Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 78517 February 27, 1989

GABINO ALITA, JESUS JULIAN, JR., JESUS JULIAN, SR., PEDRO RICALDE, VICENTE
RICALDE and ROLANDO SALAMAR, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE M. REYES, PAZ M. REYES and FE M.
REYES, respondents.

Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance for petitioners.

Leonardo N. Zulueta for Enrique Reyes, et al. Adolfo S. Azcuna for private respondents.

PARAS, J.:

Before us is a petition seeking the reversal of the decision rendered by the respondent Court of
Appeals**on March 3, 1987 affirming the judgment of the court a quo dated April 29, 1986, the
dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reading as follows;

WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by this Court on November 5, 1982 is

hereby reconsidered and a new judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring that Presidential Decree No. 27 is inapplicable to lands obtained thru

the homestead law,

2. Declaring that the four registered co-owners will cultivate and operate the
farmholding themselves as owners thereof; and

3. Ejecting from the land the so-called tenants, namely; Gabino Alita, Jesus
Julian, Sr., Jesus Julian, Jr., Pedro Ricalde, Vicente Ricalde and Rolando
Salamar, as the owners would want to cultivate the farmholding themselves.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. (p. 31, Rollo)

The facts are undisputed. The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of land,
acquired by private respondents' predecessors-in-interest through homestead patent under the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Said lands are situated at Guilinan, Tungawan,
Zamboanga del Sur.
Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners
refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and appurtenant regulations
issued by the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (DAR for short), now Department of Agrarian
Reform (MAR for short).

On June 18, 1981, private respondents (then plaintiffs), instituted a complaint against Hon.
Conrado Estrella as then Minister of Agrarian Reform, P.D. Macarambon as Regional Director
of MAR Region IX, and herein petitioners (then defendants) for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all
other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders issued in connection therewith as
inapplicable to homestead lands.

Defendants filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses of July 8, 1981.

Subsequently, on July 19, 1982, plaintiffs filed an urgent motion to enjoin the defendants from
declaring the lands in litigation under Operation Land Transfer and from being issued land
transfer certificates to which the defendants filed their opposition dated August 4, 1982.

On November 5, 1982, the then Court of Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District, Branch IV,
Pagadian City (now Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch XVIII) rendered its
decision dismissing the said complaint and the motion to enjoin the defendants was denied.

On January 4, 1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to which defendants
filed their opposition on January 10, 1983.

Thus, on April 29, 1986, the Regional Trial Court issued the aforequoted decision prompting
defendants to move for a reconsideration but the same was denied in its Order dated June 6,
1986.

On appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the same was sustained in its judgment
rendered on March 3, 1987, thus:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error thereof, the decision appealed from is

hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. (p. 34, Rollo)

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

The pivotal issue is whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the
Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27.

The question certainly calls for a negative answer.

We agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from
the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping
social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the
Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the
enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus,
 The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor.
The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest
house for himself and family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for
the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and
to the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself.
They have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become human
beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of the people's happiness is
under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right. (Patricio v. Bayog,
112 SCRA 45)

In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders'
rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute. In point is
Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides:

Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship,
whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of
other natural resources, including lands of public domain under lease or
concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of
small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.

Additionally, it is worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso supporting the inapplicability
of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question,
reading,

Section 6. Retention Limits. ...

... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory
heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act
shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.'

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals

sustaining the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

** Penned by Justice Jorge R. Coquia and concurred in by Justices Josue N.

Bellosillo and Venancio D. Aldecoa, Jr. of the Fourth Division.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 103302 August 12, 1993

NATALIA REALTY, INC., AND ESTATE DEVELOPERS AND INVESTORS

CORP., petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SEC. BENJAMIN T. LEONG and DIR. WILFREDO
LEANO, DAR REGION IV, respondents.

Lino M. Patajo for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Are lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, as approved by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and its precursor agencies1 prior to 15 June
1988,2 covered by R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988? This is the pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari assailing the Notice of Coverage3 of
the Department of Agrarian Reform over parcels of land already reserved as townsite areas
before the enactment of the law.

Petitioner Natalia Realty, Inc. (NATALIA, for brevity) is the owner of three (3) contiguous parcels
of land located in Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal, with areas of 120.9793 hectares, 1.3205 hectares
and 2.7080 hectares, or a total of 125.0078 hectares, and embraced in Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 31527 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal.

On 18 April 1979, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land located
in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the
population overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite.
The NATALIA properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite reservation.

Since private landowners were allowed to develop their properties into low-cost housing
subdivisions within the reservation, petitioner Estate Developers and Investors Corporation
(EDIC, for brevity), as developer of NATALIA properties, applied for and was granted
preliminary approval and locational clearances by the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission. The necessary permit for Phase I of the subdivision project, which consisted of
13.2371 hectares, was issued sometime in 1982;4 for Phase II, with an area of 80,000 hectares,
on 13 October 1983;5 and for Phase III, which consisted of the remaining 31.7707 hectares, on
25 April 1986.6 Petitioner were likewise issued development permits7 after complying with the
requirements. Thus the NATALIA properties later became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.

On 15 June 1988, R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988" (CARL, for brevity), went into effect. Conformably therewith, respondent Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR, for brevity), through its Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, issued on 22
November 1990 a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision which consisted of roughly 90.3307 hectares. NATALIA immediately registered its
objection to the notice of Coverage.

EDIC also protested to respondent Director Wilfredo Leano of the DAR Region IV Office and
twice wrote him requesting the cancellation of the Notice of Coverage.

On 17 January 1991, members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo, Inc.

(SAMBA, for the brevity), filed a complaint against NATALIA and EDIC before the DAR Regional
Adjudicator to restrain petitioners from developing areas under cultivation by SAMBA
members.8 The Regional Adjudicator temporarily restrained petitioners from proceeding with the
development of the subdivision. Petitioners then moved to dismiss the complaint; it was denied.
Instead, the Regional Adjudicator issued on 5 March 1991 a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Petitioners NATALIA and EDIC elevated their cause to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB);
however, on 16 December 1991 the DARAB merely remanded the case to the Regional
Adjudicator for further proceedings.9

In the interim, NATALIA wrote respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform reiterating its request to
set aside the Notice of Coverage. Neither respondent Secretary nor respondent Director took
action on the protest-letters, thus compelling petitioners to institute this proceeding more than a
year thereafter.
NATALIA and EDIC both impute grave abuse of discretion to respondent DAR for including
undedeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of the CARL. They
argue that NATALIA properties already ceased to be agricultural lands when they were included
in the areas reserved by presidential fiat for the townsite reservation.

Public respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General dispute this contention. They
maintain that the permits granted petitioners were not valid and binding because they did not
comply with the implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957, otherwise known
as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree," in that no application for
conversion of the NATALIA lands from agricultural residential was ever filed with the DAR. In
other words, there was no valid conversion. Moreover, public respondents allege that the instant
petition was prematurely filed because the case instituted by SAMBA against petitioners before
the DAR Regional Adjudicator has not yet terminated. Respondents conclude, as a
consequence, that petitioners failed to fully exhaust administrative remedies available to them
before coming to court.

The petition is impressed with merit. A cursory reading of the Preliminary Approval and
Locational Clearances as well as the Development Permits granted petitioners for Phases I, II
and III of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision reveals that contrary to the claim of public respondents,
petitioners NATALIA and EDIC did in fact comply with all the requirements of law.

Petitioners first secured favorable recommendations from the Lungsod Silangan Development
Corporation, the agency tasked to oversee the implementation of the development of the
townsite reservation, before applying for the necessary permits from the Human Settlements
Regulatory
Commission. 10 And, in all permits granted to petitioners, the Commission
stated invariably therein that the applications were in "conformance" 11 or "conformity" 12 or
"conforming" 13 with the implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957. Hence,
the argument of public respondents that not all of the requirements were complied with cannot
be sustained.

As a matter of fact, there was even no need for petitioners to secure a clearance or prior
approval from DAR. The NATALIA properties were within the areas set aside for the Lungsod
Silangan Reservation. Since Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 created the townsite
reservation for the purpose of providing additional housing to the burgeoning population of
Metro Manila, it in effect converted for residential use what were erstwhile agricultural lands
provided all requisites were met. And, in the case at bar, there was compliance with all relevant
rules and requirements. Even in their applications for the development of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision, the predecessor agency of HLURB noted that petitioners NATALIA and EDIC
complied with all the requirements prescribed by P.D. 957.

The implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957 applied to all subdivisions and
condominiums in general. On the other hand, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 referred only
to the Lungsod Silangan Reservation, which makes it a special law. It is a basic tenet in
statutory construction that between a general law and a special law, the latter prevails. 14

Interestingly, the Office of the Solicitor General does not contest the conversion of portions of
the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which have already been developed. 15 Of course, this is contrary
to its earlier position that there was no valid conversion. The applications for the developed and
undeveloped portions of subject subdivision were similarly situated. Consequently, both did not
need prior DAR approval.

We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657
provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is
referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." 16 The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which
are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and
residential lands." 17

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision
cannot in any language be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for
residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the
Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in question continued to be developed as
a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. This can readily be gleaned from the fact
that SAMBA members even instituted an action to restrain petitioners from continuing with such
development. The enormity of the resources needed for developing a subdivision may have
delayed its completion but this does not detract from the fact that these lands are still residential
lands and outside the ambit of the CARL.

Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These
include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by
government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations
Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, 18 DAR itself
defined "agricultural land" thus —

. . . Agricultural lands refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in

R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies,
and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent
authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use.

Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is bound by
such conversion. It was therefore error to include the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision within the coverage of CARL.

Be that as it may, the Secretary of Justice, responding to a query by the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, noted in an Opinion 19 that lands covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, inter
alia, of which the NATALIA lands are part, having been reserved for townsite purposes "to be
developed as human settlements by the proper land and housing agency," are "not deemed
'agricultural lands' within the meaning and intent of Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657. " Not being
deemed "agricultural lands," they are outside the coverage of CARL.

Anent the argument that there was failure to exhaust administrative remedies in the instant
petition, suffice it to say that the issues raised in the case filed by SAMBA members differ from
those of petitioners. The former involve possession; the latter, the propriety of including under
the operation of CARL lands already converted for residential use prior to its effectivity.
Besides, petitioners were not supposed to wait until public respondents acted on their letter-
protests, this after sitting it out for almost a year. Given the official indifference, which under the
circumstances could have continued forever, petitioners had to act to assert and protect their
interests. 20

In fine, we rule for petitioners and hold that public respondents gravely abused their discretion in
issuing the assailed Notice of Coverage of 22 November 1990 by of lands over which they no
longer have jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Notice of Coverage of 22

November 1990 by virtue of which undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision were
placed under CARL coverage is hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Nocon, Melo, Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.

 
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 86889 :  December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 51
LUZ FARMS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent.
 
DECISION
 
PARAS, J.:
 
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary
and permanent injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform for acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions
of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines and Procedure Implementing Production
and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the same apply to herein
petitioner, and further from performing an act in violation of the constitutional
rights of the petitioner.
As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case, is as follows:
On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which
includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80).
On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines
and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in
Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80).
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and
Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms). (Rollo,
p. 81).
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and
poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to
be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13,
Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on
January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as
promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 2-36).: rd
Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared
unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or
restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same,
insofar as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry
raisers.
This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1939 resolved to deny, among others, Luz
Farms' prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction in its Manifestation dated
May 26, and 31, 1989. (Rollo, p. 98).
Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant
said Motion for Reconsideration regarding the injunctive relief, after the filing and
approval by this Court of an injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This
Court also gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their
respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 119).
The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 131-168).
On December 22, 1989, the Solicitor General adopted his Comment to the petition
as his Memorandum (Rollo, pp. 186-187).
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made
to apply to it:
(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the
definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity."
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural
lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing
plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform
the authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for
lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in
Section 13 —
". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of
such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year
as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and
above the compensation they currently receive: Provided, That these
individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per
annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determine a lower ceiling.
 In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten
(10%) of the net profit after tax shall be distributed to said regular and other
farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year . . ."
The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and
32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as
the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as
well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance
therewith.:-cralaw
The constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:
ARTICLE XIII
x  x  x
AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless,
to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the
State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural
lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the
Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or
equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-
sharing.
x  x  x"
Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its
entirety. In fact, it acknowledges the correctness of the decision of this Court
in the case of the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc.
vs.  Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R. 78742, 14 July 1989) affirming the
constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It, however,
argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate
of the Constitution, in including land devoted to the raising of livestock,
poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 131). Livestock or poultry raising
is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in this
undertaking and represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total
investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are
many owners of residential lands all over the country who use available
space in their residence for commercial livestock and raising purposes, under
"contract-growing arrangements," whereby processing corporations and
other commercial livestock and poultry raisers (Rollo, p. 10). Lands support
the buildings and other amenities attendant to the raising of animals and
birds. The use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor or
consideration in productivity in this industry. Including backyard raisers,
about 80% of those in commercial livestock and poultry production occupy
 five hectares or less. The remaining 20% are mostly corporate farms (Rollo,
p. 11).
On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising
is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under
Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's International
Dictionary, Second Edition (1954), defines the following words:
"Agriculture — the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and
harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of
livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming.
It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . .
Livestock — domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit.
Farm — a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals."
(Rollo, pp. 82-83).
The petition is impressed with merit.
The question raised is one of constitutional construction. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of
the purpose of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution (J.M. Tuazon & Co.
vs.  Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).: rd
Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of Constitution begins with the
language of the document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case
the significance thus attached to them prevails (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs.  Land Tenure
Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).
It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are
ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the
constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the
Constitution. It is true that the intent of the convention is not controlling by itself,
but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by the people of the
Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the
terms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the deliberation, goes
a long way toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it
(Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 [1974]).
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the
meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of
the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the
coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the
Government.
The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under
Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any growth, including but not limited
to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM,
August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).
The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture."
Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind
of agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial lands and
residential properties because all of them fall under the general classification of the
word "agricultural". This proposal, however, was not considered because the
Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and suitable
agricultural lands and therefore, do not include commercial, industrial and
residential lands (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 30).
In the interpellation, then Commissioner Regalado (now a Supreme Court Justice),
posed several questions, among others, quoted as follows:
x  x  x
"Line 19 refers to genuine reform program founded on the primary right of
farmers and farmworkers. I wonder if it means that leasehold tenancy is
thereby proscribed under this provision because it speaks of the primary
right of farmers and farmworkers to own directly or collectively the lands
they till. As also mentioned by Commissioner Tadeo, farmworkers include
those who work in piggeries and poultry projects.
I was wondering whether I am wrong in my appreciation that if somebody
puts up a piggery or a poultry project and for that purpose hires farmworkers
therein, these farmworkers will automatically have the right to own
eventually, directly or ultimately or collectively, the land on which the
piggeries and poultry projects were constructed. (Record, CONCOM, August
2, 1986, p. 618).
x  x  x
The questions were answered and explained in the statement of then
Commissioner Tadeo, quoted as follows:
x  x  x
"Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami nagkaunawaan.
Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang
agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at
livestock workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama
ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986,
Vol. II, p. 621).
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which
includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and
swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that
the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian
reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and
poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. (Rollo, p. 21).
Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13
and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry
raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final
redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from
three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to
their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory,
and therefore violative of due process (Rollo, p. 21).:-cralaw
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional
question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into
such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination,
the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party,
and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the
case itself (Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R.
79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343).
However, despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with
constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is
convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion
will be the Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its
meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are
irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is as ineffectual as
intimidation, for all the awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the Court
will not hesitate "to make the hammer fall heavily," where the acts of these
departments, or of any official, betray the people's will as expressed in the
Constitution (Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary
of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R.
79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989).
Thus, where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its
constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other
branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of
judicial power conferred by the Constitution "(I)n one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law" (Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution; Article X, Section I of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as
part of the Freedom Constitution, and Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution) and which power this Court has exercised in many instances
(Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 [1987]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b),
11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock,
poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines
promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being
unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE
permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
 
 Separate Opinions
 
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I agree that the petition be granted.
It is my opinion however that the main issue on the validity of the assailed
provisions of R.A. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) and its
Implementing Rules and Guidelines insofar as they include the raising of livestock,
poultry, and swine in their coverage cannot be simplistically reduced to a question
of constitutional construction.
It is a well-settled rule that construction and interpretation come only after it has
been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. A
close reading however of the constitutional text in point, specifically, Sec. 4, Art.
XIII, particularly the phrase, ". . . in case of other farmworkers, to receive a just
share of the fruits thereof," provides a basis for the clear and possible coverage of
livestock, poultry, and swine raising within the ambit of the comprehensive agrarian
reform program. This accords with the principle that every presumption should be
indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statute and the court in considering
the validity of a statute should give it such reasonable construction as can be
reached to bring it within the fundamental law.  1
The presumption against unconstitutionality, I must say, assumes greater weight
when a ruling to the contrary would, in effect, defeat the laudable and noble
purpose of the law, i.e., the welfare of the landless farmers and farmworkers in the
promotion of social justice, by the expedient conversion of agricultural lands into
livestock, poultry, and swine raising by scheming landowners, thus, rendering the
comprehensive nature of the agrarian program merely illusory.
The instant controversy, I submit, boils down to the question of whether or not the
assailed provisions violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution (Article II,
section 1) which teaches simply that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.  2
There is merit in the contention of the petitioner that substantial distinctions exist
between land directed purely to cultivation and harvesting of fruits or crops and
land exclusively used for livestock, poultry and swine raising, that make real
differences, to wit:
x  x  x
No land is tilled and no crop is harvested in livestock and poultry farming. There are
no tenants nor landlords, only employers and employees.
Livestock and poultry do not sprout from land nor are they "fruits of the land."
Land is not even a primary resource in this industry. The land input is
inconsequential that all the commercial hog and poultry farms combined occupy
less than one percent (1%) (0.4% for piggery, 0.2% for poultry) of the 5.45 million
hectares of land supposedly covered by the CARP. And most farms utilize only 2 to
5 hectares of land.: nad
In every respect livestock and poultry production is an industrial activity. Its use of
an inconsequential portion of land is a mere incident of its operation, as in any
other undertaking, business or otherwise.
The fallacy of defining livestock and poultry production as an agricultural enterprise
is nowhere more evident when one considers that at least 95% of total investment
in these farms is in the form of fixed assets which are industrial in nature.
These include (1) animal housing structures and facilities complete with drainage,
waterers, blowers, misters and in some cases even piped-in music; (2) feedmills
complete with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts, generators, etc.; (3)
extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies; (4) anti-pollution
equipment such as bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete
ponds; (5) deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses and accessory facilities;
(6) modern equipment such as sprayers, pregnancy testers, etc.; (7) laboratory
facilities complete with expensive tools and equipment; and a myriad other such
technologically advanced appurtances.
How then can livestock and poultry farmlands be arable when such are almost
totally occupied by these structures?
The fallacy of equating the status of livestock and poultry farmworkers with that of
agricultural tenants surfaces when one considers contribution to output. Labor cost
of livestock and poultry farms is no more than 4% of total operating cost. The 98%
balance represents inputs not obtained from the land nor provided by the
farmworkers — inputs such as feeds and biochemicals (80% of the total cost),
power cost, cost of money and several others.
Moreover, livestock and poultry farmworkers are covered by minimum wage law
rather than by tenancy law. They are entitled to social security benefits where
tenant-farmers are not. They are paid fixed wages rather than crop shares. And as
in any other industry, they receive additional benefits such as allowances, bonuses,
and other incentives such as free housing privileges, light and water.
Equating livestock and poultry farming with other agricultural activities is also
fallacious in the sense that like the manufacturing sector, it is a market for, rather
than a source of agricultural output. At least 60% of the entire domestic supply of
corn is absorbed by livestock and poultry farms. So are the by-products of rice
(rice-bran), coconut (copra meal), banana (banana pulp meal), and fish (fish
meal).  3
x  x  x
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that both kinds of lands are not similarly
situated and hence, cannot be treated alike. Therefore, the assailed provisions
which allow for the inclusion of livestock and poultry industry within the coverage of
the agrarian reform program constitute invalid classification and must accordingly
be struck down as repugnant to the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.chanrobles virtual law library
 
Endnotes
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
  1. In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 70 L. ed., p. 1059.
  2. Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.
  3. Rollo, 29-30.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

EN BANC

G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by SECRETARY JOSE MARI B.

PONCE (OIC), Petitioner
vs.
DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T. SUTTON-SOLIMAN and HARRY T. SUTTON, Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004,
respectively, which declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1993, null and
void for being violative of the Constitution.

The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been
devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then
existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell
(VOS)1 their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage
farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.

On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of

DAR,2 this Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the
definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the
CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform.

In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to
withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus
exempted from the coverage of the CARL.3

On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected
respondents’ land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He
recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.

On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and
requested the return of the supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith.4 Petitioner
ignored their request.

On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993,5 which provided that only
portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of
June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land
to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1
hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815
hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from
the operations of the CARL.

On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as
final and irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their entire
landholding is exempted from the CARL.6

On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order7 partially
granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the
retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of
respondents’ land for grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure.
Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents’ landholding to be segregated and placed under
Compulsory Acquisition.

Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should be
exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied.8 They filed a
notice of appeal9 with the Office of the President assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity
of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and livestock in
determining the land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the constitutionality of
DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of the Luz Farms case which declared cattle-raising lands
excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform.
On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner
DAR.10 It ruled that DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, does not run counter to the Luz Farms case as
the A.O. provided the guidelines to determine whether a certain parcel of land is being used for
cattle-raising. However, the issue on the constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was left for
the determination of the courts as the sole arbiters of such issue.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9,
s. 1993, void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude
livestock farms from the land reform program of the government. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 is

hereby DECLARED null and void. The assailed order of the Office of the President dated 09
October 2001 in so far as it affirmed the Department of Agrarian Reform’s ruling that petitioners’
landholding is covered by the agrarian reform program of the government
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.11

Hence, this petition.

The main issue in the case at bar is the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993,
which prescribes a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising.

Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49 of the CARL, petitioner submits that it issued
DAR A.O. No. 9 to limit the area of livestock farm that may be retained by a landowner pursuant
to its mandate to place all public and private agricultural lands under the coverage of agrarian
reform. Petitioner also contends that the A.O. seeks to remedy reports that some unscrupulous
landowners have converted their agricultural farms to livestock farms in order to evade their
coverage in the agrarian reform program.

Petitioner’s arguments fail to impress.

Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the power to make
rules and regulations. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to
regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become a
practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public
functions. However, while administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law,
they are not immune from judicial review.12 They may be properly challenged before the courts
to ensure that they do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative
discretion is committed by the administrative body concerned.

The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and
regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of
the Constitution.13 The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to
abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to
enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope
intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and
regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their
regulations.14
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution.
The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian
reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the
deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter
alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court
clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities
and do not fall within the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of
livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an
agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial
fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers,
feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing
facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants
augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses,
sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.15

Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been
exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its
power in issuing the assailed A.O.

The subsequent case of Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR16 reiterated our ruling in the Luz
Farms case. In Natalia Realty, the Court held that industrial, commercial and residential lands
are not covered by the CARL.17 We stressed anew that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657
provides that the CARL shall cover all public and private agricultural lands, the term
"agricultural land" does not include lands classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial. Thus, in Natalia Realty, even portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision, which are arable yet still undeveloped, could not be considered as agricultural
lands subject to agrarian reform as these lots were already classified as residential lands.

A similar logical deduction should be followed in the case at bar. Lands devoted to raising of
livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus
exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner DAR argues that, in issuing the impugned A.O., it was
seeking to address the reports it has received that some unscrupulous landowners have been
converting their agricultural lands to livestock farms to avoid their coverage by the agrarian
reform. Again, we find neither merit nor logic in this contention. The undesirable scenario
which petitioner seeks to prevent with the issuance of the A.O. clearly does not apply in
this case. Respondents’ family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They have long
been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-
breeding capital of the Philippines.18 Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is
no evidence on record that respondents have just recently engaged in or converted to the
business of breeding cattle after the enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that
respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits is
the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the
CARL. There has been no change of business interest in the case of respondents.

Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by

Congress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the
previous law. On the other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier
one.19 In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No.
788120 which amended certain provisions of the CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the
definition of the terms "agricultural activity" and "commercial farming" by dropping from
its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-
raising.21 With this significant modification, Congress clearly sought to align the
provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to
exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.

In sum, it is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions
of the Constitution. They cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must
conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between an administrative
order and the provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails.22 The assailed A.O. of petitioner
DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian
reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, are
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 100091 October 22, 1992

CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED ITS PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A.

CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, THE COURT OF
APPEALS and ALVIN OBRIQUE, REPRESENTING BUKIDNON FREE FARMERS
AGRICULTURAL LABORERS ORGANIZATION (BUFFALO), respondents.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify the
proceedings and decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB for
brevity) dated September 4, 1989 and to set aside the decision the decision * of the Court of
Appeals dated August 20, 1990, affirming the decision of the DARAB which ordered the
segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the Central
Mindanao University (CMU for brevity) land and their inclusion in the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP for brevity) for distribution to qualified beneficiaries, on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.

This case originated in a complaint filed by complainants calling themselves as the Bukidnon
Free Farmers and Agricultural Laborers Organization (BUFFALO for brevity) under the
leadership of Alvin Obrique and Luis Hermoso against the CMU, before the Department of
Agrarian Reform for Declaration of Status as Tenants, under the CARP.

From the records, the following facts are evident. The petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural
educational institution owned and run by the state located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon
province. It started as a farm school at Marilang, Bukidnon in early 1910, in response to the
public demand for an agricultural school in Mindanao. It expanded into the Bukidnon National
Agricultural High School and was transferred to its new site in Managok near Malaybalay, the
provincial capital of Bukidnon.

In the early 1960's, it was converted into a college with campus at Musuan, until it became what
is now known as the CMU, but still primarily an agricultural university. From its beginning, the
school was the answer to the crying need for training people in order to develop the agricultural
potential of the island of Mindanao. Those who planned and established the school had a vision
as to the future development of that part of the Philippines. On January 16, 1958 the President
of the Republic of the Philippines, the late Carlos P. Garcia, "upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 53, of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended", issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale
or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the
future campus of what is now the CMU. A total land area comprising 3,080 hectares was
surveyed and registered and titled in the name of the petitioner under OCT Nos. 160, 161 and
162. 1

In the course of the cadastral hearing of the school's petition for registration of the
aforementioned grant of agricultural land, several tribes belonging to cultural communities,
opposed the petition claiming ownership of certain ancestral lands forming part of the tribal
reservations. Some of the claims were granted so that what was titled to the present petitioner
school was reduced from 3,401 hectares to 3,080 hectares.

In the early 1960's, the student population of the school was less than 3,000. By 1988, the
student population had expanded to some 13,000 students, so that the school community has
an academic population (student, faculty and non-academic staff) of almost 15,000. To cope
with the increase in its enrollment, it has expanded and improved its educational facilities partly
from government appropriation and partly by self-help measures.

True to the concept of a land grant college, the school embarked on self-help measures to carry
out its educational objectives, train its students, and maintain various activities which the
government appropriation could not adequately support or sustain. In 1984, the CMU approved
Resolution No. 160, adopting a livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program"
under which the land resources of the University were leased to its faculty and employees. This
arrangement was covered by a written contract. Under this program the faculty and staff
combine themselves to groups of five members each, and the CMU provided technical know-
how, practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to cultivate 4 to 5
hectares of land for the lowland rice project. Each group pays the CMU a service fee and also a
land use participant's fee. The contract prohibits participants and their hired workers to establish
houses or live in the project area and to use the cultivated land as a collateral for any kind of
loan. It was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU
and the faculty and/or employees. This particular program was conceived as a multi-disciplinary
applied research extension and productivity program to utilize available land, train people in
modern agricultural technology and at the same time give the faculty and staff opportunities
within the confines of the CMU reservation to earn additional income to augment their salaries.
The location of the CMU at Musuan, Bukidnon, which is quite a distance from the nearest town,
was the proper setting for the adoption of such a program. Among the participants in this
program were Alvin Obrique, Felix Guinanao, Joven Caballero, Nestor Pulao, Danilo Vasquez,
Aronio Pelayo and other complainants. Obrique was a Physics Instructor at the CMU while the
others were employees in the lowland rice project. The other complainants who were not
members of the faculty or non-academic staff CMU, were hired workers or laborers of the
participants in this program. When petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua became President of the CMU
in July 1986, he discontinued the agri-business project for the production of rice, corn and sugar
cane known as Agri-Business Management and Training Project, due to losses incurred while
carrying on the said project. Some CMU personnel, among whom were the complainants, were
laid-off when this project was discontinued. As Assistant Director of this agri-business project,
Obrique was found guilty of mishandling the CMU funds and was separated from service by
virtue of Executive Order No. 17, the re-organization law of the CMU.

Sometime in 1986, under Dr. Chua as President, the CMU launched a self-help project called
CMU-Income Enhancement Program (CMU-IEP) to develop unutilized land resources, mobilize
and promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-economic and technical training in actual
field project implementation and augment the income of the faculty and the staff.

Under the terms of a 3-party Memorandum of Agreement 2 among the CMU, the CMU-
Integrated Development Foundation (CMU-IDF) and groups or "seldas" of 5 CMU employees,
the CMU would provide the use of 4 to 5 hectares of land to a selda for one (1) calendar year.
The CMU-IDF would provide researchers and specialists to assist in the preparation of project
proposals and to monitor and analyze project implementation. The selda in turn would pay to
the CMU P100 as service fee and P1,000 per hectare as participant's land rental fee. In
addition, 400 kilograms of the produce per year would be turned over or donated to the CMU-
IDF. The participants agreed not to allow their hired laborers or member of their family to
establish any house or live within vicinity of the project area and not to use the allocated lot as
collateral for a loan. It was expressly provided that no tenant-landlord relationship would exist as
a result of the Agreement.

Initially, participation in the CMU-IEP was extended only to workers and staff members who
were still employed with the CMU and was not made available to former workers or employees.
In the middle of 1987, to cushion the impact of the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar
cane project on the lives of its former workers, the CMU allowed them to participate in the CMU-
IEP as special participants.

Under the terms of a contract called Addendum To Existing Memorandum of Agreement

Concerning Participation To the CMU-Income Enhancement Program, 3 a former employee
would be grouped with an existing selda of his choice and provided one (1) hectare for a
lowland rice project for one (1) calendar year. He would pay the land rental participant's fee of
P1,000.00 per hectare but on a charge-to-crop basis. He would also be subject to the same
prohibitions as those imposed on the CMU employees. It was also expressly provided that no
tenant-landlord relationship would exist as a result of the Agreement.

The one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988. Some contracts were renewed. Those whose
contracts were not renewed were served with notices to vacate.

The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project,
the loss of jobs due to termination or separation from the service and the alleged harassment by
school authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of the complaint.

On the basis of the above facts, the DARAB found that the private respondents were not
tenants and cannot therefore be beneficiaries under the CARP. At the same time, the DARAB
ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the
CMU land and their inclusion in the CARP for distribution to qualified beneficiaries.
The petitioner CMU, in seeking a review of the decisions of the respondents DARAB and the
Court of Appeals, raised the following issues:

1.) Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Case No. 005 for Declaration
of Status of Tenants and coverage of land under the CARP.

2.) Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed serious errors and grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the Petition for Review on Certiorari and
affirming the decision of DARAB.

In their complaint, docketed as DAR Case No. 5, filed with the DARAB, complainants Obrique,
et al. claimed that they are tenants of the CMU and/or landless peasants claiming/occupying a
part or portion of the CMU situated at Sinalayan, Valencia, Bukidnon and Musuan, Bukidnon,
consisting of about 1,200 hectares. We agree with the DARAB's finding that Obrique, et. al. are
not tenants. Under the terms of the written agreement signed by Obrique, et. al., pursuant to the
livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program", it was expressly stipulated that no
landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and staff (participants in
the project). The CMU did not receive any share from the harvest/fruits of the land tilled by the
participants. What the CMU collected was a nominal service fee and land use participant's fee
in consideration of all the kinds of assistance given to the participants by the CMU. Again, the
agreement signed by the participants under the CMU-IEP clearly stipulated that no landlord-
tenant relationship existed, and that the participants are not share croppers nor lessees, and the
CMU did not share in the produce of the participants' labor.

In the same paragraph of their complaint, complainants claim that they are landless peasants.
This allegation requires proof and should not be accepted as factually true. Obrique is not a
landless peasant. The facts showed he was Physics Instructor at CMU holding a very
responsible position was separated from the service on account of certain irregularities he
committed while Assistant Director of the Agri-Business Project of cultivating lowland rice.
Others may, at the moment, own no land in Bukidnon but they may not necessarily be so
destitute in their places of origin. No proof whatsoever appears in the record to show that they
are landless peasants.

The evidence on record establish without doubt that the complainants were originally authorized
or given permission to occupy certain areas of the CMU property for a definite purpose — to
carry out certain university projects as part of the CMU's program of activities pursuant to its
avowed purpose of giving training and instruction in agricultural and other related technologies,
using the land and other resources of the institution as a laboratory for these projects. Their
entry into the land of the CMU was with the permission and written consent of the owner, the
CMU, for a limited period and for a specific purpose. After the expiration of their privilege to
occupy and cultivate the land of the CMU, their continued stay was unauthorized and their
settlement on the CMU's land was without legal authority. A person entering upon lands of
another, not claiming in good faith the right to do so by virtue of any title of his own, or by virtue
of some agreement with the owner or with one whom he believes holds title to the land, is a
squatter. 4 Squatters cannot enter the land of another surreptitiously or by stealth, and under
the umbrella of the CARP, claim rights to said property as landless peasants. Under Section 73
of R.A. 6657, persons guilty of committing prohibited acts of forcible entry or illegal detainer do
not qualify as beneficiaries and may not avail themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian
reform. Any such person who knowingly and wilfully violates the above provision of the Act shall
be punished with imprisonment or fine at the discretion of the Court.
In view of the above, the private respondents, not being tenants nor proven to be landless
peasants, cannot qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP.

The questioned decision of the Adjudication Board, affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals,
segregating 400 hectares from the CMU land is primarily based on the alleged fact that the land
subject hereof is "not directly, actually and exclusively used for school sites, because the same
was leased to Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Philippines)".

In support of this view, the Board held that the "respondent University failed to show that it is
using actually, really, truly and in fact, the questioned area to the exclusion of others, nor did it
show that the same is directly used without any intervening agency or person", 5 and "there is
no definite and concrete showing that the use of said lands are essentially indispensable for
educational purposes". 6 The reliance by the respondents Board and Appellate Tribunal on the
technical or literal definition from Moreno's Philippine Law Dictionary and Black's Law
Dictionary, may give the ordinary reader a classroom meaning of the phrase "is actually directly
and exclusively", but in so doing they missed the true meaning of Section 10, R.A. 6657, as to
what lands are exempted or excluded from the coverage of the CARP.

The pertinent provisions of R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988, are as follows:

Sec. 4. SCOPE. — The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall

cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public
and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive
Order No. 229 including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable
for agriculture. No reclassification of forest of mineral lands to agricultural lands
shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into
account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have
determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain;

(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits ad determined by
Congress in the preceding paragraph;

(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for
agriculture; and

(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the
agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.

Sec. 10 EXEMPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS. — Lands actually, directly and

exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves,
reforestration, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and
mangroves, national defense, school sites and campuses including experimental
farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes,
 seeds and seedlings research and pilot production centers, church sites and
convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant
thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal
farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and
quarantine centers and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over,
except those already developed shall be exempt from the coverage of this
Act. (Emphasis supplied).

The construction given by the DARAB to Section 10 restricts the land area of the CMU to its
present needs or to a land area presently, actively exploited and utilized by the university in
carrying out its present educational program with its present student population and academic
facility — overlooking the very significant factor of growth of the university in the years to come.
By the nature of the CMU, which is a school established to promote agriculture and industry, the
need for a vast tract of agricultural land and for future programs of expansion is obvious. At the
outset, the CMU was conceived in the same manner as land grant colleges in America, a type
of educational institution which blazed the trail for the development of vast tracts of unexplored
and undeveloped agricultural lands in the Mid-West. What we now know as Michigan State
University, Penn State University and Illinois State University, started as small land grant
colleges, with meager funding to support their ever increasing educational programs. They were
given extensive tracts of agricultural and forest lands to be developed to support their numerous
expanding activities in the fields of agricultural technology and scientific research. Funds for the
support of the educational programs of land grant colleges came from government
appropriation, tuition and other student fees, private endowments and gifts, and earnings from
miscellaneous sources. 7 It was in this same spirit that President Garcia issued Proclamation
No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural
College (forerunner of the CMU) a land reservation of 3,080 hectares as its future campus. It
was set up in Bukidnon, in the hinterlands of Mindanao, in order that it can have enough
resources and wide open spaces to grow as an agricultural educational institution, to develop
and train future farmers of Mindanao and help attract settlers to that part of the country.

In line with its avowed purpose as an agricultural and technical school, the University adopted a
land utilization program to develop and exploit its 3080-hectare land reservation as follows: 8

No. of Hectares Percentage

a. Livestock and Pasture 1,016.40 33

b. Upland Crops 616 20

c. Campus and Residential sites 462 15

d. Irrigated rice 400.40 13

e. Watershed and forest reservation 308 10

f. Fruit and Trees Crops 154 5

g. Agricultural
Experimental stations 123.20 4
 3,080.00 100%

The first land use plan of the CARP was prepared in 1975 and since then it has undergone
several revisions in line with changing economic conditions, national economic policies and
financial limitations and availability of resources. The CMU, through Resolution No. 160 S.
1984, pursuant to its development plan, adopted a multi-disciplinary applied research extension
and productivity program called the "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Project" (CMU-KSSP). The
objectives 9 of this program were:

1. Provide researches who shall assist in (a) preparation of proposal; (b) monitor
project implementation; and (c) collect and analyze all data and information
relevant to the processes and results of project implementation;

2. Provide the use of land within the University reservation for the purpose of
establishing a lowland rice project for the party of the Second Part for a period of
one calendar year subject to discretionary renewal by the Party of the First Part;

3. Provide practical training to the Party of the Second Part on the management
and operation of their lowland project upon request of Party of the Second Part;
and

4. Provide technical assistance in the form of relevant livelihood project

specialists who shall extend expertise on scientific methods of crop production
upon request by Party of the Second Part.

In return for the technical assistance extended by the CMU, the participants in a project pay a
nominal amount as service fee. The self-reliance program was adjunct to the CMU's lowland
rice project.

The portion of the CMU land leased to the Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte
Phils., Inc.) was leased long before the CARP was passed. The agreement with the Philippine
Packing Corporation was not a lease but a Management and Development Agreement, a joint
undertaking where use by the Philippine Packing Corporation of the land was part of the CMU
research program, with the direct participation of faculty and students. Said contracts with the
Philippine Packing Corporation and others of a similar nature (like MM-Agraplex) were made
prior to the enactment of R.A. 6657 and were directly connected to the purpose and objectives
of the CMU as an educational institution. As soon as the objectives of the agreement for the
joint use of the CMU land were achieved as of June 1988, the CMU adopted a blue print for the
exclusive use and utilization of said areas to carry out its own research and agricultural
experiments.

As to the determination of when and what lands are found to be necessary for use by the CMU,
the school is in the best position to resolve and answer the question and pass upon the problem
of its needs in relation to its avowed objectives for which the land was given to it by the State.
Neither the DARAB nor the Court of Appeals has the right to substitute its judgment or
discretion on this matter, unless the evidentiary facts are so manifest as to show that the CMU
has no real for the land.
It is our opinion that the 400 hectares ordered segregated by the DARAB and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in its Decision dated August 20, 1990, is not covered by the CARP because:

(1) It is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain;

(2) The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific limits as determined by
Congress;

(3) It is private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, the
CMU;

(4) It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657 because the lands
are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for school
site and campus, including experimental farm stations for educational purposes,
and for establishing seed and seedling research and pilot production centers.
(Emphasis supplied).

Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the
DARAB is limited only to matters involving the implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it
is restricted to agrarian cases and controversies involving lands falling within the coverage of
the aforementioned program. It does not include those which are actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for, among such purposes, school sites and
campuses for setting up experimental farm stations, research and pilot production centers, etc.

Consequently, the DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending before it
involving a portion of the CMU's titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land reservation
ordered segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and found by the school to be
necessary for its purposes. The CMU has constantly raised the issue of the DARAB's lack of
jurisdiction and has questioned the respondent's authority to hear, try and adjudicate the case at
bar. Despite the law and the evidence on record tending to establish that the fact that the
DARAB had no jurisdiction, it made the adjudication now subject of review.

Whether the DARAB has the authority to order the segregation of a portion of a private property
titled in the name of its lawful owner, even if the claimant is not entitled as a beneficiary, is an
issue we feel we must resolve. The quasi-judicial powers of DARAB are provided in Executive
Order No. 129-A, quoted hereunder in so far as pertinent to the issue at bar:

Sec. 13. –– AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD — There is hereby

created an Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board under the office of the Secretary.
. . . The Board shall assume the powers and functions with respect to
adjudication of agrarian reform cases under Executive Order 229 and this
Executive Order . . .

Sec. 17. –– QUASI JUDICIAL POWERS OF THE DAR. — The DAR is hereby
vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters including
implementation of Agrarian Reform.

Section 50 of R.A. 6658 confers on the DAR quasi-judicial powers as follows:

 The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform. . . .

Section 17 of Executive Order No. 129-A is merely a repetition of Section 50, R.A. 6657.
There is no doubt that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute
in the implementation of the CARP. An agrarian dispute is defined by the same law as
any controversy relating to tenurial rights whether leasehold, tenancy stewardship or
otherwise over lands devoted to
agriculture. 10

In the case at bar, the DARAB found that the complainants are not share tenants or lease
holders of the CMU, yet it ordered the "segregation of a suitable compact and contiguous area
of Four Hundred hectares, more or less", from the CMU land reservation, and directed the DAR
Regional Director to implement its order of segregation. Having found that the complainants in
this agrarian dispute for Declaration of Tenancy Status are not entitled to claim as beneficiaries
of the CARP because they are not share tenants or leaseholders, its order for the segregation of
400 hectares of the CMU land was without legal authority. w do not believe that the quasi-
judicial function of the DARAB carries with it greater authority than ordinary courts to make an
award beyond what was demanded by the complainants/petitioners, even in an agrarian
dispute. Where the quasi-judicial body finds that the complainants/petitioners are not entitled to
the rights they are demanding, it is an erroneous interpretation of authority for that quasi-judicial
body to order private property to be awarded to future beneficiaries. The order segregation 400
hectares of the CMU land was issued on a finding that the complainants are not entitled as
beneficiaries, and on an erroneous assumption that the CMU land which is excluded or
exempted under the law is subject to the coverage of the CARP. Going beyond what was asked
by the complainants who were not entitled to the relief prayed the complainants who were not
entitled to the relief prayed for, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion because it implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

The education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly among the highest priorities in
the government socio-economic programs. In this case, neither need give way to the other.
Certainly, there must still be vast tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao outside the CMU land
reservation which can be made available to landless peasants, assuming the claimants here, or
some of them, can qualify as CARP beneficiaries. To our mind, the taking of the CMU land
which had been segregated for educational purposes for distribution to yet uncertain
beneficiaries is a gross misinterpretation of the authority and jurisdiction granted by law to the
DARAB.

The decision in this case is of far-reaching significance as far as it concerns state colleges and
universities whose resources and research facilities may be gradually eroded by misconstruing
the exemptions from the CARP. These state colleges and universities are the main vehicles for
our scientific and technological advancement in the field of agriculture, so vital to the existence,
growth and development of this country.

It is the opinion of this Court, in the light of the foregoing analysis and for the reasons indicated,
that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of grave abuse of discretion by respondents
Court of Appeals and DAR Adjudication Board. We hereby declare the decision of the DARAB
dated September 4, 1989 and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 20, 1990,
affirming the decision of the quasi-judicial body, as null and void and hereby order that they be
set aside, with costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED

Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon, and Melo, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., took no part.

Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 158228             March 23, 2004

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as represented by its Secretary, ROBERTO M.

PAGDANGANAN, petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS), respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision1 of the Court of Appeals
dated October 29, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64378, which reversed the August 30, 2000
decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, as well as the Resolution dated May 7, 2003,
which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

In controversy are Lot No. 2509 and Lot No. 817-D consisting of an aggregate area of 189.2462
hectares located at Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay,
Negros Occidental, respectively. On October 21, 1921, these lands were donated by the late
Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS (formerly Bureau of Education).2 Consequently, titles
thereto were transferred in the name of respondent DECS under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
167175.3

On July 15, 1985, respondent DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10
agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year 1984-1985 to crop year 1993-1994. The
contract of lease was subsequently renewed for another 10 agricultural crop years, commencing
from crop year 1995-1996 to crop year 2004-2005.4

On June 10, 1993, Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming to be permanent and regular
farm workers of the subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante. 5

After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piñosa, sent a "Notice of Coverage" to respondent DECS,
stating that the subject lands are now covered by CARP and inviting its representatives for a
conference with the farmer beneficiaries.6 Then, MARO Piñosa submitted his report to OIC-
PARO Stephen M. Leonidas, who recommended to the DAR Regional Director the approval of
the coverage of the landholdings.

On August 7, 1998, DAR Regional Director Dominador B. Andres approved the

recommendation, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the petition is granted. Order is hereby
issued:

1. Placing under CARP coverage Lot 2509 with an area of 111.4791 hectares situated at
Had. Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental and Lot 817-D with an area of 77.7671 hectares
situated at Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros Occidental;

2. Affirming the notice of coverage sent by the DAR Provincial Office, Negros Occidental
dated November 23, 1994;
 3. Directing the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office of Negros Occidental and the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officers of Sagay and Escalante to facilitate the acquisition of
the subject landholdings and the distribution of the same qualified beneficiaries.

SO ORDERED.7

Respondent DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the
Order of the Regional Director. 8

Aggrieved, respondent DECS filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set
aside the decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.9

Hence, the instant petition for review.

The pivotal issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the subject properties are exempt
from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1998 (CARL).

The general policy under CARL is to cover as much lands suitable for agriculture as
possible.10 Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 sets out the coverage of CARP. It states that the program
shall:

"… cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including
other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture."

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be
undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account, ecological,
developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific
limits of the public domain;

(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by
Congress in the preceding paragraph;

(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and

(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural
products raised or that can be raised thereon.

Section 3(c) thereof defines "agricultural land," as "land devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial
land." The term "agriculture" or "agricultural activity" is also defined by the same law as follows:

Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprises or Agricultural Activity means the cultivation of the soil,
planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the
harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer
in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.11

The records of the case show that the subject properties were formerly private agricultural lands
owned by the late Esteban Jalandoni, and were donated to respondent DECS. From that time
until they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, the lands continued to be agricultural
primarily planted to sugarcane, albeit part of the public domain being owned by an agency of the
government.12 Moreover, there is no legislative or presidential act, before and after the
enactment of R.A. No. 6657, classifying the said lands as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land. Indubitably, the subject lands fall under the classification of lands
of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.

Respondent DECS sought exemption from CARP coverage on the ground that all the income
derived from its contract of lease with Anglo Agricultural Corporation were actually, directly and
exclusively used for educational purposes, such as for the repairs and renovations of schools in
the nearby locality.

Petitioner DAR, on the other hand, argued that the lands subject hereof are not exempt from the
CARP coverage because the same are not actually, directly and exclusively used as school
sites or campuses, as they are in fact leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation. Further, to be
exempt from the coverage, it is the land per se, not the income derived therefrom, that must be
actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.

We agree with the petitioner.

Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are exempted from the
coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption, viz:

xxxxxxxxx

c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national
defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or
private schools for educational purposes, … , shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.13

xxxxxxxxx

Clearly, a reading of the paragraph shows that, in order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the
land must be "actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary;" and 2) the
purpose is "for school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by
public or private schools for educational purposes."

The importance of the phrase "actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be
necessary" cannot be understated, as what respondent DECS would want us to do by not
taking the words in their literal and technical definitions. The words of the law are clear and
unambiguous. Thus, the "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is
applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.14
We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Central Mindanao University v. Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board,15 wherein we declared the land subject thereof exempt
from CARP coverage. However, respondent DECS’ reliance thereon is misplaced because the
factual circumstances are different in the case at bar.

Firstly, in the CMU case, the land involved was not alienable and disposable land of the public
domain because it was reserved by the late President Carlos P. Garcia under Proclamation No.
476 for the use of Mindanao Agricultural College (now CMU).16 In this case, however, the lands
fall under the category of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture.

Secondly, in the CMU case, the land was actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for school sites and campuses. Although a portion of it was being used by the
Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.) under a "Management and
Development Agreement", the undertaking was that the land shall be used by the Philippine
Packing Corporation as part of the CMU research program, with direct participation of faculty
and students. Moreover, the land was part of the land utilization program developed by the CMU
for its "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Project" (CMU-KSSP), a multi-disciplinary applied research
extension and productivity program.17 Hence, the retention of the land was found to be
necessary for the present and future educational needs of the CMU. On the other hand, the
lands in this case were not actually and exclusively utilized as school sites and campuses, as
they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, not for educational purposes but for the
furtherance of its business. Also, as conceded by respondent DECS, it was the income from the
contract of lease and not the subject lands that was directly used for the repairs and renovations
of the schools in the locality.

Anent the issue of whether the farmers are qualified beneficiaries of CARP, we disagree with
the Court of Appeals’ finding that they were not.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that the identification of actual and potential beneficiaries
under CARP is vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform pursuant to Section 15, R.A. No.
6657, which states:

SECTION 15. Registration of Beneficiaries. — The DAR in coordination with the Barangay

Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) as organized in this Act, shall register all agricultural
lessees, tenants and farmworkers who are qualified to be beneficiaries of the CARP. These
potential beneficiaries with the assistance of the BARC and the DAR shall provide the following
data:

(a) names and members of their immediate farm household;

(b) owners or administrators of the lands they work on and the length of tenurial
relationship;

(c) location and area of the land they work;

(d) crops planted; and

(e) their share in the harvest or amount of rental paid or wages received.
A copy of the registry or list of all potential CARP beneficiaries in the barangay shall be posted
in the barangay hall, school or other public buildings in the barangay where it shall be open to
inspection by the public at all reasonable hours.

In the case at bar, the BARC certified that herein farmers were potential CARP beneficiaries of
the subject properties.18 Further, on November 23, 1994, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage placing the
subject properties under CARP. Since the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are
matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, 19 it behooves the
courts to exercise great caution in substituting its own determination of the issue, unless there is
grave abuse of discretion committed by the administrative agency. In this case, there was none.

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the bastion of social justice of poor
landless farmers, the mechanism designed to redistribute to the underprivileged the natural right
to toil the earth, and to liberate them from oppressive tenancy. To those who seek its benefit, it
is the means towards a viable livelihood and, ultimately, a decent life. The objective of the State
is no less certain: "landless farmers and farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to
promote social justice and to move the nation toward sound rural development and
industrialization."20

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 29, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 64378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The decision dated August 30, 2000 of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform placing the subject
lands under CARP coverage, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Panganiban, J., on official leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and HON.
BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines
Sur, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN
JOAQUIN, respondents.

The Provincial Attorney for petitioners.

Reynaldo L. Herrera for Ernesto San Joaquin.

QUIASON, J.:

In this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 20551
entitled "Ernesto N. San Joaquin, et al., v. Hon. Benjamin V. Panga, et al.," this Court is asked
to decide whether the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is subject, to
the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the implementator of the agrarian
reform program.

On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur
passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or
expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for
non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government
employees.

The "WHEREAS" clause o:f the Resolution states:

WHEREAS, the province of Camarines Sur has adopted a five-year

Comprehensive Development plan, some of the vital components of which
includes the establishment of model and pilot farm for non-food and non-
traditional agricultural crops, soil testing and tissue culture laboratory centers, 15
small scale technology soap making, small scale products of plaster of paris,
marine biological and sea farming research center,and other progressive
feasibility concepts objective of which is to provide the necessary scientific and
technology know-how to farmers and fishermen in Camarines Sur and to
establish a housing project for provincial government employees;

WHEREAS, the province would need additional land to be acquired either by

purchase or expropriation to implement the above program component;

WHEREAS, there are contiguous/adjacent properties to be (sic) present

Provincial Capitol Site ideally suitable to establish the same pilot development
center;

WHEREFORE . . . .
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon. Luis
R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and
Efren N. San Joaquin, docketed as Special Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and P-19-89 of the
Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, presided by the Hon. Benjamin V. Panga.

Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of writ of possession.
The San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion.

The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price
offered for their property. In an order dated December 6, 1989, the trial court denied the motion
to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property
upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally
fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event
that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of possession in an
order dated January18, 1990.

The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines
Sur to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss.
Both motions were denied in the order dated February 1990.

In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution No.
129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the
complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order dated December 6, 1989 (i)
denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990,
denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that
an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter
to issue a writ of injunction.

In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the authority to
initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P.
Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose.

Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated
that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the
approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of
Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan
to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.

The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines
Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the
amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation
proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of
the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.

Hence this petition.

It must be noted that in the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked for: (i) the dismissal of the
complaints for expropriation on the ground of the inadequacy of the compensation offered for
the property and (ii) the nullification of Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur.

The Court of Appeals did not rule on the validity of the questioned resolution; neither did it
dismiss the complaints. However, when the Court of Appeals ordered the suspension of the
proceedings until the Province of Camarines Sur shall have obtained the authority of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to change the classification of the lands sought to be
expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural use, it assumed that the resolution is valid and
that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public purpose" or
"public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was that
the condemned property must actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public
plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public
use". Under the new concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit,
which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like
a resort complex for tourists or housing project (Heirs of Juancho Ardano v. Reyes, 125 SCRA
220 [1983]; Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SC.RA 461 [1987]).

The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public
purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and
advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would
make available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery
and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen
would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the
Constitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human
need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects
public health, safety, the environment and in sum the general welfare."

It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its exercise of the power of eminent
domain cannot be restricted by the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A.
No. 6657), particularly Section 65 thereof, which requires the approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform before a parcel of land can be reclassified from an agricultural to a non-
agricultural land.

The Court of Appeals, following the recommendation of the Solicitor General, held that the
Province of Camarines Sur must comply with the provision of Section 65 of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law and must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform
of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.

In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, petitioners raised the issue of whether
the Philippine Tourism Authority can expropriate lands covered by the "Operation Land
Transfer" for use of a tourist resort complex. There was a finding that of the 282 hectares
sought to be expropriated, only an area of 8,970 square meters or less than one hectare was
affected by the land reform program and covered by emancipation patents issued by the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform. While the Court said that there was "no need under the facts of this
petition to rule on whether the public purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or
engage in a balancing of competing public interest," it upheld the expropriation after noting that
petitioners had failed to overcome the showing that the taking of 8,970 square meters formed
part of the resort complex. A fair and reasonable reading of the decision is that this Court
viewed the power of expropriation as superior to the power to distribute lands under the land
reform program.

The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the Province of Camarines Sur by
stressing the fact that local government units exercise such power only by delegation.
(Comment, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 128-129)

It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can
exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 28l US
439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 SCt. 360). It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the
legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the
local governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct. 684).
While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover,
the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the
law conferring the power or in other legislations.

Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337,
the Local Government Code, which provides:

A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution
of its sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and institute
condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units must first
secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from
agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation
proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which
expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the control
of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of law that the Court of Appeals
could cite to justify the intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation
matters is Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads:

Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. — After the lapse of five (5) years from its award,
when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for, agricultural
purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater
economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon
application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected
parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or
conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall
have fully paid his obligation.

The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it applies to lands previously
placed under the agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years from its
award."

The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order
No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian
Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it
would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the Department of
Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural
lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the applications
for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries.

Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened
or constricted by implication (Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS
2d. 241).

To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer
expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals,
etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian
Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect,
it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for
a public purpose or public use.

Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether
the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression
of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only
when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use (United States
Ex Rel Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 US 546, 90 L. ed. 843, 66 S Ct 715; State ex
rel Twin City Bldg. and Invest. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 NW 885, 8 ALR 585).

There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad their terms are, do
not embrace the sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto
(Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 [1983]).
The Republic of the Philippines, as sovereign, or its political subdivisions, as holders of
delegated sovereign powers, cannot be bound by provisions of law couched in general term.

The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation declared in
the tax declarations of their property, are unfounded. This Court has declared as
unconstitutional the Presidential Decrees fixing the just compensation in expropriation cases to
be the value given to the condemned property either by the owners or the assessor, whichever
was lower ([Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987]). As held
in Municipality of Talisay v. Ramirez, 183 SCRA 528 [1990], the rules for determining just
compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which allow private
respondents to submit evidence on what they consider shall be the just compensation for their
property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is
set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur
to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the
expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents'
property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial
court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 149548               December 14, 2010

ROXAS & COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
DAMBA-NFSW and the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 167505

DAMAYAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID SA ASYENDA ROXAS-NATIONAL

FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS (DAMBA-NFSW), Petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM, ROXAS & Co., INC. AND/OR ATTY.
MARIANO AMPIL, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 167540

KATIPUNAN NG MGA MAGBUBUKID SA HACIENDA ROXAS, INC. (KAMAHARI), ET

AL., Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM, ROXAS & Co., INC., Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 167543

DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM, FORMERLY DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

(DAR), Petitioner,
vs.
ROXAS & CO, INC., Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 167845

ROXAS & CO., INC., Petitioner,

vs.
DAMBA-NFSW, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 169163

DAMBA-NFSW REPRESENTED BY LAURO V. MARTIN, Petitioner,

vs.
ROXAS & CO., INC., Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179650

DAMBA-NFSW, Petitioner,
vs.
ROXAS & CO., INC., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed on January 13, 2010 by Roxas & Co., Inc.
(Roxas & Co.) and the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed on January 29, 2010 by
Damayan ng Manggagawang Bukid sa Asyenda Roxas-National Federation of Sugar Workers
(DAMBA-NFSW) and Katipunan ng mga Magbubukid sa Hacienda Roxas, Inc. (KAMAHARI), et
al., which both assail the Court’s December 4, 2009 Decision in these consolidated cases.

After the above-mentioned Motions were filed, Roxas & Co. filed on April 26, 2010 a Motion to
Hold in Abeyance the Resolution of its earlier Motion for Reconsideration.

Roxas & Co. moves for reconsideration on the following grounds:

I. …CLOA 6654, INSOFAR AS IT COVERS THE 3 PARCELS OF LAND WITH AN

AGGREGATE AREA OF 103.1436 HECTARES, SHOULD BE CANCELLED IN VIEW OF THE
FINAL AND EXECUTORY 02 APRIL 1996 COURT OF APPEALS DECISION EXEMPTING
THE SAID PROPERTIES FROM THE COVERAGE OF THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN
REFORM LAW (CARL).

II. …CLOA 6654, INSOFAR AS IT COVERS THE REMAINING 410 HECTARES, SHOULD BE
CANCELLED PURSUANT TO SECTION IV (B) (10) OF DAR MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 2,
SERIES OF 1994.

III. …WITH THE CARP-EXEMPTION OF THE 9 PARCELS OF LAND WITH AN AGGREGATE

AREA OF 45.9771 HECTARES, ROXAS’ LIABILITY TO PAY DISTURBANCE
COMPENSATION IS LIMITED TO ITS AGRICULTURAL LESSEES AND NOT TO ALL
FARMER-BENEFICIARIES FOUND IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES PURSUANT TO
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3844, AS AMENDED, AND THE RULING IN BACALING VS. MUYA.

IV. …THE ADDITIONAL CERTIFICATIONS WERE SUBMITTED TO PROVE THAT THE

51.5472-HECTARE PROPERTIES ARE CARP-EXEMPT, AND COROLLARILY, ADDRESS
THE GROUNDS USED BY THEN DAR SECRETARY IN DENYING ROXAS’ INITIAL
EXEMPTION APPLICATION. THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCIES ARE EITHER IMMATERIAL
OR CAN BE READILY EXPLAINED.

V. …BASED ON THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY ROXAS, THE 51.5472-HECTARE

PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF …G.R. NO. 179650 ARE CARP-EXEMPT. HENCE, THE
PREMATURE INSTALLATION BY THE DAR OF SEVERAL FARMER-BENEFICIARIES IN THE
PROPERTIES IS ILLEGAL.

VI. …THE ROXAS LANDHOLDINGS SHOULD BE DECLARED EXEMPT FROM THE

COVERAGE OF CARP.
 A. APPLYING DAR V. FRANCO…, THE ROXAS LANDHOLDINGS SHOOULD
BE DECLARED CARP-EXEMPT IN VIEW OF THE PTA ENACTMENT
DELINEATING SPECIFIC TOURISM AREAS.

B. CONSISTENT WITH THE DAR EXEMPTION ORDER CITED IN THE

FRANCO CASE AND THE SUBMISSION OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL…, THE ROXAS LANDHOLDINGS, WHICH ARE (A) LOCATED
WITHIN THE PTA-IDENTIFIED TOURISM PRIORITY AREAS AND (B)
INCLUDED IN THE NASUGBU TOURISM DEVELOPMENT PLAN, SHOULD BE
DECLARED CARP-EXEMPT.

C. WITH THE PTA ENACTMENT, THE ROXAS LANDHOLDINGS ARE CARP-EXEMPT

FOLLOWING THE COURT’S PRONOUNCEMENT THAT "THE ONLY TIME [THE NATALIA
AND ALLARDE CASES] MAY FIND APPLICATION IS WHEN THE PTA ACTUALLY
IDENTIFIES WELL-DEFINED GEOGRAPHIC AREAS WITHIN THE ZONE WITH POTENTIAL
TOURISM VALUE." 1

On the other hand, DAMBA-NFSW and KAMAHARI, et al. move for partial reconsideration of
the assailed Decision on the following grounds:

I. THE [COURT] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING TO EXEMPT FROM

CARP COVERAGE THE SUBJECT NINE (9) LOTS WITH ALLEGED AREA OF 45.9771
HECTARES OF HACIENDA PALICO BASED ON NASUGBU MUNICIPAL ZONING
ORDINANCE NO. 4, SERIES OF 1982, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:

A. ROXAS [& CO.] MISERABLY FAILED TO SHOW PROOF THAT THE

SUBJECT ZONING ORDINANCE UNDER ZONE A. VII THEREOF,
SPECIFICALLY DELINEATE THE SAID LOTS TO HAVE BEEN RE-
CLASSIFIED TO NON-AGRICULTURAL USE;

B. ROXAS [& CO.] HAS MERE FALSE CERTIFICATIONS ISSUED BY THE

HLURB AND MPDC OF NASUGBU WHICH DO NOT FIND SUPPORT IN THE
REFERRED MUNICIPAL ZONING ORDINANCE;

C. ROXAS [& CO.] FAILED TO SUBMIT IN EVIDENCE THE COMPREHENSIVE

LAND USE PLAN OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS PROVING SUCH
RECLASSIFICATION TO NON-AGRICULTURAL USE OF SUBJECT LOTS
PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF R.A. 6657 ON JUNE 15, 1988; AND

D. ROXAS [& CO.] MISERABLY FAILED TO IDENTIFY SUBJECT LOTS BOTH

IN AREAS COVERED AND LOCATIONS.

II. GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE SUBJECT NASUGBU MUNICIPAL ZONING

ORDINANCE NO. 4, SERIES OF 1982 IS A VALID BASIS FOR EXEMPTION FROM CARP
COVERAGE OF SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND, AND FURTHER GRANTING ARGUENDO
THAT ROXAS WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT THE SUBJECT LOTS ARE WITHIN THE
PU[R]PORTED URBAN CORE ZONE…, STILL THE [COURT] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN UPHOLDING THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE DAR SECRETARY’[S] ORDER
OF CARP EXEMPTION WITHOUT OBSERVING THE RIGHT OF THE FARMER-
BENEFICIARIES TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.

Preliminarily, the Court denies Roxas & Co.’s Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Resolution of its
earlier Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. Roxas & Co. asks the Court to hold its
judgment on its motion for reconsideration pending the outcome of its application with the
Tourism Infrastructure and Enterprise Zone Authority (TIEZA) for the designation of "fourteen
‘geographic areas’ of the Roxas Properties as [tourism enterprise zones], pursuant to …the
Tourism Act."

It bears stressing that Roxas & Co.’s pending application with TIEZA is totally immaterial to the
resolution of the present petitions which delve mainly on the issue of whether the subject lands
are exempt from Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage.

While the Court acknowledged the passage of the Tourism Act as another vehicle for potential
tourism areas to be exempted from CARP coverage, that did not in any way pronounce as
meritorious Roxas & Co.’s subsequent application with the TIEZA to declare its properties as
tourism enterprise zones. That is for the TIEZA, not this Court, to determine. Whatever decision
the TIEZA renders in Roxas & Co.’s application does not in any way affect the merits of these
consolidated cases.

Roxas & Co. cannot have it both ways. It must either zealously argue its legal position if it
believes it to be meritorious or altogether abandon it if it has reservations. Its Motion to Hold in
Abeyance the Resolution of its earlier Motion for Reconsideration effectively coaxes the Court to
wait for the outcome of its TIEZA application and ultimately delay the final resolution of these
consolidated cases.

On Roxas & Co.’s Motion for Reconsideration, no substantial arguments were raised to warrant
a reconsideration of the Decision. The Motion contains merely an amplification of the main
arguments and factual matters already submitted to and pronounced without merit by the Court
in its Decision. In the Court’s considered view, nothing more is left to be discussed, clarified or
done in these cases since all the main issues raised have been passed upon and definitely
resolved.

Roxas & Co. raises the fringe issue that DAR Memorandum Circular No. 7 (Series of 2004) has
no force and effect since the said DAR Memorandum Circular was not published and filed with
the Office of the National Administrative Register.

The contention fails. It should be stressed that there is no need for the publication and filing of
the said DAR Memorandum Circular with the ONAR as it is merely an administrative
interpretation.2

Interpretative rule x x x x is promulgated by the administrative agency to interpret, clarify or

explain statutory regulations under which the administrative body operates. The purpose or
objective of an interpretative rule is merely to construe the statute being administered. It
purports to do no more than interpret the statute. Simply, the rules tries to say what the statute
means. Generally, it refers to no single person or party in particular but concerns all those
belonging to the same class which may be covered by the said interpretative rule. It need not be
published and neither is a hearing required since it is issued by the administrative body as an
incident of its power to enforce the law and is intended merely to clarify statutory provisions for
proper observance by the people. x x x x.3 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)1awphil

Roxas & Co. goes on to contend that its liability to pay disturbance compensation is limited to
its agricultural lessees only and not to farmer-beneficiaries, citing Republic Act No. 3844 (RA
3844), as amended, and Bacaling v. Muya.4

Roxas & Co. is merely nitpicking on the issue. Since the DAR had initially issued CLOAs to the
farmer-beneficiaries of the nine parcels of land in Hacienda Palico, the assailed Decision merely
reiterated the original designation of the affected individuals as farmer-beneficiaries who should
be entitled to disturbance compensation before the cancellation of their respective CLOAs is
effected. This is in pursuance of the directive of DAR Administrative Order No. 6 (Series of
1994) which mandates the payment of disturbance compensation before Roxas & Co.’s
application for exemption may be completely granted.

As for the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of DAMBA-NFSW and KAMAHARI, et al., the
same likewise fails as it only rehashes earlier arguments which have been adequately passed
upon by the Court. Notably, the main arguments raised by the Motion are evidentiary in nature
that have been resolved by the DAR Secretary, whose decision on factual controversies
deserve utmost respect, if not finality.

Finally, the Court reiterates the explanation of the DAR Secretary why CLOA holders need not
be informed of the pending application for exemption, to wit:

As regards the first ground raised by [DAMBA-NSFW], it should be remembered that an

application for CARP-exemption pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, as
implemented by DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, is non-adversarial or non-
litigious in nature. Hence, applicant is correct in saying that nowhere in the rules is it required
that occupants of a landholding should be notified of an initiated or pending exemption
application.

xxxx

With regard [to] the allegation that oppositors-movants are already CLOA holders of subject
propert[ies] and deserve to be notified, as owners, of the initiated questioned exemption
application, is of no moment. The Supreme Court in the case of Roxas [&] Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 321 SCRA 106, held:

"We stress that the failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in
the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA’s already
issued to the farmer beneficiaries. x x x x. Anyhow, the farmer[-]beneficiaries hold the property
in trust for the rightful owner of the land."

Since subject landholding has been validly determined to be CARP-exempt, therefore, the
previous issuance of the CLOA of oppositors-movants is erroneous. Hence, similar to the
situation of the above-quoted Supreme Court Decision, oppositors-movants only hold the
property in trust for the rightful owners of the land and are not the owners of subject landholding
who should be notified of the exemption application of applicant Roxas & Company,
Incorporated.1avvphi1
Finally, this Office finds no substantial basis to reverse the assailed Orders since there is
substantial compliance by the applicant with the requirements for the issuance of exemption
clearance under DAR AO 6 (1994).5

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Roxas & Co., Inc. and the Motion for
Partial Reconsideration filed by DAMBA-NFSW and KAMAHARI are DENIED for lack of merit.

No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in due course.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

No part. Filed pleading Sol Gen No part

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice

I maintain my vote to dissent in part

from
the decision of December 4, 2009 DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE Associate Justice
CASTRO
Associate Justice

No part due to prior action in CA

ROBERTO A. ABAD
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo (G.R. No. 149548), pp. 1587-1588.

2
 Vide: Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, 24 April 1985, 146 SCRA 446, 454. See
also Guidelines for Receiving and Publication of Rules and Regulations filed with the UP
Law Center where interpretative rules need not be filed with the Office of the National
Administrative Register.

3
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119761, August 29,
1996, 261 SCRA 236, 256.

4
 430 Phil. 531 (2002).

5
 Rollo (G.R. No. 167505), pp. 525-527.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 160420. July 28, 2005]

DANIEL ANINAO REPRESENTED BY SPOUSE CATALINA ANINAO, MAMERTO

A. ALCARAZ, REPRESENTED BY SPOUSE HERMOGENA ALCARAZ, TEODULFO
ALCARAZ, ROMULO C. ALIPUSTAIN, FELIX ANINAO REPRESENTED BY
SPOUSE ANTONIO ANINAO, NESTOR S. ANINAO, PERFECTO B. ANINAO,
LUIS ATIENZA SR., RICARDO BASCUGUIN, RESTITUTO A. BARAL
REPRESENTED BY SPOUSE TERESA BARAL GLORIOSO, MAURO B.
BARANGAS, ORECULO M. BARANGAS, ESMAEL E. BATOCABE, ANGELINA D.
 BUCALIG, PRIMO B. CABRAL, RUFINO C. CABRAL, LEONILA CARAIG,
ANSELMO M. CARINGAL REPRESENTED BY SPOUSE SUSANA R. CARINGAL,
DEMETRIO M. CARINGAL REPRESENTED BY SON GLICERIO D. CARINGAL,
LORIANO CARINGAL, MARCIAL M. CARINGAL, PEDRO C. CARINGAL,
SIMPLICIO M. CARINGAL, TEODORA R. CARINGAL REPRESENTED BY SON
ANGELITO R. CARINGAL, PABLITO M. CASTELO, VICENTE CASTELO, FELIX
M. CASTILLO, LORENZO R. CASTROJERES REPRESENTED BY SPOUSE
EMILIA M CASTROJERES, ZALDY M. CASTROJERES, FELICISIMO CUELLA,
ROMEO B. DACILLO, VIVENCIO M. DE GUZMAN, CELEDONIO C. DE JESUS,
DIOMEDES A. DE JESUS, EFREN C. DE JESUS REPRESENTED BY SPOUSE
OFELIA DE JESUS, ISIDRO C. DE JESUS, PRISCO C. DE JESUS REPRESENTED
BY MONICA M. DE JESUS, ZOSIMO C. DE JESUS BENIGNO DE LA VEGA
REPRESENTED BY SON MAURO G. DE LA VEGA MIGUEL DE LA VEGA,
NICASIO H. DELGADO, ABELIO DELOS REYES, ENGRACIO DE LOS REYES,
ERNESTO R. DE LOS REYES, FELICIANO DE LOS REYES REPRESENTED BY
SON MANOLO DE LOS REYES, SOFRONIO DE SAGUN REPRESENTED BY
SPOUSE FLORENCIA J. DE SAGUN, NONILON DIMAISIP, MAURICIO K.
ELLAO,BRIGIDA ENDOZO, GABRIEL ETRON, NARCISO ETRON, RODRIGO B.
FAMILIAR, GAUDENCIO HERNANDEZ, VIRGILIO HERNANDEZ, GREGORIO D.
ILAO, LEONCIA ILAO, AGUSTIN A. LOPEZ, TOMAS R. MACATANGAY
REPRESENTED BY SON WENCESLAO A. MACATANGAY, EUGENIO C.
MALALUAN, QUINTIN DV. MALALUAN, ANACLETO DG. MANALO
REPRESENTED BY SON ANTONIO MANALO, ANCISLO MANALO, ATANACIO
MANALO, CRISPINIANO MANALO, CRISPULO D. MANALO, DELIA D.
MANALO, DOROTEO MANALO ISIDRO M. MANALO, QUIRICO D. MANALO,
ROGELIO MANALO, RESTITUTO MARQUEZ, CATALINO I. MARASIGAN
REPRESENTED BY SPOUSE VICTORIA MARASIGAN, EUFEMIO MARASIGAN,
FRANCISCO C. MARASIGAN, REPRESENTED BY SPOUSE ELISEA
MARASIGAN, PABLO C. MARASIGAN,PEDRO C. MARASIGAN, RUPERTO C.
MARASIGAN REPRESENTED BY SPOUSE SATURNINA MARASIGAN, EUSEBIA
C. MARCO, SENANDO C. MARCO, APOLONIO Z. MENDOZA, LORETO Z.
MENDOZA REPRESENTED BY DAUGTHER NATALIA MENDOZA, MARIANO
MENDOZA, PURIFICACION Z. MENDOZA, CASIANO MERCADO, FLORO D.
MERCADO, GERMAN B. MERCADO, CASIANA NUEVO, MODESTA DV.
PADILLA, CRISENCIA D. PANGANIBAN, LEONARDO A. PANGANIBAN
REPRESENTED BY SPOUSE NELIA PANGANIBAN, RENATO D. PANGANIBAN,
FELIXBERTO G. PASTORIN, ANASTACIA D. PEÑAFLORIDA, MAXIMO
PEÑAFLORIDA, PORFIRIO B. RAMIREZ, DANTE DV. RASDAS, DANILO DV.
RASDAS, VENANCIO DV. RASDAS REPRESENTED BY SPOUSE MARIA P.
RASADZ, SOTERO H. RODRIGUEZ REPRESENTED BY SPOUSE PASTORA
RODRIGUEZ, APOLONIO M. ROXAS, BERNABE M. ROXAS, ELISEO M. ROXAS,
LEODEGARIO A. ROXAS, LEONILO P. ROXAS, MIGUEL D. SACDALAN,
DEMETRIO P. VILLLARIN, and, NEMESIO P.
VILLARIN, Petitioners, v. ASTURIAS CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES,
INC., Respondents.

DECISION
 GARCIA, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

petitioners Daniel Aninao, et al., urge the reversal and setting aside of the
following issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 72201, to wit:

1) Resolution dated December 11, 2002,1 dismissing herein petitioners' earlier

Petition for Review of the decision and resolution dated January 4, 2002 and July 2,
2002, respectively, of the Office of the President; andcralawlibrary

2) Resolution dated October 15, 2003,2 denying petitioners' motion for

reconsideration.

The relevant facts are well laid out in the adverted January 4, 2002 decision3 of the
Office of the President (OP, for short), viz.:

Subject of this case are several parcels of land with a total area of 507 hectares,
more or less, which used to form part of a larger expanse consisting of 807
hectares situated in Brgys. Baha and Talibayog, Calatagan, Batangas, and formerly
owned by Ceferino Ascue (Ascue).

Records show that on various dates in 1989 and 1990, emancipation patents (EPs)
covering the disputed lands were issued to 323 agrarian reform beneficiaries
pursuant to Operation Land Transfer (OLT) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27
and/or Executive Order (EO) No. 228, s. of 1987, entitled "Declaring Full Ownership
to Qualified Farmer Beneficiaries Covered by [PD] No. 27."

On August 1, 1989, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Calatagan,

Batangas sent a 'Final Notification'  letter dated July 28, 1989 to the heirs of Ascue
relative to the payment of their land transfer claim (Records, p. 250).

On September 26, 1991, the DAR Region IV Office requested the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) to open a trust account in favor of Ascue in an amount
corresponding to the valuation of his agricultural property. Consequently, on
different dates . . . the LBP issued separate documents each certifying that an
amount certain, in cash and LBP bonds, has been set aside . . . .

Sometime in 1995, the heirs of Ascue, with the approval of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) at Balayan, Batangas handling the settlement his estate (sic), sold to
Asturias Chemical Industries, Inc. ("Asturias") the 807 hectares of land referred to
at the outset.

Years later, Asturias disturbed by what it viewed as initial activities undertaken by

the DAR, . . . to place its remaining landholding under the comprehensive agrarian
reform program (CARP), addressed a letter dated July 26, 1999 to the DAR Region
IV office. There, Asturias made it known that its Calatagan landholding could no
longer be considered for CARP coverage, it having "already been declared as
mineral land pursuant to a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement ('MPSA') between
the government and Asturias" (Record, pp. 163-181), and that "an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) [has already been] issued 'for the establishment of a
cement plant within the area" (Records, pp. 135-142).

On September 22, 1999, DAR Regional Director (RD) Renato Herrera issued,
pursuant to DAR Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 34, s. of 1997, a certificate of
exemption over the remaining 284.9323 hectares of land of Ascue, now owned by
Asturias . The exemption order was based on the findings of the joint LVP-DAR-
BARC team that "only fifteen (15) hectares, more or less, are planted with crops
such as upland rice, bananas, corn and coconut while the rest, with an area of
284.9323 hectares, are undeveloped, slopes of more than 18%, rocky, swampy,
and/ or mangrove areas and therefore not suitable for agricultural
purposes."(p.100, Records).

On October 22, 1999, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee

(PARCCOM) issued Res. No. 02 urging the Registry of Deeds - Nasugbu, Batangas
to cancel/consider null and void the land transaction between Ascue and Asturias if
proven that it was concluded in violation of existing laws. This was followed by Res.
No. 3, s. of 1999, urging agrarian reform associations to gather and submit
concrete evidence on the alleged selling by agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs)
and EP holders of their rights.

On January 6, 2000, the PARO of Batangas formed the Task Force for Baha,
Calatagan, Batangas ("TF Baha",) and directed it to inter alia review related Claim
Folders to ascertain if the standard operating procedures were followed in
accordance with the policies and guidelines of PD 27 and CARL; to determine
whether the property was planted to rice /corn as of 1972 and to verify the
existence of tenancy relationship.

In a letter of January 10, 2000, Asturias formally protested the OLT coverage of
portions of its Calatagan property and the threatened cancellation of its titles . . . .
The grounds cited for the protest fall under these headings: (1) "The Asturias
Landholding is NOT AND NEVER WAS a RICE and CORN farm"; and (2) The
issuance of the alleged 818 EPs and the coverage of the Asturias property under PD
# 27 is ERRONEOUS, . . . AND WITHOUT DUE PROCESS." Appended to the
letter-protest were the Batangas Census of Agriculture for years 1980 and 1991
showing that only 261 hectares of the land in Calatagan are planted to rice/corn.

On February 22, 2000, TF Baha submitted its report, with these relevant findings:
(1) procedural lapses attended the OLT-coverage of the property in question; (2)
significant portions of the OLT-covered area were planted to sugar cane; and (3)
the landowner did not recognize tenancy relations with the ARBs.

To validate the findings of TF Baha, the DAR Region IV Office created a three (3)-
man teams (the "Validating Team")
Thereafter, the Validating Team, on the premise that "it cannot be established
beyond reasonable doubt that the property is planted to palay or corn and
tenanted", recommended that "the coverage of the property under OLT be nullified;
and that the 818 EPs issued be cancelled to pave the way for the coverage
[thereof] . . . under CARP."

In its order of August 4, 2000, the dispositive portion of which is quoted at the
outset, the DAR, thru Undersecretary for Field Operations Conrado S. Navarro,
sustained the protest of Asturias and accordingly recalled/nullified the coverage of
the property in question under OLT. Undersecretary Navarro predicated his ruling
on the interplay of the following premises: (a) the landholding is not primarily
devoted to rice/corn production; (b) the existence of tenancy relations has not been
clearly established; and (c) the property had long ceased to be agricultural: it has
become mineral land.

xxx

Subsequently, two (2) groups, each claiming to be farmer-beneficiaries, separately

moved for reconsideration. However, in a resolution of January 3, 2001, the DAR,
after addressing three (3) main points raised by these groups, denied the separate
motions. [Emphasis and italization in the original]

From the adverse order of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) dated August
4, 2000,4 dispositively reading -

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the protest of Asturias Chemical Industries,

Inc., against the OLT coverage involving 507.87 hectares in Brgy. Baha and
Talibayog, Calatagan, Batangas is hereby GRANTED. However, the cancellation of
the Emancipation Patents issued therein shall be the subject of separate
proceedings before the DAR Adjudication Board pursuant to the DARAB New Rules
of Procedure which may only be allowed upon due consideration of the right of the
farmer-beneficiaries to disturbance compensation in accordance with existing laws
and regulations.

SO ORDERED,

and its Resolution of January 3, 2001,5 herein petitioners Atanacio Aninao, et al.,

appealed to the OP. On January 04, 2001, OP, thru then Executive Secretary
Alberto G. Romulo, rendered a decision,6 the decretal portion of which reads, as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed order of DAR dated August 4,

2000 and its subsequent resolution dated January 3, 2001 are hereby AFFIRMED.
The instant appeal is accordingly DISMISSED.

Petitioners subsequently moved for reconsideration, but their motion was denied
per OP resolution of July 2, 2002.7
In time, petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a Petition for Review under
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, whereat their recourse was docketed
as CA G.R. SP NO. 72201.

In a resolution of September 5, 2002,8 the appellate court, noting that only

petitioner Agustin Lopez signed the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, gave petitioners five (5) days from receipt thereof within which to
present a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) to establish that Agustin Lopez was
authorized to sign on behalf of the other petitioners. The same resolution carried
a caveat that failure to comply with the SPA requirement "will result in the
dismissal of the petition".

On September 16, 2002 and again on September 23, 2002, petitioners' counsel
filed Manifestations, appending thereto two (2) separate SPAs for
petitioner Agustin Lopez, the first allegedly signed by twelve (12) of his co -
petitioners, or by their representatives, and the second, bearing the purported
signatures of the other petitioners or their representatives, giving Agustin
Lopez authority, in coordination with their counsel, to represent them in all matters
connected with the case.

Eventually, in the herein first assailed Resolution dated December 11,

2002,9 the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners' Petition for Review for "being
insufficient in form for failing to comply with the requirements under Section 3,
Rule 4610 and Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure." Petitioners
then moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court denied the same in its
subsequent Resolution of October 15, 2003.11

Petitioners are now before this Court via the instant recourse, praying that their
right to the parcels of land in question be adjudicated on the merits, it being their
posture that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing their petition in CA G.R. SP
No. 72201 on the ground of insufficiency or deficiency of the certification against
forum shopping.

Apart from their core submission and arguments on forum shopping, petitioners
tender the following determinative issues:

1. The propriety of the nullification of the coverage under OLT of PD No. 27 of the
tracts of land in question and DAR's competence to effect such nullification;
andcralawlibrary

2. Validity of the sale of the same property by the heirs of Ceferino Ascue in favor
of respondent Asturias Chemical Industries, Inc.

On the threshold issue, petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for dismissing their
petition on the stated reason that they failed to comply with the requirements
under Section 3, Rule 46 in relation to Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Such
dismissal action is, to them, erroneous, given that they have substantially complied
with what the rules require.

We are not persuaded.

In putting petitioners to task for failure to hew with the rules on non-forum
shopping, and dismissing their petition on account of such failing, the appellate
court, in its first assailed resolution, made the following findings, to wit:

We have carefully perused the two (2) Special Powers of Attorney and found that
despite the order of the Court to submit the required authority, the petitioners
failed to comply with the Order. As written in the caption, there are 297 petitioners
with 31 names that were repeated. If we deduct the repeated names, the number
of petitioners would be reduced to 266. The Special Powers of Attorney show that
only 166 petitioners signed and out of this number, there were 24 persons who
signed but were not listed as petitioners. In sum, there were only 142 petitioners
out of 266 petitioners who signed the Special Power of Attorney.

In the matter of petitioners' non-compliance with the procedural requirement on

forum shopping, we find no reversible error in the appealed dismissal action of the
appellate court. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the requirements on the
filing of a certification against forum shopping should be strictly complied with. It
bears stressing that a petition involving two or more petitioners must be
accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping accomplished by all
petitioners, or by one who is authorized to represent them; otherwise, the petition
shall be considered as defective and, under the terms of Section 3, Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court, may be dismissed. This, we have stressed in a language too plain to
be misunderstood in Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman:12

At the outset, it is noted that . . . the Certification [against forum shopping] was
signed by Antonio Din, Jr. one of the petitioners in the instant case. We agree with
the Solicitor General that the petition is defective. Section 5, Rule 7 expressly
provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall certify under oath that he
has not commenced any action involving the same issues in any court, etc. Only
petitioner Din . . . signed the certification. It cannot likewise be presumed that
petitioner Din knew, to the best of his knowledge, whether his co-petitioners had
the same or similar actions filed or pending. We find that substantial compliance will
not suffice in a matter involving strict compliance with the rules. The attestation
contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge
by the party who executed the same. Petitioners must show reasonable cause for
failure to personally sign the certification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly
be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.

It may be, as suggested in Loquias and other cases, that a relaxation of the rule on
certification against non-forum shopping may be allowed under the principle of
substantial compliance, provided petitioners present reasonable ground to warrant
such liberality. With the view we take of the case, however, reasonable cause had
not been adequately shown for the failure of close to one half, or about 47%, of the
petitioners to either personally sign the certification against forum shopping or the
special power of attorney therefor. Certainly not lost on this Court is the fact that
the appellate court, before coming out with its first assailed issuance, motu
propio called the petitioners' attention to the flaw of their petition and accorded
them an opportunity to rectify the same or risk dismissal of their petition. Only
when petitioners failed to properly heed its advisory did the Court of Appeals
proceed with the dismissal of the petition, as warned. Petitioners' counsel's
explanation13 in his motion for reconsideration that considerable distance and the
rugged terrain separating barangays Baha and Talibayog accounted for the difficulty
of gathering the petitioners in one place for their signature would not carry the day
for them. For, the following excerpts appearing in the same motion belie counsel's
allegations about great distance and topography posing as obstacles to securing the
signatures of the petitioners:

xxx. Aside from the fact that Petitioner Lopez is the recognized leader of the
farmers-petitioners, he and his co-petitioners live in two adjacent barangays, Baha
and Talibayog, which speak of their proximity and closeness of the petitioners with
each other. . . . (at p. 4)

If on the foregoing score alone, this Court could, at this point, very well
write finis to this disposition. Nonetheless, for the peace of mind of prospective
agrarian reform beneficiaries who are, in all likelihood, expecting an answer as to
why they must yield to the superior right of another despite their having been
issued emancipation patents (EPs), we choose to discuss and address the material
issues raised in the instant petition. This approach we take in relation to our duty to
formulate guiding and controlling legal principles as we have the symbolic function
to educate the bench, the bar and adjudicating administrative offices.14

Among the more decisive issues raised relate to the propriety of the nullification of
the OLT coverage of the property in question.

It is basic that the agrarian reform program, be it under the aegis of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 27, otherwise known as the Tenants Emancipation Decree, or
Republic Act (RA) 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) law, covers only agricultural lands,15 meaning "lands devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in [RA 6657] and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land."16 Presidential Decree No. 27, by its
terms, applies to tenant-farmers of private agricultural lands primarily devoted to
rice and corn under a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy. On the other hand,
the CARP law has, for its coverage, all public and private agricultural lands,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced.17

As may be noted, EPs were issued to petitioners as agrarian reform beneficiaries or

successors-in interests pursuant to the OLT program under P.D. No. 27. To come
within the coverage of the OLT, there must be showing that the land is devoted to
rice or corn crops, and there must be a system of share-crop or lease tenancy
obtaining therein when P.D. No. 27 took effect on October 21, 1972.18 If either
requisite is absent, exclusion from the OLT coverage lies and EPs, if issued, may be
recalled.19

In the case at bench, it has been peremptorily determined by OP and, before it, by
the DAR, acting on investigations reports of its provincial (Batangas) office, as
reviewed and validated by its regional office, that the OLT coverage of the
disputed landholdings was erroneous, it being established that the lands covered
are not primarily devoted to rice and corn and that the tenancy relationship has not
been clearly established. Absent palpable error by both agencies, of which this
Court finds none, their determination as to the use of the property and/or to the
dubious status of petitioners as de jure tenants is controlling.

xxx, it is settled that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally

accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence, a situation that obtains in this case. The factual findings of the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, who, by reason of his official position, has acquired
expertise in specific matters within his jurisdiction, deserve full respect, and without
justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified or reversed.20

Upon the foregoing perspective, the nullification by the offices a quo of the
coverage of the property in question under the OLT program was rightly decreed.

But the more compelling reason arguing for the propriety of the DAR's assailed
nullification action is its determination that the property in question "had long
ceased to be agricultural and converted to mineral land even before it was placed
under OLT coverage".21 For, lands classified as mineral are exempt from agrarian
reform coverage. There is, to be sure, adequate evidence to support DAR's finding
on the mineralized nature of the land. The DAR mentioned one in page 8 of its
Order of August 4, 2000, referring to the study made in May 1965 of the then
Bureau of Mines which reported that "ample reserves of calcitic limestone and
tuffeceous shall-sandstone suitable as basic raw materials for portland cement
manufacture are available in . . . more than 339 hectares . . . Baha and Talibayog,
Calatagan." Not to be overlooked is the 25-year Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement22 (MPSA) entered into in July 1997 by and between respondent and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources covering 2,336.8 hectares of
land situated in Baha, Talibayog, Punta and Hukay, Calatagan, Batangas, including
the disputed property, for the sustainable development and utilization of limestone
and other mineral deposits existing within the contract mining area. And for a third,
the DENR has issued in favor of respondent an Environmental Clearance Certificate
(ECC)23 for its cement plant complex within the disputed area and authorizing it to
conduct limestone and shale quarrying operations thereat.

Surely not lost on this Court is the fact that the MPSA and ECC are annotated on
the six (6) titles of Asturias over the property in question.24

In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we find untenable petitioners' lament that
DAR and OP erred in not declaring the sale of the property in question made by the
heirs of Ascue to respondent as null and void under the terms of Section 6 of R. A.
6657.25 For, what said Section 6 contextually prohibits is the sale or disposition of
private agricultural lands covered by CARP. Mineral lands, meaning any area where
mineral resources, or concentration of minerals/rocks with potential economic value
are found,26 as here, are, to reiterate, outside of OLT or CARP coverage. Hence,
petitioners' invocation of Section 6 of R.A. 6657 is misplaced. What is more,
petitioners are, at bottom, without standing to challenge the validity of the Heirs of
Ascue - Asturias sale, as approved by the Regional Trial Court at Balayan,
Batangas.

Finally, petitioners' challenge to the DAR's jurisdiction to nullify the OLT coverage of
the lands subject hereof, especially when EPs have been issued therefor, is tenuous
at best. It need not detain us long. Nullification of OLT coverage and cancellation of
EPs are entirely different concepts, albeit the cancellation of an EP, if issued over a
piece of land, would be the logical consequence of the nullification of the OLT
coverage of such land. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that the assailed
ruling of the DAR Secretary, as sustained by OP, merely gave due course to the
protest lodged by respondent against the OLT coverage of the property in question.
It stopped short of ordering the recall and cancellation of the EPs thus issued over
the covered property. In fact, the DAR Secretary made it abundantly clear that "the
cancellation of the [EPs] . . . shall be the subject of separate proceedings before
the DAR Adjudication Board". There can be no quibbling about the DAR Secretary's
competence to act on protests against agrarian reform coverage and to nullify such
coverage. As held by this Court in Centeno v. Centeno27 "the DAR . . . shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian
reform program." Matters involving the administrative implementation of the
transfer of the land, such as the giving out of notices of coverage to the tenant-
farmer under P.D. No. 27 and amendatory and related decrees, rules and
regulations, shall be exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
including the issuance, recall or cancellation of EPs or CLOAs,28 save when such
certificates of land transfer have been registered with the Register of Deeds, as in
this case, in which instance the recalling authority is the DAR Adjudicating Board
(DARAB).29

As this Court held in Padunan v. DARAB:30

The ruling of the Court of Appeals that DARAB has jurisdiction to cancel
the unregistered emancipation patents in the name of Angelina Rodriquez is hereby
REVERSED. We hereby rule that it is the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform who has jurisdiction to cancel the said unregistered emancipation patents.
Private respondent Marcos, the new legal agrarian reform beneficiary of the subject
land, should file the proper action before the DAR to cancel the
said unregistered emancipation patents. (Emphasis in the original; at p. 209).

To sum up, the Court finds the case disposition of DAR, as affirmed by OP, to be in
accordance with applicable law and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-

Morales, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-44570 May 30, 1986

MANUEL GUERRERO and MARIA GUERRERO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and APOLINARIO BENITEZ, respondents.

A.D. Guerrero for petitioners.

Bureau of Legal Assistance for private respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties Manuel Guerrero, et al and Apolinario
Benitez, et al. as to determine their respective rights and obligations to one another is the issue in this petition
to review the decision of the then Court of Appeals, now the Intermediate Appellate Court, which affirmed in
toto the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations in CAR Case No. 6793-NE (SA-Q) '73, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1) ordering defendants-spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to reinstate plaintiff Apolinario
Benitez to the 10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare coconut holding in question, located at Bo.
San Joaquin, Maria Aurora Sub-province Quezon and to maintain said plaintiff in the peaceful
possession and cultivation thereof, with all the rights accorded and obligations imposed upon
him by law;

(2) ordering defendants Paulino and Rogelio both surnamed Latigay to vacate the said ten-
hectare portion and deliver possession thereof to plaintiff Apolinario Benitez;

(3) ordering defendants-spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to pay damages to plaintiffs in
the amount of P14,911.20 beginning from July, 1973 and to pay the same amount every year
thereafter until plaintiff is effectively reinstated to the ten-hectare portion;

(4) denying plaintiff-tenants' prayer for reconstruction of the copra cottage: and

(5) ordering defendants-spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to pay plaintiff the amount of
P200.00 by way of litigation expenses.

All other claims of the parties are denied. With costs against defendants-spouses.

The petitioners adopt the respondent court's findings of fact excepting, however, to its conclusion that tenancy
relations exist between the petitioners and the respondents, thus:

In 1969, plaintiff Apolinario Benitez was taken by defendants- spouses Manuel and Maria
Guerrero to take care of their 60 heads of cows which were grazing within their 21-hectare
 coconut plantation situated at Bo. San Joaquin, Maria Aurora, Subprovince of Aurora,
Quezon. Plaintiff was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within the plantation where he
and his family stayed. In addition to attending to the cows, he was made to clean the already
fruitbearing coconut trees, burn dried leaves and grass and to do such other similar chores.
During harvest time which usually comes every three months, he was also made to pick
coconuts and gather the fallen ones from a 16-hectare portion of the 21-hectare plantation. He
had to husk and split the nuts and then process its meat into copra in defendants' copra kiln.
For his work related to the coconuts, he shared 1/3 of the proceeds from the copra he
processed and sold in the market. For attending to the cows he was paid P500 a year.

Sometime in the early part of 1973, plaintiff was refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-
hectare portion of the 16-hectare part of the plantation from where he used to gather nuts. He
felt aggrieved by the acts of defendants and he brought the matter to the attention of the
Office of Special Unit in the Office of the President in Malacanang, Manila. This led to an
execution of an agreement, now marked as Exh. D, whereby defendants agreed, among
others, to let plaintiff work on the 16-hectare portion of the plantation as tenant thereon and
that their relationship will be guided by the provisions of republic Act No. 1199. The
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines.

Then in July, 1973, he was again refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion of
the plantation with threats of bodily harm if he persists to gather fruits therefrom. Defendant
spouses, the Guerreros, then assigned defendants Rogelio and Paulino Latigay to do the
gathering of the nuts and the processing thereof into copra. Defendants Guerreros also
caused to be demolished a part of the cottage where plaintiff and his family lived, thus,
making plaintiffs feel that they (defendants) meant business. Hence, this case for
reinstatement with damages.

The lower court formulated four (4) issues by which it was guided in the resolution of the
questions raised by the pleadings and evidence and we pertinently quote as follows:

(1) whether or not plaintiff is the tenant on the coconut landholding in question consisting of
sixteen (16) hectares;

(2) In The affirmative, whether or not he was unlawfully dispossessed of ten (10) hectare
thereof;

(3) Whether or not the parties are entitled to actual and moral damages, attorney's fees and
litigation expenses.

This petition for review poses the following questions of law:

Whether or not with the passage of Presidential Decree 1038 only last October 21, 1976,
Republic Act 6389 otherwise known as the Code of Agrarian Reforms has repealed in their
entirety the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act 1199) and the Agricultural Reform Code
(Republic Act 3844) abrogating or nullifying therefore all agricultural share tenancy
agreements over all kinds of lands, as the one involved in the case at bar-over coconut
plantation-and hence, the complaint below as well as the challenged decision by the courts
below, based as they are on such share tenancy agreements, have lost their validity cessante
ratio legis, cessat ipsa lex.

II
 Assuming arguendo that said laws have not thus been repealed, is respondent Benitez
hereunder the undisputed fact of the case as found by the courts below a share tenant within
the purview of the said laws, i.e., Republic Acts 1199 and 3844, or a mere farmhand or farm
worker as such relationship were extensively discussed in Delos Reyes vs. Espinelli, 30
SCRA 574. (Copied verbatim from Petition, p. 31- rollo)

Petitioner insists in this petition that Benitez was a mere farmhand or laborer who was dismissed as an
employee from the landholding in question and not ousted therefrom as tenant. Whether a person is a tenant or
not is basically a question of fact and the findings of the respondent court and the trial court are, generally,
entitled to respect and non-disturbance.

The law defines "agricultural tenancy" as the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture,
belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and
of the members of his immediate farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to share the
harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both
(Section 3, Republic Act 1199, The Agricultural tenancy Act, as amended.)

With petitioner reference to this case, "share tenancy" exists whenever two persons agree on a joint
undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either
or both contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land with the aid of
labor available from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided between
the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective contributions (Sec. 4, RA 1199; Sec. 166(25) RA
3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code).

In contrast, a farmhand or agricultural laborer is "any agricultural salary or piece worker but is not limited to a
farmworker of a particular farm employer unless this Code expressly provides otherwise, and any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair
labor practice and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment" (Sec. 166(15) RA
3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code).

The petitioners contend that the two courts below applied erroneous definitions of "tenancy" found in repealed
laws. They assert that the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code have been
superseded by the Code of Agrarian Reforms, Rep. Act 6389, which the trial court and the Court of Appeals
failed to cite and apply.

There is no question that the latest law on land and tenancy reforms seeks to abolish agricultural share tenancy
as the basic relationship governing farmers and landowners in the country.

On August 8, 1963, Republic Act 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put in its stead the
agricultural leasehold system. On September 10, 1971, Republic Act 6389 amending Republic Act 3844
declared share tenancy relationships as contrary to public policy. On the basis of this national policy, the
petitioner asserts that no cause of action exists in the case at bar and the lower court's committed grave error
in upholding the respondent's status as share tenant in the petitioners' landholding.

The petitioners' arguments are regressive and, if followed, would turn back the advances in agrarian reform
law. The repeal of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code mark the movement not
only towards the leasehold system but towards eventual ownership of land by its tillers. The phasing out of
share tenancy was never intended to mean a reversion of tenants into mere farmhands or hired laborers with
no tenurial rights whatsoever.

It is important to note that the Agricultural Tenancy Act (RA 1199) and the Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA
3844) have not been entirely repealed by the Code of Agrarian Reform (RA 6389) even if the same have been
substantially modified by the latter.

However, even assuming such an abrogation of the law, the rule that the repeal of a statute defeats all actions
pending under the repealed statute is a mere general principle. Among the established exceptions are when
vested rights are affected and obligations of contract are impaired. (Aisporna vs. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA
481).

The records establish the private respondents' status as agricultural tenants under the legal definitions.

Respondent Benitez has physically possessed the landholding continuously from 1969 until he was ejected
from it. Such possession of longstanding is an essential distinction between a mere agricultural laborer and a
real tenant within the meaning of the tenancy law (Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Edition), a tenant
being one who, has the temporary use and occupation of land or tenements belonging to another (Bouvier's
Law Dictionary, Vol. II, p. 3254) for the purpose of production (Sec. 3, Republic Act 1199; delos Reyes vs.
Espinelli, 30 SCRA 574). Respondent Benitez lives on the landholding. He built his house as an annex to the
petitioner's copra kiln. A hired laborer would not build his own house at his expense at the risk of losing the
same upon his dismissal or termination any time. Such conduct is more consistent with that of an agricultural
tenant who enjoys security of tenure under the law.

Cultivation is another important factor in determining the existence of tenancy relationships. It is admitted that it
had been one Conrado Caruruan, with others, who had originally cleared the land in question and planted the
coconut trees, with the respondent coming to work in the landholding only after the same were already fruit
bearing. The mere fact that it was not respondent Benitez who had actually seeded the land does not mean
that he is not a tenant of the land. The definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or
harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion of growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground
to forward the products of the earth by general industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique agricultural
enterprise. Unlike rice, the planting of coconut seedlings does not need harrowing and plowing. Holes are
merely dug on the ground of sufficient depth and distance, the seedlings placed in the holes and the surface
thereof covered by soil. Some coconut trees are planted only every thirty to a hundred years. The major work in
raising coconuts begins when the coconut trees are already fruitbearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging or
smoking the plantation, taking care of the coconut trees, applying fertilizer, weeding and watering, thereby
increasing the produce. The fact that respondent Benitez, together with his family, handles all phases of
farmwork from clearing the landholding to the processing of copra, although at times with the aid of hired
laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows that he is a tenant, not a mere farm laborer. (delos Reyes vs.
Espinelli, supra  Marcelo vs. de Leon, 105 Phil. 1175).

Further indicating the existence of a tenancy relationship between petitioners and respondent is their
agreement to share the produce or harvest on a "tercio basis" that is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of the
petitioner-landowners. Though not a positive indication of the existence of tenancy relations perse the sharing
of harvest taken together with other factors characteristic of tenancy shown to be present in the case at bar,
strengthens the claim of respondent that indeed, he is a tenant. The case of delos Reyes vs. Espinelli
(supra) clearly explains the matter thus:

The agricultural laborer works for the employer, and for his labor he receives a salary or
wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the share tenant
par ticipates in the agricultural produce. His share is necessarily dependent on the amount of
harvest.

Hence, the lower court's computation of damages in favor of respondent based on the number of normal
harvests. In most cases, we have considered the system of sharing produce as convincing evidence of tenancy
relations.

The petitioners entered into an agreement on May 2, 1973 which in clear and categorical terms establishes
respondent as a tenant, to wit:

AGREEMENT

This agreement entered into by and between Manuel Guerrero hereinafter referred to as the
landowner and Apolinario Benitez hereinafter referred to as tenant.
xxx xxx xxx

The petitioners, however, contend that the word "tenant" in the aforequoted agreement was used to mean a
hired laborer farm employee as understood agreed upon by the parties. The fact that their relationship would
be guided by the provisions of Republic Act 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines militates
against such an assertion. It would be an absurdity for Republic Act 1199 to govern an employer-employee
relationship. If as the petitioners insist a meaning other than its general acceptation had been given the word
"tenant", the instrument should have so stated '. Aided by a lawyer, the petitioners, nor the respondent could
not be said to have misconstrued the same. In clear and categorical terms, the private respondent appears to
be nothing else but a tenant:

Finally, comes the admission by the petitioners' counsel of the respondent's status as tenant:

ATTY. ESTEBAN:

Q You said you are living at San Joaquin, who cause the sowing of the
lumber you made as annex in the house?

ATTY. NALUNDASAN

Please remember that under the law, tenant is given the right to live in the
holding in question. We admit him as tenant.

xxxxxxxxx

(Apolinario Benitez on Redirect, TSN, June 25, 1974, pp. 4950).

The respondent's status as agricultural tenant should be without question.

Once a tenancy relationship is established, the tenant has the right to continue working until such relationship
is extinguished according to law.

The Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (Republic Act 1199), the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963
(Republic Act 3844), the Code of Agrarian Reforms (Republic Act 6389) and Presidential Decree 1038
(Strengthening the Security of Tenure of Tenant Tillers in Non-Rice/Corn Producing Agricultural Lands) all
provide for the security of tenure of agricultural tenants. Ejectment may be effected only for causes provided by
law, to wit:

l) Violation or failure of the tenant to comply with any of the terms and conditions of the
tenancy contract or any of the provisions of the Agricultural Tenancy Act;

2) The tenant's failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver the landholder's share unless the
tenant's failure is caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure;

3) Use by the tenant of the land for purposes other than that specified by the agreement of the
parties;

4) Failure of the tenant to follow proven farm practices:

5) Serious injury to the land caused by the negligence of the tenant;

6) Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any member of his immediate family or farm
household of a crime against the landholder or a member of his immediate family. (Section
50, Rep. Act 1199).
None of the above causes exists in the case at bar. The respondent has been unlawfully deprived of his right to
security of tenure and the Court of Agrarian Reforms did not err in ordering the reinstatement of respondent as
tenant and granting him damages therefor.

Before we close this case, it is pertinent to reiterate that the respondent's right as share tenant do not end with
the abolition of share tenancy. As the law seeks to "uplift the farmers from poverty, ignorance and stagnation to
make them dignified, self-reliant, strong and responsible citizens ... active participants in nation-building",
agricultural share tenants are given the right to leasehold tenancy as a first step towards the ultimate status of
owner-cultivator, a goal sought to be achieved by the government program of land reform.

It is true that leasehold tenancy for coconut lands and sugar lands has not yet been implemented. The policy
makers of government are still studying the feasibility of its application and the consequences of its
implementation. Legislation still has to be enacted. Nonetheless, wherever it may be implemented, the eventual
goal of having strong and independent farmers working on lands which they own remains. The petitioners'
arguments which would use the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Code as the basis for setting back or
eliminating the tenurial rights of the tenant have no merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, Alampay, Paras and Cruz, * JJ., concur.

Feria, J., took no part.