A Week in the War: Afghanistan, Dec.

8-14, 2010
December 14, 2010 | 1914 GMT

STRATFOR

White House Review

The review of the counterinsurgency-focused strategy being pursued in Afghanistan is expected to be

formally completed this week, with U.S. President Barack Obama scheduled to issue his assessment of
the strategy on Dec. 16, only days after the Dec. 13 death of the top U.S. diplomat to the country,
Richard Holbrooke. Though whatever information released to the public on the review will be worth
examining, its broader strokes seem all but preordained at this point. At the November NATO summit
in Lisbon, Obama pledged to hand over responsibility for the overall security situation in the country by
2014 — which means U.S. and allied combat forces will be engaged in the country for years to come. In
addition, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen announced Dec. 13 during a trip to
Afghanistan that he did not foresee any big reductions in American forces, though a modest withdrawal
was still slated to begin in line with the previously announced July 2011 deadline.

Indeed, virtually every statement on the subject from senior White House and Pentagon officials sounds
the same refrain: Progress is in fact being made, the momentum of the Taliban is being reversed, but it
is a delicate, decisive time and there will only be modest troop reductions starting in July 2011. There
has been no indication that the forthcoming report will deviate substantively from this position. On his
visit to Afghanistan last week, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates declared the strategy to be working,
a strong indication of what the tone of the upcoming report will be.
Nawa and Marjah

At the heart of what the military — particularly the U.S. Marines and British forces in Helmand
province — considers a sign of progress is the village of Nawa-i-Barakzayi, commonly shortened to
“Nawa.” The area, south of the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah in the Helmand River valley, has been
a focus of operations since the middle of 2009, when a Marine battalion was deployed there. Today,
military leaders walk the busy central bazaar without body armor and students are attending school,
which was barred when Nawa and other parts of Helmand were under Taliban control. This progress is
being touted as evidence that the current strategy can work. Indeed, a paved road is being built (the first
in the central Helmand River valley that is U.S. Marine Regimental Combat Team-1’s area of
operations) to connect Nawa to Lashkar Gah. In other words, finding ways to link and speed Nawa’s
economic development and interconnectedness with the capital, which itself is connected by road to
Kandahar and the Ring Road, is seen as central to entrenching recent gains and establishing a more
sustainable opposition to the Taliban.

To the west lies the farming community of Marjah — a proof-of-concept operation itself that saw some
initial disappointments on the pace of progress. On Dec. 7, U.S. Marine Maj. Gen. Richard Mills,
Commanding General, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), declared that the battle in Marjah is
over, and while this may be a questionable assertion regarding areas on the outskirts of the community,
it is certainly a credible argument for the more populous central areas. Patrols in those areas have
become much less kinetic and faced a lower threat from improvised explosive devices than they did in
the spring and summer (a pattern consistent with Nawa, where the Marine battalion boasts not having
fired a shot on patrol in months). Meanwhile, a local community police initiative in Marjah has also
proven successful there.

The Lisbon commitment of combat forces until 2014 provides time to consolidate what are thus far
fragile gains in the heart of Taliban territory. Mills also reiterated plans for an aggressive winter
campaign to “continue to press extraordinarily hard on all fronts” in an attempt to fundamentally change
the dynamics of the conflict in Helmand by the spring thaw. Helmand is not as rugged as other Afghan
provinces, though the wet and cold weather still impacts operational mobility and the rudimentary and
unimproved infrastructure. Nevertheless, the Taliban will be feeling the pressure this winter, and the
strategy is not without its logic — Mills claimed that his Taliban “counterpart” had left for Pakistan for
the winter dressed as a woman.

Attack in Zhari

Despite progress in areas like Nawa, the Taliban have not and will not let up completely. On Dec. 12, a
large vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) — a small minivan — was detonated next to
a small, recently established joint outpost in Sangsar in Zhari district west of Kandahar city. Six U.S.
soldiers were killed, and a dozen more American and Afghan troops were wounded.

Though it is difficult to provide a full tactical account of the attack at this point, a road appears to have
run along the compound’s outer wall, which appears to have served as a structural wall for a building
inside the compound (casualties were also reportedly related to the roof collapsing). The mud brick
walls of Afghan compounds are often considered sufficient for forming portions of the perimeter of U.S.
bases in Helmand and can admittedly absorb some punishment. But they are not blast walls, and it is
difficult to defend against large VBIEDs (the Dec. 12 VBIED was reportedly heard from eight miles
away) without some stand-off distance. While finding a location that provides stand-off distance is
ideal, there are many considerations that go into the selection of a position, including access to main
roads able to sustain large, heavy Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected All-Terrain Vehicles that provide
supplies and support. The entire purpose of the patrol base is often to establish a presence on a key
supply route or intersection.

While a post-attack analysis will undoubtedly find some failing with the selection or preparation of the
position, underlying realities make it nearly impossible to find a location that is both extremely secure
and useful to the war effort. In a counterinsurgency-focused effort, being out among the population —
and not aloof in large, imposing armored vehicles or behind layers and layers of protection — has
played an important role in the successes achieved in places like Nawa, Marjah and elsewhere.

Furthermore, while forces have been deliberately massed in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, they are
still spread extremely thin, a challenge that will only deepen as they expand their area of operations, for
example, to Sangin district farther north in Helmand and along the Arghandab River valley in Kandahar.
By the time forces are dispersed to a small position, there is not always a great deal of manpower for
even basic tasks. Being accessible — focused on relations with the local population — and being
focused on security are goals often in tension with one another, and an effective counterinsurgency
strategy necessarily includes vulnerability. Military commanders strolling down the street in an Afghan
bazaar without body armor do not do so because it is safe (their protective details dread it) but because it
is an enormously important gesture.

If the Taliban can force the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to hunker down on larger,
better-defended forward operating bases, never go out on smaller patrols and not hold isolated positions,
they will have achieved an important end: undermining the counterinsurgency effort. The momentum of
the surge of Western forces into Afghanistan and ongoing offensive efforts are not likely to be reversed
any time soon. But how the ISAF balances counterinsurgency and force protection will remain an
important element of the war effort moving forward — as will the Taliban’s ability to continue to inflict
casualties over the winter in the face of a concerted campaign to drive them from their home territory.

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