ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs.

JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs
just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or
Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of
filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated
January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in
the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90
days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the
framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have
easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in
Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and
that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the
President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from
“political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent
qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which
the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the
process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could
only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course,
whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision
of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the
short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice)
within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon
his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme
Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or
in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the
power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies
only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between
Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the
framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article
VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
Facts:

In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for
the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and
perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former
President Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political
rights.

In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None
of the disqualification cases against him prospered but he only placed second in the
results.

In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate
of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City
of Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before

the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of
his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC). 

The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President
Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon
vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.

Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who
garnered the second highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for
the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed
as Mayor of Manila.

Issue:

May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been
convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office?

Held:

Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the
focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise
unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable,
objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the
same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. 
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted
by former President Estrada does not actually specify which political right is
restored, it could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately
intend to restore former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public
office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even
if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s
text.

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative

action.

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article
IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant
pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this

Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and

remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of

all the Members of the Congress.

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of

election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the

favorable recommendation of the Commission.

It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in
which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment
cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases
involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no
favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued
that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning
power of the President.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada
shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory
penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties
that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the
pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the
LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of
the absolute pardon granted to him

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded
in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the
prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision
allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after
conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to
run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position.

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the
pardon conditional.

Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e.,
"[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate
against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek
public elective office have been restored.

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or
limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as
being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of
an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form
part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative
language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral
part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to
make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the
fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an

introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and
obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its
text.

If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on

Respondent’s promise never to seek a public office again, the former ought to have
explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President
Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is
constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a
condition to the pardon extended to former President Estrada. (Risos-Vidal vs.
Comelec,  G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015)
I. SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE
2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation of
beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by
each implementing agency: PROVIDED, That preference shall be given to
projects located in the 4th to 6th class municipalities or indigents identified
under the MHTS-PR by the DSWD. For this purpose, the implementing agency
shall submit to Congress said priority list, standard or design within ninety (90)
days from effectivity of this Act.

All programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and

scholarships, identified by a member of the House of Representatives outside of
his/her legislative district shall have the written concurrence of the member of
the House of Representatives of the recipient or beneficiary legislative district,
endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

3. Legislator’s Allocation. The Total amount of projects to be identified by

legislators shall be as follows:

a. For Congressional District or Party-List Representative: Thirty Million Pesos

(P30,000,000) for soft programs and projects listed under Item A and Forty
Million Pesos (P40,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed under Item B, the
purposes of which are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1; and

b. For Senators: One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for soft programs and
projects listed under Item A and One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for
infrastructure projects listed under Item B, the purposes of which are in the
project menu of Special Provision No. 1.

Subject to the approved fiscal program for the year and applicable Special
Provisions on the use and release of fund, only fifty percent (50%) of the
foregoing amounts may be released in the first semester and the remaining fifty
percent (50%) may be released in the second semester.

4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed once.
The Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local
Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare
and Development and Trade and Industry are also authorized to approve
realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received
from this Fund, subject to the following: (i) for infrastructure projects,
realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project category as
the original project; (ii) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the
original project/scope of work; and (iii) request is with the concurrence of the
legislator concerned. The DBM must be informed in writing of any realignment
within five (5) calendar days from approval thereof: PROVIDED, That any
realignment under this Fund shall be limited within the same classification of
soft or hard programs/projects listed under Special Provision 1 hereof:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of realignments, modifications and revisions
of projects to be implemented by LGUs, the LGU concerned shall certify that the
cash has not yet been disbursed and the funds have been deposited back to the
BTr.

Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification shall be

submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee
on Finance, for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency,
as the case may be.

5. Release of Funds. All request for release of funds shall be supported by the
documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by
the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance,
as the case may be. Funds shall be released to the implementing agencies
subject to the conditions under Special Provision No. 1 and the limits prescribed
under Special Provision No. 3.

II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, HELD AND RATIO

A. Congressional Pork Barrel
WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
to it are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on…

1.) …separation of powers

YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment

authority (a) to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations; (b) and in the areas of fund release and
realignment. Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to
participate in “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” violating the
separation of powers principle. That the said authority is treated as merely
recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law.
Informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the
proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the
same unconstitutional treatment.
2.) …non-delegability of legislative power

YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since

legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power
of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress.
3.) …checks and balances

YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as
a collective allocation limit. Legislators make intermediate appropriations of the
PDAF only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law. Thus,
actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the
General Appropriations Bill and are thus put into effect without veto
consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification
budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget” which
subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs
the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President
is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF
allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or
may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole
PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF
Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of
P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple
purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions, assistance to
indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood
control, etc). This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual
amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and,
therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to
the President’s power of item veto.

4.) …accountability

YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said

legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be
checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this very
same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any office of
the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act
on account of his office.” Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases
of project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage
of their own office.
However, the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator’s
control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetrate himself in office. This
is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-
case basis.
Also, while it is possible that the close operational proximity between
legislators and the Executive department, through the former’s post-enactment
participation, may affect the process of  impeachment, this matter largely
borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel
System’s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial
assessment.

5.) …political dynasties

NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-

executing due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” Therefore,
since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on
political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this
issue. In any event, the above-stated argument on this score is largely
speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel
System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
6.) …local autonomy

YES.  The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually
belies the avowed intention of “making equal the unequal.” The gauge of PDAF
and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking
into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator
represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-
urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
“underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny
is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even
the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from
the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the
CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development
Councils (LDCs), instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared
towards managing local affairs. The programs, policies and resolutions of LDCs
should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are
national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a
body.
B. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”
WON the following phrases are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue
delegations of legislative power:
(a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”
under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund:  The phrase “and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD
910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power as it does not lay down
a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s
authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be
used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him
to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
(b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance
the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the
Presidential Social Fund

Regarding the Presidential Social Fund:  Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by

PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used “to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects”. This gives him carte
blancheauthority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so
determine as a “priority”. The law does not supply a definition of “priority
infrastructure development projects” and hence, leaves the President without
any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one
of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the said term could
pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects” must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar
to Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient
standard of the delegating law.