At first glance, the facts and issues of this case seem simple - even academic to a point.

However, casual perusal of the records

of this case on appeal ought to show the complexity of the case at hand. The respondent-Appellee argues that it has the right
to summarily eject the Petitioner-Appellant by virtue of the expiration and non-renewal of the contract of lease while the
former argues that the contract of lease relied upon does not express the true intent of the parties. Unfortunately, the
honorable MCTC decided in favour of respondent-Appellee. This was affirmed in toto by the RTC.

We come now appearing before this Honourable Appellate Court to ask it to right this wrong and decide in favour of law and
equity. Unlawful detainer is the action that must be brought when possession by a landlord, vendor, vendee or other person
of any land or building is being unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by
virtue of any contract, express or implied. In such a case, prior physical possession is not required. 1 To make out a case of
unlawful detainer, the complaint must show that the withholding of possession, or the refusal to vacate, is unlawful. The
respondent-Appellee adduced as evidence a notarized Lease Agreement contract signed between the parties. Such
document is considered as a public document and serves as evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein
expressed.2 To this the lower court seems to be cognizant and adept in the application of law. However, its ineptitude in the
appreciation of facts are shown by its casual sweeping aside of the important issue raised by the Petitioner-Appellant in this
case - that the contract relied upon by the respondont-Appellee for its right to eject does not represent the true intention of
the parties. The LCA does not question the validity of the Lease Agreement in fact it acknowledges its existence. It merely aims
to correct the form in order to reflect the true intentions of the parties.

Art. 1359 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 1359. When, there having been a meeting of the minds of the parties to a contract, their true intention is not
expressed in the instrument purporting to embody the agreement, by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct
or accident, one of the parties may ask for the reformation of the instrument to the end that such true intention may
be expressed.

1 Sps. Benitez v. CA, 77 SCAD 793 [1997].

2 Gonzales v. CA, 90 SCRA 185 [1979]

 If mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident has prevented a meeting of the minds of the parties, the proper
remedy is not reformation of the instrument but annulment of the contract.

When the true intention of the parties to a perfected and valid contract are not expressed in the instrument purporting to
embody their agreement by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, one of the parties may ask for the
reformation of the instrument so that such true intention may be expressed. In order that there can be a reformation of the
instrument, the following requisites must, there- fore, concur:

(1) There must be a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties;

(2) Their true intention is not expressed in the instrument; and
(3) Such failure to express their true intention is due to mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident.

To materialize the true intent of the parties, a reformation of the document is thus proper as cited in the case of Rosella-
Bentir v Leanda, G.R. No. 128991, April 12, 2000, it reads:

“Reformation of an instrument is that remedy in equity by means of which a written instrument is made or construed so
as to express or conform to the real intention of the parties when some error or mistake has been committed.It is
predicated on the equitable maxim that equity treats as done that which ought to be done.The rationale of the doctrine
is that it would be unjust and inequitable to allow the enforcement of a written instrument which does not reflect or
disclose the real meeting of the minds of the parties."

The Petitioner-Appellant has continuously raised the fact that the lease agreement between the parties did not express the
true intent of the contract hence should have been ruled on not based on the mere document alone. I n the construction or
interpretation of an instrument, the intention of the parties is primordial and is to be pursued. The denomination or title
given by the parties in their contract is not conclusive of the nature of its contents. 3 As cited in the case Tanguilig v Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 117190, January 2, 1997:

3 Ayala Life Assurance, Inc. v. Ray Burton Development Corporation, G.R. No. 163075, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 462, 467-468.
 “It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that the intention of the parties shall be accorded primordial
consideration and, in case of doubt, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.”

Although the Lease Agreement provides the term for the contract, the subsequent act of DLMF in its Board meeting in
February 6, 1993 discloses a different tenure and sheds light into the agreement:

“6. Opening of an Elementary School

There is a plan to establish an elementary school principally to cater to the Foundation’s beneficiaries and the
immediate communities. The Foundation believes that quality Christian education would be ensured if it enrolls the kids
in its own school. This project is inspired by the feat of the school established in Thailand.”

Further, the Lease Agreement provides for the payment of rental. The pertinent provision reads:
“4. RENTAL. For and in consideration of this Agreement, LESSEE shall pay to the LESSOR annual rental in the amount of
One Peso (P1.00), Philippine Currency, payable within the first ten (10) calendar days of the contract year when this
Lease subsists.”

Even more revealing, is the statement made by the Board on February 04, 1995:
“6. Opening of a School
The proposed name of the school is “Livingstone Christian Academy”. The construction of the two classrooms is
on-going. The primary school will start its classes in June 1995.

A TOKEN AMOUNT OF RENTAL WILL BE GIVEN THE FOUNDATION.”

A contract of lease is a consensual, bilateral, onerous and commutative contract by which the owner temporarily grants the
use of his property to another, who undertakes to pay the rent therefore. 4|||Therefore, the form of the Lease Agreement
betrays the real intention of parties when it is denominated as such when the amount of the rent is neither onerous nor
commutative. For such use of the property an amount of ONE PESO (P1.00) is patently not equivalent to the use of such
valuable property. Dare we say, this nominal amount is not at all onerous but gratuitous.

4 Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, supra note 56, at 640.|||

According to Article 1946 of the Civil Code as cited in the case of Pajuyo v Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004:

“In a contract of Commodatum, one of the parties delivers to another something not consumable so that the latter may
use the same for a certain time and return it. A feature of commodatum is that the use of the thing belonging to
another is for a certain period. Thus, the bailor cannot demand the return of the thing loaned until after expiration of
the period stipulated, or after accomplishment of the use for which the commodatum is constituted.”
(Emphasis Supplied)

A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous and for a temporary use. The Bailor in commodatum cannot demand the
return of the thing loaned till after the expiration of the period stipulated, or after the accomplishment of the use for which
the commodatum has been constituted.5 The contract of commodatum on the land was constituted for the purpose of the
Petitioner-Appellant to provide quality education for the orphans of the respondent-Appellee and the immediate
communitinies. This was and is the true intent of the parties as to why the contract was created. Thus, the respondent-
Appellee is without legal right to order the ejectment of the petitioner-Appellant when it is still diligently providing and
observing the obligation incumbent upon which is to provide quality education. In conclusion, the lower court was remiss in
its appreciation of facts and law with its short sighted valuing of the important issue raised by LCA.

5 Art. 1946 of the New Civil Code.