1. QUIZON V. THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF PAMPANGA 2. Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code is as follows: "ART. 327.

al Code is as follows: "ART. 327. Who are

GR NO. L-6641
JULY 28, 1955
TOPIC: Imprudence and negligence; BP 129
PETITIONERS: Francisco Quizon
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, Pampanga, et al
FACTS:
- Respondent Chief of Police of Bacolor filed a criminal complaint against
petitioner Quizon, with the Justice of the Peace Court charging Quizon w/
the crime of damage to property thru reckless imprudence, the value of
damage amounting to P125.
- Quizon filed a motion to quash on the ground that, unde Art. 365 of the RPC,
the penalty w/c might be imposed on the accused would be a fine or from
P125 to P375.
- The Justice of the Peace forwarded the case to the CFI Pampanga, but the
latter returned it to him for trial on the merits, holding that the justice of the
peace had jurisdiction.
- Under Sec. 44 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (RA 926): "Original jurisdiction.
— Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction: "(f) In all criminal
cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than
six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos:"
- Sec. 87 of the Act states: "Original jurisdiction to try criminal cases. —
Justices of the peace and judges of municipal courts of chartered cities shall
have original jurisdiction over: "(c) All criminal cases arising under the laws
relating to: (6) Malicious mischief;".
- In the cases of People v. Palmon & People v. Peñas y Ferrer and Rey y
Rochas, it was held that the cases provided for in Sec 87. (c) of the Act, the
jurisdiction given to justices of the peace and judges of the municipal courts
is not exclusive but concurrent w/ the courts of first instance, when the
penalty imposed is more than 6 months imprisonment or a fine of more than
P200.
ISSUE: W/N the justice of the peace court has concurrent jurisdiction w/ the CFI
when the crime charged is damage to property thru reckless imprudence if the
amount of the damage is P125 - NO
RULING:
1. To hold that the Justice of the Peace Court has jurisdiction to try cases of
damage to property through reckless negligence, because it has jurisdiction
over cases of malicious mischief, is to assume that the former offense is but
a variant of the latter. This assumption is not legally warranted.
liable for malicious mischief . — Any person who shall deliberately cause to
the property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next
preceding chapter shall be guilty of malicious mischief".
3. It has always been regarded of the essence of this felony that the offender
should have not only the general intention to carry out the felonious act (a
feature common to all willful crimes) but that he should act under the impulse
of a specific desire to inflict injury to another.
4. The necessity of the special malice for the crime of malicious mischief is
contained in the requirement of Art. 327 of our Revised Penal Code, already
quoted, that the offender "shall deliberately cause to the property of another
any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter", i.e.,
not punishable as arson.
5. It follows that, in the very nature of things, malicious mischief can not
be committed through negligence, since culpa (negligence) and malice
(or deliberateness) are essentially incompatible. Hence, the Supreme
Court of Spain in its decisions has expressly recognized that this crime
is one of those that can not be committed by imprudence or
negligence.
6. In negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental
attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, the lack of
care or foresight.
7. It is difficult to believe that the Legislature, in giving Justices of the Peace
jurisdiction to try cases of malicious mischief, did so in total disregard of the
principles and considerations above outlined. Our conclusion is that
"malicious mischief" as used in Section 87, par. 6, of the Judiciary Act, has
exclusive reference to the willful and deliberate crimes described in Arts. 327
to 331 of our Revised Penal Code, and to no other offense.
8. A further reason for this restrictive interpretation of the term "malicious
mischief" used in Sec. 87 of the Judiciary Act, is that the same constitutes an
exception to the general jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Courts in
criminal cases, which had always stood prior to the said Act at offenses
punishable with not more than 6 months imprisonment or a fine of not more
than P200.00 or both. To this traditional jurisdiction, the Judiciary Act added
8 specific exceptions in the form of felonies triable in said courts without
reference to the penalty imposable; and malicious mischief is one of these
exceptions, while imprudence resulting in damage to property is not one of
them.
DISPOSITIVE: For the foregoing reasons, we declare that the jurisdiction over the
offense in question lies exclusively in the Court of First Instance. Hence, the writ of
certiorari is granted and the order of remand to the Justice of the Peace Court is
reversed and set aside. Without pronouncement as to costs.

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 2. People v. Faller
G.R. No. 45964. April 26, 1939

TOPIC: Imprudence and negligence (Art. 365)

PETITIONERS: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENTS: RESTITURO FALLER (alias R. AGUILAR)

FACTS:
● Restituto Faller was charged with the crime of damage caused to another's
property maliciously and willfully
● CFI: the damage was not caused maliciously and willfully, but through
reckless imprudence, and sentenced Restituto Faller, under paragraph 3 of
article 365
● Appellant assigns as sole error of the court the fact that he was sentenced
for a crime with which he was not charged, contending that a crime
maliciously and willfully committed is different from that committed through
reckless imprudence.

ISSUE: W/N the accused may be convicted of the crime of damage (to property)
through reckless imprudence – YES. (Art. 365, para 3)

RULING:
● The appellant was convicted of the same crime of damage to property with
which he is charged.
● Reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself. It is simply a way of committing
it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability.
● The information alleges that the appellant acted willfully, maliciously,
unlawfully and criminally. To this information no objection was interposed.
● Negligence being a punishable criminal act when it results in a crime, the
allegation in the information that the appellant also committed the acts
charged unlawfully and criminally includes the charge that he acted with
negligence.

3. CARILLO v PEOPLE
229 SCRA 386
(1994)

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TOPIC: Imprudence and negligence (Art. 365)
PETITIONERS: LEANDRO CARILLO
RESPONDENTS: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
1. The deceased, Catherine Acosta, a 13-year old girl, daughter of Sps.
Domingo and Yolanda Acosta, complained to her father of pains in the lower
abdomen.
2. Dr. Madrid found that it might be appendicitis, so she was brought to
Baclaran General Hospital.
3. When she was brought inside the operating room, the child was feeling very
well.
4. Dr. Madrid operated on Catherine. He was assisted by Dr. Carillo, an
anesthesiologist.
5. When Yolanda, Catherine’s mother, was allowed to enter the operating
room, Dr. Madrid told her that Catherine was already out of danger but the
operation was not yet finished.
6. It has been established that the deceased was not weighed before the
administration of anesthesia.
7. When the operation was done and Catherine was brought out from the
operating room, she was observed to be
a. Shivering
b. Her heart beat was not normal
c. She was asleep and did not wake up
d. She was pale
e. She had difficulty breathing
8. When Catherine remained unconscious until noontime the next day, a
neurologist examined her and she was diagnosed as comatose.
9. 3 days later, Catherine died without regaining consciousness.
10. CA held:
a. Catherine had suffered from an overdose of, or an adverse reaction
to, anesthesia, particularly the arbitrary administration of Nubain, a
pain killer, without weighing the patient’s body mass, which weight
determines the dosage of Nubain which can safely be given to a
patient.
b. This condition triggered a heart attack as a post-operative
complication, depriving Catherine’s brain of oxygen, leading to the
brain’s hemorrhage.
c. Found criminal negligence on the part of the doctors, as both had
i. failed to observe the required standard of diligence in the
examination of Catherine prior to the actual administration
of anesthesia.
ii. failed to monitor Catherine’s heartbeat after the operation,
iii. left the hospital immediately after reviving Catherine’s
heartbeat, depriving the latter of immediate and expert
medical assistance when she suffered a heart attack 15-
30 mins. later.
Petitioner contends:
- The true cause of Catherine’s death was septicemia or blood poisoning due
to perforated appendix with peritonitis or severe infection, which had gone
up the head of Catherine, which resulted to the deprivation of the brain of
oxygen.
ISSUE w/ HOLDING: WON Dr. Carillo was guilty of simple negligence which
resulted in homicide. – YES.
1. The true or real cause of Catherine’s death is beside the point, what is necessary
to be delved into here is the set of circumstances which both the RTC and the
CA found constituted simple negligence on the part of the accused.
2. When the patient was wheeled out of the operating room, she manifested signs
of medical instability – shivering, paleness, irregular breathing, and weak
heartbeat.
a. She was not brought to intensive care unit, instead, she was only
brought to her assigned hospital bed and was provided with oxygen.
b. Both doctors left their patient and the hospital. 15 mins. later, she
suffered convulsions and cardiac arrest.
3. The conduct of Dr. Madrid and petitioner constituted inadequate care of their
patient in view of her vulnerable condition. Both doctors failed to
a. Appreciate the serious condition of their patient whose adverse physical
signs were quite manifest right after surgery.
b. Monitor their patient closely or extend further medical care to her, such
conduct was especially necessary in view of the inadequate, post-
operative facilities of the Baclaran General Hospital.
4. While Dr. Madrid and a cardiologist were containing the patient’s convulsions,
they decided to call in the petitioner.
a. There is a strong implication that the patient’s post-operative condition
must have been considered by the 2 doctors as in some way related to
the anesthetic treatment she had received from the petitioner either
during or after the surgical procedure.
5. Nubain was an experimental drug for anesthesia and post-operative pain, and
the medical literature required that a patient be weighed first before it is
administered and warned that there was no experience relating to the
administration thereof to a patient less than 18 years of age.
a. Yet the doctor’s order sheet did not contain this precaution, but instead
directed a reader to apply the drug only when warranted by the
circumstances.
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 b. Dr. Madrid admitted that this prescription, which was unsigned, was
made in his own handwriting.
c. The instruction was open-ended, that some individual still had to
determine if circumstances existed warranting administration of the drug
to the patient.
d. Since petitioner anesthesiologist entered subsequent prescriptions or
orders in the same order sheet, which were signed by him, he was in a
position to appreciate the dangers inherent in the prior prescription,
which was within petitioner’s area of specialization.
6. The rupture of the patient’s appendix occurred during the procedure, as there
had been no evidence that the rupture occurred before the procedure, and the
blood sample prior the operation only indicated a case of appendicitis without
further elaboration. She has not also been recommended to take antibiotics,
which are usually necessary if there is a suspected rupture.
a. The fact also that Dr. Madrid was 45 mins. late may be taken into
consideration, given that time is critical in cases of appendicitis. It may
have been that the condition worsened by the time he arrived and
started the operation.
7. People v. Vistan:
a. Simple negligence – mere lack of prevision in a situation where either
the threatened harm is not immediate or the danger not openly visible.
8. Thus, the following lead to the conclusion of simple negligence:
a. the failure of petitioner and Dr. Madrid to appreciate the serious post-
surgery condition of their patient and to monitor her condition and
provide close patient care to her;
b. the summons of petitioner by Dr. Madrid and the cardiologist after the
patient's heart attack on the very evening that the surgery was
completed;
c. the low level of care and diligence exhibited by petitioner in failing to
correct Dr. Madrid's prescription of Nubain for post-operative pain;
d. the extraordinary failure or refusal of petitioner and Dr. Madrid to inform
the parents of Catherine Acosta of her true condition after surgery, in
disregard of the requirements of the Code of Medical Ethics; and
e. the failure of petitioner and Dr. Madrid to prove that they had in fact
exercised the necessary and appropriate degree of care and diligence
to prevent the sudden decline in the condition of Catherine Acosta and
her death 3 days later

DISPOSITIVE: CA decision affirmed.

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 4. Gan vs CA what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
GR NO. L-44264 method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by
September 19, 1988 his own negligence.
4. The danger confronting petitioner was real and imminent, threatening her
TOPIC: Reckless Imprudence very existence. She had no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough
PETITIONERS: Gan time to heed the very powerful instinct of self-preservation.
RESPONDENTS: CA 5. The Court found that Gan was driving within the legal limits and that the
“emergency rule” applies to the accused
FACTS:
- In the morning of 4 July 1972, the accused Hedy Gan was driving along DISPOSITIVE:
North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. There were two vehicles parked on WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting petitioner HEDY GAN y YU of
one side of the road, one following the other. As the car driven by Gan the crime of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence. She is no longer liable for the
approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a P12,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the appellate court to the heirs of the victim.
vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried SO ORDERED.
to overtake the one in front of it thereby encroaching the lane of the car
driven by Gan. To avoid a head-on collision, Gan swerved to the right and as
a consequence, hit an old man who was about to cross the street, pinning
him against the rear of one of the parked vehicles. The force of the impact
caused the parked vehicle to move forward hitting the other parked vehicle
in front of it. The pedestrian was injured, Gan's car and the two parked
vehicle suffered damages. The pedestrian was pronounced dead on arrival
at the hospital.
- An information for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence was filed against
petitioner in view of the above incident
- The trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide
- The Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the trial court and sentenced
Hedy Gan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple imprudence resulting to
homicide

ISSUE: W/N the CA was correct in finding Gan guilty of simple imprudence resulting
to homicide - YES

RULING:
1. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the CA and acquitted Gan.
2. The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act
whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this:
Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence
of the course about to be pursued?
3. Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted
to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt

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 5. IBABAO v PEOPLE a. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal or lower than those
GR NO. L-36957 provided in the first 2 paragraphs, in which case the courts shall impose the
Sept. 28, 1984 penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed, in the
period which they may deem proper to apply
TOPIC: Imprudence and Negligence b. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile
PETITIONERS: Aniceto Ibabao Law, the death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant
RESPONDENTS: People of the Philippines and Court of Appeals shall be punished by PC in its med and max periods

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be
FACTS:
imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties
● Aniceto Ibabao was charged with homicide through reckless imprudence
such help as may be in his hands to give.
after he bumped a person with his jeep, drove away and failed to lend help
the injured person
2. The proviso stating that the provisions contained in the article shall not be
● The City Court of Davao found him guilty and applying ISLAW, sentenced
applicable clearly refers to the paragraphs immediately preceding it
him to a term of 1 year, 8 months and 20 days of PC as minimum to 4 years,
3. The last paragraph on failure to lend aid on the spot necessarily applies to
2 months and 1 day of PC as maximum (court followed PC in its medium
all situations envisioned in Art. 365 whenever there is an injured party
and maximum period)
4. However, there is merit in Ibabao’s contention that the increased penalty is
● CA modified the decision
inapplicable to him due to the fact that his failure to give aid on the spot was
○ Imposable penalty is PC in its medium and maximum period
not alleged in the Information. Despite this, SC agreed with CA that failure to
○ Considering that Ibabao failed to stop and give aid to the victim, the
render assistance constitutes a qualifying circumstance (increases penalty
penalty should be 1 degree higher which is PM in its min and med
by one degree). As such it must be alleged in the information
periods
5. SC was not inclined to consider failure to lend assistance as a generic
○ Applying ISLAW, penalty should be from 3 years, 6 months and 21
aggravating circumstance since it’s not listed under Art. 14
days of PC as minimum to 7 years, 4 months and 1 day of PM

DISPOSITIVE: Penalty imposed by CA was modified to an indeterminate sentence of

ISSUE: W/N Ibabao’s failure to lend aid to his victim justifies the imposition of the
2 years and 4 months of PC as minimum to 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of PC as
penalty next higher in degree than the imposable penalty under Art. 365?- YES
maximum
RULING:
1. Art. 365 of RPC. Imprudence and negligence -- Any person who, by
reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional
would constitute a...
a. grave felony, = AM in its max period to PC in its med period
b. less grave felony = AMy in min and med periods
c. light felony = AMn in its max period

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an

act
which would constitute a…
a. Grave felony = AMy in its med and max periods
b. Less serious = Amy in minimum period

Provisions shall not be applicable:

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 6. People vs Buan 4. The law penalizes the negligent or careless act, not the result
G.R. No. L-25366 thereof.The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
March 29, 1968 determine the penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the offense.
5. As the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
TOPIC: Quasi Offense of Criminal Negligence person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one
PETITIONER: Jose Buan and the same, and cannot be split into different crimes and
RESPONDENT: People of the Philippines prosecutions.
6. Thus, the acquittal of Jose Buan of the charge of slight physical injuries
FACTS: through reckless imprudence (first case), prevents his being prosecuted for
1. The accused was driving a passenger bus along MacArthur Highway in serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence (second case), where
Bulacan. Allegedly because of his negligence and recklessness, the vehicle both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same
driven by him struck and collided with a passenger jeep, damaging said jeep vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in
and injuring its passengers. double jeopardy for the same offense.
2. Six of the passengers suffered slight physical injuries, three other riders
came out with serious bodily injuries, while the jeep was damaged to the
extent of P1,395.00.
3. A charge was filed against the accused-appellant, one for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence, in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Guiguinto, for which he was tried and acquitted.
4. Prior to this acquittal, however, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed in the
Court of First Instance the information in the instant case, for serious
physical injuries, and damage to property through reckless imprudence.
Admittedly, both charges referred to the same highway collision.
5. When the accused was arraigned in the Court of First Instance, his counsel
moved to quash the charges on the ground that he had already been
acquitted of the same offense by the Justice of the Peace Court.
6. The prosecution opposed the motion and the Court denied the motion to
quash. Unable to secure reconsideration, the accused appealed to this
Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the second case placed the appellant twice in jeopardy for
the same offense, and is barred by the previous acquittal – YES, second
case is barred because of double jeopardy

RULING:
1. The lower court erred in not dismissing the information for the second case,
in view of the appellant's previous acquittal by the Justice of the Peace Court
of Guiguinto, Bulacan, for the same imprudence.
2. Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence,
the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act.
3. The essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent
act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony.
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 7. BUERANO V. CA include and is not necessarily included in the 1st charge w/c is the physical
GR NO. L-30269 injuries case. 5) Appellant was never tried at all in the JP court of Tanay for
JULY 19, 1982 the crime of damage to property.
- This view of the CA was inspire b the ruling of this Court in the pre-was case
TOPIC: Imprudence and negligence; BP 129 of People v. Estipona. However, in the case of People v. Bian, this Court,
PETITIONERS: Epitacio Buerano speaking thru Justice Reyes held that: The law penalizes thus the negligent
RESPONDENTS: CA & People or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only
taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the
substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
FACTS:
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense
- Petitioner Buerano was the driver of the LTB bus w/c collided w/ the
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into
Mabuhay Bakery delivery panel driven by Hipolito Vismonte and owned by
different crimes and prosecutions. exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan,
Chu Yu in Tanay, Rizal.
by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of
- The Chief of Police of Tanay filed w/ the Municipal Judge a criminal case
the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents
against Buerano for the crime of slight and serious physical injuries thru
his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
reckless imprudence.
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both
- After trial, Buerano was found guilty of sight and less serious physical
charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular
injuries thru reckless imprudence and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment
accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second
from 1 month and 1 day to 2 months and to pay the cost of the suit. He
jeopardy for the same offense."
appealed to the CFI. CFI affirmed the decision and sentenced Buerano to
suffer 4 months of arresto mayor & to pay the costs.
- In the meantime, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal filed a crim case against ISSUE: W/N CA erred in not sustaining Buerano’s plea of double jeopardy - YES
Buerano in the CFI charging him w/ crime of damage to property thru
reckless imprudence. He filed a motion to quash on the ground of jeopardy RULING:
because he has been previously convicted of the offense charged. Fiscal 1. Then SolGen, in his Manifestation, admits that the CA erred in not sustaining
contended that the crime for w/c he was convicted was for less serious the plea of double jeopardy.
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, whereas the 2nd case is damage 2. He stressed that if DP exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide or
to property thru reckless imprudence, w/c are distinct offenses. physical injuries, then the same consequence must perforce follow where
- CFI denied the motion to quash, and after trial, found Buerano guilty of the same reckless act caused merely damage to property - not death - and
damage to property thru reckless imprudence. physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a
- Petitioner appealed to the CA, which sustained the CFI and sentenced vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused
Buerano to pay a fine of P4,387 w/c is double the amount of damages to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap.
suffered by the delivery truck w/ subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P2,193.50 as DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction in Criminal Case No. CA-
damages suffered by the delivery truck. G.R. No. 05123-CR is hereby set aside and petitioner is acquitted of the offense
- CA held that there was no double jeopardy because: 1) neither in the JP charged therein. SO ORDERED.
court nor in the CFI on appeal was the appellant convicted or acquitted of
the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence or the case
against him for that offense dismissed or otherwise terminated w/o his
express consent. 2) The JP court w/c found him guilty in of the slight and
less serious physical injury case was not a court of competent jurisdiction to
the the offense of damage to property involving P2,193 because the
imposable penalty may be 3x the aforesaid amt. 3) Appellant could not have
validly pleaded before the JP court to the said offense of damage to prop. 4)
The offense damage to prop was alleged in the 2nd crim case does not
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 8. Cuyos v Garcia
G.R. No. L-46934. April 15, 1988
TOPIC: Imprudence and negligence (Art. 365); BP 129
PETITIONERS: ALFREDO CUYOS y TULOR
RESPONDENTS: HON. NICOLAS P. GARCIA, Presiding Judge, Municipal Court,
San Fernando, Pampanga and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
● Petitioner Alfredo Cuyos seeks to set aside the Order 1977 issued by
respondent Municipal Court Judge Nicolas P. Garcia in Criminal Case No.
77-1848 denying petitioner's Motion to Transfer said case to the then Court
of First Instance of Pampanga for trial on the merits.
● Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, with homicide with multiple serious physical injuries and damage
to property, through reckless imprudence.
● Petitioner was a driver of a cargo truck which had collided with a
Volkswagen automobile in a vehicular accident which resulted in the death
of one (1) person and physical injuries to four (4) other people.
● Before trial could commence, petitioner filed a "Motion to Remand the Case
to the Court of First Instance for Trial", alleging lack of jurisdiction over the
case on the part of the Municipal Court.
○ He argues that the criminal complaint alleged that the Volkswagen
car involved in the accident had suffered damages amounting to
P18,000.00, and that under paragraph 3, Article 365, the crime with
which he was charged would carry a fine in an amount ranging from
the amount of the damage to three (3) times the value of the
damage alleged (i.e. 3 x P18,000.00 or P54,000.00).
○ That respondent Municipal Court of the Provincial Capital of
Pampanga, had jurisdiction only over offenses punishable by a fine
not exceeding P6,000.00, so that the case had to be transferred to
the Court of First Instance(RTC).
ISSUE: W/N the respondent Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga has
jurisdiction to try the criminal case against petitioner - NO. [RTC]
RULING:
● The criminal case involves a complex crime of homicide, multiple serious
physical injuries and damage to property, resulting from reckless
imprudence. It is complex crime constituted by two (2) or more grave or less
grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime is to be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.
● The relative seriousness of offenses is determined by the seriousness of the
penalties attached by the law to the several offenses.
● homicide through reckless imprudence - prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods/ correctional penalty; fine of 200 or more but
does not exceed 6000
● damage to property through reckless imprudence - a fine ranging from
an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but
which shall in no case be less than P25.00.
● A fine may be an afflictive penalty = if it exceeds P6,000
● Correctional penalty = P200.00 or more but does not exceed P6,000
● Grave felony = if the imposable fine is afflictive
● Less grave felony = if fine is merely correctional
○ In the instant case, the maximum fine which may be imposed upon
petitioner is P54,000.00 (3 x P18,000.00), obviously an afflictive
penalty and hence, in the scheme of the Revised Penal Code, more
serious than the penalty imposable for homicide through reckless
imprudence.
● Under B.P. Blg. 129, the criminal case against petitioner falls within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
● Section 32 (2) Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts have:
"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four (4) years and two (2) months,
or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine
and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or
other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses
or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount
thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos."
● Since the maximum fine imposable in the present case is P54,000.00, and
the maximum imprisonment imposable (for the homicide through reckless
imprudence) is six (6) years, clearly, the criminal charge involved falls
outside the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court and consequently within
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando Pampanga.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Order of the respondent Municipal Court of 9
September 1977 is hereby SET ASIDE as null and void and the Temporary
Restraining Order issued by this Court on 26 September 1977 is hereby made
PERMANENT. Because the proceedings before the respondent Municipal Court are
null and void, the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga will have to file a new information
against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga. No
pronouncement as to costs.
9 | TITLE XIV
10 | TITLE XIV