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Operation Allied Harbour (OPLAN 10414)

Operation Sustain Hope / Shining Hope


Operation Allied Harbour was the codename for NATO's efforts in Albania to
support humanitarian relief efforts for refugees in Albania, the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and Montenegro, resulting from the Serb
expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. The Serbian offensive had come as
NATO had begun a bombing campaign in Kosovo and elsewhere in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, codenamed Operation Allied Force. US
contributions to Allied Harbour were codenamed Shining Hope and Sustain
Hope. The exact timeline for these US operations is unclear. Reference is
made to both operations in a 14 April 1999 Air Mobility Command News
Service news item. The news item said that in Shining Hope, Kosovar refugees
would be airlifted from Europe to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, while Sustain Hope
involved the delivery of relief supplies to those refugees while they were still in
Europe. An American Forces Information Service news item in April 1999 said
that the operation to relocate refugees to Guantanamo Bay was in fact
codenamed Sustain Hope. Whatever the case, that plan was scrapped and
resettlement operations were subsequently conducted in CONUS via McGuire
Air Force Base and Fort Dix, both in New Jersey, as part of Operations Open
Arms and Provide Refuge. On 25 April 1999, the previously established US
Joint Task Force - Shining Hope, which had already been providing support to
refugees in Albania, formally became the US contribution to NATO's Albania
Force (AFOR).

The US Operation Sustain Hope was subsequently described as the US


humanitarian effort to bring in food, water, medicine and relief supplies for the
refugees fleeing from the Former Republic of Yugoslavia into Albania and
Macedonia. The overall objective of Operation Sustain Hope was to maintain
stability in the region and prevent a humanitarian disaster resulting from the
ongoing offensive against the people of Kosovo. The specific military mission of
the forces deployed was to support disaster relief operations to aid in the care
and protection of Kosovar refugees and to provide for their own security. The
number of US personnel who would be deployed for these purposes was
initially uncertain, since planning for the deployment was ongoing as the
advance parties departed, but at a minimum a deployment of 1,000 personnel
was anticipated. Headquarters elements, air crews, airlift control elements,
selected transport and rotary wing aircraft, security personnel, civil affairs and
psychological operations personnel, medical and engineer forces, and logistics
support forces could become involved in the operation. These forces would
operate under US and NATO operational control.
Before the Serbian offensive began in 1999, the United States pre-positioned
36,000 metric tons of food in the region, enough to feed half a million people for
3 months. The US worked with the United nations to ready life-saving supplies
at Kosovo's borders with Albania and Macedonia. President Clinton authorized
an additional $50 million in emergency aid to augment US contributions to the
UN High Commission on Refugees and other relief organizations. It also
ensured the military could help them get aid to the people in need. To support
the effort, civilian contract 747 aircraft carried more rations to Europe where
they were transferred to US military aircraft for transport to the Balkans. In
Europe, US European Command officials shipped 80 US military trucks and 30
State Department trucks to Albania to help move supplies from ports and
airports to the people who need them. The Defense Department airlifted
500,000 humanitarian daily rations to the Balkans, and more were ready to go if
needed. The flights were bound for Italy, where the supplies would be
transported to Albania. The plan was to move the rations into Tirana, Albania.
The US would be flying 10 missions daily by C-130 aircraft to Italy, from Italy to
Tirana, and taking supplies from there to the border by helicopter.

To manage this effort, Joint Task Force (JTF) Shining Hope was established by
the United States European Command (EUCOM) on 4 April 1999, with the
mission to help alleviate the suffering and provide immediate relief to more than
450,000 Kosovar refugees fleeing into Albania and the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia as a result of increased fighting in Kosovo. Never
before had the US military accepted such a massive humanitarian
responsibility. During its first 50 days of operation, JTF Shining Hope delivered
more than 3,400 tons of food, equipment, and medical supplies to those in
need.

On 5 April 1999, NATO's Headquarters, ACE Mobile Force (Land) (HQ AMF[L])
received a warning order and, based on the experience from a reconnaissance
conducted in Albania in 1998, began developing an operational concept. The
AMF(L) was a NATO Headquarters capable of readily deploying a land force at
short notice. Ten nations contributed to its staff, while all NATO nations
contributed forces. For Operation Allied Harbour the composition of the force
was decided at a Force generation conference at SHAPE.

Preparation for the deployment of a NATO force to Albania to conduct a


humanitarian mission subsequently began on 7 April 1999, when a NATO team
led by Major General Pasqualino Verdecchia of the Italian Army deployed from
Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) to co-ordinate NATO
plans with Albanian and international authorities. In response to the crisis in
Kosovo, the Albanian Government had reacted quickly in creating an
Emergency Management Group (EMG) to co-ordinate the relief effort.
A team of the AMF(L), led by the AMF(L) commander, Lieutenant General John
Reith, arrived in Tirana on 10 April 1999 to make final preparations for the
deployment of a NATO Immediate Reaction (Land) headquarters. General
Reith conducted meetings with senior Albanian and international authorities
while his staff conducted reconnaissance to make final recommendations about
the location of headquarters and deployment of the force. The advance party
also took control of in country from a predeployed AFSOUTH Command and
Control node. Forces already in place at the time of the reconnaissance as part
of national contingents deployed by NATO nations included 450 from France,
200 from Germany, 230 from Greece, 830 from the United States, 1,100 from
Italy, while Belgium, Canadian, and Dutch contingents were already en route.
The NATO's staff initially operated from the Albanian Ministry of Defence,
which provided proximity to key agencies, ministries, contractors and
international, and national journalists.

To ensure that AFOR could conduct its operations legally and freely in Albania,
NATO and the Government of the Republic of Albania concluded an agreement
regarding the status of NATO forces (Albanian SOFA), which enabled NATO to
conduct its humanitarian operation in Albania successfully. This agreement
granted NATO and its personnel certain privileges and immunities, such as free
and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access into and throughout the
Republic of Albania, including associated airspace and territorial waters,
exemption from taxes and import/export duties, and immunity from all legal
process. National elements of NATO also retained exclusive criminal and
disciplinary jurisdiction over their personnel. NATO was granted control over
the airspace in Albania and the use and occupation of the seaport at Durres
and the airport at Tirana Rinas without payment of fees. Supplementary
arrangements under the SOFA were made regarding the infrastructure in
Albania, particularly, the repair of roads and the repair and replacement of
taxiways and ramps at the Airport.

On 13 April 1999, NATO approved plans for Operation Allied Harbour, a


10,000-troop NATO deployment to support humanitarian relief efforts for
refugees resulting from the Serb expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo.
The AMF(L) Headquarters began deployment on 14 April 1999. On 15 April
NATO announced that rules of engagement for this Operation were approved
by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and that, following the reconnaissance
mission by AFSOUTH in Albania, the number of forces to be assigned to Allied
Harbour were planned to be about 7,300. The Supreme Allied Commander
Europe ordered the execution of Operation Allied Harbour on 16 April 1999. In
turn, the Commander-in-Chief AFSOUTH transferred to the Commander of
AMF(L), General Reith, authority over all NATO-led forces operating in Albania
as part of this operation. In this respect, General Reith was the Commander,
AFOR. The AFOR Headquarters was located at Plepa, near Durres in Albania.
The mission of the operation was to provide humanitarian assistance in support
of, and in close coordination with, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and Albanian civil and military authorities, to alleviate the
suffering of those who were forced to leave their homes in Kosovo and flee to
Albania.

In addition, the United States continued to work closely with the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other relief organizations to
ensure a comprehensive and adequate response to the humanitarian crisis
caused by the ethnic cleansing and atrocities being conducted by Serb forces.
US and other NATO military forces provided support for humanitarian
operations in a variety of ways, to include air and surface transportation of relief
supplies and equipment, camp preparation, shelter construction, security, and
other tasks uniquely suited to military forces. The Department of Defense
pledged over $25 million in humanitarian assistance, which, in addition to the
above, also included food (humanitarian daily rations), shelter (tents), bedding,
medical supplies, and vehicles.

As of 10 May 1999, forces for Operation Allied Harbour were provided by


Albania, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, Luxemburg, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Arab
Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. The United States contribution to
Allied Harbour was Joint Task Force (JTF) Shining Hope, which had been
previously established as part of US humanitarian relief operations in the region
and formally became the US contingent of the NATO operation on 25 April
1999.

By May 1999, AFOR, consisting of approximately 8,000 personnel, was divided


into task groups and a leading nation was appointed for each of them. Task
Force North was led by Italy. Task Force South was led by France. Task Force
Romeo, which subsequently became Task Force Bravo, was led by the
Netherlands and Belgium. Task Force Whiskey was led by Spain. Lastly, as
noted, the US JTF Shining Hope was assigned to the operation.

AFOR was also tasked with executing or considering numerous projects,


including: construction of camps and providing interim shelter; engineer support
to repair selected roads, airfield, or other appropriate infrastructure; providing
transportation for refugee movement by both ground vehicles and in special
cases by air (to include emergency medical evacuation); assisting in
transportation and distribution of food, water and supplies; and electronic
communication support as required.
The initial concept for AFOR envisaged functional Task Forces but, at the
request of certain nations, this was adapted. The resulting structured for the
force divided it into 2 regional areas and 3 functional groupings. Task Force
North deployed its headquarters at Durres, while Task Force South was at
Elbasan. Both of these task forces were tasked with camp construction and
road repair. Task Force Whisky deployed to Hamallaj. Task Force Romeo was
deployed in Durres port. The US JTF Shining Hope was based at Tirana Rinas
Airport. Task Force Whisky was responsible for refugee camp construction,
while Task Force Romeo was responsible for transportation and provision of
quick reaction force protection and humanitarian reserves. JTF Shining Hope
had the dual roles of camp construction and development of Tirana Rinas
airport.

In addition, AFOR had a number of "Force Troops," including the Italian


Carabinieri Multinational Specialised Unit (MSU), based near Kavaje. The
Carabinieri MSU and the Force Military Police Unit (FMPU) arrived in Albania
by late April 1999 and provided a high profile NATO presence, which did much
to enhance stability in the country. The tasks of the MSU and FMPU ranged
from presence patrolling to convoy escort, traffic control, particularly at the port
and airport, and investigation of crime.

The deployment of some 12,000 AFOR and US troops into Albania was not
allowed to hinder the flow of humanitarian aid. From the outset, AFOR took
control of the airspace under 3,000 feet within Albania, improved the
management of Tirana Rinas Airport and equipped it with modern air traffic
control radar systems. This included work by US engineers to repair access
road to Rinas airport in Tirana.

As a result its capacity increased from 8 to 100 aircraft daily, peaking at 88


fixed-wing flights in one day. At the height of the crisis the airport housed Task
Force Hawk (4,500 personnel and 500 vehicles under US control and tasked
primarily in support of Operation Allied Force, but also providing support to
Operation Allied Harbour), JTF Shining Hope (1,028 personnel and 104
vehicles), the United Arab Emirates contingent (297 personnel), elements of
Task Force South, and a large number of international organizations/non-
governmental organizations coordinating the movement of humanitarian aid.
Military police and designated traffic circuits were introduced to enhance
vehicle movement.

During the operation 3,489 fixed wing landings were made at the airport, of
which 1,139 were for the movement of aid; 10,000 metric tons of aid were
brought into the country through the airport. In addition, there were 4,578 tons
flown by rotary wing. Throughout the aid operation, the civilian terminal
continued to function normally.

Durres seaport was essential for the movement of heavy military equipment
and humanitarian aid into Albania. When AFOR arrived the port had a capacity
of 8 ships per day. AFOR quickly established a Port Management Co-
ordination Centre, in conjunction with civil harbour authorities, which planned
and coordinated the flow of military and civilian vessels, as well as facilitating
the management of the throughput of humanitarian aid. This improved ship turn
around times, allowing 12 to be off-loaded daily. AFOR also improved the road
network within the port area and established 120,000 square meters of secure
storage and marshalling areas for equipment, containers and personnel. This
effort, by Dutch Troops, involved the reclamation of large areas that had
previously been used to dump industrial by-products and scrap metal.

AFOR also had some 1,719 ground vehicles, which provided a daily lift
capability of nearly 1,000 tonnes. However, this daily tonnage was rarely
required as it was Commander, AFOR's policy only to provide transport on a
top-up basis. This was because most NGOs were using local haulers, which
was providing valuable revenue for Albania, and there was no desire to
undermine this. When NATO did provide support it came in the form of things
like Dutch trucks transporting World Food Program aid to Kukes and helping
UNHCR in relocating refugees. In addition, Albania had a particularly poor road
infrastructure, and the increased volume of road traffic, coupled with the lack of
maintenance, took its toll. In many places roads were partially collapsed or,
after heavy rains, were washed away. AFOR engineers identified some 500
kilometers of road that required improvement along the main supply routes.
Engineers were at a premium and constantly at work throughout the operation.
189 kilometers of road were repaired by NATO military or contracted civil
engineers. For instance, Italian engineers repaired road collapses near Kukes.

Most importantly, when AFOR arrived in early April 1999, 256,000 refugees
were being housed within Albania, either in public buildings or in people’s
homes. The influx was continuing at a rate of up to 14,000 refugees a day, with
the majority crossing the border at Morine and arriving at makeshift transit
camps outside the town of Kukes. On 15 April 1999, over 10,000 Kosovar
refugees entered Albania at the Morine border crossing. This was a significant
increase in influx and triggered the Albanian Government and UNHCR to
request AFOR assistance in the Kukes area. AFOR, although not fully
established, responded rapidly by dispatching on 17 April 1999 the Kukes Co-
ordination Team of Staff with a communications node. In addition
Headquarters, Task Force North provided a transport platoon and an infantry
platoon for security. The Team's tasks were to establish a secure base, assist
the Kukes Prefect and UNHCR field representative to co-ordinate the
transportation of refugees to camps elsewhere in Albania and to monitor, at first
hand, the refugee situation at Kukes and the daily influx from Kosovo. A tented
base was built adjacent to a World War II-era grass airstrip and became known
as Mushroom Camp. In early May 1999. the UAE contingent, under
coordinating authority of AFOR, improved the airstrip to make it capable of
receiving C-130 military transport aircraft.

Despite efforts in Kukes, it was not a desirable location for refugees. It was in a
mountainous region, where temperatures drop to minus 30 degrees Celsius
during winter. It was within Serb artillery range and it suffered from water
shortages during Summer. For these reasons, AFOR began to identify potential
refugee camp sites on the coastal plains. There was also a potential threat of
the FYROM Government ejecting refugees and so further sites were identified
in the Korce area.

Task Force Whisky quickly located a site at Hamallaj, north of Durres, while
JTF Shining Hope found a location near Fier. Task Force South identified a site
at a former fish farm in Korce and Task Force North negotiated a large site in
Rrushbull near Durres. There were also a number of nations (Austria, Turkey,
Italy and Greece for example) that had already deployed under bi-lateral
agreements with Albania, and had begun to build or in some cases had
completed refugee camps prior to AMF(L)'s deployment. Upon TOA these
troops came under Commander, AFOR's command and camp construction
became a country-wide controlled operation. By the end of May 1999, NATO
forces had opened or were planning on opening 7 refugee camps. US
engineers opened the first US built camp at Fier, dubbed Camp Hope on 12
May 1999. Refugee flow to Camp Hope was 400 per day the first week and 800
per day the second week. Total capacity was to be up to 20,000 by June 1999.
At Elbasan, French and British troops worked at a camp established by the
British. At Korce, French troops were preparing the site for a camp for up to
9,000 people. At Poiske, Greek engineers were completing construction of a
camp. At Vlore, Dutch units and the Red Cross finished a camp for 4,500. At
Rrashbull, Italian engineers were constructing 2 camps for 4,000 and 400
refugees respectively. Lastly, North of Durres, Spanish engineers were to open
the camp at Hamallaj.

These came as the refugee situation in the Kukes area grew more dire. By mid-
April 1999, No more housing was available for the refugees, local services had
been overwhelmed and water was becoming short. Thus, the Albanian EMG
decided to 'relocate' refugees to the western and southern parts of Albania
where the new refugee camps built by AFOR were becoming available. A joint
operation to move refugees and their possessions by road, rail and air was
devised. On 20 May 1999 Fragmentation Order 15 (FRAGO) was issued, and
on 22 May 1999 a section of military police deployed to Kukes to assist Task
Force Romeo, Task Force North, and the UNHCR with the movement of
refugees. The section worked closely with UNHCR officials, grouping refugees
by family and destination and ensuring an orderly departure. The majority of
refugees were moved by road and rail, but families with ‘vulnerables’
(geriatrics, women in late pregnancy, and the sick) were moved by helicopter.

Road movement was supported logistically with way-stations that provided


shelter, food, refreshments and medical cover and the hamlet of Mjede became
pivotal as the exchange point from road to rail. The refugees then traveled by
rail to either Durres, if they were destined for the Italian camps at Rrushbull or
the Spanish camp at Hamallaj, or to Fier if they were transferring to the US built
Camp Hope. The plan went well. The joint AFOR/NGOs operations were well
coordinated and useful links were forged. However, UNHCR had problems in
getting the refugees to move. The Kosovar Liberation Army was actively trying
to retain them in the area, where fighting was ongoing just across the border
and the KLA needed recruits. In addition, there was rumor that an end to the
Kosovo crisis was imminent. To overcome this, AFOR developed a successful
information campaign and a wide range of schemes were implemented to
encourage movement, such as introducing 'Elder' flights (Camp elders and
community leaders were flown in AFOR helicopters) to visit new camp locations
and see the high standard of facilities.

As the relocation plan progressed and refugees continued to flow into the
country, it became obvious that longer term accommodation requirements had
to be considered. AFOR was in the process of building tented camps with a
capacity for over 200,000, but this would only solve the immediate crisis. Thus
a plan for winterization had to be devised. A number of planning options were
considered by AFOR and the Albanian EMG and a plan was developed that
took into account current camp construction plans, infrastructure projects,
integration of local labor, and the introduction of a registration system. The plan
focused on sustaining refugees within host families, improving accommodation
in collective centers and using prefabricated buildings, such as corimex, to
replace tents in the camps. Funds to support the plan were being raised as UN
Security Council Resolution 12444 was approved.

During Operation Allied Harbour, AFOR constructed and planned a total of 21


camps, providing some 129,050 places. All camps were built to meet
UNHCR/UNICEF specifications in order to provide the best possible living
conditions with schools, children’s play areas, recreation facilities and medical
support. On average, a camp for 5,000 took an engineer company one month
to build. Planning had been completed for a further 120,550 places when the
need ceased. Peace in Kosovo in early June 1999 brought the relocation
program to an abrupt halt. Albania saw a flurry of activity as the refugee tide
was about to turn. Stragglers from Kosovo who had been held hostage were
being released and repatriated with their families and expectations in the
camps for early return to Kosovo grew. On 15 June 1999, AFOR ceased camp
construction and focused on the relocation of refugees to Kosovo.

As NATO initiated its peacekeeping mission in Kosovo proper as part of


Operation Joint Guardian, AFOR transitioned to support that operation,
eventually becoming part of NATO's Kosovo Force, eventually being
designated as Communication Zone (West) or COMMZ (W). COMMZ (W)
continued to support Operation Allied Harbour as well, but the focus shifted
from refugee assistance to refugee repatriation. To support these efforts, work
on road repair and improvement continued.

The speed and scale of the spontaneous return of refugees took everyone by
surprise. In some camps, the refugees packed everything overnight and left by
any means possible. Many had hired taxis, rented public transport, or
purchased second-hand cars. The outflow of refugees peaked at around
25,000 per day, but numbers were difficult to track as several unapproved
crossing points were used.

Those choosing to return by their own means were taking risks in a Kosovo
ravaged by fighting. At that time, NATO's KFOR had not yet fully deployed,
mines and UXOs were unmarked, and almost no aid was available. An
information campaign was devised, therefore, to attempt to slow down the
spontaneous return and included a comprehensive mine-awareness package.
However, to support those refugees determined to return home against advice,
an emergency plan was activated to set up way-stations manned by NGOs to
provide fuel, water and food. AFOR provided security, medical, and some life
support at them. The information campaign began on 14 June 1999 and was
designed to encourage the refugees to wait in their respective locations until
UNHCR was ready to receive them in Kosovo, to make them aware of the
potential dangers on return and to explain how the organized repatriation plan
was to work. Albania's EMG established an information group to co-ordinate it,
and the success of this tight collaboration was very evident – flyers and posters
were produced quickly, information bulletins were produced on a weekly basis,
and coordinated messages were broadcasted through all available mediums.
There was even a 60 minute live TV discussion with refugees, initiated by the
Press Information Office.

The ground repatriation plan was based on 2 transit centers at Mjede and
Kukes and a series of way-stations providing food, water, and medical support.
The plan was simple: refugees were collected from collective centers and
camps, driven to the nearest railway station and then railed to Mjede. They
were accommodated at Mjede overnight and then moved in road convoys
either directly to their destination in Kosovo in one day, if this was achievable,
or overnighting at Kukes. UNHCR provided the coaches for the convoys and
AFOR provided security, transport vehicles for luggage, medical support,
communications and recovery.

The US JTF Shining Hope completed the humanitarian phase of its mission on
26 June 1999, with the transfer of operation of Camp Hope to the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. On 1 July 1999, the repatriation of
refugees began in earnest and continued at a hectic pace for the next 5 weeks.
Concurrently, AFOR assisted the UNHCR and the NGOs in transporting shelter
stores and food into Kosovo and a mobile bakery was moved from Kukes to
Jakovica. Throughout the repatriation, the FMPU maintained traffic control
between Kukes and Morine. With the congestion from the spontaneous return,
it was taking some 4 hours to complete this 25 kilometer journey. The FMPU,
once in place, reduced this to one hour. The FMPU also physically counted
people crossing the border at Morine, thereby establishing accurate statistics of
returnees.

Road access to the Korce area was extremely difficult and therefore it was
decided to fly refugees from this area either to Kukes or Pristina, once the
airfield became available for use. Engineers from Task Force South developed
an old grass landing-strip into an airstrip capable of taking C-160 and C-130
military transport aircraft. Within 7 days the project was completed and the first
refugees were being flown to Kukes. Once Pristina Airport was ready to receive
them, 'vulnerables' were flown directly into Kosovo. AFOR provided planning
support to the Albanian Government and UNHCR for the repatriation plan,
during which more than 13,000 refugees were transported to Kosovo. In
addition, US Navy Seabees and Air Force RED HORSE elements assigned to
JTF Shining Hope completed the engineering projects and returned airfield
operations at Rinas Airport, near Tirana, Albania, back to the Government of
Albania civil aviation authorities on 2 July 1999. By late August 1999, less than
7,000 refugees remained in Albania.

On 1 September 1999, Operation Allied Harbour closed out in Albania. The US


JTF Shining Hope had been disestablished on 8 July 1999. At that time US
forces remaining in Albania were put under the operational authority of Joint
Task Force Noble Anvil with further delegation authorized to the commander of
Task Force Falcon for mission execution.

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