Saudi Normalization DA

Israeli-Saudi normalization deal is likely now.

Middle East Monitor 9-11. "Israel says holding talks with Palestinians to advance Saudi
normalisation deal". 9-11-2023. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230911-israel-says-holding-
talks-with-palestinians-to-advance-saudi-normalisation-deal/

Israel is holding talks with Palestinians as part of efforts to normalise relations with Saudi Arabia, the
country’s National Security Adviser said Monday, Anadolu Agency reports.

“I have been conducting a dialogue with them [Palestinian authorities] in the name of the Prime Minister for eight months,” Tzachi Hanegbi said
in statements cited by The Times of Israel newspaper.

“The conversations are taking place as part of the five-way dialogue with Jordan, Egypt and the US, ”
Hanegbi added at a conference at Reichman University in Herzliya.

“We are trying to reach agreements on security matters , so they will take responsibility for the matters that touch on their
lives, Area A and so that the IDF (army) won’t have to enter refugee camps in Jenin and Nablus instead of them,” he said.

Regarding the chances of reaching a deal to normalise Israeli-Saudi ties, Hanegbi said that an agreement
is “likely to take place”.
There was no comment from the Palestinian or Saudi authorities on the Israeli statements.

Last month, Hanegbi cited

“significant progress” in talks with Saudi Arabia and the US on reaching a
normalization deal between Tel Aviv and Riyadh.

Israeli officials have talked on several occasions about an imminent normalisation deal with Saudi
Arabia.
Saudi Arabia does not have diplomatic relations with Israel and opposes normalisation with Tel Aviv until it ends the decades-long Israeli
occupation of the Palestinian Territories.

Six Arab countries have diplomatic ties with Israel, starting with Egypt in 1979, Jordan in 1994, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain in
September 2020, and then Sudan and Morocco later that year.

Biden’s PC is key.
Talia Golijov 9-6. Editor-in-chief of the i24NEWS English website. "NYT Columnist Thomas Friedman
Urges Rejection Of Saudi-Israeli Normalization". I24news. 9-6-2023.
https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/analysis-opinion/1693979588-nyt-columnist-thomas-friedman-urges-
rejection-of-saudi-israeli-normalization

Friedman says that Netanyahu may

try to sell Washington and Riyadh on a deal that evades these promises,
positioning himself as a domestic hero by securing a peace deal with Saudi Arabia without substantial
concessions to the Palestinians. And, Friedman speculates, it would grant the Netanyahu government the legitimacy to move
forward with its judicial reform.

This formulation of a deal, Friedman writes, in which "the right-wing zealots in his cabinet can continue driving Israel over a cliff — absolutely
has to be stopped."

And yet — all of these criticisms of the Netanyahu government have been the subject of multiple Friedman columns before. Today's was
directed not at the Jewish American and Israel-philes in his audience, but at two specific men and their entourages.

For someone who has been invited into the Oval Office itself, and tasked with delivering Biden's warning to Netanyahu via the black-and-white
of the Times, Friedman's decision to publicly shame and back Biden into a corner is not softened much by his compliment that he is one of "the
best" foreign policy presidents in U.S. history. The
column also lends significance to how quickly the talks are
progressing, with White House officials shuttling back-and-forth and hosting Israeli ministers (and an
opposition leader as well), this column is as much directed to Middle East envoy Brett McGurk, National
Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, and special envoy Amos Hochstein.

In order for Washington looks for a way to shore up its presence in the Middle East by strengthening
alliances and counter creeping Chinese and Russian influence, Biden is spending significant political capital —
capital that becomes costlier as we approach 2024 and attention turns to elections. So the question is, could a
deal that to many still seems far-fetched pay dividends to his administration?

The question on many people's minds has been whether Netanyahu will allow his coalition to be tamed
(or broken) by stronger external forces. But the question on Thomas Friedman's mind seems to be: how far is
Biden willing to go to see the deal through?

Aff Requires a ton of political capital prioritizing foreign policy drains pc

Kupchan, Georgetown International Relations professor, 21
[Charles A., 3-2-21, Foreign Affairs, “Colossus Constrained”,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-03-02/colossus-constrained, accessed 6-2-22,
AFB]
The most formidable constraint on Biden’s foreign policy is domestic politics . Trump may have been a hapless
statesman, but he correctly sensed that a sizable portion of the U.S. electorate had grown weary of seemingly
unlimited foreign entanglements. Many Americans believe that Washington devotes too many
resources to solving the problems of other nations and not enough to solving its own . It has pursued
too many wars, too much free trade and immigration, and too many costly alliances and international pacts that, in Trump’s
words, “tie us up and bring America down.” Biden needs to remain mindful of the nation’s inward turn if he is to
maintain his political strength, keep hold of Congress in the 2022 midterms, and sustain the domestic
investments needed to tame the discontent that led to Trump’s rise.
Biden seems to realize as much, asserting in a February 4 speech that “there’s no longer a bright line
between foreign and domestic policy. Every action we take in our conduct abroad, we must take with
American working families in mind. Advancing a foreign policy for the middle class demands urgent
focus on our domestic economic renewal.” Still, there will be tough choices in the months ahead.
Although most Americans welcome the return of a president who stands up for human rights and
democratic allies, public support for an ambitious and expensive foreign policy will be much harder
to come by. A recent survey showed that around three-quarters of the U.S. electorate favor a withdrawal
from Afghanistan and Iraq, and roughly half want the country to be less engaged militarily around the
world. Another poll revealed that a majority of Americans believe the two main threats to the nation come
from within: the pandemic and domestic violent extremism. Among Democrats, the top five perceived
dangers for the United States are the pandemic, climate change, racial inequality, foreign interference in
U.S. elections, and economic inequity at home. Younger Americans, a key demographic for Biden, care
much more about climate change and human rights than they do about traditional security
issues. Geopolitical threats no longer occupy the American mind as they once did.
Normalization spurs Saudi civilian nuclear energy. They’ll export it globally. Solves
climate change.
Nicholas Saidel 23. Associate director of the Institute for Strategic Threat Analysis and Response. He
previously was a fellow at the Penn Law School's Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law; an associate at
the law firm of Wolf, Block LLP; a legislative aide to Rep. Robert A. Brady (D-Pa.); and a fellow at the
Foreign Policy Research Institute. "Why the U.S. Should Give Saudi Arabia Nuclear Technology".
Newsweek. 7-7-2023.
Russia and China have both taken advantage of President Biden's mismanagement of Saudi relations, which soured during the first years of his
term. Biden's rebuke of Saudi Arabia's military campaign in Yemen and his de-terrorist listing of the Houthis—an Iranian proxy militia that is
fighting the Saudis in Yemen and that has also attacked Saudi Arabia proper—reduced Saudi confidence in American support. Biden's initial
stance on the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi also added to the chilling of U.S.-Saudi relations. Saudi Arabia has since pivoted towards
U.S. competitors China and Russia. Collaborating
with the Saudis to develop a civilian nuclear program would
bring Saudi Arabia back into the American fold. The technical skill, resources, and infrastructure required
for such a program would mean close American supervision for the foreseeable future, solidifying the
U.S.-Saudi partnership.

The Saudi economy poses challenges for the U.S. that would be largely resolved by weaning it from oil as
its primary source of revenue. As laid out in its Vision 2030 plan, Saudi Arabia plans to transition from its
oil-based economy, in part, by mining and enriching its ample uranium ore to become a " nuclear
Aramco," able to export nuclear products and technology across the globe. Saudi Arabia
is already cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to set up the legal framework for this shift .
The Saudis are exploring China and Russia as alternatives if the U.S. is unwilling to assist. Saudi Arabia's oil-based economy allowed for close
relations with Russia, also an oil exporting state. Saudi Arabia and Russia work in tandem to set global oil prices and optimize their revenue
streams. Providing
civilian nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia —a far cleaner and more sustainable source
of energy than oil—would likely cause a rift in this Saudi-Russian partnership. American support for the Saudi
nuclear initiative would also foreclose the possibility of China or Russia getting involved.

Extinction. Nuclear is key.

OECD 22. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency.
“Meeting Climate Change Targets: The Role of Nuclear Energy.”12 May 2022.

https://www.oecd-nea.org/upload/docs/application/pdf/2022-
05/7628_strategic_briefing_climate_change.pdf

Leaders and governments around the world have identified the climate crisis as one of the defining challenges
for this generation and an existential threat (US Department of Defense, 2021; 2021a). International organisations
have found climate change has the potential to threaten the peace and security of people, as well as the
environment, nature, and economy (UN, 2009; OECD, 2016; OECD, 2017). The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) has further identified climate change as a threat to food security, which could lead to scarcity-driven
conflicts, in addition to migration and refugee crises around the world (IPCC, 2018).

The latest United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report concludes that climate change is
widespread, rapid and intensifying and calls for strong, rapid, and sustained reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions (IPCC, 2021). Similarly, the International Energy Agency (IEA) has reported that the path to net zero
emissions is “narrow” and will require massive deployment of all available clean energy technologies (IEA, 2020).
The magnitude of the challenge should not be underestimated. In order to limit climate change to 1.5°C by the end of the century, the
planet has a “carbon budget” of 420 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide emissions (Raupach et al., 2014), which
represents the maximum quantity of carbon dioxide that can be emitted into the atmosphere while still keeping climate change to a maximum
of 1.5°C. As illustrated in Figure 1, there is an implicit trade off between peaking early and ramping down emissions gradually; delaying
peak emissions would necessitate increasingly rapid emissions reductions.
While there exists some flexibility to peak early and ramp down gradual or peak later and ramp down more aggressively, it is generally
understood that carbon
dioxide emissions in 2030 will need to decline by approximately 45% compared to
2010 levels, before reaching net zero around 2050. In practical terms, and considering that overall carbon dioxide emissions
increased between 2010 and 2020 by more than 5%, emissions would need to decline by more than 6% per annum in the current decade.
Nevertheless, global carbon dioxide emissions are expected to grow to an all-time high in 2022-23 as economies recover from the COVID-19
pandemic. However, as highlighted by the synthesis report from UN Climate Change, the world is clearly not on track. Based on the
plans issued by governments under the auspices of the Paris Agreement, emission will rise 16% by 2030. The window for action is
rapidly narrowing. If carbon were emissions only remain constant, the entire carbon budget would be consumed within eight years.

Electrification of various sectors, including transportation and heavy industry, is expected to be a key strategy in
global decarbonisation, which will create significant growth in demand for electricity generation and bring
transformative changes to our economies. Even with improvements to demandside management and energy efficiency, the demand for
electricity demand will increase at an ever faster rate in the coming decades. The power sector is the largest carbon dioxide emitter making up
more than 40% of the global emissions, followed by transport and industry sectors representing each around 25% (IEA, 2021a). Some models
forecast total final electricity demand will increase by a factor of 2.5 between 2020 and 2050 while energy efficiency improves at a rate of 4%
per year (IEA, 2021c).
At its core, the Paris Agreement is an agreement about transforming the world’s energy mix. Having come into force 4 November 2016, the historic Paris Agreement has three aims:

1. Limiting the increase in global average temperature well below 2°C with additional efforts to limit
1. warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels;
2. Fostering adaptation and resilience efforts; and
3. Ensuring climate financing.

It is noteworthy that, despite its status as an historic agreement moving the world in the right direction vis-à-vis climate change mitigation and adaptation, the Paris Agreement and its associated national determined contributions are insufficient; humanity must do much more to achieve
the stated objective of the 2°C scenario.

The need to mobilise all low-carbon energy technologies

Fundamentally, there is no sustainable level of emissions if the 2°C scenario is to be realised. Constrained by the world’s carbon budget, carbon emissions must peak within the next few years and go to zero by 2100 (or sooner). This will require policy changes around the world as well as
massive investments in innovation, infrastructure, and deployment of non-emitting energy resources. More specifically, electricity grids must be decarbonised; vehicle fleets must be electrified or transitioned to non-emitting fuels; and a range of industrial sectors (e.g. off-grid mining,
buildings, chemicals, iron and steel, cement, oil and gas) must be transformed as well.

Whatever else might be said about the efforts undertaken thus far, they are on track to far exceed the targets arising from the 2°C scenario. It is clear that a shift in direction will be required if countries’ stated objectives are to be met.

As highlighted by NEA studies such as The Costs of Decarbonisation: System Costs with High Shares of Nuclear and Renewables, countries face unique and distinct options and challenges in their efforts to achieve optimum energy portfolios (NEA, 2019). There is no commonly applicable
solution for all countries. The best energy mix and energy strategy depends on, inter alia, a country’s natural endowments, state of economic development, technological capabilities, human capital, stability, legal and regulatory frameworks, as well as culture, values, and priorities. Many
countries are committing to reach net zero emissions by 2050. It has yet to be seen, however, whether countries have the technologies and political will to achieve this ambitious target of net zero by 2050. It is clear that a serious effort to do so would require massive investments in and
deployment of all non-emitting energy solutions, including renewable energy, nuclear energy, and carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS), in addition to energy storage, energy efficiency, and demand-side management, among other measures.

There is no “silver bullet”, no perfect solution to the complex and urgent challenge of climate change mitigation. All non-emitting energy options offer benefits but face limitations and challenges.

While hydroelectricity and nuclear energy currently account for approximately 16% and 10% of the world’s electricity supply, respectively,
variable renewables (e.g. wind and solar) are the fastest growing segment of the clean energy market. Hydroelectricity is expected to continue
to play an important role in providing baseload power; however, it is not a solution in many parts of the world that lack hydro potential. In
theory, other non-emitting technologies, such as variable renewables, nuclear power, and CCUS, can be transferred and deployed in most
jurisdictions around the world. In practice, the effectiveness and efficiency of variable renewable technologies (e.g. wind and solar) also varies
by jurisdiction, but has great potential in many energy poor parts of the world (e.g. near to the equator for solar potential). Embarking
nuclear nations face some barriers to entry, including the need to implement effective regulatory
frameworks as nuclear is a strictly controlled sector ; however, engagement with the international
community – through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with its milestones approach or bilaterally with
experienced nuclear nations for capacity building – can facilitate successful outcomes.

Variable renewables generally benefit from strong public confidence in many parts of the world; however, the sun does not always shine and
the wind does not always blow, and the variable (and often unpredictable) nature of these forms of power generation can create systems level
challenges and grid instability, that translate into higher systems costs. Higher levels of variable renewables could be deployed more
aggressively if they could be coupled with adequate energy storage capacities, dispatchable power, and baseload power. Storage and
batteries, however, are not yet available at the scale that would be required to replace fossil energy with
variable renewables and achieve zero global emissions by 2050.
Despite the massive capacity additions of variable renewables (mainly wind and solar power) over the last two decades, the relative share of fossil fuels in the electricity generation mix has barely changed (see Figure 3 below). In fact, the surge in variable renewable generation has
primarily served to compensate for the decline of nuclear power output. In absolute terms, electricity generation from fossil fuels has also increased globally, driven in large part by increasing electricity demand in nonOECD countries.

As a result, global carbon emissions are far from being on track with the Paris Agreement. After two years of consecutive increases, carbon emission flattened at 33 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide in 2019. In 2020, carbon dioxide emissions experienced a major fall of 5% mainly due to a
major global economic downturn during the COVID-19 pandemic. The fall in emissions in 2020 was not based on any structural changes in emission patterns. Accordingly, driven by post COVID-19 economic recovery, carbon emissions are expected to increase by 5% in 2021, regressing to
levels prior to the pandemic (IEA, 2021b).

CCUS may have a role to play, not only in reaching net zero emissions, but in exceeding this target to reach net negative emissions. There are several potential scenarios that could unfold, with countries taking steps to reach net zero emissions by 2050. In some possible scenarios, if
countries do not reach peak emissions early enough, the world could exceed its carbon budget even if it reaches net zero by 2050. In this scenario, CCUS would be required to extract carbon from the atmosphere after it has been emitted (a model that is often referred to as negative
emissions), reversing and mitigating some of the worst effects of climate change.

There is considerable uncertainty however in the readiness of CCUS technologies. CCUS technology
readiness levels are low, with several projects presently ongoing to demonstrate the viability and scalability of CCUS. The IEA (2021c)
has identified CCUS as one of the three key uncertainties in the pathway to net zero by 2050, along with behavioural changes and bioenergy.

Natural gas, as the least carbon intensive fossil fuel, may be a good fit in many jurisdictions in the short term, for gradually decarbonising the
global energy mix; however, in order to go to zero emissions by 2100, natural gas will likely also need to be phased out (unless it can be paired
with CCUS). Breakthroughs in renewables, energy storage, energy efficiency, as well as CCUS are needed.

Equally importantly, however, the IEA anticipates that, in

order to achieve the 2°C scenario, global installed nuclear
energy capacity will need to double by 2050. This will require significant investments in life extension and refurbishment
of existing nuclear reactors, as well as new builds of existing large-scale nuclear power technologies , as well as investments
in small modular reactors (SMRs) and Generation IV technologies.

All credible models show that nuclear energy has an important role to play in global climate change
mitigation efforts. In its 2019 report on nuclear energy – its first report on nuclear energy in over 20 years – the IEA found that nuclear
has an important role to play in global efforts to meet Paris Agreement targets (IEA, 2019). Nuclear power plant retirements
would significantly constrain global climate change mitigation efforts. Conversely, investments in nuclear energy life
extensions and refurbishments of existing reactors, as well as new builds, would make it less expensive and more feasible to meet Paris
Agreement targets.

Despite clear analyses from many sources, including the NEA, that point to the need for a massive, “all-the-above” approach that includes
nuclear energy, many multinational efforts, financial institutions, and policy positions avoid nuclear energy. However, if
countries do not
invest in nuclear energy, the risks of failure to meet Paris targets will be significantly greater. The IEA, for
example, estimates that it would cost the world an estimated USD 1.6 trillion more to meet Paris targets without nuclear energy (IEA, 2019).
Ultimately, even this estimate may prove optimistic.