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Stupidity Paradox Summary
Stupidity Paradox Summary
Many companies hire smart people who do dumb things. That phenomenon is
“the stupidity paradox.”
Stupid actions might work out temporarily, but they cause big trouble in the
long run.
Organizations often discourage clear, careful thinking by employees. They
regard it as subversive and believe that it leads to conflict and uncertainty.
Many organizations encourage employee stupidity. They rely on “stupidity
management” to limit employee thinking.
“Functional” or “selective” stupidity differs from plain old, garden-variety
stupidity.
Functional stupidity actually offers numerous benefits, including elimination
of doubt, promotion of harmony, and reduction in internal tensions and friction.
Functional stupidity manifests in five different forms.
Look out for: “leadership-induced stupidity,” “structure-induced stupidity,”
“imitation-induced stupidity,” “branding-induced stupidity” and “culture-induced
stupidity.”
You can “destupidify” your organization with acute observation, intelligent
interpretation and smart questioning.
Use reflection and critical thinking to avoid doing dumb things in your
organization.
Summary
Ford Pintos
These companies encourage stupidity and discourage reflection and analysis. They
consider such thinking subversive. “Stupidity managers” – the paladins of “stupidity
management” – purposely intervene to limit employees’ thinking. To illustrate how
“functional stupidity” works in corporate life, consider Dennis Gioia, who worked in
Ford Motor Company’s recall department in 1972. His job was to look for patterns
that revealed problems in Ford automobiles that might trigger manufacturer recalls.
“We are supposed to learn from our failures, but we rarely do. One of the big
reasons…is that when things go wrong, we look for ways of hiding it.”
Gioia did not push his fears concerning the Pinto inside Ford. He didn’t recommend
that Ford recall it. This was in 1973. In 1978, after many more people died in
exploding Pintos, Ford finally recalled the Pinto.
Gioia accepted the social norm at Ford, which was, “Don’t raise problems and don’t
tell people bad news they do not want to hear.” Disturbingly, what Gioia did – or
didn’t do – is standard operating procedure at many firms today. Company cultures
tell people not to think too much.
Functional Stupidity
“The financial crisis that began in 2008 is a testament to the stupidity lurking at the
heart of knowledge-based societies.”
Functional stupidity differs from plain old, garden-variety stupidity, but even
regular, standard-issue corporate stupidity can lead to catastrophic consequences.
“Telltale Aspects”
Curing Stupidity
Getting organizations to do smart things, and not to pursue stupidity, will always be
an uphill battle. “Culture, branding initiatives, referring to industry best practice,
organizational structures and systems and leadership” all conspire against operating
in a more intelligent way. Challenging these bolted-in-place verities is often a
tedious, unrewarding exercise. Many times, efforts to penetrate stupidity will result
in “conflict, confusion, endless debate and ultimately, indecision.”
“Smart people set about applying their impressive but narrowly focused skills. The
glamor of financial engineering created a sense of hope and excitement…investors
began to believe in the power of quants to work magic.”
Stupidity management keeps everything in happy balance, at least in the short term.
It results in “branding baloney, leadership nonsense…and fashionable pseudo-
solutions.”
You can take the right steps to destupidify your company. Start by eschewing
“relentless positivity” – the mindless homage to eternal optimism that leads to
dangerous delusion. Instead, adopt an attitude of “negative capability.” To launch
this change, be open to experience. Become willing to “tolerate anxiety and fear, to
stay in a place of uncertainty and to allow for the emergence of new thoughts or
perceptions.”
“They stopped asking tough questions and started to just believe. The upshot was a
financial system that no one fully understood and no one was willing to question.”
Negative capability means thinking carefully and critically. It has three main aspects:
2. “Interpret” – Once you understand the issues, figure out how other people
relate to them. As anthropologists say, “What do the natives think is
happening here?”
3. “Question” – Pose further revealing queries, such as: “What are the
assumptions we are making here?” “What are the reasons…we are doing this?”
“What are the wider outcomes or broader meaning?” Search for “deep
meanings,” and do not accept what appears on the surface.
“Critical Insights”
Operating intelligently calls for developing critical insights about the primary issues
your organization confronts. You must exercise “critical thinking and serious
reflection” to build these insights. Use these triggers to provoke further thought:
Transformation
Transforming your firm from stupid to smart won’t be easy. Organizations can be
complex and ambiguous. What may seem stupid could actually be smart and what
may seem smart can turn out to be stupid. Working against functional stupidity will
create a better, more productive, more efficient work environment. Your anti-
functional stupidity program should involve:
The Stupidity Paradox describes how the most educated workers are often guilty of a kind of
“functional stupidity,” defined as “an inability or unwillingness to use reflective/cognitive
capacities in the workplace” or “thinking inside the box”. Alvesson and Spicer argue that the ways
in which businesses typically tackle this – leadership development programmes, cultural change
initiatives and the like – are in fact just new ways of encouraging people not to think. So
companies that pride themselves on intelligent management may be at the greatest risk of
behaving stupidly.
The authors are both professors at Cass Business School and specialists in organisational
behaviour. The genesis of this book was a conversation in which they compared instances of
stupidity they had seen in many supposedly “knowledge-intensive” organisations such as banks,
consultancies and universities. Much of the book is devoted to categorising and describing this
behaviour.
One potentially controversial example is what the authors call “leadership-induced stupidity.”
They say they have observed a “quasi-religious belief in leadership” in many organisations, with
bright employees avoiding independent thought in favour of blindly following authority. They are
suspicious of the leadership coaching industry, which they describe as a “crew of self-styled
experts [who] bombard confused, desperate and bored middle managers with… recipes for
success.” In support of this they quote a 2014 study by McKinsey that finds no correlation
between business success and money spent on leadership development training.
The book continues to mix anecdote, opinion and research, exploring other types of unthinking
management behaviour applicable across industries. Examples include over-reliance on
processes and procedures – “structure-induced stupidity” – or an insistence on shared beliefs in
the face of evidence – “culture-induced stupidity”. Attempts to encourage new ways of thinking,
argue the authors, rarely lead to actual change: they just allow managers to feel as though they
are doing something by commissioning expensive consultancy reports.
The main focus is on general management concerns, but the introduction considers functional
stupidity in analytical work.
The writers describe how, in the years leading up to the 2008 market crash, banks hired
increasing numbers of brilliant maths and science graduates to develop models that could guide
trading and investment decisions. At first this strategy yielded exceptional returns. However, as
confidence in the models grew – catastrophe: “the connection between the quants’ clean abstract
models and the messy realities of markets began to fray.” The authors quote as an example of
the failure to allow for tranches of sub-prime debt when risk-assessing mortgage-backed
securities.
Insufficient critical reflection meant that clever models built by clever people led to “stupid” and
dangerous decisions. The Stupidity Paradox is written for a general audience, so if your work
involves modelling you may find the treatment of financial engineering simplistic. Nonetheless, it
shines a light on the important question of how to use models intelligently, a problem that
actuaries have for some time been seeking to tackle.
In the final chapter of the book, Alvesson and Spicer offer some solutions to the problems they
have observed. Firstly, they sensibly acknowledge that there can be benefits to “functional
stupidity,” noting that when people choose group-think over individual reflection they feel a sense
of shared culture and direction which facilitates decision-making. In contrast, an environment with
unlimited open discussion, challenge and criticism runs the risk of creating “conflicts and
disorder”. The writers therefore suggest that companies introduce space for critical reflection and
challenge in a structured way. One proposal is the introduction of a “devil’s advocate” to
challenge and to question, a role which could be rotated amongst team members. Another
proposal is “pre-mortems”: dedicated sessions at the start of a project where the team identifies
likely opportunities for stupidity based on previous experience.
Overall, I enjoyed The Stupidity Paradox. An element of this was undoubtedly schadenfreude – a
certain guilty pleasure in reading about mistakes made by clever people. More importantly, the
book encouraged me to think about what it means to be intelligent at work.