developed new technologies, including hypersonic missiles and antisatellite
lasers, to keep the U.S. military at bay in a Taiwan scenario. And now, China no longer
recognizes the Taiwan Strait as international waters.
China’s increased military confidence is reflected in its ever-more-belligerent rhetoric. After

meeting with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in Singapore, Chinese Minister of Defense Wei
Fenghe gave a speech in which he promised, “China will definitely realize its reunification” with
Taiwan. If anyone tries to stand in the way, he went on, “we will not hesitate to fight. We will
fight at all costs.”
In his speech, Austin attempted to reassure the region that the United States was committed to
maintaining its leadership in Asia. But diplomats and experts in Singapore could not help
noticing a gap between what the United States is saying and the resources Washington is
committing to the effort.
New research investments the Pentagon is making today won’t bear fruit for several years. U.S.
shipbuilding plans are woefully underfunded. The United States’ new trilateral alliance with
Australia and the United Kingdom (known as AUKUS) won’t result in providing Australia with
nuclear submarines until the late 2030s.
China is working on a shorter timeline. Aquilino wouldn’t volunteer an exact date for when
China might surpass U.S. military power in Asia, but he called the 2020s “the decade of
concern.” His predecessor at Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. Philip S. Davidson, testified to the
Senate Armed Services Committee in March that the threat of China invading Taiwan will
become critical in “the next six years.” With 2027 being the final year of Xi’s expected (and
unprecedented) third five-year term, it gives him a personal deadline for attempting
reunification.
Indo-Pacific Command estimated in a May report to Congress that the region needs about $67
billion in new military investment between 2024 and 2027 to maintain the U.S. comparative
military advantage over China. The budget is already behind schedule. In April, Indo-Pacific Command submitted a list of
unfunded items that totals $1.5 billion for 2023 alone.
Maintaining the U.S. military advantage in the Indo-Pacific region will be neither easy nor cheap.
Urgent tasks include dispersing more equipment and personnel to more places, hardening existing
outposts such as Guam, increasing training and equipping of allies, and drastically increasing military support to Taiwan for its self-
defense.
Meeting military escalation with escalation brings real risks that must be managed, not ignored.
But the costs of war if China concludes it can take Taiwan easily would be exponentially higher. The United States doesn’t
have the luxury of waiting until the next decade to counter China’s military expansion in Asia . As
George Washington said in his first speech to Congress in 1790, “To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of
preserving peace.”
Taiwan war goes nuclear—the US is running out of time to prevent escalation

Pettyjohn and Wasser 5/20 (Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Becca Wasser, STACIE L. PETTYJOHN is a senior
fellow and director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security. BECCA WASSER is a fellow in the defense
“A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go
program and co-lead of The Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security.
Nuclear,” Foreign Affairs, 5/20/2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-
20/fight-over-taiwan-could-go-nuclear?
check_logged_in=1&utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=regist
ered_user_welcome&utm_term=email_1&utm_content=20220714) - LH
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces
at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences
you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if
China
attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation
could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe.
A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,”
demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of
examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s
military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance
Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and
the United States could very well go nuclear.
Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If

the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the island, its
leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy . Thus,
the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable.
That would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth
contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve that goal, from
Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear
weapons may be the most effective means to keep the United States out of the conflict.
GEARING FOR BATTLE
China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a
“world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to Taiwan’s defense. China’s
warfighting strategy,
known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able to project conventional military power out several
thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan.
Meanwhile, a growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as well as potentially new warfighting
capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and escalation.
China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclearscholars at the
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo
fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times reported that China might have carried out
tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear
weapons to targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around
1,000 deliverable warheads—more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese
leaders
may believe that as early as five years from now the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear
gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan.
A fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear.
Our recent war game—in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts assumed the roles of
senior national security decision makers in China and the United States—illustrated that a U.S.-Chinese war could
escalate quickly. For one thing, it showed that both countries would face operational incentives to strike
military forces on the other’s territory. In the game, such strikes were intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation;
both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed red lines for both
countries, and produced a tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that broadened the scope and intensity of the
conflict.
For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks
targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is
a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In
response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on
the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both
sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory,
crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on their territory, each
side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other
as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team responded to China’s
moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii.
A NEW ERA
One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to
go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated
throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it
would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had
difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible. In
real life, China’s significant and recent
changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear
threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear
arsenal, and lack of experience making nuclear threats. This may push China to preemptively detonate a
nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of its warning.
China might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its
long-range conventional strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to launch
conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to strike
the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the American people.
Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully
appreciate the seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a
message that the U.S. homeland could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear
policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a
demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in
the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is
likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would have provoked a response.
The most likely paths to nuclear escalation in a fight between the United States and China are
different from those that were most likely during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States
feared a massive, bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack, which would precipitate a full-scale strategic exchange. In a
confrontation over Taiwan, however, Beijing could employ nuclear weapons in a more limited way to
signal resolve or to improve its chances of winning on the battlefield. It is unclear how a war would proceed after
that kind of limited nuclear use and whether the United States could de-escalate the situation while still achieving its objectives.
AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION
The clear lesson from the war game is that the

United States needs to strengthen its conventional
capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to ensure that China never views an invasion of Taiwan as a
prudent tactical move. To do so, the United States will need to commit to maintaining its conventional military superiority
by expanding its stockpiles of long-range munitions and investing in undersea capabilities. Washington must also be able to conduct
offensive operations inside the first and second island chains even while under attack. This will require access to new bases to
distribute U.S. forces, enhance their survivability, and ensure that they can effectively defend Taiwan in the face of China’s attacks.
Moreover, the
United States needs to develop an integrated network of partners willing to
contribute to Taiwan’s defense. Allies are an asymmetric advantage: the United States has them, and China does not.
The United States should deepen strategic and operational planning with key partners to send a
strong signal of resolve to China. As part of these planning efforts, the United States and its allies will need to
develop war-winning military strategies that do not cross Chinese red-lines . The game highlighted just
how difficult this task may be; what it did not highlight is the complexity of developing military strategies that integrate the strategic
objectives and military capacities of multiple nations.
Moving forward, military planners in the United States and in Washington’s allies and partners must grapple with the fact that ,
in a
conflict over Taiwan, China would consider all conventional and nuclear options to be on the
table. And the United States is running out of time to strengthen deterrence and keep China from
believing an invasion of Taiwan could be successful. The biggest risk is that Washington and its
friends choose not to seize the moment and act: a year or two from now, it might already be too
late.
US intervention over Taiwan goes nuclear

Jamie Seidel 6-6-22 (Jamie Seidel, Editorial Team, news, “US-China war over Taiwan could
escalate quickly to nuclear”,
https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/uschina-war-over-taiwan-could-
escalate-quickly-to-nuclear/news-story/113d892580aef6d4c0c1de682fbdee10)
US President Joe Biden says he won’t go to war with Russia over Ukraine because it’s a nuclear power.
But he insists he will fight China over Taiwan. Analysts say that has apocalyptic implications.
A recent set of war games conducted by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
demonstrated once again that any conflict between nuclear powers rapidly spirals out of
control.
It’s a lose-lose scenario that sustained a tentative peace during the Cold War.
But Russian President Vladimir Putin has changed that dynamic.
He’s now using nuclear force as a shield behind which he beats up on his non-nuclear neighbours. Mr Putin has been quick to
threaten strikes against anyone who dares to directly intervene in his invasion of Ukraine.
US President Joe Biden Xi has vowed to protect Taiwan from China’s Xi Jinping.
The US and NATO have openly yielded – while rushing arms, ammunition and information to support Kyiv’s resistance effort.
But the spectre of “consequences you have never seen” still looms large over Europe as Russia’s
bungled war places immense pressure on its autocratic leader.
Mr Biden, however, doesn’t share the same caution over Taiwan.
He’s repeatedly said he would order US forces to fight on Taipei’s behalf. Even though his White House
staff unconvincingly rush in afterwards to reassure the world that Washington remains “ambiguous” over its intent to intervene
actively.
Like Russia, China is also a nuclear power.
Its arsenal is small. But it’s still more than enough to rain down fire and fury upon the mainland
US – and plunge the world into an apocalyptic crisis.
Researchers in the US identified the construction of 119 new intercontinental ballistic missile
silos in a desert in northwestern China, indicating that the country is carrying out plans to
strengthen its strategic nuclear capability.
It's the potential chains of events that could lead to such mutually assured destruction that the
CNAS war-games sought to unravel.
“Our recent war game – in which members of Congress, former government officials, and
subject matter experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision-makers in China
and the United States – illustrated that a US-Chinese war could escalate quickly,” it warns.
Trigger point
The year is 2027. China’s military modernisation and expansion are nearing completion. Its
nuclear arsenal is in the middle of a major expansion. Its leader is desperate to justify his
position of ultimate power by finishing what the 1949 civil war failed to do – seize Taiwan.
“If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the island, its leaders may not be able to
accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy,” argue CNAS analysts Stacie
Pettyjohn and Becca Wasser.
“Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms
that it finds acceptable.”
When it comes to a fight over Taiwan, most of the cards are already in China’s favour.
It’s close. Combat aircraft can fly from mainland bases. Troop transports have only a narrow strait to cross. Its vulnerable lines of
logistics – so effectively exploited by Ukraine over Russia – are short.
It’s the opposite scenario for the United States and any coalition forces. They must cross
thousands of kilometres of open ocean. And the few island bases they have nearby are
vulnerable to attack.
“If China opened up with everything they’ve got – their so-called carrier killer missiles,
submarines and everything – it would be devastating,” says Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) analyst Dr Michael Green.
“And the US and probably Japan and Taiwan would take massive casualties. We’d lose a lot of
ships. But so would China.”
Such a human and material may not be acceptable to either side. Which is where the
temptation of coercive nuclear leverage comes in.
Like Moscow, Beijing may threaten a nuclear attack against the US if it intervenes.
It may then find its bluff called.
“Does China want to escalate to full nuclear war?” asks Dr Green. I’d seriously doubt it. So China’s strategy is to convince Japan and
US, Europe, Australia, and especially Taiwan, that resistance is futile.”
China syndrome
Beijing is building three vast new nuclear missile silo fields under the deserts of Xinjiang. It’s also
tested new hypersonic glide vehicles intended to manoeuvre nuclear warheads around any
defences.
By 2030, China will have about 1000 nuclear warheads on call.
“Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now,
the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war
to unify with Taiwan,” the CNAS analysts write.
Like Putin, Beijing will likely need a quick victory.
That would give it an incentive to strike military bases on US and allied territory.
In the war-games, this never turned out well.
“Both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets,” the analysts say. “But
such attacks crossed red lines for both countries, and produced a tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that
broadened the scope and intensity of the conflict.”
Soldiers assigned to the coastal missile troops with the navy under the PLA Northern Theater Command prepare anti-ship missile
systems.
In one scenario, China launched a pre-emptive nuclear attack on the US Pacific base on the island of Guam. The US retaliated by
using nuclear weapons against a Chinese military port.
“Each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other as such,”
CNAS notes.
But it didn’t turn out that way.
“Both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory, crossing an important threshold.”
A new world order
“One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to
threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan,” the CNAS
wargamers note. “But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible.”
Dr Green says this is the fundamental challenge of deterrence.
“So China’s strategy is not to use force, but to make us think that any fight would be futile,” he argues. “And so far, in a way, that’s
not working. They’re steeling our resolve.
“And President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is helping in Ukraine to show what’s at stake.
“But that said, if we can’t maintain deterrence, we can’t make it too hard for them to invade.
“We want Beijing to think an invasion would not work. And there we’ve slipped behind the last decade or two.”
When it comes to the nuclear threat, Beijing doesn’t have the Cold War experience the US and Russia have.
It hasn’t been through a Cuban missile crisis or an Archer Able invasion scare.
“This may push China to pre-emptively detonate a nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of
its warning,” argues CNAS.
In the war game, the US was confident its own large and diverse nuclear arsenal was enough to deter escalation and didn’t
appreciate how serious the threat was.
“As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the US homeland could be at risk if Washington did
not back down.”
And that, the CNAS analysts say, left Washington to choose defeat through de-escalation – or escalating itself.
“The clear lesson from the war game is that the United States needs to strengthen its
conventional capabilities (and strategic and operational planning with key partners) in the Indo-
Pacific to ensure that China never views an invasion of Taiwan as a prudent tactical move,” the
CNAS report concludes.
Dr Green agrees that the peril is greater now than at any point since the end of the Cold War. “And we are looking at Xi Jinping now
in a new light because of what Putin did. These authoritarian leaders may be willing to roll the dice. So it is a perilous time, although
I do think the chances of an actual war are still low.”
Taiwan war goes nuclear—unique factors overcome checks on nuke use—
historical importance, redlines, miscalc
Sweeney 21 (Mike Sweeney, Mike Sweeney is a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities. Prior to joining Defense
Priorities, Sweeney spent 13 years as think tank analyst in Washington, DC, where he focused on U.S. foreign policy and defense
planning, undertaking research and studies, including for the Department of Defense. His areas of research include U.S. national
security, such as NATO relations and enlargement, Middle Eastern politics and security relations, Russian military and doctrine, long-
range defense planning scenarios, and U.S. overseas presence and basing options. From 2001 to 2005, he served as the rapporteur
for the Defense Policy Board. He is the co-author of the monograph, Central Asia in U.S. Strategy and Operational Planning (2004)
and two books published by Brassey’s, Strategic Paradigms 2025 (1999) and Strategic Dynamics in the Nordic-Baltic Region (2000).
His articles and essays have appeared on sites such as Divergent Options, West Point’s Modern War Institute, War on the Rocks,
“WHY A TAIWAN CONFLICT COULD GO NUCLEAR,” Defense Priorities, 3/4/2021,
among other outlets.
https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/why-a-taiwan-conflict-could-go-nuclear) - LH
The centrality of Taiwan in Chinese thinking At this point, it is worth underscoring the obvious: Not
all U.S.-China conflicts
must inevitably end in a nuclear exchange. It is possible to imagine scenarios in which there is a military clash that
remains limited to conventional forces. A war over the Senkakus in the East China Sea or the Spratlys in the South China Sea has less
chance of escalating to the level of an existential conflict. But that is not true where those two seas meet:
Taiwan. It is physically closer to the mainland— essentially China’s “doorstep”—and also occupies a far more prominent place in
China’s national psyche. Taiwan is unlike any other issue in Chinese foreign policy precisely because that is
not the prism through which Beijing views the island. Rather, it is a domestic issue. Put differently, for Beijing, Taiwan is
already Chinese territory.31 While one can technically make the argument that China feels the same about various
disputed islands in both the South and East China Seas, uninhabited atolls do not carry the same historical weight as
Taiwan , not just for modern China but for the CCP itself. Since the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949, CCP leadership has sought to absorb the island. During the 1950s, a series of clashes played out between Communist and Nationalist forces on the
ancillary islands of the Taiwan Strait, each of which ended with some form of U.S. intervention on the side of Taipei.
The intervening decades have done little to cool China’s enthusiasm for reunification. The early years of the post-Cold War world saw a revival in tension over Taiwan after the election of Lee Teng-hui, who was perceived by the mainland as overly assertive on
Taiwanese sovereignty. Lee’s presidency sparked a renewed crisis in the Taiwan Strait during 1995 and 1996, with China employing missile tests and military exercises to deter action toward greater ROC independence.32 The Clinton administration responded at one
point with the deployment of two carrier battlegroups, one of which sailed through the Taiwan Strait itself in a deliberate, high-profile show of force. China’s inability to deter those U.S. deployments is often viewed as a precipitating event for its ambitious program
under President Xi Jinping there has been

of naval modernization during the ensuing 25 years.33 In a recent survey of China’s grand strategy, political scientist Avery Goldstein argues that
even less room for diffidence on China’s core interests than his immediate predecessors, with no
concern more basic to the regime’s concept of identity than dominion over Taiwan.34 The island will
remain an obsession for the Chinese leadership because, as Goldstein notes, the CCP long ago “identified restoring
sovereignty over Taiwan as an essential part of the effort to recover territory China lost during the ‘century of humiliation.’”35
Reunification goes beyond a vital interest to a basic article of faith in China’s destiny.
Compounding matters, the Chinese

public is likely to be deeply invested and supportive of a Taiwan
campaign once begun. While polling in China is hardly an exact science, one study of multiple opinion surveys found a
discernible hawkish bent among the Chinese populace, especially among the younger generations who have undergone so-called
“patriotic education,” instituted in 1994.36 This particularly could be the case if U.S. forces were to attempt
conventional strikes against air bases, missile launchers, radars, and other facilities on the Chinese mainland. Even though
these are military targets, additional collateral damage and civilian casualties are likely. Such attacks could further
inflame public sentiment in favor of the war—and against capitulation in the face of defeat—boxing in China’s leadership in
the event of conventional setbacks.37
Finally, the existential nature of a potential Taiwan campaign is underscored by China’s

understanding of its own military history. As naval scholar Toshi Yoshihara has pointed out, there is heightened recognition among the Chinese of the relationship
between major defeat at sea and regime stability.38 For example, it is possible to draw a line from the Japanese destruction of the Qing Dynasty fleet at the Battle of the Yalu River in 1894 through to the Boxer
Rebellion five years later. 39 Fleets that take immense treasure and decades to construct can be destroyed in a matter of days (or even an afternoon) and the consequences for the nation seldom end with the loss
of tonnage.
Maximalist aims will invite maximalist means These

factors raise an essential point in the calculation
regarding Chinese nuclear use: how does any leader survive a defeat over a core tenet of modern Chinese identity like
dominion over Taiwan? Or as Ambassador Chas Freeman has put it, for Beijing, a war over Taiwan could “escalate to the nuclear
level against the domestic political consequences of accepting humiliation on the core issue of Chinese nationalism.”40
Freeman’s point is worth dwelling on. Any
battle over Taiwan will not just be a question of territorial aggression but a
fight over the core conception of modern China’s soul. And for the leaders who launch such an endeavor, their
political futures will hinge on the outcome, as will, possibly, their physical safety and that of their families in the event of failure.
Under such circumstances, nuclear
use might not be palatable, but it could seem far more plausible if
military defeat were to equate to loss of domestic power and possible death anyway .
Paul Heer, a former National Intelligence Officer for East Asia, has argued that China is not seeking excuses to invade Taiwan. To the contrary, in his view, Beijing fears action by either Washington or Taipei to alter
the status quo thereby forcing China’s hand militarily.41
Given the stakes for any leader who ordered an invasion, such trepidation is understandable. Even with highly favorable conditions, amphibious landings remain among the most complex and risky of all military
operations. And current conditions—including the immaturity of China’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities,42 its lack of amphibious lift, the capabilities of the U.S. Navy, and the 100-mile width of the
Taiwan Strait—cannot be construed as entirely favorable despite other advantages, such as Taiwan’s overall proximity and the general growth in Chinese military power.
On the one hand, this is good news as it discourages the likelihood of an overt attempt by China to capture Taiwan. On the other, it
means that should
such an operation be dared, all elements of Chinese national power would
eventually be on the table, especially if U.S. intervention is forthcoming and proves decisive in the early going. This might
be the case even if nuclear use was not seen as a viable option by Chinese leaders at the outset of the campaign. The prospect of
catastrophic defeat could change their thinking.
Could the United States resort to nuclear use?

It is also not entirely outside the realm of possibility that the
United States could contemplate nuclear use. (Indeed, some of the main advocates for more openly planning to defend Taiwan have also expressed interest
in enhancing U.S. tactical nuclear options for Chinese and Russian conflict scenarios.)43 Up to this point, this paper has mainly addressed the notion that the China’s leadership could be panicked into nuclear
escalation. But defending Taiwan should not be seen as either an easy or certain victory for the United States. Although China would face important challenges in accomplishing an amphibious landing on the
island, U.S. forces would also have to surmount their own difficulties, which include operating in close proximity to the air and missile forces based on the Chinese mainland. In addition, U.S. warfighting efforts
could be impeded by unreliable access to some regional bases (such as in the Philippines) and the vulnerability of other bases (such as in Japan) to Chinese conventional missile attacks.44
Nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and China China’s

nuclear arsenal is significantly outnumbered by that of the United States, but
it is large enough to inflict significant damage and will expand further over the next decade. How
would the American leadership respond in the event of an unexpected reversal? How would the American public?
If, say, China was able to sink a single U.S. aircraft carrier—killing perhaps 5,000 Americans—it would inflict in an afternoon more fatalities than U.S. forces suffered in the eight-year Iraq War. As questionable and
costly as its post-9/11 conflicts have been, U.S. forces were never routed in massive numbers. Even Vietnam was considered a slow bleed. And after that war’s end, it was frequently asserted as gospel that U.S.
forces were never defeated outright on the battlefield. One has to go back 70-years to the Korean War to find examples of U.S. forces taking massive casualties in a single battle and openly retreating in ignominy.
It would be jarring to an American public ensconced in the myth of post-Gulf War military superiority to suffer a sudden loss of thousands of lives on a carrier or other high profile naval asset.
Alternately, if China did use conventionally armed missiles against U.S. bases in Japan and Guam, perhaps
killing not only U.S. and Japanese military personnel, but also local civilians and U.S. dependents, what reaction would that spark ?
Is it so far-fetched to consider the United States initiating nuclear use under those circumstances? The
United States does have viable tactical options, which it has sought to make more robust in accordance with the
findings of 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).45 These include the deployment of the submarine-launched low-yield W76-2
warhead and development of an upgraded version of the B61 tactical gravity bomb.46 Chinese observers have expressly noted that
these systems could make U.S. nuclear use more likely, a situation compounded by diminishing
U.S. conventional superiority in the Western Pacific.47
To be clear, as with all aspects of this discussion, the point is not to state with certainty that the United States would resort to
nuclear use. It might not be even likely. But it is worth acknowledging that it is possible. That is the element that needs to be
injected into the debate not only over the future of strategic ambiguity, but over defense planning for Taiwan scenarios more
broadly.
The preferred U.S. style of warfare—to conduct attacks deep throughout an enemy’s territory rather
than simply meeting them at a forward line of engagement—also presents problems and contains the prospect that non-nuclear
strikes might unintentionally trip Chinese redlines regarding nuclear use. Within the U.S. academic
community, this has produced a small, but important body of literature focused on the subject of “entanglement,” or the co-
mingling of systems with both conventional and nuclear applications.48 This discussion has primarily focused on China’s ballistic
missile force, as most of its systems are capable of firing both nuclear and non-nuclear warheads.49
China’s increasing reliance on road-mobile ICBMs (such as the DF-31 variants and the new DF-41) complicates this
problem, creating the potential for their misidentification as shorter-range systems, such as the road-mobile DF-
21 and DF-26, that might be used against U.S. ships or regional bases.50 Analysts have also expressed concern over the potential for
U.S. forces to inadvertently sink a Chinese SSBN as part of its ASW campaign during a Taiwan conflict, a fear that echoes similar
worries from the U.S.-Soviet struggle.51 Recall again the private comments of Chinese officials about conventional attacks on
nuclear systems nullifying its NFU policy.
The potential for mutual miscalculation Entanglement issues are far from the whole of the problem. There is still
a fundamental misreading—perhaps on both sides—of the ability to manage escalation in Taiwan
contingencies for reasons beyond strict operational matters. The very fact of China attempting something as
complex and challenging as an amphibious invasion of an island of 24 million people would show an
unwelcome tolerance for risk. For that matter, U.S. efforts to defend said island—halfway around the world
on another nuclear power’s doorstep—also shows a fair amount of audacity. Put differently, the act of
aggression against Taiwan and the effort to repel such an attack both demonstrate that each
side is willing to take actions which could be viewed as inherently risky.
Through that lens, the

additional step to unwanted nuclear escalation is not a great leap . States act
rationally, right up until they do not. In considering how a Taiwan contingency would play out, it would
therefore be prudent to assume that nuclear use is more viable than cold assessments of each side’s pre-conflict intentions suggest.
If academic surveys of Chinese strategic literature are correct, overoptimism on the ability to manage escalation once hostilities commence is not confined to the U.S. side.52
The summation to the issues discussed in this paper is thus not a traditional list of hard policy recommendations but more the urging of a specific mindset moving forward. While all those attempting to think
through U.S. policy on Taiwan should be commended for contributing to the debate, the starting and end point for such discussions must be strategic stability between the United States and China .
Nuclear issues—more than any other aspect—have to be foremost as the United States reexamines
strategic ambiguity and debates defense planning options for Taiwan. To do otherwise is
ultimately faulty policymaking.
Taiwan war goes nuclear— Ukraine increases the likelihood of nuclear use
Montgomery and Yoshihara 22 (EVAN MONTGOMERY AND TOSHI YOSHIHARA, Evan
Montgomery is a Senior Fellow and the Director of Research and Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
where he focuses on great power competition, alliance management, East Asia security challenges, and nuclear issues. Toshi
Yoshihara is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He was previously the inaugural John A. van
“LEADERLESS, CUT OFF,
Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies and a Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College.
AND ALONE: THE RISKS TO TAIWAN IN THE WAKE OF UKRAINE,” The Texas National Security
Review, 4/5/2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/leaderless-cut-off-and-alone-the-risks-
to-taiwan-in-the-wake-of-ukraine/) - LH
Specifically, during a war over Taiwan, Chinese leaders could emphasize three courses of action from the very
start: First, issue nuclear threats to keep U.S. counter-invasion forces on the sidelines and keep the conflict contained.
Second, impose a blockade to physically isolate the island and raise the escalatory risk of any resupply efforts. Third, attempt to
decapitate Taiwan’s political and military leadership to cripple its near-term defenses and undermine longer-term resistance to
occupation.
Although each course of action was already plausible before Russia’s invasion, all of them seem more likely in its aftermath. At a
minimum, they could sharpen the political, diplomatic, and military dilemmas that would accompany any prospective U.S.
intervention; erode Taiwan’s willingness and ability to hold out against an assault; and perhaps convince Chinese leaders that they
can compensate for deficiencies in their untested armed forces with adjustments in strategy. In the worst case, they might even
persuade those leaders that a war over Taiwan would be far easier than the conflict in Ukraine would seem to indicate.
Brinkmanship From the Beginning

One of the most worrisome aspects of the war in Ukraine has been Vladimir Putin’s willingness to rattle the nuclear sabre, both implicitly and explicitly, as a way of deterring
outside intervention. From the moment the conflict began, the Russian president warned audiences in other capitals that if they interfered with his “special military operation,”
Moscow would “respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.” Just days later, as the invasion suffered early setbacks,
Putin directed his senior defense officials to place Russian strategic forces on “special combat readiness.”
Although these actions have not prevented the United States and its allies from providing arms and intelligence to Ukraine, they have induced caution and colored debates over
how to respond. Notably, Washington postponed a planned Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile test flight following Russia’s increased alert level. More importantly,
U.S. officials have repeatedly equated deploying American troops to Ukraine or enforcing a no-fly zone over the besieged nation with World War III.
Any confrontation between major powers will take place under the nuclear shadow . Yet nuclear
weapons are expected to play a major role mainly when a clash is well underway. In the case of
Russia, analysts concerned about its escalation threshold — a longstanding topic of debate — have emphasized the possibility that
Moscow might resort to nuclear threats, nuclear demonstrations, or limited nuclear employment after its conventional forces fail to
deliver a victory on their own. Indeed, these concerns have only increased as Russia’s losses in Ukraine have continued to mount. In
the case of China, analysts have similarly suggested that it could be pushed to the nuclear brink
should its conventional forces falter, especially if U.S. strikes on dual-use delivery vehicles, surveillance assets, and
command-and-control systems are perceived by Beijing as an attempt to degrade its nuclear deterrent.
By contrast,
the war in Ukraine seems to increase the likelihood that China might engage in
nuclear signaling and nuclear brinkmanship at the very start of a coercive campaign against
Taiwan, not just in the later stages of a losing effort. Beijing could engage in what analysts have called “integrated strategic
deterrence” to demonstrate its resolve and to shape the risk calculus of its opponents. Such signaling could involve increasing readiness levels, deploying forces, simulating
operational preparations, and conducting exercises and tests. The goals of these steps would be to instill fear, apply psychological pressure, and create uncertainty.
Doing so could induce greater restraint on the part of the United States, particularly when it comes to direct military intervention, and drive a wedge between Washington and
frontline allies like Japan that might find themselves in the immediate crosshairs. Beijing’s growing arsenal of strategic and theater nuclear capabilities only makes this type of
scenario more plausible, insofar as a more survivable nuclear deterrent and more limited nuclear options mean that escalatory threats will appear more credible.
Early nuclear threats could also help to resolve a core strategic dilemma that China would confront during
a Taiwan contingency: Strike at the United States early and undermine its ability to intervene or forgo an attack
on the United States and undercut its willingness to intervene. On the one hand, Beijing could launch conventional attacks on forward-operating U.S. forces at the beginning of a conflict. Although a first strike
would degrade Washington’s ability to respond, it would almost certainly guarantee that a military response would be forthcoming. On the other hand, Beijing could leave U.S. forces intact, at least initially, and
focus its military campaign on its main target. Although restraint would leave the effectiveness of those forces undiminished, it might also convince Washington to curtail its involvement.
Nuclear escalation likely in the event of a Taiwan conflict—factors needed for

escalation already in place
Ayson 21 (Robert Ayson, Robert Ayson has been Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria University of Wellington since
2010 and works in close association with the Centre for Strategic Studies. He has also held academic positions with the ANU, Massey
University and the University of Waikato, and official positions with the New Zealand government. Professor Ayson completed his
MA as a Freyberg Scholar to the ANU and his PhD at King’s College London as a Commonwealth Scholar to the UK. He is an Honorary
Professor with the New Zealand Defence Force Command and Staff College. Professor Ayson has a particular interest in the ways
that thinkers in strategic studies and international relations deal with issues of competition and cooperation. He has worked on
coercion and conflict escalation in the Asia-Pacific region, New Zealand and Australian defence and foreign policy, and nuclear
“NUCLEAR ESCALATION IN A TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS?,” Asia Pacific Leadership Network,
challenges.
May 2021,
https://cms.apln.network/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/RobertAyson_Taiwan_SpecialReport_2
10519_2.pdf) - LH
Many of the ingredients are already in place for a Taiwan Strait crisis to precipitate a nuclear
escalation between China and the United States. Some of the background factors that could give rise to
such a catastrophe stem from political tensions between Beijing and Taipei over Taiwan’s future against a
wider context of growing great power competition and distrust between China (seen by Taiwan as the
principal threat to its security) and the United States (seen by Taiwan as its main protector). Some of the strategic
factors stem from the shifting asymmetries of military power between China and Taiwan and
between China and the United States, which may create incentives for escalatory options as a
crisis grows. And some of the problems are operational, including the difficulties that may face
China and the United States in ensuring clear firebreaks between conventional military options and
attacks which involve, or put at risk, nuclear capabilities. In general, there is a risk that military postures designed
to demonstrate everyday resolve could stand in the way of heading off further escalation once
the first shots are fired.
!---AT: China NFU policy
China would likely violate their NFU policy in the event of a Taiwan conflict and
Ukraine lowers the bar for ignoring the policy
Roy 5/11 (Denny Roy, Denny Roy (Ph.D. in political science, University of Chicago, 1991) is a Senior Fellow at the East-
West Center and writes mainly on Northeast Asian international security issues, particularly those involving China. His books cover a
fairly broad range of topics within the general area of Asian politics. He has also written articles for scholarly journals such as
International Security, Survival, Asian Survey, Security Dialogue, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Armed forces & Society, and Issues &
“The Ukraine War Might Kill China’s Nuclear No First Use Policy,” The Diplomat,
Studies.
5/11/2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/the-ukraine-war-might-kill-chinas-nuclear-no-
first-use-policy/) - LH
China and India are the only nuclear-armed countries in the world with a nuclear “no first use” policy (NFU). Beijing pledges that in
the event of a conflict, China would use its nuclear weapons only after an enemy nuclear strike against China. It is in the interest of
the United States and other potential adversaries that China maintain NFU, which is a unilateral Chinese strategic self-restriction .
China’s NFU, however, is increasingly under strain, and the Ukraine war might provide the final
persuasive impetus for Chinese leaders to dump the policy.
Strategists in China are already questioning the usefulness of NFU, proclaimed in 1964, in an era when
China is a nascent great power confidently moving to change the strategic status quo in the Asia-Pacific region.
NFU seems disconnected from the dramatic expansion of China’s nuclear capabilities. The U.S.
Department of Defense assesses that China’s estimated total of 250 nuclear warheads will likely increase to 1,000 by 2027. China
recently demonstrated hypersonic glide vehicle and fractional orbital bombardment capabilities and is shifting its readiness
posture toward keeping some of its missiles loaded with nuclear warheads in peacetime.
Chinese analysts who dislike NFU have argued that China is already at a nuclear disadvantage vis-a-
vis the United States, which has a much larger arsenal, and therefore cannot afford the additional
disadvantage of unilaterally restricting its own options through NFU. NFU takes away the option of attempting to block an
unwanted move by an adversary by credibly threatening to escalate to the use of a tactical nuclear weapon in certain circumstances.
Furthermore, some enemy military attacks against China using conventional weapons could produce
damage comparable to an attack by a tactical nuclear weapon. An example is a hypothetical strike on the
Three Gorges Dam, which could cause massive death and destruction. Hence, some analysts argue that China should
not base its policy on a meaningless distinction between the most powerful conventional weapons and a small
nuclear weapon.
Finally, some Chinese

analysts have already suggested that a “large-scale foreign military
intervention” attempting to impede China’s conduct of a “war of safeguarding national unity” – obviously referring to
a Taiwan Strait war scenario – should be an exception to NFU.
NFU would not be the first principle Beijing discarded because it had become obsolete. For example, during the Cold War the
Chinese government proudly cited its lack of foreign military bases as proof of China’s benevolence, in contrast to “imperialist”
countries such as the United States that had many overseas bases. That stance became non-viable as China grew into a major
economic power with global interests that needed protecting. Beijing has dropped this position since acquiring its first unambiguous
foreign base, in Djibouti, in 2017. More are on the way.
There is also precedent for Beijing interpreting, or re-interpreting, principles in a way that
effectively negates them in practical policy terms. In 2015, Chinese leader Xi Jinping told U.S. President Barack
Obama that “China does not intend to pursue militarization” of its newly-built artificial islands in the South China Sea. Americans
understood that to mean China would not turn them into military bases. Subsequently, however, the Chinese placed fighter jets,
anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles, and signals jamming equipment on the artificial islands. Shortly after the Obama-Xi summit, a
Chinese government spokesperson had explained that not “militarizing” the islands would not preclude the installation of “necessary
military facilities for defense purposes only.” She added, “There is no such thing [as] China ‘militarizing’ relevant islands and reefs .”
Beijing had stated what seemed a clear principle but then defined it in a way that justified
behavior that seemingly violated the principle.
Some U.S. observers have long been skeptical about Beijing’s willingness to honor NFU in
practice. Statements by People’s Liberation Army generals have sometimes stoked this skepticism, even if misunderstood. One
well-known anecdote involves a Chinese general, often identified as Xiong Guangkai, reportedly telling U.S. Assistant Secretary of
Defense Chas Freeman in 1996 that China was confident U.S. forces would not try to stop China’s military conquest of Taiwan
because Americans “care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan,” seemingly implying that China would respond to a
conventional conflict by nuking a city on the U.S. mainland – and also implying that the PLA did not take NFU seriously. Freeman,
however, later clarified that what his Chinese interlocutor actually said was that unlike during the 1950s, the United States could no
longer expect to cow China with nuclear threats because China now has its own nuclear retaliatory capability. It was not a disavowal
of NFU, even if many Americans mis-remember it that way.
In 2005, PLA Major General

Zhu Chenghu told a group of visiting Hong Kong journalists that China
would use nuclear weapons if the United States intervened in a cross-strait military conflict . Zhu
was then a professor at China’s National Defense University, not directly involved in formulating China’s military policy. The Chinese
government reportedly reprimanded him for speaking out of turn.
!---AT: no US engagement
Taiwan would ensure US engagement in the event of conflict
Ayson 21 (Robert Ayson, Robert Ayson has been Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria University of Wellington since
2010 and works in close association with the Centre for Strategic Studies. He has also held academic positions with the ANU, Massey
University and the University of Waikato, and official positions with the New Zealand government. Professor Ayson completed his
MA as a Freyberg Scholar to the ANU and his PhD at King’s College London as a Commonwealth Scholar to the UK. He is an Honorary
Professor with the New Zealand Defence Force Command and Staff College. Professor Ayson has a particular interest in the ways
that thinkers in strategic studies and international relations deal with issues of competition and cooperation. He has worked on
coercion and conflict escalation in the Asia-Pacific region, New Zealand and Australian defence and foreign policy, and nuclear
“NUCLEAR ESCALATION IN A TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS?,” Asia Pacific Leadership Network,
challenges.
May 2021,
https://cms.apln.network/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/RobertAyson_Taiwan_SpecialReport_2
10519_2.pdf) - LH
How Taipei reads the military intentions of the great powers would be crucial as the threats of violent action grew. Taiwan is
developing its ability to raise the costs of PLA operations after China has begun to use force , which
puts a premium on force preservation.24 But Taipei might still be faced with “use it or lose it” choices in
regard to its still limited arsenal of missiles that can reach China’s coastline and which would among the early targets
in PLA strikes on Taiwan.25 These pressures would be even higher if Taiwan had doubts about the
prospect of an early and decisive American military response. Some analysts seem increasingly
concerned just how fast the United States could respond in practice with some force elements26.
Moreover, even if US retaliation against China was more or less guaranteed, this would not
necessarily preclude Taiwan from being extensively disarmed (and for extensive harm to be caused to people
and cities) before the US response kicked in. It would be in Taiwan’s interests for China to know very early in
a crisis that PLA forces were already at a real and present risk of a devastating American attack. In such a
case Taiwan would have incentives to bring the United States into the crisis as quickly as
possible. Risk-taking would make sense for Taiwan if that is what it took to get the United
States into the action.
********IOR
UQ---South Asia
Biden’s revival of the quad is pushing India’s engagements away from China
C. Raja Mohan 5-17, senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute, and a former member of
India’s National Security Advisory Board, “Why China Is Paranoid About the Quad,” Foreign
Policy, 05/17/2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/17/india-china-quad-summit-modi-xi-
biden/
India may be nowhere near turning its partnership with the United States into any sort of formal or informal military
alliance, but their growing strategic engagement dominates China’s discourse on India. Next week’s
Tokyo summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad—a loose grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and
the United States—is therefore bound to be of special concern in Beijing.
On the face of it, China’s persistent campaignagainst India’s ties with the United States, its characterization of
the Quad as an “Asian NATO,” and its blistering attacks against the Indo-Pacific geopolitical
construct embraced by New Delhi and its partners in the Quad seem unnecessarily alarmist. Its top diplomats have
castigated the Quad members for “ganging up in the Asia-Pacific region, creating trilateral and quadrilateral
small cliques, and [being] bent on provoking confrontation.” China focusing its outrage on the Quad looks odd
considering Beijing has long lived with real U.S. alliances and hard security commitments on its periphery,
including U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, Japan, and elsewhere.
Two factors, however, help explain China’s aggressive campaign against the Quad and, especially, nascent U.S.-Indian ties.
The most obvious factor is India’s sheer size and potential power to shape China’s strategic periphery. Although China has rarely seen India as a peer competitor, Beijing is acutely conscious that India could create
significant problems for China if aligned against it with other powers. Keeping India—a potential superpower—from aligning with the United States is thus a first-order strategic goal for Beijing.
That China’s concerns about a potential U.S.-Indian alignment have recently taken a paranoid turn reminds us of Beijing’s endless rants about New Delhi’s strategic collaboration with Moscow during the 1960s and
1970s. Beijing worried about Russian imperialism aligning with India’s own hegemonic ambitions in South Asia. Chinese leader Mao Zedong was at his vulgar and pithy best in a poem describing the Soviet Union’s
relationship with India: “The bear flaunts its claws / Riding the back of the cow.” Then, as now, China did not like to see India’s relations with other powers looking better than its own mostly failed attempts to win
allies.
Second, Beijing is playing to the gallery of entrenched anti-American sentiment in New Delhi that insists on Asian solidarity and avoidance of Western coalitions. Although the weight of this sentiment—a product
of India’s history of anti-colonialism, quasi-socialism, and Cold War alignment with the Soviet Union—has begun to decline, there are many in the Indian establishment who worry that getting too close to the
United States might provoke China. Beijing is betting that its warnings might stoke further unease in New Delhi.
China, of course, has a much longer history of partnership with the United States, beginning under former U.S. President Richard Nixon in the 1970s. In New Delhi, on the other hand, keeping a reasonable distance
from Washington has been a long-standing policy. Even as India warmed up to the United States in recent years, New Delhi has insisted that its policy of “strategic autonomy” remains unchanged—currently
demonstrated by India’s refusal to join its Quad partners in denouncing Russia’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine.
Beijing’s obsession with Indian-U.S. relations also stands in contrast to the fact that China has rarely objected to Pakistan’s intensive, formalized military partnership with the United States over the decades. China
seems to have no issues reaching out to Pakistan despite the latter’s bilateral military cooperation agreement with the United States and former membership in the Central Treaty Organization and Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization—two alliances sponsored by Britain and the United States, respectively, in the 1950s.
Despite occasional hiccups, the U.S. military partnership with Pakistan endured through the decades but drew little criticism from Beijing. When the United States declared Pakistan a major non-NATO ally in 2004,
it evoked little protest from China—on the contrary, Beijing continues to celebrate its “all weather” partnership with Islamabad. This stands in sharp contrast to China’s ballistic rhetoric in 2007, when India invited
Australia, Japan, and Singapore to join its annual Malabar naval exercises. Beijing called the event the precursor to the formation of an Asian NATO. Chinese propaganda along these lines has had some measure of
success in India in the past; the narrative of Washington trying to engineer an Asian NATO resonated with Indian nationalists and leftists who shared the Chinese idea that Asian security must be shaped by Asian
powers. In September 2007, Beijing’s campaign against a U.S.-led Asian NATO triggered large-scale protests by the Indian communist parties and played a role in the eventual collapse of the coalition, backed by
the left, supporting the Manmohan Singh government.
Since 2007, the “Asian NATO” moniker has stuck in the Chinese discourse on India’s partnerships,
especially its military relations with the United States. Chinese rhetoric intensified after the Trump
administration revived the Quad in 2017—and gained additional salience when the Biden administration gave
the Quad fresh momentum by organizing a flurry of summits and policy initiatives. The upcoming Tokyo summit is
the Quad’s third since Joe Biden became president.
Barely a year ago, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was still dismissing the Quad as mere “sea foam”—here this moment and gone
the next. Now, China can’t stop denouncing the Quad as a dangerous manifestation of “small cliques” seeking to undermine Asian
security.
India’s arm’s-length relationship with its Quad partners, however, creates a problem for Chinese analysts. They are torn between
denouncing Indian military engagement with the United States as a dangerous threat and ridiculing U.S. strategic illusions about
India. On a good day, Beijing welcomes New Delhi’s foreign policy of nonalignment and its continuing refusal to become a junior
partner to Washington. On a bad day, China attacks India’s growing alignment with the United States.
For some Chinese analysts, India’s strategy is a mirror image of China’s own strategic maxim in the 1970s and 1980s: “align with the
far”—the United States—“against the near”—the Soviet Union. Today, it is India’s turn to draw closer to the United States to fend
off the much nearer threat from China. In their informal interactions with the Indian strategic community, some Chinese scholars
have expressed their concern that New Delhi is leveraging Sino-Indian military tensions over the disputed border in Ladakh since
2020 to ramp up military cooperation with Washington.
Few Chinese scholars are ready to concede the flip side of their proposition: that China’s aggressive actions
on the border are driving India closer to the United States. The official Chinese position, which Wang
repeated during his visit to India in March, is that the countries’ border tensions should be kept separate
from the larger challenges of building a multipolar world that limits U.S. power. That remains
unacceptable to India.
But Wang also offered some assurances that China’s vision of Asia is not unipolar, as India fears, and acknowledged India as a major
regional power. To his interlocutors in New Delhi, Wang dangled the bait of working together on a response to the Russia-Ukraine
war and its threat to the global order.
India is not ready to bite, insisting that resolving border tensions must precede any cooperation
with China on larger issues. Similarly, Beijing’s new Global Security Initiative—a sweeping statement designed to counter U.S.
global influence—has drawn little interest in New Delhi.
Biden’s identified the IOR as a crucial region of strategic competition and is

building strategic relationships
Michael Kugelman 6-2, Asia Program deputy director and senior associate for South Asia at
the Wilson Center in Washington, “Is Biden Building a Broader South Asia Policy?” Foreign
Policy, 06/02/2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/02/south-asia-policy-biden-
engagement-nepal-bangladesh/
It’s too early to assume a formal White House policy shift; the Biden administration hasn’t even announced a new South Asia
strategy. Some of the increased U.S. attention relates to one-off events, such as milestone diplomatic anniversaries. However,
growing Chinese influence, which now extends across South Asia, gives Washington more strategic motivations
to engage more broadly with the region.
This year marks the 50th anniversary of official ties between Washington and Dhaka—the official reason for the April
meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and his Bangladeshi counterpart, A.K. Abdul Momen. U.S.-Nepal relations
have their 75th anniversary this year, and recent diplomacy has focused on an infrastructure grant from the U.S. Millennium
Challenge Corporation (MCC), which Nepal’s parliament ratified in February after much delay.
Once these moments have passed, Washington’s relations with Dhaka and Kathmandu may lose some momentum.
But U.S. competition with China offers long-lasting rationale for more engagement. As I wrote last
week, Beijing’s growing naval power has increased its presence in the Indian Ocean region, alongside its
deepening infrastructure development footprint in South Asia. The Biden administration wanted Nepal to
ratify the MCC grant in part because it sees the package as a means of countering China’s infrastructure aid.
Indications that the United States sees South Asia as a new battleground for this strategic
competition began under former U.S. President Donald Trump, when Indo-Pacific policy documents
first underscored the importance of strengthening cooperation with a broad range of South Asian
states. During its final weeks, the Trump administration announced plans to open a U.S. Embassy in Male, the capital of the
Maldives, seeking to parry Chinese influence there.
The Biden administration seems to have similar goals. Last year, Colin Kahl, the U.S. undersecretary of defense for
policy, spoke with Maldives Foreign Minister Abdulla Shahid about “advancing shared interests in the Indo-
Pacific”—diplomatic code for countering China. The U.S. State Department described U.S. Undersecretary of State
Victoria Nuland’s March visit to Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka with similar language.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has also provided the United States with further incentive to apply a wider geographic
lens to South Asia. Countries in the region—and not just India—have a history of friendship with Russia. Moscow has long
made investments in South Asia and welcomed its students and tourists. Half the South Asian countries abstained from the first
United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s invasion. Facing global isolation, Moscow may also seek
deeper engagement in South Asia—something Washington will want to preempt.
!---IOR
US-India cooperative engagement solves freedom of navigation in the IOR---
goes nuclear
Sylvia Mishra 17, Leads the CBRN Working Group for WCAPS and is a Mid-Career Cadre
Scholar at CSIS, “Nuclear Weapons and Capabilities in the Indian Ocean: An Indian Perspective,”
Next Generation Nuclear Network, 04/18/2017, https://nuclearnetwork.csis.org/nuclear-
weapons-and-capabilities-in-the-indian-ocean-an-indian-perspective/
With strategic competition in South Asia shifting to the maritime space and nuclear weapon states
increasingly relying on sea power, the Indian Ocean region (IOR) has become a theatre for trilateral security
competition between India, Pakistan, and China. Developments over the past several years showcase the
complicated nature of the situation in the IOR, and lead to a number of difficult questions about strategic stability. What are the
drivers of nuclear escalation in the Indian Ocean region (IOR), as well as the implications for peace and stability in the
region? Will changing threat perceptions in the IOR, especially as China’s People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) demonstrates
increased capabilities, lead New Delhi to forge stronger naval ties with the United States? As
states in the IOR contest for
naval nuclear supremacy and project newly developed capabilities, this article examines the risk
of friction and misperceptions that challenges the stability of the Indian Ocean.
In 2015, China carried out a flight test of its long-range sea-based nuclear deterrent: the JL-2. With an estimated range of up to 7,200km, the JL-2 can target assets in continental India from Chinese waters.
Moreover, Chinese nuclear submarines continue to patrol the Indian Ocean, exemplifying Beijing’s willingness to project power in the IOR. China uses advanced military assets, such as attack submarines (SSNs), for
‘piracy operations’ in the IOR. However, the presence of SSNs, which are not appropriate for anti-pirate missions, intensify regional misperceptions. Beijing’s support to Pakistan’s nuclear and ballistic missile
program (M-11 missile technology transfers), and its recent announcement to provide Pakistan with eight diesel-electric attack submarines have alarmed India’s strategic community, which fears that these sales
will bolster Pakistan’s sea-denial strategy.
Furthermore, Beijing’s naval assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS) has raised concerns with Indian officials, who see a correlation between aggressive Chinese patrolling in the SCS and increasing deployments
in the IOR. Some believe China might use its bases in the SCS to project power in the Indian Ocean. The prospect of active patrols by nuclear-armed Chinese submarines has intensified India’s surveillance. The
challenge to New Delhi’s domination in the Indian Ocean has led New Delhi to bolster its maritime partnership with the United States. The US-India Joint Strategic Vision for Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean
serves as a roadmap for bilateral cooperation on safeguarding maritime security and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
On India’s other border, Pakistan tested the Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) in early 2017. Babur-3 is reportedly capable of carrying a nuclear payload and designed for integration with the
Agosta 90B diesel electric submarine. These developments augment the shifts in Pakistan’s military and nuclear force structure, which was traditionally dominated by the army. As Pakistan’s navy develops a
submarine-based nuclear deterrent, there are clear indications of accommodating the navy within Pakistan’s command and control (C2). However, questions arise regarding Islamabad’s ability to safely and
reliably manage a submarine-based nuclear force given the doubts raised over the robustness of Pakistan’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C412SR) systems. Analysts have suggested that a balanced and effective nuclear C2 system faces challenges in Pakistan. When Pakistan’s military leadership took the reins of presidential power in
1999, the country’s civilian institutions and other services came under the army’s political control. This meant that the air force and navy chiefs could no longer contribute their views on an equal footing with the
army chief. Therefore, the lack of an effective C2 has highlighted discernible doubts regarding Pakistan’s ability to communicate with the Agosta submarines to put negative controls on weapons. Pakistan’s stated
policy of “first-use” of nuclear weapons against India coupled with a weak C2 has exacerbated India’s security concerns. India views Islamabad’s attempt to acquire second-strike capabilities as attempts to gain
strategic technological and capabilities parity with India, giving impetus to the action-reaction cycle.
Given security threat perceptions in IOR, Indian naval planners and strategists are convinced that nuclear submarines will provide the most reliable deterrent. India’s pursuit of a sea-based nuclear force is thus a
logical step in its desire to achieve assured retaliatory capabilities. Few analysts argue that India’s new K-4 nuclear-capable SLBM, coupled with India’s nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine program could
lead to further destabilization and conflict in the region. There is little merit in such an argument. India’s ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force will not only improve the operational capabilities of India’s sea-
based leg of its triad but also enable New Delhi to maintain balance of power in the IOR. To maintain a credible minimum deterrent vis-à-vis China and Pakistan and to ensure its arsenal’s survivability against a
preemptive first strike, New Delhi must focus on developing submarine launched ballistic missiles (SSBM) technology and SSBN capabilities. The primary objective of India’s Arihant-class SSBNs is to deter conflict
and coercion against India by its adversaries. India’s 2015 maritime security strategy document re-prioritized & reformulated deterrence as India’s first priority and war fighting as the second. Therefore, India’s
SSBN force should be seen as a critical enabler of its no-first use policy.
As China, India, and Pakistan employ nuclear weapons at sea, the India Ocean is slipping from
a ‘Zone of Peace’ to a hotbed of nuclear politics. To help reduce tensions, India and the United
States have engaged in cooperative discussions about India opening up its military bases to the United States in
exchange for access to weapons technology to help it narrow the gap with China. The two sides will also hold talks on
anti-submarine warfare (ASW), an area of sensitive military technology and tactics. The process of India-US security-burden sharing
in the IOR should serve as a building block for an enduring navy-to-navy relationship that should grow into a shared ASW capability.
At a time of a qualitative reordering of the Asia-Pacific, stability in the Indian Ocean region
hinges on collaborative efforts by India and the United States to keep the seas open and peaceful.
AFF Answers
No Link---AT: Zero-Sum
Focus isn’t zero sum—current balancing of Ukraine and China proves
Sun 6/23 (Yun Sun, “After Biden's pivot to Asia, China feels the chill,” Politico, 6/23/2022,
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-china-watcher/2022/06/23/after-biden-pivots-
to-asia-china-feels-the-chill-00041590) -LH
The administration's outreach started with Southeast Asia — the U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit in Washington in
mid-May followed by President JOE BIDEN’s high-profile visit to South Korea and Japan on May 19-24. In Japan, Biden attended
a summit with leaders of Japan, Australia and India (the Quad) and launched the long-expected Indo-
Pacific Economic Framework.
Despite the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the administration has tried to keep its focus on China
as the most consequential strategic challenge of the U.S.; Russia by comparison is considered the “acute” yet short-term threat.
Washington is confident that it can walk and chew gum at the same time, namely countering
both Russia and China simultaneously in two theaters.
China was not directly included in last month’s Asian activities but its presence loomed large over them. The focus on the
Asia campaign came at a time of China’s “strategic low tide,” as it dealt with myriad domestic issues, including
the Covid-19 pandemic.
UQ---Saudi Focus
The US is focusing on re-establishing relations with Saudi Arabia
Kalin and Restuccia 7/10 – Stephen Kalin is a Middle East correspondent covering Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf. Andrew Restuccia covers the White House for The Wall Street Journal.
(“Biden’s Middle East Trip Is a High-Risk Bid to Reset Saudi Relations,” The Wall Street Journal.
July 10th, 2022. https://www.wsj.com/articles/bidens-middle-east-trip-is-a-high-risk-bid-to-
reset-saudi-relations-11657481150?mod=politics_featst) Edgemont PF
President Biden’s Middle East trip this week marks a move toward a more traditional American
foreign policy with Saudi Arabia, as the realities of oil diplomacy and geopolitics lead him to
compromise on campaign promises to isolate the kingdom over human-rights violations.
The shift in U.S. priorities has led to starkly divergent views being put forth by U.S. and Saudi officials over how the visit will unfold.
Mr. Biden and his senior aides say they are focused on a summit of Arab nations where the president will
mingle with multiple heads of state, and not on a highly anticipated face-to-face meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin
Salman, who remains toxic in much of Washington, especially among Democratic leaders. U.S. officials said the president will meet
with the 86-year-old King Salman and his leadership team, which includes Prince Mohammed.
Saudi officials, though, say there will be substantial exchanges between Prince Mohammed and the president on a range of topics
and have described the summit as peripheral.
After pledging to punish Saudi Arabia for human rights abuses as a candidate, President Biden is set to travel to the kingdom to meet
with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in July. WSJ’s Shelby Holliday breaks down five issues the leaders are likely to discuss.
Photo composite: Adele Morgan
Riyadh has signaled it wants acknowledgment of Prince Mohammed’s social and economic reforms and assurances that the U.S. has
its back amid threats from Iran, as Mr. Biden’s signature Middle East initiative—reviving the 2015 nuclear deal—stalls. Prince
Mohammed wants to put to rest the controversy over the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, which the U.S. intelligence
community concluded he ordered in 2018, an allegation he denies.
The president intends to discuss the Saudi human-rights record, U.S. officials said, which underpinned his campaign vow to treat the
country like a pariah. But Saudi officials say they are unlikely to make any human-rights concessions and aren’t willing to abandon an
oil-production alliance with Moscow, which the U.S. has blamed in part for high oil prices.
Without substantial progress on energy or human-rights issues, some of the president’s allies worry he could return to the U.S.
largely empty-handed and unable to tout new efforts to address high inflation, a top concern for voters ahead of this year’s midterm
elections. Mr. Biden intends to make the case that the trip is about bolstering domestic interests, U.S. officials said.
The president’s itinerary was still in flux in the days leading up to the four-day summit, U.S. officials said, with his top Middle East
adviser traveling to the kingdom last week to finalize details, underlining the difficulties the trip poses.
Ties with Saudi Arabia have reached a low point, with Mr. Biden first refusing to engage with
Prince Mohammed last year and then Prince Mohammed declining to participate in a call with
the president in the run-up to the Ukraine war. Oil prices soared above $100 a barrel after
Russia invaded Ukraine, and the Saudis did little to tap into their capacity to pump more oil to
tame the market, despite calls from the U.S.
Driving the shift toward a more traditional U.S. Middle East strategy, in part, is the impact of
high energy prices on U.S. inflation rates, which is proving a significant political liability for Mr.
Biden. Consumer prices rose 6.3% in May from a year earlier, the same as in April but down slightly from 6.6% in March, as
measured by the Commerce Department’s personal-consumption expenditures price index, which it reported Thursday. The March
rise was the fastest since January 1982.
Mr. Biden’s
goals now include keeping Saudi Arabia in the Western orbit and checking its tilt
toward Russia and China, U.S. officials said.
“As the administration looked at its global priorities, Saudi Arabia was relevant to a growing
number of them, and having a scratchy relationship with the leadership was making a whole
variety of things around the world harder,” said Jon Alterman, Middle East program director at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies.
“From a Saudi perspective, a large part of the visit is intended to reinforce the importance of partnership with Saudi Arabia and
refute the notion that the crown prince is an impetuous troublemaker and impossible partner,” Mr. Alterman said.
Turn---Dip Cap Bad---China
Dip cap causes China war --- sparks miscalculation
Security assistance in a tense era of great power competition is extremely sensitive and can increase tension
and lead to miscalculation. The risk in today’s geopolitical environment is that providing sensitive and potentially
provocative assistance will not receive the same scrutiny from policymakers and will become the norm
for the administering agency, the DOD. In the last era of great power competition, the Cold War, security assistance
often stoked tension between the United States and the Soviet Union and led to spiraling commitments. For
instance, Soviet provision of nuclear missiles to Cuba led to a nuclear standoff, while U.S. military support for Vietnam led to
deepening U.S. engagement. As competition with China and Russia increases, security assistance could
once again prove a major source of tension and cause miscalculation. Providing aid in this environment is not a mere
technical military matter, but ultimately a political and diplomatic concern that is highly sensitive. Yet today, it is the
DOD that is driving assistance to countries such as Ukraine and regions such as Southeast Asia.13 When Russia invaded Ukraine in
2014, the National Security Council became significantly involved in policymaking and limited types of assistance that could be
provided, including lethal aid.14 Such unique scrutiny was warranted because there was a crisis involving a U.S. partner and a
nuclear-armed state. But the nature of White House intervention was necessary in large part because the security assistance process
—for both decision-making and for providing assistance—was broken.
Turn---AI
NATO AI coop incentivizes coop on bigger tech issues—ensures long term
diplomatic cohesion (winners win dip cap)
Franke 21 (Ulrike Esther Franke, Dr. Ulrike Franke is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign
Relations (ECFR). She leads ECFR’s Technology and European Power initiative. Her areas of focus include German and European
security and defence, the future of warfare, and the impact of new technologies such as drones and artificial intelligence on
“ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI,”
geopolitics and warfare.
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2021,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep29123.pdf?refreqid=excelsior
%3A2482542bac8c719503d7a311e5056983&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1) - LH
As noted, agreeing on shared goals and supporting measures will present some challenges. Beyond the specific themes of ethical AI
and slowing Chinese progress in AI, however, there
are other areas for transatlantic AI cooperation. Investing
in these potentially less controversial areas may help create new platforms and lay important
groundwork for greater cooperation. For example, the transatlantic allies should facilitate the
exchange of knowledge and best practices on AI, and invest in mutually beneficial research , such
as privacy-preserving machine learning.
Defence might also be a promising area for transatlantic cooperation, given the close military ties between
the US and Europe through NATO. Military experts are raising concerns over how the introduction of AI onto the battlefield may
hinder interoperability between allied forces, so defence could be a good realm in which to strengthen
cooperation.
Militaries on both sides of the Atlantic are already investing in AI-enabled capabilities. In military affairs, as in the civilian realm, AI
has a variety of uses. Military AI applications include autonomous vehicles and weapons; intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance; logistics (for example, the predictive maintenance of military systems such as vehicles and weapons); forecasting;
and training (such as that in virtual reality simulations).
Some of these military capabilities – namely, lethal autonomous weapon systems, or “killer robots” – are among the most
controversial uses of AI. The US and its European allies have adopted different positions on this issue in international debates such as
those at the United Nations in Geneva, where lethal autonomous weapons have been under discussion since 2014. Transatlantic
cooperation on lethal autonomous weapons, or other combat-related capabilities, does not, therefore, look promising.
However, military AI includes many non-controversial uses, such as ‘sustainment’, which encompasses
logistics as well as support activities such as financial management, personnel services, and health care. AI helps make these
services more efficient and cost-effective; for example, predictive maintenance helps in monitoring a system, such as
an aircraft, and can do things such as use various sensory inputs and data analysis to predict when parts of a system will need to be
replaced. Equally, AI
can help improve logistics’ efficiency by, for instance, ensuring that supplies are delivered in
appropriate quantities and at the right time. Transatlantic
cooperation in this field is uncontroversial, but
extremely useful – especially when carried out within NATO, as this could help bring allies closer
together, establish joint procedures, and thereby ensure interoperability.
No !---China =/= Expansionist
China not existential threat. China diplomacy largely opportunistic and,
amplifying China threat only worsens relations.
Joanne Wallis and Maima Koro, 5-26-2022, (Wallis Professor of International Security,
University of Adelaide, Koro Pacific Research Fellow, University of Adelaide) "Amplifying
narratives about the 'China threat' in the Pacific may help China achieve its broader aims,"
Conversation, https://theconversation.com/amplifying-narratives-about-the-china-threat-in-
the-pacific-may-help-china-achieve-its-broader-aims-183917
Much of China’s diplomacy has been opportunistic and not dissimilar to what Australia and
other partners are doing.
Although the region is strategically important to Australia, the

southern Pacific islands are marginal to China. And
apart from Kiribati and Nauru, the northern Pacific islands are closely linked to the US.
China’s interest may primarily be about demonstrating strategic reach, rather than for specific
military purposes.
So, amplifying narratives about China’s threatening presence may unintentionally help China
achieve its broader aim of influencing Australia.
And framing
China’s presence almost exclusively as threatening may limit Australia’s
manoeuvrability.
Given the accelerating frequency of natural disasters in the region due to climate change, it is only a matter of time before the
Australian and Chinese militaries find themselves delivering humanitarian relief side-by-side.
Being on sufficiently cordial terms to engage in even minimal coordination will be important.
Indeed, Australia should try to draw China into cooperative arrangements in the Pacific.
Reviving, updating, and seeking China’s signature of, the Pacific Islands Forum’s Cairns Compact on Development Coordination,
would be a good start.
If China really has benign intentions, it should welcome this opportunity. The compact, a mechanism created by Pacific states, could
help ensure China’s activities are well-coordinated and targeted alongside those of other partners.
Amplifying threat narratives also feeds into Australia’s perceived need to “compete” by
playing whack-a-mole with China, rather than by formulating a coherent, overarching regional
policy that responds to the priorities of Pacific states.
China no where close to being an existential threat militarily or technologically

but over militarization in response to amplified threats can prove to be harmful
Michael D. Swaine, 3-31-2020, (director of the East Asia program at the Quincy Institute),
"China Doesn’t Pose an Existential Threat for America," Foreign Policy,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/21/china-existential-threat-america/
In fact, there isn’t much actual evidence to support the notion of China as an existential threat.
That does not mean that China is not a threat in some areas, but Washington needs to approach this issue based
on the facts, not dangerous rhetoric. Unfortunately, right sizing the challenges that China poses seems to be an
impossible task for Washington.
In the most basic, literal sense, an existential threat means a threat to the physical existence of the nation through the possession of
an ability and intent to exterminate the U.S. population, presumably via the use of highly lethal nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapons. A less conventional understanding of the term posits the radical erosion or ending of U.S. prosperity and freedoms
through economic, political, ideational, and military pressure, thereby in essence destroying the basis for the American way of life.
Any threats that fall below these two definitions do not convey what is meant by the word “existential.”
As a military power, China has no ability to destroy the United States without destroying itself.
China’s nuclear capabilities are far below those of the United States, and its conventional
military, while regionally potentially powerful, has a fraction of the budget of that of the United
States.
Some argue that China could militarily push the United States out of Asia and dominate that
region, denying the country air and naval access and hence support for critical allies. This would presumably have an existential
impact by virtue of the supposedly critical importance of that region to the stability and prosperity of the United States. Yet there
are no signs that Washington is losing either the will or the capacity to remain a major military
actor in the region and one closely connected to major Asian allies, which are themselves
opposed to China dominating the region. In reality, the greater danger in Asia is that
Washington could so militarize its response to China that its actions and policies become
repugnant even to U.S. allies.
No LIO Impact - China won’t establish an Asian sphere of influence as U.S

remains a major military actor with ties to allies in the region
Michael D. Swaine, 3-31-2020, (director of the East Asia program at the Quincy Institute),
"China Doesn’t Pose an Existential Threat for America," Foreign Policy,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/21/china-existential-threat-america/
Some argue that China could militarily push the United States out of Asia and dominate that
region, denying the country air and naval access and hence support for critical allies. This would
presumably have an existential impact by virtue of the supposedly critical importance of that region to the stability and prosperity of
the United States. Yet
there are no signs that Washington is losing either the will or the capacity to
remain a major military actor in the region and one closely connected to major Asian allies,
which are themselves opposed to China dominating the region. In reality, the greater danger in
Asia is that Washington could so militarize its response to China that its actions and policies
become repugnant even to U.S. allies.
No China expansionism impact. China at a disadvantage demographically,

economically, geographically, and politically making unfavorable conditions for
China to expand sphere of influence
Andrew J. Nathan, 4-14-2022, (a professor of political science at Columbia University), "What
Exactly Is America’s China Policy?," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/14/us-
china-biden-strategy-geopolitics/
Whatever China’s strategic vision, its ambitions are constrained by the hard realities of
demography, economy, geography, and global politics. Internally, Beijing struggles to recruit the
loyalty of its 55 officially recognized ethnic minorities—especially Tibetans, Uyghurs, Kazakhs,
and Mongolians, who occupy large strategic territories around the rim of the Han Chinese heartland. Within
the heartland, the regime races to keep up with the growing welfare demands of a new, large,
urban middle class, even as the population ages and the economy slows.
China shares land or sea borders with 20 countries, all distrustful to varying degrees and most
seeking to balance against Chinese influence with ties to the United States, Japan, and one
another. The sea lanes on which China’s highly globalized economy depends are vulnerable to
interdiction by the U.S. and other navies. And China faces five independent power centers—the
United States, the EU, India, Japan, and Russia—in a multipolar system that is not going to disappear. As
China’s power increases, all but Russia have turned increasingly resistant to Chinese influence,
as have most of China’s smaller neighbors. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has deepened Moscow’s
dependence on Beijing for economic and diplomatic support, but in the long run, that
dependence will also feed Russia’s long-standing fear and resentment of Chinese power.
Not only are these conditions unfavorable to China’s prospects for achieving global hegemony.
They actually give China a positive stake in important features of the international status quo—the norm of territorial integrity, the
principle of sovereignty, and the system of open trade and investment.
No expansionism impact. China already capable of expanding sphere of

influence but repeatedly stresses it won’t - history proves
Zhou Bo, 11-06-2020, (Senior Colonel Zhou Bo (ret) is a senior fellow of the Centre for
International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University and a China Forum expert. He was
director of Centre for Security Cooperation of the Office for International Military Cooperation
of the Ministry of National Defence of China.), "Does a stronger China need a sphere of
influence as US power wanes?," South China Morning Post,
https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3108284/stronger-china-has-no-reason-seek-
sphere-influence-even-us-power
The Chinese government has repeatedly stressed that China would not seek to be a hegemon
even if it became developed. Although this might sound like lip service to some, its assertion is backed by
history. For 2,000 years, much of East Asia was part of the Chinese sphere of influence, but that
influence was primarily cultural.
Admiral Zheng He’s seven voyages in the Indian Ocean showed the sweeping power of the
“Celestial Empire” in the Ming dynasty, but the Chinese didn’t bother establishing a single
military base in any of these places. It was only 600 years later that the People’s Liberation Army established a logistics
base there in support of counter-piracy efforts in the Indian Ocean.
Influence and a sphere of influence are two different things. Today, China’s influence almost
overlaps with that of the United States. Such influence will grow further since China is widely
expected to surpass the US to become the world’s largest economy in terms of gross domestic
product in 10 to 15 years. In other words, a global China is already influential enough to
demand any spheres of influence
China rise isn’t a threat – multiple warrants.

John Mueller 21 {John Mueller is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. He is also a member of
the political science department and senior research scientist with the Mershon Center for
International Security Studies at the Ohio State University}, 21 - ("China: Rise or Demise?," Cato
Institute, 5-18-2021, https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/china-rise-or-demise#confronting-
china)//marlborough-wr/
China’s Decline: Problems and Prospects
Concerns about the security implications of China’s rise are not particularly justified. Moreover,
China faces many problems. As Freeman puts it, “China has its hands full.” Among the
problems: “environmental devastation, slowing growth, a rapidly aging population and
shrinking labor force, enormous levels of industrial overproduction, accumulating local debt, a
still‐inadequate social safety network, and an increasingly oppressive political system.… It has
an unfinished civil war with Taiwan and uneasy relations with fifty‐five ethnic minority groups—
8½ percent of its population—at least two of which are in a near state of rebellion.”79
Although China might eventually be able to handle these and other problems, they will arrest
the attention of its leaders for a long time. And, in total, they might be taken to suggest that
descent or at least prolonged stagnation might come about, rather than a continued rise.
The Environment
As Thomas Fingar and Jean Oi point out, China’s decision to accord a “higher priority to growth
and job creation than to environmental protection has had highly negative and increasingly
resented impacts on health and quality of life.”80 The current result: air pollution kills over a
million and a half Chinese each year.81 Barry Naughton of the University of California at San
Diego points out that although China has 19 percent of the world’s population, it incurs 30
percent of the health costs, and this might increase as the population ages.82
Corruption
There is also a problem with endemic corruption characterized by collusive economic looting
and privilege seeking by officials, businessmen, and gangsters. China’s railway minister, for
example, was found to have amassed over a hundred million dollars in cash alone, acquired 350
apartments, and maintained 18 mistresses.83 The courts, too, are corrupt. Bribes influence
judgments, while extortion, excessive fees, and the leaking of confidential information is
common. Moreover, the judiciary is not independent of the Communist Party: courts and
prosecutors report to it, and it controls judicial budgets, appointments, and promotions.84
Under Xi Jinping, who became president in 2013 and may enjoy lifetime tenure in office, China
has escalated its attack against its monumental corruption problem, going after not only those
at the bottom but also those at the top. The anti‐corruption campaign, which has charged
hundreds of thousands of party cadres, is far too vast to be simply an effort to root out factional
opposition.85 However, as Claremont College’s Minxin Pei notes, the anti‐corruption campaign
has sometimes been used to purge party officials who are suspected of disloyalty to President
Xi.86 For example, a man who Elizabeth Economy of the Council on Foreign Relations considers
to have been “a rising political star” was purged in 2017 at first on grounds of corruption and
then of conspiring to “usurp party and state power” and was sentenced to life imprisonment.87
To a degree, corrupt officials have little incentive to mend their ways because being corrupt may
not be the reason officials are being arrested for corruption. New rules (not new incentive
structures) have been instituted but, notes Duke University’s Melanie Manion, these “may have
some public relations appeal, but officials will undoubtedly find ‘workarounds’ that, when
exposed, will feed public cynicism.”88
Andrew Wedeman, a prominent student of the issue who heads the China Studies Program at
Georgia State University, suggests that, in all, “corruption may be an intractable problem” as
long as “people remain subject to temptation, and conditions and incentives make it possible
and profitable to ignore regulations, accept bribes to expedite projects, or in other ways pursue
acceptable goals through unsanctioned means.” Moreover, “it has the potential to erode public
confidence in the regime and the legitimacy of party rule” even as it “tarnishes China’s image
abroad and sometimes distorts and impedes efforts to meet critical challenges.” His essay on
the subject is provocatively titled “Anticorruption Forever?”89
In his study of China’s crony capitalism, economist Minxin Pei argues that the process not only
wastes “precious resources that could have been invested more productively” but also diverts
energies and talents into sectors “that are unlikely to be the growth engines needed to upgrade
the Chinese economy.” The result, he suggests, is likely to be “long‐term economic
stagnation.”90
The Belt and Road Initiative
On top of all this, there is trouble with China’s (or President Xi Jinping’s) elaborate, even
grandiose, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—a project, notes Zakaria, whose budget at some $1.5
trillion is about the same as that for the United States’ F-35 fighter jet program.91 From the
beginning there was commentary from Chinese scholars and business leaders questioning the
economic rationale for many of the investments.92 In fact, notes Naughton, the idea was in part
economically misguided:
Transport is already much cheaper by sea than by land, and the economic centers of Asia
(including China) are all on the coast. The overland portion of BRI will create expensive land
connections to relatively small nearby economies that already have alternative transportation
links. While such investments will make a modest contribution, on a case‐by‐case basis, to the
neighboring economy, they are unlikely in the aggregate to have a high payback to the Chinese
economy.93
As it happens, the BRI is increasingly showing signs of being not only a case of overreach but one
of “strategic disfunction” in the words of analyst Tanner Green. An expenditure of hundreds of
billions on the project has so far failed to deliver either returns for investors (including state‐run
banks) or political returns for China. It “persists only because it is the favored brainchild of an
authoritarian leader living in an echo chamber”—for other Chinese to attack BRI is “to attack the
legitimacy of the party itself.”94 By 2019, BRI lending by China had fallen from a peak of $75
billion in 2016 (at a time when Xi was touting BRI as “a project of the century”) to $4 billion. And
by the end of 2020, reports were noting that the money had been doled out “with a
combination of hubris, ambition, and naivete” and used descriptors like “unravelling,” “fallen off
a cliff,” and “ill‐conceived” while observing that China was now “mired in debt renegotiations
with a host of countries.”95
In fact, note Fingar and Oi, “China’s relationship with more or less all countries is more fraught
today than it was before Xi launched the BRI and China began to flex its economic and military
muscles in ways neighbors found worrisome.”96 Elizabeth Economy also points out that there
has been a backlash and that “stories of Chinese corruption and scandals with infrastructure
projects are contributing to rising Sinophobia.”97 McMaster acknowledges that “China’s
behavior is galvanizing opposition among countries that do not want to be vassal states.”98 And
David Shambaugh, a China specialist at George Washington University, agrees: “If Beijing is
trying to recreate a twenty‐first‐century version of the imperial ‘tribute system,’ it will
inevitably fail, as other sovereign Asian nations do not desire to fall into such a patron‐client
relationship with China again.”99
Similarly, Ho‐fung Hung of John Hopkins University points out that, although “China’s economic
influence in many countries in the Global South has been rising,” this rise “has brought China a
set of challenges including loan delinquencies and increasing security risks to its personnel and
property overseas.… As others have learned, there are no easy solutions to these challenges and
there is little reason to judge that China will succeed where others have stumbled.” In Michael
Beckley’s estimation, the scheme “will probably exacerbate China’s woes” because it “funds
hundreds of financially dubious projects in unstable countries, more than half of which have
credit ratings below investment‐grade.” Concludes Hung: “China is still far from becoming a
hegemonic power, even in Asia.”100
Restive Populations
China’s massive effort to deal with Muslim identity and with possible secession in its vast
western province known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has been especially brutal
and is potentially counterproductive in the deep and lasting resentments it may engender.
Chinese concerns about the problems in the province have been evident for decades.101
However, officials were particularly alarmed by terrorism by rebellious Uyghurs that killed
dozens between 2008 and 2014. There were also days of battling in 2009 between rioters,
counter‐rioters, and police in Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi, that may have killed 200 people.
Accordingly, as part of an ongoing campaign against the “three evil forces” of terrorism,
separatism, and extremism, China launched a crackdown against local Uyghurs—Muslims who
number some 10 or 20 million and make up about half the population of Xinjiang. By the end of
2015, authorities deemed the terrorism situation to be under control, and they focused on
building coercive capacity through technological and human surveillance. While there were
some efforts at detention and re‐education at the time, they remained targeted, selective, and
brief.102
Beginning the next year, however, there was a shift in policy, and it seems to have been
motivated by a fear of emerging contacts between Uyghurs and Islamic militant organizations in
Southeast Asia and the Middle East.103 Among these organizations was a radical Islamist group,
the Turkistan Islamic Party, whose leader in 2016 said, “The soldiers of Islam must be willing to
return to China to emancipate the Western province of Xinjiang from the communist invaders.”
And the Islamic State, or ISIS, which had exploded onto the scene in 2014 in Iraq and Syria and
which had some Uyghur fighters, incorporated Xinjiang into its transnational jihadist ideology. In
a major speech in July 2014, its leader had listed China first in a list of places “where Muslims’
rights are forcibly seized.” China, then, saw the threat in Xinjiang to be something of an
existential one, and it envisioned that the huge province might become “China’s Libya” or
“China’s Syria.” As much as a third of Xinjiang’s population was deemed to be vulnerable to
extremist influence.104
To counter this threat, the Chinese targeted diaspora networks to cut off a pathway by which
terrorist threats could reenter China, and they established a wide array of detention centers in
Xinjiang devoted to re‐education, seeking to inoculate the population from “infection.”105
Similar thinking was behind an extensive project to import selected ethnic Chinese—perhaps
over a million—to live within Uyghur families. There has also been a program to allow, or force,
Uyghurs to learn Chinese‐preferred trades. These bizarre, gargantuan exercises were
sometimes justified in medical terms as “a re‐education hospital” that would “cleanse the virus
from their brain and restore their normal mind” or would “make them into people who are
politically qualified.”106 Information is limited, but it appears that detainees spend endless
hours singing patriotic Chinese songs, watching TV programs about President Xi Jinping, and
memorizing passages from books about him. From time to time, they are tested for their
progress at memorization, and those who fail are subjected to different levels of punishment
according to the degree of their failure, including food deprivation and beatings.107
The effort might prove to be counterproductive.108 The Chinese somehow came to believe that
they could concentrate perhaps a million potential separatist Muslims in “re‐education” camps,
letting them bond and potentially plot in between mandatory sessions in which they are told
how wonderful the Chinese are. They may have succeeded in terrorizing the Uyghur population
with their effective and draconian policing, but they also may have instilled a strong and
lingering resentment and alienation.109
The threat from Islamist extremism, and particularly from ISIS, has diminished even as outside
criticism of the inhumanity of the hundreds of concentration camps in Xinjiang has increased.
Meanwhile, enthusiasm for maintaining the expensive and visible archipelago of detention
centers seems to have waned in China, and the regime claims to have closed the camps and
released the detainees at the end of 2019.110 As the principal at one of the camps put it, “All
the students have graduated. They are all finished now. Our work is done here.… They have all
been deradicalised and completed their studies. Nobody in this area is in further need of the
training.”111 However, there is some evidence that this is not true and that camps have been
extended.112 The Chinese contend that the region, and the country, have been free from
terrorism since 2014. In the meantime, other methods of surveillance and population control,
less obvious and likely less expensive, have been maintained and further developed.
It seems highly likely that Chinese officials have overreacted to the terrorist threat.113
However, alarm over the rise of ISIS and its international ambitions was worldwide. For
example, the ISIS phenomenon transfixed the American public: a poll conducted in the spring of
2016 asked the 83 percent of its respondents who said they closely followed news stories about
ISIS whether the group presented “a serious threat to the existence or survival of the US.” Fully
77 percent agreed, more than two‐thirds of them strongly.114 Although it should not be taken
in any sense to excuse the human rights violations in Xinjiang, an unpleasant comparison might
be made. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, although dramatic and horrible, did not nearly present an
existential threat to the United States in the way that the potential violent secession of its
largest province did to China. Yet the United States massively overreacted.115 And it did so by
launching a set of foreign wars that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands.
China has problems with restive populations elsewhere as well. In Tibet, some 200 perished in
violent protests and riots in 2008 that, like those in Urumqi a year later, targeted Chinese‐
owned businesses. Thereafter, there were 140 self‐immolations protesting Chinese rule.116
Policing costs have been extensive. Even before the institution of the archipelago of self‐
education centers in Xinjiang in 2016, China’s total annual spending on domestic security is
estimated to have surpassed the amount it was spending on external defense—more than $100
billion in U.S. dollars—and it was the largest for any country in the world. At the same time,
financial transfers from Beijing were funding 63 percent of the budget in Xinjiang and 90 percent
in Tibet.117
More recently and most importantly, there were massive protests in Hong Kong in 2019 to a
new security law imposed by China that would potentially subject Hong Kong residents to the
mercies of corrupt courts in China that are dominated by the Communist Party. The new law
was withdrawn, but the demonstrators escalated their demands, and some of them committed
violence and physical damage, including the ransacking of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council
building and the disruption of operations at the airport for a while.
Then in 2020, China essentially abrogated the 1997 international agreement by which the British
turned over its imperial possession to China with a promise that a condition of “one country,
two systems” would be maintained for 50 years. Opposition has now been overpowered at a
considerable cost in local and international resentment. In the process, the Communist Party
imposed a sweeping national security law. It bans four major offenses—separatism, subversion,
terrorism, and collusion with foreign countries. Anyone advocating or engaging in any of these,
as interpreted by the authorities, would be subject to arrest, which means, as is the norm for
national security suspects in the rest of the country, being locked up for as long as six months,
subject to torture and coerced confession, while being denied access to counsel, family, or
friends. Successful prosecution for these rather vague offensives carries a maximum penalty of
life imprisonment. Beijing repeatedly blames the unrest on foreigners, particularly the United
States, who are, it says, plotting to sow chaos and to topple the Communist Party.118
Alienation of Foreign Firms
Fingar and Oi point to another development that “bodes ill for China’s future”: it has alienated
foreign firms. It has done so by stealing intellectual property, demanding transfers of
technology as a condition for operating in China, and “generally failing to honor contracts and
trade commitments.” As a result, they note, rather than building facilities in China, foreign
companies have increasingly sought better opportunities in other countries.119 Notes Doug
Bandow, “Even corporate America, long the strongest supporter of the Sino‐American
relationship, has grown frustrated, viewing the Chinese market as almost irredeemably biased
against foreign firms.”120
Meanwhile, China’s authoritarian crackdown in Hong Kong, a region that once sported an
attractive openness and a court system that was not corrupt, is scarcely likely to encourage
international confidence and investment.121 Transparency International routinely ranks
countries for perceived corruption. Its rankings from least to most for 179 countries in 2019
found that for what might be called “Chinese entities,” Singapore ranked at 4, Hong Kong at 16,
Taiwan at 28, and China at 80. (The United States, for comparison, ranks at 23.) The Hong Kong
ranking seems likely to change. And that could have substantial economic consequences. As one
business executive puts it, “Businesses will inevitably change their perceptions of Hong Kong as
a gateway to China that is protected by rule of law.… There will be foreign companies that say
‘we’ll just enter China directly, I’ve got no one‐up going via Hong Kong,’ or they’ll just exit China
completely.”122
The new national security law is unlikely to charm foreigners—including those in the vast
Chinese diaspora—because China has applied it to anyone living anywhere on the planet. Thus,
it appears that foreigners who, for example, call for independence for Hong Kong or advocate
sanctions against China are subject to arrest and life imprisonment if the Chinese government
can get its hands on them.123
Increasing Illiberalism
Zhao Ziyang, who was ousted as general secretary of the Communist Party in 1989 and put
under house arrest for the rest of his life for opposing the use of force to end the occupation of
Tiananmen Square by pro‐democracy and anti‐corruption demonstrators, concluded that “our
biggest problem is that everything is owned by the state.” And he argued that “if a country
wishes to modernize, not only should it implement a market economy, it must also adopt a
parliamentary democracy as its political system. Otherwise, this nation will not be able to have a
market economy that is healthy and modern, nor can it become a modern society with a rule of
law.” To reach that goal, he suggested, “two breakthroughs” were necessary. First, the ruling
Communist Party needed to allow competing parties to emerge along with freedom of the
press. And second, the party needed to “use democratic means to reform itself,” allowing “the
existence of legitimate differences of opinion” while reforming the legal system and creating “an
independent judiciary.”124
To say the least, this is not the direction in which China is heading. China’s own plans have
stressed the need to accelerate a transition to consumption‐led demand, to restructure or close
inefficient state‐owned companies (which comprise fully a third of the economy), to promote
innovation and entrepreneurship, and to avoid unsustainable levels of debt.125 From an
economic standpoint, however, China under the leadership of Xi is pretty much doing
everything wrong. Naughton observes that, although “China’s technological potential is
enormous,” obtaining “overall developmental success will require that policymakers step back
and take a more open and market‐based approach,” something, he points out, that “is not
currently in evidence.”126
For example, although state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) receive preferential interest rates when
they borrow money, enjoy lower tax rates, and have privileged access to resources including
land, they are notorious for underperforming relative to private firms. A case in point: their
productivity per person of aluminum is one‐seventh that of a private competitor.127 There have
been efforts to reform SOEs over the last decades, but as Fingar and Oi point out, these “were
incomplete and remain so today.”128 In fact, the importance of SOEs is being elevated.129
Notes Naughton, “The large gap in profitability between SOEs and non‐SOEs which had almost
disappeared in the mid‐2000s, now appears entrenched.” And, he continues, although SOEs get
their capital from state‐owned banks, those banks “have neither the capability nor a clear
mandate to aggressively monitor enterprise performance.”130
There is also a remarkable system of something that might be called state‐favored enterprises.
In this, the party and government play the role of a venture capitalist and subsidize enterprises
they deem promising through direct investment, tax breaks, special funding, and abundant bank
loans. Some of these ventures have been successful, but many of them have failed to deliver.
The problem is that the benefactors of the low‐performing failures, unlike ordinary venture
capitalists, do not cut them off as they prove inadequate. Instead, they engage in regulatory
forbearance and supply ad hoc bailouts rather than letting them succumb to well‐deserved
bankruptcy. They are thus kept alive—a corporate species of the living dead or what Naughton
and others call “zombie firms,” a term also applied to SOEs. And the whole process is laced with
corruption—or as Naughton puts it, “cordial relationships.” In all, concludes Naughton, “In the
end, China is spending trillions of dollars with little serious scrutiny of the value of the
investment.”131
The primary result of this system has been increasing debt and an almost comical epidemic of
overproduction. In fact, notes Beckley, China’s debt is the largest ever recorded for a developing
country, and it has quadrupled over the past decade or so.132 Meanwhile, zombie firms,
including SOEs, continue to produce material—including huge ships—even when market
demand slackens, and the whole concept of bankruptcy seems to be unthinkable. Notes one
economist, “For private companies in overcapacity industries, after several years of losses
there’s no way to continue. The owner will shut them down or sell them off, but at SOEs they
can keep getting bank loans or government support.” There was a determined effort to change
this between 1997 and 2005, but the global financial crisis that began in 2008 reversed that
effort. And under Xi, the stress has been on strengthening the ruling party’s grip on state assets
while seeking to make them more competitive.133
! NU---US Intervention Inevitable
US intervention is inevitable
Josh Boak, Aamer Madhani and Zeke Miller 5-23-22 (Josh Boak is a White House
Reporter at The Associated Press, Aamer Madhani is a White House reporter at
The Associated Press, Zeke Miller is a White House reporter at The Associated
Press, AP News, “Biden: US would intervene with military to defend Taiwan”,
https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-biden-taiwan-china-
4fb0ad0567ed5bbe46c01dd758e6c62b)
TOKYO (AP) — PresidentJoe Biden said Monday the U.S. would intervene militarily if China were to
invade Taiwan, declaring the commitment to protect the island is “even stronger” after Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine. It was one of the most forceful presidential statements in support of Taiwan’s self-governing in decades.
Biden, at a news conference in Tokyo, said “yes” when asked if he was willing to get involved
militarily to defend Taiwan if China invaded. “That’s the commitment we made,” he added.
The U.S. traditionally has avoided making such an explicit security guarantee to Taiwan, with
which it no longer has a mutual defense treaty, instead maintaining a policy of “strategic
ambiguity” about how far it would be willing to go. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which has governed U.S.
relations with the island, does not require the U.S. to step in militarily if China invades, but makes it American policy to ensure
Taiwan has the resources to defend itself and to prevent any unilateral change of status by Beijing.
A White House official said Biden’s comments did not reflect a policy shift for the United States, a point echoed more firmly by
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, asked by reporters if Biden’s answer indicated the U.S. would do more to help Taiwan than it has
done to help Ukraine and whether the U.S. was making a commitment to send troops to help Taiwan in the event of an invasion.
“As the president said our One China policy has not changed,” Austin said at the Pentagon. “He reiterated that policy and our
commitment to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. He also highlighted our commitment under the Taiwan Relations Act to
help provide Taiwan the means to defend itself. So, again, our policy is not changed.”
But Biden’s words drew a sharp response from mainland China, which has claimed Taiwan to be a rogue province.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin expressed “strong dissatisfaction and
resolute opposition” to Biden’s comments. “China has no room for compromise or concessions
on issues involving China’s core interests such as sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
He added, “China will take firm action to safeguard its sovereignty and security interests, and we
will do what we say.”
Speaking alongside Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Biden said any effort by China to use force against Taiwan would “just
not be appropriate,” adding that
it would “dislocate the entire region and be another action similar to
what happened in Ukraine.”
China has stepped up its military provocations against democratic Taiwan in recent years, aimed
at intimidating it into accepting Beijing’s demands to unify with the communist mainland.
“They’re already flirting with danger right now by flying so close and all the maneuvers that are
undertaken,” Biden said of China.
Under the “one China” policy, the U.S. recognizes Beijing as the government of China and
doesn’t have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. However, the U.S. maintains unofficial contacts including a de facto
embassy in Taipei, the capital, and supplies military equipment for the island’s defense.
Biden said it was his “expectation” that China would not try to seize Taiwan by force, but he also
said that “depends upon just how strong the world makes clear that that kind of action is going
to result in long-term disapprobation by the rest of the community.”
He added that deterring China from attacking Taiwan was one reason why it’s important that
Russian President Vladimir Putin “pay a dear price for his barbarism in Ukraine,” lest China and
other nations get the idea that such action is acceptable.
Wanting no escalation with nuclear-armed Russia, Biden quickly ruled out putting U.S. forces into direct conflict with Russia. But the
U.S. has shipped billions of dollars in military assistance that has helped Ukraine put up a stiffer-than-expected resistance to Russia’s
onslaught.
Taipei cheered Biden’s remarks, with Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Joanne Ou expressing “sincere welcome and
gratitude.”
“The challenge posed by China to the security of the Taiwan Strait has drawn great concern in
the international community,” said Ou. “Taiwan will continue to improve its self-defense
capabilities, and deepen cooperation with the United States and Japan and other like-minded
countries to jointly defend the security of the Taiwan Strait and the rules-based international
order, while promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.”
It’s not the first time Biden has pledged to defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack , followed by
administration officials contending there had been no change to American policy. In a CNN town hall in October, Biden was asked
about using the U.S. military to defend Taiwan and replied, “Yes, we have a commitment to do that.”
Taiwan isn’t the only foreign policy issue on which the White House has clarified or walked back Biden’s comments. When he
declared in March that Putin was a war criminal, Jen Psaki, then the press secretary, said the president was “speaking from his
heart” even though a legal conclusion hadn’t been reached on the issue.
During a March speech in Poland, Biden said of Putin, “This man cannot remain in power.” White House officials raced to say that
Biden was not calling for regime change in Russia.
Biden’s latest comments on Taiwan came just before he formally launched a long-anticipated
Indo-Pacific trade pact that excludes Taiwan.
White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan confirmed Sunday that Taiwan isn’t among the governments signed up for the
Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which is meant to allow the U.S. to work more closely with key Asian economies on issues like
supply chains, digital trade, clean energy and anticorruption.
Inclusion of Taiwan would have irked China.
Sullivan said the U.S. wants to deepen its economic partnership with Taiwan on a one-to-one
basis.
! NU: China Rise Inevitable
Chinese technology (cyber, biotech, + AI) ahead right now (aff non-unique
card?) but w/ some impact stuff too
Arthur Herman {senior fellow and director of the Quantum Alliance Initiative at Hudson
Institute}, 21 - ("Why China Is Winning the War for High Tech," National Review, 10-14-2021,
https://www.hudson.org/research/17342-why-china-is-winning-the-war-for-high-tech)//
marlborough-wr/
“China Demonstrates Most Powerful Quantum Computer.” That was the headline from the
Australian scientific journal Cosmos this July, which came with this subject line: “Google
trumped as physicists set a new quantum computing record.”
The story told how China’s Zuchongzhi programmable quantum computer had surpassed
Google’s best quantum computer in solving the kind of complex problem that would stump even
the fastest supercomputers, such as factorizing large numbers. The announcement is one more
indication that China is on track to achieve what every cybersecurity expert fears, and every
politician outside Beijing should fear: the creation of a large-scale quantum computer that is
able to break into every public encryption system currently in existence.
Controversy and skepticism met the Chinese claims of what is known as “quantum advantage,”
just as Google took criticism when it made similar claims a year ago. But from the point of view
of understanding China’s strategy with advanced technologies such as quantum computers, the
claim is almost as important as any reality behind it. The truth is that China sees all these
technologies, from quantum to AI and biotech, including advanced viral research, as tools in its
bid for global hegemony — and for crushing the U.S. and its democratic allies under its wheels.
The other truth is that we do not see the world this way. Americans, along with most of our
Western counterparts, still think of technologies like quantum and biotech as extensions of
science, or perhaps opportunities for business enterprise. That assumption, laudable though it
may be from an ethical and free-market perspective, has allowed America’s commanding lead in
one aspect of advanced technology after another to erode, to China’s benefit. We are now
facing a point where the lead may be passing permanently to China.
In August 2018 I published an article in National Review on how China and the U.S. were
stacking up in this high-tech competition. I wrote: “What’s really going on is a struggle for the
future not just of the U.S. but of the world, with China pushing for global hegemony and the U.S.
belatedly pushing back. At stake is the future not only of the American economy but also of the
economies of our allies in Europe and Asia.”
Where are we, nearly three years later?
One useful benchmark is how China is doing in the top five high-tech areas targeted for
“strategic national science and technology projects” in its 14th Five-Year Development Plan,
which President Xi unveiled this spring. The plan calls for increasing R&D spending on these and
other advanced technologies by 7 percent per year from 2021 to 2025. Together with Made in
China 2025 and China Standards 2035, the plan forms a clear blueprint for Chinese domination
of science and technology in the 21st century — a blueprint the United States still lacks.
It is striking that the list fails to include one of the areas where U.S.–China competition has been
keenest in the past three years, namely 5G wireless technology. That’s almost certainly because
China thinks it’s won that contest. A March 2021 article by the Council on Foreign Relations’
David Sacks all but declared as much. It noted that the ban the Trump administration had
pushed against Huawei, the telecom-equipment giant that was leading China’s 5G effort, in the
end found only eight countries willing to join — compared with the 90-plus countries that have
signed up with Huawei, including NATO members Hungary, Iceland, the Netherlands, and
Turkey, as well as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. A principal reason why the United States has had
trouble persuading countries not to use Huawei is that we haven’t offered a viable alternative
that involves a full stack of 5G equipment from microchips to radio networks — something
Huawei has offered for three years running.
The 14th Development Plan also doesn’t list supercomputers, a topic covered in my previous
article. Here, too, the Chinese must feel like winners, since the latest list of global top-500
supercomputers puts China as the No. 1 owner of the world’s fastest supercomputers for the
eighth time since November 2017, accounting for nearly 40 percent of all the machines on the
list (the U.S. comes in at No. 2, at around 36 percent). But the real reason why supercomputers
are off the list may be that China’s focus is already shifting to next-generation technology ,
starting with machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI).
In fact, AI heads the list of technologies China seeks to dominate in its Development Plan.
Last March the U.S. National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, headed by former
Google CEO Eric Schmidt, warned in a report that China is poised to replace the U.S. as the
world’s “AI superpower.” Schmidt himself added that the U.S. “is not prepared to defend or
compete in the AI era.”
It was in 2017 that China adopted the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,
with the aim of becoming the center of global innovation with policy support, government
coordination, and total investments worth $150 billion. As of March 2019, the number of
Chinese AI firms had reached 1,189, second only to the U.S., which has more than 2,000 active
AI firms. It’s not clear how many more companies have been added to the number, but most are
focused on the kinds of AI applications that support China’s military and intelligence.
The second technology on the list is quantum. Although, thanks to U.S. companies such as
Google, IBM, and Microsoft, we still hold a strong lead in quantum computing and quantum-
computing patents, it is widely recognized that China dominates the field of quantum
communications (i.e., using photon entanglement to encrypt messages between users) and now
has more total patents across the full spectrum of quantum technology. A Scientific
American article on July 15 of this year quoted Mitch Ambrose, a science-policy analyst at the
American Institute of Physics: “It’s such a new problem for the U.S. to be facing. It was ahead [in
quantum technology] for so long, and in so many areas, that it hasn’t really had to do much
thinking about what it means to be behind.” The news about the Zuchongzhi computer’s
prowess suggests the U.S. lead in quantum computing may be eroding as well.
Third on the list is semiconductors. While China still holds only 7.6 percent of the market for
global chip sales, the Chinese government is making serious efforts to close the gap with the
goal of reaching 70 percent self-sufficiency by 2025. Buoyed by a booming market — China
produces 36 percent of the world’s electronics — and these government investments, a July
2021 Semiconductor Industry Association report found that China is poised to be increasingly
competitive in some key semiconductor market segments.
The money being poured into China’s semiconductor effort is staggering. China’s National
Integrated Circuits Industry Development Investment Fund (known as the “Big Fund”) was set
up in 2014 with $21 billion in state-backed financing. A second round of government funding in
2019 exceeded $35 billion. “In addition,” the SIA report notes, “China has announced more than
15 local government IC funds for a total of $25 billion in dedicated funding to Chinese
semiconductor companies. Combined with the National Fund, this amounts to $73 billion which
is unmatched in any other country.” Combined with China’s $50 billion in additional
government grants, equity investments, and low-interest loans, the total investment easily
dwarfs the $50 billion the Biden administration says it wants to use to sustain our faltering
domestic semiconductor industry, including the creation of a National Semiconductor
Technology Center.
The fourth area on the list is brain science, or “brain–computer fusion tech,” as enthusiasts call
it, which enables new neurotechnologies that have far-reaching implications for medical
science and other advanced technologies, as well as national security . The United States and
China are the biggest spenders in this sector. The U.S. BRAIN Initiative was started in 2013 under
the Obama administration and includes plans for $6 billion of funding through the year 2025.
The China Brain Project was announced three years later, along with the country’s 13th Five-
Year Plan, giving an estimated funding of $1 billion through the year 2030.
That is a small amount compared with our BRAIN Initiative, and the difference is that China has a
clearer focus on using brain–computer interfaces for military purposes as well as civilian use.
The China Brain Project’s goals also more strongly align with the military rhetoric of the People’s
Liberation Army, which hopes to use this emerging technology to achieve high-performance
equipment systems from drones and robots to enhancing the human intelligence of their
operators.
Even scarier is China’s focus on the fifth area on its list, namely genomics and biotech. Given the
strong evidence that the COVID-19 virus came from a Wuhan bioresearch lab, and may have
been part of China’s work on a bioweapon strategy, the fact that President Xi sees biotech as a
major focus of research and development in the future makes one wonder whether COVID was
simply a prelude to developing an even deadlier and more contagious super-virus as a
bioweapon.
The point is that from code-breaking quantum computers and AI to semiconductors and brain–
computer fusion, all these technologies have deep military implications. Chinese military
leaders believe that such emerging technologies will inevitably be weaponized, often pointing
to a quotation by Friedrich Engels: “Once technological advancements can be used for military
purposes and have been used for military purposes, they very immediately and almost
necessarily, often violating the commander’s will, cause changes or even transformations in the
styles of warfare.”
If we want to know why China is winning the high-tech war with the U.S., and why the U.S.
continues to lose ground in this high-stakes contest, the short answer is that China has
discovered the secret of how the U.S. prevailed over its enemies during World War II, and then
during the Reagan revolution: by investing in technologies that support its military to catalyze
an economic and technological revolution. Just as our World War II mobilization led to the
development of nuclear power, jet propulsion, and the first computers, so the Reagan
revolution produced the innovations of the digital age, from fast and cheap microchips to the
Internet. As commentator David P. Goldman has noted, “The Soviet Union folded in the face of
America’s superior arms and entrepreneurial growth. China watched and learned.” China
expects America to do a Soviet-style abdication when China finally dominates the high-tech
field.
China has also been careful to funnel its funding into targeted research institutes with a clear
strategic focus, such as the National Integrated Circuits Industry Development Investment Fund.
The U.S. has no similar centers of gravity for funding and for implementing a long-term
strategy. Instead, who gets funding and how much in AI, quantum, or semiconductor
manufacturing is left to the vicissitudes of the budget cycle and who controls Congress and the
White House.
China also enjoys a deep bench in STEM talent to draw upon for its national initiatives.
Compared with the U.S., the numbers are discouraging. A recent Georgetown University Center
for Security and Emerging Technology report predicts that China’s Ph.D. graduates will be nearly
double those in the U.S. by 2025. In fact, 80 percent of Chinese Ph.D. grads are in STEM fields.
All in all, the picture is somber. I predicted in my article three years ago that China would
overtake the U.S. in patent filings by 2020. China decided not to wait that long. The World
Intellectual Property Organization, which oversees a system for countries to share recognition of
patents, said China filed 68,720 applications last year while the United States filed 59,230. In
fact, China first knocked the United States from the top spot two years ago in 2019.
China has drawn up a clear blueprint for victory and is deploying massive and targeted funding
to win the high-tech war. We are doing neither. Unless and until the U.S. finds a way to mobilize
the energies and resources that animated our World War II victory and our moon shot, and can
turn around an American education establishment more obsessed with CRT than with STEM,
China will continue to move ahead in that struggle, as the public wonders why we keep falling
behind.

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Diplomatic Capital DA---DDI22

Uniqueness---Biden diplomatic focus is on China --- diverting from current

Biden containment of China through active diplomacy avoids a catastrophic

Clearly, the Biden Administration also recognises

As an authoritarian regime, China

Achieving this outcome will not be easy. Divergences

Perception---focusing on a particular issue saps diplomatic capital

Resolving NATO disunity on emerging tech requires political attention

Security cooperation priorities trade off with other regional initiatives

Financial and diplomatic

Plan locks in US diplomatic focus with NATO

While those goals and activities remain in place, public

Diplomacy needed to get countries on board

The EU’s effort

Differing approaches to AI within NATO guarantee norm-setting is burdensome

AI hampers alliance decision making—strains diplomacy

Litany of issues with AI norm-setting guarantees long term diplomatic

The experts who expressed worries also

Some respondents noted that, even

US-European disagreements hamper a united response to AI

US & Europe disagree

NATO diverges on a unified approach to AI – US diplomacy is necessary to get

it might be wiser to spend one’s finite reserves of

states with an effective cyber diplomacy

Multilateral diplomacy in cybersecurity requires a whole-of-government

The consensus among practitioners of multilateral diplomacy is that the

Therein lies the rub. Both

To its credit, the

Regional priorities are zero-sum

Enter the Reputation versus Prioritization Trade-Off

Applied to the context of contemporary US alliances, allies

Diplomatic capital is finite and dependent upon other goals.

Diplomatic capital is finite!!

Let me boil this down: Mr. Bolton is a dove on China.

Dip Cap is finite

Dip cap is spread thin by new policies – its limited

Diplomatic capital is a finite resource

Diplomatic capital is finite—focus tradeoff

Diplomatic capital is limited and can be gained or lost through material

This is an interesting illustration of the way material

For example, in Tokyo, Biden

Biden is containing China through active diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific---avoids a

Clearly, the Biden Administration also recognises

As an authoritarian regime, China

Indo-Pacific diplomacy is the top US priority—essential in deterring aggressive

Biden is invested in cooperation focused on deterring China now—key to check

During his recent meetings at the international level, the

Efficiency and performance in the Indo-Pacific

Diplomacy and allied engagement reflect US focus on China now—key to check

Rallying U.S. Allies Around the Security Threat Posed by China

In June 2021, NATO

In the official communique released at the end of that summit, the

Expanding the U.S. Role in the Indo-Pacific

Biden is focusing on China now—must invest in relationships in the Indo-Pacific

The US wants to invest more in the Indo-Pacific

Strategic Concept provides focus on China

WASHINGTON — Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken

The pivot to Asia lives.

And then, there’s the regional fallout of the war in Ukraine.

Biden is invested in cooperation focused on deterring China now—key to check

During his recent meetings at the international level, the

Efficiency and performance in the Indo-Pacific

From a cybersecurity perspective, China “possesses persistent and unending resources to