EN BANC

[G.R. No. 68635. March 12, 1987.]

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION

AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. NO.
68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, vs. HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL."

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM : p

In almost identical letters dated 20 October 1986, personally sent to Justices Andres R.
Narvasa, Ameur na M. Herrera, and Isagani A. Cruz, and a fourth letter, dated 22 October
1986 addressed to Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division of this
Court, (incorporated herein by reference), and in feigned ignorance of the Constitutional
requirement that the Court's Divisions are composed of, and must act through, at least ve
(5) members, and in a stance of dangling threats to effect a change of the Court's adverse
resolution, petitioner Eva Maravilla Ilustre wrote in part:
"Please forgive us for taking the liberty of addressing you this letter which we do
hope you will read very carefully.
"It is important to call your attention to the dismissal of Case No. G.R. 68635
entitled 'Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,' by an
untenable minute-resolution although an extended one, dated 14 May 1986 which
we consider as an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by
the First Division of the Supreme Court of which you are a member.

xxx xxx xxx

"We consider the three minute-resolution: the rst dated 14 May 1986; the second,
dated 9 July 1986; and the third, 3 September 1986, railroaded with such
hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the Supreme Court under
circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics.
xxx xxx xxx

"Your attention is called to minute-resolution of 9 July 1986 which writes nish to

our case before the Supreme Court (. . . THIS IS FINAL') There is nothing nal in
this world. We assure you that this case is far from nished by a long shot . For at
the proper time we shall so act and bring this case before another forum where
the members of the Court can no longer deny our action with minute resolutions
that are not only unjust but are knowingly and deliberately promulgated. The
people deserve to know how the members of the highest tribunal of the land
perform in the task of decision making by af xing their respective signatures on
judgments that they render on petitions that they themselves give due course.
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 "Please understand that we are pursuing further remedies in our quest for justice
under the law. We intend to hold responsible members of the First Division who
participated in the promulgation of these three minute-resolutions in question. For
the members thereof cannot claim immunity when their action runs afoul with
penal sanctions, even in the performance of of cial functions; like others, none of
the division members are above the law.

"In our quest for justice, we wish to avoid doing injustice to anyone, particularly
the members of the First Division, providing that they had no hand in the
promulgation of the resolution in question. That is why we are requesting you to
inform us your participation in the promulgation of these resolutions in question.
Even we who are poor are also capable of playing fair even to those who take
advantage of our poverty by sheer power and in uence. We shall then wait for
your reply. If, however, we do not hear from you after a week, then we will consider
your silence that you supported the dismissal of our petition. We will then be
guided accordingly. (Emphasis supplied).

The letter also attacked the participation in the case of Justice Pedro L. Yap, Chairman of
the First Division in this wise:
"As Division Chairman, Associate Justice Pedro Yap, as a copy of Resolution
dated 14 May 1986 we received indicate, did not even have the elementary
courtesy of putting on record that he voluntarily inhibited himself from
participating in the promulgation of this minute-resolution, although an extended
one, which he should have done consistent with judicial decorum and the Canons
of Judicial Ethics. After all he is the law partner of 'Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez,
counsel for respondents, now the distinguished Solicitor General . . . indicative
that even at this stage of the proceeding in point of time, the Supreme Court still
recognizes Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez as counsel for respondents, even as he is
already the Solicitor General. For not withdrawing from the case formally Atty.
Ordoñez has manifested his unmitigated arrogance that he does not respect the
Canons of Professional Ethics, similar to the actuation of his law partner,
Associate Justice Pedro Yap, Chairman of the First Division of the Supreme Court,
an act that further aggravates the growing wrinkles in the domain of judicial
statesmanship, impressed as it is, with very serious and dangerous implications.
"(9) By 11 April 1986, date of the reorganization of the First Division,
Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez already became the Solicitor General. With such
amazingly magical coincidence, Dr. Pedro Yap, law partner of Atty. Sedfrey
A. Ordoñez in the law rm Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Padlan became the
Chairman of the Division.
xxx xxx xxx

"(11) So we see that on 11 August 1986 to 14 May 1986 when some

members of the Division were still busy putting their respective of ces in
order and had possibly have no idea about the Maravilla case.

Was it possible for Chairman Yap to have convinced the Division

members that Maravilla petition is without merit, and since the members —
the new ones knew nothing about the case, readily agreed to the dismissal
of the petition by a minute-resolution — extended one. After all this was the
case of the Solicitor General. If this is what happened, then we are sorry to
say that you were deliberately 'had.'

After all, the 14 May 1986 untenable minute resolution although an

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 extended one, does not bear the signatures of the Division members. The
members should have signed the resolution, after all, the Supreme Court
had given the petition due course, indicating whether they concur, dissent
or otherwise abstain from voting."

The letter to Justice Herrera went on to state.

"We assume, of course, that you had studied the case thoroughly since you were
with the original 7-man First Division under the chairmanship of then Justice
Claudio Teehankee. We assure you that we will bring this case before another
forum to hold responsible the members of the Division who participated in the
dismissal of the case by the unjust minute-resolutions, knowingly rendered for
intended objective that your conscience you are aware.
xxx xxx xxx

"We leave the next move to you by informing us your participation in

the promulgation of the minute-resolutions in question. Please do not take
this matter lightly for we know justice in the end will prevail. For if we do not
hear from you within a week, we will consider your silence as your
admission that you supported the dismissal of the petition. In this way, we
shall then be guided accordingly. The moment we take action in the plans
we are completing, we will then call a press conference with TV and radio
coverage Arrangements in this regard are being done. The people should or
ought to know why we were thwarted in our quest for plain justice.
xxx xxx xxx

"Finally, in view of action that we are prepared to take in this case, that will no
doubt cause nationwide attention, and there should be anyone that will cause me
harm personally, may we request you to show this letter to the authorities
concerned so that they will know where to look, when it becomes necessary."
(Emphasis supplied)

The aforesaid letters were included in the Agenda of the First Division of 22 October 1986,
were "Noted," and referred en consulta to the Court en banc.
On 28 October 1986, the Court en banc took up the background and history of the case,
found no reason to take any further action, and referred the case back to the First Division
"as set forth in the latter's resolution of October 27, 1986." In this Resolution, the First
Division traced the history of the case, clari ed that Justice Yap assumed his position in
this Court only on 2 May 1986; that when the resolution of dismissal was issued on 14
May 1986, Justice Abad Santos was the incumbent Chairman of the First Division, and that
Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Ordoñez was private respondents' counsel; that upon
realization thereof, Justice Yap inhibited himself from further participation in the case; and
that Justice Yap was designated Chairman of the First Division only on 14 July 1986, after
the compulsory retirement of Justice Vicente Abad Santos on 12 July 1986. The
Resolution of the First Division (incorporated herein by reference) concluded thus:
"The dispositions in this case were arrived at after careful study. Because a case
is resolved against the interests of a party, does not mean that it is an 'unjust
decision' or that it has been 'railroaded.'
"This Division declares without hesitation that it has consistently rendered justice
without fear or favor. YAP, J., took no part."

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 On 3 November 1986, petitioner again addressed similar letters to Justices Narvasa,
Herrera, and Cruz, (incorporated herein by reference), excerpts from which follow:
"It is rather amazing that when we wrote you our previous letter, we never
dreamed that you would rush, as you did rush for assistance en consulta with the
Honorable Court en banc. The unfortunate part of it all is the fact that the Court
en banc had to promulgate its resolution dated 28 October 1986 which to us
when considered in its entirety, is just as untenable as the First Division extended
and unsigned minute-resolution of 14 May 1986.

"Evidently you misunderstood our point of inquiry, to wit: 'Did you or did you not
approve the dismissal of our petition under —

"1) The 14 May 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

"2) The 9 July 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

"3) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

"That was all we asked. The other matters contained in our letter were intended
merely to give you the highlights of our case. This is what we wanted to know to
properly guide us when we finally bring our case to the other forum of justice.

"Did it ever occur to you that when you and the other members of the First
Division referred our letters to the Honorable Court en banc en consulta it was all
your fault that the Court en banc had to promulgate its unsigned extended
minute-resolution that unfortunately exposed the distinguished members of the
newly reorganized Supreme Court and, at the same time, convicted themselves as
guilty of distorting facts involved in our petition?
"This, we are sure, will come as a shock to you. We will show you why —

xxx xxx xxx

"This is just a sample of what we will expose to the nation before the other forum
of justice where we will soon bring this case beyond the reach of the newly
reorganized Supreme Court. We are prepared to expose many more of this kind of
judicial performance readily constituting travesty of justice. Ponder upon this well
because it is our very rm conviction that the people deserve to know how the
distinguished members of the highest tribunal of the land perform their duties in
this most sensitive area of decision making.
"Anyhow, whether you referred our letter to the Court en banc (en consulta) or not,
the situation remains the same. At the proper time, as we said, we will bring this
case before another forum of justice where the members of the First Division, in
fact the Honorable Court en banc may no longer deny our action by mere
untenable and unjust minute resolutions. Better believe it that we intend to hold
responsible members of the First Division who took part in the promulgation of
the untenable and unjust extended minute-resolution that is not even signed by
any of those who promulgated it; therefore, to us, is clearly bereft of judicial
integrity from its very inception on 14 May 1986.
xxx xxx xxx
"Thus, we will bring this case before another forum of justice as Eva Maravilla
Ilustre against the distinguished members of the First Division, in fact against the
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 entire membership of the newly organized Supreme Court (because of its en banc
unsigned extended minute-resolution that is without judicial integrity, dated 28
October 1986). But do not be mislead (sic) for we are not alone in this ght. Other
lawyers, not just by their mere sympathy for me personally and my case, but by
their rm conviction that judicial statesmanship must be maintained at all times
in the highest tribunal of justice in the land, that they have offered their free legal
services when the legal confrontation begins.

xxx xxx xxx

"Paragraph 4, found on page 3 of the en banc resolution projects the most
fantastic, most unbelievable picture of Division Chairman Justice Yap. It states —

"'. . . When the resolution of dismissal on May 14, 1986, Justice Yap
was unaware that Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez was private respondent's
counsel.
"The Honorable Court en banc must think everybody stupid to swallow this
statement hook, line and sinker. For Justice Yap we say: Tell that to the marines.
But more than this, we leave this matter to the conscience of Justice Yap.

"Ignoramus that we are, unschooled in the domain of law and procedure, but we
are learning a few as we prosecute our case within legitimate limits, we state here
that both resolutions — that promulgated by the Court en banc of 28 October
1986 and that promulgated by the First Division dated 27 October 1986, are
nothing but a desperate attempt, when both are considered in their respective
entirety, to maneuver without success, some semblance of justi cation on the
untenable and unjust 14 May 1986 extended and unsigned minute-resolution that
is bereft of judicial integrity.
xxx xxx xxx

"Thus, if the members of the First Division and those of the Honorable Court en
banc think for one minute that because of their respective 4-page minute but
extended resolutions apparently impressive for their lack of merit, deliberately
unsigned that exposed their lack of judicial integrity, that we will now give up the
ght, just forget it. Ignoramus that we are, better believe it when we say we are
prepared to carry the ght before another forum of justice . When we do, we shall
call for a press conference with TV and radio coverage, so that we can present to
the entire nation our quest for justice against the steam-roller of power and
influence and, at the same time, to call the attention of the people to the manner
in which the members of the highest tribunal of the land perform their respective
individual and collective functions in the domain of this most sensitive area of
decision making.

"Allow us to restate our previous and now, our present inquiry, to wit:.
"Did you or did you not approve the dismissal of our petition under —

"a) The 14 May 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

b) The 9 July 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

c) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.'" (Emphasis supplied).

True to her threats, after having lost her case before this Court, petitioner led on 16
December 1986 an Af davit-Complaint before the Tanodbayan, totally disregarding the
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 facts and circumstances and legal considerations set forth in this Court's aforecited
Resolutions of the First Division and en banc. Some Members of this Court were
maliciously charged with having knowingly and deliberately rendered, with bad faith, an
unjust, extended Minute Resolution "making" her opponents the "illegal owners" of vast
estates. Some Justices of the Court of Appeals were similarly maliciously charged with
knowingly rendering their "unjust resolution" of 20 January 1984 "through manifest and
evident bad faith," when their Resolution had in fact and law been upheld by this Court.
Additionally, Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordoñez and Justice Pedro Yap of this Court were
also maliciously charged with having used their power and in uence in persuading and
inducing the members of the First Division of this Court into promulgating their "unjust
extended Minute Resolution of 14 May 1986."
All the foregoing, in complete disregard of the Resolutions of this Court, as the tribunal of
last resort, 1) upholding the challenged judgment of the Court of Appeals; 2) dismissing
the Petition on the ground that the doctrine of res judicata was clearly applicable not only
as to the probate of the Will of the decedent but also as to the heirship of petitioner,
among others, and their right to intervene and participate in the proceedings; and 3)
nding that there was no attempt whatsoever on the part of Justice Yap nor Solicitor
General Ordoñez to unduly influence the members of the First Division.
The Complaint before the Tanodbayan (incorporated herein by reference) was allegedly
led "in my quest for justice, something that has been closed to me by the Supreme Court
forever" and specifically charged:.
"CHARGE NO ONE —
Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez and Justice Pedro Yap of 1) 'persuading, inducing,
influencing the members of the newly organized First Division . . . into
promulgating their unjust, extended minute RESOLUTION of 14 May 1986,
knowingly with deliberate intent with such unusual hurry/promptitude unequalled
in the entire history of the Supreme Court based on insigni cant issues and
deliberately evading/prevaricating the more important substantial ones raised in
my petition, in violation of Section 3, sub-letter (a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, . . .; and.
"(2) Under the same Section 3, subletter (e) of the same Republic Act . . . for
causing me and the other heirs of Ponciano Maravilla undue injury by using their
power and influence as Solicitor General and Associate Justice, respectively. . . .
"CHARGE NO. TWO —
"Associate Justices Luis Javellana, Vicente Mendoza and Sera n Cuevas,
members of the then FOURTH SPECIAL CASES DIVISION, Intermediate Appellate
Court —
1) For knowingly rendering their unjust RESOLUTION dated 20 January 1984 in
the exercise of their functions through manifest and evident bad faith in CA-G.R.
No. SP-13680, entitled 'Francisco Q. Maravilla, et al. v. Hon. Antonia Corpus
Macandog, et al. 'in violation of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code;"
2) For causing me and the other heirs such 'undue injury' by deliberately,
knowingly rendering their unjust RESOLUTION dated 20 January 1984 . . . in
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, Section 3 (e) thereof.
"CHARGE NO. THREE —
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 "Associate Justice Vicente Abad Santos (retired) then Chairman of the First
Division of the Supreme Court as of 14 May 1986, and Associate Justice Isagani
Cruz, Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera and Pedro Yap, . . . —
1) For knowingly and deliberately rendering their unjust, extended MINUTE
RESOLUTION of 14 May 1986 dismissing my petition in G.R. No. 68635, . . . with
manifest and evident bad faith to make the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez,
now the distinguished Solicitor General, the 'illegal owners' of the vast estates of
my aunt Digna Maravilla . . .;
"2) Under Section 3, sub-letter (e) Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, . . . for
deliberately causing us heirs of Ponciano Maravilla undue injury by depriving us
of our rights over my aunt's vast estates because of their manifest and evident
bad faith in knowingly promulgating their unjust, extended minute RESOLUTION
of 14 May 1986, deliberately intended to make the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A.
Ordoñez, now the Solicitor General, the 'illegal owners' of my aunt Digna
Maravilla's estates when, under the law, these Ordoñez clients are not entitled to
own these vast properties whether under testate or intestate succession or mixed
succession." (Emphasis supplied).

Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the press, which was
widely publicized in almost all dailies on 23 December 1986, without any copy furnished
this Court nor the members who were charged. The issue of the Daily Express of 23
December 1986 published a banner headline reading:
"ORDONEZ, 8 JUSTICES FACE GRAFT CHARGES"
thereby making it unjustly appear that the Justices of this Court and the other
respondents were charged with "graft and corruption" when the Complaint was actually
led by a disgruntled litigant and her counsel after having lost her case thrice in this
Court.
On 26 December 1986, the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) dismissed petitioner's Complaint
and decreed in the dispositive portion of his Resolution (herein incorporated by reference)
that:
"WHEREFORE, all the premises considered, this Of ce resolves to dismiss the
complaint against Justices Pedro Yap, Isagani Cruz, Andres Narvasa, Ameur na
Melencio-Herrera, Vicente Abad Santos, and will continue evaluating the
complaint against Justices Sera n Cuevas, Luis Javellana and Vicente Mendoza,
Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez, and the private respondents."

The aforestated Resolution indicated at the bottom of the last page:

"Copy Furnished:
DEAN WENCESLAO LAURETA
Counsel for the Complainant
919 Prudencio Street
Sampaloc, Manila.

In the Resolution of this Court en banc, dated January 29, 1986, it required:
"(1) Petitioner Eva Maravilla Ilustre to show cause, within ten (10) days from
notice, why she should not be held in contempt for her aforecited statements,
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 conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or of cial actions of
the Justices concerned, which statements, unless satisfactorily explained,
transcend the permissible bounds of propriety and undermine and degrade the
administration of justice; and

"(2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta, as an of cer of the Court, to show cause, within ten
(10) days from notice, why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for
the aforecited statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court
and the of cial actions of the Justices concerned, and for hiding therefrom in
anonymity behind his client's name, in an alleged quest for justice but with the
manifest intent to bring the Justices into disrepute and to subvert public
con dence in the Courts and the orderly administration of justice." (pp. 383-384,
Rollo).

(1)
In her Compliance-Answer led on February 9, 1987, wherein Eva Maravilla Ilustre prays
that the contempt proceedings against her be dismissed, she contends, in essence, that:
(1) "there was no intention to affront the honor and dignity" of the Court; (2) the letters
addressed to the individual Justices were private in character and were never meant for
anybody, much less the Supreme Court en banc, "there (being) a constitutional mandate
affording protection to privacy of communications;" (3) if her statements in those letters
were really contemptuous, the Court "should have immediately taken disciplinary
proceedings" against her, and not having done so, the Court has "forfeited" that right and is
now "estopped" from doing so; this citation for contempt is a "vindictive reprisal" for her
having led the complaint before the Tanodbayan, "an action that lacks sincerity, taken not
in the spirit of judicial statemanship;" (4) she instituted the complaint before the
Tanodbayan "in my honest belief that I lost my case before the Supreme Court not because
of lack of merit or of its own merits, assisted by attorneys who offered their services in the
prosecution of my case;" (5) the newspaper publicity of this case "was no fault of mine;
neither is it the fault of my former counsel Dean Wenceslao Laureta," who prevailed upon
her to call off the press conference with TV and radio coverage; that she is not a
"disgruntled litigant" who thrice lost before the Court, rather, she has challenged the validity
of the resolutions of the Court "containing distortion of facts, conjectures and mistaken
inferences" particularly, in that (a) there is no res judicata (b) the Court of Appeals in its
decision declared that the judgment of the trial Court had long attained nality, so that it
can no longer be set aside, (c) her "opponents," clients of Atty. Ordoñez, are not entitled to
own her aunt's "vast properties" whether under the law of testate or intestate succession
or mixed succession," (d) that the statement in this Court's Resolution that the Court of
Appeals had denied intervention is an "unadulterated distortion of the facts;" (b) the
statement in the en banc Resolution that some Justices of the Court of Appeals were
similarly maliciously charged with knowingly rendering their "unjust resolution" of 20
January 1984 is a bit "premature, a prejudgment over a case over which this Court does
not have jurisdiction;" (7) Atty. Laureta is not her counsel in the case before the
Tanodbayan; (8) before the latter body, she has "established not only probable cause but
has also proved the collective culpability (of the Justices concerned) as charged;" (9) and
that her 53-page Motion for Reconsideration before the Tanodbayan is made an integral
part of her Answer.
(2)
In his own Answer, Atty. Laureta maintains substantially that: (1) he is not respondent
Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan and that she has consulted and/or engaged the
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 services of other attorneys in the course of the prosecution of her case, like Atty. Edgardo
M. Salandanan and Atty. Vedastro B. Gesmundo; that he just learned from other sources
that respondent Ilustre was planning to bring her case to the Tanodbayan with the
assistance of other lawyers who offered her their legal services; (2) it was he who
dissuaded her from calling her intended press conference and from circulating copies of
her complaint "not only in the performance of duty as an of cer of the court, but also as a
former president of Manila III Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and as a
professional lecturer in Legal and Judicial Ethics in some Manila law schools in his desire
to protect and uphold the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as the highest tribunal of
the land." He should, therefore, be given "a little bit of credit for what he did" instead of
taking this disciplinary proceeding against him; that Ms. Ilustre is not a "disgruntled
litigant" who "lost her case thrice in this Court;" (3) he did not prepare respondent Ilustre's
letters to the individual Justices, "appearances to the contrary notwithstanding;" that these
letters were "never, at any time, considered as constituting contempt of court" in the
resolutions of this Court, otherwise, "it would have taken immediate disciplinary action as it
is doing now;" the Court has lost its right to consider the statements in the letters as
constituting contempt and it is now "estopped" from proceeding with this disciplinary
action; (4) by doing so, this Court has "unmistakably revealed the intent and character that
underlie its present action as a vindictive judicial vengeance, inconsistent with the spirit of
judicial statesmanship by hiding behind the well-recognized fact that the Supreme Court is
supreme in the domain of the administration of justice;" (5) "there was no disregard
intended to the Resolution of the Honorable Court, as the tribunal of last resort, relative to
its upholding the judgment of the Court of Appeals;" he is just doing "his duty as an of cer
of the court to put the records in this regard in their proper light;" particularly (a) that the
judgment of the trial court had attained its nality long ago, (b) the doctrine of res judicata
is inapplicable, otherwise, this Court would not have remanded the case to the Court of
Appeals for review, (c) the observation in the First Division's extended Resolution of 14
July 1986 that Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Ordoñez was private respondents'
counsel "de es every vestige of human understanding;" that Justice Yap had forthwith
inhibited himself from participating in the case is not borne out by the record of this case.
Justice Yap had "never voluntarily entered on the record his inhibition" when he should have
done so when respondent Ilustre's petition was taken up; Justice Yap's partner, Atty.
Ordoñez, continued to be recognized by this Court as counsel for private respondents even
as he was already the Solicitor General; (b) nally, "appearances to the contrary
notwithstanding, he has not committed acts unworthy of his profession. The truth of the
matter is, he should at least be credited in whatever small way for his acts and efforts
taken by him to protect and uphold the honor and dignity of the Honorable Court."
We nd the explanations of both Ms. Ilustre and Atty. Laureta unsatisfactory. Their claims
that they had done nothing that could constitute an affront to the honor and dignity of this
Court dissipate in the face of attendant facts and circumstances and "defy every vestige of
human understanding," to use their own language. Indeed, they should not "think that they
will win a hearing by the sheer multiplication of words." (Mathew 6:7).
Respondents' reliance on the "privacy of communication" is misplaced. Letters addressed
to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions
become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire Court. The
contumacious character of those letters constrained the First Division to refer the same to
the Court en banc, en consulta and so that the Court en banc could pass upon the judicial
acts of the Division. It was only in the exercise of forbearance by the Court that it refrained
from issuing immediately a show cause order in the expectancy that after having read the
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 Resolution of the Court en banc of October 28, 1986, respondents would realize the
unjustness and unfairness of their accusations.
The Court is far from "estopped" in initiating these proceedings. The Chief Justice had
promptly announced his Statement, dated December 23, 1986, that "the Supreme Court
will take appropriate steps on the matter upon its resumption of sessions on the rst
working day of the year."

There is no vindictive reprisal involved. The Court's authority and duty under the premises
is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks
of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the
legal profession.
We are not convinced that Atty. Laureta had nothing to do with respondent Ilustre's letters
to the individual Justices, nor with the complaint led before the Tanodbayan. In the
Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 11, 1986, led by Atty. Laureta in the main petition,
he stressed:
"10. The composition of the First Division was reduced to ve members.
Strangely enough, about one month later, the Honorable Court promulgated its
extended resolution with such promptitude in the entire history of the Supreme
Court unequalled in a manner of speaking. . . ."
In the Manifestation and Motion, dated June 25, 1986, led by Atty. Laureta (p. 311,
Rollo), the same phrases were incarnated:
"the promptitude with which the Resolution of 14 May 1986 was
promulgated (par. 9, Motion for Reconsideration, p. 5) unequalled in the
entire history of the Supreme Court in so far as petitions given due course is
concerned . . ." (Emphasis given).

Those same terms are reproduced verbatim in the letters ostensibly authored by
respondent Ilustre addressed to the individual Justices whom respondents have charged.
Thus:
"We consider the three minute resolutions . . . railroaded with such
hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the Supreme Court under
circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics" (Ltr.
to Justice Narvasa, p. 2; ltr. to Justice Herrera, p. 2; ltr. to Justice Cruz, p. 2).
xxx xxx xxx
"with such unusual hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the
Supreme Court" (Ltr. to Justice Narvasa, p. 5; ltr. to Justice Herrera, p. 5; ltr. to
Justice Cruz, p. 5)."

The same terminologies are reiterated in the Complaint and in the Motion for
Reconsideration filed before the Tanodbayan (p. 2).
Further, in his Manifestation & Motion, dated June 25, 1986, Atty. Laureta stated:
"counsel for petitioner personally inquired from Division Clerk of Court
Corazon Serevo the following:
(1) When was the above-entitled case deliberated by the First Division?
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 (2) Are there recorded minutes of such deliberation?
(3) Who among the members of the Division voted for dismissal of the petition to
be promulgated by resolution and who did not, if any?

(4) Who prepared the Resolution?" (p. 312, Rollo).

Atty. Laureta's obsession to receive the answer to his queries surfaces again in the second
letters dated November 3, 1986 to the individual Justices under the supposed signatures
of respondent Ilustre, thus:
"Evidently you misunderstood our point of inquiry in our rst letter. It is a very
simple inquiry, to wit Did you or did you not approve the dismissal of our petition
under.
1) The 14 May 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No

2) The 9 July 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No

3) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No."
(Emphasis original) (Ltr. to Justice Narvasa, p. 1; to Justice Herrera, p. 1; to
Justice Cruz, p. 1).

Additionally, the disparaging remarks like: exertion of "undue" and "powerful in uence" by
Atty. Ordoñez and Justice Yap; "distortion of facts, conjectures and mistaken references";
"untenable minute resolution although extended"; "unjust minute resolution" repeated by
Atty. Laureta in his several pleadings, echoed and re-echoed in the individual letters to the
Justices, as well as in the Complaint and the Motion for Reconsideration before the
Tanodbayan, reveal the not-too-hidden hand of Atty. Laureta.
The foregoing is bolstered by the reports received by the members of the Court that
copies of the complaint led with the Tanodbayan were distributed to the editors of the
metropolitan newspapers in envelopes bearing the name of respondent Laureta, who was
heard over the radio speaking on the same complaint, and that he was following up the
complaint and the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the Tanodbayan.
Furthermore, respondent Laureta as his co-respondent Ilustre's lawyer had control of the
proceedings. As stressed by this Court in an early case, as such lawyer, "Whatever steps
his client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the
Canons of Legal Ethics should be reminded him that '(a) lawyer should use his best efforts
to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself
ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial
of cers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer
should terminate their relation.'" (In Re: Contempt Proceedings in Surigao Mineral
Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1, 23) Respondent Laureta manifestly failed to
discharge such responsibility. For all intents and purposes, he appears to have encouraged
and abetted his client in denigrating the members of the First Division of this Court, by
baselessly charging them with rendering an "unjust" resolution with "deliberate bad faith,"
because of his stubborn insistence on his untenable arguments which had been rejected
as without merit by the Court's First Division, whose Resolution was upheld by the Court en
banc. Worse, the dissemination in the print and broadcast media in bold captions falsely
depicting the Justices as "FAC(ING) GRAFT CHARGES" instead of the baseless rantings of
a disgruntled litigant appear to have been timed to place them in a bad light at the height
of the Christmas season.
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 We come now to the specific accusations of respondents.
They charge Associate Justices Vicente Abad Santos (retired) then Chairman of the First
Division of the Supreme Court as of May 14, 1986, Andres Narvasa, Ameur na M. Herrera,
and Pedro Yap for knowingly and deliberately rendering their "unjust, extended Resolution
of May 14, 1986" dismissing their petition in this case with manifest and evident bad faith
to make the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez (now the Solicitor General) the "illegal
owners" of the estates of Digna Maravilla, thereby causing the heirs of Ponciano Maravilla
(Digna's eldest brother) undue injury by depriving them of their rights over the estates of
Digna Maravilla (Charge No. Three before the Tanodbayan). They further charge Justice
Yap (and Atty. Sedfrey Ordoñez) of having "persuad(ed), induc(ed) and in uenc(ed) the
members of the newly organized First Division into promulgating their "unjust, extended
minute Resolution of 14 May 1986" (Charge No. One before the Tanodbayan), which
Resolution, (the "Division Resolution," for short) is herewith attached as Annex "A".
Preliminarily, respondents deny that respondent Ilustre lost three times in this Court. It
cannot be denied, however, that, as stated in the Resolution of October 28, 1986 of the
Court en banc, this is the third time (in fact, the fourth, if we include Fernandez, et al. vs.
Maravilla, L-18799, 10 SCRA 589 [1964]) that a controversy involving the estate of the late
Digna Maravilla is elevated to this Court. The rst was in G.R. No. L-23225 (37 SCRA 672
[1971], where this Court ruled:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decree of the court below denying probate of
the 1944 will of Digna Maravilla (Exhibit 'A') is reversed and the said testament is
hereby ordered probated. Let the records be returned to the Court of origin for
further proceedings conformable to law. . . ."

As stated in the en banc Resolution of October 28, 1986 (hereto attached as Annex "B", and
hereinafter referred to as the "Banc Decision") while respondent Ilustre was not a party in
that case, upon remand of the case to the probate Court, she and other children of the
deceased brothers and sisters of the testatrix led two Motions for Intervention.
Respondent Ilustre's participation in the estate involved, therefore, harks back to that rst
case.
The Court of Appeals resolved the issue of intervention in CA-G.R. No. 05394, entitled
"Heirs of Pastor Maravilla, et al. vs. Hon. Ernesto S. Tengco, et al." in a Decision penned by
Justice Venicio Escolin (hereinafter referred to as the "Escolin Decision") wherein it was
categorically ruled that there was no point to allowing intervention on the part of
respondent Ilustre, et als., "for failure to show any right or interest in the estate in
question." Thus:
"(2) As heretofore stated, private respondents, in their counter-petition for
mandamus, seek this Court's resolution on the petitioners' motion for intervention
in Sp. Proc. No. 4977. In their respective pleadings and memoranda, the parties
have lengthily discussed the issue of whether or not petitioners may be allowed to
intervene; and the same may as well be determined in the present case, if only 'to
avoid or, at least, minimize further protracted controversy' between the parties
(PCIB vs. Hon. Escolin, 56 SCRA 2661. A resolution of this issue should render
moot and academic the question anent the disqualification of respondent Judge.

We agree with private respondents that petitioners' motions for intervention are
devoid of merit, for failure on their part to show any right or interest in the estate
in question. There is no dispute that the last will and testament of the late Digna
Maravilla had already been admitted to probate in a nal judgment which the
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 Supreme Court promulgated on March 2, 1971 (G.R. No. L-23225). In the said will,
Digna instituted her husband Herminio Maravilla as —

xxx xxx xxx

The above testamentary provision for the universal heirship of Herminio Maravilla
over the residue of the decedent's present and future property legally and
completely excluded the petitioners, as collateral relatives of the testatrix, from
inheriting any part of the latter's estate through intestate succession or mixed
succession. Having no forced or compulsory heirs, except her husband, the
testatrix had the absolute freedom to institute the latter as her sole, universal heir,
and such freedom is recognized by Article 842 of the Civil Code, which provides:

'ART. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of
all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to
succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided
he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the
legitime of said heirs."

There is therefore no point in allowing the petitioners, who clearly appear to have
no interest in the estate, to intervene in the proceedings involving the settlement
thereof.

xxx xxx xxx"

The aforesaid Decision was af rmed by this Court in G.R. No. L-46155 on November 9,
1977 and has become nal. That was the second case involving the estate led before this
Court.
Respondents' contention, therefore, that the statement in the Banc Resolution "that the
Court of Appeals had denied intervention" is an "unadulterated distortion of the facts" is
obviously erroneous and intended to mislead.
The "Escolin Decision" (in CA-G.R. No. 05394-R), which had become nal, also nally
foreclosed any claim that respondent Ilustre, and those who sought to intervene with her,
may have had on the estate of Digna Maravilla. In unmistakable terms, what the Court of
Appeals held in that Decision, affirmed by this Court, bears repeating:
"The above testamentary provision for the universal heirship of Herminio
Maravilla over the residue of the decedent's present and future property legally
and completely excluded the petitioners, as collateral relatives of the testatrix,
from inheriting any part of the latter's estate through intestate succession or
mixed succession. . . ."

To circumvent that judgment, however, two years later, or on February 29, 1979,
respondent Ilustre, with respondent Laureta as counsel, led a complaint for partition of
Digna Maravilla's estate and for damages against the heirs of Digna Maravilla's husband,
who had then passed away (docketed as Civil Case No. X-404), before the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, San Carlos City, Branch X, presided over by Judge Antonia
Corpuz Macandog. That Court, after declaring defendants therein (private respondents in
the petition under review) in default, ordered "all properties of Digna Maravilla mentioned in
this case to go back to their trunk of origin, the plaintiffs herein who are represented by
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 Eva Maravilla Ilustre and Eva Maravilla Ilustre herself" (hereinafter referred to as the
"Macandog Decision"). In addition, the judgment awarded damages to the respondent
Ilustre, et als., (the plaintiffs therein), and the sum of P100,000.00 to their counsel,
respondent Laureta.
A special civil action for certiorari was led by the defeated parties (private respondents in
the petition under review) before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. L-58014, praying that the
lower Court's declaration of default in Civil Case No. X-404 and all other actions or
decisions taken thereafter be declared null and void and that the dismissal of the
complaint be ordered. on January 21, 1982, this Court resolved to refer the case to the
Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, questions of fact being involved.
In a Decision dated January 14, 1983, the Court of Appeals (Fourth Division), 1 in AC-G.R.
SP No. 13680 (hereafter called the "Busran Decision"), dismissed the petition and denied
certiorari slating in one breath that "the judgment subject of assail had long become nal"
(at p. 13), and in another "for all we know, the judgment below had already attained nality
long ago." The reason relied upon was that petitioners therein had the remedy of appeal
but instead availed of Certiorari, which is not a substitute therefor.
On motion for reconsideration, however, led by petitioners (private respondents in the
petition under review), in that appealed case (AC-G.R. SP No. 13680), the same Court of
Appeals (Fourth Special Cases Division) 2 in its Resolution of January 20, 1984 (the
"Javellana Resolution"), reconsidered and set aside the "Busran Decision" and entered
another one:
"1. Annulling the order of default of the Hon. respondent Court dated 29 April
1980 and its decision dated 11 August 1981; and
2. Dismissing private respondents' complaint in Civil Case No. X-404 and ordering
the Hon. respondent Court not to take further action therein."

Respondent Ilustre challenged that reversal in the present Petition for Review led on
October 22, 1984. This is the third case brought before this Court involving the same
estate. Review was denied in an extended minute Resolution by the First Division of this
Court in the challenged Resolution of May 14, 1986, for the following reasons:
"The appealed Decision stands on firm legal grounds.

(1) The Order of Default of the Trial Court was issued in grave abuse of
discretion. The Answer was led only one day late besides the fact that when so
filed, the Order of default had not yet been issued by the Trial Court.

(2) While appeal is, indeed, the remedy from a judgment by default, Certiorari may
be resorted to when a party has been illegally declared in default (Omico Mining &
Industrial Corporation vs. Vallejos, 63 SCRA 300-301 [1975]),or where it is
necessary to restore order to proceedings in the Court below (Lim Tanhu vs.
Ramolete, 66 SCRA 462-463 [1975]).
(3) More importantly, the judgment of the Trial Court, in Civil Case No. X-404
declaring that the Testatrix's collateral relatives have a rightful claim to her estate
to the exclusion of the husband who was designated her sole and universal heir,
nulli es the Will already probated by nal judgment and overturns the
pronouncements of both the Appellate Court and this Court on the case.
There being former judgments on the issues which have become nal, rendered
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 by Courts having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, the said
judgments having been rendered on the merits, and there being between the prior
and subsequent action identity of parties, subject matter and substantial identity
of cause of action, it is clear that the complaint below in Civil Case X-404 is
barred by the principle of res adjudicata, and whatever transpired therein are null
and void ab initio and without any legal effect.
To rule otherwise would upset the fundamental issue on which res judicata rests
that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once,
that when a right or fact has been judicially determined, the judgment of the
Court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties
and those in privity with them in law or estate (Sarabia vs. Sec. of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, 2 SCRA 54 [1961]).
ACCORDINGLY, the review sought for is denied and respondent Court's judgment
in CA-G.R. SP No. 13080 is hereby affirmed.

SO ORDERED."

Respondents decry the fact that the First Division set aside the due course Order and
denied review in an extended Minute Resolution instead of in a signed Decision. They allege
that said Resolution was "railroaded with such hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire
history of the Supreme Court under circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of
legal and judicial ethics," unduly "persuaded, induced and in uenced" by Solicitor General
Ordoñez and Justice Pedro Yap.
Nothing is farthest from the truth. As explained in the "Banc Resolution".
"The petition for review was assigned to the then First Division of seven Justices,
which initially gave it due course because the resolution of the Intermediate
Appellate Court had reversed a decision originally rendered by the then Court of
Appeals, and in order to have more time for further study.

Pleadings were submitted, the last being on May 3, 1985, which can be
considered as the date when this case was submitted for resolution.

The First Division of seven (7) was not able to act on the case up to the February,
1986 political upheaval. The last incident in the case was a motion for the early
release of decision filed by petitioner on November 19, 1985.
When this Court was reorganized in April of 1986, the membership of the First
Division was reduced to ve (5) Justices. Taking account of the motion of
petitioner for early release of decision, the new First Division, then chairmanned
by Justice Abad Santos, realizing that the doctrine of res judicata was clearly
applicable — not only as to the probate of the will but also as to the heirship of
petitioner, among others, and their right to intervene and participate in the
proceedings — resolved, on May 14, 1986 to dismiss the petition through an
extended resolution which at the same time recalled the due course order. The
new Division of 5 acted unanimously."

The recall of a due course Order after a review of the records of the case is a common
occurrence in the Court. Respondents speak as if it were only their petition which has been
subjected to such recall. They have lost all objectivity in this regard. They are hardly
qualified, and cannot presume to speak of the "entire history" of the Supreme Court.
As to the participation of Justice Yap in the case, the "Banc Resolution" stated:
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 "Justice Yap clari ed that he was on of cial mission to Switzerland for the
Presidential Commission on Good Government after his appointment to the
Supreme Court on April 11, 1986 and did not assume his position in the Supreme
Court until his return on May 2, 1986. When the resolution of dismissal on May
14, 1986 was issued, Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Sedfrey Ordoñez was
private respondent's counsel.

On June 11, 1986, petitioner led a motion for reconsideration, which was taken
up by the First Division on July 9, 1986 with Justice Abad Santos still the
Chairman. This time, Justice Yap, realizing that his former partner, Atty. Ordoñez,
had submitted the pleadings for petitioner, inhibited himself and Justice Edgardo
L. Paras was designated under Special Order No. 21, dated July 9, 1986, to sit in
the Division in his place. The motion for reconsideration was denied with nality
on July 9, 1986.

Justice Yap was designated Chairman of the First Division on July 14, 1986.

On August 7, 1986, petitioner asked leave to le a second motion for

reconsideration, which was denied on September 3, 1986, entry of judgment of
the May 14, 1986 resolution having been made on July 28, 1986. Justice Yap
again took no part in the deliberation of the case."

But respondents continue to claim derisively that Justice Yap could not have been
"unaware" of the appearance of Atty. Sedfrey Ordoñez. They reacted by saying "tell it to the
marines" (Letters of November 3, 1986 to Justices Narvasa, Herrera, and Cruz, at p. 8,
respectively). But that was the true and untarnished fact. With so many cases being
handled by the Court, the appearances of lawyers during deliberative sessions very often
escape attention, concentration being centered on the issues to be resolved.
Respondents also fault the Court for "still recogniz(ing) Atty. Ordoñez as counsel" for their
opponents in the case. In the same "Banc Resolution," it was clarified:
"A copy of the resolution, dated May 14, 1986, was sent by the Releasing Clerks to
Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez as his name still appears on the cover page of the Rollo.
It was not necessarily because the Supreme Court 'still recognizes him as counsel
for respondents'" (at p. 4).

The fact of the matter is that even Atty. Laureta continued to recognize Atty. Ordoñez
as counsel as shown by his pleadings led before the Court, which inevitably contained
the notation "copy furnished Atty. Sedfrey Ordoñez." No withdrawal of appearance
having been presented by Atty. Ordoñez in the main petition, his name continues to be
in the Rollo of the case and the personnel concerned continue to furnish him with
copies of Resolutions of this Court.
In respect of the charge that the Resolutions of the First Division of May 14, 1986, July 9,
1986 denying the Motion for Reconsideration with nality, and September 3, 1986 denying
leave to le a second motion for reconsideration since entry of judgment of the May 14,
1986 Resolution had been made on July 28, 1986, were "unjust" and were "railroaded," the
Banc Resolution, adopting the Division Resolution, explained:
"The aforesaid resolutions were by no means 'railroaded.' The pleadings led by
the parties, as in any other case, were included in the Agenda of the First Division
as soon as feasible. The Division acts promptly on all Agenda items, and the
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 minutes of its deliberations are released as soon as possible after Agenda day.

xxx xxx xxx

"The dispositions in this case were arrived at after careful study. Because a case
is resolved against the interests of a party, does not mean that it is an 'unjust
decision;' or that it has been 'railroaded.'

This Division declares without hesitation that it has consistently rendered justice
without fear or favor." (at p. 4)

Respondents insist that the doctrine of "res judicata" is inapplicable. In their own words
"the ordered probate of the 1944 Will of Digna Maravilla by judgment of the Supreme Court
in G.R. No. L-23225 is conclusive only as to the genuineness and due execution of said will,
but not upon the validity of testamentary provision, particularly with the invalid designation
of Herminio Maravilla as sole and universal heir of Digna Maravilla."
On this point, the "Javellana Resolution," in reversing the "Busran Decision" (AC-G.R. SP No.
13680), aptly held:
"The then Court of Appeals held that the questioned decision does not run counter
to the decision of the Hon. Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225 admitting the will
of Digna Maravilla to probate because the latter refers to the extrinsic validity of
the will, while the former concerns its intrinsic validity. We cannot agree with this
observation because it is quite clear from the questioned decision that the will
was in effect declared not to have been freely and voluntarily executed by the
deceased Digna Maravilla but was the result of the evil and fraudulent
machinations of her husband, Herminio Maravilla, and sets aside said will. The
declaration that private respondents, as collateral relatives of the deceased Digna
Maravilla, are entitled to her estate, is an indication that the Hon. respondent
Court has nulli ed the will. Private respondents are not compulsory heirs and, in
the absence of their being named legatees or devisees in the will, they could only
lay claim to the estate of Digna Maravilla if the latter died without a will, pursuant
to Art. 1003 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
'Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.'
"However, assuming arguendo, that the matter complained of by private
respondents referred only to the intrinsic validity of the will, still, it was improper
for them to have instituted a separate action in a court other than that in which
the probate proceeding was pending.

xxx xxx xxx

'It seems clear from these provisions of the law that while the
estate is being settled in the Court of First Instance in a special
proceeding, no ordinary action can be maintained in that court, or in
any other court, by a person claiming to be the heir, against the
executor or against other persons claiming to be heirs, for the purpose
of having the rights of the plaintiffs in the estate determined. The very
purpose of the trial or hearing provided for in section 753 is to settle
and determine those questions, and until they are settled and
determined in that proceeding and under that section no action such as
the present one can be maintained."
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 Considering that the "Escolin Decision," as af rmed by this Court on November 9, 1977 in
G.R. No. L-46155, had become final, the "Javellana Resolution" aptly observed:
"3. The questioned decision of the Hon. respondent Court dated 12 August 1981
(referring to the 'Macandog Decision') unsettles and reviews issues which had
long been laid to rest by the Hon. Supreme Court and the then Court of Appeals."

But respondents ask: if res judicata were applicable, why did this Court, in G.R. No. L-
50814, refer the case to the Court of Appeals? The answer is simple. The issue of whether
the remedy of petitioners in that case was appeal and not certiorari had to be resolved. If
certiorari were proper, then the "Macandog Decision" had not become nal. If appeal, its
nality would be the consequence. The "Javellana Resolution;" which reversed the "Busran
Decision," held that Certiorari was proper when a party has been illegally declared in
default. It follows that the "Macandog Decision" had not attained finality.
Still undaunted, respondents claim that the Court of Appeals "deliberately
evaded/divaricated" two important issues: (1) that the judgment of the Trial Court (in CC
No. X-404) had attained nality as in fact the Court of Appeals had held that the "judgment
of assail had long become nal," and (2) that Digna Maravilla's husband could not be
instituted as the sole and universal heir of the wife on indestructible ground of moral
impossibility and could not inherit wife's vast estate on the ground of utter unworthiness."
The penchant of respondents for making misleading statements is again obvious. It was
not in the "Javellana Resolution" that the Court of Appeals held that "the judgment of assail
(referring to the 'Macandog Decision') had long become nal." That was in the "Busran
Decision," which was precisely reversed by the "Javellana Resolution."
As to the alleged unworthiness of the husband to inherit from his wife, the "Javellana
Resolution" pointedly observed:
"The last will and testament of Digna Maravilla which instituted her husband,
Herminio Maravilla, as her sole and universal heir, was admitted to probate,
pursuant to a nal judgment of the Hon. Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225, 27
February 1971. This probate foreclosed all questions as to the age and mental
capacity of the testator, the signing of the document by the testator, or by
someone in his behalf, and the acknowledgment of the instrument by him in the
presence of the required member of witnesses who af x their signatures to the
will to attest the act. In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, 168). Yet, more than ten
years later, the Hon. respondent Court would nullify the effects of the probate by
declaring that Digna Maravilla did not voluntarily and sanely execute the probated
last will and testament, nullifying the institution of Herminio Maravilla as her sole
and universal heir, and ordering the return of the properties of Digna Maravilla to
the trunk of origin."

The soundness of the legal conclusions arrived at in the "Escolin Decision" and "Javellana
Resolution" commends itself. Only a disgruntled litigant and a defeated lawyer would claim
that those judgments were accepted "hook, line and sinker" by this Court. The doctrine of
res judicata is inescapably applicable. Thus it was that the First Division, in its challenged
Resolution of May 14, 1986, found it unnecessary, after further study, to have a signed
Decision and, instead, recalled the due course Order, which it had previously issued to give
it "more time for further study" (p. 2, Banc Resolution, October 28, 1986). Contrary to
respondents' claim, the Court is not "duty bound" to render signed Decisions all the time. It
has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or minute Resolutions, provided a legal
basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.
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 But obdurately enough, respondents have seen t to take their case to the Tanodbayan
charging the members of the First Division of this Court collectively with having knowingly
and deliberately rendered an "unjust extended minute Resolution" with deliberate bad faith
in violation of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code 3 and for deliberately causing "undue
injury" to respondent Ilustre and her co-heirs because of the "unjust Resolution"
promulgated, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 4

Respondents' action is brazenly unjusti able. Nor can they plead ignorance. As aptly
declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of December 24, 1986, which the Court hereby
adopts in toto, "(I)t is elementary that the Supreme Court is supreme — the third great
department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with
nality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may
pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.'" It is elementary that "(A)s has ever been
stressed since the early case of Arnedo vs. Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263 [1911]) 'controlling
and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at
the risk of occasional error, judgments of courts determining controversies submitted to
them should become nal at some de nite time xed by law, or by a rule of practice
recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even of the court which
rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law, into which, in the
opinion of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the courts are organized
is to put an end to controversy, to decide the questions submitted to the litigants, and to
determine the respective rights of the parties.'" (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime
Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305, 316-317)
Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code as
to "rendering knowingly unjust judgment" refer to an individual judge who does so "in any
case submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who would pass
judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision rendered by him but the proper appellate
court with jurisdiction to review the same, either the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme
Court. Respondents should likewise know that said penal article has no application to the
members of a collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisions who reach their
conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due
deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision is "unjust" cannot
prosper.
The Chief Justice's Statement of the supremacy of the Supreme Court's judicial power is
by no means a "display of arrogance" as per respondents' puerile contention, but a
restatement of the fundamental principle of separation of powers and checks and
balances under a republican form of government such as ours, viz. that the three co-equal
branches of government, the executive, legislative and judicial, are each supreme and
independent within the limits of its own sphere. Neither one can interfere with the
performance of the duties of the other. (Forbes vs. Chuoco, 16 Phil. 534 [1910]). As
restated by the late Justice Jose P. Laurel in the 1936 landmark case of Angara vs.
Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 134), our Constitution "as 'a de nition of the powers of
government' placed upon the judiciary the great burden of 'determining the nature, scope
and extent of such powers' and 'when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments .. but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation entrusted to it by the Constitution to determine
con icting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
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 actual controversy the rights which the instrument secures and guarantees to them.'"
As an of cer of the Court, respondent Laureta, should realize that the cardinal principle he
would grossly impair and violate is that of the independence of the judiciary, which the
members of the bar are called upon to defend and preserve. The independence of the
judiciary is the indispensable means for enforcing the supremacy of the Constitution and
the rule of law.
To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so a
member of the Supreme Court for of cial acts done by him in good faith and in the regular
exercise of of cial duty and judicial functions is to subvert and undermine that very
independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive. "For it is a
general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a
judicial of cer in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own
convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability to
answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge would be
inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence
without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful." (Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U.S.
335).
Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division,
speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond
investigation or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the
legislature. (U.S. vs. Pons, 34 Phil. 729; Gardiner, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 61 Phil. 118;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) The Supreme Court's pronouncement of the doctrine
that "(I)t is well settled that the enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts as regards the
tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has
been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certi ed by the of cers of
Congress and approved by the Executive [as claimed by petitioner-importer who
unsuccessfully sought refund of margin fees] — on which we cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree" is fully and reciprocally applicable to Supreme Court
orders, resolutions and decisions, mutatis mutandis. (Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. vs.
Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350. (Citing Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1).
The Court has consistently stressed that "the doctrine of separation of powers calls for
the executive, legislative and judicial departments being left alone to discharge their duties
as they see t " (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It has thus maintained in the same way
that the judiciary has a right to expect that neither the President nor Congress would cast
doubt on the mainspring of its orders or decisions, it should refrain from speculating as to
alleged hidden forces at work that could have impelled either coordinate branch into
acting the way it did. The concept of separation of powers presupposes mutual respect by
and between the three departments of the government. (Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275,
286-287).
To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claim that the members acted
"with deliberate bad faith" and rendered and "unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of
the duty of their high of ce to act upon their own independent consideration and judgment
of the matter at hand would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of
such collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption of regular
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 performance of of cial duty. To allow such collateral attack would destroy the separation
of powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the nal arbiter of all justiciable
disputes.
Dissatis ed litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the separation of
powers mandated by the Constitution relitigate in another forum the nal judgment of this
Court on legal issues submitted by them and their adversaries for nal determination to
and by the Supreme Court and which fall within the judicial power to determine and
adjudicate exclusively vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and in such inferior
courts as may be established by law.
In resume, we nd that respondent Ilustre has transcended the permissible bounds of fair
comment and criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice in her
letters addressed to the individual Justices quoted in the show-cause Resolution of this
Court en banc, particularly the underlined portions thereof; in the language of the charges
she led before the Tanodbayan quoted and underscored in the same Resolution; in her
statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or the of cial
actions of the Justices concerned and her ascription of improper motives to them; and in
her unjusti ed outburst that she can no longer expect justice from this Court. The fact that
said letters are not technically considered pleadings, nor the fact that they were submitted
after the main petition had been nally resolved does not detract from the gravity of the
contempt committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy
cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court.
We likewise nd that Atty. Laureta has committed acts unbecoming an of cer of the Court
for his stance of dangling threats of bringing the matter to the "proper forum" to effect a
change of the Court's adverse Resolution; for his lack of respect for and exposing to public
ridicule, the two highest Courts of the land by challenging in bad faith their integrity and
claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgments (Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234
[1974]); for authoring, or at the very least, assisting and/or abetting and/or not preventing
the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of his client,
respondent Ilustre, notwithstanding his disclaimer that he had absolutely nothing to do
with them, which we nd disputed by the facts and circumstances of record as above
stated; for totally disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal considerations set
forth in this Court's Resolutions of the First Division and en banc, as the Tribunal of last
resort; for making it appear that the Justices of this Court and other respondents before
the Tanodbayan are charged with "graft and corruption" when the complaint before the
Tanodbayan, in essence, is a tirade from a disgruntled litigant and a defeated counsel in a
case that has been brought thrice before this Court, and who would readily accept anything
but the soundness of the judgments of the Courts concerned, all with the manifest intent
to bring the Justices of this Court and of the Court of Appeals into disrepute and to
subvert public confidence in the Courts.

Atty. Laureta should be reminded that his rst duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. For like
the Court itself, "a lawyer is an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice."
(Surigao Mineral Conservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1 [1970]; Castañeda vs. Ago, 65
SCRA 505 [1975]).
In assessing the penalty on respondent Laureta, the Court notes that "disciplinary
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 proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do
not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the
conduct of one of its of cers. Not being intended to in ict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaint nor a prosecutor therein. It may
be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a t person to be allowed
the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actions as an of cer of the Court with
the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct
have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the of ce of an attorney." Viewed in the light of the
demonstrated persistence of grave misconduct and undermining public con dence in the
honor and integrity of the Court and its members (at a time when the Court is exerting
every effort to regain public con dence in our courts after the trauma and debacle
undergone by them in the past regime), the Court shall impose upon him an inde nite
suspension, leaving it to him to prove at some future and opportune time, that he shall
have once again regained the tness to be allowed to resume the practice of law as an
officer of the Courts. (In re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562).
ACCORDINGLY, (1) respondent Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt, and is
hereby ned in the amount of P1,000.00 only, mindful that the power of contempt should
be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle of punishment; and.
(2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave professional misconduct, rendering
him un t to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the
of ce of an attorney, and is hereby suspended from the practice of law until further Orders,
the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all Courts of the country for their information
and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Wenceslao Laureta.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Yap, J., no part.

Footnotes

1. Composed of Justices Busran (ponente), Coquia and Zosa, as members.

2. Composed of Justices Cuevas, Mendoza and Javellana (ponente).

3. "ART. 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. — Any judge who shall knowingly render an
unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision, shall be punished by prision
mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification.
4. "SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. —

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 xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or any private party any
unwarranted bene ts, advantage or preference in the discharge of his of cial
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. . . ."

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