Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Lampros Psomas
University of Winchester
lambrospsomas@yahoo.co.uk
Lampros.Psomas@unimail.winchester.ac.uk
https://winchesteruni.academia.edu/LamprosPsomas
Periohi Rendi
Greece
In 1921 Albania one major game was afoot: that of the first political elections, which took
place between February and April 1921. For Albanian officials it was absolutely necessary to
initiate an electoral process before the long anticipated international recognition of the
independence and integrity of Albania and the final delimitation of the Albanian-Greek
frontier. The main reason was the territorial disputes of Albania with Greece. The
participation of the inhabitants of the disputed Southern Albania (Gjirokastër and Korçë
regions) in the elections was to prove the Albanian national sentiment of the inhabitants.
Conversely, abstention from voting could be disastrous for the Albanian state, as it could
prove that the inhabitants of the region desired union with Greece. The then British envoy in
Albania Harry Eyres informed his government that the Muslims of the Korçë region
participated in the process, while their Christian compatriots mostly abstained from voting1.
However, he maintained that all the inhabitants of Gjirokastër region, across religion, took
part in the electoral process normally. To that the Foreign Office (FO) replied that a certain
1
Morton Frederic Eden, who was known to London as Eyres’ informer, was probably a victim
of propaganda. Eyres, therefore, should be more careful with the information coming from
that source. Who was Morton Frederick Eden? What was he doing in Albania? Why did the
FO not seem to trust his information? These are the questions with which this article is
concerned.
In order to reply to these questions, this essay will firstly review the issue of Southern
Albania briefly and will analyse the importance of the first political elections in the area for
both Albania and Greece. It will then present the British involvement in the Albanian affairs,
especially those connected with the South of the country, and the role of the Anglo-Persian
Oil Company. Through the misleading information that reached Britain and the League of
Nations on the issue of the elections and the deportation of the Greek-speaking bishop Jacob
of Durrës, the essay, based on unpublished archival material, will reveal the role of Morton
Frederic Eden as an intelligence agent. Finally, this article will attempt to investigate his
BRITISH INVOLVEMENT
The issue of Southern Albania in the first quarter of the last century was a rather complex
one. The brief analysis that follows examines only the issues that concern the particular
interests of this article. Thus, Greece claimed that the regions of Korçë and Gjirokastër in
what is today known as Southern Albania – Northern Epirus for the Greeks – should not be
included in Albania, as they were areas, so the Greeks argued, inhabited by a Greek majority.
The truth is that a majority of Orthodox Christians inhabiting the regions in question
Albania. These sympathisers, nonetheless, were to be found mostly in the Gjirokastër region
2
(west of the Vjosë River), where the Orthodox Christians formed a majority of the population
and where the Greek-speaking minority was also located. The majority of the inhabitants of
Korçë region (east of the Vjosë River), on the other hand, was Muslim – particularly
belonging to the Bektashi sect, which had championed Albanian nationalism; Korçë was also
the stronghold of a rather few, at the time, Orthodox Christian Albanian nationalists2.
In the troubled Balkans of the beginning of the 20th century, the notorious ‘tinderbox
of Europe’, such issues were thorny. Each side attempted to push forward with its claims in a
decisive, even violent, manner. Greece occupied these areas from the Ottoman Empire during
Balkan War I (1912-1913), but the Great Powers asked their troops to be withdrawn, upon
Italy’s special demand (Protocol of Florence, 1913). The inhabitants, who did not wish to be
included in the Albanian state, revolted, following the Greek troops’ withdrawal and the new
sovereign of the country, the 38-year-old German prince William of Wied (1876-1945)3,
granted autonomy to the Southern regions of Gjirokastër and Korçë (Protocol of Corfu,
1914). During World War I (1914-1918) and up to 1915 the Greeks had reasons to believe
that the area would be annexed by them, as they bargained with the Entente powers their
participation in the War. Greece’s dubious attitude, however, and the collapse of Serbia,
which was followed by the occupation of Northern and Central Albania by the Austro-
Hungarians, forced the Entente Powers to intervene in the Balkans. Italian troops landed in
the port of Vlorë, Southern Albania, and occupied the Greek-claimed Gjirokastër, whereas
French troops landed in Thessaloniki, Greece, and marched as far as Korçë in the disputed
In the aftermath of World War I the Entente troops abandoned Southern Albania,
either forcefully (Italians) or peacefully (French) (1920). The Greeks prepared to replace the
Entente troops, as their belated entrance in the War on the part of the Entente Powers (1917-
1918) had placed them with the victors’ side at the Peace Conference of Paris. Greece’s
3
greatest ally at the time, Britain, strongly advised the Greeks and Prime Minister Eleftherios
Venizelos, probably Britain’s closest friend in the Balkans, not to occupy the regions of
Korçë and Gjirokastër, until a final settlement concerning their fate was to be arranged.
Venizelos agreed. At exactly that point Greece had ultimately lost the case. On 17 December
1920, a month after Venizelos’ devastating electoral defeat (1 November 1920), Albania
entered the League of Nations with the support of Robert Cecil – essentially Britain – and by
the end of the year Britain was the first country to send an envoy in semi-official capacity:
Harry Eyres. We shall return to Cecil and Eyres below. It should be stated here, however, that
Eyres’ arrival was celebrated in Albania, as the presence of a British diplomat in their country
meant, for them, that the time of the official recognition of their country’s independence and
With Eyres in Albanian soil, with Greek troops away from their Southern regions and
engaged in a major struggle against the Turks in Asia Minor (Greko-Turkish War 1919-
1922), the Albanians believed that the electoral process constituted an opportunity to prove
the Albanian character of the disputed areas. The very participation of the Southerners in the
electoral process would sufficiently prove their will to belong to Albania. It was, therefore,
vital for Albanian officials to see the vast majority of the Orthodox Christian minority of the
South to vote normally and peacefully for Albanian parties and Albanian politicians.
Conversely, the abstention from voting would prove the Christians’ Greek national sentiment.
This is why the Greek government, through the substitute governor of the governorate of the
Greek Southern Epirus – as opposed to the Albanian Northern Epirus –, Kotzonanos, asked
those who favoured union with Greece to abstain from voting5. The response of the
inhabitants to these conflicting calls is an issue which will be further discussed below. It is
necessary to underline here that the whole disputed area finally constituted part of the
4
country, when the independence and integrity of Albania was officially recognised by the
It is now important to examine some issues that emanate from the above account.
Indeed, apart from Albania and Greece, which were the main parties concerned with the
question of Southern Albania, and France, which got involved briefly during World War I
and withdrew voluntarily, two more players appear to have participated: Italy and Britain.
The former’s interests in the area go back to the 18th century and are connected with the
‘Adriatic Question’ and Italy’s antagonism with Austria-Hungary. Italy did not want to see
any foreign naval power controlling either the east coast of the Otranto Straits or the east
coast of the Corfu Channel – between the Greek island of Corfu and the opposite port of
Sarandë7.
Britain was a new player in the area; its pre-World-War-I pro-Greek attitude was
radically changed in the aftermath of the Great War. During the Peace Conference of Paris
Britain, together with France, supported the Greek claims over the region in question, though
not decidedly. Thus, the refusal of Italy to accept these claims brought the negotiations to a
deadlock8. The British Premier, the liberal Sir David Lloyd-George, officially supported the
Greek claims against the Italian demands. However, when the French troops withdrew from
Korçë and called for the Greeks to replace them, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, the
conservative Earl George Nathaniel Curzon of Kedleston, opposed it9. Moreover, the
Albanians were aware of this change in British attitude. The Greek governor-general of
Epirus Achilles Kalevras informed the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs accordingly10. Later
the same year Albania was admitted to the League of Nations. One of the most instrumental
personalities that worked to this end was the influential British conservative politician and
diplomat Sir Robert Cecil, representative of the British dominion of South Africa to the
League and the man who sponsored Albania’s admission11. Cecil was a very close friend and
5
parliamentary collaborator with Aubrey Herbert, a conservative MP who headed a group of
MPs supporting the Albanian cause. On 10 February 1921 the FO appointed a temporary
representative (consul without exequatus), Sir Harry Charles Augustus Eyres (1856-1944), at
Durrës. The 65-year-old Eyres was a diplomat of the old Victorian school who relied mostly
on his own judgement and initiative rather than the FO directives. He was called from
retirement, as he had served as interpreter and later consul-general at the British embassy in
Istanbul (1877-1882, 1896-1914) and had spent some time in Shkodër in 188212. Upon his
arrival Eyres made clear, according to the unequivocal instructions of his superiors at the FO,
that his appointment did not imply official recognition of Albania and did not reveal British
views on the issue of the Albanian borders13. However, Eyres’ arrival profoundly satisfied the
Albanian government. Eyres was the first foreign diplomat, representing a great power, that
set foot on Albanian soil – even in semi-official capacity. For Albanians this was part of a
sequence of events, manifesting a u-turn in British politics on Albania. Indeed, in April 1921
Curzon informed the new Italian ambassador in London baron Giacomo de Martino that
Britain was ready to co-operate with Italy on the issue of Albanian independence and
integrity in clearly demarcated borders. This was the first direct and official demonstration of
The reason behind this change has often been associated with Venizelos’ electoral
defeat in Greece and the return of the anti-British King Constantine I (1913-1917, 1920-
1922) in the country (November-December 1920). However, the change of the British
political approach on Albania had already started and was initially expressed with Curzon’s
opposition to the perspective of the occupation of Korçë by Greek troops, as shown above.
More recently Nicola Guy expressed the view that the purpose to balance the Italian influence
in Albania by reinforcing the Greeks had ceased to exist after the departure of the Italian
troops. An independent Albania would more effectively contribute to the balance of power in
6
the Balkans and the Adriatic15. However, William Bland and Ian Price expressed the view
that petroleum was found in Albania by the Italians during their occupation of Southern
Albania and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, partly owned by the British state, with
connections to the government and with considerable influence in the British Parliament, was
interested in it16. This study agrees with the suggestions made by Bland and Price and it is
going to further support this views. The British concern about the oil fields in Albania
manifests a more direct British interest in the area, than mere diplomatic considerations
concerning the international balance of power. This British special interest did not escape
Greek attention at the time17. Indeed, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company had initiated
negotiations with Albanian officials to gain concessions in 1920. The negotiations reached a
first provisional agreement in January 192118. The company made specific financial offers to
the Albanian government and reached another more specific agreement through its affiliate
D’Arcy Exploration Company on 25 March 1921. The agreement would allow monopoly for
fifty years and the capital to be invested would reach £1.000.000 with a 20% profit for
Albania. Although the then Albanian government favoured the agreement, the newly formed
Albanian parliament kept postponing its ratification. Eyres informed his government
accordingly, assuring it that he was not directly involved, since this was an issue between a
private company and the Albanian State19. This was not true, however, as it appears from his
detailed reports on the matter, as well as the Italian accusations against him. Italy, the first
country that spotted oil fields in Albania, considered her interest in the case her prerogative
for political and financial reasons, but the right to pump oil had been denied to her. Eyres
was, therefore, accused for direct involvement, while Italian newspapers treated British
involvement in Albania as treason20. The delay of the ratification of the agreement by the
parliament allowed Italian and American companies to react and start competing with the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Eyres kept being involved in the case, proving the FO’s tactful
7
interest. More specifically, when the company wanted to know which were the thoughts of
the Albanian government on the issue it made a relative request to the FO, which, in its turn,
asked from Eyres to collect the necessary information directly from the Albanian
government21. It is also worth noting that a man working for the interests of the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company in Albania was the Albanophile Major Julian Barnes, interested also in
other business activities such as tobacco. Barnes had worked on the Albanian issue during the
Paris Peace Conference together with another diplomat and Near-East-specialist Sir Harold
George Nicolson and for the delimitation of the Albanian frontiers in the summer of 1921,
together with Major Harold Temperley22. The issue of the delimitation of the Albanian
borders was strongly connected with the interests of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, for the
main oil concessions were located in Southern Albania, especially in the pro-Greek area west
of the Vjosë River and the mainly Greek port of Sarandë. Finally, in April 1921 the
representatives of the Anglo-Persian returned to England, being enthusiastic with the richness
of Albania in petroleum and minerals, as well as the agreement they had reached with the
‘Albania centred great hopes in the success of the Anglo-Persian, and that
position’23.
It is, therefore, clear that apart from Albania and Greece, as well as Italy with its special
interests in Albania, Britain too was directly involved. Robert Cecil effectively supported and
facilitated Albania’s admission to the League of Nations, while the British government tried
result, it was widely believed in Albania that Britain was her more honest and true ally. This
8
encouraged Albanian initiatives in the South of the country in an effort to close the issue of
the Greek claims on the area. Pro-Albanian British were ready to provide help to this end.
The participation of the inhabitants of Southern Albania in the first political elections was of
national significance, as it was explained above24. The Muslim inhabitants of the contested
area participated in the process unanimously. They belonged mostly to the Muslim Bektashi
sect, which had a pioneering role in the development of Albanian nationalism, the Albanian
population, however, in its vast majority abstained from voting; only very few Christians
from Korçë eventually took part in the process. In Gjirokastër region the people abstained
from voting as they were in close contact with Greece and followed the instructions of the
Greek authorities. This attitude caused the wrath of the Albanian authorities and the prefect
United States, who had previously been head of the Albanian nationalist ‘Vatra’ (Hearth)
Association in the USA and was later to become parliamentary deputy26. In Korçë Eyres
believed that the inhabitants abstained from voting, motivated and encouraged by bishop
Jacob of Durrës, stationed at Korçë at the time, who, in his turn, followed instructions from
Greece. The inhabitants of Korçë were also in favour of the ‘Manifesto’, initiated by the
mayor of the city Kostaq Kota, a native of Korçë and a notorious opportunist27, which
demanded the autonomy of Southern Albania in a cantonal form, following the example of
Switzerland28.
The above attitude of the Christians in the region, who constituted a majority of the
population in Gjirokastër and its surrounding area, as well as an important minority in Korçë
and its surrounding area, infuriated the Albanian authorities who reacted violently with
9
threats, imprisonments etc.29 As Eyres’ temporary substitute, the Consul Sir Clifford Edward
Heathcote-Smith pointed out, the Orthodox of Southern Albania were considered by their
Muslim compatriots as ‘ “bad Albanians”, in the sense that they are opposed to the national
idea for an united Albania’30. In a major such reaction they started pressing the Greek-
speaking Orthodox bishop in Korçë Jacob of Durrës to abandon the country immediately
after the elections in April 1921. In September the notorious mayor of Korçë, who had
changed his allegiances and had turned to the government, issued a petition asking for the
bishop’s deportation. The petition, which had the support of the government, was to be
signed by the inhabitants of the city, many of whom did it unwillingly horrified by the
violence exercised against the supporters of the bishop31. Following the international
recognition of the independence and integrity of the Albanian state (November 1921) and
before the arrival of the Commission of Enquiry of the League of Nations under the
internationally acclaimed Finn geologist and politician Dr. Johannes J. Sederholm in Albania
(December 1921), the Albanian authorities, acting fast and without any warning, abducted
bishop Jacob in the early morning of 23 November 1921 and deported him, securing thus
minimum reaction from the Orthodox inhabitants of the city32. It is, however, certain that the
Orthodox Christians of Korçë demonstrated against the unforeseen and swift initiative of the
government immediately after realising what had happened33. The Albanian government
attempted to present a more favourable account of the events or to depreciate them by stating
that most of the Christians participated in the elections and that there were no important
reactions to Bishop Jacob’s deportation. Though the reports by locals that reached the League
of Nations refuted their assertions34, the Albanian government found some support from
Eyres and the newly arrived League of Nations Commissioner Dr. Sederholm.
Eyres was able to understand what was taking place in Korçë. Because of Jacob’s
presence, the ‘Manifesto’, the tension and the uncertainty in the area, he followed the
10
developments there directly and carefully. However, he informed his government that in the
region of Gjirokastër the population participated in the electoral process normally35. As it was
shown here, Gjirokastër region, together with the town of Himarë, were strongly pro-Greek
and the Orthodox Christians abstained almost entirely from voting. The general picture that
Eyres provided was misleading: the inhabitants of Gjirokastër region, known for their
allegiance to Greece, participated in the electoral process, which meant, for Eyres, that their
supposed pro-Greek sympathies did not express the majority of the Orthodox Christians. In
the pro-Albanian city of Korçë a large part of the Christian population abstained from voting
‘owing to intrigues of Greek bishop and mayor’, as he cabled to the Earl of Kedleston36. The
abstention from voting, therefore, occurred only in Korçë and only due to the intrigues of
Jacob and Kota. Eyres, nonetheless, received a very revealing reply. Charles H. Tufton, FO
secretary and head of the Central Department, asked Eyres to be more careful, as his
informant on Gjirokastër region, Morton Frederic Eden, was probably a victim of Albanian
propaganda. It was known to the FO in London that Eyres’ information was misleading. The
FO was also aware of the source of such misleading information: Morton Frederic Eden37.
On the other hand, the League of Nations Commissioner in Albania Dr. Sederholm
was a man who travelled almost to every part of the country and came in contact with the
inhabitants. Based on the information he gathered on the spot, possibly from election
catalogues, he was able to point out that the Orthodox Christian inhabitants of Korçë
abstained from voting almost in their entirety (about 97%). He also accused the Albanian
government for the way it formed the electoral districts, in an effort to eliminate the Christian
representation in the newly formed Parliament and he came to the conclusion that the
Christians were ‘at the mercy of Mohammedan majorities’38. In the case of Jacob’s
deportation, however, he informed the Secretary General of the League of Nations, the
British aristocrat and diplomat Sir James Eric Drummond, wrongly. He presented the
11
abduction of the bishop in very mild terms: an order to leave within three days, with a car
placed at his disposal. He also informed Drummond that there was no reaction ‘either hostile
or in his (Jacob’s) favour’. As it was shown above this was not true. Sederholm arrived in
foreigner in Albania’39, obviously considering him unbiased. There were very few foreigners
travelling around Albania at the time. The British journalist Joseph Swire, who visited
Albania a few years later (1923), mentioned as foreigners the members of the Commission of
Enquiry of the League of Nations, the British Minister at Durrës, the British advisor in the
Albanian Ministry of the Interior, Lieutenant-Colonel Walter Francis Stirling, and Eden40.
The latter was the only one reported by various sources as travelling around Albania at the
time, apart from Sederholm and probably a couple of Anglo-Persian Oil Company
representatives. The assumption, therefore, that it was again Eden the man who misinformed
Dr. Sederholm on the case of Jacob’s deportation should not be excluded. If this assumption
is true, Eden can be ‘guilty’ for misleading both, Eyres and Sederholm. His very presence and
his odd mysterious activity raise reasonable questions. Who was he? On whose behalf was he
acting? Why was he ready to misinform officials and influence their reports according to his
interests?
As it was noted above, in his report to Curzon, Eyres did not name his source. Tufton
however, in his reply, did not hesitate to reveal the source’s name and suggest, indirectly
admonishing, Eyres to be more cautious. This proved that the FO was very well informed on
Albania even through alternative sources. Apart from intelligence reports on Albanian affairs
coming from agents in Serbia and Greece, the FO was also well informed about Eden’s
activities. Thus, on 25 May 1921, the Swiss ambassador in London informed the FO that a
12
British subject, ‘Mr. Morton Frederic Eden’, spent some time in the Chateau Märchlingen in
Bern canton, where he had ‘a pro-Albanian activity’. The Swiss diplomat, in his turn, was
instructed to ask the FO whether Eden was acting in (semi-)official capacity or not41. Before
replying that Eden was acting in his own individual interests42, the FO asked to be more
profoundly informed on Eden by Major Harold William Vazeille Temperley. Born in 1879 in
Cambridge, Harold Temperley was a historian profoundly interested in British and European
foreign policy and had extensively travelled to Austria-Hungary and the Balkans prior to
World War I. During the Great War Temperley worked at the War Office preparing reports
on the background of the Balkan territorial disputes. He repeatedly expressed his sympathy
and support for the emancipation of the peoples of both the Austro-Hungarian and the
Ottoman Empire, showing special interest for Serbia, on the history of which he published a
book in 1917. In 1918 he was in Thessaloniki, Greece, and later in Serbia as acting attaché at
the British Embassy. Between 1918 and 1920 he travelled to the area repeatedly, as member
of a mission for Montenegro, where he co-operated with Eden. Thus, in the aftermath of
World War I he supported the Yugoslav and Albanian causes against Italian pretentions,
while serving as an adviser to the Paris Peace Conference British delegation in 1919. A
month after the events described here, in July 1921, he was a member of the British
delegation for the demarcation of the Albanian frontiers, together with the aforementioned
Major Barnes, trying to balance between the British promises to Greece, Italy and Yugoslavia
during World War I and his will to support Albania. He was, therefore, a man deeply
involved with the Balkans – especially Serbia and Albania – interested in not only the past of
the region as an historian, but also its present and future. It is true that ‘he retained a
fascination with the “rejuvenating” qualities of the “Near East” for the rest of his life’43.
13
Temperley presented a brief report revealing Eden’s role, whom he had personally
known from his service in Montenegro. Morton Frederic Eden (1865-1948) was a member of
the British Adriatic Mission sent in Albania in 1915 in an effort to organise the British aid to
Serbia on the spot. As a member of the Adriatic Mission, Eden was employed by the War
Office. This is why another member of the Mission the notable pro-Albanian British MP
Colonel Aubrey Nigel Henry Molyneux Herbert (1880-1923) often referred to Eden in his
diaries as his friend and co-operative44. However, according to Temperley, Eden was also
‘employed as a civilian for intelligence report’ by the FO, initially in Korçë (1916 – 1919)
and then in Shkodër (1919 – 1920). From Aubrey Herbert we know that Eden worked in
Shkodër as secretary to the head of the British Military Mission to Albania and Montenegro
Temperley. Phillips was a member of the Anglo-Albanian Association and had served as
commander of the international military mission in Shkodër prior to World War I (1913-
1914)45. Temperley reported that Eden had ceased to work for the FO since March 1920. It
was then that the British War Office withdrew its Military Mission and Eden departed from
Shkodër together with General Phillips and Temperley46. Informed about the communication
between Eden and Eyres – probably even indicating the recent misleading information the
latter sent to the FO on the Albanian elections – Temperley underlined that ‘Mr. Eyres has
recently reported him (Eden) travelling in Albania, where he appears to have shut his eyes to
anything he did not want to see’47. In Temperley’s report, Eden appears as a biased observer,
deliberately veiling facts. It is possible that when Tufton warned Eyres that Eden was
probably a victim of Albanian propaganda, what he really did was that he informed Eyres that
he himself was a victim of Eden’s propaganda and that the FO was aware of it.
Eden’s pro-Albanian bias was expressed even prior to the events described here. In
the Public Record Office (PRO) at Kew Gardens there is an unsigned ‘secret report’ on
14
Albania dated 4 April 1919 from Shkodër, Northern Albania, and entitled ‘Present attitude of
the Orthodox Population of Southern Albania’. The report is concerned with the worries of
the inhabitants of Southern Albania in the aftermath of World War I, especially of those who
followed the Orthodox Christian rite48. The report started by stating that Orthodox Albanians,
claiming that the solution of the partition of Albania between its neighbours (Greece and
Serbia) was not a realistic solution after World War I, since nationalism had grown
immensely among Albanians during the war. The only viable solution would be the formation
of a strong, independent and territorially extensive Albania. The report concluded that Britain
could intervene to this end and that locals were ready to welcome such an involvement50. The
report included information neither on the Greek claims nor on the inhabitants’ response to
The author of this report was clearly a pro-Albanian English. The date on, and the
place from, which the document was made (Shkodër, 4 April 1919) conveniently match the
information provided by Temperley. Although Shkodër is a northern Albanian city, the report
concerns the south of the country, indicating that its author had been there quite recently.
According to Temperley, Eden was ‘a civilian employed for intelligence report’ in Korçë,
Southern Albania, between 1916 and 1919 and in Shkodër from 1919 to March 1920. It can
be assumed, therefore, that Eden was the author of the above pro-Albanian intelligence report
and that it summed up his thoughts on Southern Albania in which he worked since 1916.
Aubrey Herbert probably had this pro-Albanian report in mind when he asked the Assistant
Under-Secretary of State and head of the political section of the British Delegation at the
Paris Peace Conference Sir Eyre Alexander Barby Wichart Crowe (1864-1925) to adopt a
more pro-Albanian attitude in the Conference51. At the same time, just before the beginning
15
of April 1919, he moved to the North and worked in Shkodër until March 1920, a year later.
Eden then moved to England but was back in Southern Albania before the end of 1920,
probably together with Eyres. He was present in the area during the events of 1921 described
here. Since he informed Eyres about the elections in Gjirokastër we can assume that he was
present there in March-April 1921. He then probably returned to Korçë, where in January
1922 he, possibly, misinformed Sederholm about Bishop Jacob’s deportation in November
1921. All this time between 1915, when he arrived in Albania with the British Adriatic
Mission, and 1921 he kept travelling back to England, as well as Switzerland, always
supporting the Albanian cause52. The image depicted here presents an individual with strong
pro-Albanian sympathies and with particular interest in Southern Albania. Even if the
assumptions made here – that Eden was the foreign eye witness who misinformed Sederholm
on bishop Jacob’s deportation and that he was the author of the 1919 secret report – are not
true, the image, based on Eden’s affirmed attitude and the documents by Tufton, Temperley
and the Swiss ambassador in London, remains the same: Eden was an ardent pro-Albanian,
who preferred to work on the spot and tried to push his country to a more consistent pro-
Albanian stance. In order to achieve this goal he did not hesitate to misinform and mislead his
country’s officials. It should also be noted that he did not abandon his role as ‘a civilian
employed for intelligence report’, even when he ceased to work for the FO. He kept showing
though unofficially.
When Eden wrote his intelligence report of April 1919, he was already a member of
the Anglo-Albanian Association. Through this report, therefore, he not only expressed his
personal views, but also served the purposes of the Association. In 1920, when he ceased to
work for the FO, he published a booklet in London entitled Albania: Its Discontents and their
Origin, in which he further analysed his views expressed in the 1919 intelligence report. In
16
this booklet his profound knowledge of events and realities of Southern Albania is clearly
manifested, together with his views on Albanian dissatisfaction towards Italy and anticipation
of British – or American – involvement. He also accused Greece for trying to Hellenise the
Orthodox Albanians of the South and he repeated his view that the perspective of partition of
Albania was something achievable immediately after the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), when the
Balkan armies had the upper hand, but definitely unattainable in the aftermath of World War
I, when Albanian nationalism had effectively grown. In the very last sentence of his booklet,
Eden warned that if Albanians were disappointed, they would easily turn to other powers,
namely Russia, i.e. the Soviet Union53. Additionally, in an analysis of his on the Orthodox
population of Southern Albania, he categorised Christians into ‘three classes, the genuine
pro-Greeks, the indifferent and the Albanian Nationalists’54. This categorisation is also to be
found in the reports that Heathcote-Smith sent to the FO in 192155. It is possible that
Heathcote-Smith’s views were again influenced by Eden, as a man who studied the problems
‘impartially on the spot’56. This view was later adopted by Eyres too57. Finally, Eden repeated
his views and turned directly against Albania’s neighbours – Greeks and Serbs – in another
Since Eden’s pro-Albanian attitude reached the point of shutting his eyes ‘to anything
he did not want to see’, according to Temperley, it is interesting to examine the reason behind
Eden’s pro-Albanian attitude. Eden was a member of the Anglo-Albanian Association. The
Association was found by Aubrey Herbert, Mary Edith Durham and some others in 1913 to
support the interests of Albania at a time, when Greece, Montenegro and Serbia had occupied
much of its lands and the only supporters of the country were Austria-Hungary and Italy,
themselves with specific interests in the area. The Association intended to promote Albanian
interests and to influence British politics in favour of Albania. When Albania was territorially
defined in 1913 (Protocol of Florence) and her sovereign prince William arrived in Durrës in
17
1914, the Association considered its targets accomplished and was dissolute in 1914.
Nevertheless, during World War I the Albanian Question was once again raised and was to be
discussed in any post-war settlement. As a result, Aubrey Herbert re-established the Anglo-
Albanian Association on 28 February 1918, again with Mary Edith Durham’s help, and the
participation of Morton Frederic Eden, who had been in Albania since 1915, working closely
with Aubrey Herbert, and was now an ardent pro-Albanian59. In the following years Britain
took her turn in the Albanian issue, something that made the members of the Association
genuinely believe that their country was ‘the only disinterested promoter of the Albanian
case’. For them the Albanians depended a lot on the American and British ‘sense of fair
play’60. It is in this framework that Aubrey Herbert’s statement that Eden provided the War
Office with ‘impartial information’ has to be understood61. Sharing this mentality, Eden
proceeded by writing two booklets, as it was shown above, in order to promote the Albanian
The issue of the first political elections in Albania constituted a rather complicated problem.
Albania and Greece were particularly interested not in the results and the political powers that
were to emanate through the process, but in the very participation of the Orthodox Christian
inhabitants. Though Britain always appeared as an impartial and disinterested party, she too
was interested in the process and the problems of Southern Albania in particular, so that the
first diplomatic representative in Albania was Britain’s Harry Eyres. The Anglo-Persian Oil
Company had initiated negotiations with the Albanian government for the country’s
petroleum and it was particularly interested in seeing the Korçë and, more importantly,
18
This was the framework in which Eden –member of the Anglo-Albanian Association
and ardent pro-Albanian – acted. He worked officially for the War Office as member of the
British Adriatic Mission and was simultaneously employed by the FO as ‘a civilian for
intelligence report’. In this capacity he promoted Albanian interests and tried to influence in
favour of Albania not only the British public – through the publication of pro-Albanian
booklets, when he ceased to work for British authorities – but also the FO – through
‘impartial’ reports on Albania. He worked extensively for Southern Albania, though he did
not restrict his activities in the area. He did not quit his intelligence activities, even though he
ceased to work officially for the British government. He returned to Albania and showed
Eden’s pro-Albanian, wholly partial, activity can be explained by his sympathies and
his membership to the Anglo-Albanian Association; only partly, however. His membership of
the Association cannot sufficiently explain even his very presence in Albania after March
1920, when he ceased to work for the British government. Moreover, it cannot explain his
frequent trips to Albania and back to England or even his presence in Switzerland and his
activities there, activities that attracted the attention of the Swiss authorities. This ceaseless
mobilisation and the continued trips required important financial resources, while his
activities in and outside Albania demanded important connections. The only reasonable
explanation is the he was sent to Albania to play his ‘impartial’ part – and obviously paid –
by the Anglo-Albanian Association, which probably considered its interests better served
through the on-the-spot presence of one of its members, in order to influence British decision
making.
Again, this answer does not seem to suffice. Why was Eden so profoundly interested
19
concerning all the Albanian issues and the Question of Northern Albania affected Albanian-
Yugoslav relations and seemed of equal importance. Eden, however, seems to have restricted
his activities to the South of the country. Finally, did the Association possess the resources to
cover the expenses of an on-the-spot agent? And even if it did, why did Eyres, probably even
Sederholm, avoid revealing his identity to their superiors? These questions aim to shed light
on the other possibilities concerning Eden’s role, which should not be overlooked.
It is not unreasonable to think that maybe Eden was selected for the role of
misinforming and misleading the British government by a party more interested in,
particularly, Southern Albania than the British government itself: the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company. Despite its connections with the British government and the parliament, the
company needed to exclude the possibility that Southern Albania was to be annexed by
Greece. More specifically, the company needed to make sure that Gjirokastër region, where
the petroleum concessions were mainly to be found, was to constitute part of Albania. It was
not certain at all that the British government was to adopt such an attitude. Despite Britain’s
more favourable turn to Albania, there were influential British, who clearly held more pro-
Greek views, such as Lloyd-George, while specialists with important posts, such as Nicolson
or Temperley, believed, as late as September 1921 – i.e. some months after the Albanian
elections and the agreement of the Anglo-Persian with the Albanian government and few
months before the official recognition of Albania –, that some modifications to the 1913
borders of Albania were necessary and that at least Gjirokastër region should be granted to
Greece, owing to the Greek national sentiment of the inhabitants’ majority62. Since Eyres
adopted a pro-Albanian attitude and was himself involved in the negotiations of the Anglo-
Persian with the Albanians, it can be assumed that he shared Eden’s views; he maybe even
allowed himself to be misled by Eden... The Anglo-Persian had already sent a specialist on
Albania on the spot, Major Barnes, but Eden had already spent many years in Albania and
20
had established important connections with locals. Being a foreigner, he was to be considered
believed and repeatedly exclaimed. As it was shown above, nevertheless, Eden was not
for the Anglo-Persian than Barnes, the latter often described as ‘quite straight, but stupid’ by
There is no sufficient evidence to prove that Eden worked for the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company – as his name does not appear in the relative FO documents – or any other
agent ‘employed for intelligence report’ is that his name should not appear in anything
written. Thus, the reasons behind Eden’s choice to continue working for intelligence report
after March 1920, his possible employers and their motives, remain obscure.
1
Eyres to the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in David Lloyd-George’s
government, Durrës, 22 April 1921. Foreign Office (hereafter FO) 141/669/10, C 9284/580/90.
2
For a relative study see Lampros Psomas, ‘The Religious and Ethnographic Synthesis of the Population of
Southern Albania (Northern Epirus) in the Beginning of the Twentieth Century’, Theologia, vol. 79:1, 2008, pp.
235-284, esp. pp. 261-272, available online at http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/press/theologia/material/2008
_1_9_Psomas.pdf Information on the population at the time were also included in the reports of the head of the
Commission of Enquiry Dr. Johannes J. Sederholm. See Sederholm to Sir Eric Drummond, ‘Report by the
Commission of Enquiry on its Work from 19 December 1922 to 1 February 1923: The Enquiry in Southern
Albania’, Geneva, 6 April 1923. FO 371/8531, C 7811/211/90. Part of this report was published by Basil Kondis
& Eleftheria Manda (ed.), The Greek Minority in Albania: A Documentary Record (Thessaloniki: Institute for
Balkan Studies, 1994), pp. 42 – 43.
3
For the prince William’s brief reign see Duncan Heaton-Armstrong, The Six Month Kingdom: Albania, 1914
(London: I. B. Tauris – Centre for Albanian Studies, 2005).
4
The most comprehensive account on the Question of Southern Albania in English remains Edith Pierpont
Stickney’s, Southern Albania or Northern Epirus in European International Affairs, 1914-1922 (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1926), although it does not take into consideration the developments after 1922,
which however escape the scope of this study. See also Nicola Guy, The Birth of Albania: Ethnic Nationalism,
the Great Powers of World War I and the Emergence of the Albanian Independence (London: I. B. Tauris –
Centre for Albanian Studies, 2012), pp. 28-29, 53-55, 58-61, 74-76, 100-102, 104-106, 119-120, 134-140, 160-
161, 165-178, 183, 184-186, 187-189, 212-213, 222-223.
5
Kotzonanos to the Greek Foreign Office, Janina, 1 December 1920. Greek Foreign Office (hereafter GFO)
1921, A/5, no. 16167 in Basil Kondis, O Eλληνισμός της Βορείου Ηπείρου και οι ελληνοαλβανικές σχέσεις:
Έγγραφα από το ιστορικό αρχείο του Υπουργείου Εξωτερικών [The Hellenism of Northern Epirus and the Greek-
Albanian Relations: Documents from the Historical Archives of the GFO], vol. 2 (Athens: Estia, 1997), p. 290.
Bairas, Major-General, commander of the 8th Infantry Division, to the Greek War Ministry, Janina, 2 January
1921. GFO 1921, A/5, no. 5 in ibid., p. 293.
6
The Paris Ambassadorial Conference, of which Italy was, but Greece was not, a member stated that the borders
of the South of Albania should be those defined by the 1913 Protocol of Florence. See the decision made by the
21
Conference of the Ambassadors, Paris, 9 November 1921. FO 93/117/1-2. Guy, The Birth of Albania, pp. 235-
239.
7
The most comprehensive account on the Adriatic Question, prior to World War I, I have located is an old
booklet written in Greek: Ant. G. Kartalis, Η Ιταλική Πολιτική εν Αλβανία και τοις Βαλκανίοις [The Italian
Policy in Albania and the Balkans] (Athens, 1914). Italy’s particular interest over the Corfu Channel reached its
peak in 1923, when Italian troops temporarily occupied the island. James Barros, The Corfu Incident of 1923:
Mussolini and the League of Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965). For a brief account,
though mostly concentrating on financial issues, of Italy’s interest in Albania see Alessandro Roselli, Italy and
Albania: Financial Relations in the Fascist Period (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), pp. 1-12. See also Guy, The
Birth of Albania, 43-44, 155-156, 179-186.
8
Guy, The Birth of Albania, pp. 152-199.
9
Basil Kondis, Ευαίσθητες Ισορροπίες: Ελλάδα και Αλβανία στον 20ό αιώνα [Sensitive Balance: Greece and
Albania in the 20th Century] (Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 1994), pp. 125-144. See also Kondis, The Hellenism, vol.
2, p. 15.
10
Kalevras to the GFO, Janina, 22/24 May 1920. GFO 1920, A/5, no. 6797 in Kondis, The Hellenism, vol. 2, p.
198.
11
Bejtullah Destani and Jason Tomes (ed.), Albania’s Greatest Friend: Aubrey Herbert and the Making of
Modern Albania. Diaries and Papers, 1904-1923 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), pp. 321-326. See also Robert
Clegg Austin, Founding a Balkan State: Albania’s Experiment with Democracy, 1920-1925 (Toronto, ON:
University of Toronto Press, 2012), pp. 19-26. Guy, The Birth of Albania, pp. 222-230.
12
Robert Elsie, A Biographical Dictionary of Albanian History (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012), p. 136.
13
Curzon to Eyres, London, 10 February 1921. The FO to Eyres, London, 23 February 1921. Cypher to Eyres,
London, 15 March 1921. FO 369/1548, K 1961/1961/290. Eyres was officially appointed Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary at Durrës on 16 January 1922 and was welcomed with pomp and enthusiasm five
days later. Sydney Philip Perigal Waterlow, acting first secretary of the FO, to Eyres, London, 16 January 1922.
FO 371/7326, C 518/7/90. Eyres to Curzon, Durrës, 30 January 1922. FO 371/7326, C 1884.
14
Guy, The Birth of Albania, pp. 230-232.
15
Ibid., p. 231.
16
William Bland and Ian Price, A Tangled Web: A History of Anglo-American Relations with Albania, 1912-
1955 (London: Albania Friendship Society of Southern California, 1986), p. 13.
17
Granville Leveson-Gower, 3rd Earl Granville, British Ambassador in Athens, Greece, to the FO, Athens, 22
September 1921. FO 371/5728, C 18506/580/90.
18
R. W. Ferrier, The History of British Petroleum Company: The Development Years, 1901-1932, vol. 1
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 548.
19
Minute by Major Temperley, London, 16 June 1921. FO 371/5737, C 12859/580/90. Financial Offer of the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company to the Albanian Government, London, 11 July 1921. FO 371/5737, C
14291/6478/90. Sir J. Milne C. Cheetham, British Minister in France, Paris, 20 July 1921. FO 371/5728, C
14969/580/90. Eyres to Curzon, Durrës, 28 July 1921. FO 371/5737, C 15827/6478/90. See also Owen Pearson,
Albania in the Twentieth Century: A History. Vol. 1: Albania and King Zog. Independence, Republic and
Monarchy, 1908-1939 (London: I. B. Tauris – Centre for Albanian Studies, 2004), pp. 160-161.
20
Minute by Harold Nicolson, London, 5 September 1921. FO 371/5725, C 17740/580/90. Report by Nicolson
to the FO, London, 5 September 1921 and Waterlow to Eyres, London, 23 September 1921. FO 371/5729, C
17740/580/90. Department of Overseas Trade to the FO, London, 12 October 1921. FO 371/5737, C
19620/6478/90. Edward Caper Cure, Commercial Counsellor of the Department of Overseas Trade, to the FO,
London, 14 October 1921. FO 371/5737, C 19728/6478/90. Heathcote-Smith to Curzon, London, 23 November
1921. FO 371/5737, C 22707/22707/90.
21
The managing director of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Tufton, London, 7 October 1921. Cypher to
Eyres, London, 14 October 1921. Tufton to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, London, 15 October 1921. FO
371/5728, C 19341/580/90.
22
Guy, The Birth of Albania, pp. 173-174. Austin, Founding a Balkan State, pp. 23-24, 170. Destani & Tomes,
Albania’s Greatest Friend, p. 327.
23
Pearson, Albania in the Twentieth Century, vol. 1, p. 161.
24
For the first elections and political parties in Albania see the most recent Austin, Founding a Balkan State, pp.
9-17. Lampros Anast. Psomas, ‘Issues concerning the first political elections in Albania’, Theologia, vol. 80:1,
2009, pp. 217-233.
25
For the role of the Bektashis in Albanian nationalism see Nathalie Clayer, ‘Bektachisme et nationalisme
Albanais’ in Alexandre Popovic and Gilles Veinstein (ed.), Bektachiyya: Études sur l’ordre mystique des
Bektachis et les groupes relevant de Hadji Bektach (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1995), pp. 277-308. She revised her
thoughts in a more recent work without doubting, however, the profound connection between Bektashism and
22
nationalism in the beginning of the 20th century. See her monumental Aux Origines du Nationalisme Albanais:
La Naissance d’Une Nation Majoritairement Musulmane en Europe (Paris: Karthala, 2007), pp. 474-493. For
the Albanian awakening from the point of view of Albanian nationalist historiography see Stavro Skendi, The
Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967).
26
Nicholas J. Cassavetes, head of the Pan-Epirotic Federation of the U.S.A., to Drummond, Boston, 18 April
1921. FO 286/762, C 11556/4280/90. For Tromara see Destani & Tomes, Albania’s Greatest Friend, p. 256, n.
142.
27
Kostaq Kota was portrayed as a Greek-speaking moderate Albanian nationalist, surrounded by fanatic
nationalists, who firmly controlled Korçë. Secret Intelligence Report, Athens, undated. FO 286/778, W
3458/3458/50, D 525. Eyres considered him a notorious personality, wanted for assassinations in Egypt. Eyres
to Curzon, Durrës, 22 April 1921. FO 141/669/10, C 9284/580/90. At any rate, Kota was effective in political
maneuvering. With the ‘Manifesto’ he turned against the Albanian government, but when the power of the latter
was solidified he supported it and became close collaborator of Ahmed bey Zogolli, later king Zog, whom he
repeatedly served as a Prime Minister.
28
For Korçë region see Eyres to Curzon, Durrës, 22 April 1921. FO 141/669/10, C 9284/580/90. Sederholm to
Drummond, ‘Report by the Commission of Enquiry on its work from 19 December 1922 to 1 February 1923:
The Enquiry in Southern Albania», Geneva, 6 April 1923. FO 371/8531, C 7811/211/90 and in Kondis –
Manda, The Greek Minority in Albania, p. 39. For the ‘Manifesto’ see Eyres to Curzon, Durrës, 18 March 1921
and the document attached. FO 371/5726, C 669/580/90. Eyres to Curzon, Durrës, 20 April 1921. FO 371/5726,
C 8178/580/90. Eyres to Curzon, Durrës, 22 April 1921. FO 141/669/10, C 9284/580/90. Eyres to Curzon,
Annual Report about Albania, p. 3, Durrës, 1 May 1922. FO 371/7332, C 6726/6726/90. About Gjirokastër
region see The Greek Community of Gjirokastër to the Greek prefect of Corfu, 17 February 1921. GFO 1921,
A/5, no. 401 – 22 in Kondis, The Hellenism, vol. 2, pp. 298 – 299. John Spyromelios, notable of the town of
Himarë, to the prefect of Corfu, 22 February 1921. GFO 1921, A/5, no. 22, in ibid., p. 301. Cassavetes to
Drummond, Boston, 18 April 1921. FO 286/762, C 11556/4280/90.
29
Psomas, ‘Issues concerning the first political elections in Albania’, pp. 220-221.
30
Heathcote-Smith to Curzon, Durrës, 10 January 1922. FO 371/7330 and FO 141/669/10, C 818/818/90.
31
Secret Intelligence Report, Athens, 13 October 1921. FO 286/778, W 3458/3458/50, D 566, 525. Eyres to
Curzon, Durrës, 18 October 1921. FO 371/5737, C 20786/4280/90. Chargé d' Affaires in Greece to the baron
Robert Gilbert Vansittart, Curzon’s principal private secretary, Athens, 20 September 1921. FO 371/5737, C
18477/4280/90.
32
Heathcote-Smith to Curzon, Durrës, 23 November 1921. FO 286/762, C 22310/4280/90. Alexander Rizos-
Rangavis, Greek Minister in London, to Curzon, London, 24 November 1921. FO 371/5737, C 22345/4280/90.
See also the demostrations: Themistokles Bamikhas, head of the Association of Epirotes of Corfu, to the GFO
and the Embassies of the United Kingdom, the USA, Italy and France in Athens, Corfu, 27 November 1921.
Jacob of Durrës to the Ministers of the United Kingdom, the USA, Italy and France in Durrës, Corfu, 27
November 1921. Jacob of Durrës to Eyres, Corfu, 20-23 December 1921. FO 286/762, C 22270/580/90. Rizos-
Rangavis to Curzon, London, 2 December 1921. FO 371/5737, C 22820/4280/90.
33
Basil Dendramis, Greek permanent representative at the League of Nations, to Drummond, Geneva, 29
November 1921. Circulated to the Council and the members of the League, Geneva, 6 December 1921. FO
371/5737, C 23361/4280/90.
34
A convincing account of the events was presented by Cassavetes to Drummond, Boston, 18 and 22 April
1922. FO 286/762, C 11556/4280/90.
35
Eyres to Curzon, Durrës, 29 April 1921. FO 286/762, C 10079/4280/90.
36
Eyres to Curzon, Durrës, 20 April 1921. FO 371/5726, C 8178/580/90.
37
Tufton to Eyres, London, 26 May 1921. FO 286/762, C 10079/4280/90.
38
Sederholm to Drummond, ‘Report by the Commission of Enquiry on its work from 19 December 1922 to 1
February 1923: The Enquiry in Southern Albania’, pp. 9-10, Geneva, 6 April 1923. FO 371/8531, C
7811/211/30.
39
The Commission of Enquiry to the League of Nations, ‘Commission of Enquiry in Albania: Report on
Southern Albania’, p. 5. Tiranë, 18 January 1922. FO 371/7328, C 2135/735/90.
40
Joseph Swire, King Zog’s Albania (London: Robert Hale & Co., 1932), p. 16-19.
41
The Swiss Minister in London to the FO, London, 25 May 1921. FO 371/5727, C 11576/580/90.
42
Tufton to the Swiss Minister, London, 6 June 1921. FO 371/5727, C 11576/580/90.
43
Brendan Simms, ‘Temperley, Harold William Vazeille (1879–1939)’, Oxford Dictionary of National
Biography available at http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/36449?docPos=1 accessed on 18 March 2014.
See also Austin, Founding a Balkan State, pp. 23-24.
44
From Aubrey Herbert we get scattered information for Eden’s activities in Albania in July-August 1918.
Destani & Tomes, Albania’s Greatest Friend, pp. 240-241, 246.
23
45
Beytullah Destani (ed.), M. Edith Durham, Albania and the Albanians: Selected Articles and Letters, 1903 -
1944 (London: Centre for Albanian Studies, 2001), pp. 88, 131, 205.
46
Destani & Tomes, Albania’s Greatest Friend, p. 304, n. 110. Aubrey Herbert considered this an unfortunate
event that prevented Britain from getting direct information on the area and its issues.
47
See Temperley’s report, London, 3 June 1921. FO 371/5727, C 11576/580/90.
48
British Intelligence Secret Report, ‘Present Attitude of the Orthodox Population of Southern Albania’, FO
608/29 in Beytullah Destani (ed.), Albania and Kosovo: Political and Ethnic Boundaries, 1867 – 1946 (London:
Archive Editions, 1999), pp. 433 – 439.
49
Ibid., pp. 433 – 437.
50
Ibid., pp. 438 – 439.
51
Destani & Tomes, Albania’s Greatest Friend, p. 275.
52
Ibid., p. 340.
53
Morton F. Eden, Albania: Its Discontents and their Origin (London: J. Lovejoy & Son, [1920]), esp. pp. 5-8,
10-13, 16-19, 22-23.
54
Ibid., p. 16.
55
Heathcote-Smith to Curzon, p. 2, Durrës, 2 January 1922. FO 371/7328, C 506/506/90. See also Psomas, ‘The
Religious and ethnographic synthesis’, pp. 268 – 269. In Heathcote-Smith’s categorization Eden’s ‘indifferent’
Orthodox Albanians are branded ‘moderate’.
56
Eden, Albania, p. 15.
57
Eyres to Curzon, Annual Report about Albania, p. 3, Durrës, 1 May 1922. FO 371/7332, C 6726/6726/90.
58
An Australian [Morton F. Eden], Albania and Its Neighbours (London, 1921).
59
Destani, M. Edith Durham, p. 205. See also Joseph Swire, Albania: The Rise of a Kingdom (New York, NY:
The Times, 19712), p. 281.
60
Austin, Founding a Balkan State, p. 19. Destani & Tomes, Albania’s Greatest Friend, p. 275.
61
Destani & Tomes, Albania’s Greatest Friend, p. 325.
62
Austin, Founding a Balkan State, pp. 23-24. Nicolson had expressed similar views in 1919 and this was the
view of the British and the Americans at the Paris Peace Conference. Pearson, Albania in the Twentieth Century,
pp. 120, 126, 130.
63
Destani & Tomes, Albania’s Greatest Friend, p. 327.
24