The MutualKnowledgeProblemand Its

ConsequencesforDispersedCollaboration
CatherineDurnellCramton
Mail Stop SF5, Fairfax,Virginia22030-4444
School of Management,George Mason University,
@som.gmu.edu
ccramton

Abstract Rousseau 1996, Boudreau et al. 1998, DeSanctis and

Thispaperproposesthatmaintaining "mutual knowledge" is a Poole 1997, Handy 1995, Kemske 1998, O'Hara-
central problem of geographically dispersed collaborationand Devereauxand Johansen1994, Townsendet al. 1998).
tracestheconsequences offailure todo so. Itpresents a model Geographicallydispersedteamsare groupsof people
oftheseprocesseswhichis grounded in studyofthirteen geo- witha commonpurposewho carryout interdependent
graphically dispersed teams.Fivetypesofproblems constitut- tasksacrosslocationsand time,usingtechnology to com-
ingfailures ofmutual knowledge areidentified:failuretocom-
municatemuchmorethantheyuse face-to-face meetings
municate andretain contextual information, unevenly distributed
information, difficulty communicating and understanding the (adaptedfromLipnackand Stamps1997,and Maznevski
salienceofinformation, differences inspeedofaccesstoinfor- and Chudoba2000). The use of suchteamshas outpaced
mation, anddifficulty interpreting themeaning of silence.The our understanding of theirdynamics,and inexplicable
frequency of occurrence and severity of each problem in the problemshave been noted.In a fielddescriptionof dis-
teamsareanalyzed. Attribution theory, theconcept ofcognitive persedcollaboration, Armstrong and Cole (1995, p. 187)
load,andfeedback dynamics areharnessed toexplainhowdis- observethesepuzzles: "A decisionmade in one country
persedpartners arelikelytointerpret failures ofmutual knowl- elicitsan unexpectedreactionfromteammembersin an-
edgeandtheconsequences oftheseinterpretations fortheintegrity
othercountry. . . Conflictsescalate strangelybetween
of theeffort. In particular, it is suggested thatunrecognized
differences in thesituations, contexts, andconstraints of dis- distributed groups,resistingreason. Group membersat
persedcollaborators constitute "hiddenprofiles" thatcan in- sites separatedby even a fewkilometersbeginto talkin
creasethe likelihoodof dispositional ratherthansituational the language of 'us and them'."
attribution, withconsequences forcohesionandlearning. Mod- This paper utilizesthe communications literatureon
eratorsand accelerators of thesedynamics areidentified,and "mutualknowledge"to explorechallengesof communi-
implications forbothdispersed andcollocated collaborationare cationand collaborationunderdispersedand technology-
discussed. mediatedconditions.Mutual knowledgeis knowledge
(Dispersed Collaboration; Dispersed Teams; Distributed Work; Virtual
Teams; Mutual Knowledge; InformationExchange; InformationSharing; that the communicatingpartiesshare in common and
Shared Understanding;Attribution;Proximity;Conmputer-Mediated Conm- knowtheyshare(Krauss and Fussell 1990). In thework
munication; SystemsDyn1amics;Cognitive Load) of communication theoristHerbertClarkand his associ-
ates, mutualknowledgeis referredto more broadlyas
"commonground,"and consideredintegralto thecoor-
dinationof actions(Clark 1996,Clarkand Carlson1982,
The organizationof groupworkand the means of com- Clark and Marshall 1981). But membersof dispersed
municationto supportit are changing.Developmentsin teams do notstandon commonground.Indeed,theusage
communicationand collaborative technologies have "common ground"suggestshow deeplyengrainedphysi-
made it feasible for groups to work togetherdespite cal copresence and sharedphysicalsettingmaybe to es-
physicaldispersionof members.Organizationshavebeen tablishing shared understanding and affiliation.In 1990,
quick to experimentwithgeographicallydispersedwork Krauss and Fussell raisedthequestion of how theuse of
teamsto takeadvantageof interorganizational and inter- new communications technologiesto support cooperative
nationalopportunities and maximizetheuse of scarcere- workwouldinteract withtheproblemofestablishing mu-
sources.This is likelyto be an increasingly prevalentand tual knowledge.This paper takes up thatquestionand
important formof workin the years ahead (Arthurand adds to it two additionalones: "How does geographic

ORGANIZATION SCIENCE, C) 2001 INFORMS 1047-7039/0

1/1203/03461$05.00
Vol. 12, No. 3, May-June2001, pp. 346-371 1526-5455electronicISSN
CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON The Mutual KnowledgeProblem

dispersionofteammembersaffectthemutualknowledge gleaned fromfirsthand observation.The mutualknowl-

problem?"and "To theextentthatgeographicdispersion edge thatClarkand his son have concerningtheirday at
and use of new communicationstechnologiesaffectthe the beach is direct knowledge because it is based on
mutualknowledgeproblem,what are the consequences sharedexperiencein a particularsetting.For membersof
forcollaboration?" dispersedcollaborations, opportunities to achieveunme-
diatedknowledgeof theirpartners and theirpartners'sit-
uationsare likelyto be limited.Ratherthanabsorbing
The MutualKnowledgeProblem directknowledgebyvisitingeach other'soffices,walking
Establishingmutualknowledgeis important because it
throughthesame building,attending thesame meetings,
increasesthe likelihoodthatcommunication will be un-
and drivingthesame streets, dispersedcollaborators must
derstood(Clark 1996,Clarkand Carlson1982,Clarkand
findothermeans to establishwhattheirremotepartners
Marshall 1981, Fussell and Krauss 1992, Krauss and
do and do not know: interaction and categorymember-
Fussell 1990). People may startwiththe same informa-
ship.
tion, have a shared experience,or share information
throughcommunication. In each case, mutualknowledge
Interactional Dynamics
consistsnot only of the information itselfbut also the
In lieu of directknowledge,mutualknowledgecan be
awarenessthatthe otherknows it. For example,Clark
establishedthroughinteraction. However,researchcon-
(1996) describesstandingon a beach on a beautifulday,
cerninginformation sharingand media effectsin groups
examininga rareconch shell. If his son joins him,their
raisesquestionsaboutthelikelihoodof successunderdis-
mutualknowledgenow includesthecharacteristics ofthe
persedand technology-mediated conditions.It is well es-
beautifulday, the beach and the sea, the presenceof
tablishedthatgroupsthatmeetface-to-face tendto dwell
Clark,thepresenceof the son, the conch shell between
on commonlyheld information in theirdiscussionsand
them,and theirawarenessthattheysharethisknowledge
overlookuniquelyheld information (Stasserand Stewart
in common.When theytalk witheach otherthenand
1992; Stasseret al. 1995; Stasserand Titus 1985, 1987).
later,theycan referto aspects of this experiencewith
Accordingto Stasserand his colleagues,groupmembers
considerableconfidencethatwhat theysay will be un-
engage in discussionby samplingfromtheirpool of in-
derstoodby the other.They also can coordinatefuture
formation. As thenumberofpeople whohave a particular
actionswiththehelp of thismutualknowledge.For ex-
piece of information increases,so does themathematical
ample,theycould agree to meetback at the same place
probabilitythatit will be mentionedin the group's dis-
in an hour.
cussion.Moreover,whenitis mentioned, itprobablywill
Mutualknowledgeincreasesthelikelihoodof compre-
be salientto a largerproportion ofthegroupbecause they
hensionbecause it allows speakers"to formulatetheir
have encountered it previously.By contrast, pieces of in-
contributionswithan awarenessof whattheiraddressee
formation knownto onlyone or a fewpeople mustcom-
does and does not know" (Krauss and Fussell 1990, p.
pete in the information pool withmorecommonlyheld
112). Proceedingwithoutmutualknowledge,people may
information. If mentioned,uniquely held information
speak and understandwhatis said on the basis of their
may not be as salientto groupmembersas commonly
own informationand interpretation of the situation,
held information, and fail to drawattention.
falselyassumingthattheotherspeaksand understands on
Whena group'sdiscussionis mediatedby technology,
the basis of that same information and interpretation stud-
theproblemseemsto be worse.Threeexperimental
(Blakar 1985). Krauss and Fussell (1990) describethree ies information exchange in groups using syn-
compared
mechanismsby whichmutualknowledgeis established: conferencing and face-to-
chronous text-based computer
directknowledge,interactional dynamics,and category face exchangeto be less
groups.Theyfoundinformation
membership. The nextsectionsdrawon severalresearch
completeand discussionmorebiased in thegroupsusing
to considerhow dispersedcollaborationand
literatures to communicate (Hightower and Sayeed 1995,
technology
use of new communicationtechnologiesimpact these
1996; Hollingshead1996). The computer-mediated groups
threemechanisms. overalland took moretime
exchangedless information
DirectKnowledge doingit. One of themostrobustfindingsconcerningthe
Direct knowledgeis createdin the course of firsthand effectof computermediationon communication is thatit
experiencewithindividuals(Krauss and Fussell 1990). proceeds at a slower ratethan does face-to-face (Lebie et
One can make informedguesses about what they know al. 1996, Straus 1997, Straus and McGrath 1994, Walther
and do notknowon thebasis of experiencessharedwith and Burgoon1992). Thereis considerableevidencethat
them and knowledgeof theirhabits and environment groupsusingthismediumtake longerto completetasks

ORGANIZATIONSCIENCE/VOl. 12, No. 3, May-June 2001 347

CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON The Mutual KnowledgeProblem

than groups workingface-to-face(Kiesler et al. 1985, requirements, holidaysand customs,access to informa-

et
McGuire al. 1987, Weisband 1992). The slower rate tion,available equipmentand support,strength of com-
has been attributed to the time requiredto typewords petingdemands,and so forth.For dispersedteammem-
ratherthansay them(Siegel et al. 1986) and the effort bersto understand each otherand coordinatetheirwork,
requiredto conveynuancesin textwithoutparaverbaland theymustachieve mutualknowledgeconcerningsuch
nonverbalcues such as tone of voice, facial expression, differences. However,information about one's own lo-
and gesture(Hightowerand Sayeed 1995, 1996; McGrath cationand contextmaybe uniquelyheldinformation. Ac-
and Hollingshead1994). Forthesereasons,itappearsthat cordingto the principleof group discussionbased on
groupscommunicating throughsuch meansare not able samplingfromtheinformation pool, such information is
to sample as much information fromtheirinformation less likelyto be mentionedand heeded in groupdiscus-
pool duringa givenperiodoftimeas can groupsworking sions thanis commonlyheld information.
face-to-face. As a consequence,less uniquelyheld infor- When people attemptto achieve mutualknowledge
mationis aired,and theirdiscussionis morebiased by through theymustbothshareinformation
interaction, and
commonlyheld information. confirmthatthe information has been receivedand un-
Warkentin et al. (1997) got somewhatdifferent results derstood.Electronicmediationposes hurdlesnotonlyto
in a follow-upstudyunder different conditions.They information sharingbutalso confirmation. Give and take
comparedinformation exchangein studentgroupsmeet- is hamperedbytheslowerpace andgreatereffort required
ing face-to-facewithoutcomputersupportwith infor- by mostformsof mediatedcommunication. In particular,
mationexchangein groupswhose memberswerelocated conversations conductedthroughcomputersdo nottypi-
at threedifferent universities acrosstheUnitedStatesand cally provideefficient back-channelfeedback(Brennan
who used asynchronouscomputerconferencing to com- 1998). Back-channelfeedbackincludeshead nods,brief
municate. The dispersed groups still exchanged less verbalizationssuch as "yeah" and "m-hmmm,"smiles,
uniqueinformation thanthecollocatedgroups;however, and thelike (Krautet al. 1982,Yngve 1970). These non-
the relationshipdid not reach significancein thisstudy. verbaland briefverbalcues efficiently signalthestateof
It is possible thatthetechnologyused (an asynchronous mutualknowledgewithouttakingoverthespeakingturn.
ratherthansynchronous mode) and thelongertimeframe In addition,feedbacklags associatedwithmediatedcom-
given thedispersedgroups(threeweeks versus25 min-
municationand dispersedcollaborationare likelyto have
utes)allowed forimprovedinformation exchangebygiv- a devastatingimpact on the establishmentof mutual
inggroupmembersofflinetimeto assess information and
knowledge."A delay of 1.6 secondsis sufficient to dis-
frametheircontributions.
rupttheabilityof thesenderto referefficiently to the. . .
It is important to notehow thestudyconditionsdiffer
stimuli,despitethefactthattheback-channelresponseis
fromgeographicallydispersedcollaborationin practice
eventuallytransmitted," observe Krauss and Fussell
in organizations.Tasks were relativelystraightforward.
(1990, p. 132).
People did not have to gatherinformation themselves;
Thus, the communication literatureraises the follow-
theyweregivena packetof clues. By contrast, dispersed
ing questions: Will uniquelyheld information be shared
collaboratorsin organizations typicallyworkon complex
in
tasksforwhichtherelevantinformation mustbe distin- and recognized geographicallydispersed,computer-
guished frommillionsof otherdetails. Hightowerand mediated teams? Will feedbackin such teams confirm
Sayeed (1995) note thatwhen groupsusing computer- receipt and understanding of information exchanged?In
mediatedcommunicationwere given a higherinforma- other words, can interactioneffectively establish mutual
tion load, theirdiscussion became even more biased. knowledge in dispersed computer-mediated teams?
They expressconcernabouthow groupscommunicating
throughsuch media will handleambiguousand complex CategoryMembership
information problems. Finally,people make assumptionsabout others'knowl-
Dispersedcollaborationis distinguished bothbyheavy edge on thebasis of thesocial categorizations theyapply
use of mediatedcommunication of part- to them(Clark and Marshall 1981, Krauss and Fussell
and distribution
ners across more thanone location.Thus far,we have 1990). For example,theyassumethata cabdriverknows
examinedmedia effectson information sharing.It is also therouteto theairportand thata fellowAmericanknows
important to considertheeffectson information sharing the wordsto the nationalanthem.In dispersedcollabo-
of differences amonglocationsand distribution of infor- rations,people mayassumemutualknowledgeon theba-
mationacross locations.The locationsof dispersedcol- sis of sharedprofessionalstatusor organizationalmem-
laboratorsmay differin theirphysicallayoutand travel bership.However,achievingmutualknowledgewill be

348 ORGANIZATIONSCIENCE/VOl. 12, No. 3, May-June 2001

CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON The Mutual KnowledgeProblem

moredifficult if a dispersedteam spans functional, cul- Clark(1996, p. 121) is "how commongroundgetsstaked

turaland organizational boundaries.Manydispersedcol- out and exploited."Therefore, I turnto otherliteratures
laborationsdo span such boundaries. to exploretheconsequencesof failureto establishmutual
In additionto influencingassumptionsabout shared knowledgeon decision quality,productivity, and rela-
knowledge,social categorization affectsthedevelopment tionshipsin dispersedteams,taking intoaccount themod-
of relationshipsamongpeople communicating via com- eratingfactors noted by Krauss and Fussell (1990).
putermediation.Lea and Spears(1991, 1992, 1993) have
Decision Quality and Productivity.As discussed
observedthatthe mediumreducesthe number cues of
above, when task-relevantinformationis distributed
available to communicators about each otherrelativeto
amongmembersof a group,thereis a riskthattheywill
face-to-facecommunication.Accordingto theirsocial
failto shareand heed uniquelyheldrelevantinformation.
identity/deindividuation (SIDE) theory,when people
Researchshows thattheconsequenceis poorerdecision
communicatewithotherstheydo notknowwell through
quality(Dennis 1996, Stasserand Titus 1985). The risk
such media, theyexperiencefeelingsof isolation,ano-
maybe greaterfordispersedteamsrelativeto collocated
nymity, anddeindividuation. As a consequence,they"ov-
teamsfortwo reasons.First,thereis a significant proba-
erattribute"on thebasis ofthefewsocial cues theyglean.
bilitythattask-relevant information will be distributed
Theyuse relativelymeagerinformation to assignremote
across locationsand thatcriticalpieces of information
othersto social categoriesand treatthemaccordingly.If
will surfaceat isolated locations. Second, a dispersed
theyconclude thattheysharean identitywitha remote
group's means of communication will likelyrestrict in-
partner, theyare morelikelyto view therelationship and
teraction,such thatsamplingfromtheinformation pool
the remoteotherpositivelythanif theyfindno shared
is less thanit would be fora collocatedteam,withthe
social identity.Thus, SIDE theoryassertsthatsocial cat-
consequenceof poor decisionquality.
egorizationsexert considerableinfluenceover conclu-
Groups may attemptto protectdecision quality by
sions drawnabout remoteothers,positiveand negative
monitoring and correcting failuresof mutualknowledge.
feelingsabout them,and affiliation withthemin lieu of
In thiscase, a criticalconsideration is theease and speed
the individuatinginformation available in relationships
of detectingand correctingerrors(Krauss and Fussell
carriedout face-to-face.
1990). The morearduousand time-consuming thispro-
The salienceof social categorization fordispersedcol-
cess is, thegreatertheprobableloss in productivity. This
laboratorsraisesthefollowingquestions:Does social cat-
could be a problemfordispersedgroupsusingcomputer-
egonizationhelp dispersedcollaboratorsestablishmutual
mediatedcommunication becausetheinteraction required
knowledgeof important matters? If people assignremote
to detectand correct communication errorsseems to be
othersto social categorieson thebasis of meagerinfor-
less efficient in conversations involving computers than
mation,will theyforminappropriate expectationsabout
in face-to-face conversations (Brennan 1998; Hightower
whattheyknow?If theyforminappropriate expectations,
and Sayeed 1995, 1996; McGrath and Hollingshead
whatare theconsequencesfortherelationship?
1994; Siegel et al. 1986). Hightowerand Sayeed (1995,
p. 43) pointout that"creatingmutualunderstanding ...
Consequences of Failure to Establish Mutual
require(s) group members (using computer-mediated
Knowledge
communication) muchmoreinformation
to transmit than
The precedingdiscussionsuggeststhatit maybe difficult
thoseworkingfaceto face."It is reasonableto expectthat
forgeographically dispersed,technology-mediated teams
dispersedgroupsusingsuch media will have to sacrifice
to achievemutualknowledge.This sectionconsidersthe
speed if theymustprotectdecisionquality,and decision
consequencesof failureto establishmutualknowledge.
quality hingeson mutualknowledgeof distributed infor-
In the communicationsliterature, mutualknowledgeis
mation.
consideredto be a precondition foreffectivecommuni-
This discussionraises the followingquestions:When
cation and the performance of cooperativework.How-
task-relevantinformationis distributed,do dispersed
ever,accordingto Krauss and Fussell (1990), thisdoes
teamsmakepoorerqualitydecisionsbecause offailureto
not mean thatcommunication mustbe errorfree.It de-
establishmutualknowledge?Do dispersedteamsdevelop
pendson whether theconsequencesofmisunderstandings
strategiesto limit information-processing burdensand
are major or minor,and whetherthe dynamicsof con-
preservedecisionquality?Musttheyacceptreducedpro-
versationprovidemechanismsfordetectingand correct-
ductivity or are thereotheroptions?
ing errors.Beyond this,thereis littlediscussionin this
of specificconsequencesof failureto establish
literature Relationships.The work of communicationtheorist
mutualknowledge."What is importantfor us," writes Rolv Blakar and his colleagues providesa criticallink

ORGANIZATIONSCIENCE/Vol. 12, No. 3, May-June2001 349

CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON The Mutual KnowledgeProblem
betweenthe conceptof mutualknowledgeand thecon-
sequencesforworkingrelationships offailureto establish
mutualknowledge.This streamof researchinvestigates
how familymembersreactto communication difficulties
caused by lack of mutualknowledge.Blakar calls the
probleman absence of "sharedsocial reality,"however,
its operationalization is consistentwith lack of mutual
knowledge(i.e., people who are engaged in communi-
cationhave different information but do notrealize this
is thecase). In the studies,pairs of familymembersare
givenmaps of a city.One subject'smap containsarrows
thatmarka routethroughthecity.This subjectis toldto
describetherouteto his or herpartnerso thatthepartner
can followtherouteon hisorherown map.Unbeknownst
to thesubjects,theirmaps differin keyrespects,making
it impossibleforthemto carryout thetasksuccessfully.
Blakar and his associates were interestedin when and
how such problemsare solved,allowingcommunication
to be reestablished(Blakar 1973, 1984; Hultberget al.
1980).
Theyconcludedthatit is essentialthatcommunication
are"adequatelyattributed"
difficulties bytheparticipants.
When an erroror conflictin information exchangeis de-
tected,people makeattributions concerningitscause. The
researchfocuseson whetherattributions concerning com-
municationdifficulties are personalor situational(Heider
1958) and constructive or nonconstructive forcontinued
communication. Personalattributions associatethecause
ofthecommunication conflictwithsomecharacteristic or
behaviorof an individual.For example,participants in
thestudyconductedby Hultberget al. (1980) made per-
sonal attributions when they made statementssuch as
"My explanationwas notadequate"or"You givedamned
bad explanations!"They made situationalattributions
when theyinvestigatedthe credibilityof the maps they
were using. Attributions werejudged to be constructive
if theyfacilitatedinquiryand changeto reducetheinci-
dence of communication conflictsin thefuture.Attribu-
tionswerenonconstructive iftheyweretaskirrelevant or
destructiveto cooperation,inquiry,and adaptation.The
researcherssuggestedthatsituationalas opposed to per-
sonal attributionstendto producebetterresolutionofcon-
flictsbecause theyfocus participantson modifyingthe
"contracts"thatguidethecommunication process(Blakar
1984). Ifattributionsaredestructive, contractsconcerning
thecommunication processbreakdown and people with-
drawfromcooperation.
This workhas significant implicationsforthestudyof
mutualknowledgein dispersedcollaboration.It recog-
nizes thatcommunication failuresare interpretedandthat
interpretationscan vary.These interpretations can change
people's perceptionsof each other,theirwillingnessto
350
cooperate,and theways in whichtheycommunicateand
cooperate.The firstpartof thissectionsuggeststhatdis-
persedcollaborationsare vulnerableto failuresofmutual
knowledge.Therefore,the way such failuresare inter-
preted-i.e., attributed-couldbe criticalfor the long-
termviabilityof dispersedcollaboration.
Blakar and his collaboratorsfocus on the distinction
betweenpersonaland situationalattributions. Applying
theseideas to dispersedcollaboration, we shouldconsider
how the dynamicsof social categorizationinfluenceat-
tributions and outcomes.As notedpreviously,Lea and
Spears (1991, 1992, 1993) have observedthatpeople us-
ing computer-mediated communication withremoteoth-
ers theydo notknowwell relyheavilyon social catego-
rizations to guide their relationships.The social
categorizationsprovidea basis foraffiliation if partici-
pants share a significant social identity.However,they
also can providefodderforin-group/out-group dynamics
ifremoteothersare seen as belongingto social categories
different thanoneself.This raisesthe
and less attractive
questionof whetheror underwhatcircumstances theat-
tributions remotecollaboratorsmakeconcerningfailures
of mutualknowledgewill be personal,categorical,or sit-
uational.It is notclear how thesedifferent typesof attri-
butionsaffecttheviabilityofdispersedcollaboration. Lea
and Spears (1992) observethatpeople tendto overlook
errorsmadeby otherswithwhomtheysharea significant
social identity.On the otherhand,collaboratorsmight
recategorizeless generouslyremoteotherswithwhom
theyexperiencea communication failure.In addition,we
can thinkof Blakar's "contracts"as norms:understand-
ingswithina groupaboutwhatbehaviorsare and are not
appropriate(Jackson1965). Ideally,groupsthatexperi-
ence communication failureswill modifytheirnormsto
preventfutureoccurrences.However,if communication
failuresare blamed on individualsor subgroups,coop-
erativenormsmaybreakdown.
This discussionpresentsthefollowingquestions:How
are failuresof mutualknowledgeattributed in dispersed
collaborations?Under what circumstancesare attribu-
tionsindividual,categorical,or situationalin nature,and
withwhat consequencesforfuturecommunication and
collaboration?
Figure1 summarizestherelationships discussedin this
section.The discussionraises important questionsabout
how mutualknowledgeis establishedand itssignificance
in dispersedcollaboration.The existingliteraturepro-
vides a basis forexpectinga numberof problemswith
seriousconsequences.There is a need forclose exami-
nationof thedynamicsof actualdispersedcollaborations
to see if such problemsdo occur and how theymanifest
ORGANIZATIONSCIENCE/Vol. 12, No. 3, May-June 2001
CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON The Mutual KnowledgeProblem

Figure 1 participated,countriesof origin included the United

Likely Impact of Dispersion and Mediated Com-
States,Canada, Colombia,Portugal,Germany,Ukraine,
munication on Mutual Knowledge and on Collab-
orative Outcomes India, Thailand,Hong Kong, and Indonesia.All of the
Structural
factors
Processes
participants based in AustraliawereAsian exchangestu-
Outcomes

Use of Slower rate

dents. Attnbutions
technology -
mediated
Effortrequired
Feedback lags The teamsweregiventheassignment
(personal,
sduational,
of (1) comingup
Viabilityof
Collaboration
communication
\ Mutualcaeoal
\

Knowledge
withan idea fora businessthatwould use theInternet
categoncal)
in
Contextual or
Problem: some way,(2) writinga businessplan,and (3) creatinga
local differences
Member differences
presentationfor investorsor an online storefront.
Less shared reality
Biased discussion
P
rquality -
The
Performance
Geographic
dispersion project spanned a seven-weekperiod. Communication
deciso
decision

Dispersed
toolsused bytheteamsincludedelectronicmail,Internet-
making

task-related
information
based "chat"tools,an Internet-based votingtool (Dennis
Task
et al. 1996), telephone,and fax. The projecthome page
Informationload Interdependence
was a commonpointof referenceforthe teams.Home
characteristics ... ... ..
-- . --...- ------
-- - Time pressure . ........ndenc
--

page materialincluded detailed team assignmentsfor

each week,samplebusinessplans,projectevaluationcri-
themselves.This suggestsa fine-grained qualitativeanal- teria, and linksto resourcessuch as thevotingtool,chat
ysis of thecommunication and experiencesof groupsin- rooms, and information aboutelectroniccommerce.The
volved in such collaborations.This approachshould il- teams were permitted to use whatevercommunication
luminatethe dynamicssuggestedby these theoriesand tools they found useful, including thosethattheyfound
how theyaffectparticipants in ways othertypesof in- independently on the World Wide Web.
vestigationswould not. The ninefacultymemberswhose studentsparticipated
in the projectcommunicatedwith each otherthrough
electronicmail, a facultylistserv,and occasional tele-
Method phonecalls. None ofthefacultyhad metanyoftheothers
The data were containedin an archivaldatasetthatwas face-to-face. Thus,thefacultyalso was a dispersedteam
createdin thecourseof a collaborativeprojectinvolving thatcollaboratedforthreemonthsto managea complex
graduatebusinessfacultyand students locatedatnineuni- global social system.Despite efforts to make projectre-
versitieson threecontinents. The projectwas intendedto quirementsconsistentacross all nineuniversities, differ-
improvestudents'technicalskills,give themexperience ences werediscoveredas theprojectunfolded.Whenany
in usingtechnologyto collaboratewithremotepartners, such differencewas discovered,affectedstudentswere
and expose themto the possibilitiesof electroniccom- informed immediately andeveryeffort was madeto bring
merce.I gave mygraduatestudentstheoptionof partici- requirements intoalignment.
patingin thisprojectin lieu of thegroupprojectI usually
assign in my OrganizationalBehaviorcourse at George Data Sources
Mason University(GMU). Half my studentsdecided to Data constituting thecases include1,649pieces ofe-mail
participatein the dispersedteamsproject.Each of them exchangedby membersofthe13 teams,printouts oftheir
chose a partnerwithinmyclass and thesepairswereas- online chats,team logs of theiruse of communication
signedrandomlyto a teamwithpairsfromtwootheruni- tools,26 analysispaperswrittenby projectparticipants,
versities. and gradesawardedindependently to each teamby two
The six-memberteams includedpairs fromtwo U.S. instructors. George Mason University studentswho par-
universitiesand one university located elsewhere.Non- ticipated in the projectturned in copies of theire-mailon
U.S. partnerswere locatedin Canada (UniversiteLaval, disk and on paper. On every team on which GMU stu-
Memorial University of Newfoundland), Australia dents worked, there were two Texas Christian University
(SouthernCross University), and Portugal(Universidade (TCU) students, as well as twostudentsfroma university
do Minho). There were 45 teams in all, including13 abroad. The TCU studentsturnedin copies of theire-
teams withGMU students.Only the data generatedby mail, and theirprofessorsentcopies to me. I compared
the 13 teams thathad GMU membersare used in the the two sets of recordsand added to the masterrecord
analysis,yielding13 cases. The studentsrangedin age newlydiscoverede-mails.This strategy was intendedto
from23 to 48 yearsold, and all were graduatestudents identifyall cross-sitee-mails. As a resultof the cross-
taking business or managementinformationsystems check,therewere only a handfulof pointsin the team
courses.Because a numberof foreignexchangestudents historiesat which it was clear fromthe contentof the

ORGANIZATIONSCIENCE/Vol. 12, No. 3, May-June2001 351

CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON The Mutual KnowledgeProblem

messages thatan e-mail was missing,and I earmarked puttingthe13 cases intoan accessibleformwithoutcom-
thesepoints.The countof e-mailrecordsby teamranged promisingtheirrichness,(2) understanding each case on
from61 messages(Team 30) to 217 messages(Team 6). itsowntermsbeforeattempting to generalizeacrosscases
Each team's communication log listedtheteam's on- (Eisenhardt1989, Miles and Huberman1994), (3) con-
line chatsand use of otherWeb-basedtools such as the ductingan embeddedinformation-processing analysisof
votingtool.The numberofchatsheldbyteamsor subsets episodesofconflict, or confusion,(4) creating
frustration,
ofteamsrangedfromnone(Teams 11, 18,and 26) to five and refiningconstructsthatcut across cases, (5) identi-
(Teams 5, 21, and 39). The teamsturnedin copies of the fyingothervariablesof interest, (6) reviewingall cases
textsof mostof theirchats.However,on some occasions of constructsand build evidence
to refinethe definition
theyfailedto makea printout so thetextwas notavailable to measureor refutethem,(7) integrating theconstructs
foranalysis.Descriptiveinformation about each of the intoa tentativemodel,and (8) reviewingall cases to re-
cases appearson theleftside of Table 1. futeor refinethemodel.
GMU studentswroteindividualsix-pageanalysispa-
Data Management.I followed the process used by
pers aftertheprojectended.They were instructed to an-
Gersick(1988) in her studyof eightcollocatedproject
alyze one or two eventsin thelifeof theirteamthatthey
teamsto graduallycondensethevoluminouscase histo-
consideredto be significant,
usinge-mailandchatrecords
ries so theycould be reviewedtelescopicallyas well as
as a resource.They were requiredto do theirbest to ex-
microscopically.I wantedto make it possible to follow
amine these events fromthe perspectivesof the other
the flowof each case while preservingtightlinksto the
teammembersas well as fromtheirpersonalperspective.
originalpieces of data. Each of the 13 teams'e-mailwas
To understand theexperiencesoftheteams,I also drew
readintoAskSam,a text-management softwareprogram.
on my experiencesas a memberof the geographically
Missing e-mail identifiedthroughthe crosscheckwith
dispersedfacultyteam and my work withthe students
TCU was added to the files.Each piece of e-mail was
engaged in the project.In addition,severalmembersof
assignedan identification number.
the facultyteam wroteabout theirexperiencesand cir-
AskSam was used to createfieldswithinwhichto an-
culated these narratives.Finally,my colleague at TCU
notateeach piece ofe-mail.In one suchfield,myresearch
sentme copies of thegradesshe awardedto each of the
assistantsummarizedthe literalcontentof the e-mail.
13 teams thatincludedGMU studentsso thatI would
This paralleledGersick's literalsummariesof the team
have two perspectives,hers and my own, on team per-
meetingsshe studied.In anotherfield,myresearchassis-
formance.
tantrecordedherinterpretations oftheactivityintheteam
Cursoryreviewof the cases suggestedthattherehad
and thequestionsthatcame to hermind.She had been a
been a greatdeal of conflictin theteams.In sevenof the
memberof one of the teamsand recognizednuancesof
13 teams,conflictescalatedto thepointthathostilecoa-
situationsthata newcomerto thecomplexprojectprob-
litionsformed.In fiveof these teams,membersat two
ably would have failed to grasp. Her attentionwas di-
sites began to complainabout partnersat the thirdsite,
rectedprimarily to themicroscopiclevel-recordingthe
refusingin some cases to sendthempieces of theteam's
literalcontentof each piece of e-mail-with secondary
workor put theirnames on finishedwork.Two teams
attention to theflowof events.
evidenced shiftingcoalitions among subgroupsat the
threesites. Close examinationof episodes of conflict, Case Analysis.I studiedeach case and recordedmy
or confusionin theteamsseemedto be mer-
frustration, observationsin a fieldcreatedforthispurpose.Creation
ited. ofthesummariesmadeitpossibleforme to reviewentire
cases quicklywhenI wishedto,tracking theoverallflow
Data Analysis of events.In addition,countsof the numberof e-mails
Data managementand analysisproceduresare summa- each teamexchangedduringeach day oftheprojectwere
rizedin Table 2. My objectiveswereto analyzeepisodes generatedthroughthe softwareand transformed into
of conflict, orconfusionintheteams,examine graphsof the team's communicationactivity-another
frustration,
the significanceand consequencesof these episodes in perspectiveon theflowof thewhole.I also examinedthe
thecontextof each case as a whole,and look forpatterns e-mailmicroscopically, comparingmyimpressionswith
across cases. I followed Eisenhardt's(1989) specifica- thesummariesand commentsof myresearchassistant.I
tionsforanalysisof multiplecase studies,withthe ad- wantedto be surethatthe summariesshe preparedwere
ditionofan embeddedinformation-processing analysisof sufficiently
descriptive,so thatI could relyon themwhen
episodesofconflict, orconfusionwithincases
frustration, I wished to move quicklythroughthe material.Using
(Yin 1994, Coulam and Smith1985). Steps included(1) AskSam,one can double-clickon thesummary ofa piece

352 ORGANIZATIONSCIENCE/VOl. 12, No. 3, May-June 2001

CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON The Mutual KnowledgeProblem

Table 1 Informationby Case

Lack of Unevenly Differences Relative Meaning Use of

Non U.S. Number contextual distributed in salience speed of of silence Technical external Coalition
Team location Grades of emails Chats* informationinformation
of informationaccess uncertainproblems informationactivity

15 Australia 100; 95 156 4 c u r q T E some

26 Canada 86; 95** 65 0 C U s q E none
(Newfoundland)
11 Portugal 96; 86 159 0 C U S R 0 T E much
30 Canada 93; 93 61 3 U S 0 t e none
(Newfoundland)
17 Canada 90; 90 125 1 C U s q t E some
(Newfoundland)
21 Portugal 90; 90 95 5 C u r 0 T E none
1 Portugal 90; 81 85 1 c U q T e some
5 Australia 90; 74 156 5 U R 0 T E much
6 Portugal 86; 86 217 1 S 0 T E none
3 Canada 86; 86** 153 3 C u s R 0 T e much
(Quebec)
18 Canada 83; 83 105 0 C U s r q t E none
(Quebec)
37 Canada 83; 83 130 2 C U s r q T e none
(Newfoundland)
39 Canada 83; 83 142 5 c U s r q T E much
(Quebec)

C, U, R, S, 0, and T = serious problemsofthistype in the team. c, u, r,s, q, and t = some problemsof thistype in the team.
E = frequentuse of information fromexternalsources in the team. e = some use of information fromexternalsources in the team.
representsthe numberof chats involvingat least two locationsduringwhichprojectworkwas conducted
numberadjusted to reflectdifferencesin gradingcriteria

of e-mailand be shownthefulltext.Thus,it was easy to among membersof a collectiveare influencedby indi-

move as I did betweenmicroscopicand telescopicviews vidual information-processing and limita-
characteristics
of theteam's work.Like Gersick,I eventuallycondensed tions,and (2) how structuresand systems shape the in-
thesummariestwomoretimes:first intoa timelineofkeyteractionsamong individuals and the decisions and
events and then intostagesof team activity.I also tracked
actions of the collective.Considerableattentionis de-
team behaviorsand activitiesthatare generallyconsid- votedto examininghow individuals"perceiveand inter-
ered to be predictorsof performance and viability:per-
pretstimuliand how theyremember, use and communi-
formancestrategies, planningactivities,leadershipactiv-
cate information about a complex world" (Coulam and
communication
ities,roles,coalitionsand conflicts, with
Smith1985, p. 1). Accordingly,information-processing
or about outsidestakeholdersand authorities, and mile-
analysis is an appropriatemethodfor investigating the
stonesin projectdevelopment. establishment of mutualknowledgeand failuresof mu-
Afterstudyinga team's e-mail and recordingmy ob- tual knowledge.The typicalmediumfor information-
servations,I reviewedtheanalysispaperswritten by the
processinganalysesis thecase studybecause of thefine-
two GMU membersof the team. The papers gave me grainedevidence that is required(Coulam and Smith
insightintotheirinterpretationsof theteam'sinteraction,
1985).
whichI could comparewiththee-mailand chatrecords, I analyzedtheexchangeand processingof information
my own analysis,and the commentary of my research
leadingup to,during,and afterepisodesof conflict, frus-
assistant. tration,or confusionin theteams.Frome-mailand chat
Information-Processing Information-processingrecords,I determined
Analysis. whatinformation each teammem-
analyses of collectivessuch as and
organizations teams ber did and did nothave at thetime a problem arose.This
investigatetwo centralquestions:(1) how interactions includedactivitiessuch as establishingto whome-mails

ORGANIZATIONSCIENCENVol. 12, No. 3, May-June2001 353

CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON The Mutual KnowledgeProblem

Table 2 Data AnalysisProcedures

Stages of Work
and Key Observations Activities Purpose
Data Manipulation

Check completenessofe-mailrecordsbycomparinge-mail
turnedinbyteammembersat ECU and SWU.
Add to themasterfileany newlydiscoverede-mails.
all e-mailintotextmanagementsoftwareprogram.
Import
Adjusttimestampsto EasternStandardTimeso e-mailcan
be sequenced correctly
and resequence.
Assemblerecordsand reportsofteam "chat"sessions.
Researchassistantwritesa literalsummary ofeach ofthe
1,649 pieces ofe-mailand ofeach chatsession. Focus
on contentofindividualpieces ratherthanoverallflowof Gersick1988: Beginprocess ofgraduallycondensing
events.Observationsand questionsnotedinseparate voluminous ofteamactivity
transcripts into
field. summariesofeventsequences.

Data analysis

Researcherstudieseach case, movingbetweensummaries Eisenhardt1989:540; Milesand Huberman1994:

and actualtextofe-mails.Observationsand questions "Allowtheuniquepatternsofeach case to emerge"
notedinseparatefield. to generalizeacross cases."
beforeattempting
Reviewand writesummariesofanalysispapers written
by Get perspectiveon themeaningthatparticipants
membersofeach team.Papers focusedon one ortwo made oftheteam's interactions.
criticaleventsinthe lifeoftheteam.
Triangulateresearcherimpressionswiththoserecordedby Develop a deep understanding
ofeach individual
and researchassistant,and withe-mail
participants case frommultipleperspectives.
records.
Observationofhighdegree of Reviewall teamcases and analysispapers to select See whether thereseem to be some generalizations
inteams and
conflict episodes offrustration,
conflict
or confusion. across cases thatcould be explored.
decisionto examine
episodes offrustration,
conflict
or confusionin
depth.
Trace developmentofeach episode, attempting
to
determinewhathappened and howeach teammember
saw it.
Observationthatinthese Carefully exactlywhate-mailsand chatexperiences
identify
episodes, people frequently thepartiesto an incidentdid and did nothave at thetime
seemed to be working from itoccurred.
different
information.
Observationthatthere Createfiveconstructsrepresenting
typesofproblems
seemed to be recurrent observed.
typesofproblems.
Studyall 13 cases again indepthto 1) challengeand refine Eisenhardt1989: Refinedefinition
ofconstructs
and
thedescriptibns oftypesofproblems,2) documenttheir buildevidencethatmeasurestheconstructineach
frequency, 3) documentthefrequencyofothervariables case.
ofinterest,and 4) lookforotherimportanttypesof
problemsnotrepresentedbytheconstructs.
Observationthatthereseem Integrateconstructsintoa tentative
model,drawingon the
to be causal relationships cases and therelevantliterature.
betweeninformation
exchange activitiesand
attributions
failures, about
teammembers,and team
coalitionactivity.
Studythe 13 cases intheirentirety
a thirdtimeto challenge Eisenhardt1989: Verify
thattheemergent
and refinethismodel. relationships
betweenconstructs
fitwiththe
evidence ineach case.

354 ORGANIZATIONSCIENCE/VOl. 12, No. 3, May-June2001

CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON The Mutual KnowledgeProblem

were and were notaddressed,and whethertheaddresses sitesin deadlinesfordeliverables,evaluationcriteria, and

were correct.I also comparedaccounts in the student
analysispaperswiththee-mailand chatrecords,noting
pointsof divergencein contentor tone. In a systematic
way,I soughtto understand theperspectiveofeach mem-
ber of a teamas an episode unfoldedon thebasis of the
information he or she had at thetimeand whathe or she
wrotein e-mailor chats.
Cross-CaseAnalysis.Acrosscases, I noticedrecurring
patternsin thedevelopmentof problems.I studiedthese
patternsinductively. I characterized individualincidents,
groupedthem,and adjustedthe descriptionsand group-
Eventually,I characterized
ings iteratively. fivetypesof
problems:(1) failureto communicateand retaincontex-
tualinformation, (2) unevenlydistributed information,(3)
differences in the salienceof information to individuals,
(4) relativedifferences in speed of access to information,
and (5) interpretation of the meaningof silence. I re-
viewedall thecases to refineor refutemydescriptions of
these problemsand assess theirfrequencyacross cases
and theirseriousnesswithincases. I recordedtheidenti-
ficationnumbersof e-mailsor chatsin whichI observed
each typeof problem.Then I reviewedtheaccumulated
evidencein lightofmyknowledgeofeach team'scase and
judged whether each problemwas (1) presentand serious,
(2) presentbut not serious,or (3) absent.The charting
techniqueis an adaptationof techniquessuggestedby
Miles and Huberman(1994) and used by Elsbach and
Sutton(1992). I foundI could integrate thefiveproblems
into a model thatdescribedhow episodes typicallyun-
foldedand theirconsequencesforteams.In anotherre-
view of thecases, I soughtto refineor refutethismodel.
Findings
This sectionreportsfindingsat the episode, case, and
cross-caselevels of analysis.I describethefivetypesof
problemsobserved,theirfrequencyand severityacross ated team membersat TCU wroteto theirpartnersat
cases, and theirassociationwithteamstrategiesand out- UniversiteLaval in Canada: "I can't believe whatI just
comes. I also presenta model thatsummarizestherela- heard.Is it truethatAnna and Georgehave springbreak
tionshipof problemsto each otherand theprocessesob-
servedacrosscases.
TypesofProblems
Failure to Communicateand RetainContextualInfor- ished withoutwarningfromthe e-mail traffic
mation.Team membershad difficulty gatheringand re- days.Panickedteam
membering information aboutthecontextswithinwhich tookover thetaskof theirsilentpartners.
theirdistantpartnersworked.They also failed to com-
municateimportant information abouttheirown context
and constraintsto theirremotepartners.The teams in-
volved in the project,includingthe dispersedfaculty
team, sometimesfailed to recognize differences across ever, the informationdid notseemto register
the timingof springbreak. Only belatedly did many
teamscome to understand competingtimecommitments
thatwere affecting members'participation. Team mem-
bersalso sometimesassumed that the collocated partners
werein closertouchwitheach otherthantheywere.
For example, Team 26 experienced conflictover
whetheror notto scheduleonline"chat"sessionsamong
teammembers.The GMU pairrefusedto schedulea ses-
sion. Accordingto a GMU partner, we "feltstrongly that
a phonecall would be muchmoreefficient." In his anal-
ysispaper,he interpreted theTCU partners'insistenceon
usingthe mediumas follows:"Perhapstheydid not re-
alize how difficult
itis to implement thenecessarysched-
uling."Whatwas notcommunicated in theteamwas the
factthatusingchat tools was partof the evaluationcri-
teriaat TCU but not at GMU. The TCU studentswere
takinga managementinformation systemscourse,while
theGMU students weretakingan organizational behavior
course.Despite efforts to make requirements consistent,
differencessuch as this one surfaced. The conflict
stemmedfroma difference in theorganizationalcontexts
of theGMU and TCU members,butto theend,theGMU
partnerssaw it only as a preferenceon the partof the
TCU partners.Importantinformation about the organi-
zationalcontextand constraints was not communicated
amongdispersedteammembers.
In Teams 3, 6, 17, and 18, some team membersdis-
appearedduringwhatturnedoutto be theirspringbreak.
One of Team 18's GMU partnersbelieves thatshe sent
herremotepartnersan e-mailthatdescribedGMU's up-
comingspringbreak and statedthatshe and her collo-
catedpartnerwouldbe away forthreedays.WhenI stud-
ied thee-mailrecords,I could not findher message.At
thispoint,the team had turnedin its businessplan, but
faced an impendingdeadline forits presentation. After
severaldays passed withoute-mailfromGMU, exasper-
now???" Replied theCanadians,"Maybe theyare out of
town!"Team 3 had a similarexperiencewhenpartners at
MemorialUniversity ofNewfoundland whowererespon-
sible forassemblingall partsof the businessplan van-
forthree
members at other schools eventually
The Canadian
partners had notmentionedtheirupcomingbreakto their
distant team members.
In Team 6, e-mail recordsshow thata team member
did warn theothersabouta tripduringspringbreak;how-
in theminds

ORGANIZATIONSCIENCE/Vol. 12, No. 3, May-June 2001 355

CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON The Mutual KnowledgeProblem

of theremotepartners. Requestsfromteammatesforim- at leastone oftheTCU partners receivedthee-mail,how-

mediateactioncontinuedto arrivein here-mailwhileshe everthispersondid notcorrecttheGMU partners when
was away. It appearsto be difficult
forteammatesto cre- theycomplainedthatthe Canadians had notbeen heard
ate a mentalmap of theirdistantpartners'situationand from.The dynamiccreatedin the team concerningthe
to updatethatmap whennew information arrives. Canadiansteammates'tardinesspersistedtotheend,even
At theoutset,some studentsfailedto send an initiale- thoughit was based on inaccurateinformation.
mail message to theirteammatesforup to threeweeks. In Team 11, the Portuguesepartnerswere the firstto
Often,personsreportedlaterthattheywere takingmid- writeto thegroup.Theirmessagecontainedtwoincorrect
termexaminationsor completingsome otherproject. e-mail addressesand two correctaddresses.It was five
However, theyfailed to perceive the need to describe daysbeforeone GMU teammemberdiscoveredthemes-
theirsituationto remotepartnerswhose situationsmight sage fromPortugalin here-mail.By thattime,bothGMU
be quite different.Relationshipsfaredbetterwhen pre- and TCU membershad begun to worryand complain
occupiedteammateslaid out immediately theconstraints aboutwhattheythoughthad been silencefromPortugal.
underwhichtheywereoperating. The Portugueseprobablywere receivingmail fromthe
Participantsalso seemed to exaggeratethe complete- UnitedStatesbutwondering whytheirgreeting was being
ness of communication in thecollocatedcondition.This ignored.Moreover,thereis no evidence thatthe GMU
is yet anotherway of misjudgingthe contextof remote partnerwho foundthe e-mail fromPortugalever for-
partners.A GMU partnerin Team 11 assumedthatcon- wardeditto therestoftheteam.The Portugueseoperated
cernsshe had expressedon thetelephoneto one partner on theassumptionthattheentireteamhadtheinformation
at TCU would be conveyedto theotherpartnerat TCU. containedin theinitialnote,butin fact,onlyone or two
Later the GMU partnerwrotethat she had repeatedly UnitedStatesmembershad it.
asked TCU to make a particularchange in the team's Impressionsformedas a resultof unevenlydistributed
homepage, whileone oftheTCU teammatesinsistedthat information persistedin the face of correcting informa-
he had neverheardthisconcern.One factorin thisdif- tion.This is notsurprising whenone considershow dif-
ferencewas theGMU partner' s assumptionabouttheease ficultit is to traceall thewaysin whicha particular piece
and completenessof communication betweenthe collo- of information (in thiscase, erroneousinformation) has
cated TCU partners. shapedone's feelingsabout anotherperson.The history
of Team 30 offersa striking illustration.
The mailinglist
UnevenlyDistributedInformation. Unevenlydistrib- used by one of the GMU partners, Paul, had an errorin
utedinformation withteam-levelcollabo-
also interfered it:It includedone personwhowas a memberofa different
rationand caused problemsin relationships. Two causes team and omittedone person(Don) who was a member
wereerrorsin e-mailaddressesand failureto sendcopies of Paul's team.By thetimethesituationcame to a head,
of e-mailto all teammembers.Team membersalso may Paul thoughthe had sentsix e-mailsto theentireteam.
have thoughttheysente-mailthatin factneverwentout He was receivinge-mailfromhis teammember,Don, but
or was undelivered.The bucket of information being did notrealizethathe was notsendingmail to Don. The
passed amongteammembersprovedtobe farleakierthan personwho was receivingthe e-mail in errorneverno-
theyrealized.Wildlydifferent perspectivesamongteam tifiedPaul. Eventually,Paul spentseveralhoursinvesti-
memberswere createdbecause of differences in the in- gatingchatroomsitesand proposedone to theteam.He
formation theyreceived. was astonishedwhenDon wrotewithinhoursproposing
In two teams(Teams 37 and 11), partnerslocatedout- a different chatroom,assumingthattheteamwouldmeet
side the United States were quick to initiatecommuni- there,and ignoringPaul's message.In his analysispaper,
cation,yetthisfailedto become commonknowledgein Paul wrotethatthisindicated"resentment towardme for
theteam.On thecontrary, theimpressiongrewthatthese takingtheinitiativeand makingdecisions."
partnerswereabsentorunwillingtocommunicate. Mean- Paul gave Don the benefitof the doubtby writingto
while,theywonderedwhytheirinitialmessageswereig- checkthee-mailaddress,butDon did notrespondto this
nored.In Team 37, a Canadian partnerwas the second note,whichoffendedPaul even more.But let us look at
person to check in. Afterintroducingherself,she ex- thisfromDon's pointofview:Even thoughPaul has writ-
plainedthathercollocatedteammatewas away fora few tensix detailede-mailsto theteam,Don has notreceived
days but would writeshortly.She mistypedthe address any of them.To Don, Paul is a deadbeatteam member
of one GMU partner, buttypedthesecondGMU address who now has finallysent a shortnote askingif he has
correctly.However,neitherGMU partnerever indicated Don's addressright!Eventually,Paul removedtheincor-
havingreceivedhere-mail. E-mail recordsconfirmthat rectname fromhis mailinglist and added Don's name,

356 ORGANIZATIONSCIENCE/VO1. 12, No. 3, May-June 2001

CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON The Mutual KnowledgeProblem
butPaul did notchangehis understanding of theteamor
see how differently thisexchangemusthave appearedto
Don. Even thoughPaul figuredout thathe had Don's
name and addresswrongand offeredto sendDon all the
early messages he had written,Paul still presentedthe
exchangeas a powerstrugglein his analysispaper.Paul
stillthoughtthatDon deliberatelyignoredthe workhe
had done.
In relationshipsconductedface-to-face,it is a chal-
lengingcognitiveexerciseto interpret a set of factsfrom
theperspectiveof anotherperson.It is farmoredifficult
to determinehow theinformation beforetheotherparty
differsfromone's own, and then see thingsfromthe
other'sperspective.Geographicdispersionmakes these
two activitiesmoredifficult because of undetected "leaks
in thebucket,"because partnersseem to have difficulty
retaininginformation about remotelocations,and be-
cause feedbackprocessesare laborious.In addition,the
data suggestthatteammemberswithcompleteor correct
information may not speak up when erroneousconclu-
sions are voiced in theteam.
Problemsstemmingfromunevenlydistributed infor-
mationwere notlimitedto cases involvingerrorsin ad-
dresses and undeliveredmail. Sometimespeople knew
theywere exchangingmail withonly partof the team,
butfailedto understand howthisaffected theperspectives
of teammemberswho did notreceivethemail,or how it
affectedthe dynamicsof the team as a whole. In Team
11,Lisa in Portugalsuggesteda focusfortheteam'sproj-
ect. Team membersat GMU and TCU exchangede-mail
aboutLisa's idea withoutcopyingher.They agreedthat
heridea was creativeand interesting buttoo complexfor
the team's timeframe.When the team voted electroni-
cally,Lisa's idea was notselected.FromLisa's perspec-
tive,her idea was metby silence.Therewas no discus-
sion, praise, or criticism-just a vote. When team
membersbegan volunteering via e-mail to develop par-
ticularpartsof thebusinessplan,thePortuguesepartof
the team was silent.I suspectthatthe GMU and TCU
memberswere moreconscious of the silence fromPor-
tugalthantheirown silencein responseto Lisa' s idea. E-
mailconcerning Lisa's idea was exchanged.Itjustwasn't
sentto Lisa.
It is not news thatprivateconversationscan create
problemsin a team.However,the dynamicsand conse-
quences of this behaviorin dispersedteams are worth
noting.Privateexchangesof e-maildistortperceptions of
thevolumeof activityin a team.This can confusemem-
bers' sense of pace and timing.Memberswho are receiv-
ing all thee-mailwill perceivesome membersas active
and othersas relativelyinactive.Those who are not re-
ceivingall themail will perceivetheenergylevel of the
ORGANIZATIONSCIENCENVol. 12, No. 3, May-June2001
team to be low and the pace to be slow. Accordingly,
theymayfurther reducetheirpace, orberatemembersfor
because theydo notknowoftheirefforts.
inactivity Anal-
ysisoftheteamhistoriessuggeststhatthesekindsofper-
ceptionscan be excruciatingly to identifyand
difficult
changewhena teamis dispersed.Private"conversations"
maycreatemuchmoreconfusionfordispersedteamsthan
face-to-face
teams.
Differences in theSalience ofInformation. Teams also
encounteredproblemsthathingedon differences in the
salience of information among team members.Writers
tendedto assumethatwhatwas salientto themwouldbe
salientto theirreaders.Scholarshave observedthatme-
diatedcommunication oftenlacks cues to meaningsuch
as facial expressions,body language,and tone of voice
(Kiesler and Sproull 1992, Sproull and Kiesler 1986).
However,thesetypesof cues also signalthesalience to
thecommunicator of one piece of informationrelativeto
another.Dispersedteammemberswerenotsuccessfulin
communicating to theirpartnerswhatpartsof theirmes-
sages, or whichmessages,theyconsideredmostimpor-
tant.When an e-mail message addressedseveraltopics,
partnerssometimesdifferedon whichtopicstheyfound
salient.For example, as describedpreviously,a GMU
partnerwho wanteda change made in the team home
page raisedtheissue on thetelephonewithTCU Partner
1 and in a postscriptto a four-paragraph e-mailto TCU
Partner2. The proposedchangewas thelast of threeis-
sues addressedin thee-mail.TCU Partner2 laterinsisted
indignantlythat he had never heard of the request.
Clearly,thepostscript had greatersalience to the sender
thanto thereceiver.
Differencesin information salience were exacerbated
by unwieldyfeedbackprocessesin the dispersedteams
and the makingof indirectrequests.Analyzinga tense
exchangein Team 6, a GMU memberobserved:
Withso muchinformation goingback and forth, it was difficult
formyteammatesto absorbeverydetail ... Because I couldn't
"see" if thereceiverwas payingattention, I didn'tknow if my
message had to be repeated.Yet it is time-consuming to let the
senderknowmyperceptionof theirmessage.
In othercases, writersdid not use in theire-mailkey
wordsthattheythought theyhad used. In Team 18,Anna
wantedto clear up irritationthathad resultedwhen she
and George disappeared for threedays duringGMU's
springbreak. In her analysis paper, she wrote,"When
everything done, I thoughtit was timeto clear our
was
misunderstandings.I didn'twantto brushthingsaway. I
sentan e-mailsayingthatwe need to have a chatas there
were some misunderstandings to be cleared." The chat
nevertook place. One reasonmay be thatAnna did not
357
CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON The Mutual KnowledgeProblem
actuallyuse the words"clear our misunderstandings" in
here-mail.Instead,she wrote,"Thereseemsto be a com-
municationslapse betweenus. Georgeand I thoughtthat
we probablyneed to discuss certainaspects fromthe
home page. Is it possible to chat today?. .. This is im-
portant,so please let us know soon." It is unlikelythat
Anna's wish to resolvetheissue of whyshe and George
disappearedwas clear to her dispersedteammatesbe-
cause she said thatshe wantedto "discusscertainaspects
fromthehomepage." Confusiondue to indirectwording
is notconfinedto computer-mediated communication, as
Tannen(1994) has shown.But thecharacteristics ofsome
of the communicationtechnologiesused by dispersed
groupsprobablymake it difficult formembersto recog-
nize themeaningand importance of indirectrequestslike
thisone.
In addition,therewas a tendencyto requestfeedback
fromthe team indirectly, yet to expect quick responses
fromeveryone.(Kiesler et al. 1984 predictedthelatter.)
"EverytimeI sent an e-mail requesting"any thoughts"
fromeveryone,I expectedto receiveone fromeveryone.
And when I didn't,I feltthatthose who didn'trespond
were notholdingup theirend of thebargain,"reporteda
memberof Team 5. A memberof Team 17 observed,
"People alwayssaid, 'Hope to hearfromyou soon.' Who
thenhas responsibility forinitiating communication?" A
memberof Team 11 recalled sendinge-mail "into the
abyss," and GMU-based membersof Team 6 discussed
thefeedbackproblemamongthemselves,butneverwith
othermembersof theirteam. In an analysispaper,one
wrote:
We wantedacknowledgment of thetimewe spenton thedeliv-
erable as well as a feelingthatwe were on target.No one re-
sponded. We sent anothere-mail sayingthatwe hadn't heard
fromanyone. Finally,we heard fromone group member,but
even thatmessage containedminimalinformation.
Clearly,the salience of the requestforfeedbackwas
higherforsendersthanreceivers.Thus, whenelectronic
communication is voluminous,sendersand receiversun-
wittingly may differin whattheyfindmostsalientand
fail to fulfilltheirdistantpartners'expectations.This
problemmay be complicatedby a tendencyto statere-
quests indirectly,yet expect quick responsesfromall
members.In general,thelevel of feedbackamongmem-
bers of a dispersedgroupis not likelyto be as high as
memberswould wish,and maynotbe sufficient to ensure
sharedunderstanding.
RelativeDifferences in Speed ofAccess toInformation. commentsby the United States partnerswould always
Researchhas shownthatteamsusingcomputer-mediated follow theirmessages. It would appear thattheircom-
communication operateat a slowerratethanteamsmeet- mentswereignored.
ing face-to-face(Lebie et al. 1996, Straus 1997, Straus
358
and McGrath1994, Waltherand Burgoon 1992). How-
ever, this studysurfaceda second typeof problemin-
volvingspeed: relativedifferences amongteammembers
in speed of access to information. One manifestation of
this problem stemmed from differences among team
membersin access to communications technology. Some
membershad 24-houre-mailaccess whiletheirpartners
had access onlywhenat theiruniversity. If some mem-
berssee e-mailonlyonce a day or once everyfewdays,
thislimitsthe interaction thatis possible and slows the
pace of theteam.Observeda memberof Team 3, "Some
problemsdraggedon for days while the suspicionsof
groupmembersintensified. In reality,theproblemcould
have been as simpleas someonenotbeingable to getto
thecomputerlab to checktheirmessages."
A second manifestation seemed to stemfromdiffer-
ences in the speed of electronictransmissionsamong
partsof a team.This was exemplified by therelationship
amongmembersofTeam 5, whichincludedtwomembers
in Australiaand fourmembersin theUnitedStates,two
of themin Virginiaand two in Texas. The teamheldfive
onlinechatsduringwhichtensionsbetweenthemembers
in theUnitedStatesand Australiawereevident.Near the
end of the team's fifth chat,an Americanteammember
observedthattheAustralianmembersalways seemedto
be "25 minutesbehindthediscussion"and suggestedthat
thiscould be an artifact of thespeed of transmission be-
tween the continents.The team membersat the two
UnitedStateslocationscould carryon a relativelyrapid
exchangeuntilbeing "interrupted" by teammembersin
Australiawho referred to subjectsfromwhichtheothers
had movedon.
I was not able to verifythishypothesisthroughchat
room transcripts or othermeans.However,theexplana-
tionproposedbytheteammemberis credible.Telephone
lines carriedmost of the Internettrafficbetween the
UnitedStatesand Australiaand theyfrequently became
overloaded,resultingin breakdownsand timelags. This
would mean thatpartsof the teamwerecommunicating
at different rates-one ratebetweenthe two sitesin the
UnitedStatesand anotherratebetweentheUnitedStates
andAustralia.This is a recipeforfrustration andirritation
forall. IfthemembersinAustraliarespondedtomessages
theinstanttheyreceivedthem,theirresponsesstillwould
appearin thechatroomtraffic well aftertheconversation
betweentheUnitedStatespartners had movedon because
of timelags comingand going.Moreover,fromtheper-
spectiveof theAustralianpartners, a streamof unrelated
Both types of problems concerningrelative speed
ORGANIZATIONSCIENCE/Vo1. 12, No. 3, May-June 2001
CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON The Mutual KnowledgeProblem
tendedto be invisibleto team members.Instead,they
wereattributed to remotepartners'lack of conscientious-
ness. In addition,recognizingtheconstraints on access to
information was only of limitedhelp to the teams.The
factremainedthatit was difficult forteam membersto
work"in sync"withone another.Althoughthesourceof
problemssometimeswas identified, suspicionsand im-
pressionsthathad formedtendedto persist.
Interpreting theMeaningofSilence.One ofthebiggest
challengesteammembersfacedwas interpreting themean-
ing of theirpartners'silence.Over thecourseof thepro-
ject, it became clear thatsilence had meantall of the
followingat one timeor another:I agree.I strongly dis-
agree. I am indifferent. I am out of town.I am having
technicalproblems.I don'tknowhow to addressthissen-
sitiveissue. I am busywithotherthings.I did notnotice
your question.I did not realize thatyou wanteda re-
sponse.
Partnersoften misinterpreted silence. One common
problem was interpreting silence as consent when it
stemmedfromdisagreement or inattention. For example,
UnitedStatesmembersofTeam 11 misjudgedthesilence
of theirPortuguesepartnersafteran electronicvote.The
Americansinterpreted the silence as consent,and then
began to wonder.When theyinquired,theirPortuguese
partnersreplied,"Yes we are still (here), but you had
decided everything. Now you should tell us what you
want. . . We don't know (anything)about (thebusiness
idea thatwas chosen)." Similarly,a GMU memberof
Team 6 informed herteammatesthatshe would be away
duringspring break. "I asked if I neededto submitany-
thingforthe home page beforeI departed. . . When I
didn'treceive a response,I assumed everything was in
order."Aftershe had left,herteammatesbegan to write
tersee-mails,askingfortheaddressofherpersonalhome
page, whichtheywishedto linkto theteamhomepage.
Silence due to technicalproblemsor faultyinformation
sometimeswas interpreted as intentionalnonparticipa-
A 21
tion. memberof Team became concernedwhen
variousteammembers"did notrespondto mostof thee-
mails and keptmissingchat room meetings."He inter-
pretedthis as his partners'"unwillingnessto work." It
eventuallywas discoveredthattheU.S. partners thought
the timedifference betweenthemselvesand theirPortu-
guese partnerswas six hours,when it was five hours.
Times forthe synchronous"chats" among the partners
were communicatedin error,whichmeantthatthe Por-
tuguesepartnerswould arriveat the appointedhourand
find no one there. This confusionpersistedover the
courseof fourchatsand two weeks beforeit was ironed
out.
ORGANIZATIONSCIENCE/Vo1. 12, No. 3, May-June 2001
In meetingsconductedface-to-face, it can be difficult
themeaningofteammembers'silence.How-
to interpret
ever, geographicdispersionand relianceon communi-
cations technologyadd new dimensionsof uncertainty
and complicateefforts to resolvetheuncertainty. A part-
nercould be out of townor silencedby technicalprob-
lems. Theremay be a tendencyto fall silentratherthan
addresssensitiveissues because of thedifficulty of com-
municatingnuances when using less rich communica-
tionsmedia. In particular, uncertaintyabout silence can
makeit difficultto knowwhena decisionhas been made
in a geographicallydispersedgroup.
Clearly,the 13 dispersedteams struggledwithprob-
lems involvingthe distribution and interpretationof in-
formation. The problemswere serious.Theyaffectedin-
dividualworkingrelationships and theviabilityof teams
as wholes.Relationshipproblemswerecreatedand mag-
nifiedby flawsin information management. These prob-
lems were difficult to correct.Correctivefeedbackwas
scarce and slow, and it was laboriousto modifyimpres-
sions in the face of new information. Impressionsper-
sistedin theface of correctedinformation. Table 3 sum-
marizesthefivetypesof problemsidentified.
FrequencyofProblems
Table 1 displaystheoccurrenceby teamof each typeof
problemdescribedabove. The displayincludesindicators
of teamactivity(thetotalnumberof e-mailslogged,the
numberof online chats held, and communicationwith
externalsourcesof information), in-group/out-group dy-
namics (whetherhostilecoalitionsformed),and perfor-
mance(gradesreceived).Also notedforeach teamis the
occurrenceand severityoftechnicalproblemssuchas the
inabilityto access groupware,chatline,or e-mailservers
when planned,the inabilityto transmit compatiblefiles
amongteammembers,and theuse ofincorrect passwords
or procedures.Table 4 summarizesthefrequenciesofoc-
currenceand severityof each problemacross all the
teams.It showsthatthemostseveredisruptions to teams'
work were caused by unevenexchange of information
and technicalproblems.These problemswere seriousin
nineof the 13 teams.The mostcommonproblemsacross
teamsweredifficulty themeaningof silence,
interpreting
unevenexchangeof information, and technicalproblems.
Difficultyinterpretingthemeaningof silencewas "some
problem"or "a seriousproblem"in all 13 teams.Uneven
exchange of information and technicalproblemswere
"some problem"or "a seriousproblem"in 12 of the 13
teams.
and Outcomes
AssociationwithStrategies
betweentheincidenceand se-
I looked forrelationships
verityof particularproblemsin teamsand a measureof
359
CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON The Mutual KnowledgeProblem

Table 3 Types of InformationProblems

Failureto communicateand retaincontextualinformation

fordispersed collaboratorsto gather,retain,and update information
Propositions:Itis difficult about the contextsin whichtheirdistant
partnerswork,particularly as the numberof locations increases. Reciprocally,dispersed collaboratorsoftenfailto communicateimportant
about theirown context,situation,and constraintsto theirremotepartners.
information
Examples of such informationinclude the lengthof the tripto the office,the quality,accessibility,and featuresof equipment,measurement
processes and standards; local holidaysand customarypractices, pressure fromlocal supervisorsand coworkers,local historyand
interpretive
schemas, competingresponsibilities, and local emergencies.

Unevenlydistributedinformation
Propositions:Dispersed collaboratorsfailmoreoftenthantheyrealize to distributethe same information
to all members.Causes include
humanand technologicalerror,and selective distribution
withoutawareness of all itsconsequences.
Uneven distribution of information
resultsin team members havingdifferent perspectives because of the different
information
theyhave.
Partnerswithcomplete or correctinformation may notspeak up when erroneousconclusions are voiced in the team. Impressionscreated
on the basis of unevenlydistributedinformation oftenpersistin the face of correctinginformation.
Uneven distributionof information
distorts
perceptionsofthe volume of activityin a team, and confuses the team's pacing and timing.

Differencesin the salience of information

among membersof a dispersed collaboration
Propositions:Dispersed collaboratorstend to be less successful thancollocated collaboratorsin communicatingto theirpartnerswhat
parts of theirmessages, or whichmessages, theyconsider most important. They may assume thatwhat is salientto themwillbe salientto
remotepartners.In particular,requests thatare stated indirectly
may be salientto the person makingthe request but notsalientto the
object of the request. Whilethisproblemis notunique to dispersed teams, itmay be problematicforthembecause of restrictedback-
channel feedback and oftenslow feedback cycles.

Relativedifferencesin speed of access to information

Propositions:Dispersed collaborationsare susceptible to problemsthatstem frompartsof a team communicatingat different rates. Some
members may be in frequentcontact withone anotherwhileothersare heard fromless often.Causes include differencesamong partsof a
team in the speed of electronictransmissionsor in access to communicationstechnology.This means thatpartnersare notsynchronizedin
termsof theiraccess to information and theirabilityto detect and correctmisunderstandings.
The structural
causes of these types of
problemstend to be invisibleto team members. Even when recognized, differencesin communicationrate pose problemsfor
collaboration.

of the meaningof silence

Interpretation
Propositions:Dispersed collaboratorsoftenare uncertainabout or misinterpretthe meaningoftheirremotepartners'silence. Geographic
dispersionand reliance on communicationstechnologyadd new dimensionsof uncertainty to the meaningof silence and complicate
effortsto resolve the uncertainty.
There may be a tendencyto fallsilentratherthanaddress sensitiveissues because ofthe difficulty
of
communicatingnuances using the available media. Uncertainty about silence can make itdifficult
to knowwhen a decision has been made
in a geographicallydispersed group.

Table 4 Frequency of Problems Across Teams (in percentages)

Type of problem

Lack of Unevenly Differences Differences Meaning

Extentof contextual distributed in salience in speed of silence Technical
problem information information of information of access uncertain problems

Serious problem 54 69 23 23 46 69
Some problem 23 23 46 38 54 23
Not a problem 23 8 31 38 0 8

360 ORGANIZATIONScIENcE/Vol. 12, NO. 3, May-June2001

CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON TheMutual KnowledgeProblem
performance (i.e., gradesreceived),theincidenceof hos-
tile coalitions,and the numberof e-mails and chats
logged. I also looked to see whetherteams could be
groupedby theirtaskand relationship management strat-
egies. The data suggestfourconstellations: (1) good per-
formance,task focus, moderaterelationshipdemands,
relativelylow volumeof communication, and low coali-
tion activity;(2) good performance, hightask and rela-
tionshipdemands,relatively highvolumeofcommunication,
and highcoalitionactivity;(3) weakerperformance, rela-
tivelyhighvolumeof communication, manyand diverse
information problems,and highcoalitionactivity;and (4)
weakerperformance, relationshipfocus,tasksecondary,
relativelyhighvolume of communication, and low coa-
litionactivity.Therewereno obviousdirectrelationships
in thissmall samplebetweentheincidenceand severity
of particularinformation problemsand performance. In-
formation problemsseemed to be moredamagingto re-
lationshipsthanto task performance. It also seemed to
matter how membersdealtwiththeinformation problems
thatoccurred:theextentto whichtheyextendedtheben-
efitof thedoubtwhenremotepartnersdid notbehaveas
expected,and theextentto whichtheywereable to iden-
tifyaspectsof thesituationthathelpedexplainbehavior
to expectations.
thatwas contrary
Thus,teamswithan averagegradeof 90% and above
seem to constitute two types:thosethatexchangedrela-
tivelylittlee-mail and did notdevelop coalitionactivity,
and thosethatexchangedmoree-mailand developedco-
alitionactivity.Teams 26, 30, and 21 fitthefirstcategory
and Teams 15, 11, and 17 fitthesecond.The threeteams
thatearneda grade of 90 or above and avoided the de-
velopmentof hostilecoalitionsemphasizedminimalism
and closure in theirworkprocessesand tendedto give
remotepartnersthebenefitof thedoubt.In otherwords,
theykepttask and social demandsrelativelylow. They
exchangedsome personalinformation at the outset,but
otherwisetendedto focuson thetask at hand. The tone
was businesslikebutgracious.Throughskillorluck,they
agreedquicklyon a viable idea fora businessand then
focusedon implementing the idea. Givingremotepart-
ners the benefitof the doubtwas important, as each of
these teams did encountersignificantinformation ex-
changeproblemsearlyin theirlivesthateasilycouldhave
escalated. However, members'interpretations of these
events,attributions made aboutremotepartners, and con-
sequentbehaviorsdid notacceleratethedevelopmentof
hostilerelationships in theteam.Theystruggled to main-
taina gracioustonedespite unanswered questions,seem-
ing slights,and frustration.
For example,Team 26 exchangedonly 65 messages,
ORGANIZATIONSCIENCENVol. 12, No. 3, May-June2001
less than half the numberthat many otherteams ex-
changed.The averagegradeitreceivedon itsprojectwas
second highestamong the thirteenteams studied.Indi-
vidual introductionswere briefand businesslike,butthe
tone of communication was graciousoverall.One team
memberrepeatedlymodeledthisbehavior,whilestilltak-
ing a strongstandon a few issues. The team's commu-
nication is peppered with commentssuch as "Good
ideas!," "Thanksforthevoteof confidence," "Greatpic,"
and "What a talentedgroup!"The groupencountereda
seriouschallengeearlyon because of errorsin e-mailad-
dressesinvolvingboththeGMU and TCU partners. The
upshotwas thatfourof the six team membersvoted to
accept a projectidea thatthe two GMU membershad
nevereven received,whilea projectproposalfromGMU
bouncedback undeliveredfromTCU. Both GMU mem-
bersnotedin theiranalysispapersthattheywereirritated
by thisevent;however,one of themadded,"I do under-
standwhythisoccurred.An initialphase of confusionis
to be expectedin virtualteamsthatrelyprimarily on e-
mail forcommunication." In otherwords,he made a sit-
uationalratherthanpersonalor categoricalattribution.
When new challengesinvolvingdifferences in context,
constraints,and ideas arose fortheteam,theywerehan-
dled in sophisticatedways. Confronting disagreements
over elementsof the businessplan, a team memberin
Canada wrote, "Greetings, friends. We seem to
be at odds overwhatour companyshouldbe doing. . ."
In the otherthreeteamsthatearneda gradeof 90 or
above (Teams 15, 11, and 17) some memberswere de-
terminedto turnin a qualityproductand managedto do
so. However,lifeinsidetheteamwas turbulent. Attempts
were made to extendthe benefitof the doubtto remote
partners;however,attributions grewharsh.For example,
a memberof Team 11 eventuallywrote,"We gota cheap
excuse (fromthePortuguesepartners) thatI did notbuy."
Ultimately, partnersat two of the threelocationsbegan
planningto do theprojectas a groupoffouranddiscussed
whetherto withholdthenamesoftheout-group members
fromthefinishedproduct.It maybe thattheapproachto
thetasktheseteamstookwas relativelydemanding,and
it overwhelmedtheteam's social capacityand available
communication media.For example,theseteamsdebated
longeron the kind of businesstheywould design than
did Teams 26, 30, and 17. When information problems
occurred,theywere difficult to resolve and did consid-
erabledamage.
The same problemsand processesappearedin a more
virulentformin Teams 5, 3, and 39, whose gradesaver-
aged below 90 percentand who had a relativelyhigh
volume of communication, frequentand diverseinfor-
mationproblems,and fiercecoalitionactivity.Almostall
361
CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON The Mutual KnowledgeProblem

of the teams withmuchcoalitionactivityincludedstu- and Poole 1994,Maznevskiand Chudoba2000, McLeod

dentswho werehighachievers,judgingfromthequality 1996).
of theirworkin my course overall.They may have de- Failure to exchangeadequate information about con-
mandedmorefromthedispersedmode of workand their textand failureto distribute the same information to all
remotepartnersthan could be delivered.For example, membersof theteamconstitute two majorpitfallsin in-
Team 5 subjectedideas to intensescrutiny butstruggled formation exchange(Point[3]) to whichdispersedteams
in the aftermath to maintainworkingrelationships. Re- maybe subject.It mayalso be difficult forteammembers
flecteda memberof Team 3, "Our grouplacked anyreal to retainand update information about remotecontexts
talentforoffering compromisesand movingon." Another providedby theirdistantteammates.As a consequence
memberof Team 3 describedthebehaviorof partnersas of thesefailures,groupmembersare morelikelyto work
"belligerent, lackadaisical,and indifferent."
These groups fromdifferent definitions of the situation,whichhandi-
seem to have become caught in destructiveand self- caps communication and collaboration.In addition,fail-
reinforcingpatternsof interactionto which dispersed ureto shareand retainup-to-dateinformation aboutcon-
teamsare susceptible. text contributesto communicationbreakdowns by
On theotherhand,Teams 6 and 37 privilegedharmony limitingtheabilityof sendersto framecommunication in
overquality.Team 6 is an outlierin thatitse-mailvolume a decenteredratherthan self-centered way. Messages
was thehighestof all theteamsand its internalrelation- framedin a decenteredor receiver-centered way have a
shipsappearto have been themostpositive.Membersof betterchance of being interpreted accurately(Point [4])
this team realized early on thatuneven distribution of (Blakar 1985). The likelihood of tension is probably
information among team memberscould be a problem greaterif groupmembers'social and practicalrealities
and investedconsiderableeffort in avoidingthissituation. are quite different fromthe outset(Point [1]); however,
However, the team's work productwas not graded as subsequentaspectsof interaction may add to theconfu-
highlyas thatof some of the otherteams. In analysis sion.Humanerrorin usingtechnologyand technicalfail-
papers,membersof bothTeams 6 and 37 suggestedthat ures can createinformation distribution problemsin an
desireforharmonyin theteamhad interfered withscru- otherwiseuntroubledsituation.However,once tensions
tinyof business ideas. Wrote a memberof Team 37, have begun to develop,negativeattributions have been
"(We) feltwe shouldgo along withtheothermembers' made (Point [6]) and coalitionshave formed(Point[7]),
ideas . . . even thoughwe did not agree withthem... membersmaybe moreinclinedto distribute information
The wholeteamwas neverin conflict.Everyonewas very selectivelyamongteammembers,and problemsescalate.
polite." Exchangeof information is just one partof the com-
municationprocess. Receiversmust"decode" the sym-
IntegrativeModel bols thatconstitute a message and interpret themeaning
Figure2 summarizestheprocessesI observed.It focuses of the sender(Redding 1972, Rommetveit1968). The
on thechallengesdispersedteamsface in integrating in- contextswithinwhichsendersand receiversencode and
dividualmembercontributions and maintaining social in- interpretinformation are likelyto differwhentheirgeo-
tegrationin lightof the mutualknowledgeproblemand graphiclocationsare distant,increasingthelikelihoodof
its consequences. The task requirements, context,and misinterpretation. This problemis exacerbatedbyfailure
compositionof thegroupestablishthedegreeof integra- to exchange sufficient information about context.Two
tionrequiredforeffectiveperformance and how difficult otherpossiblepitfallsat thisstage(Point[4]) of thepro-
to achieve thisis likelyto be (see Point[1] in Figure2). cess are thedrawingof erroneousconclusionsaboutre-
For example,a complextaskmayrequirea highlevel of motepartners'silence,and differences in thesalienceto
integration of individualexpertiseforsuccess. However, senderand receiverof different partsof a message,lead-
achieving this integrationwill be more challengingif ing to differinginterpretations of themessage.
groupmembersstartfromdifferent social and practical The available information and how it is processedaf-
realities-e.g., come fromor live in different cultures, fectsattributions (Point [6]). I proposethatpersonalat-
have differentfunctionalbackgrounds,are working tributions aremadeaboutremotepartners moreoftenthan
acrossorganizationalboundaries,or are widelydispersed collocatedpartners because moreinformation is available
geographicallyfromone another.In addition,the char- aboutthelocal thantheremotesituation.The complexity
acteristicsof the available communication technologies, of dispersedstructures and processesalso makes situa-
theirappropriateness forthe task at hand,and how the tionalattribution difficult. Interpretations and attributions
groupuses thesetechnologies (Point[2]) representanother can be checked throughfeedback,howevergeographi-
set of enablingand constrainingconditions(DeSanctis cally dispersedgroupsface threechallenges:timelags,

362 ORGANIZATIONSCIENCE/VO1. 12, No. 3, May-June 2001

CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON The Mutual KnowledgeProblem

Figure 2 The Mutual Knowledge Problem and Its Consequences for Dispersed Collaboration

factors:
Structural Processes:

Group including
structure, Themutual
dispersion
geographic knowledge
Useof [2] problem
Available
communication communication (points1-5)
media ia
med
Taskcharacte/stics [3] shared?
Context
Taskcharacteristics / exchange
Information Uneven
distribution?
(interdependence, [1]
load,
information Degreeof Feedback
time
pressure) *

integration
required Lags? [4]
required?
Effort Meaningofsilence?
task?
Interdependent Relative speeds?
cycle Interpretation Salience
shared?
information?
task-related
Dispersed [5] ofmessage
orlocaldifferences?
Contextual [
Member differences?

[7] Causal[6]
Cohesion attnbution
Outcomes: Modifynorms?
Coalition
activity? Personal?
Viability Disengagement? SPtuational?
SCtategoncal?
Categorical?
Performance

andits
consequences
(points6-7)

theeffortrequiredto seek and give feedbackwhendis-
persed,andrelativedifferences thatmayexistinfeedback
speeds amongpartsof thegroup(Point [5]). Slow feed-
back cycles (Point [5]) reduce correctivefeedbackand
increasethelikelihoodoferroneousinterpretations (Point
[4]) and exaggeratedattributions(Point[6]).
Finally,theremay be a tendencyto generalizesuch
social perceptions,particularlynegativeones, to the lo-
cationalsubgroupof whicha personis a member,which
sets in motionin-group/out-group dynamics(Point [7])
thatare destructive to groupcohesion.In some cases that
I studied,collocatedpartnersreliedincreasingly on each
other,criticizingtheirremotepartners amongthemselves
and sometimesdisengagingfromthe group's work.In
othercases, subgroupsin twolocationsexchangedcritical
e-mailaboutthethirdsubgroupand refusedto sendthem
work products.Typically,an important piece of infor-
mationwas not sent,sentto the wrongplace, or lost in
transit(Point [3]), whichaffectedtheconclusionsdrawn
by all parties(Point [4]) and led to negativeattributions
to individualsand subgroups(Point [6]) and thedisinte-
grationof relationships (Point[7]). Sometimes,problems
weremitigatedwhenerrorswerecaughtin thecourseof
a feedbackcycle (Point [5]). However, therewere in-
stancesin whichthiscorrectionwas so slow in coming
thatthoseinvolvedwere unable to traceand modifyall
thefaultyconclusionstheyhad drawn.The cycledepicted
in Figure2 can be self-reinforcing: The problemsof in-
formationexchange,interpretation, de-
and attribution
scribedhere,and theirdisintegrative effecton teamre-
lationships,add to the already substantialintegration
challengeconfronted bya geographically dispersedgroup
(Point[1]).
Discussion
This paperproposesthata centralproblemof geograph-
ically dispersed collaborationis maintainingmutual

ORGANIZATIONSCIENCE/VOl. 12, No. 3, May-June 2001 363

CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON The Mutual KnowledgeProblem
knowledge.Bothphysicaldispersionofcollaborators and
frequentuse of communications technologytendto nega-
tivelyaffectthemeansby whichpeople establishmutual
knowledge.I also suggestthatfailureto establishand
maintainmutual knowledge can have serious conse-
quences forthe viabilityof dispersedcollaboration.My
empiricalfindingssupportand develop thistheory.The
fivespecificproblemsI identifiedinductivelyare mani-
festationsof themutual-knowledge problemthatare es-
peciallylikelyunderconditionsof physicaldispersion.I
describeways in whichtheseproblemsinteract, exacer-
batingfactors,and typicalconsequences.Whilefailureto
establishand maintainmutualknowledgemay be more
likelyand seriouswhencollaboratorsare physicallydis-
persed,the problems,processes,and consequencesare
probablynot limitedto dispersedcollaboration.I offer
groundedsuggestionsabouthow and whenthesedynam-
ics mightappearin collocatedcollaborations.
Failures of InformationExchange
Two specificproblemsthatcame to lightin this study
concernfailuresof information exchangewhichresultin
dispersedpartnershavingdifferent information,but not
knowingthisis thecase. Membersof theteamsI studied
oftenfailedto guess whichof themanyfeaturesof their
contextand situationdifferedfromthecontextsand sit-
uationsof remotepartners.They did not communicate
criticallocal information. Second, team membersfailed
farmore oftenthantheyrealized to distribute the same
information to all members.Causes includedhumanand
technologicalerror,and selectivedistribution withoutap-
parentawarenessof all its consequences.
Identification of thesefailuresof information
exchange
extendsourunderstanding ofbothmutualknowledgeand
dispersedcollaboration.One reasonthatgeographicdis-
persionposes challengesto collaborationis thatlocations
are likelyto differ.Differencescan includethelengthof
the tripto the office;the quality,accessibility,and fea-
tures of equipment;measurementprocesses and stan-
dards; local holidaysand customarypractices;pressure
fromlocal supervisorsand coworkers;local historyand
interpretiveschemas;competingresponsibilities; and lo-
cal emergencies.In addition,dispersedteams may be
more likely than collocated teams to include members
withdifferent culturalbackgroundsandorganizational af-
filiations,which introducestill more contextualdiffer-
ences. People who wishto collaboratemustdiscoverand
workacross thesedifferences.
However,myresearchsuggeststhatdispersedcollab-
oratorsare notskilledat discoveringand communicating
aboutsuchdifferences. In addition,whentheinformation
was mentionedin the teams I studied,remotepartners
364
sometimesfailed to note or rememberit. This makes
sense when we thinkof local information as a "hidden
profile"(Stasser and Stewart1992; Stasseret al. 1995;
Stasserand Titus 1985, 1987). Accordingto theprinciple
of information sampling,uniquelyheld information is
less likelythancommonlyheld information to be men-
tionedin groupdiscussions.If mentioned, itis less likely
thancommonlyheld information to be salientto group
members.These problemsare exacerbatedby highinfor-
mationload (StasserandTitus1987) anduse oftext-based
communicationtechnologies(Hightowerand Sayeed
1995, 1996; Hollingshead1996). Thus,membersof dis-
persed teams may have difficultyachieving mutual
knowledgeofimportant aspectsofthesituationsandcon-
textsin whichpartners function. In addition,theproblem
of unrecognizeddifferences in contextexacerbatesother
problemsdescribedbelow.
Unrecognizeddifferences in contextshouldbe less of
a problemforcollocatedteamsthandispersedteamsto
theextentthatcollocatedteammemberssharecontextin
common. Collocated teams also have more powerful
waysofdiscoveringdifferences, suchas visualinspection
and face-to-face communication. Futureresearchshould
comparethe mechanismsby which membersof collo-
cated and dispersedteams identifydifferences in situa-
tions,constraints, and assumptions.In addition,research
shouldcontinueto examinehow dispersedcollaborators
handlecontextualinformation. It wouldbe usefulto iden-
tifyconditionsunderwhichtheyare able to formmental
mapsofthesituationsofremotepartners andupdatethem
as situationschange.We may also wish to comparethe
abilityof dispersedcollaboratorsto detectdifferences in
task-related information across locationsrelativeto dif-
ferencesin context,includingculturalcontext.
Communicationacross distance and via technology
was shownin mystudyto be a particularly leakyprocess.
Messages wereaddressedincorrectly, undelivered, or de-
liberatelynotsentto teammembers.People workedfrom
different information farmoreoftenthantheyrealized,
and thiscaused seriousproblemsin communication and
relationships.Confusionand conflictwas promulgated
not just by different interpretations of the same infor-
mation,but also by different interpretations of different
information. I have shown thatmembersoftenblamed
each otherfortheirfrustrations.
This problemhas implicationsforthedevelopmentof
trustin dispersedcollaboration.Jarvenpaaand Leidner
(1999) and Jarvenpaaet al. (1998) foundthattrustin dis-
persedteamswas predictedmoststrongly duringtheearly
phasesof teamactivitybyperceptionsofothermembers'
"integrity,"by whichtheymean"adherenceto principles
thought to makethetrusteedependableandreliable"such
ORGANIZATIONSCIENCE/VO1. 12, No. 3, May-June 2001
CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON The Mutual KnowledgeProblem
as demonstrated work ethic,fairdealings,and consis-
tency"(Jarvenpaaet al. 1998,p. 3 1). The authorspropose
thattrusting actionand demonstrated reliability
increase
trustin dispersedteams.However,myworksuggeststhat
human and technicalerrorsin information distribution
may be commonin dispersedcollaboration,particularly
duringtheearlyphasesof activity.If theseareinterpreted
as failuresofpersonalreliability,
theyare likelyto inhibit
thedevelopmentand maintenanceof trust.
Failures of Interpretation
This studyalso identifiedthreeproblemsthatdisrupted
shared interpretation of informationin the dispersed
teams: difficulty communicating and understanding the
salienceof information, differences in speed of access to
information, and difficulty interpreting the meaningof
silence. When problemsof salience occurred,partners
had the same information but attendedto different parts
of it and misunderstood each otheras a result.Whilethis
problemis not unique to dispersedteams,it probablyis
exacerbatedby theuse of computer-mediated communi-
cation.The mediumdoes notprovidetheparaverbaland
verbalcues thatpeople use in conversationto signalthe
importanceof one piece of information relativeto an-
other.Furthermore, failureto communicatesaliencemay
be morecostlyin dispersedthancollocatedcollaborations
because of slow feedbackchannelsand restricted back-
channelfeedback.Slow and effortful feedbacklimitsde-
tectionand correctionof misunderstandings. Kieslerand
Sproull(1992, Sproulland Kiesler 1986) describedhow
computermediationrestricts cues to themeaningofcom-
munication.I focuson theproblemof signalingtheim-
portanceof one piece of information relativeto another
and how thisproblemis manifested in dispersedcollabo-
rationand exacerbatedby the otherproblemsidentified
in thisstudy.
The membersof thedispersedteamsI studiedalso had
difficultyworkingtogetherwhenthe speed of feedback
cyclesdiffered amongpartsof thegroup.Some members
were in frequentcontact with rapid feedback cycles,
while contactwithotherswas limitedand slowerpaced.
These differences were caused by differences in access
to communicationtechnologyand the distributionof
membersacross distanceand time.The teamswere not
synchronized in theiraccess to information and abilityto
detect and correct misunderstandings, so had a dif-
and
ficulttimemaintaining mutualknowledge.
This observation revealsa new side of theissue ofrate
in computer-mediated communication. Researchershave
shown thatthe rate at which computer-mediated com-
municationproceedsaffectsgroupproductivity the and
developmentof relationships(Straus 1997, Straus and
ORGANIZATIONSCIENCE/Vol. 12, No. 3, May-June2001
McGrath 1994, Walther 1992, Waltherand Burgoon
1992). My findingcalls attention to theconsequencesof
partsof a groupcommunicating at differentrates.Future
researchshouldexplorewhetherunevenfeedbackcycles
withina grouphave a different impactthanuniform feed-
back cycles. Uneven feedbackcycles across partsof a
groupcould be moredestructive thana uniformly slow
pace because subgroupsgrowout of syncwith,and iso-
latedfrom,thegroup.This could resultin theirbecoming
scapegoats. Ironically,feedbackcycles may be slower
and moreunevenamongpartsof a groupunderjust those
conditionsforwhichrapidcyclesare mostneeded:when
thecontextsof sendersand receiversdiffersubstantially.
Forexample,feedbackcyclesmaybe unpredictable when
partof a teamis travelingconstantly or locatedin an area
witha weak communications infrastructure.
Finally,I observedthatteammembersoftenmisinter-
pretedthe meaningof theirremotepartners'silence.
Physicaldispersionand dependenceon communications
technologyadd sourcesof uncertainty aboutthemeaning
of silencebeyondthoseexperiencedby groupsthatmeet
Partnersmayfall silentbecause theyfindit
face-to-face.
difficult and time-consuming to convey sensitiveissues
in text,or because of technicalfailures.They may be
silentbecause theyagree,because theydisagree,or be-
cause theyarephysicallyabsent.In themutualknowledge
literature, Brennan(1998) describeshowlack offeedback
(i.e., silence) leads to failuresof groundingin conversa-
tionswithand through computers. Withoutfeedback,one
does notknowwhethera computeris working,has com-
pletedthetask,has malfunctioned, or is waitingforad-
I
ditional inputs. broaden her point by showing how
physical dispersion presents additional sourcesof uncer-
of
taintyas to themeaning partners' silence.
ConsequencesforAttribution
The failuresof information exchangeand interpretation
identifiedin thisstudyhave consequencesforattribution
processes.They illuminatetwo reasonswhypeople are
likelyto makepersonalratherthansituational attributions
concerningremotepartners. First,failureto shareand re-
memberinformation about remotesituationsand con-
texts,and unevendistribution of information, mean that
remotepartnersoftenlack information to make situa-
tionalattributions.Accordingto theattribution literature,
when people do not have situationalinformation, they
tendto makepersonalattributions, i.e., theirexplanations
focuson thedispositionsof individuals(Jonesand Nisbett
1972,Nisbettet al. 1973).
The studyalso demonstrates the complexityof com-
municatingand collaboratingacross distance and via
365
CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON The Mutual KnowledgeProblem
technology.Information aboutmultiplelocationsmustbe
gathered,integrated, and updated.Multiplepossible ex-
planationsforunexpectedbehaviorand silencesmustbe
weighedand investigated. Exchangesbetweensubgroups
mustbe reportedto thewhole.Feedbacklags,whichmay
be differentforeach location,mustbe takenintoaccount.
There is considerableevidence thatwhen people work
underheavy cognitiveload, theybecome morelikelyto
makepersonalratherthansituationalattributions (Gilbert
and Hixon 1991,Gilbertand Osborne1989,Gilbertet al.
1988).
Fallingback on personalattributions because of a lack
of informationor information-processing limitations
amountsto blamingindividualsforproblemsthatmay
have broadercauses. This distractspartnersfromfulldi-
agnosisof problemsand modification ofpracticesto pre-
ventreoccurrences. It also damagespartners'opinionsof
each other.These pointsare consistentwiththe obser-
vationsof Blakar (1984) and Hultberget al. (1980) con-
cerningtheeffectsofpersonalversussituationalandcon-
structiveversus nonconstructive attributionsamong the
familymemberstheystudied.
Attribution processes among people who collaborate
across distanceand throughtheuse of computermedia-
tion meritadditionalattention.One of the contributions
of thisstudyis harnessingthe powerof the well devel-
oped literature concerningattribution to help understand
thedevelopmentof suchrelationships. Two information-
based antecedentsof attribution, situationalinformation
and cognitiveload, are exploredin thisstudy.However,
theattribution literature describesadditionalinformation-
based antecedentsof attribution, as well as a numberof
motivation-based antecedents.(See Kelley and Michaela
1980 fora summary.)This literature could help us un-
derstandhow dispersedcollaboratorsmake senseof their
complicatedworld.
Futureresearchmightalso explorewhethercognitive
load is indeedhigherin dispersedthancollocatedteams,
and traceall itsconsequences.Two consequencesaredis-
cussed in thispaper:bias towarddispositionalattribution
and difficultyidentifyinguniquely held information.
However,therecould be otherconsequencesover time,
suchas stressor burnout.In addition,theconceptof cog-
nitiveload facilitatesapplicationof thesefindings to col-
locatedteams:Membersofcollocatedteamsmaybe most
likelyto encounterthe problemsof mutualknowledge,
and theirconsequences discussed here,when members
are experiencingheavycognitiveload.
The data suggestthatprocessesthatbeganwithfailures
of mutualknowledgeand producedpersonalratherthan
situationalattribution eventuallyled to thefracturing of
some teamsintoin-groupsand out-groups.Therewas a
366
tendencyto generalizeattributions, particularlynegative
ones,to othersat thesamelocation.Team members'anal-
ysispapersdescriberemotesubgroupsas "lackadaisical,"
"aggressive,"and havingan "inferiority complex."This
is consistentwith the work of Lea and Spears (1991,
1992, 1993) who suggestthatpeople using computer-
mediatedcommunication tendtocategorizeremoteothers
on the basis of meagercues. In a dispersedteam,one
salientbasis forsocial categorizationis location,e.g., the
Californiagroupor the Portuguesegroupor the client-
sitegroup.Accordingto theliteratures concerning group
identityand in-group/out-group conflict, suchtendencies
are exacerbatedby weak team integration (Karakowsky
and Siegel 1995, McDonald 1995) and the need for a
targetfordisplacedhostility(Brewer 1986). Frustration
in searchof an outletmay build up in dispersedcollab-
orationsbecause of theelusive problemsof information
exchangeand interpretation describedin thisstudy,and
otherstructural and technicalchallenges.Once in-group/
out-groupdynamicshad arisen in the teams I studied,
subgroupstended to withholdinformation fromeach
other.This erodesmutualknowledgeto a greaterdegree,
and worsensproblems.It also createsdiffering impres-
sions amongpartsof a groupof thegroup'stimingand
pace, impactingmotivationand coordination.
Futureresearchshouldexploretherole of social cate-
gorizationprocessesin dispersedworkgroups,including
generalization on thebasis of location.Dynamicsinvolv-
ing subgroupsshouldbe investigated because dispersed
teamsin practicetypicallyincludecollocatedsubgroups
(GoodmanandWilson1998,Leonardetal. 1998,Maznevski
and Chudoba 2000, Mazchrzaket al. 2000, Snow et al.
1996).
AssociationwithPerformance
There were no clear relationships betweenteamperfor-
mance and particularproblemsof information exchange
and interpretation,or thegeneralincidenceof suchprob-
lems. Failures of mutual knowledge were ubiquitous
acrosstheteams.Althoughit was possibleto distinguish
differentteam performancestrategies,no one strategy
was associatedwithhighperformance. However,perfor-
mancestrategies did seem to be associatedwithdifferent
relationaloutcomesin theteams.Futureresearchshould
returnto thisissue withmore sensitivetaskdesigns.In
particular,designs should varythe distributionof task-
relatedinformation across locationsand the amountof
interdependence requiredof teammembers.Using such
tasks, relationshipsamong team performance, perfor-
mance strategies,and the failuresof mutualknowledge
identifiedin thisstudyshouldbe examined.
ORGANIZATIONSCIENCE/VO1. 12, No. 3, May-June 2001
CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON The Mutual KnowledgeProblem
Amplifying
and ModeratingForces
Feedback lags seem to amplifythe problemsof infor-
mation exchange and interpretation identifiedby this
study.Krauss and Bricker(1966) demonstrate thatfeed-
back lags disruptthe abilityof sendersand receiversto
establishcommonreferents, a buildingblock of mutual
knowledge.In addition,thisstudysuggeststhatfeedback
lags contributeto the exaggerationof negativeattribu-
tionsconcerningremotepartnersand make it moredif-
ficultfordispersedcollaboratorsto diagnosetheirsitua-
tion.
Withoutfeedback,deprivedcollaboratorsare leftto
speculatewhytheirexpectationshave notbeen fulfilled
and when feedbackwill come. In the absence of situa-
tionalinformation, theyare likelyto makenegativeattri-
butionsconcerningthedispositionsof theirremotepart-
ners. These attributionscan grow more negative as
waitingcontinues.Deprivedcollaborators also sometimes
amplifytheirdemands, triggeringan exaggeratedre-
sponse fromtheirremotepartners.The situationis like
thatof thepersonwho ultimately turnsthehotwaterup
too highin theshowerbecause oftimelags betweenturns
of thefaucetand response.One participant
said as much:
"Some problemsdraggedon fordayswhilethesuspicions
of group membersintensified. In reality,the problem
could have been as simpleas someonenotbeingable to
get to the computerlab to check theirmessages." The
speed of feedbackcycles may constitutea criticalcon-
straintforgeographically dispersedgroups.
In addition,feedbacklags and dispersedinformation
make it extremely difficult
forpeople to getan overview
of thestructure and functioning of a dispersedsystemof
relationships. Actionsand reactionsare difficult to inter-
pret when disruptedby lags in feedback.Blaming is a
common response when individualsdo not grasp the
structureand dynamicsofcomplexsystemsofwhichthey
are a part(Bowen 1985, Senge 1990). In futureresearch,
systemsdynamicstheory(Sterman1989) mightcontrib-
ute to our understanding of theimpactsof distributed in-
formationand feedbacklags on dispersedcollaboration
and computer-mediated communication.
In both dispersedand collocatedcollaboration,prob-
lems establishingand maintaining mutualknowledgeare
mostlikelyto occurwhenthereis a greatdeal ofuniquely
held task-relatedand contextualinformation and limited
communication channels.Exacerbatingfactorscan be ex-
pectedto includeheavycognitiveload, a complexinter-
dependenttask, tighttime limits,and a complex team
design-particularlyone involvingstrongsubgroupiden-
tities,whichmayreinforce local perspectives.
For situationsin which these factorsare operating,
ORGANIZATIONSCIENCE/VO1. 12, No. 3, May-June 2001
practicesthatshouldmoderateproblemsincludemethod-
ically seekingout situationaland uniquelyheld infor-
mation,givingpromptfeedbackwheneverpossible,fo-
cusing on the overall structureand processes of the
systemof relationships ratherthanon individuals,reex-
amininggroup operatingpracticesand norms,and ex-
tendingthebenefitof the doubtratherthanengagingin
the creationof out-groups.The overall effectof these
practicesis to directattentionto group-leveldiagnosis
and learning.
Limitations
The mode of generalization to case studyre-
appropriate
searchis analyticgeneralization-generalization to the-
ory ratherthan statisticalgeneralization(Yin 1994).
Therefore,itis important howtheteamsstud-
to articulate
ied here may be typicaland atypicalof geographically
dispersedwork groups.Geographicallydispersedwork
groupstake manydifferent formsin practice(Goodman
and Wilson 1998, Leonard et al. 1998, Maznevski and
Chudoba2000, Mazchrzaket al. 2000, Snow et al. 1996).
The teamsI studiedprobablyare atypicalin the limita-
tionstheyfacedaroundmeansofcommunication. Travel,
videoconferencing, and telephoneconferencing werenot
an optionforthem,and theywere limitedby personal
expensein theiruse of thetelephone.Occasional face-to-
face meetingsand moretelephonecontactmightmoder-
ate the processesobserved;however,thereis reason to
thinkthatbasic tendenciesmightbe thesame.Additional
modesof contactcould contribute to unevenexchangeof
information amongpartsof a teamifused extensively by
dyadsor subgroups.
Severalteamdesignfactorsshouldalso be noted:group
identityand timeframe(discussedin Walther1997), in-
terdependence, and composition.The local university-
based subgroupsoftheteamsstudiedprobablyhad a con-
siderablystrongerbasis for identitythan the teams as
wholes.Whiledispersedteamsin practiceare oftencom-
posed of people frommultipleorganizationsand sub-
groupswith strongidentities,the weak basis for team
identityshould be taken into account. Likewise, the
teams' seven-weektimeframeis notunusualin business
practice;however,its relativeshortnessand the teams'
low expectation offutureinteractionshouldalso be noted.
As discussedpreviously,theteam's level of interdepen-
dence could be characterizedas moderate.They carried
anda range
outa projectthatrequiredresearch,creativity,
of skillswithoutcomesof significance forthemembers.
The teamswere composedof adultprofessionalsrepre-
sentinga rangeof ages withmoderateinternational and
technicalexperience.We mustcontinueto examinethe
formsthatdispersedcollaborationtakes in practiceand
367
CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON The Mutual KnowledgeProblem
take thesestructural factorsintoaccountin our research
designsand theories.
Anotherlimitationof the studyis the use of one pri-
maryjudge of the meaningof the data. Case studyand
multiplecase studymethodologists strugglewiththeis-
sue ofreliability,given unwieldyformofthedataand
the
the timerequiredto reviewit, and this studyfaces the
same challenge.This workfollowedthe recommended
practiceof preservinga case studydatabase and case
studyprotocol (Yin 1994) so that anotherresearcher
could reviewthe process.FollowingEisenhardt(1989),
the protocolincludedtwo reviewsof all the cases that
were aimed at testingreliability, one afterinitialformu-
lationof constructsand the second afterformulation of
themodel to refineor refuteemergingconclusions.
There are also some safeguardspeculiarto thisstudy.
There was a clear standardas to what constitutedthe
foundationof thedata because everyeffortwas made to
develop completee-mail historiesof each team. Com-
municationand the flowof eventswere preservedin a
recordthatdid not reflectthe choices of a researcher.
While I was the finaljudge of themeaningof thiscom-
municationand theseevents,I did comparemy impres-
sions withthoserecordedseparatelyby a researchassis-
tantand by 26 participantsin the teams. When these
impressionsdiverged,I could and did minutelyexamine
thee-mailrecordsto tryto understand thedivergence.
In addition,I providednumerousdetailedexamplesin
thisreportso thatsome assessmentof the evidencecan
be made in lieu of a fullreviewof the records.Gersick
(1988) observes thatthe advantageof a single patient
judge of meaningis thatanalysis is done consistently,
yieldingunderstanding of a whole event.However,this
will always be one side of a trade-off in a studysuch as
thisone.
A thirdlimitation is thatthisstudydid notcomparethe
dispersedteamswithcollocatedteams,so we cannotde-
terminetheextentto whichtheproblemsand processes
describedalso occur in collocated collaborations.This
issue must be explored empirically.However, I have
takencare to describewhenwe mightsee thesedynamics
in collocatedcollaborations, and to providegroundedrea-
sons whyfailureto establishand maintainmutualknowl-
edge shouldbe morelikelyand moreseriousin dispersed
collaborations.
Implicationsfor Practice
While theconclusionsofferedhereare tentative, design-
ers and membersof geographicallydispersedteamsmay
still be interestedin the implicationsforpractice.This
worksuggeststhatdesignersof dispersedteams should
aggressivelyexplorein advance potentialdifferences in
368
situationsand incentivesthatwill affectteammembers.
Goals, incentives, and situationsshouldbe alignedwhen-
ever possible. When theycannotbe, these differences
shouldbe broughtto all teammembers'attention.
Ideally, all members of a dispersed collaboration
shouldbe sentthesame information. Beyondthecontent
of the information, thisprovideseach memberwithan
accuratepictureof thepace of activityin thecollabora-
tion,includinganydifferences in pace amongsubgroups.
In practice,however,theinformation load couldbe over-
whelming.Ifthereis a riskofoverload,leadersand mem-
bersof dispersedteamsshouldcommunicate information
thatestablishesor makes adjustmentsto theparameters
of collaborationsuch as (1) the availabilityof members
(includingidentification of holidays),and constraints on
availabilitysuchas competingresponsibilities; (2) theob-
jectives of the collaborationand solutioncontexts;(3)
local requirements, customs,processes,and constraints
thatbearon memberavailability, objectives,or solutions;
(4) meansof communication and norms,includingback-
up procedures;and (5) reportson the pace of activity
overalland thepace in any subgroups.
Membersof dispersedteamsand people communicat-
ing via computermediationshould resist makingas-
sumptionsabout the situationand constraints of remote
others.Instead,theyshouldactivelyseek out suchinfor-
mation.It is also important forindividualsto monitorthe
tendencyto leap todispositionalattributions aboutremote
partners. Situationalcauses shouldbe considered,even if
information to supportthemis notimmediately available.
In addition,promptfeedbackwhenpossiblehelpsevery-
one in a complexdistributed systemto correctinaccurate
interpretations and attributions.Training in systems
thinking maybe usefulformembersof distributed work
groups by helpingthem appreciatethe structure, pro-
cesses, and timelags of the systemof whichtheyare a
part.
We have entereda new era of collaborativeactivity,
one in whichit is feasibleforworkgroupsto span time
zones ratherthanyardsor miles.Thereare manyadvan-
tagesto be gainedthroughtheuse of suchgroups.How-
ever,theirusefulnesswillbe maximizedifwe understand
characteristic dynamicssufficiently well,so thateffective
teamdesignscan be developedand effective trainingcan
be offered.The literatureon computer-mediated com-
municationhas led the way by exploringthe natureof
communicationin such groups.However, it is argued
herethatnot only the mode of communication but also
the fact thatthese groups are complex distributed dy-
namic systemswill affectprocesses,and outcomes.We
knowthatpeople tendnotto be sensitiveto thestructure,
processes,and timelags of thesystemsof whichtheyare
ORGANIZATIONSCIENCE/VO1. 12, No. 3, May-June 2001
CATHERINE DURNELL CRAMTON The Mutual KnowledgeProblem
a part.However,successfulcollaborationin geographi-
callydispersedworkgroupsmayhingeon membersmas-
teringtheseskills:graspinglocal realitiesand thebig pic-
ture,establishingmutualknowledge,takingintoaccount
the dynamicsof feedbackprocesses,and understanding
theprocesseslinkingdistantbutinterdependent parts.
Acknowledgments
The authorthanksOrganization ScienceSeniorEditorWandaOrlikowski
forguidingthereviewandrefinement ofthispaperwithgreatwisdom.The
authoralso appreciatesthe helpfulcommentsprovidedby Katherine
Chudoba,GerardineDeSanctis,Pamela Hinds,George Huber,Richard
Klimoski,David Kravitz,Fred Niederman,Roger Volkema, Joseph
Walther,and threeanonymousreviewers.An earlyversionof thispaper
appearedin the 1997 Academyof Management Best Paper Proceedings
and benefitedfromthecomments of threeanonymous reviewers.
The authoris grateful
to Beata LobertJones,whoorganizedtheVirtual
LearningEnvironment projectand sharedrecordswithher;herresearch
assistantColleen Lambert,who intelligently organizedand summarized
thousandsof e-mails;and hergraduatebusinessstudents, who embraced
theopportunity to explorea frontier of collaborationand sharetheirad-
ventures.
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