During the trial, the Prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: (a) Dr.

Nelson Macaraniag, (b)

Alexander Tamayao, (c) Romulo Cabalza and (d) Estelita Batulan. Their version follows. Tamayao was
on Tamayao Street in Atulayan Norte, Tuguegarao at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of August
22, 1990 when a young man came running from the house of Vicente Danao towards the house of
Batulan, shouting that his Uncle Totoy (Batulan) had been stabbed. Tamayao rushed towards
Danao’s house, which was about 30 meters from his own house, and there he saw Dulin stabbing
Batulan who was already prostrate face down.

Tamayao mentioned of the long standing grudge between Batulan and Dulin, and of seeing them
fighting in April 1990. He recalled Dulin uttering on two occasions: He will soon have his day and I
will kill him.

Cabalza, a barangay tanod, was in his house around 10:00 o’clock in the evening of August 22, 1990
when he heard the commotion in Danao’s house which was facing his house. It was Carolina,
Danao’s daughter, screaming for help. He thus sought out a fellow barangay tanod. On his return to
the scene, he found Batulanat the door of Danao’s house, with Dulin wielding a sharp pointed
instrument, about 6-7 inches long. Fearing for his safety, he rushed to the Barangay Hall to seek the
assistance of Edwin Cabalza and Nanding Buenaflor to bring Batulan to the Provincial Hospital in
Carig, Tuguegarao.5

Estelita recalled that Tamayao went to her house around 10:00 o’clock in the evening of August 22,
1990 to inform her that Dulin had stabbed her husband in Danao’s house. At the hospital, she was
told that her husband had sustained two wounds in the back and several stab wounds in the front,
and was being attended to at the hospital’s intensive care unit (ICU) before he expired.

Estelita said that Barangay Captain Meman went to her husband’s wake and repeated what he had
said to her about Dulin. But when she later on sought out Barangay Captain Meman to ask him to
confirm what he had told her about Dulin’s vowing to kill her husband, Barangay Captain Meman’s
response was: I’m sorry I cannot go and declare what I have stated because I am afraid of FREDDIE
and he will kill all those persons who will testify in their favor.6

Estelita mentioned of the heated discussion between her husband and his nephew, Seong Bancud, in
front of Danao’s house in April 1990. On that occasion, Dulin wielded a knife with which he tried to
stab her husband. Dulin was pacified only when she went to the aid of her husband, but she then
heard Dulin saying: You will soon have your day, I will kill you.7

Batulan died on August 24, 1990 at 12:15 a.m.; the cause of death to be "Hypovolemic shock
secondary to Massive Hemothorax secondary to Multiple stab wounds."

In his defense, Dulin testified that as he (Dulin) approached Bancud, Batulan, the cousin of his (Dulin)
mother, stabbed him on the right side of his body and in the left hand; that he complained to
Batulan: Uncle, you hit me (Dinisgrasya nakun), but Batulan replied: I will really kill you; that he
(Dulin) ran to the upper level of Carolina Danao’s house, pursued by Batulan who stabbed him again
several times; that they grappled for the weapon until he (Dulin) was able to wrest it from Batulan;
that he (Dulin) stabbed Batulan with the weapon, and they struggled until he (Dulin) felt weak,
eventually falling to the ground; and that he (Dulin) regained consciousness only the next day at the
hospital.

On December 29, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision convicting Dulin of murder,14 to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Alfredo Dulin guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and appreciating the privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense and no aggravating circumstance

Decision of the CA

In his appeal, Dulin contended that his crime should be homicide instead of murder, considering the
RTC’s appreciation of incomplete self-defense as a privileged mitigating circumstance; and that even
if self-defense should be unavailing, he could be found guilty only of homicide because it was the
victim who had first attacked by stabbing him, and that the multiple wounds inflicted on the victim
did not mean that he had not been justified in killing the victim. He argued that the penalty imposed
on him was incorrect considering the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the presence of
the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.

On August 26, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction subject to the modification of the civil liability,
decreeing:

The Court agrees with the OSG representing the State that the penalty requires modification. The
Court a quo committed error in the imposition of the proper penalty. The crime committed by
appellant in the case at bench is murder qualified by treachery. There being no aggravating and no
mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua. Where no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the medium period of the
imposable penalty, which is reclusion perpetua, should be imposed by the trial court.

Issues

In this appeal, Dulin submits the following issues for our review and consideration, to wit:

Whether or not there was a valid self defense

Whether or not treachery attended the killing of batulan

The appeal is partly meritorious.

There was no self-defense

The accused who pleads self-defense admits the authorship of the crime. The burden of proving self-
defense rests entirely on him, that he must then prove by clear and convincing evidence the
concurrence of the following elements of self-defense, namely: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)

reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression as the condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense is aptly described in
People v. Nugas, as follows:

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance
of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself.
The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression
from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril
must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the
concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or
material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the
attack or assault must be unlawful.

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent
unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or
with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the
injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of
happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but
must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or
opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a
mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver
was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.

(after taking the weapon from batulan, the element of unlawful aggression ceased to exist.)

We uphold the finding and holding of the CA. Batulan, albeit the initial aggressor against Dulin,
ceased to be the aggressor as soon as Dulin had dispossessed him of the weapon. Whatever Dulin
did thereafter – like stabbing Batulan with the weapon – constituted retaliation against Batulan. In
this regard, retaliation was not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that the victim
started already ceased when the accused attacked him, but in self-defense, the aggression was still
continuing when the accused injured the aggressor.23 As such, there was no unlawful aggression on
the part of Batulan to justify his fatal stabbing by Dulin.
Still, Dulin vigorously insists that the initial aggression employed by Batulan did not cease because
the latter followed him into Danao’s house with the singular purpose of ending his life; and that
there was no gap in the aggression initiated by Batulan.

The insistence is unwarranted. Dulin admitted having successfully disarmed Batulan and then
running away from him. With the aggression by Batulan having thereby ceased, he did not anymore
pose any imminent threat against Dulin. Hence, Batulan was not committing any aggression when
Dulin fatally stabbed him.

It is notable, too, that the results of the medico-legal examination indicating Batulan to have
sustained twelve stab wounds confirmed the cessation of the attack by Batulan. The numerosity and
nature of the wounds inflicted by the accused reflected his determination to kill Batulan, and the
fact that he was not defending himself.

II.

Incomplete self-defense was not proved

Pursuant to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law. For
this purpose, the accused must prove the existence of the majority of the elements for self-defense,
but unlawful aggression, being an indispensable element, must be present. Either or both of the
other requisites may be absent, namely: reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it, or the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.27

Dulin posits that the totality of circumstances indicated that his acts constituted incomplete self-
defense, and must be appreciatedas a privileged mitigating circumstance.28

Dulin’s position is untenable. Like in complete self-defense, Dulin should prove the elements of
incomplete self-defense by first credibly establishing that the victim had committed unlawful
aggression against him. With Batulan’s aggression having already ceased from the moment that
Dulin divested Batulan of the weapon, there would not be any incomplete self-defense. Moreover,
as borne out by his stabbing of Batulan several times, Dulin did not act in order to defend himself or
to repel any attack, but instead to inflict injury on Batulan.

III.
The RTC and CA erred in appreciating

the attendance of treachery

Murder is the unlawful killing of any person attended by any of the circumstances listed Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code. Treachery, which was alleged in the information, is one such qualifying
circumstance.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means
and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.Two conditions must concur in order for treachery to be appreciated, namely: one, the
assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and two, said means, methods or
forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. Treachery, whenever
alleged in the information and competently and clearly proved, qualifies the killing and raises it to
the category of murder.

Based on the established facts, Dulin and Batulan grappled for control of the weapon Batulan had
initially wielded against Dulin, who divested Batulan of it and ran with it into the house of Danao,
with Batulan in immediate pursuit. They continued to grapple for the weapon inside the house of
Danao, and it was at that point when Dulin stabbed Batulan several times. Under the circumstances,
treachery should not be appreciated in the killing of Batulan because the stabbing by Dulin did not
take Batulan by surprise due to his having been sufficiently forewarned of Dulin’s impending
assault,32 and being thus afforded the opportunity to defend himself, or to escape, or even to
recover control of the weapon from Dulin. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without
warning, or is done in a swift, deliberate and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed
and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape, without the slightest provocation on the
part of the victim.33 The mode of attack must not spring from the unexpected turn of events.

Consequently, Dulin should be liable only for homicide, the penalty for which is reclusion temporal.
People vs Don vega

Facts: [O]n 18 January 2009 at about 11:30 in the evening, the victim, Manuel Padilla Isip, was at
Arellano Street, Malate, Manila because his friend, a certain Ogad Venus, was celebrating his
birthday. They were around fifteen at that time including the celebrator. While drinking, chatting,
and listening to music, they spotted accused Don Vega who was about four [arms'] length away
sniffing rugby from a bottle. After a few hours, Don Vega approached them and caused a
disturbance. He smashed several items. Victim Manuel Isip tried to pacify the accused saying, "pre,
huwag naman dito, kasi may nagkakasiyahan dito" but accused harshly replied, "huwag kang
makialam dito, baka ikaw ang samain." Victim Manuel Isip did not comment and merely turned his
back to avert a bigger trouble. While the victim's back was turned on him, accused suddenly grabbed
[the] victim from behind, wrapped his left arm around [the] victim's neck and using his right hand,
plunged a knife to his (Manuel's) chest.

The victim (Manuel Isip) suffered six stab wounds and one abrasion on the body. The cause of his
death is [sic] the four stab wounds that penetrated the frontal cavities of the chest.4

Version of the Defense

The defense offered the lone testimony of Don, which was recounted by the RTC in its Decision, in
this manner:

For its part, the defense presented accused himself, who painted an entirely different picture of the
incident. He claimed that on 18 January 2009, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, [h]e was along
Tuazon St., San Andres, Manila, drinking with victim Manuel Isip and a certain "Fernandez," together
with the birthday celebrator called "Ogad." A certain "Jeffrey" and the father of the celebrator were
also there. More than fifteen joined the drinking spree. The mood was fine. He requested victim
Manuel Isip to play his theme song. The victim asked him to wait because there were many who
made similar request[s]. He reiterated his request to victim several times but he ignored him. He
then approached the victim, but the latter punched him. Upset, he went back to his table and picked
up a bladed weapon. Victim Manuel Isip suddenly charged towards him, so he stabbed him. He
thought the people will pacify him (accused), but he was wrong. He then dashed to his house
because people were ganging up on him. He was apprehended inside his abode and he voluntarily
surrendered to those who arrested him. [The victim] was unarmed. It was unfortunate because he
did not have previous "bad blood" with [the] victim. He regrets what has happened; it was unwilled.

RTC convicted Don of the crime of Murder

Affirmed by CA

Whether the CA erred in affirming Don's conviction for Murder.

The appeal is partly meritorious.

An accused who pleads self-defense admits to the commission of the crime charged.
He has the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the killing was
attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting
to self-defense. Of these three, unlawful aggression is indispensable. Unlawful
aggression refers to "an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real
imminent injury, upon a person."27 Without unlawful aggression, the justifying
circumstance of self-defense has no leg to stand on and cannot be appreciated.

The Court agrees with the CA that Don failed to discharge his burden. All the
requisites of self-defense are wanting in this case:

First, there is no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. For unlawful aggression to be
present, there must be real danger to life or personal safety.29 Accordingly, the accused must
establish the concurrence of the three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a
physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent;
and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.30 None of the elements of unlawful aggression was
proven by the defense.

Second, in the absence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the second requisite of self-
defense could not have been present. Even assuming that there was unlawful aggression, the means
employed by Don in repelling the alleged attack by Manuel was not reasonably necessary. Manuel
was unarmed and had his back turned while Don used a bladed weapon to "repel the attack" and
stab Manuel repeatedly

Lastly, the third requisite requires the person mounting a defense to be reasonably blameless. He or
she must not have antagonized or incited the attacker into launching an assault. In this case, Don
was not entirely blameless as the reason why Manuel scolded him was because he was breaking
things and making unnecessary disturbance. It was also Don who suddenly rushed to the victim and
stabbed the latter several times in the chest.

Hence, the Court finds that Don failed to prove that he acted in self-defense.

Treachery was not established

by clear and convincing evidence

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means
and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.41
To qualify as an offense, the following conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed means,
methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity
to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to
defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself.

In the case at bar, the following circumstances negate the presence of treachery:

First, the stabbing incident happened during a drinking spree in which Don was already a part of. He
did not deliberately seek the presence of Manuel as he was already in the same vicinity as Manuel,
joining the merriment when he stabbed the latter.
Second, in killing Manuel, Don merely picked up a bladed weapon from his table - there was no
mention in the records as to who owned the said weapon. In a similar case, the Court held that
treachery cannot be presumed merely from the fact that the attack was sudden. The suddenness of
an attack does not, of itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the purpose was to kill, so
long as the decision was made all of a sudden and the victim's helpless position was accidental.46

Based on the first and second circumstances abovementioned, Don's decision to attack Manuel was
more of a sudden impulse on his part than a planned decision.

Lastly, as testified to by the witnesses of the prosecution, the incident happened during a drinking
spree where there were more or less 15 people, excluding Don and Manuel. If Don wanted to make
certain that no risk would come to him, he could have chosen another time and place to stab
Manuel.

Tabuena vs People

Facts: Facts:

The petitioner in this case is tabuena who was charged with the crime of malversation by the
sandiganbayan.

Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the president’s
office and in cash what the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) owes the Philippine
National Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7 January 1985 memorandum of then
Minister Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin. Tabuena agreed. About a week later, Tabuena received
from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated 8
January 1986 reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction. In obedience to President
Marcos’ verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo G. Dabao and
Adolfo Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3) withdrawals.
On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal was made for P25 Million, following a letter of even date
signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting the PNB extension office at the MIAA the depository
branch of MIAA funds, to issue a manager’s check for said amount payable to Tabuena. The check
was encashed, however, at the PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao and the cashier of the PNB Villamor
branch counted the money after which, Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25 Million in cash was
delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs. Gimenez did not issue any receipt for
the money received. Similar circumstances surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment and
delivery of another P25 Million, made on 16 January 1986. The third and last withdrawal was made
on 31 January 1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena’s co-signatory to the letter- request for a
manager’s check for this amount. Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the PNB Villamor branch as
Tabuena requested him to do the counting of the P5 Million. After the counting, the money was
loaded in the trunk of Tabuena’s car. Peralta did not go with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs.
Gimenez’ office. It was only upon delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all
the amounts she received from Tabuena. The receipt was dated January 30,1986. Tabuena and
Peralta were charged for malversation of funds, while Dabao remained at large. One of the justices
of the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused
themselves; the volume of the questions asked were more the combined questions of the counsels.
On 12 October 1990, they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

One of the defense of tabuena is that they acted in good faith by merely following the instruction in
the presidential memorandum.

Issue: whether tabuena is guilty of the crime charged thereof

Ruling: Going now to the defense of good faith, it is settled that this is a valid defense in a
prosecution for malversation for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the accused. To
constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by
a criminal intent.

Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS
Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with
the presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is something easier said than done. Marcos was
undeniably Tabuena's superior — the former being then the President of the Republic who
unquestionably exercised control over government agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC. (justifying
circumstance acting in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.)

In other words, Marcos had a say in matters involving inter-government agency affairs and
transactions, such as for instance, directing payment of liability of one entity to another and the
manner in which it should be carried out. And as a recipient of such kind of a directive coming from
the highest official of the land no less, good faith should be read on Tabuena's compliance, without
hesitation nor any question, with the MARCOS Memorandum. Tabuena therefore is entitled to the
justifying circumstance of "Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for
some lawful purpose."16 The subordinate-superior relationship between Tabuena and Marcos is
clear. And so too, is the lawfulness of the order contained in the MARCOS Memorandum, as it has
for its purpose partial payment of the liability of one government agency (MIAA) to another (PNCC).

STOP HERE

Optional

However, the unlawfulness of the MARCOS Memorandum was being argued, on the observation, for
instance, that the Ongpin Memo referred to in the presidential directive reveals a liability of only
about P34.5 Million. Granting this to be true, it will not nevertheless affect Tabuena's goad faith so
as to make him criminally liable. What is more significant to consider is that the MARCOS
Memorandum is patently legal (for on its face it directs payment of an outstanding liability) and that
Tabuena acted under the honest belief that the P55 million was a due and demandable debt and
that it was just a portion of a bigger liability to PNCC. Thus, even if the order is illegal if it is patently
legal and the subordinate is not aware of its illegality, the subordinate is not liable, for then there
would only be a mistake of fact committed in good faith.
People vs Genosa

Facts: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant
herein. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter,
Ben changed and the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent.
Appellant testified that every time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and
sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified
during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled and the victim
beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another room. Appellant admitted having
killed the victim with the use of a gun. The information for parricide against appellant, however,
alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe.
Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court
found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravating
circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION
praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of
the cause of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the
inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review
or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said
psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION
of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or
psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman syndrome” plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses
on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by
the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records.

The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There is no showing of the
victim's position relative to appellant's at the time of the shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is the
rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as
a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have
anticipated aggression from the assailant.85

Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must
have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the
unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.86 There is no
showing, though, that the present appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully
attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the
contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same
moment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that
she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order
to ensure its execution, this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.
ISSUE:

1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome” as
constituting self defense.

2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the
“battered woman syndrome”.

A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful
physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to
do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate
relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must
go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship
with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a
battered woman.”

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of
violence,” which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident;
and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered
woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner.
Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in
the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest
belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the
batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the
accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken
altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts
of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly characterizing
the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but
appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through
a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the
cycle.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal
right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of
self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must
face a real threat on one’s life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not
merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-
defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and
unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the
present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already
been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom. During that
time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the
danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual
threat on her life or safety.

The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however, taken
in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as
well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.

The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the
batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her
psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power
without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.

As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally
produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is
committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper
acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance,
the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce
such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.

2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as
the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument
or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased
may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must
have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the
unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.
There is no showing, though, that the present appellant intentionally chose a specific means of
successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might
make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the
same moment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof
that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in
order to ensure its execution, this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.

The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or
obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in
spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put
her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to
vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the
presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty
is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the
minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may
immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless
she is being held for some other lawful cause.

NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise known as Anti-
Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides
that "xxx. Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered women
syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the absence of any of the
elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"

Proper Penalty

The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have been found to
have attended the commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree,
pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 588 of the same Code.89 The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period is imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken into
account in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other modifying circumstances were shown
to have attended the commission of the offense.90 Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is next lower in degree -- prision
mayor -- and the maximum shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as
minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum.
Noting that appellant has already served the minimum period, she may now apply for and be
released from detention on parole.91